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**The plan identifies the non-Western world as a space devoid of the rule of law---that sets the stage for aggressive intervention and colonial plunder, which locks in neoliberal structural violence---and their ev is based on distorted representations of the rule of law that have no relationship to reality**

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental-European powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the ‘periphery’, both by itself and through a set of international institutions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism.

Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ‘lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ‘lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy.

The theory of ‘lack’ and the rhetoric of the rule of law have justified aggressive interventions from Western countries into non-Western ones. The policy of corporatization and open markets, supported today globally by the so-called Washington consensus3, was used by Western bankers and the business community in Latin America as the main vehicle to ‘open the veins’ of the continent—to borrow Eduardo Galeano’s metaphor4—with no solution of continuity between colonial and post-colonial times. Similar policy was used in Africa to facilitate the forced transfer of slaves to America, and today to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products, oil, minerals, ideas and cultural artefacts in the same countries. The policy of opening markets for free trade, used today in Afghanistan and Iraq, was used in China during the nineteenth century Opium War, in which free trade was interpreted as an obligation to buy drugs from British dealers. The policy of forcing local industries to compete on open markets was used by the British empire in Bengal, as it is today by the WTO in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people have been vehicles of plunder, not of legality. In all these settings the tragic human suffering produced by such plunder is simply ignored. In this context law played a major role in legalizing such practices of powerful actors against the powerless.5 Yet, this use of power is scarcely explored in the study of Western law.

The exportation of Western legal institutions from the West to the ‘rest’ has systematically been justified through the ideological use of the extremely politically strong and technically weak concept of ‘rule of law’. The notion of ‘rule of law’ is an extremely ambiguous one. Notwithstanding, within any public discussion its positive connotations have always been taken for granted. The dominant image of the rule of law is false both historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others ‘lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an ‘efficient’ market.

The rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new ground whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology. Moreover, when large corporate actors dominate states (affected by a declining regulatory role), law becomes a product of the economy, and economy governs the law rather than being governed by it.

**Using national security to justify restraints on the executive is self-defeating. Security discourse consolidates authoritarian politics.**

Aziz RANA Law at Cornell 11 [“Who Decides on Security?” Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 87, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops\_papers/87 p. 1-7]

Today politicians and legal scholars routinely invoke fears that the balance between liberty and security has swung drastically in the direction of government’s coercive powers. In the post-September 11 era, such worries are so commonplace that in the words of one commentator, “it has become part of the drinking water of this country that there has been a trade-off of liberty for security.”1 According to civil libertarians, centralizing executive power and removing the legal constraints that inhibit state violence (all in the name of heightened security) mean the steady erosion of both popular deliberation and the rule of law. For Jeremy Waldron, current practices, from coercive interrogation to terrorism surveillance and diminished detainee rights, provide government the ability not only to intimidate external enemies but also internal dissidents and legitimate political opponents. As he writes, “We have to worry that the very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be used by the government against its enemies.”2 Especially disconcerting for many commentators, executive judgments—due to fears of infiltration and security leaks—are often cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency undermines a core value of democratic decisionmaking: popular scrutiny of government action. As U.S. Circuit Judge Damon Keith famously declared in a case involving secret deportations by the executive branch, “Democracies die behind closed doors. . . . When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.”3 In the view of no less an establishment figure than Neal Katyal, now the Principal Deputy Solicitor General, such security measures transform the current presidency into “the most dangerous branch,” one that “subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government.”4 Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis.5 After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action.6 More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices.7 As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches.8 Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.”9 The hope—returned to by constitutional scholars for decades—has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the postSeptember 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner—buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics.10 As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments.11 Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge—its strengths and limitations—have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature. As an initial effort to delineate the relationship between knowledge and security, I will argue that throughout most of the American experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as grounded in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being (especially those threats posed by external warfare and domestic insurrection). Drawing from a philosophical tradition extending back to John Locke, politicians and thinkers—ranging from Alexander Hamilton and James Madison at the founding to Abraham Lincoln and Roger Taney—maintained that most citizens understood the forms of danger that imperiled their physical safety. The average individual knew that securing collective life was in his or her own interest, and also knew the institutional arrangements and practices that would fulfill this paramount interest. A widespread knowledge of security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect property or to respond to forms of external violence. Thus the question of who decides was answered decisively in favor of the general public and those institutions—especially majoritarian legislatures and juries—most closely bound to the public’s wishes. What marks the present moment as distinct is an increasing repudiation of these assumptions about shared and general social knowledge. Today the dominant approach to security presumes that conditions of modern complexity (marked by heightened bureaucracy, institutional specialization, global interdependence, and technological development) mean that while protection from external danger remains a paramount interest of ordinary citizens, these citizens rarely possess the capacity to pursue such objectives adequately. Rather than viewing security as a matter open to popular understanding and collective assessment, in ways both small and large the prevailing concept sees threat as sociologically complex and as requiring elite modes of expertise. Insulated decision-makers in the executive branch, armed with the specialized skills of the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self-defense.12 The result is that the other branches—let alone the public writ large—face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge presidential discretion. Not surprisingly, the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the very same executive bodies. How did the governing, expertise-oriented concept of security gain such theoretical and institutional dominance and what alternative formulations exist to challenge its ideological supremacy? In offering an answer to these questions, I begin in Part II by examining the principal philosophical alternatives that existed prior to the emergence of today’s approach, one of which grounded early American thought on security issues. I refer to these alternatives in the Anglo-American tradition as broadly ‘Hobbesian’ and ‘Lockean’ and develop them through a close reading of the two thinkers’ accounts of security. For all their internal differences, what is noteworthy for my purposes is that each approach rejected the idea—pervasive at present—that there exists a basic divide between elite understanding and mass uncertainty. In other words, John Locke and even Thomas Hobbes (famous as the philosopher of absolutism) presented accounts of security and self-defense that I argue were normatively more democratic than the current framework. Part III will then explore how the Lockean perspective in particular took constitutional root in early American life, focusing especially on the views of the founders and on the intellectual and legal climate in the mid nineteenth century. In Part IV, I will continue by detailing the steady emergence beginning during the New Deal of our prevailing idea of security, with its emphasis on professional expertise and insulated decision-making. This discussion highlights the work of Pendleton Herring, a political scientist and policymaker in the 1930s and 1940s who co-wrote the National Security Act of 1947 and played a critical role in tying notions of elite specialization to a new language of ‘national security.’ Part V will then show how Herring’s ‘national security’ vision increasingly became internalized by judicial actors during and after World War II. I argue that the emblematic figure in this development was Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who not only defended security expertise but actually sought to redefine the very meaning of democracy in terms of such expertise. For Frankfurter, the ideal of an ‘open society’ was one premised on meritocracy, or the belief that decisions should be made by those whose natural talents make them most capable of reaching the technically correct outcome. According to Frankfurter, the rise of security expertise meant the welcome spread of meritocratic commitments to a critical and complex arena of policymaking. In this discussion, I focus especially on a series of Frankfurter opinions, including in Ex parte Quirin (1942), Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), Korematsu v. United States (1944), and Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), and connect these opinions to contemporary cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). Finally, by way of conclusion, I note how today’s security concept—normatively sustained by Frankfurter’s judgments about merit and elite authority—shapes current discussions over threat and foreign policy in ways that often inhibit rather than promote actual security. I then end with some reflections on what would be required to alter governing arrangements. As a final introductory note, a clarification of what I mean by the term ‘security’ is in order. Despite its continuous invocation in public life, the concept remains slippery and surprisingly under-theorized. As Jeremy Waldron writes, “Although we know that ‘security’ is a vague and ambiguous concept, and though we should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger when talk of trade-offs is in the air, still there has been little or no attempt in the literature of legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept.”13 As a general matter, security refers to protection from those threats that imperil survival—both of the individual and of a given society’s collective institutions or way of life. At its broadest, these threats are multidimensional and can result from phenomena as wide-ranging as environmental disasters or food shortages. Thus, political actors with divergent ideological commitments defend the often competing goals of social security, economic security, financial security, collective security, human security, food security, environmental security, and—the granddaddy of them all—national security. But for my purposes, when invoked without any modifier the word ‘security’ refers to more specific questions of common defense and physical safety. These questions, emphasizing issues of war and peace, are largely coterminous with what Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously referred to in his “Four Freedoms” State of the Union Adresss as “the freedom from fear”: namely ensuring that citizens are protected from external and internal acts of “physical aggression.”14 This definitional choice is meant to serve two connected theoretical objectives. First, as a conceptual matter it is important to keep the term security analytically separate from ‘national security’—a phrase ubiquitous in current legal and political debate. While on the face of it, both terms might appear synonymous, my claim in the following pages is that ‘national security’ is in fact a relatively novel concept, which emerged in the mid twentieth century as a particular vision of how to address issues of common defense and personal safety. Thus national security embodies only one of a number of competing theoretical and historical approaches to matters of external violence and warfare. Second, and relatedly, it has become a truism in political philosophy that the concept of liberty is plural and multifaceted.15 In other words, different ideals of liberty presuppose distinct visions of political life and possibility. Yet far less attention has been paid to the fact that security is similarly a plural concept, embodying divergent assumptions about social ordering. In fact, competing notions of security—by offering different answers to the question of “who decides?”—can be more or less compatible with democratic ideals. If anything, the problem of the contemporary moment is the dominance of a security concept that systematically challenges those sociological and normative assumptions required to sustain popular involvement in matters of threat and safety.

**Global expansion of the Western conception of rule of law enables neoliberal resource plundering---turns the whole case because it causes failed transitions that are hijacked by authoritarians**

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

The rule of law rhetoric has been used as a justification for ‘plunder’ (broadly definable as inequitable distribution of resources by the strong at the expenses of the weak), thus backing a claim that it has been used ‘illegally’. This can be identified as ‘the dark side of the rule of law’, which is kept silent from any public discussion. In order to deeply understand both sides of the rule of law, the close connection of such concept with the ideal of democracy has to be disentangled, and on the contrary its close association with practices of ‘plunder’ has to be recognized.

In the dominant liberal democratic tradition the rule of law has at least two different aggregates of meaning. In the first, the rule of law refers to institutions that secure property rights against governmental taking and that guarantee contractual obligations. This is the meaning of rule of law invoked by Western businessmen interested in investing abroad. International institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) often charge the lack of the rule of law as the main reason for insufficient foreign investment in poor countries. The rule of law is thus interpreted as the backbone of an ideal market economy. Normative recipes for market liberalization and opening up of local markets to foreign investment thus come packaged with the prestigious wrapping of the rule of law.

According to the second approach, which relates to a liberal political tradition rooted in ‘natural law’ and in the more secular form of ‘rational law’, society should be governed by the law and not by a human being acting as a ruler (sub lege, non sub homine). The law is impersonal, abstract and fair because it is applied mechanically to anyone in society, and a system is effectively governed by the rule of law when its leaders are under its restraint.

Some conservatives might favour the first meaning, protecting property and contracts. The second meaning, providing rights, is a favourite of the moderate left and of many international human rights activists seeking to do good by the use of the law (the ‘do-gooders’). Perhaps someone located in the so-called ‘Third world’ would claim to be a champion of both meanings, which appear to merge in the recent, comprehensive definition of the World Bank: ‘The rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws, predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to maintain order, promote the private sector growth, fight poverty and have legitimacy’.8

A system can be governed by the rule of law in one or the other sense. There are systems in which property rights are worshipped but that are still governed by ruthless, unrestricted leaders. President Fujimori’s Peru or Pinochet’s Chile are good recent examples of such arrangements, but many other authoritarian governments presently in office mainly in Africa, Asia and Latin America that follow the ‘good governance’ prescriptions of the World Bank also fall in this category.

In other systems, with good human rights credentials, governments interpret their role as significantly redistributive. Property rights may not be sacred, and a variety of ‘social theories’ may limit their extension or curtail them without compensation. In such settings, quite often, courts and scholars might develop theories that limit the enforcement of contracts in the name of justice and social solidarity. Consequently, they might fit the second but not the first definition ofthe rule of law. Scandinavian countries, amplifying attitudes shared at one time or another in history by a number of continental legal traditions such as France, Germany and Italy (or the United States’ New Deal), might offer such a model in Western societies.

Western countries have developed a strong identity as being governed by the rule of law, no matter what the actual history or the present situation might be. Such identity is obtained—as is the usual pattern—by comparison with ‘the other’, almost invariably portrayed as ‘lacking’ the rule of law.

Based on the idea that others ‘lack’ the rule of law, many external interventions have been enacted in the so-called ‘developing countries’ by Western actors. Many of such interventions, instead of being beneficial for the local society, have shown the possibility for the law to be used as an instrument of oppression and plunder, ironically representing an ‘illegal’ use of the rule of law.9

**The impact is global extinction---US-driven economic orthodoxy collapses democracy, causes resource wars and environmental collapse**

Vandana Shiva 12, founder of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Western Ontario, chairs the Commission on the Future of Food set up by the Region of Tuscany in Italy and is a member of the Scientific Committee which advises President Zapatero of Spain, March 1, 2012, “Imposed Austerity vs Chosen Simplicity: Who Will Pay For Which Adjustments?,” online: <http://www.ethicalmarkets.com/2012/03/01/imposed-austerity-vs-chosen-simplicity-who-will-pay-for-which-adjustments/>

The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio +20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio-fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the 1%”.

But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy.

The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India.

The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy.

And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”.

Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies.

There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity.

Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.

**Our alternative is to refuse the affirmative’s technical fix for war powers in favor of subjecting the 1ac’s discourse to rigorous democratic scrutiny**

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, “NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this meahn for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently-it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

**Reject their ideological focus on short-term impacts---cast the ballot to fundamentally rethink the global promotion of Western law**

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

Contemporary mass cultures operate within a short time-span. Most intellectuals do not acknowledge that it is exactly because of plunder of gold, silver, bioresources and so on that development accelerated in the West, so that underdevelopment is a historically produced victimization of weaker and more enclosed communities and not the disease of lesser people.

Prevailing short-term and short-sighted opportunism must be overcome. An analysis of the imperial adventure rendered in legal terms opens up a possibility for a radical rethinking of a model of development defined by Western ideas of progress, development and economic efficiency. A reconfiguration would mean, first and foremost, a clear rejection of an ideology of inherent superiority of Western culture that does not recognize that the West is itself part of something much larger.

**Framework---policymakers and legal intellectuals use representations of the rule of law as a positive force that bear no relationship to reality---interrogating flawed understandings of the rule of law undermines the truth-value of their claims about its tangible effects**

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

The expression ‘rule of law’ has gained currency well outside the specialized learning of lawyers. It has reached political and cultural spheres, entering everyday discourse and media language, it is pronounced in countless political speeches and promenades on the agendas of private and public actors.

Unfortunately, the term has incrementally lost clarity and is today interpreted in widely disparate ways. ‘Rule of law’ is almost never carefully defined as a concept; users of the expression allude to meanings that they assume to be clear and objective but are not so. Rule of law has thus become part of that dimension of tacit knowledge, described by Polanyi in his classic study of human communications.6 Naturally, this would be a perfectly innocent and common phenomenon, not worthy of inquiry, were it not for the weighty political implications of the phrase in different contexts.7

The connotations of the expression ‘rule of law’ have always been implicitly positive. Today, the concept is inextricably linked to the notion of democracy, thus becoming a powerful, almost indisputable, positively loaded ideal. Who could argue against a society governed under democracy and the rule of law?

The rule of law lives today in a comfortable limbo, stretched to fit the needs of every side of the political spectrum as a symbol or an icon rather than as a real-life institutional arrangement with its pros and cons to be discussed and understood as those of any other cultural artefact. It is necessary to get to a better understanding of this powerful political weapon, and to question its almost sacred status, by analyzing it as a Western cultural artefact, closely connected with the diffusion of Western political and economic domination.

**Our framework is necessary to reclaim the political from state-focused methods that constrict democratic dialogue. Error replication is inevitable without interrogating the ethical foundations of the 1ac**

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

## Solvency

**Courts can’t restrict presidential war powers**

**Wheeler 9** Darren A. Wheeler, associate professor of political science at Ball State University, “Checking Presidential Detention Power in the War on Terror: What Should We Expect from the Judiciary?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39.4 (Dec 2009): 677-700

This article argues that there are four specific reasons why those expecting the Supreme Court to be a significant check on presidential detention power in the war on terror are likely to be disappointed. The first reason is that the judiciary makes decisions in what can be referred to as "judicial time." In short, the courts are slow. The judicial decision-making process **is often one that takes years to complete** (Rehnquist 1998). Few political actors conceptualize the decision-making process in such an extended manner. If the president can respond more quickly to matters of policy than the courts, **it might be difficult for the judiciary to act as a check on the president**. The second factor that limits the judiciary's ability to check presidential detention power is the fact that courts usually answer specific narrow legal questions as opposed to larger, "big picture" policy questions (Baum 2007; Rehnquist 1998; Rosenberg 1991). As a result, even when the Court makes a decision on a matter, it is often a narrow one that addresses only a small part of the overall policy picture**. This can limit the impact that the courts have on the policymaking process**, as other policy makers often find different means to accomplish their desired goals **regardless of the** roadblocks presented by the **courts** on particular details. The third factor that potentially limits judicial impact on the president's desired detention policies is the fact that the judicial implementation process is fraught with uncertainty (Baum 2007; Canon and Johnson 1999; Carp, Stidham, and Manning 2004; Stumpf 1998). **Even when the courts make a decision, it is possible for** other political actors (including **the president) to shape the implementation process** in such a way as **to minimize the impact that the** particular **decision might have** on the president's preferred policies. Finally, the judiciary, especially since the second half of the twentieth century, has adopted a general posture of deference to the executive in matters of war powers and foreign affairs (Fisher 2005; Howell 2003; Rossiter and Longaker 1976). This deference might lead the Court to refuse to even hear challenges to presidential detention power. Even when the Court does hear cases, it may dispose of them in ways that illustrate this historical pattern of deference. Any combination of these factors **may limit the ability of the judiciary to check presidential initiatives**, **especially in** a policy area - **the war on terror** - in which the Bush administration clearly demonstrated an intense willingness and desire to exert unilateral control over matters (Fisher 2004; Goldsmith 2007; Kassop 2007; Savage 2007; Wheeler 2008).

**Even if the president has to rely on risky legal grounds – no court will ever rule against him on national security affairs and even if they did, the executive would circumvent them**

Vermeule 9 \*Adrian, John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Harvard Law Review, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, February

4. Standards Versus Grey Holes. - A particular clarification about grey holes is also necessary. A conventional legal perspective would hold that administrative law is, of course, composed of both "rules" and "standards" in the sense in which these terms are used in legal theory. 35 And on this perspective, it is unsurprising that where the relevant law creates standards, judges will increase deference to the executive when administrative action touches on sensitive matters of national security and foreign relations, or as emergencies arise. No one thinks that liberal legalism is inconsistent with standards, as opposed to rules, or that it prohibits all judicial deference to the executive, or that it requires judges to redecide all administrative decisions. Is the claim that our administrative law is Schmittian just a claim that it contains standards, or that judges sometimes defer to agencies? No. A "standard" in the legal theorist's sense is merely a potential grey hole, and the sort of deference that liberal-legalist judges are usually willing to afford is not enough to bring a grey hole into being either. My suggestion is that the standards inherent in administrative law are best understood as adjustable parameters, in which the intensity of review can be dialed up or down. When (and only when) it is dialed down far enough, the apparent availability of judicial review becomes a sham or facade, and a grey hole arises. It is hard to specify, in the abstract, when exactly this occurs, or how deferential review must be to create a grey hole. But it is not necessary to specify that in the abstract. If the examples in Part II are convincing - the proof must be in the pudding - then the reality is that in certain domains, and with respect to certain questions, it is an inescapable fact that judges applying the adjustable parameters of our administrative law have upheld executive or administrative action on such deferential terms as to make legality a pretense. In such cases, judicial review is itself a kind of legal fiction and the outcome of judicial review is a foregone conclusion - not something that is compatible, even in theory, with the banal liberal-legalist observations that administrative law contains standards and permits deference. II. The Black and Grey Holes of Administrative Law I will lay the groundwork for the later theoretical discussion with an overview of decisions by the federal courts of appeals in cases at the intersection of administrative law and national security, especially after 9/11. It is important to be clear about what this overview is intended [\*1107] to show. I do not attempt to prove an empirical hypothesis to the effect that administrative law in the courts of appeals has become more deferential after 9/11, although that may well be true. The examples of law-free zones and sham review I will examine are not evidence of some further hypothesis; rather they are themselves the facts to be established. They show that administrative law in operation contains substantial black and grey holes built into its working structure - that our administrative law is in this sense substantially Schmittian. Not as Schmittian as possible, but much more so than the various camps of rule-of-law theorists and administrative law theorists think is true or desirable.

## Credibility

**Liberal peace theory ignores the violence that goes into creating pliant regimes willing to trade with the US---naturalizes mass violence in the interim and makes long term collapse inevitable**

**Herman 12**—professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Edward, 7/25/12, Reality Denial : Steven Pinker's Apologetics for Western-Imperial Volence, http://www.zcommunications.org/reality-denial-steven-pinkers-apologetics-for-western-imperial-volence-by-edward-s-herman-and-david-peterson-1)

Pinker’s establishment ideology kicks-in very clearly in his comparative treatment of communism, on the one hand, and democracy and capitalism, on the other. He is explicit that whereas communism is a “utopian” and dangerous “ideology” from which most of the world’s serious violence allegedly flowed during the past century, democracy, capitalism, “markets,” “gentle commerce,” and the like, are all tied to liberalism—or more exactly to “classical liberalism.”[133] These institutional forms are not the result of ideologies, much less utopian and dangerous; they are the historically more advanced permutations of the Leviathan that help to elicit those components of the neurobiology of peaceableness (or “better angels” as opposed to “inner demons”) for which the human brain has been naturally selected over evolutionary time. Hence, they are sources of the alleged decline in violence, and their spread is a force for positive and more peaceful change in the world.[134]¶ Not so communism. At the outset of Chapter 6, “The New Peace,” Pinker approvingly quotes Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s line that, unlike the communists, “Shakespeare’s evildoers stopped short at a dozen corpses [b]ecause they had no ideology” driving them. (295) In discussing the alleged mental traits of the members of a society mobilized to commit genocide, he argues that “Utopian creeds that submerge individuals into moralized categories may take root in powerful regimes and engage their full destructive might,” and highlights “Marxism during the purges, expulsions, and terror-famines in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, and Pol Pot’s Cambodia.” (328) In his 2002 book, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, he devoted several pages to what he called the “Marxist genocides of the twentieth century,” and noted that “Historians are currently debating whether the Communists’ mass-executions, forced marches, slave labor, and man-made famines led to one hundred million deaths or ‘only’ twenty-five million.”[135] And in the section of the current book titled “The Trajectory of Genocide,” Pinker cites the authority of the “democratic peace” theorist and “atrocitologist” Rudolph Rummel, who in his 1994 book Death By Government wrote that whereas “totalitarian communist governments slaughter their people by the tens of millions[,]…many democracies can barely bring themselves to execute serial murderers.”[136] (357)¶ As we have seen, **Pinker rewrites history** to accommodate this familiar establishment perspective, so that the Cold War was rooted in communist expansionism and U.S. efforts at containment, and the several **million deaths in the Korean and Vietnam wars** were attributable to the communists’ fanatical unwillingness to surrender to superior force, not to anti-communist and racist attitudes that facilitated the U.S. military’s mass killings of distant peoples. He deals with U.S. state-capitalism’s support and sponsorship of the corrupt open-door dictatorships of Suharto, Marcos, Mobutu, Pinochet, Diem, the Greek Colonels, and the National Security States of Latin America (among many others), and the “burgeoning” of torture following the end of the Cold War, by eye aversion. ¶ In Pinker’s view, the Third World’s troubled areas are suffering from their failure to absorb the **civilizing lessons** modeled for them in the United States and other advanced countries. **He ignores the eight-decades-long massive U.S. investment in the military and ideological training, political takeovers, and subsequent support of Third World dictators in numerous U.S. client terror states**, including Guatemala, transformed from a democracy to terror state in 1954, Brazil, shifted from a democracy to military dictatorship in 1964, the Philippines in 1972, and Chile the same in 1973, among many others. A tabulation by one of the present authors in 1979 found that 26 of the 35 states in that era that used torture on an administrative basis were U.S. clients, all of them recipients of U.S. military and economic aid.[137] These clients were capitalist in structure, but threatened and employed force to keep the lower orders disorganized and more **serviceable to the local elites and transnational corporations** investing there. One Latin American Church document of that period spoke of the local U.S.-supported regimes as imposing an economic model so repressive that it “**provoked a revolution that did not exist**.”[138] **This was a deliberate “decivilizing” process, with the civilized serving as co-managers**.¶ We have seen that Pinker finds the modern era peaceful by focusing on the absence of war between the major powers, **downplaying the** **many murderous wars carried out by the West** (and mainly the United States) **against small countries,** **and falsely suggesting that** **the lesser-country conflicts are home-grown**, even where, as in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it was U.S. military assaults that precipitated the internal armed conflicts, with the United States then actively participating in them. The Israeli occupation and multi-decade ethnic cleansing of Palestine he misrepresents as a “cycle of deadly revenge,” with only Israel fighting against “terrorism” in this cycle. He speaks of Islamic and communist ideology as displaying violent tendencies, and congratulates the U.S. military for allegedly overcoming the kind of racist attitudes reported at the time of the Vietnam war (U.S. soldiers referring to Vietnamese as “gooks,” slopes,” and the like)—but the military’s new humanism is another piece of Pinker misinformation and pro-war propaganda. And he fails to cite the numerous instances of Israeli leaders referring to Palestinians as “grasshoppers,” “beasts walking on two legs,” “crocodiles,” “insects,” and a “cancer,” or Israeli rabbis decrying them as the “Amalekites” of the present era, calling for extermination of these unchosen people.[139]¶ As regards Israel, Pinker never mentions the Israeli belief in a “promised land” and “chosen people” who may be fulfilling God’s will in dispossessing Palestinians.[140] Although the lack of angelic behavior in these assaults and this language, ethnic cleansing, and dispossession process is dramatic, and has had important effects on the attitudes and behavior of Islamic peoples, it fails to fit Pinker’s ideological system and political agenda, and therefore is not a case of conflict with ideological roots. ¶ For Pinker, there is also nothing ideological in the “miracle of the market” (Reagan), no “stark utopia” in Friedrich von Hayek’s assertion that the “particulars of a spontaneous order cannot be just or unjust,”[141] no ideology in the faith that an unconstrained free market will not produce intolerable inequalities and majority resistance that in turn require the likes of Pinochet, Suharto, or Hitler to reassert the requisite “stability**.” It is simply outside of** **Pinker’s orbit of thought that liberalism and neoliberalism** in the post-Soviet world **are** **ideologies that have serviced an elite in a class war**; **that the major struggles and crises** that **we have witnessed**, **over climate change, the massive upward redistribution of** **income** and wealth, **the global surge of disposable workers, and the enlargement of NATO and the police-and-surveillance state, are features of a revitalized consolidation of class power**, under more angelic names like “reform,” “free markets,” “flexibility,” “stability,” and “fiscal discipline.” For Pinker, the huge growth of the prison population shows the lack of “self-control” of the incarcerated savages still with us; and it is one merit of the liberal state that it gets the bad guys off the streets. ¶ Another device that Pinker uses when weighing capitalism versus communism is to take notorious state abuses committed in the name of communism (e.g., under Joseph Stalin), not as perversions of communism, but as inherent in its ideology, and flowing directly from it. Many historians and leftists have long argued that Stalinism constituted a radical betrayal and perversion of genuine communism, and that it emerged out of crises and stresses that made anything approaching genuine communism unreachable.[142] Pinker never addresses this kind of explanation and exemption of real-world communism, but he does this implicitly for real-world degenerate forms of capitalism. Thus, Nazi Germany and its mass murders are not credited to capitalism’s account, even though Germany under the Nazis was still capitalist in economic form and surely a variant of capitalism arising under stress and threat from below, with important business support.[143] Suharto’s Indonesia and Pinochet’s Chile could be said to fit this same pattern. Rightwing believers in the crucial importance of free markets, such as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, approved of Pinochet’s rule, which ended political freedom and freedom of thought, but worked undeviatingly for corporate interests and rights. But it took only one decade of the Chicago Boys’ privatizations and other “reforms” for Chile’s economy and financial system to collapse. In the harsh depression that ensued, the banks were re-nationalized and their foreign creditors bailed-out in a process sometimes called the “Chicago Road to Socialism,” but then shortly thereafter they were re-privatized all over again, at bargain-basement prices.[144] (Pinochet does not show up in Pinker’s index; Chile does, but never as a free market state loved by von Hayek, Friedman, and the Chicago School of Economics, and supported by the United States.)¶ In one of his book’s more outlandish moments, Pinker even allocates Nazism and the holocaust to communism. He writes that since “Hitler read Marx in 1913,” Marxism led definitively if “more circuitously” to the “[dekamegamurders] committed by the Nazi regime in Germany.”[145] (343) But while there is no evidence that Hitler really examined Marx or accepted any of his or his fellow Marxist writers’ ideas,[146] it is incontestable fact that Hitler held Marxism in contempt, and that communism and communists ranked very high among Hitler’s and the Nazi’s demons and targets (along with Jews) when they held power in Germany.[147] So is the fact that racist theories and “mismeasure of man” literature in the Houston Stewart Chamberlain tradition—of which Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray arguably are heirs—were fanatically embraced by Hitler, and therefore linked to Nazism—and not very “circuitously,” either. ¶ Pinker not only doesn’t credit the Nazi holocaust to capitalism, he also fails to give capitalism credit for the **extermination of the Native Americans** in the Western Hemisphere and the huge death tolls from the Slave Trades,[148] which should have been prevented by the rising “better angels.” As noted, he also ignores democratic capitalism’s responsibility for the surge of colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries, the associated holocausts,[149] and the death-dealing and exploitation of the Western-sponsored terror states in Indonesia, the Philippines, Latin America and elsewhere. **He also fails to address the huge toll of structural violence** **under capitalism flowing from its** domestic and **global dispossession processes,** and, interestingly, intensifying with the post-1979 transformation of China and the breakup of the Soviet bloc and Soviet Union (1989-1991), which reduced any need on the part of Western capitalism to show concern for the well-being of its own working class majority. This helps explain the **significant global increases in inequality and dispossession** **and slum-city enlargement** over the past two decades, a period that Pinker calls the “New Peace” and depicts as an age of accelerating “Civilization”!¶ Pinker refers to the deaths during China’s Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) as a “Mao masterminded…famine that killed between 20 million and 30 million people.”[150] (331) For Pinker, clearly, the dead were victims of a deliberate policy that demonstrates the evil behind communist ideology. But as the development economists Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen have pointed out, China under Mao installed a massive and effective system of public medical services, as well as literacy and nutrition programs that greatly benefitted the general population in the years prior to the famine—a fact that is difficult to reconcile with the allegation that Mao regarded mass starvation as an acceptable means to some other end. Instead, Drèze and Sen blamed this tragedy on the lack of democracy in China, with the absence of pressure from below and a lack of timely knowledge of policy failure significantly offsetting the life-saving benefits of communist China’s medical and other social welfare programs.[151] ¶ Drèze and Sen also compared the number of deaths caused by this famine under Mao with the number of deaths caused by what they called the “endemic undernutrition and deprivation” that afflicts India’s population year-in and year-out. “Estimates of extra mortality [from China’s famine] vary from 16.5 million to 29.5 million,” they wrote, “arguably the largest in terms of total excess mortality in recorded history.”[152] But “despite the gigantic size of excess mortality in the Chinese famine,” they continued, the “extra mortality in India from regular deprivation in normal times vastly overshadows the former. Comparing India’s death rate of 12 per thousand with China’s 7 per thousand, and applying that difference to India’s population of 781 million in 1986, we get an estimate of excess normal mortality in India of 3.9 million per year. This implies that every eight years or so more people die in India because of its higher death rate than died in China in the gigantic famine….India seems to manage to fill its cupboard with more skeletons every eight years than China put there in its years of famine.”[153] Indeed, by 2005, some 46 percent (or 31 million) of India’s children were underweight, and 79 percent suffered anemia. “Forty years of efforts to raise how much food-grains Indians are able to eat has been destroyed by a mere dozen years of economic reform,” Jawaharal Nehru University economist Utsa Patnaik observes.[154]

**NATO is the perfect example of our link argument---it sanitizes global violence**

**Kuus 9**—Department of Geography, The University of British Columbia (Merje, Cosmopolitan militarism? Spaces of NATO expansion, Environment and Planning A 2009, vol 41, pages 545-562)

`With little fanfare—and even less notice—the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has gone global'' (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006, page 105), proclaims a recent article in Foreign Affairs, the flagship journal of the United States foreign policy establishment. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) now has twenty-six member states and twenty-three partner countries—the latter include three candidate states—as well as looser cooperation agreements with a further eleven states.(1) All countries that neighbor NATO's member states are incorporated into the alliance's networks of cooperation. In addition, NATO is developing closer relations with `contact countries' like Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand with which it does not (yet) have formal cooperation agreements. The alliance has enlarged twice since the end of the Cold War, and further enlargements are widely anticipated, perhaps as soon as later this decade. The buzz in the military - industrial - academic complex— or what its practitioners call `the strategic community'—is about global, not European, partnerships of `new Atlanticism' and `forward defense'. The alliance's summits are impeccably choreographed spectacles that project the image of an integrative and inclusive NATO of global reach. That NATO acts **not against threats** but for `Euroatlantic values'—freedom and security, cooperation and solidarity, just and lasting peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Its space is not closed off in defense against territorial threats, but is open in an effort to spread these values. Stretching `from Vancouver to Vladivostok' and from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean, NATO's network space incorporates Afghanistan and Algeria as well as Canada and Croatia into a distinctly globalist discourse of common security and shared values. ``These days'', notes The Economist (2006), ``NATO looks ever more like a kind of United Nations in military uniform'' (page 14). This expansion of NATO's geographic scope and mechanisms of legitimation is significant. It points to a reconfiguration of where and how **Western military power is** exercised and **normalized**. Traditionally, militarism relies on nationalist geographical imaginaries. Historically, the spaces of empire, the West, or the Free World have also served to `ground' militarism. The current phase of NATO enlargement projects a different story. It is a story of the whole humanity and the whole global space gently guarded by beneficent NATO. The world's largest military alliance appears to have departed from the ideological framework of the Cold War era—in which NATO was an antidote to Soviet Communism—and to have become a magnetic center of international cooperation in spheres like peacekeeping, landmine destruction, and democracy building. There is no outside and no ideological enemy in this space; there are only different kinds and degrees of belonging to the inside. **Formal intergovernmental agreements** and collaboration projects **are only one medium for this globalist discourse**. **More importantly, the discourse is produced through** a wide range of activities in the **civil society: academic conferences** and workshops **as** **well as educational** and cultural **events** for different audiences. These activities are often carried out by networks of NGOs, which operate in all NATO member and partner countries, sometimes in collaboration with umbrella associations that coordinate their activities. For example, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) links nearly thirty such national NGOs. Sponsored by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and the United States Mission to NATO (the national NGOs have their own sponsors), it calls itself ``one of the strongest and most influential youth NGO networks in the world'' (S—rensen and Th—rud, 2005, page 1). The processes of NATO's public legitimation thus combine a unified message with a relatively decentred institutional structure. I investigate how NATO's globalist discourse operates. Approaching militarization as a multilayered process through which military approaches to political problems gain elite and popular acceptance, I focus not on NATO's core meaning or capabilities but on the processes of its public legitimation. I argue that the normative space in which NATO has a constitutive influence on social relations is expanding ahead of formal membership. This expansion is effected through what I call **cosmopolitan militarism**: the framing of a military alliance in terms of cosmopolitan spaces that transcend national borders and ideological blocks to unite the whole globe. Cosmopolitan militarism here is an evolving mechanism or tendency in legitimizing NATO in its member and partner states. My argument is not that NATO is cosmopolitan, but rather that **it packages** or enacts **itself as such**. By unpacking how this is done, my analysis expands the interdisciplinary scholarship on the militarization of political culture and political space today. In empirical terms, I focus on Central Europe, defined here as the ten states that have acceded into the alliance since the end of the Cold War. These states are selected because they are at the forefront of NATO's expansion efforts. They share their `integration stories' with potential entrants and coach them for closer integration with NATO, and their NGOs receive substantial funding for events that popularize the alliance beyond its borders. Their own position in this effort is ambiguous. In spite of their full membership in NATO, they are also on the margins of the alliance. As newcomers, whose membership was by no means certain until this decade, they still need to prove their Western credentials. At home, their governments need to justify increased military budgets at the time of stagnant or even declining health, education, and other social spending. Moreover, these countries joined the alliance specifically **because they saw NATO as an exclusively Western club.** After a decade of rhetoric about joining Europe, their governments now need to justify sending military personnel outside Europe, to places that are popularly looked upon as non-European and less civilized. In short, Central European politicians and the general public need to remake their mental maps of Europe, the West, and global politics. As a result, the legitimation of NATO's normative space is more visible in Central Europe than in Western Europe, where similar activities have been going on since the 1950s. The investigation will proceed in three steps. The following section situates the paper in the geographic scholarship on militarization so as to highlight the need for further work on that process, especially in settings and scales other than the nation-state. In the subsequent empirical sections I examine the production of NATO's cosmopolitan militarism. In section 3 I delineate the development of NATO as an institution, highlighting its expansion and its extensive partnership agreements around the globe. In the fourth section I look at how the globalist geographical imaginaries are put into practice in the public relations campaigns of NATO and its related NGOs. **Analyzing** this public relations machinery from official speeches to **educational**, and entertainment **activities that seem far from** **militarism**, **I foreground the agents of militarization** **beyond** the institutions of **the nation-state**. The empirical examples come from the vast amount of information available through the websites of NATO and its supporting NGOs. This information includes not only official speeches and conference programs, but also policy papers, event descriptions, and educational materials, as well as visual materials like photo sequences, promotional videos, and video files of briefings, ceremonies, and lectures.(2) NATO summits have separate websites that cover the formal program as well as the supporting publicity events. Taken together, these materials enable me to foreground the material processes through which **militarization happens on a daily basis**. The new spaces of NATO are not simply preached; they are made in a very tangible and material level in multiple scales through a myriad of seemingly mundane practices like geographic education, language training, or international youth networking. These spaces are made intellectually plausible and experientially attractive. My objective is both to identify the key mechanisms that drive cosmopolitan militarism and to give a feel for NATO's public relations machinery in its smart, even glamorous, detail. This ambience is essential for understanding the popular appeal and effect of cosmopolitan militarism. In the concluding section I outline the implications of cosmopolitan militarism to the study of militarization. 2 The spaces and scales of militarization Militarism and militarization are key aspects of social life today. Militarism here refers to an ideology. the central tenet of which is that military force is a necessary resolver of conflict, whereas militarization refers to a multifaceted social process by which military approaches to social problems gain elite and popular acceptance (Enloe, 2004, page 219). Most **militarization** thus defined takes place in what is called peacetime. Its central locations are not the military or even the defense ministry; it rather **operates** **through civilian structures like education**, entertainment, and the popular media. The emerging geographic research on militarization focuses not as much on military institutions and military conflict—although these issues are undoubtedly important—as on the structures of legitimacy on which military force depends (Mamadouh, 2005; Woodward, 2004; see also Flint, 2005). Intersecting with scholarship in international relations (Cohn, 1987; Enloe, 2000) and anthropology (Gusterson, 2004; Lutz, 2006), this work exposes the explicit glorification and implicit normalization of military force and military institutions throughout society (Gregory, 2004, chapter 6; Sidaway, 2003; Thrift, 2006). I show that militarization is not imposed on the society; it is woven through the social fabric. However, more work still needs to be done to better understand how militarization occurs in different spheres of social life. Geographers need to engage the current period of military conflict without uncritically reifying the role of the state or the military in this process (Dalby, 1996, page 659; Flint, 2003a; 2003b). Empirically, this requires close attention to places far beyond military bases and defense ministries, to everyday practices like aid operations, cultural diplomacy, or youth NGOs—in short, the military ^ industrial ^ media ^ entertainment network that sustains and legitimizes military force (Der Derian, 2001). Examining all these `other' settings beyond the formal sphere of the state would show in greater detail that militarization extends much beyond the promotion of military force per se, in particular that it involves the normalization of militaristic presumptions about international, national, and personal matters. Such an examination would also help us to look beyond ``politics with a big P'' (Flint, 2003c) and to examine militarization as daily enactment. Such accounts must closely examine the role of moral claims in militarization today. Although moral arguments have always been an integral part of justifying political violence, they have become a central feature of the post-Cold-War settlement (Chomsky, 1999). The military complex becomes a key part of the production of moral good, and, conversely, `moral intervention' becomes a precondition for military intervention (Flint and Falah, 2004). The `enlargement' of the sphere of democratic states is thus underpinned by a militarized geography with moral rationalizations (Dalby, 2005, page 423; Falah et al, 2006; Gregory and Pred, 2006). The conceptual apparatus of the `war on terror' likewise rests on universalist and globalist geographical imaginaries (Retort, 2005; Sparke, 2005). These tendencies prompt Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) to posit that today's power relations are based not on force itself, but on the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. Power relies on an `ethicopolitical dynamic' in which war is no longer an activity of defense or resistance, but one that is justified by an appeal to essential values and justice (page 11). For Hardt and Negri, empire's powers of intervention do not begin directly with its weapons of lethal force but rather with its moral instruments (page 35). **Military intervention becomes** juridically **legitimate** only **when it is inserted into existing international consensuses**. The first task of the empire is ``to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power'' (page 15). This production of consensuses is practiced by a variety of bodies, like state institutions and the news media, and most importantly by the so-called NGOs. For Hardt and Negri, then, **NGOs form a key part of the production of imperial right because they prepare the normative space for military intervention** (page 40). The above bodies of scholarship present a number of disagreements, but they all point to the need to examine militarization at scales other than the state. Traditionally, militarism is analyzed in the context of one state, especially the United States. That state is indeed the preeminent military power today. Its military spending amounts to nearly one half of the world's total, it operates over 800 `significant-size' military bases abroad, and it actively participates in several military conflicts (Lutz, 2006, page 593; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2006). NATO enlargement, and the strong US support that makes it possible, can be seen in terms of American hegemony, of the US exercising its power extraterritorially (Flint and Falah, 2004). It can be conceptualized as an attempt by the US to maintain centrality in the sphere where it is still clearly the dominant military power (Agnew, 2005). However, although global power relations today are effected in significant measure through US military power, they are also diffuse and decentered. This relatively decentered mode of operation is the starting point of Hardt and Negri's (cf 2000; 2004) argument about the network-like operation of power. In the passage from modern imperialism to postmodern empire, they argue, the dialectic of inside ^ outside has been replaced by ``a play of degrees and intensity, of hybridity and artificiality'' (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pages 186 ^ 188). Empire has no others; it integrates others (page 195). Today's security measures signal ``a lack of distinction between inside and outside, between the military and the police. Whereas `defense' involves a protective barrier against external threats, `security' justifies a constant martial activity equally in the homeland and abroad'' (Hardt and Negri, 2004, page 21). Whereas disciplinary power closes off space, measures of security lead to opening and globalization (Agamben, 2002). The `war on terror', then, is not a war against terrorists; it is a war to create and maintain a social order. As such, it is spatially indeterminate (Hardt and Negri, 2004, page 14). Hardt and Negri's thesis has a number of weaknesses that have been debated at length (Agnew, 2005; Balakrishnan, 2003; Sparke, 2005). Nevertheless, it is helpful in pinpointing the role of publicity campaigns and transnational networks in the operation of power today (Wood, 2003). NATO offers illuminating examples of such campaigns and networks. The alliance is separate from the military of any state. It has no military force separate from the member states. Although forces of individual member states may work under NATO command on specific missions, these forces are committed to such missions in a strictly intergovernmental fashion. All missions are decided unanimously among the member states. National expenditures on NATO are minor compared with national defense budgets. The alliance's imagery is painstakingly international with multiple languages and multiple flags always in sight. NATO summits are meetings of civilians—heads of state and government—and military uniforms feature only in the background. NATO has no single command center like the Pentagon and its summits move around among the member states. Although it is headquartered in Brussels, a city that most people associate with wet-lunching Eurocrats rather than military men, most of its decision making is located in national capitals. The alliance seems easy to dismiss as a minor accessory to the `real' militaries of nation-states. **Yet NATO is the indispensable alliance for Western military force today**. Its members account for roughly two thirds of the global military expenditures, it is a key player in several military conflicts, and it is continually bolstering its technical capabilities to operate globally.(3) The war in Kosovo was a NATO mission and the military operations in Afghanistan likewise involve substantial NATO forces. More importantly, NATO's norms and consensuses shape a range of domestic policy spheres in the member and candidate states, from military spending and defense structures to civil rights in the armed forces. **The alliance's discourse of democracy and human rights now forms an integral part of the justification of military intervention globally. It is precisely this low-key `soft' image that makes NATO an exceptionally illuminating example of cosmopolitan militarism.** The alliance prompts us to go beyond the focus on one state, such as the US, and to consider the transnational operation of militarization in liberal democratic societies. I use the concept of cosmopolitanism to capture the mechanisms through which NATO is legitimized in its member and partner states. Militarism and cosmopolitanism appear to be incompatible at first: the former associates with nationalism and statism, while the latter eschews these notions. Although there is no single cosmopolitanism, the ideas and practices commonly described as cosmopolitan all position themselves in opposition to nationalist and statist particularity (cf Cheah and Robbins, 1998). They evoke an allegiance to the worldwide community of humans. This is exactly what NATO does. Through cosmopolitan rhetoric and imagery, the alliance casts itself as an agent of global peace. The important question here, then, is not whether NATO is a `truly' cosmopolitan institution or whether it is merely a fig leaf for the US military ^ industrial complex; the question rather is how NATO's activities are publicly legitimized through evoking loyalties to the whole of humanity. To use the concept of cosmopolitanism in this way is neither to assign any core meaning to it nor to implicate all cosmopolitan practices in militarization. It is rather to foreground the ways in which **cosmopolitan spatial imaginaries** can **legitimize militarization**.(4) NATO is statist and intergovernmental in its institutional structure, but it is cosmopolitan in its public legitimation in the member states.

**Hegemony invokes a permanent state of emergency that justifies our paranoid neurosis—the idea we need to deter invisible threats creates self-fulfilling prophecies makes war inevitable**

**Zizek 5**—prof, Sociology, University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Give Iranian Nukes a Chance, http://www.lacan.com/zizekiranian.htm)

But are nuclear arms in the hands of Iran's rulers really a threat to international peace and security? To answer the question properly, one has to locate it in its political and ideological context. Every power structure has to rely on an underlying implicit threat, i.e. whatever the oficial democratic rules and legal constraints may be, we can ultimately do whatever we want to you. In the 20th century, however, the nature of this link between power and the invisible threat that sustains it changed. Existing power structures no longer relied on their own fantasmatic projection of a potential, invisible threat in order to secure the hold over their subjects. Rather, the threat was externalized, displaced onto an Outside Enemy. It became the invisible (and, for that reason, all-powerful and omni-present) threat of this enemy that legitimized the existing power structure's **permanent state of emergency**. Fascists invoked the threat of the Jewish conspiracy, Stalinists the threat of the class enemy, Americans the threat of Communism-all the way up to today's "war on terror." The threats posed by such an invisible enemy legitimizes the logic of the preemptive strike. Precisely because the threat is virtual, one cannot afford to wait for it to come. Rather, one must strike in advance, before it is too late. In other words, the omni-present invisible threat of Terror legitimizes the all too visible protective measures of defense-which, of course, are what pose the true threat to democracy and human rights (e.g., the London police's recent execution of the innocent Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes). Classic power functioned as a threat that operated precisely by never actualizing itself, by always remaining a threatening gesture. Such functioning reached its climax in the Cold War, when the threat of mutual nuclear destruction had to remain a threat. With the "war on terror", the invisible threat causes the **incessant actualization**, not of the threat itself, but, of the measures against the threat. The nuclear strike had to remain the threat of a strike, while the threat of the terrorist strike triggers the endless series of preemptive strikes against potential terrorists. **We are** thus **passing from the logic of MAD** (Mutually Assured Destruction) **to a logic in which ONE SOLE MADMAN runs the entire show and is allowed to enact its paranoia.** **The power that presents itself as always being under threat**, living in mortal danger, and thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power-the very model of the Nietzschean ressentiment and moralistic hypocrisy. And indeed, it was Nietzsche himself who, more than a century ago, in Daybreak, provided the best analysis of the false moral premises of today's "war on terror": No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather, the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus **all states are now ranged against each other:** they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. **This presupposition**, however**, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse**. At bottom, indeed, **it is** itself the challenge and **the cause of wars,** because as I have said, **it attributes immorality to the neighbor and** thus **provokes a hostile disposition and act**. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. Is not the ongoing "war on terror" proof that "terror" is the antagonistic Other of democracy-the point at which democracy's plural options turn into a singular antagonism? Or, as we so often hear, "In the face of the terrorist threat, we must all come together and forget our petty differences." More pointedly, the difference between the "war on terror" with previous 20th century worldwide struggles such as the Cold War is that the enemy used to be clearly identified with the actually existing Communist empire, whereas today the terrorist threat is inherently spectral, without a visible center. It is a little bit like the description of Linda Fiorentino's character in The Last Seduction: "Most people have a dark side ... she had nothing else." Most regimes have a dark oppressive spectral side ... the terrorist threat has nothing else. The paradoxical result of this spectralization of the enemy is an unexpected reflexive reversal. In this world without a clearly identified enemy, it is the United States, the protector against the threat, that is emerging as the main enemy-much like in Agatha Christie's Murder on the Orient-Express, where, since the entire group of suspects is the murderer, the victim himself (an evil millionaire) turns out to be the real criminal. This background allows us to finally answer our initial question: Yes, nukes for Iran-and Noriega and Saddam to the Hague. It is crucial to see the link between these two demands. Why are Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Ignatieff and other internationalist liberals-who are otherwise full of pathetic praise for the Hague tribunal-silent about the idea to deliver Noriega and Saddam to the Hague? Why Milosevic and not Noriega? Why was there not even a public trial against Noriega? Was it because he would have disclosed his own CIA past, including how the United States condoned his participation in the murder of Omar Torrijos Herrera? In a similar way, Saddam's regime was an abominable authoritarian state, guilty of many crimes, mostly toward its own people. However, one should note the strange but key fact that, when the U.S. representatives were enumerating Saddam's evil deeds, they systematically omitted what was undoubtedly his greatest crime (in terms of human suffering and of violating international law): the aggression against Iran. Why? Because the United States and the majority of foreign states actively helped Iraq in this aggression. What's more, the United States now plans to continue Saddam's work of toppling the Iranian government.

## Terror

**Their threats of terrorism are paranoid creations of the MIC—impact is extinction**

**Valenzuela 3** Manuel, social critic, commentator, Internet essayist and author of Echoes in the Wind, “perpetual war; perpetual terror”

Without war, violence and weapons there is no Pentagon. And so to survive, to remain a player, wars must be created, weapons must be allocated, profits must be made and the Military Industrial Complex must continue exporting and manufacturing violence and conflict throughout the globe. And, as always, in the great tradition of the United States, enemies must exist. Indians, English, Mexicans, Spanish, Nazis, Koreans, Communists and now the ever-ambiguous Terrorists. The Cold War came to an end and so too the great profits of the MIC. Reductions in the Pentagon budget threatened the lifeblood of the industry; a new enemy had to be unearthed. There is no war – hence no profit – without evildoers, without terrorists lurching at every corner, waiting patiently for the moment to strike, instilling fear into our lives, absorbing our attention. We are told our nation is in imminent danger, that we are a mushroom cloud waiting to happen. And so we fear, transforming our mass uneasiness into nationalistic and patriotic fervor, wrapping ourselves up in the flag and the Military Industrial Complex. We have fallen into the mouse trap, becoming the subservient slaves of an engine run by greed, interested not in peace but constant war, constant killing and constant sacrifice to the almighty dollar. Brainwashed to believe that War is Peace we sound the drums of war, marching our sons and daughters to a battle that cannot be won either by sword or gun. We are programmed to see the world as a conflict between “Us” versus “Them”, “Good” versus “Evil,” that we must inflict death on those who are not with us and on those against us. The MIC prays on our human emotions and **psychology**, exploiting human nature and our still fragile memories of the horrors of 9/11, manipulating us to believe that what they say and do is right for us all. We unite behind one common enemy, fearing for our lives, complacent and obedient, blindly descending like a plague of locusts onto foreign land, devastating, usurping, conquering and devouring those who have been deemed enemies of the state, those who harbor and live among them, “evil ones,” “evildoers” and “haters of freedom,” all for the sake of profit and pillage, ideology and empire. Power unfettered and unleashed, our freedoms die and are released. The so-called “War on Terror” is but a charade, a fear-engendering escapade, designed to last into perpetuity, helping guarantee that the Military Industrial Complex will grow exponentially in power. It is a replacement for a Cold War long ago since retired and unable to deliver a massive increase in defense spending. Terrorists and the countries that harbor them have replaced the Soviet Union and Communists as enemy number one. With a war that may go on indefinitely, pursuing an enemy that lives in shadows and in the haze of ambiguity, the MIC will grow ever more powerful, conscripting hundreds of thousands of our youth, sending them to guide, operate and unleash their products of death. Rumblings of bringing back the draft are growing louder, and if you think your children and grandchildren will escape it, think again. In a war without end, in battles that do not cease, the MIC will need human flesh from which to recycle those who perish and fall wounded. Empire building needs bodies and drones to go with military might, instruments of death need trigger fingers and human brains, and, with so many expendable young men and women being conditioned in this so-called “war on terror,” MIC will continue its reprogramming of citizen soldiers from peaceful civilians to warmongering killing machines. After all, “War is Peace.” Yet the Department of War, ever steadfast to use its weaponry, fails to realize that no amount of money will win this war if the **root causes** of terrorism are not confronted as priority number one. If you get to the roots, you pull out the weed. If not, it grows back again and again. But perhaps a perpetual war is what MIC has sought all along. A lifetime of combat, a lifetime of profit, a lifetime of power. Assembly lines of missiles, bombs, tanks and aircraft operate without pause, helping expand a sluggish economy and the interests of the Pax Americana. Profit over people, violence before peace, the American killing machine continues on its path to **human extinction**, and it is the hands and minds of our best and brightest building and creating these products of decimation. While we look over our shoulders for terrorists and evildoers, the world ominously looks directly at us with both eyes intently focused on the armies of the “Great Satan” and the “Evil Empire,” not knowing which nation will be attacked or on whom the storm of satellite-guided-missiles will rain down on next. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. In becoming pre-emptive warmongers, we are also becoming victims of our own making, helping assure a swelling wrath of revenge, resentment and **retaliation** against us. If we kill we will be killed, if we destroy we will be destroyed. The MIC is leading us down a steep canyon of fury, making us a pariah, a rogue country in the eyes of the world. We are becoming that which we fear most, a terrorist state. As political scientist and ex-marine C. Douglas Lummis has said, “Air bombardment is state terrorism, the terrorism of the rich. It has burned up and blasted apart more innocents in the past six decades than have all the anti-state terrorists who have ever lived. Something has benumbed our consciousness against this reality.” Today we are seen, along with Israel, as the greatest threats to world peace. When hundreds of thousands throughout the planet call Bush “the world’s number one terrorist,” that less than admirable distinction is automatically imputed onto the nation as a whole and the citizens in particular. This can be seen in the world’s perception and treatment of us today.

**Their terrorism advantage is epistemologically suspect---the ballot is crucial to reject state-sponsored knowledge that legitimizes global violence**

**Raphael 9**—IR, Kingston University (Sam, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 49-51) ellipses in orig.

Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of ‘terrorism studies’ has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‘security studies’ (Reid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of ‘terrorism’, as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenomenon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Horgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identify a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992: 2–3). That is, there exists a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’ who have ‘recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. This community, or ‘network of productive authors’, has operated by establishing research agendas, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid, 1993, 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terrorism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2¶ Further, this community has traditionally had **significant influence** when it comes to the formulation of government policy, particularly in the United States. It is not the case that the academic field of terrorism studies operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 180; Burnett and Whyte, 2005), it is a community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Government agencies (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989: 142–190; RAND, 2004). Likewise, a high proportion of ‘core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, these scholars have **fed their ‘knowledge’ straight into the policymaking process** in the US.3¶ The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that **it is critically important to analyse the research output** from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the **aura of objectivity** surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a **positivist assumption**, explicitly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is **apolitical and objective** (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). There is little to **no reflexivity** on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This **reification of academic knowledge** about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its **contribution to the policymaking process** in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to **insulate** the broad direction of **US policy from critique**. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, it becomes **vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny**. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has **led the US** and its allies **to intervene throughout the South** on behalf of their national security, with **profound consequences** for the human security of people in the region.¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply **replicate official US government analyses**. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and **uncritical reliance on selective US government sources**, combined with the **frequent** use of **unsubstantiated assertion**. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to **insulate from critique** those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the **experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’** the **way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions** in the South. That is, ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19).¶ These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work **plagued by substantive problems** which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through **legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions** in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.

**Their repetition of terrorist threats reinforces stereotypes and leads to a fearful, securitized, islamophobia. Their disadvantage fuels calls to war and is academically suspect.**

Streuner and Willis, 2009 [Dr. Erin Steuter a nd Dr. De borah Wills Depart ment o f Soci ology Mount Allis on Univer sity rin Steuter and Deborah Wills are the authors of At Wa r with Meta phor: Media Propaganda and Racism in th e Wa r on Terr or (Lexington Books, 2008). Erin Steuter is an a ssociate professor of Soci ology where she specializes in examining the ideological repr esentations of the ne ws. Recip ient of multiple awards for her teaching and r esearch, her research and published works have appeared in Political Communication and Persuasion , Canadian Jo urnal of Communication , Journal of American and Comparative C ultures , a nd other noted academic journals. Deborah Wills is an associa te professor of English at Mount Allison University . “iscourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror “http://www.gmj.uottawa.ca/0902/v2i2\_steuter%20and%20wills.pdf]

One of the least visible bu t most ideological ly-charged choices in W ester n medi a’s coverage of the Afg han and Iraqi war s is its “consistent disinterest in nonviolent Muslim perspectives” (Gottsc halk and Greenberg 2007). As Peter Go ttschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2007) point out, moderate voices from the Mu slim community are routinely omitted from news coverage, an absence that confirms public stereotyping of all Muslims as extremist. While this omission pre-dates September11, it has intensified since; domestic news sources “seldom mention the terms ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ except in the context of conflict, violence, and bloodshed” (G ottschalk and Greenberg 2007).

Constructing the Enemy Media coverage of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are critically shaped by pre-existing, Is lamophobic frames that reflect neo-colonial assumptions (Henry & Tator, 2002; Kellner, 2004; Norris, Kern & Just, 2003; Nacos, 2002; Paletz, 1992; Picard, 1993). Karim argues that a coherent set of journalistic narratives have emerged regarding “Muslim terrorism” (2003: 81) narratives that reinforce stereotypes of murderous Muslims and advance limited and often inaccurate information about Islam. Edward Said (1997) similarly argues that the image of Is lam in Western media is laden “not only [with] patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unres trained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred” (Said, 1997: ii). He notes that “malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign cultu re in the West; what is said about the Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians” (Ibid: 12). Journalist David Lamb concurs, noting that Arabs are now “caricatur ed in a manner once reserved for blacks and Hispanics” (cited in Lester & Ross, 2003: 76).

Elizabeth Poole observes that in the media’s discussion of the War on Terror, anti-Western violence is “seen to evolve out of something inherent in the [Muslim] religion” (Poole, 2002: 4). As several studies have documented, after the events of 9/11, North American media intensified their depictions of prevailing st ereotypes about Arabs and Muslims (Pintak, 2006; Inbaraj, 2002; McChesney, 2002). Pintak contends that the bias in American media after 9/11 constitutes “jihad journalism”, adding that such slanted coverage became “the hallmark of the post-9/11 era” (Pintak, 2006: 42-44). The media’s dominant narrative, according to McChesney, portrays “a benevolent, democratic and peace-loving nation brutally attacked by insane evil terrorists who hate the United States for its fr eedoms” (McChesney, 2002: 43). Its chief message is that the U.S. “must immediately increase its military and covert forces, locate the surviving culprits and exterminate them” in order to “root out the global terrorist cancer” (Ibid). This dominant narrative’s reliance on disease metaphors poi nts to one of the key features of North American and European media coverage of th e wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the War on Terror in general: the patterned and systematic dehumanization of Muslims (Kuttab, 2007; Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson & Mihic, 2008)

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Philip Knightly’s (1975) and Sam Keen’s ( 1991) pioneering work on enemy construction analyzes the persistence of animal images of the enemy in media propaganda. The construction of the enemy as a dehumanized Other is much more than a representational strategy performed by the news media; its results can be global in reach. Said’s work lays much of the groundwork for current analyses of the media’s fabrication of the enemy-Other; it argues that colonial and imperial projects depend on the way we characterize those we see as deeply and oppositionally different from ourselves. Over time, these characterizations are systematized and grouped into an organized body of thought, a repertoire of words and images so often repeated that it comes to seem like objective knowledge. Orientalism, the distorting lens created by this process, offers a framework through which the West examines what it perceives as the foreign or alien, Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills 12 consistently figuring the East as the West’s invers e: barbaric to its civilized, superstitious to its rational, medieval to its modern. While We stern citizens are defined by their essential uniqueness and individuality, those of the East are constructed in metaphoric terms that emphasize their indistinguishability; the language of Western media discourse typically emphasizes mass over singularity when it represents the East.

In times of conflict, when constructions of the Other conflate with constructions of the enemy, this pattern intensifies. As Lori A. P eek points out, the processes of defining the enemy and defining the Other have a lot in common, in that they “sometimes lead to devastating outcomes” (Peek, 2004: 28). Presenting the enemy- Other as an indistinguishable mass is an essential strategy in the process of enemy fabrication; wartime images traditionally stress this indistinguishability, as evidenced in Frank Capra’s 1945 propaganda film, Know Your Enemy: Japan , which claimed all Japanese resembled “photographic reprints off the same negative” (Dower, 1986: 18), a message visually reinforced by inter-cutting scenes of a steel bar being hammered in a forge with scenes of regimented Japanese mass activity, the visual correlative of a race lacking individual identity.

Such representations operate most visibly in overt propaganda, but devolve so thoroughly into public discourse that they influence the media’s rhetorical choices. Middle-Eastern identities are confused and eroded; Rayan El Amine notes that the Islamic menace “has replaced the red menace, and the ‘evil empire’ of the cold war ha s become the . . . ‘evil doers’ of the Arab and Muslim world” (2005). The metaphors employed in Canadian newspaper headlines further and solidify such attitudes, compressing difference into unanimity by employing a vocabulary of indistinguishability. Unlike the civilized citizens of the West, who are prim arily identified with culture rather than with nature , the hordes of the East are represented as being as natural as insects and as undifferentiated as a hive or swarm. The headlines gathered here clearly indicate an ongoing equation of the Muslim Other with swarming insects and massing rodents, a metaphoric conflation that is especially resilient and persistent. As Merskin notes, we did not see “the end of enemy construction with the war in Iraq. The stereotype was carried from the Taliban, bin Laden, and terrorists to the axis of evil and Hussein. Since the occupation of Iraq, the evil Arab image shifted to . . . ‘crazed’ Ira qis opposed to U.S. occupation” (2004: 60). Such images are not, as Merskin argues, simply an issue of journalistic imbalance and unfair representations, but speak to fundamental questions of why such images are so necessary and prevalent.

**One in three billion chance of nuclear terrorism**

**Mueller 10** John, professor of political science at Ohio State University, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science & Technology, Winter2010, Vol. 26, Issue 2

In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only **limited desire** and **even less progress in going atomic**. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the **tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.**

The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence.

**Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely** not only because of the resistance of guards, but because **chase would be immediate**. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, "have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates."

**If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces**. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered.

Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home.

Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation.

Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group." They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine" whereas "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Stressing the "daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues," Younger concludes, "to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies" could fabricate a bomb "is farfetched at best."

**Under the best circumstances**, the process of making a bomb could take months or even **a year** or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals.

If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives.

The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily **become monumental**. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them.

Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting.

It is possible to calculate the chances for success. **Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists' favor** — for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles — the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be **less than one in a million**. If one assumes, somewhat **more realistically**, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to **one in well over three billion**.

Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.

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**Herman 12**—professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Edward, 7/25/12, Reality Denial : Steven Pinker's Apologetics for Western-Imperial Volence, http://www.zcommunications.org/reality-denial-steven-pinkers-apologetics-for-western-imperial-volence-by-edward-s-herman-and-david-peterson-1)

Disappearing Imperialism, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Institutional Imperatives¶ Pinker’s remarkable inversion of reality in portraying the post-World War II period as a “Long Peace,” with residual violence stemming from communist ideology and actions, points up the relevance of Chalmers Johnson’s comment that “**When imperialist activities produce unmentionable outcomes,…then ideological thinking kicks in**.”[34] It kicks in for Pinker with communist expansionism and U.S. “containment.” It also kicks in with his notion that communism, but not capitalism, was both “utopian” and “essentialist,” “submerge[ing] individuals into moralized categories,” and causing some of the worst atrocities of the modern period. (328-329) But weren’t the racism and anticommunism of the Western powers and in particular the United States “essentialist” ideologies in the Pinkerian sense, and wedded to the “full destructive might” of these powers? And didn’t these ideologies justify exterminations and massive ethnic cleansings of inferior and threatening peoples, replacing them with advanced peoples and cultures who put resources to a higher use? Weren’t Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman, and many other members of the Chicago School of Economics “free-market” ideologues?¶ The U.S. push for markets and investor rights and political control, sometimes called Imperialism, is for Pinker just natural and doing good, taking advantage of positive-sum business games with “gentle commerce,” as well as containing those with ideology who kill people freely. “The very idea of a capitalist peace is a shock to those who remember when capitalists were considered ‘merchants of death’ and ‘masters of war’,” (288) to give one example of Pinker’s perspective.[35] Pinker doesn’t mention any such thing as “aggressive commerce” or discuss the possibility (and reality) of the cross-border seizure of property by the more powerful states. There are 17 citations to “gentle commerce” in his Index, and writers who promulgate the related ideas of “gentle commerce,” “Democratic Peace,” “Liberal Peace,” “Capitalist Peace,” and “Kantian Peace” (in the Pinker-friendly version of it) are featured and referenced lavishly. But there are zero indexed citations to the word “imperialism” in Better Angels, and no mentions of Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick’s Aggressive Unilateralism, John Hobson’s Imperialism, John Ellis’ The Social History of the Machine Gun, Mike Davis’ Late Victorian Holocausts, Penny Lernoux’s Cry of the People, Gabriel Kolko’s Confronting the Third World, Noam Chomsky’s Deterring Democracy, Robert Engler’s The Politics of Oil, or David Harvey’s The New Imperialism.¶ Pinker’s ideological thinking stresses the development of positive and humane attitudes by individuals—in the Civilized states—moving them towards humane policy, opposition to slavery, concern for civilians in war, and moves toward democracy, while he essentially ignores **the development of institutional forces that might overwhelm these individual factors and make for serious violence.**¶ In addition to his neglect of “aggressive commerce” and cross-border seizures of people, property, and resources, Pinker ignores the post-World War II growth of U.S. militarism, with its **vested interests in weapons and warfare**, and the expanding and self-reinforcing power of the ”iron triangle” of the military-industrial-complex to shape national policy. This may be why he never mentions, let alone discusses, the classics on this topic by Seymour Melman, Gordon Adams, Richard Kaufman, and Tom Gervasi,[36] or the more recent work of Chalmers Johnson, Andrew Bacevich, Henry Giroux, Nick Turse, and Winslow Wheeler.[37] These very knowledgeable individuals believe that Eisenhower’s warning in his 1960 Farewell Address about the threat of the military-industrial complex was on target, that **the U**nited **S**tates **is** **dominated by an institutional structure with a huge vested interest in war rather than peace**, **and** one that **has succeeded in making this country into a war-demanding and war-making system**. These and other analysts have also featured the encroachment of the permanent-war system on civil liberties and democracy,[38] suggesting that any neo-Fukuyaman perspective on “end-of-history” liberalism and Pinker’s streaky but steady decline in violence is Panglossian **nonsense grounded in ideological thinking**.¶ Pinker prefers James Sheehan to Chalmers Johnson and Andrew Bacevich. Sheehan’s theme in Where Have All the Soldiers Gone: The Transformation of Modern Europe[39] is that Europeans have changed their very conception of the state, and made the state “no longer the proprietor of military force” but rather “a provisioner of social security and material well-being” (in Pinker’s summary of the book (268)). But the soldiers are still there, NATO is still expanding, Modern Europe is contributing troops and bombs to the Afghan war, was heavily involved in the 2011 war in Libya, and along with the United States, currently threatens Syria and Iran. Europe’s social security systems have been under attack for years, and the well-being of ordinary citizens seems to be a declining objective of Europe’s leaders, as well as those in the United States. Following the U.S. lead, Europe is moving from “cradle-to-grave nurturance” back to “military prowess”—exactly the opposite direction from that Pinker believes they have taken. (685)¶ Vietnam and the Antiwar Protests¶ Pinker’s proof of a march toward peace has other amusing features. He says that “another historic upheaval in the landscape of 20th century values was a resistance by the populations of the democratic nations to their leaders’ plans for war,” (263) and he spends a fair amount of space describing the growth of peace movement activism in the 1960s and in advance of the war on Iraq. Yet, elsewhere in his book he blames the 1960s movements for their “decivilizing” impact (see our section on “Class, Race, and the ‘Science of Self-Control’”), but in the present context they allow him to claim their actions as evidence of the march toward the “Long Peace.” Pinker claims that in the 1960s the peace movement helped elect Nixon, who “shifted the country’s war plans from a military victory to a face-saving withdrawal (though not before another twenty thousand Americans and a million Vietnamese had died in the fighting).” (264) Elsewhere in his book Pinker writes that the “war was ferociously prosecuted” by Nixon—and that plus 20,000 Americans and a million more Vietnamese would seem like big-time war-making. (683) But the peace movement’s alleged help in getting Nixon elected is Pinker’s evidence for the advance of the “better angels.” ¶ Pinker fails to explain why before, during, and after the Vietnam war the elites have been so little influenced by the masses marching in the streets. Why must the masses even march in the streets? Why must the elites continue to engage in military buildups and serious violence, at heavy economic cost, when according to his preferred expert James Sheehan the state is abandoning military force and focusing on the material well-being of the public? If institutional forces are not the explanation, why don’t the “better angels” trickle up to the leadership, especially when in his view the higher morality trickles down from the elite to the general population? ¶ According to Pinker, “The three deadliest postwar conflicts were fueled by Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese communist regimes that had a fanatical dedication to outlasting their opponents.” (308) As regards Vietnam, he goes on to show that the Vietnamese were willing to absorb large casualties inflicted on them by the U.S. invaders. For Pinker, this is the fanaticism that fueled the Vietnam war. There is not a word of criticism of the invaders who were willing to inflict those deaths in a distant land; certainly nothing “fanatical,” no mention of the UN Charter, no word like aggression is applied to this attack; and there is no mention anywhere in the book that the United States had supported the French effort at re-colonization, then supported a dictatorship of its own choosing; and that U.S. officials recognized that those fanatical resisters had majority support as we killed vast numbers of them to keep in power our imposed minority government. While acknowledging **800,000** or more “civilian battle deaths” in the Vietnam war, Pinker does not stop to explain how vast numbers of civilians could be killed in “battle” and whether these deaths might possibly represent a gross violation of the laws of war, or how this could happen in an era of rising morality and humanistic feelings, and carried out so ruthlessly by the dominant Civilized power.¶ Nowhere does Pinker mention the massive U.S. chemical warfare in Vietnam (1961-1970), and the estimated “three million Vietnamese, including 500,000 children,…suffering from the effects of toxic chemicals” used during this ugly and very unangelic form of warfare.[40] What makes this suppression especially interesting is that Pinker cites the outlawing and non-use of chemical and biological weapons as evidence of the new evolving higher morality and decline of violence (273-277)—so his dodging of the facts on the massive use of such weapons in Operation Ranch Hand and other U.S. programs in Vietnam is remarkable dishonesty.¶ Pinker would never think of accepting Vietnamese communist estimates of casualties, just as he does not hesitate to use numbers provided by the U.S. State Department.[41] But nowhere are Pinker’s biases more blatantly obvious than in this allocation of Vietnamese “civilian battle deaths” to the fanaticism of the communist resistance in not surrendering to an invader unleashing incredible violence from abroad for reasons its own leaders had difficulty settling on.¶ Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo¶ Pinker’s bias is also extremely clear when he gets to explaining the new morality applied by his country in assaulting Iraq. According to Pinker, the “Vietnam syndrome” has **caused the U.S. leadership to shy away from wars** that will cause many U.S. casualties or impose massive civilian casualties on foreigners. He writes that “Military leaders at all levels have become aware that gratuitous killing is a public relations disaster at home and counterproductive abroad alienating allies and emboldening enemies. The Marine Corps has therefore instituted a martial-arts program in which leathernecks are indoctrinated in a new mode of honor, the Ethical Marine Warrior,” whose “catechism” is that the warrior is a “protector of life,” including not just self and others but “all others.” (264-265) After he recounts a long story (“allegory”) with a humanistic touch applied to the behavior of U.S. soldiers, Pinker says that “The code of the Ethnical Warrior, even as an aspiration, shows that the American armed forces have come a long way from a time when its soldiers referred to Vietnamese peasants as gooks, slops, and slants and when the military was slow to investigate atrocities against civilians such as the massacre at My Lai.” (265-266)¶ Pinker provides no evidence that U.S. warriors today don’t refer to Iraqis and other invaded peoples with derogatory terms (e.g., “Haji”[42]), or that the Marine Warrior Code is even a genuine “aspiration” as opposed to a P.R. effort, or that it is actually “indoctrinated,” let alone taken seriously. He ignores the fact that back at the time of the Vietnam War there was a written military code as well as international law on the treatment of civilians that had no apparent impact on actual policy.[43] ¶ He also offers no evidence that the military is more ready now than in the past to investigate atrocities, or that they don’t see the main route to dealing with gratuitous (or strategically convenient and useful) civilian killings as non-investigation, denial, and cover-up. Pinker does not mention the repeated official assertion by Gen. Tommy Franks, the original commander of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, that “we don’t do body counts,”[44] nor does he discuss the U.S. brutalities and blatantly illegal actions in the destruction of Fallujah in 2004,[45] the cold-blooded killing in 2005 of 24 Iraqi civilians by U.S. Marines in the city of Haditha and its long cover-up,[46] or former U.S. Afghanistan force commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s admission before his own troops in 2010 that they had “shot an amazing number” of innocent Afghanis at checkpoints, “but to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be a threat.”[47] Pinker does mention WikiLeaks, but only once and in relation to what he describes as a “previously classified civilian casualty database of the American-led military coalition,” that not surprisingly attributed the “majority (around 80 percent) [to] Taliban insurgents rather than coalition forces.” (267) He does not discuss the well-publicized WikiLeaks release of the formerly “classified U.S. military video depicting the indiscriminate slaying of over a dozen people in the Iraqi suburb of New Baghdad.”[48] Nor does he mention any of WikiLeaks’ other substantial troves of documents.[49]¶ In short, for this stream of pro-war apologetics Pinker relies on pure assertion, the uncritical acceptance of official and implausible claims, and a refusal to report inconvenient evidence. ¶ However, when he deals with claims of mass civilian deaths brought about by U.S. policy in Iraq Pinker becomes much more demanding on the quality of evidence and methodology. One device that he uses here and elsewhere is to distinguish between the aggression-based killings by the United States during the initial stage he calls “quick” and “low in battle deaths,” and deaths during the “intercommunal violence in the anarchy that followed.” (266) He fails to mention the Nuremberg condemnation of aggression that ties it closely to deaths that follow: “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."[50] He ignores the facts that the civil conflicts were unleashed by the U.S. attack, and that the United States was an ongoing and large direct killer long after the “mission” was declared “accomplished” by George Bush on May 1, 2003. Fallujah and Haditha were just two of many U.S.-inflicted horrors that followed the announcement of an accomplished mission, and the U.S. invader-occupier was also an active manipulator of the civil conflicts that it unleashed. On the assumption that Nuremberg principles apply, this entire death-dealing and hugely violent enterprise is the legal and moral responsibility of Pinker’s home country leaders—a point that Pinker evades.¶ Pinker goes to some pains to discredit the higher-end mortality estimates for both the Iraqi theater of conflict under the U.S. war and occupation and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after its 1996 invasion by Rwanda and Uganda, two key U.S. allies in Central Africa. Specifically, he criticizes the work of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health researchers, published in the British medical journal The Lancet in October 2006, which reported that 655,000 Iraqis had died during the roughly 40-month period from the March 20, 2003 U.S. invasion through July 2006, with some 601,000 of these deaths due to violence.[51] He also criticizes the January 2008 report by the Brussels-based International Rescue Committee and the Burnet Institute of the University of Melbourne, which estimated 5.4 million excess deaths from all causes in the eastern DRC for the period 1998 to April 2007.[52]¶ Pinker asserts that these mortality estimates are “not credible,” and refers to both of them with the derogatory term “revisionist” (his emphasis). “Revisionist” in this case means essentially not in accord with estimates that Pinker prefers. “Rather than counting bodies from media reports and nongovernmental organizations,” Pinker writes, “surveyors ask a sample of people whether they know someone who was killed, then extrapolate the proportion to the population as a whole….Without meticulous criteria for selecting a sample, extrapolations to an entire population can be wildly off.” (317-318) Thus in these two cases he rejects a method that is the current standard in epidemiological research—and that Pinker himself uses when it serves his methodological purposes (see “Massaging the Numbers,” below)—and that in our opinion is the soundest way of estimating mortality rates in large-scale armed conflicts, with their dangerous, high-risk settings and the frequent unreliability of governmental record-keeping. ¶ Pinker and his preferred sources contend that the John Hopkins survey suffered from a “main street bias” that caused a substantial overestimation of Iraqi deaths.[53] These critics fail to mention that the John Hopkins team deliberately excluded the city of Fallujah from their sample. Fallujah had suffered two major U.S. military assaults in 2004, the second, in November and December, having devastated this city of some 250,000 people. When the Johns Hopkins team carried out its first survey of Iraqi mortality rates in September 2004, no fewer than two-thirds of all the violent deaths that it found for all of Iraq were reported in just one cluster of households in Fallujah. The researchers decided to exclude the Fallujah data from their 2004 mortality estimate, believing that its inclusion would skew the overall results;[54] and when they carried out their second, more extensive survey in 2006, they excluded Fallujah altogether. This gave their estimate a substantial downward bias.[55]¶ Pinker prefers the estimates produced by Iraq Body Count, an organization that relies largely on newspaper reports, and admittedly undercounts deaths with this unscientific methodology.[56] For the same period covered by the John Hopkins study (March 2003 - July 2006), IBC estimated 53,373 Iraqi deaths due to violence,[57] making the Johns Hopkins estimate of deaths caused by violence (601,000) more than eleven-times greater than the IBC’s. As Gilbert Burnham, who led the second of the Johns Hopkins teams, observes, “I can’t think of any country that would estimate its national mortality rates by obituary notices in the newspapers.”[58] Pinker also favors the 2008 report by the Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group—essentially, by employees of the puppet government of the U.S. military occupation—that estimated the number of violent deaths in Iraq to have been 151,000 from March 2003 through June 2006 (or roughly the same period as covered by the Johns Hopkins study).[59] Unlike the Johns Hopkins team, the Iraq Family Health Survey did not request copies of death certificates from surviving family members to help verify their claims; and the field research was carried out by employees of highly politicized Iraqi ministries serving under the U.S. occupation regime. So again here as elsewhere, Pinker uses the preferential method of research, selecting his sources on the basis of their congenial findings, accepting methodologies that are often laughable, and admonishing researchers who come up with the wrong conclusions for the technical flaws in methods entirely ignored by the Truthers.¶ In what on Pinkerian logic might be described as the ultimate in “revisionism,” Pinker completely ignores the “sanctions of mass destruction” imposed on Iraq by the UN but under U.S.-dominant influence and command, which in varying degrees of severity lasted from August 1990 into the U.S. invasion-occupation of 2003. It has been estimated that these sanctions may have **caused a million Iraqi deaths**, and in a notable incident, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright said in a 60 Minutes interview in 1996 that the sanctions-based deaths of an estimated “**half a million**” **Iraqi children** were “worth it.”[60] In another notable statement on the Iraq sanctions, John Mueller and Karl Mueller wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs that **this sanctions regime caused more deaths than “all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history**.”[61] U.S. officials knew that their destruction of Iraqi sanitation and water facilities by bombing raids during the 1991 war might well cause disease and deaths, but this did not impede the bombing or prevent the follow-up refusal to allow Iraq to buy replacement equipment during the sanctions era.[62] Pinker never mentions these unangelic sanctions and this massive death toll, and though he thanks John Mueller in his Preface to Better Angels and cites Mueller 20 times in his Index and lists 10 different works by Mueller in his References, Pinker somehow misses Mueller’s co-authored Foreign Affairs article that throws grisly light on a major case of mass killing—but by the United States, hence invisible to Pinker.¶ Pinker is equally committed to minimizing the human cost of the violence in the DRC, and therefore dismissive of higher-end estimates of mortality rates there. John O’Shea of the Irish relief agency GOAL has called the DRC the “worst humanitarian tragedy since the Holocaust,"[63] and Reuters contends that the war in the DRC “has claimed at least 10 times as many lives as the December [2004] tsunami yet remains almost unheard of outside of Africa.”[64] As of 2005, the eastern DRC already had suffered a decade of violence, and the August 2010 UN “mapping exercise” on the most serious violations of human rights in the DRC reported that the “apparently systematic and widespread nature of the attacks, which targeted very large numbers of Rwandan Hutu refugees and members of the Hutu civilian population, resulting in their death, reveal a number of damning elements that, if they were proven before a competent court, could be classified as crimes of genocide.”[65]¶ But Pinker’s preferred sources on the DRC—the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Norway; the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden; and the Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University in Canada—are alike in contending that, in Pinker’s words, the IRC-Burnet estimate was “inflated” by “about thirty-five times the PRIO battle-death estimate,” and by more than six-times the estimate produced by the HSRP (which includes both direct and indirect causes of deaths). (317) In their reliance on “public sources” such as international and non-governmental organizations, and most important, news agencies,[66] the “passive surveillance” methods employed by both PRIO and UCDP parallel Iraq Body Count’s methods, and HSRP largely depends on the work of PRIO and UCDP. But no matter how many different media sources one checks, even working from comprehensive databases such as Factiva and Nexis, this is a limited and unscientific methodology, almost guaranteed to yield undercounts, especially in large-scale, multiyear theaters of conflict such as the DRC and Iraq. With its estimates of mortality restricted to the category of “battle-related deaths,”[67] we believe that the adoption of this methodology is motivated to serve political ends. (For more on PRIO and the UCDP, see “Sources and Methods,” below.)¶ Following the lead of the Human Security Report Project’s 2009/2010 The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (which thanks Pinker by name in its acknowledgements section), Pinker charges the IRC-Burnet estimate with working from a “prewar death rate that was far too low,” and “subtracting it from an estimate of the rate during the war that was far too high.”[68] (319) The HSRP, Pinker adds, “cautions against accepting estimates of excess deaths from retrospective survey data, since in addition to all of their sampling pitfalls, they require dubious conjectures about what would have happened if a war had not taken place.” (319)¶ The IRC-Burnet researchers produced compelling replies to these charges, pointing out that even if they had used the higher baseline mortality rate of 2.0 deaths per 1,000 preferred by HSRP and Pinker, the “estimated deaths would be 3.3 million since 1998”[69]—nearly four times as many as the HSRP’s “best estimate” of 860,000 deaths for the shorter period from May 2001 through April 2007.[70] But these competing claims have no bearing on a separate survey on behalf of the UN, which had already estimated that through September 2002, some 3.5 million excess deaths had occurred in the eastern provinces as a “direct result of the occupation of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda.”[71] We should add that, just as the Johns Hopkins surveys excluded Fallujah, thereby injecting a conservative factor into their results, the IRC-Burnet survey excluded from its samples locations where the violence and the risk to the researchers were greater than in the locations included in the samples, giving the IRC-Burnet results a conservative tilt as well. ¶ But something else is almost surely at work behind Pinker’s advocacy for lower death tolls in Iraq and the DRC, and his reliance on sources that attack the work of researchers who have produced the higher-end estimates. Namely, his “New Peace” and “waning-of-war” agenda requires it. **Two large-scale bloodbaths like those in Iraq and the DRC must be downsized to fit his agenda.**  Pinker therefore locates the lower-end numbers that he wants, ignores the “sanctions of mass destruction” in Iraq, attributes responsibility for the Iraq invasion-occupation deaths to “intercommunal” violence, thereby taking the United States off-the-hook, and clings to a “battle death” estimate for the DRC that ignores the many more indirect deaths from malnutrition and otherwise treatable diseases that characterized life in the eastern DRC over much of the past two decades, and comprise the major component of the DRC toll.

**Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy---the strategy omnipotence sees threats to empire everywhere, which necessitates constant violence---you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus**

**McClintock 9**—chaired prof of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at UW–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (Anne, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be **dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.”** I have come to feel that we cannot understand the **extravagance of the violence** to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, **thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured**—unless we grasp a **defining feature of our moment**, that is, **a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power**. Taking shape, as it now does, around **fantasies of global omnipotence** (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with **nightmares of impending attack, the U**nited **S**tates **has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe.** For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both **deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat.** Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a **limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end.** But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “**a consensual hallucination,”** 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil **only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.**

I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible **(the better politically to challenge)** those established but **concealed circuits of imperial violence** that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the **continuities that connect those circuits** of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a **super-carceral state.** 5

Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of **intellectual** **inquiry**, as well as the claims of **political responsibility,** not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace **the shadowlands of empire?** If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, **casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters?** For **imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere,** an **offshore** fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, **from within**,

## Cheesman and Bruce

**Cheeseman & Bruce 96** Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce Assoc. Prof in social sciences @ Curtin univ, ’96, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

# 1NR

## Terror

**Aff can’t reduce resentment---not sufficient**

Stephen Holmes 13, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, July 2013, “What’s in it for Obama?,” The London Review of Books, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/stephen-holmes/whats-in-it-for-obama>

On the basis of undisclosed evidence, evaluated in unspecified procedures by rotating personnel with heterogeneous backgrounds, the US is continuing to kill those it classifies as suspected terrorists in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. It has certainly been eliminating militants who had nothing to do with 9/11, including local insurgents fighting local battles who, while posing no realistic threat to America, had allied themselves opportunistically with international anti-American jihadists. By following the latter wherever they go, the US is allowing ragtag militants to impose ever new fronts in its secret aerial war. Mistakes are made and can’t be hidden, at least not from local populations. Nor can the resentment of surrounding communities be easily assuaged. This is because, even when it finds its target, the US is killing not those who are demonstrably guilty of widely acknowledged crimes but rather those who, it is predicted, will commit crimes in the future. Of course, the civilian populations in the countries where these strikes take place will never accept the hunches of CIA or Pentagon futurologists. And so they will never accept American claims about the justice of Obama’s slimmed-down war on terror, but instead claim the right of self-defence, and this would be true even if drone operators could become as error-free as Brennan once claimed they already are. But of course collateral damage and mistaken-identity strikes will continue. They are inevitable accompaniments of all warfare. And they, too, along with intentional killings that are never publicly justified, will communicate resoundingly to the world that the arbitrary and unpredictable killing of innocent Muslims falls within America’s commodious concept of a just war.

**Plan causes extraordinary rendition shift**

Kenneth Anderson 09, Professor of International Law at American University, 5/31, “Security Issues Like Squeezing Jello? Reversion to the Mean? Jack Goldsmith on the Effects of Security Alternatives,” http://opiniojuris.org/2009/05/31/security-issues-like-squeezing-jello-reversion-to-the-mean-jack-goldsmith-on-the-effects-of-security-alternatives/#sthash.TB1xcePu.dpuf

One way you might look at this is that there is a sort-of national security constant that remains in equilibrium over time, using one tactic or another, gradually evolving but representing over time a reversion to the national security mean. Or you might say that national security, seen over time, looks a little like squeezing jello – if squeezed one place it pops out another. ¶ I think Jack is right that the administration – any administration – tends to strive for a certain equilibrium, as it is confronted with a flow of threats that the public discounts to near-zero but which it does not see itself quite so able to do, however much it might want to. However, as the op-ed also notes, and I agree, these methods are not completely equivalent or compensating. That is so not just with regards to third party costs, but also with respect to security as such. Intelligence gathering, by all accounts not very effective to begin with, has become much more difficult. This is not compensation, it is a seemingly permanent downward shift in the security mean. ¶ Besides the consequences that Jack identifies, I would add that the current move to semi-compensating policies means two things. First, intelligence is likely to be increasingly outsourced to foreign intelligence services. That can provide valuable information, but it will be increasingly uncorroborated and subject to filtering by those services. That is not good. ¶ Second, in a somewhat unrelated matter, I would guess that future conflicts, where not fought by Predator, will be increasingly outsourced to proxy forces. ¶ In the focus on intelligence and security, I think this second point has not received sufficient attention. The United States has a long familiarity with proxy forces as a form of deniability, among other things – Ronald Reagan, for example, faced with many limitations placed by Congress on his uses of force, found proxy forces an essential element of his foreign policy, in Central America particularly. The domestic risks that policy can entail are illustrated by the Iran-Contra contra-temps; on the other hand, Reagan was reasonably successful in pursuing his administration’s anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policy aims in Salvador and Nicaragua, among other places, by proxy forces. ¶ But I would be quite surprised if proxy war were not today under active discussion for places like Somalia (where we have already undertaken measures close to it) and other places. More precisely, I would surprised if it were not an active discussion among the New Liberal Realists of the Obama administration, whatever the transnationalists say or think.¶ In any case, whether those last two speculations prove true or not, the tendency of the administration to seek compensating policies seems likely at a minimum to complicate the issues of Guantanamo, Bagram, and other matters besides.

**Their repetition of terrorist threats reinforces stereotypes and leads to a fearful, securitized, islamophobia. Their disadvantage fuels calls to war and is academically suspect.**

Streuner and Willis, 2009 [Dr. Erin Steuter a nd Dr. De borah Wills Depart ment o f Soci ology Mount Allis on Univer sity rin Steuter and Deborah Wills are the authors of At Wa r with Meta phor: Media Propaganda and Racism in th e Wa r on Terr or (Lexington Books, 2008). Erin Steuter is an a ssociate professor of Soci ology where she specializes in examining the ideological repr esentations of the ne ws. Recip ient of multiple awards for her teaching and r esearch, her research and published works have appeared in Political Communication and Persuasion , Canadian Jo urnal of Communication , Journal of American and Comparative C ultures , a nd other noted academic journals. Deborah Wills is an associa te professor of English at Mount Allison University . “iscourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror “http://www.gmj.uottawa.ca/0902/v2i2\_steuter%20and%20wills.pdf]

One of the least visible bu t most ideological ly-charged choices in W ester n medi a’s coverage of the Afg han and Iraqi war s is its “consistent disinterest in nonviolent Muslim perspectives” (Gottsc halk and Greenberg 2007). As Peter Go ttschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2007) point out, moderate voices from the Mu slim community are routinely omitted from news coverage, an absence that confirms public stereotyping of all Muslims as extremist. While this omission pre-dates September11, it has intensified since; domestic news sources “seldom mention the terms ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ except in the context of conflict, violence, and bloodshed” (G ottschalk and Greenberg 2007).

Constructing the Enemy Media coverage of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are critically shaped by pre-existing, Is lamophobic frames that reflect neo-colonial assumptions (Henry & Tator, 2002; Kellner, 2004; Norris, Kern & Just, 2003; Nacos, 2002; Paletz, 1992; Picard, 1993). Karim argues that a coherent set of journalistic narratives have emerged regarding “Muslim terrorism” (2003: 81) narratives that reinforce stereotypes of murderous Muslims and advance limited and often inaccurate information about Islam. Edward Said (1997) similarly argues that the image of Is lam in Western media is laden “not only [with] patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unres trained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred” (Said, 1997: ii). He notes that “malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign cultu re in the West; what is said about the Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians” (Ibid: 12). Journalist David Lamb concurs, noting that Arabs are now “caricatur ed in a manner once reserved for blacks and Hispanics” (cited in Lester & Ross, 2003: 76).

Elizabeth Poole observes that in the media’s discussion of the War on Terror, anti-Western violence is “seen to evolve out of something inherent in the [Muslim] religion” (Poole, 2002: 4). As several studies have documented, after the events of 9/11, North American media intensified their depictions of prevailing st ereotypes about Arabs and Muslims (Pintak, 2006; Inbaraj, 2002; McChesney, 2002). Pintak contends that the bias in American media after 9/11 constitutes “jihad journalism”, adding that such slanted coverage became “the hallmark of the post-9/11 era” (Pintak, 2006: 42-44). The media’s dominant narrative, according to McChesney, portrays “a benevolent, democratic and peace-loving nation brutally attacked by insane evil terrorists who hate the United States for its fr eedoms” (McChesney, 2002: 43). Its chief message is that the U.S. “must immediately increase its military and covert forces, locate the surviving culprits and exterminate them” in order to “root out the global terrorist cancer” (Ibid). This dominant narrative’s reliance on disease metaphors poi nts to one of the key features of North American and European media coverage of th e wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the War on Terror in general: the patterned and systematic dehumanization of Muslims (Kuttab, 2007; Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson & Mihic, 2008)

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Philip Knightly’s (1975) and Sam Keen’s ( 1991) pioneering work on enemy construction analyzes the persistence of animal images of the enemy in media propaganda. The construction of the enemy as a dehumanized Other is much more than a representational strategy performed by the news media; its results can be global in reach. Said’s work lays much of the groundwork for current analyses of the media’s fabrication of the enemy-Other; it argues that colonial and imperial projects depend on the way we characterize those we see as deeply and oppositionally different from ourselves. Over time, these characterizations are systematized and grouped into an organized body of thought, a repertoire of words and images so often repeated that it comes to seem like objective knowledge. Orientalism, the distorting lens created by this process, offers a framework through which the West examines what it perceives as the foreign or alien, Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills 12 consistently figuring the East as the West’s invers e: barbaric to its civilized, superstitious to its rational, medieval to its modern. While We stern citizens are defined by their essential uniqueness and individuality, those of the East are constructed in metaphoric terms that emphasize their indistinguishability; the language of Western media discourse typically emphasizes mass over singularity when it represents the East.

In times of conflict, when constructions of the Other conflate with constructions of the enemy, this pattern intensifies. As Lori A. P eek points out, the processes of defining the enemy and defining the Other have a lot in common, in that they “sometimes lead to devastating outcomes” (Peek, 2004: 28). Presenting the enemy- Other as an indistinguishable mass is an essential strategy in the process of enemy fabrication; wartime images traditionally stress this indistinguishability, as evidenced in Frank Capra’s 1945 propaganda film, Know Your Enemy: Japan , which claimed all Japanese resembled “photographic reprints off the same negative” (Dower, 1986: 18), a message visually reinforced by inter-cutting scenes of a steel bar being hammered in a forge with scenes of regimented Japanese mass activity, the visual correlative of a race lacking individual identity.

Such representations operate most visibly in overt propaganda, but devolve so thoroughly into public discourse that they influence the media’s rhetorical choices. Middle-Eastern identities are confused and eroded; Rayan El Amine notes that the Islamic menace “has replaced the red menace, and the ‘evil empire’ of the cold war ha s become the . . . ‘evil doers’ of the Arab and Muslim world” (2005). The metaphors employed in Canadian newspaper headlines further and solidify such attitudes, compressing difference into unanimity by employing a vocabulary of indistinguishability. Unlike the civilized citizens of the West, who are prim arily identified with culture rather than with nature , the hordes of the East are represented as being as natural as insects and as undifferentiated as a hive or swarm. The headlines gathered here clearly indicate an ongoing equation of the Muslim Other with swarming insects and massing rodents, a metaphoric conflation that is especially resilient and persistent. As Merskin notes, we did not see “the end of enemy construction with the war in Iraq. The stereotype was carried from the Taliban, bin Laden, and terrorists to the axis of evil and Hussein. Since the occupation of Iraq, the evil Arab image shifted to . . . ‘crazed’ Ira qis opposed to U.S. occupation” (2004: 60). Such images are not, as Merskin argues, simply an issue of journalistic imbalance and unfair representations, but speak to fundamental questions of why such images are so necessary and prevalent.

## Circumvention

**Yes motive – institutional incentives**

William **Scheuerman**, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, **2013** [Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, PhD from Harvard, Barack Obama's "war on terror", Eurozine, 3/7/2013, <http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2013-03-07-scheuerman-en.pdf>, BJM]

Given dual democratic legitimacy, holders of executive power face deeply rooted institutional incentives to retain whatever power or authority has landed in their laps. Fundamentally, their political fate is separate from that of the legislature's. They have to prove −− on their own −− that they deserve the trust placed in them by the electorate. Unlike prime ministers in parliamentary regimes, they also face strict term limits. As astute observers have noted, this provides political life in presidential regimes with a particular sense of urgency since the executive will only have a short span of time in which to advance his or her program. Presidentialism's strict separation of powers means that the executive will soon likely face potentially hostile opponents who have gained a foothold in the legislature. In the US, for example, even presidents recently elected with large majorities immediately need to worry about looming midterm congressional elections. To be sure, even prime ministers in parliamentary systems will want to get things done. But incentives to do so in a high−speed fashion remain more deeply ingrained in presidential systems. These familiar facts about presidentialism allow us to help make sense of Obama's disappointing record. Without doubt, Obama has been personally as well as ideologically committed to reining in Bush−era executive prerogative. Yet he now occupies an institutional position which necessarily makes him averse to far−reaching attempts to limit his own room for effective political and administrative action, especially when the stakes are high, as is manifestly the case in counterterrorism. Understandably, he needs to worry that the electorate will punish him −− and not the Congress or Supreme Court −− for mistakes which might result in deadly terrorist attacks on US citizens. Given the institutional dynamics of a presidential system characterized by more−or−less permanent rivalry, it is hardly surprising that he has held onto so much of the prerogative power successfully claimed for the executive branch by his right−wing predecessor. As Obama's own political advisors have been vocally telling him since 2009, it might indeed prove politically perilous if he were to go too far in abandoning the substantial discretionary powers he enjoys in the war on terror. Unfortunately, their "sound" political advice −− which indeed may have helped Obama get reelected −− simultaneously has had deeply troublesome humanitarian and legal consequences.