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#### The aff reduces class analysis to a "one of many" in difference politics - this rhetorical strategy ignores the structural productions of the very forces they criticize.

-Plurality

-Social Production of Difference

-Relations of Production b4 Discourse

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

Eager to take a wide detour around political economy, post-Marxists tend to assume that the principal political points of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world must necessarily be ‘cultural.’ As such, most, but not all post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ which is largely premised on uncovering relations of power that reside in the arrangement and deployment of subjectivity in cultural and ideological practices (cf. Jordan & Weedon, 1995). Advocates of 'difference’ politics therefore posit their ideas as bold steps forward in advancing the interests of those historically marginalized by ‘dominant’ social and cultural narratives. There is no doubt that post-Marxism has advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power within the processes of representation and that it remains useful in adumbrating the formation of subjectivity and its expressive dimensions as well as complementing our understandings of the relationships between ‘difference,’ language, and cultural conﬁgurations. However, post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations and the machinations of capitalist social organization. In some instances, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized;’ in others, class is summoned only as part of the triumvirate of ‘race, class, and gender’ in which class is reduced to merely another form of ‘difference.’ Enamored with the ‘cultural’ and seemingly blind to the ‘economic,’ the rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have also prevented them from considering the stark reality of contemporary class conditions under global capitalism. As we hope to show, the radical displacement of class analysis in contemporary theoretical narratives and the concomitant decentering of capitalism, the anointing of ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct, and the ‘culturalization’ of politics, have had detrimental effects on ‘left’ theory and practice. Reconceptualizing ‘Difference’ The manner in which ‘difference’ has been taken up within ‘post-al’ frameworks has tended to stress its cultural dimensions while marginalizing and, in some cases, completely ignoring the economic and material dimensions of difference. This posturing has been quite evident in many ‘post-al’ theories of ‘race’ and in the realm of ‘ludic’1 cultural studies that have valorized an account of difference—particularly ‘racial difference’—in almost exclusively ‘superstructuralist’ terms (Sahay, 1998). But this treatment of ‘difference’ and claims about ‘the “relative autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a reduction and distortion of Marxian class analysis’ which ‘involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism.’ The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the ‘view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ideological the superstructure.’ It is then ‘relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic base does not cause the political/cultural/ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but relatively autonomous or autonomous causal categories’ (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations the ‘cultural’ is treated as a separate and autonomous sphere, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, many of these ‘culturalist’ narratives have produced autonomist and reiﬁed conceptualizations of difference which ‘far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference’ have, in effect, reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with (negotiated) on a discursive level without a fundamental change in the relations of production’ (Sahay, 1998). At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that arguing that ‘culture’ is generally conditioned/shaped by material forces does not reinscribe the simplistic and presumably ‘deterministic**’** base/superstructure metaphor **which** has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. Rather, we invoke Marx’s own writings from both the Grundrisse and Capital in which he contends that there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. This emphasizes Marx’s understanding of capitalism and capital as a ‘social’ relation—one which stresses the interpenetration of these categories, the realities which they reﬂect, and one which therefore offers a uniﬁed and dialectical analysis of history, ideology, culture, politics, economics and society (see also Marx, 1972, 1976, 1977).2 Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ and ‘representational’ politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation and struggle. We readily acknowledge the signiﬁcance of contemporary theorizations that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of ‘difference’ that have historically been denigrated. This has undoubtedly been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities. However, they have also tended to redeﬁne politics as a signifying activity generally conﬁned to the realm of ‘representation’ while displacing a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the material sources of political and economic marginalization. In their rush to avoid the ‘capital’ sin of ‘economism,’ many post-Marxists (who often ignore their own class privilege) have fallen prey to an ahistorical form of culturalism which holds, among other things, that cultural struggles external to class organizing provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics.3 In many respects, this posturing, has yielded an ‘intellectual pseudopolitics’ that has served to empower ‘the theorist while explicitly disempowering’ real citizens (Turner, 1994, p. 410). We do not discount concerns over representation; rather our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference and representation in the cultural realm. While space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point, we contend that culturalist arguments are deeply problematic both in terms of their penchant for de-emphasizing the totalizing (yes totalizing!) power and function of capital and for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish the centrality of class. In a proper historical materialist account, ‘culture’ is not the ‘other’ of class but, rather, constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class rule in different contexts.4 ‘Post-al’ theorizations of ‘difference’ circumvent and undermine any systematic knowledge of the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation and capitalist social relations. We therefore believe that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize ‘difference’ by drawing upon Marx’s materialist and historical formulations. ‘Difference’ needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. We need to acknowledge that ‘otherness’ and/or difference is not something that passively happens, but, rather, is actively produced. In other words, since systems of differences almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in speciﬁc contexts. Drawing upon the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle our categorical approaches to both class and difference, for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies in the situation of our politics—that it was absurd to ‘choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will and historical or structural determination.’ In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see ‘difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics’ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies). Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (1) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (2) the meanings that get attached to categories of difference; and (3) how differences are produced out of, and lived within speciﬁc historical formations.5 Moreover, it presents a challenge to those theorizations that work to consolidate ‘identitarian’ understandings of difference based exclusively on questions of cultural or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). In this regard, much of what is called the ‘politics of difference’ is little more than a demand for inclusion into the club of representation —a posture which reinscribes a neo-liberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free-market capitalism. In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their ‘different’ cultural goods. What advocates of this approach fail to address is that the forces of diversity and difference are allowed to ﬂourish provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism of difference politics (including those based on ‘race’) cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices, and cannot capture the ways in which various manifestations of oppression are intimately connected to the central dynamics of capitalist exploitation. An historical materialist approach understands that categories of ‘difference’ are social/political constructs that are often encoded in dominant ideological formations and that they often play a role in ‘moral’ and ‘legal’ state-mediated forms of ruling. It also acknowledges the ‘material’ force of ideologies—particularly racist ideologies—that assign separate cultural and/or biological essences to different segments of the population which, in turn, serve to reinforce and rationalize existing relations of power. But more than this, an historical materialist understanding foregrounds the manner in which ‘difference’ is central to the exploitative production/ reproduction dialectic of capital, its labor organization and processes, and in the way labor is valued and renumerated.

#### Capitalism results in incalculable atrocities - this violence outweighs.

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23 JF)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers**).** An estimated two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

#### Our alternative is to return the priority of political contestation to class. The aim of our alternative makes the production of social relations, capitalism and class, the starting point for resistance and criticism.

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

The real problem is the internal or dialectical relation that exists between capital and labor within the capitalist production process itself—a social relation in which capitalism is intransigently rooted. This social relation—essential to the production of abstract labor—deals with how already existing value is preserved and new value (surplus value) is created (Allman, 2001). If, for example, the process of actual exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value is to be seen as a state of constant manipulation and as a realization process of concrete labor in actual labor time—within a given cost-production system and a labor market—we cannot underestimate the ways in which ‘difference’ (racial as well as gender difference) is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital. It is this relationship that is mainly responsible for the inequitable and unjust distribution of resources. A deepened understanding of this phenomenon is essential for understanding the emergence of an acutely polarized labor market and the fact that disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). ‘Difference’ in the era of global capitalism is crucial to the workings, movements and proﬁt levels of multinational corporations but those types of complex relations cannot be mapped out by using truncated post-Marxist, culturalist conceptualizations of ‘difference.’ To sever issues of ‘difference’ from class conveniently draws attention away from the crucially important ways in which ‘people of color’ (and, more speciﬁcally, ‘women of color’) provide capital with its superexploited labor pools—a phenomenon that is on the rise all over the world. Most social relations constitutive of racialized differences are considerably shaped by the relations of production and there is undoubtedly a racialized and gendered division of labor whose severity and function vary depending on where one is situated in the capitalist global economy (Meyerson, 2000).6 In stating this, we need to include an important caveat that differentiates our approach from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet which can sound, to the uninitiated, both radical and vaguely Marxian. It is not. Race, class and gender, while they invariably intersect and interact, are not co-primary. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ On the surface the triplet may be convincing—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—but this ‘is grossly misleading’ for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’ (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘class’ is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical, social dimension or treated solely as a cultural phenomenon—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is transformed from an economic and, indeed, social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely signiﬁes a ‘subject position.’ Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class. As a result, many post-Marxists have also stripped the idea of class of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status as a universal form of exploitation whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely the priority given to different categories of what he calls ‘dominative splitting’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time, then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential signiﬁcance, Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. The question of what has political priority, however, would depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and, while this would certainly depend upon the preceding categories, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. As to the question of which split sets into motion all of the others, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, ﬁrst of all, because class is an essentially (hu)man-made category, without root in even a mystiﬁed biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signiﬁes one side of a larger ﬁgure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124) Contrary to what many have claimed, Marxist theory does not relegate categories of ‘difference’ to the conceptual mausoleum; rather, it has sought to reanimate these categories by interrogating how they are refracted through material relations of power and privilege and linked to relations of production. Moreover, it has emphasized and insisted that the wider political and economic system in which they are embedded needs to be thoroughly understood in all its complexity. Indeed, Marx made clear how constructions of race and ethnicity ‘are implicated in the circulation process of variable capital.’ To the extent that ‘gender, race, and ethnicity are all understood as social constructions rather than as essentialist categories’ the effect of exploring their insertion into the ‘circulation of variable capital (including positioning within the internal heterogeneity of collective labor and hence, within the division of labor and the class system)’ must be interpreted as a ‘powerful force reconstructing them in distinctly capitalist ways’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 106). Unlike contemporary narratives which tend to focus on one or another form of oppression, the irrefragable power of historical materialism resides in its ability to reveal (1) how forms of oppression based on categories of difference do not possess relative autonomy from class relations but rather constitute the ways in which oppression is lived/experienced within a class-based system; and (2) how all forms of social oppression function within an overarching capitalist system. This framework must be further distinguished from those that invoke the terms ‘classism’ and/or ‘class elitism’ to (ostensibly) foreground the idea that ‘class matters’ (cf. hooks, 2000) since we agree with Gimenez (2001, p. 24) that ‘class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.’ Rather, class denotes ‘exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production.’ To marginalize such a conceptualization of class is to conﬂate an individual’s objective location in the intersection of structures of inequality with people’s subjective understandings of who they really are based on their ‘experiences.’ Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent, and solely individual. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, can easily become an isolated ‘difference’ prison unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach. Having a concept of class helps us to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender … [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19) A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of ‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality ‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the actual structure of power and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. This, of course, does not imply that we ignore racism and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that ‘race’ doesn’t explain racism and forms of racial oppression. Those relations are best understood within the context of class rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but that compels us to forge a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails (among other things) moving beyond the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘race’ as the dominant prisms for understanding exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. Our position is one that attempts to link practices of racial oppression to the central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society in order to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully.7

#### We must have fidelity toward communism, not refusal.

Badiou 10 - Professor at European Graduate School (Alain Badiou, “The Idea of Communism,” pages 245-260)

So we can now return to our subject, the communist Idea. If, for an individual, an Idea is the subjective operation whereby a specific real truth is imaginarily projected into the symbolic movement of a History, we can say that an Idea presents the truth as if it were a fact. In other words, the Idea presents certain facts as symbols of the real of truth. This was how the Idea of communism allowed revolutionary politics and its parties to be inscribed in the representation of a meaning of History the inevitable outcome of which was communism. Or how it became possible to speak of a 'homeland of socialism', which amounted to symbolizing the creation of a possibility - which is fragile by definition - through the magnitude of a power. The Idea, which is an operative mediation between the real and the symbolic, always presents the individual with something that is located between the event and the fact. That is why the endless debates about the real status of the communist Idea are irresolvable. Is it a question of a regulative Idea, in Kant's sense of the term, having no real efficacy but able to set reasonable goals for our understanding? Or is it an agenda that must be carried out over time through a new post-revolutionary State's action on the world? Is it a utopia, if not a plainly dangerous, and even criminal, one? Or is it the name of Reason in History? This type of debate can never be concluded for the simple reason that the subjective operation of the Idea is not simple but complex. It involves real sequences of emancipatory politics as its essential real condition, but it also presupposes marshalling a whole range of historical facts suitable for symbolization. It does not claim (as this would amount to subjecting the truth procedure to the laws of the State) that the event and its organized political consequences are reducible to facts. But neither does it claim that the facts are unsuitable for any historical trans-scription (to make a Lacanian sort of play on words) of the distinctive characters of a truth. The Idea is a historical anchoring of everything elusive, slippery and evanescent in the becoming of a truth. But it can only be so if it admits as its O"tn real this aleatory, elusive, slippery, evanescent dimension. That is why it is incumbent upon the communist Idea to respond to the question 'Where do correct ideas come from?' the way Mao did: , 'correct ideas' (and by this I mean what constitutes the path of a truth in a situation) come from practice. 'Practice' should obviously be understood as the materialist name of the real. It would thus be appropriate to say that the Idea that symbolizes the becoming 'in truth' of correct (political) ideas in History, that is to say, the Idea of communism, therefore comes itself from the idea of practice (from the experience of the real) in the final analysis but can nevertheless not be reduced to it. This is because it is the protocol not of the existence but rather of the exposure of a truth in action. All of the foregoing explains, and to a certain extent justifies, why it was ultimately possible to go to the extreme of exposing the truths of emancipatory politics in the guise of their opposite, that is to say, in the guise of a State. Since it is a question of an (imaginary) ideological relationship between a truth procedure and historical facts, why hesitate to push this relationship to its limit? Why not say that it is a matter of a relationship between event and State? State and Revolution: that is the title of one of Lenin's most famous texts. And the State and the Event are indeed what are at stake in it. Nevertheless, Lenin, following Marx in this regard, is careful to say that the State in question after the Revolution will have to be the State of the withering away of the State, the State as organizer of the transition to the non-State. So let's say the following: The Idea of communism can project the real of a politics, subtracted as ever from the power of the State, into the figure of 'another State', provided that the subtraction lies within this subjectivating operation, in the sense that the 'other State' is also subtracted from the power of the State, hence from its own power, in so far as it is a State whose essence is to wither away. It is in this context that it is necessary to think and endorse the vital importance of proper names in all revolutionary politics. Their importance is indeed both spectacular and paradoxical. On the one hand, in effect, emancipatory politics is essentially the politics of the anonymous masses; it is the victory of those with no names,10 of those who are held in a state of colossal insignificance by the State. On the other hand, it is distinguished all along the way by proper names, which define it historically, which represent it, much more forcefully than is the case for other kinds of politics. Why is there this long series of proper names? Why this glorious Pantheon of revolutionary heroes? Why Spartacus, Thomas Muntzer, Robespierre, Toussaint Louverture, Blanqui, Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Mao, Che Guevara and so many others? The reason is that all these proper names symbolize historically - in the guise of an individual, of a pure singularity of body and thought the rare and precious network of ephemeral sequences of politics as truth. The elusive formalism of bodies-of-truth is legible here as empirical existence. In these proper names, the ordinary individual discovers glorious, distinctive individuals as the mediation for his or her own individuality, as the proof that he or she can force its finitude. The anonymous action of millions of militants, rebels, fighters, unrepresentable as such, is combined and counted as one in the simple, powerful symbol of the proper name. Thus, proper names are involved in the operation of the Idea, and the ones I just mentioned are elements of the Idea of communism at its various different stages. So let us not hesitate to say that Khrushchev's condemnation of 'the cult of personality', apropos Stalin, was misguided, and that, under the pretense of democracy, it heralded the decline of the Idea of communism that we witnessed in the ensuing decades. The political critique of Stalin and his terrorist vision of the State needed to be undertaken in a rigorous way, from the perspective of revolutionary politics itself, and Mao had begun to do as much in a number of his writings.11 Whereas Khrushchev, who was in fact defending the group that had led the Stalinist State, made no inroads whatsoever as regards this issue and, when it came to speaking of the Terror carried out under Stalin, merely offered an abstract critique of the role of proper names in political subjectivation. He himself thereby paved the way for the 'new philosophers' of reactionary humanism a decade later. Whence a very precious lesson: even though retroactive political actions may require that a given name be stripped of its symbolic function, this function as such cannot be eliminated for all that. For the Idea - and the communist Idea in particular, because it refers directly to the infinity of the people - needs the finitude of proper names. Let's recapitulate as simply as possible. A truth is the political real. History, even as a reservoir of proper names, is a symbolic place. The ideological operation of the Idea of communism is the imaginary projection of the political real into the symbolic fiction of History, including in its guise as a representation of the action of innumerable masses via the One of a proper name. The role of this Idea is to support the individual's incorporation into the discipline of a truth procedure, to authorize the individual, in his or her own eyes, to go beyond the Statist constraints of mere survival by becoming a part of the body-of-truth, or the subjectivizable body. We will now ask: why is it necessary to resort to this ambiguous operation? Why do the event and its consequences also have to be exposed in the guise of a fact - often a violent one that IS accompanied by different versions of the 'cult of personality'? What is the reason for this historical appropriation of emancipatory politics? The simplest reason is that ordinary history, the history of individual lives, is confined within the State. The history of a life, with neither decision nor choice, is in itself a part of the history of the State, whose conventional mediations are the family, work, the homeland, property, religion, customs and so forth. The heroic, but individual, projection of an exception to all the above - as is a truth procedure - also aims at being shared with everyone else; it aims to show itself to be not only an exception but also a possibility that everyone can share from now on. And that is one of the Idea's functions: to project the exception into the ordinary life of individuals, to fill what merely exists with a certain measure of the extraordinary. To convince my own immediate circle - husband or wife, neighbours and friends, colleagues - that the fantastic exception of truths in the making also exists, that we are not doomed to lives programmed by the constraints of the State. Naturally, in the final analysis, only the raw, or militant, experience of the truth procedure will compel one person or another's entry into the body of- truth. But to take him or her to the place where this experience is to be found - to make him or her a spectator of, and therefore partly a participant in, what is important for a truth the mediation of the Idea, the sharing of the Idea, are almost always required. The Idea of communism (regardless of what name it might otherwise be given, which hardly matters: no Idea is definable by its name) is what enables a truth procedure to be spoken in the impure language of the State and thereby for the lines of force by virtue of which the State prescribes what is possible and what is impossible to be shifted for a time. In this view of things, the most ordinary action is to take someone to a real political meeting, far from their home, far from their predetermined existential parameters, in a hostel of workers from Mali, for example, or at the gates of a factory. Once they have come to the place where politics is occurring, they will make a decision about whether to incorporate or withdraw. But in order for them to come to that place, the Idea and for two centuries, or perhaps since Plato, it has been the Idea of communism - must have already shifted them in the order of representations, of History and of the State. The symbol must imaginarily come to the aid of the creative flight from the real. Allegorical facts must ideologize and historicize the fragility of truth. A banal yet crucial discussion with four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that 'just ideas' come from this practically invisible practice. The fiveperson meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness. That is why the real must be exposed in a fictional structure. The second reason is that every event is a surprise. If this were not the case, it would mean that it "could have been predictable as a fact, and so would be inscribed in the History of the State, which is a contradiction in terms. The problem can thus be formulated in the following way: how can we prepare ourselves for such surprises? And this time the problem really exists, even if we are already currently militants of a previous event's consequences, even if we are included in a body of- truth. Granted, we are proposing the deployment of new possibilities. However, the event to come will tum what is still impossible, even for us, into a possibility. In order to anticipate, at least ideologically, or intellectually, the creation of new possibilities, we must have an Idea. An Idea that of course involves the newness of the possibilities that the truth procedure of which we are the militants has brought to light, which are real-possibilities, but an Idea that also involves the formal possibility of other possibilities, ones as yet unsuspected by us. An Idea is always the assertion that a new truth is historically possible. And since the forcing of the impossible into the possible occurs via subtraction from the power of the State, an Idea can be said to assert that this subtractive process is infinite: it is always formally possible that the dividing line drawn by the State between the possible and the impossible may once again be shifted, however radical its previous shifts - including the one in which we as militants are currently taking part - may have been. That is why one of the contents of the communist Idea today as opposed to the theme of communism as a goal to be attained through the work of a new State - is that the withering away of the State, while undoubtedly a principle that must be apparent in any political action (which is expressed by the formula 'politics at a distance from the State' as an obligatory refusal of any direct inclusion in the State, of any request for funding from the State, of any participation in elections, etc.), is also an infinite task, since the creation of new political truths will always shift the dividing line between Statist, hence historical, facts and the eternal consequences of an event. With this in mind, I will now conclude by turning to the contemporary inflections of the Idea of communism.12 In keeping with the current reassessment of the Idea of communism, as I mentioned, the word's function can no longer be that of an adjective, as in 'Communist Party', or 'communist regimes'. The Party-form, like that of the Socialist State, is no longer suitable for providing real support for the Idea. This problem moreover first found negative expression in two crucial events of the '60s and '70s of the last century: the Cultural Revolution in China and the amorphous entity called 'May '68' in France. Later, new political forms, all of which are of the order of politics without a party, were - and are still being tried out.13 Overall, however, the modern, so-called 'democratic' form of the bourgeois State, of which globalized capitalism is the cornerstone, can boast of having no rivals in the ideological field. For three decades now, the word 'communism' has been either totally forgotten or practically equated with criminal enterprises. That is why the subjective situation of politics has everywhere become so incoherent. Lacking the Idea, the popular masses’ confusion is inescapable. Nevertheless, there are many signs suggesting that this reactionary period is coming to an end. The historical paradox is that, in a certain way, we are closer to problems investigated in the first half of the nineteenth century than we are to those we have inherited from the twentieth. Just as in around 1840, today we are faced with an utterly cynical capitalism, which is certain that it is the only possible option for a rational organization of society. Everywhere it is implied that the poor are to blame for their own plight, that Mricans are backward, and that the future belongs either to the 'civilized' bourgeoisies of the Western world or to those who, like the Japanese, choose to follow the same path. Today, just as back then, very extensive areas of extreme poverty can be found even in the rich countries. There are outrageous, widening inequalities between countries, as well as between social classes. The subjective, political gulf between Third World farmers, the unemployed and poor wage earners in our so-called 'developed' countries, on the one hand, and the 'Western' middle classes on the other, is absolutely unbridgeable and tainted with a sort of indifference bordering on hatred. More than ever, political power, as the current economic crisis with its one single slogan of 'rescue the banks' clearly proves, is merely an agent of capitalism. Revolutionaries are divided and only weakly organized, broad sectors of working-class youth have fallen prey to nihilistic despair, the vast majority of intellectuals are servile. In contrast to all this, as isolated as Marx and his friends were at the time when the retrospectively famous Manifesto of the Communist Party came out in 1847, there are nonetheless more and more of us involved in organizing new types of political processes among the poor and working masses and in trying to find every possible way to support the re-emergent forms of the communist Idea in reality. Just as at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the victory of the communist Idea is not at issue, as it would later be, far too dangerously and dogmatically, for a whole stretch of the twentieth century. What matters first and foremost is its existence and the terms in which it is formulated. In the first place, to provide a vigorous subjective existence to the communist hypothesis is the task those of us gathered here today are attempting to accomplish in our own way. And it I insist, a thrilling task. By combining intellectual constructs, which are always global and universal, with experiments of fragments of truths, which are local and singular, yet universally transmittable, we can give new life to the communist hypothesis, or rather to the Idea of communism, in individual consciousnesses. We can usher in the third era of this Idea's existence. We can, so we must.

### Off

#### Our interpretation is that topical affirmatives must defend a restrictions on the president’s war powers authority.

#### Restrictions means prohibition on action

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Authority means “authorization” – topical affirmatives must remove the permission to act, not just regulate the President

Hohfeld,Yale Law,1919(Wesley, http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/law/HohfeldRights.htm)

Many examples of legal powers may readily be given. Thus, X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible object" has the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers, immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as abandonment; and-simultaneously and correlatively-to create in other persons privileges and powers relating to the abandoned object,-e. g., the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X has the power to transfer his interest to Y, that is to extinguish his own interest and concomitantly create in Y a new and corresponding interest. So also X has the power to create contractual obligations of various kinds. Agency cases are likewise instructive. By the use of some metaphorical expression such as the Latin, qui facit per alium, facit per se\* the true nature of agency relations is only too frequently obscured. The creation of an agency relation involves, inter alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal. That is to say, one party, P, has the power to create agency powers in another party, A,-for example, the power to convey P's property, the power to impose (so called) contractual obligations on P, the power to discharge a debt owing to P, the power to "receive" title to property so that it shall vest in P, and so forth. In passing, it may be well to observe that the term "authority," so frequently used in agency cases, is very ambiguous and slippery in its connotation. Properly employed in the present connection, the word seems to be an abstract or qualitative term corresponding to the concrete "authorization," the latter consisting of a particular group of operative facts taking place between the principal and the agent. All too often, however, the term in question is so used as to blend and confuse these operative facts with the powers and privileges thereby created in the agent. A careful discrimination in these particulars would, it is submitted, go far toward clearing up certain problems in the law of agency.

#### Violation:

#### Reasons to prefer and voting issue –

#### Limits – the plan amounts to deterrence of prez powers, not clear limitations– that’s opens a floodgate of affs that just dissuade presidential expansion of power

#### Ground – They skirt key neg ground because all DAs, Ks, and CPs like ESR, flexibility, legalism, and politics compete based off restrictions on the presidential decision-making process, not after the fact impacts

#### Topic education - The central question of this year’s topic who should have what war power authority within the three branches. The aff obfuscates this debate by avoiding questions of authority restriction.

#### Process education—this isn't a framework argument, it’s a call for specificity on debating the presidency—it’s a prior question to informed criticism

Mucher, 12 [“Malaise in the Classroom: Teaching Secondary Students about the Presidency” Stephen Mucher is assistant professor of history education in the Master of Arts in Teaching Program at Bard College, http://www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?p=7741]

Contemporary observers of secondary education have appropriately decried the startling lack of understanding most students possess of the American presidency. This critique should not be surprising. In textbooks and classrooms across the country, curriculum writers and teachers offer an abundance of disconnected facts about the nation’s distinct presidencies—the personalities, idiosyncrasies, and unique time-bound crises that give character and a simple narrative arc to each individual president. Some of these descriptions contain vital historical knowledge. Students should learn, for example, how a conflicted Lyndon Johnson pushed Congress for sweeping domestic programs against the backdrop of Vietnam or how a charismatic and effective communicator like Ronald Reagan found Cold War collaboration with Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev. But what might it mean to ask high school students to look across these and other presidencies to encourage more sophisticated forms of historical thinking? More specifically, what might teachers begin to do to promote thoughtful writing and reflection that goes beyond the respective presidencies and questions the nature of the executive office itself? And how might one teach the presidency, in Arendtian fashion, encouraging open dialogue around common texts, acknowledging the necessary uncertainty in any evolving classroom interpretation of the past, and encouraging flexibility of thought for an unpredictable future? By provocatively asking whether the president “matters,” the 2012 Hannah Arendt Conference provided an ideal setting for New York secondary teachers to explore this central pedagogical challenge in teaching the presidency. Participants in this special writing workshop, scheduled concurrently with the conference, attended conference panels and also retreated to consider innovative and focused approaches to teaching the presidency. Conference panels promoted a broader examination of the presidency than typically found in secondary curricula. A diverse and notable group of scholars urged us to consider the events and historical trends, across multiple presidencies, constraining or empowering any particular chief executive. These ideas, explored more thoroughly in the intervening writing workshops, provoked productive argument on what characteristics might define the modern American presidency. In ways both explicit and implicit, sessions pointed participants to numerous and complicated ways Congress, the judiciary, mass media, U.S. citizens, and the president relate to one another. This sweeping view of the presidency contains pedagogical potency and has a place in secondary classrooms. Thoughtful history educators should ask big questions, encourage open student inquiry, and promote civic discourse around the nature of power and the purposes of human institutions. But as educators, we also know that the aim and value of our discipline resides in place-and time-bound particulars that beg for our interpretation and ultimately build an evolving understanding of the past. Good history teaching combines big ambitious questions with careful attention to events, people, and specific contingencies. Such specifics are the building blocks of storytelling and shape the analogies students need to think through an uncertain future. Jimmy Carter’s oval office speech on July 15, 1979, describing a national “crisis of confidence” presented a unique case study for thinking about the interaction between American presidents and the populations the office is constitutionally obliged to serve. Workshop participants prepared for the conference by watching the video footage from this address and reading parts of Kevin Mattson’s history of the speech. In what quickly became known as the “Malaise Speech,” Carter attempted a more direct and personal appeal to the American people, calling for personal sacrifice and soul searching, while warning of dire consequences if the nation did not own up to its energy dependencies. After Vietnam and Watergate, Carter believed, America needed a revival that went beyond policy recommendations. His television address, after a mysterious 10-day sequestration at Camp David, took viewers through Carter’s own spiritual journey and promoted the conclsions he drew from it. Today, the Malaise Speech has come to symbolize a failed Carter presidency. He has been lampooned, for example, on The Simpsons as our most sympathetically honest and humorously ineffectual former president. In one episode, residents of Springfield cheer the unveiling of his presidential statue, emblazoned with “Malaise Forever” on the pedestal. Schools give the historical Carter even less respect. Standardized tests such as the NY Regents exam ask little if anything about his presidency. The Malaise speech is rarely mentioned in classrooms—at either the secondary or post-secondary levels. Similarly, few historians identify Carter as particularly influential, especially when compared to the leaders elected before and after him. Observers who mention his 1979 speeches are most likely footnoting a transitional narrative for an America still recovering from a turbulent Sixties and heading into a decisive conservative reaction. Indeed, workshop participants used writing to question and debate Carter’s place in history and the limited impact of the speech. But we also identified, through primary sources on the 1976 election and documents around the speech, ways for students to think expansively about the evolving relationship between a president and the people. A quick analysis of the electoral map that brought Carter into office reminded us that Carter was attempting to convince a nation that looks and behaves quite differently than today. The vast swaths of blue throughout the South and red coastal counties in New York and California are striking. Carter’s victory map can resemble an electoral photo negative to what has now become a familiar and predictable image of specific regional alignments in the Bush/Obama era. The president who was elected in 1976, thanks in large part to an electorate still largely undefined by the later rise of the Christian Right, remains an historical enigma. As an Evangelical Democrat from Georgia, with roots in both farming and nuclear physics, comfortable admitting his sins in both Sunday School and Playboy, and neither energized by or defensive about abortion or school prayer, Carter is as difficult to image today as the audience he addressed in 1979. It is similarly difficult for us to imagine the Malaise Speech ever finding a positive reception. However, this is precisely what Mattson argues. Post-speech weekend polls gave Carter’s modest popularity rating a surprisingly respectable 11-point bump. Similarly, in a year when most of the president’s earlier speeches were ignored, the White House found itself flooded with phone calls and letters, almost universally positive. The national press was mixed and several prominent columnists praised the speech. This reaction to such an unconventional address, Mattson goes on to argue, suggests that the presidency can matter. Workshop participants who attended later sessions heard Walter Russell Mead reference the ways presidents can be seen as either transformative or transactional. In many ways, the “malaise moment” could be viewed as a late term attempt by a transactional president to forge a transformational presidency. In the days leading up to the speech, Carter went into self-imposed exile, summoning spiritual advisors to his side, and encouraging administration-wide soul searching. Such an approach to leadership, admirable to some and an act of desperation to others, defies conventions and presents an odd image of presidential behavior (an idea elaborated on by conference presenter Wyatt Mason). “Malaise” was never mentioned in Carter’s speech. But his transformational aspirations are hard to miss. In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we've discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning. We've learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose. It is this process—the intellectual act of interpreting Carter and his [in]famous speech as aberrant presidential behavior—that allows teachers and their students to explore together the larger question of defining the modern presidency. And it is precisely this purposeful use of a small number of primary sources that forces students to rethink, through writing and reflection, the parameters that shape how presidents relate to their electorate. In our workshop we saw how case studies, in-depth explorations of the particulars of history, precede productive debate on whether the presidency matters. The forgotten Carter presidency can play a disproportionately impactful pedagogical role for teachers interested in exploring the modern presidency. As any high school teacher knows, students rarely bring an open interpretive lens to Clinton, Bush, or Obama. Ronald Reagan, as the first political memory for many of their parents, remains a polarizing a figure. However, few students or their parents hold strong politically consequential opinions about Carter. Most Americans, at best, continue to view him as a likable, honest, ethical man who is much more effective as an ex-president than he was as president. Workshop participants learned that the initial support Carter received after the Malaise Speech faded quickly. Mattson and some members of the administration now argue that the President lacked a plan to follow up on the goodwill he received from a nation desiring leadership. Reading Ezra Klein, we also considered the possibility that, despite all the attention educators give to presidential speeches (as primary sources that quickly encapsulate presidential visions), there is little empirical evidence that any public address really makes much of a difference. In either case, Carter’s loss 16 months later suggests that his failures of leadership both transformational and transactional. Did Carter’s speech matter? The teachers in the workshop concluded their participation by attempting to answer this question, working collaboratively to draft a brief historical account contextualizing the 1979 malaise moment. In doing so, we engaged in precisely the type of activity missing in too many secondary school classrooms today: interrogating sources, corroborating evidence, debating conflicting interpretations, paying close attention to language, and doing our best to examine our underlying assumptions about the human condition. These efforts produced some clarity, but also added complexity to our understanding of the past and led to many additional questions, both pedagogical and historical. In short, our writing and thinking during the Arendt Conference produced greater uncertainty. And that reality alone suggests that study of the presidency does indeed matter.

#### All advantages must stem from a topical plan action. Claiming advantages from juridical anarchy, the presentation of their 1ac or their scholarship is extra T. Judges can only assess the effects of topical plan action. This is key to debatability and fairness. Allowing extra topical advantages crushes competitive equity and undermines neg ground.

#### Competing interps key –key to universal understandings of the resolution. Reasonability leads to judge intervention

### Case

#### Their attempt to transform your “colonized mind” creates a pseudo-intellectual drama

Zizek 8—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)

ellipses in orig

Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas ... The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. My personal experience is that practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are gen­uinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environ­ment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identi­fication, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: "Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radi­cality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to any­thing determinate. II. From Human to Animal Rights We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth­ claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power con­ditions can this statement be uttered?" What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives, or, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "narratives" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story. The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progres­sives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to nar­rate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3

### 2NC

#### Debate is not a colony, it is a metonym for economic exploitation. The name of the game changes but economic exploitation remains the same.

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That sort of Malcolm X/blaxploitation narrative, including the insistence that Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind continue to shape Americans’ understandings of slavery, also is of a piece with a line of anti-racist argument and mobilization that asserts powerful continuities between current racial inequalities and either slavery or the Jim Crow regime. This line of argument has been most popularly condensed recently in Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, which analogizes contemporary mass incarceration to the segregationist regime. But even she, after much huffing and puffing and asserting the relation gesturally throughout the book, ultimately acknowledges that the analogy fails.37 And it would have to fail because the segregationist regime was the artifact of a particular historical and political moment in a particular social order. Moreover, the rhetorical force of the analogy with Jim Crow or slavery derives from the fact that those regimes areassociated symbolically with strong negative sanctions in the general culture because they have been vanquished. In that sense all versions of the lament that “it’s as if nothing has changed” give themselves the lie. They are effective only to the extent that things have changed significantly. The tendency to craft political critique by demanding that we fix our gaze in the rearview mirror appeals to an intellectual laziness. Marking superficial similarities with familiar images of oppression is lessmentally taxing than attempting to parse the multifarious, often contradictory dynamics and relationsthat shape racial inequality in particular and politics in general in the current moment. Assertions thatphenomena like the Jena, Louisiana, incident, the killings of James Craig Anderson and Trayvon Martin, andracial disparities in incarceration demonstrate persistence of old-school, white supremacist racismand charges that the sensibilities of Thomas Dixon and Margaret Mitchell continue to shape most Americans’ understandings of slavery do important, obfuscatory ideological work. They lay claim to a moral urgencythat, as Mahmood Mamdani argues concerning the rhetorical use of charges of genocide, enables disparaging efforts either to differentiate discrete inequalities or to generate historically specific causal accountsof them as irresponsible dodges that abet injustice by temporizing in its face.38 But more is at work here as well. Insistence on the transhistorical primacy of racism as a source of inequality is a class politics. It’sthe politics of a stratum of the professional-managerial class whose material location and interests, and thus whose ideological commitments, are bound up with parsing, interpreting and administering inequality defined in terms of disparities among ascriptively defined populations reified as groups or even cultures. In fact, much of the intellectual life of this stratum is devoted to “shoehorning into the rubric of racism all manner of inequalities that may appear statistically as racial disparities.”39 And thatproject shares capitalism’s ideological tendency to obscure race’s foundations, as well as the foundations of all such ascriptive hierarchies, in historically specific political economy. This felicitous convergence may help explain why proponents of “cultural politics” are so inclined to treat the products and production processes of the mass entertainment industry as a terrain for political struggle and debate. They don’t see the industry’s imperatives as fundamentally incompatible with the notions of a just society they seek to advance. In fact,they share its fetishization of heroes and penchant for inspirational stories of individual Overcoming. This sort of “politics of representation” is no more than an image-managementdiscourse within neoliberalism. That strains of an ersatz left imagine it to be something more marks the extent of our defeat. And then, of course, there’s that Upton Sinclair point.

#### Slavery was an economic strategy to grow crop margins, which was the comparative advantage of the Americas - this is also why slavery ended here before.

Tom **Keefer,** a member of Facing Reality, an anti-imperialist, anti-racist collective in Montreal , 20**03** http://newsocialist.org/old\_mag/magazine/39/article03.html

These large numbers of slaves and the success of the slave trade as jump starter for capitalist industrialization came from what has been called the "triangular trade"--an intensely profitable economic relationship which built up European industry while systematically deforming and underdeveloping the other economic regions involved. The Europeans would produce manufactured goods that would then be traded to ruling elites in the various African kingdoms. They in turn would use the firearms and trading goods of the Europeans to enrich themselves by capturing members of rival tribes, or the less fortunate of their own society, to sell them as slaves to the European merchants who would fill their now empty ships with slaves destined to work in the colonial plantations. On the plantations, the slaves would toil to produce expensive cash crops that could not be grown in Europe. These raw materials were then refined and sold at fantastic profit in Europe. In 1697, the tiny island of Barbados with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania combined, while by 1798, the income accruing to the British from the West Indian plantations alone was four million pounds a year, as opposed to one million pounds from the whole rest of the world. Capitalist economists of the day recognized the super profitability of slavery by noting the ease of making 100% profit on the trade, and by noting that one **African slave was as profitable as seven workers in the mainland**. Even more importantly, the profits of the slave trade were plowed back into further economic growth. Capital from the slave trade financed James Watt and the invention and production of the steam engine, while the shipping, insurance, banking, mining, and textile industries were all thoroughly integrated into the slave trade. What an analysis of the origins of modern capitalism shows is just how far the capitalist class will go to make a profit. The development of a pernicious racist ideology, spread to justify the uprooting and enslavement of millions of people to transport them across the world to fill a land whose indigenous population was massacred or worked to death, represents the beginnings of the system that George W. Bush defends as "our way of life". For revolutionaries today who seek to understand and transform capitalism and the racism encoded into its very being, it is essential to **understand how and why these systems of domination and exploitation came into being before we can hope to successfully overthrow them**.

capitalism facilitated the whitening of American immigrants for the purpose of labor-

[Robyn Wiegman](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.wichita.edu/journals/boundary/v026/26.3wiegman.html#authbio) [director of Women’s Studies and associate professor of women’s studies and English at the University of California, Irvine. She has published American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and Gender (Duke University Press, 1995)] Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity- Boundary 2 26.3 (1999) 115-150 [Project Muse]

Whiteness studies, in contrast, turns with urgency to the historical to serve as the critical construction site for constituting a postsegregationist antiracist white subject. In four regularly cited texts—Roediger’sWages of Whiteness and Towards the Abolition of Whiteness, Allen’s Invention of the White Race, and Ignatiev’s How the Irish Became White—social historians chart the effects of industrialization, and with it wage labor, on the racialization of ethnic immigrants in the nineteenth century. In doing so, they locate whiteness not in the epidermal “reality” of white skin but in complex economic and political processes and practices. Key to the demonstration of the historical construction of whiteness is the story of the Irish who left their homeland as racialized subjects of British colonial rule to become white in the course of nineteenth-century U.S. life. As W. E. B. Du Bois diagnosed nearly a century ago in Black Reconstruction, whiteness emerges as the compensatory psychological and public “wage” that enabled various groups, especially the Irish—often called the “black Irish”—to negotiate a social status simultaneously distinct from and opposed to that of the slave or ex-slave. For Roediger, this negotiation is a tragic failure of insurgent class consciousness, since much of the force behind the discursive racialization of the Irish as black arose from their large occupation of unskilled and domestic labor. “Whiteness was a way in which white workers responded to a fear of dependency on wage labor and to the necessities of capitalist work discipline.”[27](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.wichita.edu/journals/boundary/v026/26.3wiegman.html" \l "NOTE27)By paying close attention to the struggle of the Irish against the negative racialization that accompanied their lower-class status in the United States, Roediger demonstrates how “working class formation and the systematic development of a sense of whiteness went hand in hand for the U.S. white working class,” so much so, in fact, that the very meaning of worker would be implicitly understood as “white” by the end of the century.[28](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.wichita.edu/journals/boundary/v026/26.3wiegman.html" \l "NOTE28) .

We win specificity: As an intellectual and educator, you have an obligation to prepare academic spaces such as debate to be anti-capitalist.

McLaren & Rikowski 1 - \*Professor of Education, leading architect in Critical Pedagogy, \*\* Senior Lecturer in Education Studies and was Acting Head of Education Studies in the School of Education at the University of Northampton. Studies (Peter, Glenn, http://clogic.eserver.org/4-1/mclaren&rikowski.html Pedagogy for Revolution against Education for Capital: An E-dialogue on Education in Capitalism Today, January - February 2001)

Representatives of capital in business, state bureaucracies and government are fundamentally aware of the significance of education and training in terms of labor power production, though they call it 'human capital', but we know what that means! Indeed, read any UK Department of Education and Employment report of the last twenty or more years and they illustrate the intense concern regarding the quality of UK labor power. It is, of course, all wrapped up in such euphemisms or proxy concepts as 'employability', 'human capital', 'work-ready graduates', school kids who are able to 'meet industry's needs' and the like. Teachers and trainers have huge strategic importance in capitalist society: they are like 'angels of the fuel dump', or 'guardians of the flame', in that they have intimate day-to-day responsibility for generating the fuel (labor power) that generates what Marx called the 'living fire' (labor) (Marx, 1858, p.361). Their roles start to explain the intense efforts of representatives of capital in state bureaucracies, government, business and the media in attempting to control the labor of teachers and trainers. Teachers' and trainers' labor is channeled into labor power production, and increased pressures arising from competition to enhance the quality of labor power within nation states (as one response to globalization), spurs on efforts to do this. The implications are massive: control of curricula, of teacher training, of education unions, training organizations and much more. There are many means of such control, and empirical and historical investigations are important here. Letting the law of money loose (though education markets) is just one strategy. Attempts to control the processes involved is another, but increasingly both are used in tandem (though these strategies can come into conflict). So, there are strong forces at work to ensure that teachers' and trainers' labor is reconfigured on the basis of labor power production. But also, teachers and trainers are in a structural position to subvert and unsettle processes of labor power production within their orbits. Even more, they can work to enshrine alternative educational principles and practices that bring into question the constitution of society and hint at ways in which expenditure of labor power does not take a value form. This is a nightmare for representatives of capital. It is an additional factor making for the control of teachers' and trainers' labor. And this highlights, for me, the central importance of radical or critical pedagogy today, and why your work, Peter, has such momentous implications and consequences for the anti-capitalist struggles ahead. Peter: And for me, it highlights the significance of education for today's anti-capitalist movement. As you have put it, radical pedagogy and the anti-capitalist struggle are intimately related: that was also one of the messages I aimed to establish in my Che/Freire book (McLaren, 2000). Glenn: Your Che/Freire book really consolidated the relation between ant-capitalism and radical pedagogy for me. You see, Peter, when I was younger, I used to think that it would be better being in some industrial situation where the 'real action' was going on, rather than in education. However, labor power is capital's weakest link, as it is incorporated within personhood. Labor power is the commodity that generates value. And education and training are processes of labor power production. Give all this, then to be in education today is to be right at the center of the action! There is no better place to be. From other things I have said, it follows that education and training, insofar as they are involved in the production of labor power, that, in capitalism, takes the form of human capital, then they are also involved in the capitalization of humanity. Thus: a politics of human resistance is necessary first of all within education and training. These are the places that it goes on in the most forced, systematic and overt way. Radical pedagogy, therefore, is an aspect of this politics, an aspect of resisting processes within education and training that are constituted as processes of reducing humans to labor power (human capital). On this account, radical pedagogy is the hot seat in anti-capitalist struggles. The question of pedagogy is critical today, and this is where our work productively collides. You have written extensively on Pedagogy for Revolution (though also increasingly, and more directly on the critique of capitalist schooling in recent years). I have concentrated more on the negative analysis of Education for Capital, and said little about pedagogy, though I now realize its absolute importance more clearly after reading your wonderful Che Guevara, Paulo Friere, and the Pedagogy of Revolution (McLaren, 2000). Both are necessary moments within an exploration of what Paula Allman (1999) has called socially transformative praxis. My negative critique of Education for Capital exposes the centrality of the question of pedagogy, I believe. From the other direction, your work on the centrality of pedagogy for the anti-capitalist struggles calls for an exploration of the constitution of society and a negative critique of education as labor power production. This also provides an argument about the necessity of radical, transformative pedagogy as a key strategy for use in terminating the capitalization of humanity and envisioning an open future. It grounds the project of radical pedagogy; shows its necessity in capitalism today. We can contrast Education for Capital (as an aspect of the capitalization of humanity) with Pedagogy for Revolution (that transforms social relations and individuals, and seeks to curtail the horror of capital within the 'human'). I was wondering if that was how you saw it, Peter. Although we have come at things from different angles, we have arrived at the same spot. Capital is like a labyrinth. Peter: That's a good way of putting it. I think you have spelled out the connections between our work from the development within your own ideas and experience. I might see it slightly differently in some respects. I think I have a stronger notion of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis than you have in your own work, is that fair and accurate? Glenn: I think it is in the sense that is I would not place so much store by the notion of philosophy, though praxis is hugely significant for me. You may say the two go together. My Marxism was learnt largely through debates within the Conference of Socialist Economists, their journal Capital & Class, participating in the (now defunct) Revolutionary Communist Party and going to Socialist Workers Party meetings in the mid-to-late1990s, but most of all through reading Marx. Theorists such as Derek Sayer, John Holloway, Simon Clarke and Kevin Harris were very important for me, and more recently Moishe Postone and the works of Michael Neary (Neary, 1997; Neary and Taylor, 1998). But what do you think, Peter? How do you see Marxism as, for lack of a better word, a philosophy? And how does it link up with your work on pedagogy for revolution? Marx, Marxism and Method Peter: Yes, Glenn, as I see it Marxism is a philosophy of praxis. This is so in the sense that it is able to bring knowledge face-to-face with the conditions of possibility for its own embodiment in history, into contact with its own laboring bodies, into contact with its forgotten life-activity, its own chronotype or space-time co-ordinates (i.e., its constitutive outside). Knowledge, even critical knowledge, doesn't reproduce itself, for to assert this much is to deny its inherence in history, its insinuation in the social universe of production and labor. But I guess that's okay with some post-structuralists who tend to reduce history to a text anyway, as if it miraculously writes itself. Postmodern theory is built upon the idea of self-creation or the fashioning of the self. Self-creation assumes people have authorized the imperatives of their own existence, the conditions in which they form or create themselves. But Marxism teaches us that people make history within, against, and through systems of mediation already saturated by a nexus of social relations, by a force-field of conflicting values and accents, by prior conventions and practical activities that constrain the possible, that set limits to the possible. Raya Dunayevskaya (1978) describes Marxism, as I recall, as a 'theoretical expression of the instinctive strivings of the proletariat for liberation'. That pretty much captures the essence for me. Paula Allman (1999) notes that Marx's efforts were directed at exposing 'the inherent and fundamental contradictions of capitalism'. I agree with her that these contradictions are as real today as they were in Marx's time. She enjoins readers to dismiss the criticisms of Marxism as essentialist and teleological and to rely not on the perspectives of Marxists but on the writings of Marx himself. After all, Marx's works constitute a critique of relations historically specific to capitalism. We need to try to understand not only the theoretical concepts that Marx offers us, but also the manner in which Marx thinks. Glenn: It sounds as if there is a role for philosophers in the revolution then. Peter: I think the concrete, objective crisis that we live in today makes philosophy a matter of extreme urgency for all revolutionaries, as Dunayevskaya puts it. You may not be interested in philosophy, but I am sure philosophy is interested in you. Well, the specific ideologies of capitalism that frame and legitimize certain philosophical approaches and affirm some over others are interested in your compliance, perhaps that is a better way to put it. My own interest here is in developing a philosophy of praxis for educators. The key point for me is when Marx broke from the concept of theory when he wrote about the 'working day' in Capital. Here we see Marx moving from the history of theory to the history of the class struggle. The workers' struggles at the time shifted the emphasis of Marx's work. Dunayevskaya (1978) notes that 'From start to finish, Marx is concerned with the revolutionary actions of the proletariat. The concept of theory now is something unified with action. The ideal and the material became unified in his work as never before and this is captured in his struggle for a new social order in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."'

### 1NR

#### B) Education—they are also the only real net benefits to CPs that use different mechanisms like Courts, Congress, OLC, and DOD—in-depth comparisons of legal restrictions won’t take place without these DAs, which is unique

Topp & Bricker ‘10 (Sarah – prof @Trinity & Bret – U of Kansas “SUPPLYING A WELL-ROUNDED EDUCATION: A CASE FOR MANDATORY TOPIC ROTATION” http://www.cedadebate.org/cad/index.php/CAD/article/view/270/242

Mandatory topic rotation would guarantee that students achieve depth of education on a diversity of areas. Mandating a new topic area each year means that a four- year debater will have in-depth knowledge of four different areas of controversy. It is true that absent compulsory rotation, students still learn about several topic areas, but with forced rotation, there will likely be a larger variety of topics discussed. Crucially, each student will be exposed to issues relevant to foreign policy, domestic policy, and in stale education. A mandatory rotation ensures that students are exposed to a large variety of literature bases, and therefore expand their research skills. Debaters’ research skills already tend to be far ahead of their non-debate peers in college. However, some debaters can currently go their entire college career searching a database or source unrelated to domestic or legal issues. In particular, the focus on foreign policy and avoidance of legal policy has limited the research bases to which debaters are exposed. A topic rotation changes the types of databases and searches done because some databases are more relevant and useful for some topics than they are for others. The result is that students will experience and benefit from working with different interfaces and reading a variety of academic genres. Such exposure will make them more well-rounded debaters and students and better prepare them for life in the law, academia, and other professions.

#### Ignorance of strategic and tactical ends merely entrenches the status quo and denies other more progressive strategies – tactical disruptions are preferable to moral ones

Smith 2012 (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)

Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The prisoner’s dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement.For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety.

#### Procedural rules aren’t censorship or violence – they are necessary for a productive debate and the only consequence is you lose, which just incentivizes better arguments.

Armstrong 2k—Paul, Dean and Professor of Literature at Brown University, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory,” New Literature History, pg 211–223

The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codiﬁed as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more ﬂexible and openended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity. As a rule-governed but open-ended activity, play provides a model for deploying power in a nonrepressive manner that makes creativity and innovation possible not in spite of disciplinary constraints but because of them. Not all power is playful, of course, and some restrictions are more coercive than enabling. But thinking about the power of constraints on the model of rules governing play helps to explain the paradox that restrictions can be productive rather than merely repressive. Seeing constraints as structures for establishing a play-space and as guides for practices of exchange within it envisions power not necessarily and always as a force to be resisted in the interests of freedom; it allows imagining the potential for power to become a constructive social energy that can animate games of to-and-fro exchange between participants whose possibilities for self-discovery and self-expansion are enhanced by the limits shaping their interactions.

#### Procedural limits on deliberation aren’t violent or exclusionary—they are limited and reflexive because they are democratically determined by the topic process in which we all got a vote.

Glover 10—Prof of Poli Sci @ UConn, Robert, Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion, Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 36

Different theorists promote divergent conceptions of what ought to count as acceptable and legitimate forms of democratic engagement, and promote more or less stringent normative conceptions of the grounds for exclusion and de-legitimization. One of the most novel approaches to this question is offered by agonistic pluralism, a strain of democratic theory advanced by political theorists such as William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and James Tully. Agonistic pluralism, or simply agonism, is a theory of democracy rooted in the ancient Greek notion of the agon, a public struggle or contest between adversaries. While recognizing the necessity of placing restrictions upon democratic discourse, agonistic pluralists also call upon us to guard against the naturalization of such exclusion and the coercive act of power which it implies. Rather, we must treat these actions as contingent, subject to further scrutiny, critique, and re-articulation in contentious and widely inclusive democratic spaces. In so doing, agonistic pluralism offers us a novel means of approaching democratic discourse, receptive to the claims of new actors and identities while also recognizing that there must be some, albeit minimal, restrictions placed on the form that such democratic engagement takes. In short, the goal of agonists is not to ‘eradicate the use of power in social relations but to acknowledge its ineradicable nature and attempt to modify power in ways that are compatible with democratic values’. This is democracy absent the ‘final guarantee’ or the ‘definitive legitimation.’ As one recent commentator succinctly put it, agonistic pluralism forces democratic actors to ‘…relinquish all claims to finality, to happy endings…’.

#### WE have NBs to our interp

#### Switch-side debate—only our framework creates a form of education that improves critical thinking and prevents violent dogmatism.

Olbrys 6—Stephen Gencarella Olbrys (Ph.D., Indiana University, 2003) is Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Massachusetts, Dissoi Logoi, Civic Friendship, and the Politics of Education, Communication Education, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 353-369

Unlike the ABOR and Powell Memo, both of which institutionalize opposition, adaptation of dissoi logoi warrants engagement. The metaphor of balance shifts from one of equal distribution of opinions on campus to the action of keeping one’s poise, of teaching students to maintain an intellectual equilibrium through a deep understanding of their footing. The aim of practice in dissoi logoi is not simply awareness of other ideas\*often shorthand in consumer society for paying attention only to opinions one wishes to hear\*but rather the ability to reproduce them, to understand them, and to critique them all. This meets Bauerlein’s (2004) call for adversarial voices in higher education but also moves to internalize that process as a productive friction for the development of an individual’s intellect and character rather than simply externalize it through the establishment of a spokesperson marketplace; as such, this practice would place an onus on the student to take responsibility for their own education as a site of productive friction and on the professor for encouraging such responsibility and reflexivity. Judicious adaptation of dissoi logoi is thus necessary to combat the political divisiveness and enclaves ultimately encouraged by the Powell Memo and ABOR. ¶ A thorough historical understanding of the Sophistic movement and early conceptualizations of democracy would benefit students in several ways. First, it provides ample preparation to argue one’s opinion eloquently. This is the closest sense to the Sophists’ notion, a way to influence the polity through oratorical finesse; the (ancient) metaphor here is a ‘‘throw,’’ the learned ability to parry an opponent in wrestling. Second, practice in dissoi logoi encourages the ethical appreciation of other positions, which in turn creates an empathy counter to the prevalent politics of ideological piety aiming for annihilation of differing opinions. A prochoice student assuming an anti-abortion role could not, for example, merely assert ‘‘I want to dominate women,’’ just as a anti-abortion student could not simply declare in opposition, ‘‘I want to kill babies.’’ Both would have to conduct considerable research to argue the contrary claim. Third, dissoi logoi in the curriculum places intellectual pressure on student ideologues of any persuasion, including those uncommitted to general education. Fourth, the responsibility to understand multiple perspectives activates an integrative approach to education (cf. Gayle, 2004). Earnest performances of dissoi logoi demand importing concepts, information, and experiences from other classes, while at the same time providing practical training for the adaptation of knowledge in nonclassroom situations. Fifth, dissoi logoi emphasizes necessary engagement with an alterity that is fundamental for the emergence of citizenship in democracy and public debate. It does not erase the significance of values\*indeed, a profitable topic for discussion could revolve around values as universals or as constructed conventions\*but locates them within historical contexts. Finally, appropriate performance of dissoi logoi affords an alternative to the shouting-matches or programmatic utterances that pass for contemporary debate; and, as a practice of listening (to others and to oneself) as much as speaking, it entails broad questions about human responsibility to other humans. In this manner, dissoi logoi aids a critical thinking marked by student involvement in their own education, but does not reduce talk in the public sphere to rational deliberation bereft of emotions or artistry. This is also a gesture to an ancient notion in which citizens learn to reach good judgments (personal and collective) by hearing various opinions on an issue.¶ Advocating the practice of dissoi logoi as an integral part of higher education will fuel criticism. Conservatives might argue against the inherent relativism implied by respect for contrary positions. Progressives might take issue with the justification for dominant order in expecting students to speak on its behalf, particularly in a classroom setting where opportunities to challenge that order are more readily available than in the ‘‘real’’ world. Both critiques are legitimate, and are related to concerns about deliberative democratic theories, notably the problems of unequal resources for expression (such as privileging particular cultural or gendered ways of speaking) and the normative approval of voicing opinion over silence. Both conservatives and progressives might call into question the definition of citizenship wrought through this practice, and assert that the other side would simply utilize dissoi logoi as a cover for indoctrination under the guise of neutrality. Likewise, they might note that intellectual exposure does not occur in a vacuum but is contingent upon outside social forces. In an era when progressivism reigns, students would be more inclined to accept progressive values, and vice versa when conservatism reigns. The problematic of detailing arguments for racist, sexist, classist, or homophobic beliefs might quickly arise as a serious concern for classroom decorum and institutional codes concerning hate and free speech, to say nothing of the unease in requiring a student to explain an opinion that they find reprehensible or for which there is no accepted widespread political value (such as fascism), but for which there exist seminal historical texts (such as Mussolini’s The Doctrine of Fascism).¶ Implementation of dissoi logoi within classroom practice is not simple. It requires an appreciation of the social contexts of education (in knowledge and in citizenship) as a kind of apprenticeship rather than as unchallenged instruction. The positions of power that distinguish students from professors would also require earnest address. While most formulations of academic freedom provide for assignments that require students to represent viewpoints with which they disagree as long as there is a reason germane to the subject matter and no hostility wrought upon the student, dissoi logoi necessitates a further step of open communication with students about the nature of pedagogy itself\*for example, its structure and aims\*if not involvement by the students in deciding upon controversies to engage, appropriate ways to assess their achievements, the possibility of conscientious objection, the shared responsibilities for safe expression, and the means to address inevitable tensions. Such a commitment also requires that professors interrogate their own pieties and practice engagement with adversaries (and the cultivation of civic friendship) themselves. Demonstration of sites of agreement and common human desires (itself a productive impiety in a world predicated on enclaves of political ideology) in tandem with respectful invitations for adversaries to present their case would not only be novel\*and thereby attractive to undergraduates\*but serve the purpose of modeling in the classroom the kind of democratic behavior hoped for outside it.¶ Before abandoning dissoi logoi as too risky or unsettling, then, let us consider the educative gains in its contentious nature. Let us assume that a class addresses terrorism from a perspective of dissoi logoi. The first topic for discussion might be whether this is even suitable for such a practice. That is, are some issues so obvious to common sense and community values that they cannot be made problematic, or so reprehensible that they should not be defended, even if hypothetically or in an attempt to understand the structure of their logic? A range of questions would follow. Beyond addressing the views on the left and the right for the causes of and responses to terrorism, would students need to discuss\*and therefore gain knowledge of\* militant fundamentalist Islam’s difference from mainstream Muslim religious practice? Should the history of Israel come into play, or European colonization of the Middle East? Should the representation of the United States in American media be juxtaposed to that on al-Jazeera? Should the United States close its borders to immigrants and keep tabs on minority communities? Should the sympathies and sensitivities of the classroom participants play in the decision to have a discussion in which all students would be responsible for voicing all opinions? All of these are important questions for serious public discussions concerning American responses to terrorism, and the pursuit of any of them requires thorough research and an abiding commitment to an active learning that challenges taken-for-granted assumptions.¶ Civic Friendship and the Question of Citizenship in Higher Education¶ Although they offer starkly different solutions, both the oppositional model of ABOR and the Powell Memo and the engagement model of dissoi logoi respond to the tyranny of any dominant ideology in higher education. Both also draw attention to the absence in contemporary American society of civic friendship as getting along with others whose opinions differ from one’s own. Discussions of civic friendship are missing from most assessments of pedagogy on either the left or the right, a lack that flatly impoverishes theories of democratic education to assist students in becoming citizens in a world predicated on pluralism and tolerance of other’s opinions.¶ Long theorized as a necessary component of healthy political order, the concept of civic friendship is itself currently in flux. Recent considerations have recognized its role in education (Blacker, 2003; Scorza, 2004) and as an antidote to what Kahane (1999) calls the politics of annihilation. These developments conceptualize civic friendship in a much different manner than do Neo-Aristotleans (who rely heavily on ancient notions of fraternity, similarity, and instrumentality), communitarians and civic republicans (who regard such bonds as a social obligation), theorists of an ethic of care (who require willing emotional capacities to embrace alterity), and traditional liberals (who locate friendship within the private sphere).¶ Blacker, for example, draws upon Rawlsian political liberalism in defining civic friendship as an expression of mutual respect and concern for democracy’s stability (Blacker, 2003, p. 249) but seeks a path that would accommodate the constitutional nonestablishment principle and the comprehensive moral groundings of religious and secular organizations in any given local community. In this model, civic friendship operates ‘‘in the service of deepening citizens’ chosen comprehensive allegiances’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 254), but also fosters exposure to the moral codes of others to assist in the understanding of democratic pluralism and to overcome mutual suspicions; public schools assist in creating contexts for discussion and interaction rather than overtly teaching specific moral orthodoxies. For Blacker, exposure to rather than sheltering from the deepest moral convictions of others (whether political, religious, or aesthetic) is the sine qua non of civic friendship, ‘‘where one develops an ability to perceive and, where appropriate, appreciate what lies beneath and behind the politics of those who agree and, most importantly, those who do not’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 261). To achieve these goals, he advocates a ‘‘school stamps’’ program for extracurricular activities and the creation of student counseling groups drawn from diverse community members. Blacker concludes with praise of civic friendship as a worthy challenge to an education that avoids controversy under the guise of decorum, and as sound pedagogical justification when ‘‘fundamentalist parents complain about environmentalist volunteers, atheist parents about clergy, and the whole lot of them about who-knows-what’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 267).¶ Blacker’s comments coincide with Scorza’s, for whom civic friendship is best modeled on Emerson’s ‘‘turbulent union,’’ a regard for one’s friend as a ‘‘beautiful enemy’’ who tempts us to become like them (Scorza, 2004, p. 95). Emerson’s political friendship opposes as anti-democratic those ‘‘conceited’’ forms of interaction that seek only to conquer rather than to learn from the other. As such, Emerson (and Scorza) posit the communicative norms of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘tenderness’’ at the root of civic friendship, meaning a coupling of a frankness and the ‘incivility’ to speak one’s mind with a respect and the civility to engage the other as a worthy equal. Like Scorza, Kahane recognizes that friendships (personal and civic) evolve, and locates a recognition of the ‘‘ongoing relationship\*not shared objective qualities or capacities’’ (Kahane, 1999, p. 269) as the basis for this practice, since such evolving commitment also permits friends to disagree and even to fight but to likewise establish limits preventing a total dissolution of the friendship. Scorza (2004, p. 91) upholds the case of Jefferson and Adams as an example of a friendship that developed over time and between fierce political rivals. Similarly for Kahane, an ongoing relationship necessitates a developing sense of a history of contact to cement a valued coformation and encourage its repeated performance in the future.¶ Blacker, Scorza, and Kahane do not declare a one-to-one correlation between personal friendship and civic friendship but do perceive politically significant structural similarities. Recognizing also that friendship cannot be imposed from authority, they all suggest that materialized opportunities for civic friendship (without long-standing artificialities or limits to communication, as installed by many versions of discourse ethics) might ignite very positive ventures for the individual’s moral development and for the improvement of democratic pluralism by fostering respect for alterity. This is not to suggest a naı¨vete´ about what leads contemporary undergraduates to establish bonds of friendship, nor to deny the massive number of influences beyond the classroom that may pull them against civic friendship with those who differ ideologically, nor to propose that higher education should unconditionally and primarily become a conduit for friendship. It is, instead, to recognize a correlation between undergraduates struggling to define themselves as citizens in a society marked by lip-service to diversity and extreme divisiveness in politics on the one hand, and the possible function of education to assist the young in becoming participants in a pluralist democracy on the other.¶ Civic friendship provides a context for the appreciation of citizenship as both a subject of intellectual inquiry and a communicative practice. In turn, the question of citizenship emerges as an apt topic for disputation within the classroom. The differences between the Powell Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact might, for example, provide a point of entry for students to examine the different configurations of citizenship within liberal democracy depending on the inflection of liberal democracy or liberal democracy. That is, all three programmatic statements suggest a correlation between ideas taught in the classroom and behaviors of matriculated students in public culture. The Powell Memo does not specifically address higher education’s role in civic education but implies such influence in the argument against radicalizing pedagogies. The actual word ‘‘citizen’’ appears infrequently in the document, but in usage reveals an intimate connection between education and citizenship. Powell claims, for example, that business executives must be ‘‘good citizens,’’ dismisses the head of the AFL-CIO as not ‘‘the most endearing or publicminded of citizens’’ from a business perspective, and justifies ‘‘citizen groups’’ who rewrite textbooks. ‘‘Citizen’’ here functions rhetorically in two ways: as a catch phrase for someone whose behavior is judged by others and as an organized political group. Given the context of the corporate mission outlined by Powell, it would be judicious to view this notion of citizenship within the lens of liberal democracy, which emphasizes particular rights (property and voting especially) and maintains a close kinship with consumer identity.¶ The language of ABOR differs from the Powell Memo in this regard, a point that would be instructive for students to recognize so as not to assume all oppositional models of education are alike. ABOR opens with a direct commentary on the mission of the university as the pursuit of truth, the discovery of new knowledge through scholarship and research, the study and reasoned criticism of intellectual and cultural traditions, the teaching and general development of students to help them become creative individuals and productive citizens of a pluralistic democracy, and the transmission of knowledge and learning to a society at large. This commitment to citizenship aligns ABOR with the aforementioned Campus Compact Presidents’ Declaration, which warrants that institutions provide students opportunities to ‘‘embrace the duties of active citizenship and civic participation’’ and to demonstrate and teach democratic principles. A cynical reading of ABOR might take its abundant mission statement as parasitic, drawing upon metaphors from the Ivory Tower and civic education to appear authentic to both. Let us assume, however, that the language of ABOR is genuine and in agreement with Campus Compact. If so, they advance a notion of citizenship as a performative mode, one that emphasizes the democratic more strongly than liberalism.¶ Drawing the distinction between these two inflections of liberal democracy\*or between those that argue higher education should have no role in the training of citizens (as Fish’s aforementioned essay does) and those that do (such as the Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact)\*is no easy task but certainly one that exists within the purview of legitimate academic exercise, especially in classes dedicated to the theory and practice of rhetoric. The nuances and multiple variations of each theme require substantial intellectual work, and any position on citizenship taken by students could be held responsible to such informed research. Yet, the students’ discussion need not terminate solely with demonstration of knowledge of the histories and trajectories of various conceptualizations of citizenship. They might also become the topic for a formidable exchange over the nature and needs of citizenship in contemporary society, and might likewise entail debate over the ‘‘best’’ kind of ‘‘education suited to the realization of citizenship’’ (Callan 2004, p. 71). In other words, through their research on the subject of citizenship, students could be encouraged towards reflexive action that asks them to debate the values they come to understand. Such a cultivation of reflexivity, performed within a context of dissoi logoi, also suggests that the question of citizenship in higher education is not left strictly to faculty and administrators to decide. Rather, students must come to terms with and take up the question of citizenship themselves. A pedagogy that encourages civic friendship provides a stable and ‘safe’ ground for this unfolding, a scaffolding into citizenship through civic friendship.¶ Conclusion¶ In the interest of all students, it is important to treat seriously the recent call for diversity in higher education by conservative critics. Analysis of the rhetorical structures of the Powell Memo and ABOR reveals, however, a similarity that justifies cause for alarm among progressive, moderate, and even libertarian educators. These texts call for higher education to be moved by degrees to serve corporate conservatism rather than the general good. Still, throughout ABOR and other calls for civic education such as Campus Compact, there arises a common exhortation for a balanced relationship between teaching knowledge and training in citizenship in public higher education. One problem inherent in oppositional models of education such as ABOR (or its progressive equivalents) is the development of a history of contact between different political traditions and moralities. ABOR and the Powell Memo establish forums for opposition, not exchange; taken to their extremes, the end result is that youth simply pen themselves into their own tribe’s enclaves and never test ideas and beliefs against alternatives. This would be a disaster in terms of student intellectual and ethical development. In contrast, an emphasis on engagement models of education such as dissoi logoi would address this absence of contact, and through them the classroom would become a site for lively disputation over public virtues and the impetus for fostering relationships predicated on respect and understanding.¶ In direct response to those who, like Fish, assert that educators ‘‘do their job,’’ I contend that training in democratic citizenship is an important part of the work of scholars in rhetoric, following a tradition that hearkens to antiquity. Adaptations ofdissoi logoi are necessary to expand the practice’s applicability for the intellectual development and civic engagement of all students in contemporary society, but such practice echoes an ancient expectation for a mixture of knowledge and oratorical display in presenting a case. This emphasis on knowledge united with rhetorical performance should satisfy those who seek the academic benefits of the Ivory Tower and those who regard public education as civic training. To require participation in this practice within the classroom would provide an antidote to the apathy permeating contemporary public culture and prevent higher education from becoming an instrument of party politics without resorting to closed enclaves of thought.¶ Both oppositional and engagement models raise the question of suitable contexts to cultivate civic friendships through which students gain a more thorough understanding of their own moral capacities and of those in others with whom they must find a way to get along in pluralist democratic society. Although there are no definitive reasons why an oppositional model could not promote civic friendship, when such opposition unfolds on campus merely as the creation of antagonist enclaves rather than opportunities for students to struggle internally and with others over political ideas that inform their social worlds and identities, the meaningfulness of the gesture of friendship is easily lost. This essay has argued that the practice of dissoi logoi more readily serves the purpose of civic friendship, particularly if it puts into play debate over the very meanings of citizenship and friendship, and the role of higher education in the cultivation of both. In this manner, all educators and students may participate in the discussion of public virtues as an intellectual and civic enterprise, and appreciate higher education as a place to interrogate everything and to take nothing for granted in the pursuit of understanding and knowledge.

#### Dogmatic decision-making causes extinction—the habits of thinking formed by switch-side debate solve every global problem.

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Popular culture offers one other myth about decision-making which is worth questioning. And that is the belief that when we make reflective decisions we carefully weigh each of our options, giving due consideration to all of them in turn, before deciding which we will adopt. Although perhaps it should be, research on human decision-making shows that this simply is not what happens.4 When seeking to explain how people decide on an option with such conviction that they stick to their decision over time and with such confidence that they act on that decision, the concept that what we do is build a Dominance Structure has been put forth. In a nutshell this theory suggests that when we settle on a particular option which is good enough we tend to elevate its merits and diminish its flaws relative to the other options. We raise it up in our minds until it becomes for us the dominant option. In this way, as our decision takes shape, we gain confidence in our choice and we feel justified in dismissing the other options, even though the objective distance between any of them and our dominant option may not be very great at all. But we become invested in our dominant option to the extent that we are able to put the other possibilities aside and act on the basis of our choice. In fact, it comes to dominate the other options in our minds so much that we are able to sustain our decision to act over a period of time, rather than going back to re-evaluate or reconsider constantly. Understanding the natural phenomenon of dominance structuring can help us appreciate why it can be so difficult for us to get others to change their minds, or why it seems that our reasons for our decisions are so much better than any of the objections which others might make to our decisions. This is not to say that we are right or wrong. Rather, this is only to observe that human beings are capable of unconsciously building up defenses around their choices which can result in the warranted or unwarranted confidence to act on the basis of those choices. Realizing the power of dominance structuring, one can only be more committed to the importance of education and critical thinking. We should do all that we can to inform ourselves fully and to reflect carefully on our choices before we make them, because we are, after all, human and we are as likely as the next person to believe that we are right and they are wrong once the dominance structure begins to be erected. Breaking through that to fix bad decisions, which is possible, can be much harder than getting things right in the first place. There are more heuristics than only those mentioned above. There is more to learn about dominance structuring as it occurs in groups as well as in individuals, and how to mitigate the problems which may arise by prematurely settling on a “good enough” option, or about how to craft educational programs or interventions which help people be more effective in their System 1 and System 2 thinking. There is much to learn about human thinking and how to optimize it in individuals of different ages; how to optimize the thinking of groups of peers and groups where organizational hierarchies influence interpersonal dynamics. And, happily, there is a lot we know today about human thinking and decision-making that we did not know a few years ago. Which brings us to the final question, “Why is critical thinking of particular value?” Let us start with you first. Why would it be of value to you to have the cognitive skills of interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self- regulation? Why would it be of value to you to learn to approach life and to approach specific concerns with the critical thinking dispositions listed above? Would you have greater success in your work? Would you get better grades? Actually the answer to the grades question, scientifically speaking, is very possibly, Yes! A study of over 1100 college students shows that scores on a college level critical thinking skills test significantly correlated with college GPA.5 It has also been shown that critical thinking skills can be learned, which suggests that as one learns them one’s GPA might well improve. In further support of this hypothesis is the significant correlation between critical thinking and reading comprehension. Improvements in the one are paralleled by improvements in the other. Now if you can read better and think better, might you not do better in your classes, learn more, and get better grades. It is, to say the least, very plausible. Learning, Critical Thinking, and Our Nation’s Future But what a limited benefit — better grades. Who really cares in the long run? Two years after college, five years out, what does GPA really mean? Right now college level technical and professional programs have a half-life of about four years, which means that the technical content is expanding so fast and changing so much that in about four years after graduation your professional training will be in serious need of renewal. So, if the only thing a college is good for is to get the entry level training and the credential needed for some job, then college would be a time-limited value. Is that the whole story? A job is a good thing, but is that what a college education is all about, getting started in a good job? Maybe some cannot see its further value, but many do. A main purpose, if not the main purpose, of the collegiate experience, at either the two-year or the four-year level, is to achieve what people have called a “liberal education.” Not liberal in the sense of a smattering of this and that for no particular purpose except to fulfill the unit requirement. But liberal in the sense of “liberating.” And who is being liberated? You! Liberated from a kind of slavery. But from whom? From professors. Actually from dependence on professors so that they no longer stand as infallible authorities delivering opinions beyond our capacity to challenge, question, and dissent. In fact, this is exactly what the professors want. They want their students to excel on their own, to go beyond what is currently known, to make their own contributions to knowledge and to society. [Being a professor is a curious job — the more effective you are as a teacher, less your students require your aid in learning.] Liberal education is about learning to learn, to think for yourself, on your own and in collaboration with others. Liberal education leads us away from naïve acceptance of authority, above self- defeating relativism, and beyond ambiguous contextualism. It culminates in principled reflective judgment. Learning critical thinking, cultivating the critical spirit, is not just a means to this end, it is part of the goal itself. People who are poor critical thinkers, who lack the dispositions and skills described, cannot be said to be liberally educated, regardless of the academic degrees they may hold. Yes, there is much more to a liberal education, than critical thinking. There is an understanding of the methods, principles, theories and ways of achieving knowledge which are proper to the different intellectual realms. There is an encounter with the cultural, artistic and spiritual dimensions of life. There is the evolution of one’s decision making to the level of principled integrity and concern for the common good and social justice. There is the realization of the ways all our lives are shaped by global as well as local political, social, psychological, economic, environmental, and physical forces. There is the growth that comes from the interaction with cultures, languages, ethnic groups, religions, nationalities, and social classes other than one’s own. There is the refinement of one’s humane sensibilities through reflection on the recurring questions of human existence, meaning, love, life and death. There is the sensitivity, appreciation and critical appraisal of all that is good and all that is bad in the human condition. As the mind awakens and matures, and the proper nurturing and educational nourishment is provided, these others central parts of a liberal education develop as well. Critical thinking plays an essential role in achieving these purposes. Any thing else? What about going beyond the individual to the community? The experts say critical thinking is fundamental to, if not essential for, “a rational and democratic society.” What might the experts mean by this? Well, how wise would democracy be if people abandoned critical thinking? Imagine an electorate that cared not for the facts, that did not wish to consider the pros and cons of the issues, or if they did, had not the brain power to do so. Imagine your life and the lives of your friends and family placed in the hands of juries and judges who let their biases and stereotypes govern their decisions, who do not attend to the evidence, who are not interested in reasoned inquiry, who do not know how to draw an inference or evaluate one. Without critical thinking people would be more easily exploited not only politically but economically. The impact of abandoning critical thinking would not be confined to the micro-economics of the household checking account. Suppose the people involved in international commerce were lacking in critical thinking skills, they would be unable to analyze and interpret the market trends, evaluate the implications of interest fluctuations, or explain the potential impact of those factors which influence large scale production and distribution of goods and materials. Suppose these people were unable to draw the proper inferences from the economic facts, or unable to properly evaluate the claims made by the unscrupulous and misinformed. In such a situation serious economic mistakes would be made. Whole sectors of the economy would become unpredictable, and large scale economic disaster would become extremely likely. So, given a society that does not value and cultivate critical thinking, we might reasonably expect that in time the judicial system and the economic system would collapse. And, in such a society, one that does not liberate its citizens by teaching them to think critically for themselves, it would be madness to advocate democratic forms of government. Is it any wonder that business and civic leaders are maybe even more interested in critical thinking than educators? Critical thinking employed by an informed citizenry is a necessary condition for the success of democratic institutions and for competitive free-market economic enterprise. These values are so important that it is in the national interest that we should try to educate all citizens so that they can learn to think critically. Not just for their own personal good, but for the good of the rest of us too. Generalizing, imagine a society, say, for example, the millions of people living in the Los Angeles basin, or in New York and along the east coast, or in Chicago, or Mexico City, Cairo, Rome, Tokyo, Baghdad, Moscow, Beijing, or Hong Kong. They are, de facto, entirely dependent upon one another, and on hundreds of thousands of other people as well for their external supplies of food and water, for their survival. Now imagine that these millions permitted their schools and colleges to stop teaching people how to think critically and effectively. Imagine that because of war, or AIDS, or famine, or religious conviction, parents could not or would not teach their children how to think critically. Imagine the social and political strife, the falling apart of fundamental systems of public safety and public health, the loss of any scientific understanding of disease control or agricultural productivity, the emergence of paramilitary gangs, strong men, and petty warlords seeking to protect themselves and their own by acquiring control over what food and resources they can and destroying those who stand in their path. Look at what has happened around the world in places devastated by economic embargoes, one-sided warfare, or the AIDS epidemic. Or, consider the problem of global warming, and how important it is for all of us to cooperate with efforts to curtail our uses of fossil fuels in order to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Consider the “cultural revolutions” undertaken by totalitarian rulers. Notice how in virtually every case absolutist and dictatorial despots seek ever more severe limitations on free expression. They label “liberal” intellectuals “dangers to society” and expel “radical” professors from teaching posts because they might “corrupt the youth.” Some use the power of their governmental or religious authority to crush not only their opposition but the moderates as well -- all in the name of maintaining the purity of their movement. They intimidate journalists and those media outlets which dare to comment “negatively” on their political and cultural goals or their heavy handed methods. The historical evidence is there for us to see what happens when schools are closed or converted from places of education to places for indoctrination. We know what happens when children are no longer being taught truth-seeking, the skills of good reasoning, or the lessons of human history and basic science: Cultures disintegrate; communities collapse; the machinery of civilization fails; massive numbers of people die; and sooner or later social and political chaos ensues. Or, imagine a media, a religious or political hegemony which cultivated, instead of critical thinking, all the opposite dispositions? Or consider if that hegemony reinforced uncritical, impulsive decision making and the “ready-shoot-aim” approach to executive action. Imagine governmental structures, administrators, and community leaders who, instead of encouraging critical thinking, were content to make knowingly irrational, illogical, prejudicial, unreflective, short-sighted, and unreasonable decisions. How long might it take for the people in this society which does not value critical thinking to be at serious risk of foolishly harming themselves and each other? In 2007 world news reports spoke of school buildings and teachers being shot terrorists and violently extreme religious zealots. Education which includes a good measure of critical thinking skills and dispositions like truth-seeking and open- mindedness, is a problem for terrorists and extremists because they want to have complete control of what people think. Their methods include indoctrination, intimidation, and the strictest authoritarian orthodoxy. In the “black-and-white” world of “us vs. them” a good education would mean that the people might begin to think for themselves. And that is something these extremists do not want.