# 1NC

## Off

**The 1AC absolves us of our symbolic responsibility to the other—the frenetic politics of the 1AC convinces us that we’re active subjects, when in reality they’ve just told a narrative of suffering for the enjoyment of everyone in the activity—we do this as a way to avoid a true confrontation with the Real**

Slavoj **Žižek 97** Director of Humanities at the Birkbeck Institute, 1997 Slavoj, *The Plague of Fantasies*, p. 113-116

At the level of elementary psychological observation, one can answer this by recalling the deep satisfaction a subject (a parent, for example) can derive from the awareness that his or her beloved daughter or son is really enjoying something; a loving parent can literally enjoy through the Other's enjoyment. However, there is a much more uncanny phenom­enon at work here: the only way really to account for the satisfaction and liberating potential of being able to enjoy through the Other – of being relieved of one's enjoyment and displacing it on to the Other – is to accept that enjoyment itself is not an immediate spontaneous state, but is sustained by a superego imperative: as Lacan emphasized again and again, the ultimate content of the superego injunction is 'Enjoy!'. In order to grasp this paradox properly, one should first elucidate the opposition between the (public symbolic) Law and the superego. The public Law 'between the lines' silently tolerates – incites, even – what its explicit text prohibits (say, adultery), while the superego injunction which ordains jouissance, through the very directness of its order, hinders the subject's access to it much more efficiently than any prohibition. Let us recall the figure of the father who advises his son on sexual exploits: if the father warns him against it, formally prohibits him from dating girls, and so on, he of course, between the lines, only propels the son to do it –to find satisfaction in violating the paternal prohibition; if, on the contrary, the father, in an obscene way, directly pushes him to 'behave like a man' and seduce girls, the actual effect of this will probably be the opposite (the son's withdrawal, shame of the obscene father, even impotence ...). Perhaps the briefest way to render the superego paradox is the injunction 'Like it or not, enjoy yourself!'. An attempt to resolve this same deadlock is the typical hysterical strategy of changing **(suspending) the symbolic link while pretending that nothing has changed in reality**: a husband, say, who divorces his wife and then continues to visit her house and the kids regularly as if nothing had happened, feeling not only as at home as before, but even more relaxed; **since the symbolic obligation to the family is broken, he can now really take it easy and enjoy it**. Against this background, it is easy to discern the liberating potential of being relieved of enjoyment: in this way, one is relieved of the monstrous duty to enjoy. On closer analysis, one would thus have to distinguish between two types of 'the Other doing (or, rather, enduring) it for me' :31 • In the case of commodity fetishism, our belief is laid upon the Other: I think I do not believe, but I believe through the Other. The gesture of criticism here consists in the assertion of identity: no, it is you who believe through the Other (in the theological whimsies of commodities, in Santa Claus ...). • In the case of a video recorder viewing and enjoying a film for me (or of the canned laughter, or of the weepers who cry and mourn for you, or of the Tibetan prayer wheel) it is the other way round: you think you enjoyed the show, but the Other did it for you. The gesture of criticism here is that, no, it was not you who laughed, it was the Other (the TV set) who did it. Is not the key to this distinction that we are dealing here with the opposition between belief and jouissance, between the Symbolic and the Real? In the case of (symbolic) belief, you disavow the identity (you do not recognize yourself in the belief which is yours); in the case of (real) jouissance, you misrecognize the decentrement in what you (mis)perceive as 'your own' jouissance. Perhaps the fundamental attitude which defines the subject is neither that of passivity nor that of autonomous activity, but precisely that of interpassivity. This interpassivity is to be opposed to the Hegelian List der Vernunft ('cunning of Reason'): in the case of the 'cunning of Reason', I am active through the other – that is, I can remain passive while the Other does it for me (like the Hegelian Idea which remains outside the conflict, letting human passions do the work for it); in the case of interpassivity, I am passive through the other – that is, I accede to the other the passive aspect (of enjoying), while I can remain actively engaged (I can continue to work in the evening, while the VCR passively enjoys for me; I can make financial arrangements for the deceased's fortune while the weepers mourn for me). **This allows us to propose the notion of false activity: you think you are active, while your true position**, as embodied in the fetish, is **passive** .... Do we not encounter something akin to this false activity in the paradox of Predestination (the very fact that things are decided in advance – that our attitude to Fate is that of a passive victim – urges us to engage ourselves in incessant frenetic activity) and in the typical strategy of the obsessional neurotic, which also involves a 'false activity': he is **frantically active in order to prevent the real thing from happening** (in a group situation in which some tension threatens to explode, the obsessional talks all the time, tells jokes, etc., in order to prevent the awkward moment of silence which would make the partici­pants aware of the underlying tension).32 The object which gives body to the surplus-enjoyment fascinates the subject, it reduces him to a passive gaze impotently gaping at the object; this relationship, of course, is experienced by the subject as something shameful, unworthy. Being directly transfixed by the object, passively submitting to its power of fascination, is ultimately unbearable: the open display of the passive attitude of 'enjoying it' somehow deprives the subject of his dignity. Interpassivity is therefore to be conceived as the primordial form of the subject's defence against jouissance: I defer jouissance to the Other who passively endures it (laughs, suffers, enjoys ...) on my behalf. In this precise sense, the effect of the subject supposed to enjoy – the gesture of transposing one's jouissance to the Other –is perhaps even more primordial than that of the 'subject supposed to know', or the 'subject supposed to believe'. Therein lies the libidinal strategy of a pervert who assumes the position of the pure instrument of the Other's jouissance: for the (male) pervert, the sexual act (coitus) involves a clear division of labour in which he reduces himself to a pure tool of woman's enjoyment; he is doing the hard work, accomplishing the active gestures, while she, in transports of ecstasy, endures it passively and stares into space .... In the course of the psychoanalytic treatment, the subject has to learn to accept directly his relationship to the object which gives body to his jouissance, bypassing the proxy who enjoys in his place, instead of him. The disavowed fundamental passivity of my being is structured in the funda­mental fantasy which, although it is a priori inaccessible to me, regulates the way I relate to jouissance. For that precise reason, it is impossible for the subject to assume his fundamental fantasy without undergoing the radical experience of 'subjective destitution': in assuming my fundamental fantasy, I take upon myself the passive kernel of my being – the kernel the distance towards which sustains my subjective activity. The substitution of the object for the subject is thus in a way even more primordial than the substitution of the signifier for the subject: if the signifier is the form of 'being active through another', the object is the form of 'being passive through another' – that is to say, the object is primordially that which suffers, endures it, for me, in my place: in short, that which enjoys for me. So what is unbearable in my encounter with the object is that in it, I see myself in the guise of a suffering object: what reduces me to a fascinated passive observer is the scene of myself passively enduring it. Far from being an excessive phenomenon which occurs only in extreme 'pathological' situations, interpassivity, in its opposition to interactivity (not in the standard sense of interacting with the' medium, but in the sense of another doing it for me, in my place), is thus the feature which defines the most elementary level, the necessary minimum, of subjectivity: in order to be an active subject, I have to get rid of – and transpose on to the other – the inert passivity which contains the density of my substantial being. In this precise sense, the opposition signifier/ object overlaps with the opposition interactivity/interpassivity: the signi­fier is interactive, it is active on my behalf, in my place, while the object is interpassive, it suffers for me. Transposing my very passive experience on to another is a much more uncanny phenomenon than that of being active through another: in interpassivity I am decentred in a much more radical way than I am in interactivity, since interpassivity deprives me of the very kernel of my substantial identity. Consequently, the basic matrix of interpassivity follows from the very notion of subject as the pure activity of (self-)positing, as the fluidity of pure Becoming, devoid of any positive, firm Being: if I am to function as pure activity, I have to externalize my (passive) Being – in short: I have to be passive through another. This inert object which 'is' my Being, in which my inert Being is externalized, is the Lacanian objet petit a. In so far as the elementary, constitutive structure of subjectivity is hysterical – in so far, that is, as hysteria is defined by the question 'What for an object am I (in the eyes of the Other, for the Other's desire)?', it confronts us with interpassivity at its purest: what the hysterical subject is unable to accept, what gives rise to an unbearable anxiety in him, is the presentiment that the Other(s) perceive him in the passivity of his Being, as an object to be exchanged, enjoyed or otherwise 'manipulated'. Therein lies the 'onto­logical axiom' of Lacanian subjectivity: the more I am active, the more I must be passive in another's place – that is to say, the more there must be another object which is passive in my place, on my behalf. (This axiom is realized in its utmost simplicity in the proverbial senior manager who, from time to time, feels compelled to visit prostitutes to be exposed to masochistic rituals and 'treated as a mere object'.) **What psychoanalysis is looking for in an active subject is precisely the fundamental fantasy which sustains his disavowed passivity.**

**Your “radical act” is really safe transgression that only maintains the very structures they criticize---ideology sustains itself by constructing spaces of false disidentification to convince us that we’re challenging it, when in reality our transgression through those forums sustains the very ideology it claims to reject**

**Stavrakakis 12** Yannis Stavrakakis, Associate Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, "SYMPOSIUM: FANTASY AND MARKETS: Beyond the Spirits of Capitalism? Prohibition, Enjoyment, and Social Change" Cardozo Law Review August, 2012 Cardozo Law Review 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 2289

If, today, the battle between austerity and spending, the return of ascetic prohibition and its clash with a faltering commanded enjoyment, is presented as a major clash between two antithetical alternatives, the type of inquiry put forward here **entitles us to ask whether this is really the case.** What if **that which appears as antithesis**, as a true ethico-political battle between competing models, and claims to mark the horizon of the possible, **conceals an extimate relation of mutual engagement** producing a single bipolar system?

My main hypothesis is that, apart from the simple case of straightforward synergy between the different dimensions on which ideological/discursive interpellations and subjective identifications operate, this system can often take the extremely sophisticated form of complex form/force articulations which then undergo a certain process of distribution or splitting - to use a Kleinian category - along a set of different axes (public/private, scene/obscene, formal/informal, visible/invisible, explicit/implicit, etc.). This (unevenly structured and **invested**) distribution very often **conceals the symbiotic relation between the two or more poles involved or produced in the process.** The emergence of an oppositional polarity **camouflages, disavows, a synergy reproducing the hegemonic structure/order**. n26

In fact, even a degree of transgression is often **implicitly encouraged by a dominant discourse** and is thus, in most cases, **reinforcing its grip.** "The persistence of any pattern of domination is always problematic" and thus in order to keep it in place both stick and carrot are required: "beatings, jailings, executions, secret understandings, bribes, warnings, concessions and, not least, how many public demonstrations of grandeur, exemplary punishment, beneficence, spiritual rectitude, and so forth?" n27 To retain its grip, every hegemonic ideology needs to take into account in advance its own failure, its own limits, and to condition [\*2298] its own (partial) transgression. Here, we see the lacking "Other," an incomplete power structure, indirectly acknowledging this lack, allowing a certain degree of dis-identification, providing a **breathing space** for its subjects, on the condition, of course, that this remains under control: "**Ideology is effective precisely by constructing a space of false disidentification**." n28 **It is impossible to capture the way a hegemonic order is reproduced without bringing to light this mutual engagement** and without **charting an alternative course** beyond the short-circuit present in such cases.

**Don’t accept their frenetic politics---a negative ballot is the only radical act, to refuse pseudo-activism, break down the symbolic, and deny them of their enjoyment at the other’s expense**

**Zizek 2** Professor of Philosophy @ Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, Slavoj, “Revolution at the Gates”, pg 167-172

The problem lies in the further implicit qualifications which can easily be discerned by a “concrete analysis of the concrete situation”, as Lenin himself would have put it. “Fidelity to the democratic consensus” means **acceptance of the present liberal**-parliamentary **consensus**, **which precludes any serious questioning of the way this liberal-democratic order is complicit in the phenomena it officially condemns**, and, of course, **any serious attempt to imagine a different sociopolitical order.** In short, it means: **say and write** whatever you like — **on condition that you do not actually question or disturb the prevailing political consensus**. Everything is allowed, solicited even, as a critical topic: the prospect of a global ecological catastrophe; violations of human rights; sexism, homophobia, anti-feminism; growing violence not only in faraway countries, but also in our own megalopolises; the gap between the First and the Third World, between rich and poor; the shattering impact of the digitalization of our daily lives ... today, there is nothing easier than to get international, state or corporate funds for a multidisciplinary research project on how to fight new forms of ethnic, religious or sexist violence. The problem is that all this occurs against the background of a fundamental Denkverbot: a **prohibition on thinking**. Today’s liberal-democratic hegemony is sustained by a kind of unwritten Denkverbot similar to the infamous Berufsverbot (prohibition on employing individuals with radical Left leanings in the state organs) in Germany in the late 1960s — the moment we show a minimal sign of engaging in political projects which aim seriously to challenge the existing order, the answer is immediately: “Benevolent as it is, this will inevitably end in a new Gulag!” The ideological function of constant references to the Holocaust, the Gulag, and more recent Third World catastrophes is thus to serve as the support of this Denkverbot by constantly reminding us how things could have been much worse: “Just look around and see for yourself what will happen if we follow your radical notions!” What we encounter here is the ultimate example of what Anna Dinerstein and Mike Neary have called the project of disutopia: “not just the temporary absence of Utopia, but the political celebration of the end of social dreams”.2 And the demand for “scientific objectivity” amounts to just another version of the same Denkverhot: the moment we seriously question the existing liberal consensus, we are accused of abandoning scientific objectivity for outdated ideological positions. This is the “Leninist” point on which one cannot and should not concede: today, **actual freedom** of thought **means** freedom **to question the prevailing liberal-democratic “post-ideological” consensus — or it means nothing**. The Right to Truth The perspective of the critique of ideology compels us to invert Wittgenstein’s “What one cannot speak about, thereof one should be silent” into “What one should not speak about, thereof one cannot remain silent”. If you want to speak about a social system, you cannot remain silent about its repressed excess. The point is not to tell the whole Truth but, precisely, to append to the (official) Whole the uneasy supplement which denounces its falsity. As Max Horkheimer put it back in the l930s: “If you don’t want to talk about capitalism, then you should keep silent about Fascism.” Fascism is the inherent “symptom” (the return of the repressed) of capitalism, the key to its “truth”, not just an external contingent deviation of its “normal” logic. And the same goes for today’s situation: those who do not want to subject liberal democracy and the flaws of its multiculturalist tolerance to critical analysis, should keep quiet about the new Rightist violence and intolerance. If we are to leave the opposition between liberal-democratic universalism and ethnic/religious fundamentalism behind, the first step is to acknowledge the existence of liberal fundamentalism: the perverse game of making a big fuss when the rights of a serial killer or a suspected war criminal are violated, while ignoring massive violations of “ordinary” people’s rights. More precisely, the politically correct stance betrays its perverse economy through its oscillation between the two extremes: either fascination with the victimized other (helpless children, raped women . . .), or a focus on the problematic other who, although criminal, and so on, also deserves protection of his human rights, because “today it’s him, tomorrow it’ll be us” (an excellent example is Noam Chomsky’s defence of a French book advocating the revisionist stance on the Holocaust). On a different level, a similar instance of the perversity of Political Correctness occurs in Denmark, where people speak ironically of the “white woman’s burden”, her ethico-political duty to have sex with immigrant workers from Third World countries — this being the final necessary step in ending their exclusion. Today, in the era of what Habermas designated as die neue Unubersichtlichkeit (the new opacity),~ our everyday experience is more mystifying than ever: modernization generates new obscurantisms; the reduction of freedom is presented to us as the dawn of new freedoms. The perception that we live in a society of free choices, in which we have to choose even our most “natural” features (ethnic or sexual identity), is the form of appearance of its very opposite: of the absence of true choices. The recent trend for “alternate reality” films, which present existing reality as one of a multitude of possible outcomes, is symptomatic of a society in which choices no longer really matter, are trivialized. The lesson of the time-warp narratives is even bleaker, since it points towards a total closure: the very attempt to avoid the predestined course of things not only leads us back to it, but actually constitutes it — from Oedipus onwards, we want to avoid A, and it is through our very detour that A realizes itself. In these circumstances, we should be especially careful not to confuse the ruling ideology with ideology which seems to dominate. More than ever, we should bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s reminder that it is not enough to ask how a certain theory (or art) positions itself with regard to social struggles — we ask how it actually functions in these very struggles. In sex, the true hegemonic attitude is not patriarchal repression, but free promiscuity; in art, provocations in the style of the notorious “Sensation” exhibitions are the norm, the example of art fully integrated into the establishment. Ayn Rand brought this logic to its conclusion, supplementing it with a kind of Hegelian twist, that is, reasserting the official ideology itself as its own greatest transgression, as in the title of one of her late non-fiction books: “Capitalism, This Unknown Ideal”, or in “top managers, America’s last endangered species”. Indeed, since the “normal” functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of the basic principle of its functioning (today’s model capitalist is someone who, after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse, etc., posing as a humanitarian), **the ultimate act of transgression is to assert this principle directly, depriving it of its humanitarian mask**. I am therefore tempted to reverse Marx’s Thesis 11: **the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and change things** (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: “What can we do against global capital?”), but to question the hegemonic **ideological co-ordinates**. In short, our historical moment is still that of Adorno: To the question “What should we do?” I can most often truly answer only with “I don’t know.” I can only try to analyse rigorously what there is. Here people reproach me: When you practise criticism, you are also obliged to say how one should make it better. To my mind, this is incontrovertibly a bourgeois preiudice. Many times in history it so happened that the very works which pursued purely theoretical goals transformed consciousness, and thereby also social reality. If, today, we follow a direct call to act, **this act will not be performed in an empty space** — **it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates**: those who “really want to do something to help people” get involved in (undoubtedly honourable) exploits like Mediecins sans frontieres, Greenpeace, feminist and anti-racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly encroach on economic territory (for example, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions, or use child labour) — they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit.6 This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity: **of doing things not in order to achieve something, but to prevent something from really** happening, really **changing**. All this frenetic humanitarian, Politically Correct, etc., activity fits the formula of “Let’s go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!”. If standard Cultural Studies criticize capitalism, they do so in the coded way that exemplifies Hollywood liberal paranoia: the enemy is “the system”, the hidden “organization”, the anti-democratic “conspiracy”, not simply capitalism and state apparatuses. The problem with this critical stance is not only that it replaces concrete social analysis with a struggle against abstract paranoiac fantasies, but that — in a typical paranoiac gesture — it unnecessarily redoubles social reality, as if there were a secret Organization behind the “visible” capitalist and state organs. What we should accept is that there is no need for a secret “organization-within-an-organization”. the “conspiracy” is already in the “visible” organization as such, in the capitalist system, in the way the political space and state apparatuses work.8 Let us take one of the hottest topics in today’s “radical” American academia: postcolonial studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, postcolonial studies tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities’ “right to narrate” their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress “otherness,” so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance towards the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance towards the “Stranger in Ourselves”, in our inability to confront what we have repressed in and of ourselves — the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudopsychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas. . . . (Why pseudo-psychoanalytic? Because the true lesson of psychoanalysis is not that the external events which fascinate and/or disturb us are just projections of our inner repressed impulses. The unbearable fact of life is that there really are disturbing events out there: there are other human beings who experience intense sexual enjoyment while we are half-impotent; there are people submitted to terrifying torture.. . . Again, the ultimate truth of psychoanalysis is not that of discovering our true Self, but **that of the traumatic encounter with an unbearable Real**.) The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that universities are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included — up to a point), but conceptual: notions of “European” critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. At a certain point, this chic becomes indistinguishable from the famous Citibank commercial in which scenes of East Asian, European, Black and American children playing is accompanied by the voice-over: “People who were once divided by a continent ... are now united by an economy” — at this concluding highpoint, of course, the children are replaced by the Citibank logo. The great majority of today’s “radical” academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with a secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play the stock market). If there is one thing they are genuinely afraid of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life-environment of the “symbolic classes” in developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when they are dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, and so on, is thus ultimately a defence against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: “Let’s talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change, **to make sure that nothing will really change**!” The journal October is typical of this: when you ask one of the editors what the title refers to, they half-confidentially indicate that it is, of course, that October — in this way, you can indulge in jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the secret assurance that you are somehow retaining a link with the radical revolutionary past.. . . With regard to this radical chic, our first gesture towards Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be one of praise: at least they play their game straight, and are honest in their acceptance of the global capitalist co-ordinates — unlike pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt an attitude of utter disdain towards the Third Way, while their own radicalism ultimately **amounts to an empty gesture which obliges no one to do anything definite**. There is, of course, a strict distinction to be made here between authentic social engagement on behalf of exploited minorities (for example, organizing illegally employed chicano field workers in California) and the multiculturalist/postcolonial “plantations of no-risk, no-fault, knock-off rebellion” which prosper in “radical” American academia. If, however, in contrast to corporate multiculturalism”, we define “critical multiculturalism” as a strategy of pointing out that “there are common forces of oppression, common strategies of exclusion, stereotyping, and stigmatizing of oppressed groups, and thus common enemies and targets of attack,” I do not see the appropriateness of the continuing use of the term “multiculturalism”, since the accent shifts here to the common struggle. In its normal accepted meaning, multiculturalism perfectly fits the logic of the global market.

## Off

**Gotta have a plan—failure to have a concrete option we can debate against guarantees that oppression continues and efforts for change backfire**

**Steve, 07** (Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation who lives in East Lansing, MI, Date Last Mod. Feb 8, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm)

What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, could be the priorities of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. In order for the most oppressed people here to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have plans and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear simple solutions to complex questions, that only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples of what we are fighting for. People can respond to examples better than unusual theory. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state or a new state.

**And, their strategy allows vague shifting which conceals weaknesses and results in manipulation that turns their impact**

**Galles, 09** [Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary\_galles/]

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one--including those proposing a "reform"--can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician's product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face "customers"--voters-- far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians' "sales pitches" for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his "solution" to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)--a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan's details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying "that was not in our proposal" or "we have no plans to do that" or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don't spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans' welfare is the criterion.

**Third, it undermines clash—it’s impossible to engage their ideas if we don’t know what they are—that clash is critical to develop strategies and test ideas which eventually result in social change**

**Branham, 95** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

In the years following his release from prison, Malcolm X honed his speaking skills through sidewalk preaching and his ministry in New York Temple No. 7 and other mosques. He gained national attention in the late 1950s through a series of public confrontations with Black clergy, civil rights leaders and the press. After complaining about the lack of coverage of the NOI in the Amsterdam News, he was given his own column in which he blasted Christian ministers as "chicken-eaters" who served "the slaveowners' church." When a delegation of prominent New York ministers protested, editor James Hicks offered them equal space in a column that would run beside Malcolm X's - a debate in print. "By the third week," Hicks recalls, "it was apparent that, by having a target, Malcolm was even more devastating. Malcolm murdered the man" (Goldman, 1973, p. 61). Hicks' rhetorical assessment was an astute one. Malcolm X was at his best when able to use the ideas of another as a foil for his own, which shone most brightly in the light generated by confrontation.

## Case

#### Rhetorical silence on whiteness preserves the invisibility of whiteness and preserves material white privilege.

What is unspoken is left as the ASSUMED norm.

**DR. CRENSHAW** Prof of Speech Comm @ Univ. Ala. **1997**

Carrie-PhD. USC; former director of debate @ Univ. of Ala.; WESTERN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION; *Resisting Whiteness’ Rhetorical Silence*; 61(3), Summer; pp. 253-278.

This analysis brings into focus several observations about how whiteness operates rhetorically and ideologically in public political discourse. First, the ideology of white privilege maintains its invisibility through rhetorical silence. Rhetorical silence protects the invisibility of whiteness because it both reflects and sustains the assumption that to be white is the “natural condition,” the assumed norm. Rhetorical silence about whiteness preserves material white privilege because it masks its existence and makes the denial of white privilege plausible. Hall argues that language is the principle medium of ideologies because ideologies are sets or chains of meaning which are located in language. However, ideologies also “work” through rhetorical silences which conceal privilege. Ideological systems are made up of both presences and absences because positively marked terms ‘signify’ “in relation to what is absent, unmarked, the unspoken, the unsayable” (Hall, “Signification” 109). In this case, the ideology of white privilege “works” through rhetorical silence about whiteness.

It is UNCONSCIONABLE to protest American wars elsewhere when there are domestic WARS of “home”. There is an UNSPOKEN “politics of assumption” that takes the PERMANENCE of domestic warfare for granted building a RAGE against this LIVING APOCALYPSE into a CREATIVE POSSIBLITY for INSURGENCY.

**RODRIGUEZ** Asst Prof @ University of California Riverside **2k8**

Dylan Rodriguez 2008 [Assistant Professor at University of California Riverside, *Abolition Now!* p.93-100]

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprecedented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto- apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis – and political possibility – for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institutionalize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, militarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant political energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home." This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the political and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spectrum of government-proctored non-profit organizations. It is in the context of the formation of the NPIC as a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and disturbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate – and accompanying unwillingness to abolish – the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crirninalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building project. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, social and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to engage in desperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars. Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politically normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of dominance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises of this condition of domestic warfare in favor of short-term, "winnable" policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tolerate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of engagement (that is, warfare)? 'this radical accountability reflects a variation on anti- colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses: Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One political move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical *dis-identification* with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive *identification* with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider “insurgency” as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive maneuvering of “resistance”). Reading a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon’s call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: “For us who are determined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood.”

#### We must focus on neo-liberalism is FUNDAMENTALLY RACED.

**ROBERTS & MAHTANI** Dpt. Of Geography and Planning Univ of Toronto **2k10**

David J. and Minelle- *Neoliberalizing Race, Racing Neoliberalism: Placing “Race” in Neoliberal Discourse*; a paper first presented in 2008 at the AAGs in Boston, MA in April; published online February 18th; ANTIPODE, Vol. 42, Issue 2; pp. 248-257, March.

[http://ccrri.ukzn.ac.za/docs/Neoliberalizing\_Race,\_Racing\_Neoliberalism\_Placing\_Race\_In\_Neoliberal\_Discourses\_.pdf](http://ccrri.ukzn.ac.za/docs/Neoliberalizing_Race%2C_Racing_Neoliberalism_Placing_Race_In_Neoliberal_Discourses_.pdf)

We concur that it is important to analyze the processes through which the ideology neoliberalism is actualized through the various policies, discourses, and social relations that make up the processes of neoliberalization in society. However, this theorization can tend to limit analyses to what we call moments of eruption of racial discrimination from processes of neoliberalization; only including race in analyses that focus on neoliberalization actually limits the understanding of the way that neoliberalism is thoroughly imbued with race. We argue that scholarship needs to do more than map how processes of neoliberalization have racialized results and instead focus the ways neoliberalism (its underlying philosophy) is fundamentally raced and actively produces racialized bodies. Paying particular attention to the racialized discourses about immigrants in a Canadian newspaper, we argue that neoliberalism works to modify the ways in which race functions. We attempt to provide a more precise theoretical backdrop for analysis of race as has been recommended by geographers (McKittrick 2006, Pulido 2000

#### Racism must be rejected in EVERY INSTANCE without surcease. It justifies atrocities, creates another and is truly the CAPITAL SIN.

MEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris 2000 Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

# 2NC

## 2NC Overview

**Their so-called subversive display is only a manifestation of our demand for enjoyment---the key to this transcendence is a negative ballot, to come to the recognition that our winning and our fun as structurally dependend upon the suffering of millions is a bad form of scholarship**

**McGowan 4** PhD from Ohio State English Department (Todd, 2004, “Introduction: Psychoanalysis after Marx”, *End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment*”, p. 192-4) MH

The problem with the school uniform movement, as well as all of the other calls for a return to prohibition, is that, as the previous chapters have sought to demonstrate, widespread disobedience is not the problem. The problem with the society of commanded enjoyment—what constitutes its danger for us—is not the enjoyment that it unleashes, but the barrier that it proves to enjoyment. Rather than being beset by disobedience and transgressive enjoyment, our society has become replete with obedience, with subjects who are wholly committed to sustaining their symbolic identity, their status within the prevailing social order. This obedience predominates precisely because it **successfully disguises itself as its opposite**—as rebellion, radicality, and difference. The most difficult obstacle to overcome today is the sense that **one is radical or subversive**, precisely because **this sensibility is so pervasive,** even among—or especially among—the most conservative subjects. In fact, **convincing subjects that they are radical has become the primary function of ideology today.** If I believe that I am already radical while I am following the dictates of the social order, I am not likely to **challenge those dictates**. Already in the nineteenth century Marx and Engels saw that life under capitalism tended to offer subjects a sense of their own freedom (i.e., their own radicality and distance from the big Other) combined with an increase in actual unfreedom. They say, “in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces.”2 The situation that Marx and Engels describe here has grown exponentially today. Existing in the isolation of her/his imaginary enclave, the contemporary subject tends to feel certain of her/his freedom and distance from the social order. Phenomenologically, today’s subject is a radical and independent subject, but this experience of radicality is the fundamental manifestation of contemporary ideology.3 It is in this way that global capitalism—the hegemonic power of our time—secures its domination throughout the world. Ironically, despite all of the claims of radicality being made today, very few call into question the functioning of global capitalism. We can see an illuminating example of the tacit acceptance of global capitalism in the docu- mentary Trekkies (1999), which chronicles the fanatical devotion that Star Trek has inspired. The film shows the extreme lengths to which people go out of love for Star Trek and all that it represents. One woman wears her Star Fleet uniform to work every day; a dentist transforms his office into a simulation of the Enterprise; and a man considers having his ears surgically altered in order to resemble those of Mr. Spock. According to these fans and the many others interviewed, there is something special about the Star Trek universe that inspires this kind of devotion.When pressed for details, they mention its fairness, its equality, its diversity, its tolerance, and its ethic of nonviolence. However, not a single fan depicted in the film, out of hundreds that are interviewed, mentions the fact that the Star Trek economy is a wholly socialist one, that this universe is so far from our prevailing capitalist one that its subjects don’t even have money. Trekkies find themselves drawn to Star Trek’s radicality— or so they claim—and yet, they completely miss the aspect of the show that most challenges our contemporary existence—its blatant rejection of capitalism as the sine qua non of modern life. Though Star Trek doesn’t hide its rejection of capitalism, Trekkies don’t see it because global capitalism has become a fundamental horizon of our thought. Though we are skeptical about the functioning of almost everything else, we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience **can we hope to break out of it.** Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it—and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. The society of enjoyment works to convince subjects that they exist outside this society, in independent isolation. It thus becomes increasingly difficult to grasp oneself within the universal. One feels and lives like an outsider. But this in no way hampers the functioning of the universal. It works through us all the more effectively insofar as we fail to recognize it. In the society of enjoyment, the most difficult task becomes **recognizing our own role as an integral part of this society**—what keeps it going. **The great temptation today lies in proclamations of one’s radicality**, expressions of a refusal to conform to the social order. But **any subversive display** today **plays in the prevailing demand for enjoyment**. The key to transcending the society of enjoyment— and the global capitalism with which it works hand-in-hand—lies in reconciling ourselves to this society, in **grasping our fundamental investment in it.** When we **recognize ourselves as the subjects of the society of enjoyment** and the subjects of global capitalism rather than as subjects existing in marginality or in isolation, **we take a leap beyond this society**. The limits of the society of enjoyment are daunting limits precisely because we cannot recognize them as such. In recognizing these limits—in recognizing the extent of our obedience— **we find a way out of this obedience**. As Hegel puts it in the Encyclopedic Logic, “No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond it.”4 The act of recognition is, at the same time, the act of transcendence. To recognize one’s failure to enjoy is already to begin to enjoy.

## 2NC Link—Armchair Activism

**The 1AC’s armchair activism make us more comfortable and therefore more invested in the political status quo---only the alternative’s complete rejection of the very political-ideological terrain of the symbolic order can solve**

**McGowan 4** PhD from Ohio State English Department (Todd, 2004, “Introduction: Psychoanalysis after Marx”, *End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment*”, p. 124-6) MH

In response to the command to enjoy, contemporary cynicism is an effort to gain distance from the functioning of power, to resist the hold that power has over us. Hence, the cynic turns inward and displays an indifference to external authorities, with the aim of self-sufficient independence. Symbolic authority—which would force the subject into a particular symbolic identity, an identity not freely chosen by the subject herself—is the explicit enemy of cynicism. To acknowledge the power of symbolic authority over one’s own subjectivity would be, in the eyes of the cynic, to acknowledge one’s failure to enjoy fully, making such an acknowledgment unacceptable. In the effort to refuse the power of this authority, one must eschew all the trappings of conformity. This is why the great Cynical philosopher Diogenes made a show of masturbating in public, a gesture that made clear to everyone that he had moved beyond the constraints of the symbolic law and that he would brook no barrier to his jouissance. By freely doing in public what others feared to do, Diogenes acted out his refusal to submit to the prohibition that others accepted. He attempted to demonstrate that the symbolic law had no absolute hold over him and that he had no investment in it. However, **seeming to be beyond the symbolic law and actually being beyond it are two** different—and, in fact, **opposed— things**, and this difference becomes especially important to recognize in the contemporary society of enjoyment. In the act of making a show of one’s indifference to the public law (in the manner of Diogenes and today’s cynical subject), one does not gain distance from that law, but **unwittingly reveals one’s investment in it**. Such a show is done for the look of the symbolic authority. The cynic stages her/his act publicly in order that symbolic authority will see it. Because it is staged in this way, we know that the cynic’s act—such as the public masturbation of Diogenes—represents a case of acting-out, rather than an authentic act, an act that suspends the functioning of symbolic authority. Acting-out always occurs on a stage, while the authentic act and authentic enjoyment—the radical break from the constraints of symbolic authority—occur unstaged, without reference to the Other’s look.9 In the History of Philosophy, Hegel makes clear the cynic’s investment in symbolic authority through his discussion of Plato’s interactions with Diogenes: In Plato’s house [Diogenes] once walked on the beautiful carpets with muddy feet, saying, “I tread on the pride of Plato.” “Yes, but with another pride,” replied Plato, as pointedly. When Diogenes stood wet through with rain, and the bystanders pitied him, Plato said, “If you wish to compassionate him, just go away. His vanity is in showing himself off and exciting surprise; it is what made him act in this way, and the reason would not exist if he were left alone.10 Though Diogenes attempts to act in a way that demonstrates his self-sufficiency, his distance from every external authority, what he attains, however, is far from self-sufficiency. As Plato’s ripostes demonstrate, **everything that the cynic does to distance himself from symbolic authority plays directly into the hands of that authority.**11 Here we see how cynicism functions symptomatically in the society of enjoyment, providing the illusion of enjoyment beyond social constraints while leaving these constraints completely intact. We don’t have to look twenty-five hundred years in the past for an example of cynicism’s hidden investment in symbolic authority: this investment is even more fully present in contemporary cynicism. It is especially clear in the cynicism of the antiauthority, discontented hacker working at a new internet company. The hacker is able to eschew all of the trappings of the traditional office labor: she/he can make her/his own hours, wear what she/he wants, listen to a walkman, and, in general, be her/his own boss. But nonetheless, this rejection of authority is wholly amenable to the functioning of the internet company. In fact, such a company thrives on it. It is not uncommon for internet companies to fire hackers when they lose their rebelliousness and become part of the corporate structure. Such companies want edgy product development that only a rebellious hacker can provide. The cynical worker works all the more effectively for the company—for the authority—in the guise of an opposition to structures of authority. Imagining her/himself as a rebel against tradition allows the hacker to become more creative, to spur the company on toward greater and greater profits. Contemporary cynicism at large works much like it does in the case of the hacker. The cynic rejects authority at the same time she/he devotes **all of her/his energies to helping it along**. The contemporary cynic’s rebellion is, in this way, not a brake upon the functioning of late capitalism, but its engine. The cynicism among subjects today thus indicates the extent to which the society of enjoyment leaves subjects bereft of the actual enjoyment that would break from the prevailing symbolic authority.

## 2NC AT: Bad

**Your wrong, not only has pscyhoanalysis changed to fit a post colonial criticm but psychoanalysis is indespinsible for postcolonial theory**

Christopher **Lane 2003** (Professor of English at Northwestern University, “Psychoanalysis and Colonialism Redux: Why Mannoni's "Prospero Complex" Still Haunts Us”, Journal of Modern Literature) p. 127-128

Although psychoanalysis and colonialism share a long and fraught history, the 1986 reprinting of Frantz Fanon's treatise Black Skin, White Masks doubtless altered the course of their relationship, promoting in some academic circles even the possibility of a lasting truce. While for years critics had disparaged Freud's notorious description of femininity as a "dark continent," using this analogy to tarnish psychoanalysis with fin-de-siècle imperial fantasies, a sea change occurred in the 1980s. **Scholars began representing psychoanalysis not as complicit with colonialism, but as indispensable to its critique**. Emily Apter credits some of this transformation to the "return of Fanon" that *began* in 1986 when Pluto Press reissued Fanon's best-known work. 3 Homi K. Bhabha's introduction renewed interest in Fanon's clinical role as a psychiatrist and his shared [End Page 127] intellectual history with Jacques Lacan. 4 Although Bhabha downplayed Fanon's 1960s status as a revolutionary icon, he insisted that Fanon's "psychoanalytic framework illuminates the 'madness' of racism, the pleasure of pain, the agonistic fantasy of political power," so **making psychoanalytic vocabulary an ally for postcolonial theory**. 5

**Psychoanalysis may be tied up in colonial history and opression but it is for that reason that it is a key stone to any post conolial criticism.**

Christopher **Lane 2003** (Professor of English at Northwestern University, “Psychoanalysis and Colonialism Redux: Why Mannoni's "Prospero Complex" Still Haunts Us”, Journal of Modern Literature) p.129-130

Viewing psychic conflicts as politically determined, Fanon sought explanations for suffering in the patient's cultural world. His 1952 account of the "North African syndrome" and late essay "Colonial War and Mental Disorders" are but two examples of his emphasis on cultural symptomatology. 13 In a similar vein (and despite his temporary rejection of Jean-Paul Sartre's critical analysis of négritude), Fanon adopted Sartre's ontological account of racial tension. But despite its emphasis on dialectical conflict, this perspective is more rigid than Mannoni's, for it locks Europeans in a category of sameness and fixes the colonized as Europe's "Other." As Fanon declared, in these now-famous words, "the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man. And conversely [le véritable Autrui du Blanc est et demeure le Noir. Et inversement]." 14 By the mid 1950s, by contrast, Mannoni tended to de-ontologize racial conflict, thereby distinguishing between prejudice and persons. He began offering a more nuanced psychoanalytic critique of colonialism, in which otherness in the broadest sense is a determinant of conflict, rather than a guise that the colonized seem to represent to those who would subject them. For Mannoni, the origins of violence need not be external, but can obtain from the power of a person's racial [End Page 129] imagos. By stressing the influence of fantasies bearing no logical or even practical influence on external reality, Mannoni alters our conception of colonial reciprocity and relationality. This is something Apter almost concedes when summarizing this debate and explaining why Fanon's wrangle with Mannoni still haunts us: Fanon's famous attack on Mannoni . . . exemplifies many of the pitfalls and virtues of conjugating race and psychoanalysis. **It shows**, on the one hand, **how suppressed colonial histories have been embedded within the conceptual apparatus of psychoanalysis, and on the other, how vital psychoanalysis remains to a nuanced understanding of dependency; whether at the micro level** (colon facing off against colonisé), **or the global level** (the politics of "dependent" nations within transnational capital flows of debt, technical know-how, and actuarial projection). 15

# 1NR

#### Must address race first, neo-liberalism is used to MASK racial inequalities.

**WARD Univ. of Illinois @ Urbana-Champaign 2k7**

Robert Anthony-; *Neoliberal Silences, Race, & The Hope of CRT*; A paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Research Association; April Draft;

<http://www.urban.illinois.edu/apa-pw/APA07/Neoliberal%20Silences_Robert%20Ward.pdf>

Neoliberalism fosters an economic theory of democracy. The idea is that democracy is commodified at the price of political liberalism, subordinating the state to the market. Highlighting the parallel between economic and political markets. Neoliberal policy in the development of charter schools does not create an “equal playing field”, in contrast, by undoing the memory of past discrimination, and unseating our historical consciousness of institutional discrimination it seeks to overlook civic values in the interest of developing commercial interests. The need through actualizing the academic function of education to place individuals in the division of labor and integrate them into the workforce (distributive and economic functions of education) takes precedent for charters and is disconnected from concepts of the social, justice, or civic responsibility. As such, colorblindness negates relationships between racial difference and power. The danger in such an ideological approach to educational policy and other implications is that the “rhetoric of color-blindness is commonly used as a pretext to continue to justify hierarchical racial divisions (Parker, 2003, 150).” Though market ideology virtually ignores notions of race, the history of racialization and discrimination in both the national and New Orleans context are implicit in every facet of the restructuring process. Through a shift in focus from individual actors or governing bodies determining school structures to the market as the primary delineator, power is “uncoupled from matters of ethics and social responsibility (Giroux, 2004, 59).” Thus, social responsibility is shifted from the state and those governing bodies onto the poor and oppressed groups and historical discriminatory policies and treatments forgotten. Under the neoliberal approach to education through charter schools, market ideology replaces longstanding social contracts that sought equality and opportunities that public schools were hoped to one day fulfill. The chartering of public education is representative of a much larger effort that is deeply ingrained in America’s racial consciousness, in whiteness, and in the new left’s attempts to position class over the legacy of racialization in America. Market ideology is the triumph of capital over politics as well as morality. It is the triumph of economic logic over all other domains of human existence, and therefore represents the end of history (Giroux 2004). The promotion of a new relationship between government and knowledge: the development of new forms of social accounting and expertise (via technological advances) to promote notions of government at a distance. The notion of educational reform for “equal educational opportunity” finds little material import and is purely ideological at best. Major criticism levied on both reform movements since the mid 1950’s and research such as the landmarks studies of the *Coleman Report* and the work of Jencks, and Bowles and Gintis are extensive in scope. Of particular interest are that reforms and research to this end were all results based with a primary focus on individualism, competition, and meritocracy. Also, the ideological stance of “equal educational opportunity” concentrates too heavily on site based reform, choosing to view schools as autonomous instead of as closely tied to the wider society of racial segregation mechanisms, the labor market, and the state itself. Finally, the too little consideration in reform language considers the question of what education is and seeks to accomplish, besides being viewed as purely functional (Burbules & Sherman 1979). This is to say that without reform addressing past discrimination by way of race and class then reform initiatives are not only still inequitable and unequal but still in fact discriminatory. Particularly through reform initiatives using market ideology, but also in discussions of educational equity in general, too little attention is paid to the fact that American public education “depends heavily on local property taxes, and inequalities in tax revenues among school districts produce inequalities in educational resources, facilities, programs, and opportunities (Walters, 2001, 44).” Whereas the federal response is for local and state governance to turn to market ideology to solve the questions of equal educational opportunities, particularly in urban districts, what ends up occurring is that the market ideology approach to education veils how racial histories accrue political, economic, and cultural weight to the power of whiteness. This occurs simply by virtue of refusal to acknowledge it. As a final point from the establishment of common schools in the early 19th century to the market approach to education in the present day, “racial inequality in educational funding and other forms of educational opportunity were explicit policies of the state throughout the country (Anderson, 2001, 35).” What the market approach to educational reform offers to Whites and the power structures driving these reforms is the belief that the concept of institutional racism have no merit. It legitimates the idea that America has achieve a “level playing field” and as such privileges in education and economic opportunities that Whites enjoy are due to individual “determination, a strong work ethic, high moral values, and a sound investment in education (Giroux, 2004).” This ideological standpoint leaves Whites and the elite free and clear, absolving them from feeling any sense of responsibility to rebuild the physical infrastructure of American schools. This task proves critical for sustaining a high-quality learning environment for those students who have been cheated from such opportunities. This leaves millions of students in need of decent facilities and educational opportunities, especially in urban areas, and in a strange twist of fate, only themselves to blame for the conditions in which they exist (Anderson, 2005, 133).”

**Only a critical race theory can center the struggle against neo-liberalism.**

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Robert Anthony-; *Neoliberal Silences, Race, & The Hope of CRT*; A paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Research Association; April Draft;

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A critical race theory (CRT) framework places race as the central unit of analysis and **attacks** liberalism and the inherent belief in the law to create an **equitable** and **just** society (2003, 149). Flying in the face of neoliberal ideology and policy, one of the main tenets of CRT continues to hold that while classical racism may have subsided, everyday racism **has** and **continues** to rise (2003, 149). Particularly considering the context of New Orleans and the shifting focus from traditionally underserved communities to viewing the individual student as a utility maximizer, it is important to engage a critical race methodology here to expose the flaws of the color-blind view of everyday social relations. The rhetoric of color-blindness **pretends** to **ignore** the impact on **social perceptions**, **status**, and **identity** of all societal members that socialized notions of racial categories have; and is commonly used as a pretext to continue justifying those hierarchical racial divisions (2003, 150). Given the critical race-based positions that were developed in other fields, its coupling with CRT has given the theory expanding explanatory power to address the myriad elements of race, its role in shaping law and the nation state, personal and group identity, distribution of goods and services, and institutional practices and policies. Since its inception, CRT has not lock itself into a singular line of criticism against the law and society regarding race (Hayman, 1995). This notion of government at a distance through market ideology and charter schools does not divorce us from the necessity of interrogating why, how, and for what purposes do educational institutions reinforce racial, class, and gender inequality for students of color (2003, 152). Regardless of the limited autonomy of charter schools, standard approaches to educational policy are still the normative. The policy process has been typically defined as a series of decisions regarding actions taken in terms of what to do, decisions on how to do it, and decisions on how to assess outcomes through assessment and evaluation (Lee, 1998) (2003, 154). CRT tells us that although these areas are seemingly distinct, the policy process remains **interconnected**, and decisions made in one vector process will have an effect on the other domains (2003, 154-5). The complex realities of policymaking in education, which would include showing how **influence**, **pressure**, **dogma**, **expediency**, **conflict**, **compromise**, **error**, and **pragmatism** all play a role in the policy process. Furthermore, we need to criticize the illusion of the “**neat** and **superficial**” way that the policy process has been presented; surely, the policy process in education is “messy” (p.9) (155). Simply put, given that CRT views racism as a central part of how society is organized and governed, it helps explain and illustrate how and why racism is accepted and taken for granted by White society (2003, 156). However, when one examines the impact of these policies over the long term, their combined effect is to provide minorities with an inferior education that the majority of Americans would neither tolerate nor accept for their own children (2003, 157). In the case of neoliberal policies and rhetoric, race, racialism, and racism play a role in determining policy design, implementation, and **particularly** outcomes by simply pretending that they don’t exist.