#### A2: you instrumentalize

 (Jose **Medina**, October **2011**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, 6/26/12,K.H.)

Insurrectionary genealogies exploit the openness of our (indefinitely mul-tiple) pasts. As G.H. Mead suggested in the Philosophy of the Present (1949), the past is as open as the future,56 and they are both equally dependent on the present. As Mead puts it, ‚the novelty of every future demands a novel past.‛57 The past is re-newed in and through our interpretative practices; it is rendered present in our lives through interpretations that are always the result of re-descriptions and negotiations from the vantage point of the present informed by our current vision of the future.58 For this reason, our past is incessantly novel: we make it and remake it, incessantly, in every present.59 But here an important worry arises: the worry of instrumentalization. We can do harm to past subjects by instrumentalizing their struggles, by co-opting their voices and experiences and using them for our own purposes. If forgetting or ignoring past subjects and their struggles can be unjust, we also commit injustices through the epistemic spoliation of past lives. We have obligations with respect to subjects of the past, who had their own interests and values. For example, those who have lived under slavery, the victims of Auschwitz, those tortured and killed by dictatorial regimes, the thousands who die every year in the USA without medical attention or basic necessities, and many others should be remembered not simply because we find it useful or in our interest, but because their lives and deaths deserve critical attention and to be put in relation to our own. Following Mead as well as critical theorists as different as Jürgen Habermas and Walter Benjamin, James Bohman (2009) and Max Pensky (2009) have argued against the instrumentalization of the past and for the need to give moral recognition to past subjects and moral weight to their experiences and perspectives. As Bohman puts it, ‚we do not just deliberate about the past but rather with the past.‛60 From a Foucaultian perspective the instrumentalization worry is appeased not by giving moral recognition to sub-jects of the past as partners in deliberation, but rather, by acknowledging their agency and power/knowledges, whether or not these can be recruited to our delibe-ration processes in the way we would like. On the thoroughly pluralistic view of epistemic agency that we find in the Foucaultian framework, there is an irreducible plurality of centers of experience and agency that function as centers of resistance and contestability. Differently situated discursive subjectivities (or publics) have differential capacities to contest and resist the truths/untruths and the knowledges/ignorances that surround their discursive lives. And insofar as our predecessors are treated as discursive subjects—and not as mere objects to be manipulated at will—we need to take into account their per-spectives. Insurrectionary genealogies must take into account the experiences and valuations of past subjects, in which we can find challenges, subversions, and resistances of all sorts. It is there where genealogical investigations draw their cri-tical force. It is in the friction between forgotten and silenced lives and the lives of the present where the insurrections start to happen. Animated by a guerrilla plura-lism, Foucaultian genealogies, far from contributing to instrumentalizations and sub-jugations of the past, are in fact tools for resisting them; their critical power resides precisely in resisting unifications and totalizing perspectives. Genealogical investigations are informed by multiple processes of inter-pellation with traffic going in all directions. In particular, there are two very dif-ferent forms of interpellation at play: genealogists interpellate past subjects, but they are also interpellated by subjects of the past. And this double interpellation is some-thing very different from merely treating past subjects as partners in deliberation. It involves more complex (and varied) communicative and normative interrelations. **It involves a mutual process of estrangement**: we make past lives alien as they also make our own lives strangely unfamiliar. So, in **insurrectionary genealogies, far from ma-king ourselves free to remember or forget in whatever way seems most convenient to us**, we make ourselves vulnerable to the past by opening our memories to the challenges and contestations of various subjects—the subjects in our present and in our future as well as those in the past—with whom we compare and contrast our discursive perspectives. In genealogical investigations of this sort, the engagement with past subjectivities is mutually transformative: we open ourselves up to interro-gation by voices and perspectives hidden in our past, while at the same time we also cast them in a new light that they did not enjoy before the genealogical encounter. Through these critical transformations new connections are brought to light, new possibilities of resistance are activated, and new forms of solidarity become possible. Without losing sight of the specificity of local struggles, without subsuming them under grand movements of liberation, genealogical investigations help us see the interconnections among historically situated forms of subjugation. Through insur-rectionary genealogies we can become part of multiple communities of resistance—past, present, and future ones—which, without being unified, intersect and overlap in complex ways, creating friction of all sorts. Drawing on the epistemic friction among multiple sources of agency and multiple power/knowledges, insurrectionary genealogies activate counter-memories that make available multiplicitous pasts for differently constituted and positioned subjectivities, making it possible to form plu-ral and heterogeneous forms of solidarity with the past, and opening up new possi-bilities for social contestation.

#### It’s inherent.

**Bernstein ‘2**

(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues "this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. **There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life**" (IR 81). 15 "**The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being**. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — **this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings**. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "**Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

**The relationship towards death is, and must be, an individual determination—if a person perceives their interests as valuable, or that death will be a different state, then our obligation would be to prevent their death**

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Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, **attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person**, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. **If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable, precisely to the extent that he or she values it**. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the **primary** **injustice** done to a person is to deprive the person of a life **he or she may think valuable**. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — **friendships, family, life goals, etc**. — which are subjected to de facto **self-assessment** for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

#### There is no one, abstract truth of the situation. These truths become ossified, dead, and inert when not discussed in terms of lived human experience. Our genealogy is a crucial form of epistemic interrogation. Is key

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The genesis amnesia with respect to the truths circulated in our discursive practices is problematic because it forces us to accept inherited truths independently of the life-experiences from which they were drawn. James warns us against the danger of relying uncritically on fixed truths, for this means relying on the experiences and valuations of others or of our past selves, which may have lost their force and appropriateness in our current experiential contexts. Fixity is a property that human truths cannot have. Those recalcitrant truths that take the appearance of being permanent and fixed simply hide ossified valuations and rigidified beliefs. Our body of truths always has to be critically revisited in the light of new expe-riences. On James’s view, truths cannot simply be taken for granted, because they become inert or dead truths, i.e. truths that have been removed from the stream of life and are presented in complete independence from particular experiential contexts and particular experiential subjects.52 Truths have to be related to the subjects in whose life they make a difference, to their experiences and valuations. According to James, when truths are detached from the life-experiences that gave them birth, they lose their vital force and they become rigid, ossified, dead. Truths cannot be simply found; they have to be created or recreated to be alive. Living truths are truths of our own making. Of course, the living truths we make today will be the dead truths of tomorrow. Our truths lose their action-guiding value and productivity when they are detached from concrete life-experiences, becoming ossified by habitual use. But this does not mean that we cannot rely on those beliefs that have been previously accepted as true. Our epistemic activities need to rely on a stock of truths that have been previously established in our transactions with the world (our own as well as those of others). But the older truths on which we rely cannot be simply taken for granted; they have to be subject to a critical epistemic examination that traces them back to their experiential sources. This is why James claims that, besides a method, pragmatism is ‚a genetic theory of what is meant by truth.‛53 We have to uncover how truths have been made. We need to recover ‚the trail of the human serpent‛ that is left ‚over everything‛54 and is often erased or forgotten. It is in this sense that the Jamesian approach to truth is essentially genealogical.55 On James’s view, the epistemic analysis of our beliefs requires the genealogy of those ideas and thoughts that have been made true in our practices. But of course genealogies are driven by present concerns and interests and, therefore, they are both backward-looking and forward-looking simultaneously. Jamesian genealogies trace the vital trajectories of our truths within our practices, presenting them at the cross-roads between the life-experiences and actions of the past and those of the present and future. The critical task, for James, is to trace the practical trajectories along which the life of those truths have run their course, trying to determine if there is still some life left in them and what paths their present and future life can take. But notice that the exclusive focus of Jamesian genealogies is on continuities and convergences in alethic trajectories within our practices. A Jamesian genealogy tries to uncover what our truths have done so far and what they can still do for us. A Foucaultian genealogy goes much further and its attention to epistemic diffe-rences is more radical. A Foucaultian genealogy tries to uncover what our truths have never done for (some of) us and never will; and it tries to connect the truths generated within a given practice with the un-truths that are also generated along-side them, digging up all sorts of epistemic frictions and struggles that reveal the competing and alternative truths that may lie in the interstices of a discursive practice or in counter-discourses. Thus, as argued above, in Foucault we find a more radical and uncompromising epistemic pluralism, a guerrilla pluralism. Grounded in this pluralism, Foucaultian genealogical investigations have their primary focus on discontinuities and divergences in alethic trajectories that can interrogate the con-tinuities and convergences that we take for granted, and thus produce ‚an insur-rection of subjugated knowledges.‛ Foucaultian genealogy is not only a way of re-freshing or reviving our past in the light of our present; it is the more radical attempt to make our present and our past alien to us, to look at historical trajectories with fresh eyes, with different eyes, so that they appear as strange artifacts. And this pro-cess of self-estrangement in which Foucaultian genealogies consist involves the un earthing of the radical differences that lie within our practices and within ourselves, but have been silenced, marginalized, stigmatized, excluded, or forgotten. A genea-logy animated not simply by a melioristic pluralism, but by a guerrilla pluralism, re-quires more than merely revisiting the past to see how and why things were settled in the way they were. It requires interrogating and contesting any settlement, ma-king the past come undone at the seams, so that it loses its unity, continuity, and na-turalness, so that it does not appear any more as a single past that has already been made, but rather, as a heterogeneous array of converging and diverging struggles that are still ongoing and only have the appearance of having been settled. When social divisions and social struggles become the focus of attention, genealogies lead to the splintering of the present and the past into irreducibly heterogeneous presents and pasts that resist unification and contain multiple cross-roads full of friction

#### The permutation solves best: incorporating your counter-perspective increases total friction with the dominant narrative. That’s guerilla pluralism at its finest.

*We don’t need to commit to one perspective or interpretation – that’s a Western science-based way of thinking. Our history does not lie on the “truth” axis, but rather on the “discourse-power” axis. Your perspective is another subjugated knowledge. Our form of knowledge production denies the notion of mutual exclusivitiy because that is borne out of seeking truth. “Mine is true, so yours cannot be”. The ultimate goal is NOT “truth” but rather disunity. For this, a multiplicity of perspectives are key.*

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In the 1975-76 lectures ‚Society Must Be Defended,‛ Foucault draws a contrast be-tween ‚the genealogy of knowledges‛ and any kind of linear intellectual history such as the history of the sciences: whereas the latter is located at ‚the cognition-truth axis,‛ ‚the genealogy of knowledges is located on a different axis, namely the discourse-power axis or, if you like, the discursive practice—clash of power axis.‛6 Genealogy traces the development of discursive formations that give rise to certain forms of knowledge and power relations. Through their meaning-generating acti-vities, through a grammar of meanings that makes certain things intelligible, sur-veyable, and the proper objects of investigation and knowledge (and others unintel-ligible, unsurveyable, and epistemically opaque), discursive practices have both (and simultaneously) epistemic and power effects. And it is of course crucial that we re-gard power and knowledge not only as intimately related but as inseparable, which is why Foucault and Foucaultians have used the cumbersome expression ‚power/ knowledge.‛ One may naively think that the opposite of power/knowledge would be powerlessness/ignorance, so that those excluded or marginalized in the discursive practices that produce certain epistemic and power effects would be simply subjects without any knowledge and any power, quasi-non-agents. But the pluralistic genea-logical approach that Foucault sketches goes completely against those views that portray the oppressed as merely powerless and ignorant. In fact, this approach un-masks as an important misconception the view that the oppressed simply lack power and knowledge because of the forms of exclusions and marginalization they suffer. That distorted characterization plays in the hands of the dominant ideologies and grants too much to them: namely, it grants the very definition of what counts as legitimate power and legitimate knowledge. Instead, a more accurate characteriza-tion would be the one that describes oppressed groups as those whose powers and knowledges have been demeaned and obstructed. This is why, after drawing the contrast between genealogy and history of knowledge, Foucault goes on to say that the critical task that genealogy confronts us with is ‚an immense and multiple battle, but not one between knowledge and ignorance, but an immense and multiple battle between knowledges in the plural—knowledges that are in conflict because of their very morphology, because they are in the possession of enemies, and because they have intrinsic power-effects.‛7 How do we fight against power on this view? Not by trying to escape it (as if liberation consisted in standing outside power altogether), but rather, by turning power(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of power against others. Similarly, how do we fight against established and official forms of know-ledge when they are oppressive? Not by trying to escape knowledge altogether, but rather, by turning knowledge(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of knowledge against others. The critical battle against the monopolization of knowledge-producing practices involves what Foucault calls ‚an insurrection of subjugated knowledges.‛ When it comes to knowledge of the past and the power associated with it, this battle involves resisting the ‚omissions‛ and distortions of of-ficial histories, returning to lost voices and forgotten experiences, relating to the past from the perspective of the present in an alternative (out-of-the-mainstream) way. And this is precisely what the Foucaultian notions of ‚counter-history‛ and ‚coun-ter-memory‛ offer. Official histories are produced by monopolizing knowledge-producing prac-tices with respect to a shared past. Official histories create and maintain the unity and continuity of a political body by imposing an interpretation on a shared past and, at the same time, by silencing alternative interpretations of historical experien-ces. Counter-histories try to undo these silences and to undermine the unity and continuity that official histories produce. Foucault illustrates this with what he calls ‚the discourse of race war‛ that emerged in early modernity as a discourse of resis-tance for the liberation of a race against the oppression of another, e.g. of the Saxons under the yoke of the Normans. Foucault argues that in Europe—and especially in England—‚this discourse of race war functioned as a counter-history‛8 until the end of the 19th Century, at which point it was turned into a racist discourse (aimed not at the liberation of an oppressed race, but at the supremacy of an allegedly superior race that views all others as an existential threat). In lecture IV of ‚Society Must Be Defended” Foucault sets out to analyze the ‚counterhistorical function‛ of the race-war discourse in early modernity.9 Part of what the race-war discourse did was to retrieve the untold history of a people which could be used as a weapon against the official history that legitimized their oppression. This counter-history tapped into the subversive power of a silenced historical experience and reactivated the past to create distinctive knowledge/power effects: new meanings and normative attitudes were mobilized, so that what was officially presented as past glorious victories that legitimized monarchs and feudal lords as the rightful owners of the land to whom taxes were owed, now appeared as unfair defeats at the hands of abusive conquerors who became oppressors and had to be overthrown.

#### The permutation is the BEST option: the plurality of subjugated knowledge is the ONLY way to exert continued friction against the status quo, create a bulwark against co-option and spur disunity in hegemonic knowledge systems.

(Jose **Medina**, October **2011**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, 6/26/12,K.H.)

#### As Foucault puts it, genealogies can be described as the ‚attempt to de-subjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.‛40 But, as he emphasizes, genealogies do not simply ‚reject knowledge, or invoke or celebrate some immediate experience that has yet to be cap-tured by knowledge. This is not what they are about. They are about the insur-rection of knowledges.‛41 Genealogical investigations proceed by ‚way of playing lo-cal, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the uni-tary theoretical instance‛ that filters them out or absorbs them by putting them in their proper place within a hierarchy. Genealogies are insurrections of subjugated knowledges. And the plurals here are crucial, for the plurality of insurrections and of subjugated knowledges has to be kept always alive in order to resist new hegemonic unifications and hierarchizations of knowledges. The danger that the critical work of genealogies can be reabsorbed by hegemonic power/knowledges is brilliantly described by Foucault: Once we have excavated our genealogical fragments, once we begin to exploit them and to put in circulation these elements of knowledge that we have been trying to dig out of the sand, isn’t there a danger that they will be recoded, recolonized by these unitary discourses which, having first disqualified them and having then ignored them when they reappeared, may now be ready to reannex them and include them in their own discourses and their own power-knowledge? And if we try to protect the fragments we have dug up, don’t we run the risk of building, with our own hands, a unitary discourse? 42 Insurrections of (de-)subjugated knowledges and their critical resistance can be co-opted for the production of new forms of subjugation and exclusion (new hege-monies) or for the reinforcement of old ones. The only way to resist this danger is by guaranteeing the constant epistemic friction of knowledges from below, which—as I have argued elsewhere43—means guaranteeing that eccentric voices and perspec-tives are heard and can interact with mainstream ones, that the experiences and concerns of those who live in darkness and silence do not remain lost and un-attended, but are allowed to exert friction. Genealogies have to be always plural, for genealogical investigations can unearth an indefinite number of paths from for-gotten past struggles to the struggles of our present. And the insurrections of sub-jugated knowledges they produce also need to remain plural if they are to retain their critical power, that is, the capacity to empower people to resist oppressive power/knowledge effects. In the next section I will put this Foucaultian pluralism in conversation with other epistemological pluralistic approaches to memory and knowledge of the past. 2. Epistemic Friction, Guerrilla Pluralism, and Counter-Memory What we need in order to maintain possibilities of resistance always open is epistemic friction. As Wittgenstein puts it: ‚We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!‛44 I want to define epistemic friction as follows: epistemic friction consists in the mutual contestation of differently normatively structured knowledges which interrogates epistemic exclusions, disqualifications, and hegemonies. Episte-mic friction is acknowledged and celebrated in pluralistic views of our epistemic negotiations and our cognitive lives, but not every kind of epistemic pluralism makes room for epistemic friction in the same way. In this section I want to explore the implications of a thoroughgoing epistemic pluralism for genealogical investiga-tions. For this purpose, I will compare and contrast Foucault’s pluralism with two different kinds of epistemic pluralism that can be found in American philosophy, ar-guing that Foucaultian pluralism offers a distinctive notion of epistemic friction that has tremendous critical force.

**The Compassion disad- Affirming this ethic of compassion is an ethical necessity – only by privileging compassion can we counter dominant hierarchies of subjugation**

Porter ‘6 (Elisabeth, head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, “Can Politics Practice Compassion?” hypatia 21:4, project muse)

I am defending the position that it is possible to be politically compassionate and just and that such a claim should be disentangled from notions of gender.12 I dispute the essentialist claim that women are naturally compassionate. However, because of women's traditional association with caring and their role as primary parent, many women are experienced in caring and tend to respond readily with compassion. As others also argue (Philips 1993, 70; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 13), I am emphasizing the interplay between the particularity of compassion and the universality of justice. Undoubtedly, the dichotomy of public justice associated with masculinity and private care associated with femininity narrowed moral parameters, harmfully cementing restrictive gendered stereotypes. Rather, the relationship between compassion and justice is rich. Compassion "helps us recognize our justice obligations to those distant from us" (Clement 1996, 85). Examples of justice obligations include welfare programs; foreign aid; famine and disaster relief; humane immigration policies; and relieving the suffering of families who are affected by terrorism in Bali, Iraq, Israel, London, Morocco, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the United States, and elsewhere. A choice between justice and compassion is false; considerations of justice "arise in and about the practice of care" (Bubeck 1995a, 189). Thus, a defense of the need for compassion is as much a defense for the rights of justice. Anticipating this defense was Elizabeth Bartlett's (1992) interpretation of Albert Camus' concept of rebellion in the novel The Plague. She made three points that resonate with my argument on the relationship between justice and care. First, justice originates from care. In Camus' ethic of rebellion, the passionate demand for justice and rights comes from compassionately witnessing and being outraged by such aggressive acts as battering, abuse, or police brutality, such incomprehensible injustices as innocent children suffering from malnutrition, and various forms of others' oppression. As Bartlett remarked, "It is these moments of compassionate recognition of human dignity, not a dispassionate calculation of rights, which give rise to the demand for justice" (1992, 84). Second, both justice and care imply community. In The Plague, rebellion is a rejection of all forms of oppression. Acts of compassion are choices to "suffer with" others in order to build solidarity.13 Third, care defines justice. For Camus, "only those actions which retain the impulse and commitment to care serve justice" through compassionate responses (Bartlett 1992, 86). This strong notion of compassionate justice in politics is necessary if we are to respond meaningfully to peoples' pain. The defense of compassionate justice is prominent in feminist literature because of women's historical experience of injustice and because of women's traditional association of caring. It is also prominent in postcolonial and development discourse where there are attempts to redress political injustice with the practical, compassionate development of human well-being. Responsibility for Connections The third potential barrier to realizing political compassion lies in the controversy as to who and what we are responsible for. I have argued elsewhere that responsibilities are based on the principles of connection (1991, 159). We carry out responsibilities through moral engagement with others. The question, "how can I (we) best meet my (our) caring responsibilities?" (Tronto 1993, 137) is central to, but not exclusive to feminist ethics. Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, in expanding the relational dimension of ethics, argue that "somehow, we owe something to others and that our ability to handle what we owe to others decides in some sense who we are" (2001, 2). Yet this is not easy in practice. In our socially embodied moral world, our identities, relationships, and values differentially define our responsibilities. Practices of responsibility are situated culturally and many need changing. For example, in a materialist, technocratic age dominated by self-interest, compassionate impulses toward those who are suffering are dismissed readily as time-consuming, or consciences are salved by a quick donation to charity while complaining of "compassion fatigue." Yet after the anguish of 9/11, people in many nations reassessed their priorities and lifestyles, reaching out to loved ones and strangers in affirming ways.14 Some feminists see the particularity of responsibility as an obstacle to realizing political compassion. For example, Susan Mendus argues that "identity and morality are constituted by actual relationships of care between particular people," thus the concept of care does not translate readily to the wider political problems of hunger, poverty, refugee status, and war that require solutions for people we do not know (2000, 106). As I am arguing, it is not care alone or a particular relationship of care that enables compassionate responsibility, but a merging of a compassionate drive with a search for justice, equality, and rights. **Caring for someone necessarily encompasses a concern for his or her equality and rights.** I am supporting a strong notion of compassionate justice that accepts responsibilities toward "particular others" who can include "actual starving children in Africa with whom one feels empathy" (Held 1987, 118). If we take seriously the idea of global interdependence, then regardless of our specific nationalities and races, we have "duties" to people who are distant from us and belong to other communities (Midgley 1999, 161). Amartya Sen also believes we have a "multiplicity of loyalties" (1996, 113) to humanity, our nation, city, community, family, and friends. Simone Weil's notion of "justice as compassion" also is one in which mutual respect for all humans grounds our obligations to prevent suffering and harm. She believes that we have an unconditional obligation not to let a single human suffer "when one has the chance of coming to his assistance" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 114).15 This qualifier is important. **We cannot assume responsibility for all suffering, to do so is naïve. We can assume, however, some responsibility to try to alleviate suffering whenever we can.** Yet, as intimated earlier, in order to move beyond empathy, we must also address claims for justice and equality. Again, I suggest that without the compassionate drive that is prompted by visualizing the pain of injustice, we will not feel peoples' anguish, or bother to consider what they need. As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public citizenship. It is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it is possible to do so, and the possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically, this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met. There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to assist less wealthy nations.16 State responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of co-suffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs, and alleviate suffering. This **vocal civic debate can provoke** the third process **of political responses that actually lead to political compassion.**

**Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to** be observant, and understand the implications of a failure to practice compassion. To summarize this section, the conceptual barriers that prevent the practice of political compassion are significant but surmountable. Compassion is not too personal for politics. Rather**, it can be the emotion that helps prompt a critical scrutiny of institutional structures; it is the driving force toward the practice of compassionate justice**; and, as an emotion and response, it broadens political responsibilities. Political Compassion I now argue that political compassion is linked to the political goals of a good society and is achievable politically.17 This argument contrasts with that of Hannah Arendt, who wrote that compassion abolishes the distance between citizens and thus is "politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence" (1973, 86). Arendt's belief is that whereas the public arena is a site for deliberation, dissent, and argument, compassion requires a direct response that talking distorts. Certainly, too much abstract discussion on poverty, asylum seekers, detention camps, or the effects of war delays actual decisions for change. However, later, I argue that dialogue is a crucial way for all concerned groups to ascertain the best way to respond to peoples' feelings of vulnerability. Particularly in the current global climate of heightened vulnerability to terrorist attacks, the need for protection is powerful. Within liberal democracies, we are more accustomed to emphases on autonomy and self-sufficiency than the need for protection. While care ethics recognizes that we all are vulnerable in the sense that fortune and fate are "morally arbitrary" (Porter 1995, 181) and this is why it is important that we care about each other, most care ethics literature refers to the vulnerable either as children or as those requiring [End Page 109] welfare, disability rights, or health care. In the present international context, we often lose sight of personal powerlessness and politically equate vulnerability with minimizing the possibility of terrorist threats. Considerations of national security thus dominate over human security. Certainly, terrorist threats must be dealt with appropriately, **but the means of national protection should not be at the expense of the emotional safety of** such **vulnerable groups** as asylum seekers. States need to maximize security, but "there are broader understandings of human security that encompass social well-being and the security of political, civil, social, cultural, and economic rights" (Porter 2003b, 9). The defense of human security can adopt an attitude toward the vulnerable of protective "holding," which minimizes harmful risk and reconciles differences (Ruddick 1990, 78–79). How democratic nations deal with the vilification or reconciliation of cultural and religious differences is central to the practice of political compassion. For example, asylum seekers rightfully seek refuge, safety, and security, under United Nations conventions. These rights include the right to seek asylum and the right to request assistance to secure safety in their own countries. Those seeking such rights increasingly are facing governments with tightened borders. In multicultural states, tolerance, trust, and openness are essential for positive civic relationships. **Since 9/11, there has been a movement away from open tolerance to closed dichotomies based on an "othering,"** a stereotyping of groups considered different from "us." **These dichotomies are not harmless opposites; they "mask the power of one side of the binary to control the other**" (D. Bell 2002, 433**), like us/them, citizen/foreigner, friends/enemies, and good/evil. Absolutist dichotomies are blind to nuances, middle-ground positions, particular contexts, and connections, all the considerations of judgment needed for wise, compassionate decisions**. Importantly, absolutist dichotomies are oblivious to the pain of those who are excluded, those most in need of protection. They make people feel "at risk" simply for looking different or having a different faith. Those with absolutist views see "illegal immigrants" and "queue jumpers" rather than desperate, fearful people seeking legitimate asylum. A classic example of this binary control is President George W. Bush's ultimatum, "If you're not with us, you're against us**." A simplistic with us/against us**, free world/axis of **evil analysis cements an inclusion/exclusion that fails to comprehend the pain of those who are excluded**.