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Contention One is Genealogy:

**Welcome to the Predator Empire—executive authority over targeted killing is increasingly constituted by a disposition matrix that relies on an ethos of precision and total knowledge about the targets—this embeds an everywhere war into the fabric of political planning**

Shaw, 13 (Ian GR, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow, Scotland, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” GeoPolitics, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2012.749241#.UjDhzST4uO1>, BJM)

Since 2010, Obama administration ofﬁcials have busily constructed a database for administering life and death. The “disposition matrix”1 as it’s called, contains a list of suspects targeted for elimination across the planet. These spreadsheets are now a permanent feature of US national security. Once upon a time, targeted killings were antithetical to the American way of war. During the Clinton cabinet, ofﬁcials debated ﬁercely about the legality of eliminating Osama bin Laden. Even by July 2001, the US ambassador to Israel said, “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations. . . . They are extrajudicial killings and we do not support that”.2 Now, targeted killings have become so normalised that the Obama administration is seeking ways to streamline the process. The disposition matrix was developed by Michael Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center to centralise the kill lists across multiple state agencies, including the CIA and the Pentagon. The result is a single, evolving database in which “biographies, locations, known associates, and afﬁliated organizations are all catalogued. So are strategies for taking targets down, including extradition requests, capture operations and drone patrols”.3 This deadly form of bureaucracy4 suggests the changing method of state violence: the decentralisation of targeted killings across the globe and the simultaneous centralisation of state power in the executive branch of government. From soldier, to special op, to lethal bureaucrat, this complicated and evolving geopolitical picture, one underwritten by lawfare, drones, and Orwellian terminology, is very much the new face of an old Empire**.** Of course, the post-2001 “Global War on Terror” began its life as a geographically and legally amorphous war, encompassing battleﬁelds and “black sites” that marked a new phase of American exceptionalism. The hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and the counterinsurgency in Iraq mobilised billion-dollar budgets and legions of troops. But as the clock ticked, and cracks in the Project for the New American Century emerged, the borders of the “Global War on Terror” did not contract, they expanded. In secret and shadow, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia became targets in a low-level war that Obama’s White House ofﬁcially brands an ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’.5 Referring to this gradual expansion of state violence in spaces far removed from declared theatres of war, Derek Gregory describes an “everywhere war”6 that is deﬁned by asymmetrical and paramilitary battles in the borderlands of the planet. At the start of 2012, amid controversy stirred by hawkish congressmen, President Barack Obama and his former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, unveiled a new national strategy built around the ~~unmanned~~ [unstaffed] aerial vehicle and special operations forces. Troop numbers are to be cut by as much as 100,0007 as part of a restructuring to create a “smaller, leaner” military that will no longer engage in large-scale counterinsurgency. In addition to presenting the kind of technological visions that Rumsfeld touted only a decade earlier, Panetta discussed a “ﬂoating base”8 that would serve special operations forces as well as drone units. Taking stock of these developments, the aim of this paper is to grasp the contours and consequences of this droniﬁcation of US national security under a label I name the “Predator Empire”. The MQ-1 Predator (see Figure 1) is perhaps the most well-known of all military drones used today. It has a wingspan of 55 feet, a length of 27 feet, and can be remotely piloted from thousands of miles away via satellite communications. According to the US Air Force,9 “The Predator system was designed in response to a Department of Defense requirement to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information combined with a kill capability to the warﬁghter”. Its deathly name conjures images of a science-ﬁction dystopia, a “Terminator Planet”10 where robots hover in the sky and exterminate humans on the ground. Of course, this is no longer science-ﬁction fantasy. Drone operators sitting in a Nevada desert now control a ﬂeet of robots that can loiter above the landscape with advanced sensing capabilities and weapon systems – giving rise to the claim that drone warfare resembles a “video game” (see Figure 2). And yet, as Steven Graham reminds us, “The instinct to technologise and distanciate their killing power – to deploy their technoscientiﬁc dominance to destroy and kill safely from a distance in a virtualised ‘joystick war’ – has been the dominant ethos of US military culture and politics for a century or more”.11 The modern Predator drone dates back to the GNAT-750 (and “Amber” before it) ﬂown in Bosnia in 1994 by the CIA under codename “LOFTY VIEW”. Six years later in 2000, the CIA ﬁrst started ﬂying Predators in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. The agency’s ﬁrst targeted killing took place on February 2002; the Counterterrorism Center unleashed a “Hellﬁre” missile at a “tall man” believed to be none other than the al-Qa’ida leader and his lieutenants. But the analysts had wrongly identiﬁed civilians gathering up scrap metal.12 All were killed. And in a mark of irony that often haunts the drone wars – the site of the strike was Zhawar Kili, a mujahideen complex built by Jalaluddin Haqqani in the 1980s with CIA and Saudi support.13 This model of extrajudicial killings, one developed almost exclusively in-house,14 would soon be rolled out across the Durrand Line to become the model of drone strikes in Pakistan. Since 2004, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been the primary target for the agency’s clandestine attacks. Hundreds of civilians and thousands of militants have died15 in an undeclared war that generates international controversy for its seeming violation of national sovereignty and international law.16 While the number of drones carried by the CIA is classiﬁed, in 2012 the agency’s former director David Petreaus requested that the number of Predators and Reapers increase by 10, from an inventory of “30 to 35”.17 The CIA’s drone programme in Pakistan emerges from a history of targeted killings and counterinsurgencies, especially in Latin America and Vietnam.18 Ever since The National Security Act established the CIA in 1947, clandestine operations have deﬁned a “black world”19 of intelligence, surveillance, and extrajudicial activity that continues to swell and spread, blurring the division between military and civilian violence.20 Targeted killings are a central US counterterrorism tactic that came to prominence after Israel used them against suspected Palestinian terrorists in 2000.21 Although there is no agreed deﬁnition under international law, targeted killings are deﬁned by the UN as “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force”.22 The details of the CIA’s drone programme remain shrouded in secrecy, despite Obama’s admission on a “web chat” that he was keeping the strikes on “a tight leash”.23 On September 9, 2011, US District Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled that the CIA is not legally required to inform the public about the use of drones in the killing of suspected terrorists.24 Even if the exact details are classiﬁed, the White House and anonymous “ofﬁcials” implicitly justify the drone campaign with broader legal arguments such as the “inherent right to self defense” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.25 But perhaps any appeal to a legal argument is limited: law has never been a guaranteed check on sovereign power, whether declared or not – often enabling and exacerbating it.26 And 2011 will be remembered as the year when extrajudicial state violence reached an unprecedented milestone. On the 30th of September, a senior member of al-Qa’ida was killed in Yemen by a covert US drone strike. His name was Anwar al-Awlaki, born inside the US in 1971. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) responded, “This is a program under which American citizens far from any battleﬁeld can be executed by their own government without judicial process, and on the basis of standards and evidence that are kept secret not just from the public but from the courts”.27 As I will soon argue, drones were already cementing their position as a favoured option for US security in 2010. The 2010 National Security Strategy28 and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism29 state that the American way of life is threatened by geographically and legally amorphous al-Qa’ida ‘afﬁliates’ in regions that stretch from North and East Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, and beyond. These documents are important because they set in motion a set of speciﬁc responses “such that different referents of security give rise to different kinds of governmental technologies and political rationalities”.30 The drone emerges as one governmental technology able to hunt down afﬁliates “everywhere”. The next section of the paper will examine these strategic discourses in more depth, especially in light of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance31 that spelled the end of large-scale ground wars. My analysis then extends to a set of delegitimising discourses that challenge the abstract White House security and bureaucratic narratives, by reviewing interview materials from a 2010 report by Civilians in Armed Conﬂict (CIVIC)32 and a 2012 report by Stanford Law School and the New York School of Law.33 From these empirical materials I then make a number of theoretical points concerning the changing face of US national security or the “Washington Rules”.34 I employ the provocative concept “Predator Empire” as a way of bringing together the strategies, practices and technologies arranged around the deployment of drones for targeted killings. The Predator Empire is underwritten by a regime of biopolitical power that according to Foucault35 has “life” as its target. What, or rather who counts as life is understood in two distinct ways. First, there are the various known personalities that make up the kill lists on the White House’s disposition matrix. Second, there are the “patterns of life” that are coded and targeted by analysts and operators. Since 2008, the CIA has rolled out “signature strikes” in Pakistan that target individuals or groups that display “dangerous” or “suspicious” patterns of life. What makes these forms of targeted killing so controversial is that the person eliminated is not identiﬁed by staff in the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Instead, they exist as digital proﬁles across a network of technologies, algorithmic calculations, and spreadsheets. The ability to strike distant targets in the far reaches of the planet is enabled by the evolution of a topographic and ground-based spatial power to an aerial and topological spatial power. While by no means denying the vast material infrastructure or ‘Droneworld’36 that houses unmanned aerial vehicles across the globe; the extensive digitising, coding, and eliminating of life in “real time” is what marks the Predator Empire as distinctive.

**Since 2004, the United States Military has conducted a campaign of drone warfare in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA). Our Affirmative is an attempt to trace the various systems of knowledge/power that have coalesced to produce a space in which certain bodies can be indiscriminately executed. The violence conducted in FATA cannot be understood along any one trajectory – rather, it is the product of numerous, heterogenous regimes of racial, colonial, geopolitical and legal knowledge production. There exists no totalizing political theory that can understand or explain this ongoing genocidal violence. Rather, it must be read genealogically, at the cross-section of its own particularities.**

Akhter and Shaw, 2012 (Majed Akhter, Professor of Geography and Development at University of Arizona, and Ian Graham Ronald Shaw, Professor at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University of Glasgow, The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan, Antipode Vol 44, #4, 2012, [http://www.academia.edu/2201329/The\_Unbearable\_Humanness\_of\_Drone\_ Warfare\_in\_FATA\_Pakistan](http://www.academia.edu/2201329/The_Unbearable_Humanness_of_Drone_%20Warfare_in_FATA_Pakistan))

FATA is divided into seven tribal agencies spanning 27244km and, according to the last census in 1998, is home to 3.1million people. FATA, especially the agencies of North and South Waziristan, has been subjected to drone bombardment since 2004, with the intensity of attacks only increasing under the Obama administration. The interlinked legal and military history of this region is rarely given adequate attention, with “analysis” usually relying on a characterization of the inhabitants, the Pakhtuns, as “rugged” and “intractable” (Nawaz 2009). At least since the British engagement with the region, roughly a century and a half ago, the legal and constitutional status of the region in relation to state power has been co-determined with its geopolitical role. The tribal regions that today comprise Afghanistan, FATA, and the region formerly known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan have, as far back as the fourteenth century, been constructed as “special cases” that could not be governed according to normal rules (Figure 2). British engagement with the region began in 1849, after the annexation of Punjab. The current legal and geopolitical position of FATA can only be understood from its colonial past as a “frontier” region for the British Raj, understood at the time as a “wide tract of border country, hinterlands, or a buffer state” (Spain 1977:27). Buffer states can be interpreted as classic territorial exceptions—states by virtue of not being other states. A buffer state was supposed to ensure that two giants did not rub shoulders. Afghanistan’s birth as a buffer state between the expanding powers of Russia and Britain was ushered in by the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 and the Pamir Boundary Agreement of 1895.The former was an agreement between an Afghan King and the British recognizing what Pakistan today claims is the international boundary with Afghanistan. The latter was an agreement between the British and the Russians that demarcated Afghanistan’s northern border. The British followed a “three-fold frontier” strategy, which applied their state power and law in gradients over the frontier (Embree 1977). The ﬁrst frontier was on the outskirts of the geographic edges of directly administered territory—in the case of the northwest frontier, in the environs of Peshawar and the settled areas. Afghanistan, an ostensibly sovereign state, was the third frontier. It is the second frontier, where the British ruled the Pakhtun tribes indirectly, where we locate the colonial legacy of FATA. The Pakhtuns were theoretically to retain a measure of autonomy over their own affairs, but control was exercised through subsidies provided to selected tribal leaders from the British. The British state thus extended its control, but not its rule. This peculiar political space, forged in the furnace of the geopolitical “Great Game” between Britain and Russia, required a correspondingly peculiar legal order—the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901.The FCR were crafted by Lord Curzon to create some semblance of codiﬁed law to govern the tribal area. The act gives the federal government the right to appoint a “Political Agent” (PA) for each of the agencies in FATA. The PA is invested with considerable magisterial, administrative, revenue, executive and development powers in the agencies. They have the authority to decide any matter, civil or criminal, or refer it to a jirga, or assembly of tribal men (which the PA, of course, convenes). There is no judicial review or accountability of any decision made by the PA. Other powers given to the PA under the FCR under speciﬁc circumstances are: preemptory imprisonment, expulsion of individuals and groups, destruction of buildings, imprisonment of children, collective punishment, strict regulation of housing, economic blockades, and even execution (Amnesty International 2010;Mahmud 2010; Spain 1977; Tanguay-Renad 2002). Upon independence in 1947, Pakistan adopted the FCR, and continued the policy of excepting FATA from the normal rule of law. The FCR and the constitutional status of FATA have not gone unchallenged, and two cases in particular cemented the geographical exception of FATA. In Chaudri Manzoor Elahi vs Federation of Pakistan (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that FATA as an area was beyond the jurisdiction of any superior court—and therefore there was no one for the people of FATA to appeal to for their rights as citizens of Pakistan. And in Government of NWFP vs Muhammad Irshad (1995), it was ruled that the President’s word is indeed law in tribal areas.1 However, dissenting opinions were registered in both rulings and “the issue has yet to be fully settled and the constitutional position of FATA inhabitants remains ambiguous and unfavorable” (Tanguay-Renad 2002:554). Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) spells out the exception clearly. The most telling clauses are listed below: 247.3) No Act of Parliament shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs.247.5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the President may, with respect to any matter, make regulations for the peace and good Government of a Federally Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof.247.6) Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides. It is 247.3 that produces FATA as a space of political-geographic exception by declaring it out of bounds from any act declared by Parliament. In lethal parallel,247.6 produces FATA as a legal-geographic exception by declaring the area out of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. And the “cherry on top” is 247.5, which makes FATA subject to the judgment of one person, the President. As we saw above, the President exercises authority in the region through the legal architecture of the FCR and political agents. Relatively recent constitutional and political developments in Pakistan, in the wake of the tumultuous Lawyer’s Movement of 2007, offered some hope that a progressive government would bring signiﬁcant constitutional changes with respect to the status of FATA (Khan 2009). The legal fraternity of Pakistan took to the streets in the name of the supremacy of law and the constitution, and eventually toppled the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, America’s staunchest international ally in the war on terror. In the heady days of early 2008, after the populist Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) swept dramatically to power, the Prime Minister promised that the “obsolete” FCR would be abolished and FATA brought into a normalized federal relationship with the rest of the country. During the following year, cosmetic changes to the FCR were ushered in by the President (Ali 2009).The much-vaunted historical eighteenth amendment to the Pakistani Constitution, the culminating politico-legislative act of the new democratic government, was passed by Parliament in April 2010. It was conspicuously silent about any change in FATA’s constitutional position (National Assembly of Pakistan2010). Although the amendment makes concessions of power from the center to the provinces, there is no mention of any amendment to Article 247. As Amnesty International despairingly notes “[d]espite numerous recent promises by Pakistan’s government to reform the FCR and improve the legal situation of the people of FATA. . . governed by this law, as of May 2010, the FCR continued to relegate millions of people in northwest Pakistan to second-class legal status”(2010:26). Perhaps, upon reﬂection, the Pakistani government came to the same conclusion as British political strategist Dr Coatman did almost 80 years ago—this place, and these people, must be excepted from state and society for the purposes of war: There are many good reasons why we should not [extend constitutional reforms], and the ﬁrst reason is the one I mentioned to you at the beginning of my address—namely, the position of the North-West Frontier and its importance from the point of view of defence and foreign relations. And on the Frontier even the ordinary process of government, the police and the building of roads, cannot be looked upon in quite the same way as in other parts of India, because, after all, the North-West Frontier Province is the terrain in which our armies might have to operate in case of war. We cannot play fast and loose with that territory (Coatman 1931:342). The history of FATA reveals a region that has served military and state power. This was the case a century ago when the FCR were ﬁrst drafted and the British Empire spanned the globe, and it is the case now, with the FCR still alive and drones raining terror down on the people of FATA. The fact that drone warfare has not extended beyond FATA and into Baluchistan, another borderland Province of Pakistan also rumored to harbor terrorist networks, speaks volumes of the role of legal geography in war. Indeed, threats made by Obama during his campaign to expand the drone war beyond the excepted area of FATA and into Baluchistan have not materialized. This is because the legal-historical geography of the terrain acts in concert with the object itself to produce drone warfare in FATA: it is not simply a matter of drones operating over an undifferentiated enemy landscape. Rather, uneven geo-legalities of war, state, and exception make drone warfare a reality in certain spaces and not others.

**Though the Predator Empire spans the globe, its effects are differentially located along diffuse military and legal geographies. Agamben’s notion of the ‘State of Exception’ is critical to understanding how FATA has been historically produced as a zone outside the law, subject to unlimited and unaccountable violence.**

Akhter and Shaw, 2012 (Majed Akhter, Professor of Geography and Development at University of Arizona, and Ian Graham Ronald Shaw, Professor at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University of Glasgow, The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan, Antipode Vol 44, #4, 2012, [http://www.academia.edu/2201329/The\_Unbearable\_Humanness\_of\_Drone\_ Warfare\_in\_FATA\_Pakistan](http://www.academia.edu/2201329/The_Unbearable_Humanness_of_Drone_%20Warfare_in_FATA_Pakistan))

There are two interrelated approaches to capture the spatial complexities of FATA, Pakistan. First, the region falls under Agamben’s (1998, 2005) deﬁnition of a “state of exception”—where the juridical protections of law are suspended and the sovereign is able to subject the territory to unmitigated violence and torture (eg Gregory2004, 2006, 2007, 2010; Ramadan 2009). Such a reading is one that illustrates the processes through which the Pakistani government turns a “blind eye” to the CIA’s bombing campaign, leaving hundreds of civilians dead in its legal shadow. Second, after Elden (2009), we can consider the state of Pakistan itself as being rendered contingent. That is, given the failings of the Pakistani government to control its territory in the face of real and perceived terrorist networks, its own sovereignty is no longer guaranteed—and in the interest of maintaining territorial integrity—international intervention is pursued. Agamben’s (1998) state of exception is a lawless space, precisely because the sovereign has mandated that it be so, and by “withdrawing” the sovereign is able to enact an excess of law. The logic of sovereignty for Agamben is thus a logic founded on the very collision between an excess of law and a lack of law. This process is always already spatial, both domestically and internationally. Speaking to the former, Braun and McCarthy (2005:808) write: If Guantanamo Bay revealed a democracy that was fully able and willing to use its power to cast noncitizens outside political life—a fact troubling to many but certainly not all Americans—Katrina revealed that the potential for abandoned being is present and often realized in the spaces of the nation itself, in its cities, streets, sewers, markets, housing, and hospitals. Spaces of exception also exist around the globe, in black sites and war prisons that span an invisible geography. As Gregory (2007:226) surmises: The very language of “extraordinary rendition,” “ghost prisoners,” and “black sites” implies something out of the ordinary, spectral, a twilight zone: a serial space of the exception. But this performative spacing works through the law to annul the law; it is not a “state” of exception that can be counterposed to a rule-governed world of “normal” politics and power. It is, at bottom, a process of juridical othering that involves three overlapping mechanisms: the creation of special rules that withdraw legal protections . . . ; the calculated outsourcing of war crimes to regimes known to practice torture; and the exploitation of extra-territorial sites where prisoners are detained and tortured at the pleasure of sovereign power. If Gregory’s Agamben-fuelled critique points to a networked geography of exceptional sites, a legal-lethal space where “politico-juridical instruments [are used]to exempt categories of people from the responsibilities or the protections of the law” (Gregory 2010:177), then Elden’s analytic encompasses entire states. Arguing against deterritorialized political visions, his analytic pivots on the status of territory: “Yet while we should certainly rethink and examine, and be open to an analysis of the new, we must not forget that the war has thus far been fought with a very conventional sense of territory in mind—territory that has been targeted, bombed, and invaded” (Elden 2009:xx). By giving a detailed and empirically rich account of the UN’s progressive move towards intervention, Elden writes: “a state that fails to exercise one of the standard deﬁnitions of sovereignty—effective political control of the ‘monopoly of legitimate physical violence’ within its territory—ﬁnds that its sovereignty more generally is held to be ‘contingent’” (2009:162). FATA is emblematic of this process, with the failure of the Pakistani government to control its own territory rendering the FATA region vulnerable to outside intervention, in this case, the attacks of the US drone army. A word of caution is necessary here. We are not saying that Pakistan deserves to be violently invaded because it fails to enact control of FATA. Nor are we saying that FATA’s “exceptional” status justiﬁes “exceptional” violence. We have narrated the geo-legal history of FATA by invoking Agamben’s “state of exception” not to exonerate imperial belligerence and “blame the victim”, but rather to disrupt chauvinistic portrayals of invaded peripheries as passive and listless when confronted with the active military might of the metropole. The Pakistani state, following its imperial predecessors, has actively created FATA as an exceptional region: an aberration that exists outside of the state’s constitutional laws. This process of judicial abandonment, an old colonial performance, has created a volatile landscape that in turn produces conditions conducive for international intervention. But the necessary twist here is that the intervention is itself exceptional in the form of the Predator drone, an object with a fetishized metaphysical status. Taken together, drone and FCR act in concert to produce the space for war in FATA, Pakistan—a topology of technology and law. The legal space that drones operate in is thus located in the deadly residue of drone and document. The ongoing silence of the CIA with respect to its drone operations in Pakistan is raising international and national criticism. Recent Congressional hearings in the USA have debated this, with much of the discussion centered on what counts as a legitimate “target” for assassination and “self-defense”. Indeed, the CIA’s drone strikes are controversial precisely because they exist in a shadowy vacuum of accountability. As the UN Special Rapporteur (on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) Phillip Alston puts it, “Transparency is required by both [international humanitarian law] and human rights law. A lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill” (Alston 2010). This led a prominent law professor to suggest that drone pilots could be liable for war crimes (Hodge 2010). Currently, US drone attacks are justiﬁed following 9/11, an event that led Congress to grant the President the ability to use all necessary force against persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks of 9/11 (“The authorization for use of military force against terrorists”, Public Law 107–40). In addition to domestic law, the USA relies on international law in the guise of Article51 of the UN Charter: A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty if either (a) the second State consents, or (b) the ﬁrst, targeting, State has a right under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, because (i) the second State is responsible for an armed attack against the ﬁrst State, or (ii) the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the ﬁrst State launched from its territory. International law permits the use of lethal force in self-defence in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is necessary and proportionate (Alston 2010:12). Both the CIA and Pakistani government remain tight-lipped on the drone program, allowing it to persist in deadly silence and continually undo FATA’s sovereignty. This is opposed to Alston’s (2010:27) recommendation that “If a State commits a targeted killing in the territory of another State, the second State should publicly indicate whether it gave consent, and on what basis”. US State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has defended the drone program, arguing the attacks against suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban targets are bundled into the nation’s legitimate right to self-defense: “Koh also asserted that in targeting suspected militants via drone strikes the United States was adhering to basic international humanitarian law rules regarding distinction and proportionality. These rules, meant to protect civilians from harm, do not protect civilians absolutely” (Mariner 2010). The status of “civilian” is therefore worryingly undermined by the drone. As one professor and legal scholar at George Washington University, puts it: . . .instead of apologizing each time the wrong individual is targeted or collateral damage is caused, we should stress that the issue would be largely resolved in short order if the abusive civilians would stop their abusive practices and ﬁght—if they must—according to established rules of war. They cannot have it both ways . . . (Etzioni 2010:67: emphasis in original). There is therefore much at stake in drone warfare, including the status of those civilians under the constant watch of the Predator; human beings that are so often translated into statistical and targeted calculations. In this sense, our argument is that the US-led attacks in FATA result from the interactions between the drone itself and the legal history of Pakistan’s northwest, enshrined in FCR of 1901. Both of these objects act in concert to produce an exceptional and contingent space. In this sense, territory is itself a shifting outcome of wider political processes. Never does it sit there, and never does it sit still.

#### This state of exception to the sovereignty of the FATA is created out of a desire to pursue terrorists; a war on terror which relies on naturalizing the visual logic of racialization as a justification for homeland security such that it skews racial geographies rendering any conception of territorial sovereignty meaningless.

Feldman, 2011

[Kenneth P., assistant professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley Comparative American Studies, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from Above”, December, Vol 9, No 4, 325–41, BJM]

What is particularly ‘racial’ about the contemporary US homeland security state? According to cultural theorist Jodi Melamed**,** the process of racialization converts the effects of differential value-making processes into categories of difference that make it possible to order, analyze, describe, and evaluate what emerges out of force relations as the permissible content of other domains of US modernity (e.g. law, politics, economy). (forthcoming) The paradigmatic motor for this process of conversion may remain the color-line theorized by W. E. B. Du Bois at an earlier moment of imperial terror’s link with anti-blackness (Kramer, 2006). However, the mid-twentieth century break with formal white supremacy and the absorption of a nominal antiracism by the neoliberal state has given way to forms of race-making that exceed Du Bois’ mapping (Melamed, 2006; Winant, 2001). That the raciality of the war on terror — its capacity to produce a fungible constellation of figures exposed to the everyday violence of life-in-death — no longer adheres to white supremacist rubrics of the color-line is among the so-called ‘post-racial’ era’s signal achievements. The moment when the effects of racism are no longer addressed by the state as structurally unequal distributions of human value and valuelessness, and instead are seen as operating solely through the market logic of individual ‘preference’ and ‘choice’ is simultaneously the moment when the raciality of the war on terror becomes inscribed in the homeland security state’s governing legal, military, and policing apparatus, and infuses its visual logics (Goldberg, 2008). In this contemporary regime, racialization’s spatial vectors illuminate and police the state’s ambiguous borders in order to expose categories of embodied difference to an interpretive grid of ‘threat’. One vector of this process has been reproduced in horizontally-defined sociospatial relationships, what I call racialization on the ground. Through processes of inclusion, seclusion, exclusion, and extermination, the dialectic that racializes space and spatializes race generates ‘territorializations and regionalizations . . . of life’s possibilities’ (Goldberg, 2008: 30; Lipsitz, 2011). George W. Bush succinctly put it this way, in what has become the ‘commonsensical’ imagined geography for the war on terror: ‘we are taking the fight to these terrorists with our military in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do not have to face them in the streets of our own cities.’ Bush’s geography links frontier expansion (the ‘beyond’ in excess of state sovereignty) to an imperial defense of internalized space, tidily activating a recognizable genealogy of US racialization on the ground. Histories of indigenous violence, for instance, have narrated a persistent telos that expands the boundaries of ‘civilization’ westward (Drinnon, 1980; Slotkin, 1973). The imperial construction of US national borders has drawn routinely on the legacy of the War of 1848 (Sadowski-Smith, 2008; Streeby, 2002). Flourishing walls, barriers, fences, and other assorted passage-points dramatize a form of territorial sovereignty increasingly on the wane (Brown, 2010). And the ‘carceral continuum’ that structures US regimes of confinement transfers bodies from the space of the slave plantation through cartographies of Jim Crow and the urban ghetto to the largest and most raciallystratified prison system in human history (Alexander, 2010; Gilmore, 2007; Wacquant, 2002). Likewise, empire’s imagined geographies fold geographic distance into Orientalist hierarchies of human value (Gregory, 2004; Said, 1979). Recent scholarship in cultural geography has extended this insight to map the racialized logistics of perception that prepare soldiers for counterinsurgency deployments ‘on the ground’ of targeted cities resolutely not, or not quite, ‘our own’ (Gregory, 2008). What Mahmood Mamdani has usefully termed ‘culture talk’ supplements the waning of white supremacy with instrumentalized ‘cultural’ content deployed at checkpoints and border-crossings to submit ‘cultural’ difference to an interpretive grid of threat (Mamdani, 2004; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991: 21). This ‘culturalization’ of counterinsurgency’s dayto- day and face-to-face encounters narrows the contours of observable human action into categories of threat infused with Orientalist frameworks (Davis, 2010). Under contemporary regimes of homeland security, racialization on the ground has been supplemented by a differentially-embodied vertical vector of racialization, what I call racialization from above. This ‘politics of verticality’ leaves behind the strategic outposts of the border crossing, the fence, the check point, the guard tower, the high ground, and the hilltop as it heads skyward (Weizman, 2007). A particularly prominent technology of racialization from above has been condensed in the assemblage of aerial surveillance, policing, and state-sanctioned killing known as the unmanned aircraft system (UAS). By fusing visuality, pre-emption, and a disregard for territorial sovereignty, unmanned aerial systems have become among the most popular technologies of the homeland security state. While more than 40 countries have developed UAS capacities in the past hundred years, the last decade has seen massive growth in these machines of death-dealing, with scholars and policy-makers predicting widespread expansion in the years ahead. Under the auspices of security, they have been deployed across police, surveillance, and military theaters. While the ‘screening’ of warfare is intimately linked to technological developments in what James Der Derian calls the ‘military–industrial–media–entertainment network’, assuming that unmanned aerial systems leave either the human or territory behind when they head skyward misses the centrality of visual perception so important to racialization from above (Der Derian, 2001). As Derek Gregory has recently explicated, a network of over 180 people are involved in any single mission, including ‘pilots’, ‘sensor’ operators, mission controllers, senior commanders, intelligence officers, military lawyers, data analysts, and image technicians — as well as those military personnel ‘in theater’ (in press). Many of these actors train their gaze on a collage of video screens whose content is generated by infrared and daylight color TV cameras, satellite mappings, and laser rangefinders. This ‘human element’, the military emphasizes, ‘is at the core of the overall system’ (Eyes of the Army, 2010: 9). As with all racial geographies, the temporal trails quietly alongside the spatial. Boundaries between civilization and barbarism, whiteness and non-whiteness, human and inhuman, are buttressed by asynchronous and even extra-temporal (out of time) temporalities whose past-tense grammar limns the elsewhere of racialized difference. Racial naturalism and racial historicism are the most notable forms here, differentiating populations based upon a highly-constructed framing of a past-tense relation to present political, cultural, and ontological norms (Goldberg, 2002). US empire’s liberal ideologies — of the ‘white man’s burden’ at the turn of the twentieth century, the ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ projects at mid-century, the color-blind arguments at century’s end, and the human rights strains in the war on terror — all hinge on such notions of history’s waiting room and its varied racialized exclusions (McAlister, 2001; Mills, 1997; Murphy, 2010; Singh, 2006). Under the homeland security state, however, the waiting room has become infiltrated by threat and risk. To address this, racialization from above weaves permanently temporary observation into permanently temporary warfare, with ‘endurance’ its organizing chronos (Weizman, 2007). A future anterior grammar of pre-emption provides the temporal frame for the raciality of the war on terror, whose substantial differentiation from earlier forms of colonial warfare — where accumulation by dispossession was accomplished through extraterritorial conquest and settlement from without — brings to bear geographic ambiguities made sensible only through preventing what ‘will have been’ (Goldberg, 2008; Harvey, 2005; Pease, 2009). The war on terror seizes on that which appears as imminent, as probable, as possible. While questions of territorial sovereignty animate the predictable rhythm of oscillating troop deployments and withdrawals, they remain irresolvable when the horizon of war-making is always-already marked by an open-ended and indefinite futurity.

**However, the State of Exception by itself is inadequate to understanding the complexity of violence in FATA. The legal geography of the region dovetails with a particular conception of drone warfare emanating from the United States, which seeks to render the world as a set of objectified targets defined by their absolute visibility, able to be exterminated at a whim.**

Akhter and Shaw, 2012 (Majed Akhter, Professor of Geography and Development at University of Arizona, and Ian Graham Ronald Shaw, Professor at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University of Glasgow, The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan, Antipode Vol 44, #4, 2012, [http://www.academia.edu/2201329/The\_Unbearable\_Humanness\_of\_Drone\_ Warfare\_in\_FATA\_Pakistan](http://www.academia.edu/2201329/The_Unbearable_Humanness_of_Drone_%20Warfare_in_FATA_Pakistan))

The drone is heralded by the US military as the apex of a targeting logic—accurate, efﬁcient, and deadly. This logic traces a distinct genesis. In 1938 Martin Heidegger wrote of the “age of the world picture”, in a classic essay on the split between subject and object. For him, today’s world is conceived, grasped, and conquered as a picture—and what it means “to be” is for the ﬁrst time deﬁned as the objectiveness of representing. In this modern age of humanism, a subjective “worldview” arises for the ﬁrst time—humans appear as Cartesian subjects and the world as a calculated picture, engineered by science and technology. Ray Chow(2006) extends this metaphysical analysis to contend that the world has further been produced as a “target”. In the wake of the atomic event of Hiroshima, the entire globe is rendered as a grid of targets to be destroyed as soon as it can be made visible. Indeed, to see is to destroy. Vision is thus crucial to an ocularcentric Western society (Rose 2001), and always already entangled within military culture. The ability to gaze from “nowhere” and yet represent “everywhere” is what Haraway (1988) labels the “god-trick”. She argues that the eyes have been perfected by the logics of military, capitalist, and colonial supremacy; one that is fundamentally located within a nexus of disembodiment:. . .the vantage point of the cyclopian, self-satiated eye of the master subject. The Western eye has fundamentally been a wandering eye. Vision is apparently without limit, the ‘ordinary primate’ can now see underwater, at night, through walls, into biological cells, onto distant galaxies: an “unregulated gluttony” that prides itself on its “objectivity”(1988:586). This disembodied visual logic is perfected in the doctrine of airpower, the dominant theme of US national defense post World War II. Kaplan (2006a) names this a “cosmic view” that both uniﬁes and separates “targets” from above. The sky is the space in which technology masters the world. It is clean, disembodied, and a place where nobody dies (that just happens on the ground). Do we not see here a colonial logic of “us” in the sky, versus “them” on the ground (Amoore2009; Gregory 2010)? The drone is capable of performing (Bialasiewicz et al 2007) this logic, through a digital worldview of targets that dismisses ambiguity and reinforces the same old god-trick of a view of somewhere from nowhere (Kaplan 2006b). This is not to say that the sky is a space of pure deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Since the mid-twentieth century the atmosphere has become increasingly nationalized, particularly after the Cold War (Kaplan 2006b; Williams 2010). The “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) was a set of tactics put forward by the US military for securing the future of warfare (Kaplan 2009). They include information communications, space technology, satellites, drones, nano-robotics, all pivoting around the idea of “network-centric warfare”. As McDonald (2007) argues, this is precisely the reason that “outer space” needs to be investigated by critical geography, given that social life tied to the celestial, and space-based subjectivities are increasingly normalized. Orbital logics thus spill into the everyday, as does the pervasive inﬂuence of targeting in US culture. From the use of GIS sciences that spatialize, calculate, and ﬁx Cartesian wanderings—without a necessary appeal to the uniqueness of place or its crumpled ontologies—to the vicarious gazing and gaming of a far-away war (Shaw 2010; Wark 2007), targeting is now woven into the fabric of mundane life. GIS and GPS programs are no longer alien technologies used by armies and government agencies, but shared everyday practices. As such, the drone is not an aberration—but the apex of an expanding targeting zeitgeist. In this age, “to be” is to be locked within the cool certainty of a crosshair. Yet despite the drone’s mounting importance to global warfare, we ﬁnd its use in FATA, Pakistan of particular signiﬁcance. Its covert CIA deployments are both publically condemned and privately supported by the Pakistani government as the USA consistently breaches its national sovereignty. As retired Pakistani general Talat Masood asks, one assumes rhetorically, “How can you be an ally and at the same time be targeted?” (quoted in Schmitt and Drew 2009, our emphasis). Not only is this territorial contradiction worth highlighting, but so too is the fetishized status of the drone itself as it relates to contemporary geopolitics. But ﬁrst, we sketch the history of FATA, a region riddled with historical and legal complexities.

**The drone is only the latest manifestation of a Western epistemology obsessively focused on rendering the world perfectly visible. This epistemology feeds off of racist and colonialist regimes of knowledge to produce the Other as an object within crosshairs, able to be exterminated on a whim.**

*The drone perpetuates a “panoramic gaze”. We virtualize warfare on a daily basis: the media bombards us with images of war and nation building. We begin to see war as state-making, as a condition of possibility for society. This virtualization necessitates a devaluation. U.S. soldiers approach war like a video game, and life must lay in wait ready for “demolition at any moment”.*

Chow, 2006 (Rey Chow, Professor of Literature at Duke, Age of the World Target, pg. 39-41, 2006)

The World Becomes Virtual The dropping of the atomic bombs effected what Michel Foucault would call a major shift in epistemes, a fundamental change in the organization, production, and circulation of knowledge. War after the atomic bomb would no longer be the physical, mechanical struggles between combative oppositional groups, but would increasingly come to resemble collaborations in the logistics of perception between partners who occupy relative, but always mutually implicated, positions. As in the case of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for several decades, war was more and more to be fought in virtuality, as an exchange of defensive positionings, a tacitly coordinated routine of upping the potential for war, a race for the deterrent. Warring in virtuality meant competing with the enemy for the stockpiling, rather than actual use, of preclusively horrifying weaponry. To terrorize the other, one specializes in representation, in the means of display and exhibition. As Virilio writes, “A war of pictures and sounds is replacing the war of objects (projectiles and missiles).” In the name of arms reduction and limitation, the salt and start agreements served to promote, improve, and multiply armament between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were, strictly speaking, allies rather than adversaries in the so-called “Star Wars” or sdi (Strategic Defense Initiative). Moreover, war would exist from now on as an agenda that is infinitely selfreferential: war represents not other types of struggles and conflicts— what in history classes are studied as “causes”—but war itself. From its previous conventional, negative signification as a blockade, an inevitable but regretted interruption of the continuity that is “normal life,” war shifts to a new level of force. It has become not the cessation of normality, but rather, the very definition of normality itself. The space and time of war are no longer segregated in the form of an other; instead, they operate from within the here and now, as the internal logic of the here and now. From being negative blockade to being normal routine, war becomes the positive mechanism, momentum, and condition of possibility of society, creating a hegemonic space of global communication through powers of visibility and control. It is important to note that the normativization of war and war technology takes place as well among—perhaps especially among—the defeated. As Dower writes, in Japan, deficiency in science and technology was singled out as the chief reason for defeat, and the atomic bomb was seen simultaneously as “a symbol of the terror of nuclear war and the promise of science.” in militarism, postwar Japan specialized in the promotion of science and technology for “peace” and for the consolidation of a “democratic” society. Instead of bombs and missiles, Japan became one of the world's leading producers of cars, cameras, computers, and other kinds of “high tech” equipment. Hitachi, Toshiba, Sony, Sanyo, Nikon, Mitsubishi, and their like becoming household names throughout the world, the defeated “victim” of the war rises again and rejoins the “victor” in a new competition, the competition in bombarding the world with a different type of implosion—information. With the preemptiveness of seeing-as-destruction and the normativization of technology-as-information, thus, comes the great epistemic shift, which has been gradually occurring with the onset of speed technologies and which finally virtualizes the world. As a condition that is no longer separable from civilian life, war is thoroughly absorbed into the fabric of our daily communications—our information channels, our entertainment media, our machinery for speech and expression. We participate in war’s virtualization of the world as we use—without thinking— television monitors, remote controls, mobile phones, digital cameras, PalmPilots, and other electronic devices that fill the spaces of everyday life. We do not usually notice the strangeness of, say, listening to news on the radio about different calamities while preparing lunch or dinner, nor are we shocked by the juxtaposition on television of commercials with reports of rapes, tortures, or genocides. Our consumption of war, bloodshed, and violence through our communication technologies is on a par with our consumption of various forms of merchandise. There is, furthermore, another side to the virtualization of the world which most of us do not experience but which is even more alarming: when a war does occur, such as the Gulf Wars that began in 1991 and 2003, the ubiquitous virtualization of everyday life means that war can no longer be fought without the skills of playing video games. In the aerial bombings of Iraq, the world was divided into an above and a below in accordance with the privilege of access to the virtual world. Up above in the sky, war was a matter of maneuvers across the video screen by U.S. soldiers who had been accustomed as teenagers to playing video games at home; down below, war remained tied to the body, to manual labor, to the random disasters falling from the heavens. For the U.S. men and women of combat, the elitism and aggressiveness of panoramic vision went hand in hand with distant control and the instant destruction of others; for the ordinary men, women, and children of Iraq (as for the ordinary people of Korea and Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s), life became more and more precarious—immaterial in the sense of a readiness for total demolition at any moment. Even as we speak, the Pentagon is reported to be building its own Internet for the wars of the future, with the goal “to give all American commanders and troops [including those on the ground] a moving picture of all foreign enemies and threats—‘a God’s-eye view’ of battle.”

**All of this takes place within the pedagogical constraints of international relations theory, an obsessively white, masculine, heteronormative and capitalist discipline. The pedagogy of traditional IR is a strategy of epistemic containment, isolating flimsy narratives of hegemony, security, and militarism from critical analysis through amnesia on questions of race, class, gender, and colonialism. Within the FATA region this takes the form of an epistemic silence and refusal to acknowledge narratives that run counter to the demands of the Security State. Our genealogical analysis is able to uncover what remains concealed in the totalizing narratives of IR, and deploy them as a critique of racist, sexist, and colonialist pedagogy.**

*Contemporary IR discourse is a strategy of containment: it consciously denies underlying contradictions and instead provides a “substitute truth” to make existence bearable. IR champions “policy-relevance” and quantitative analysis: these are the mechanisms of containment. These are NOT truth seeking but truth MASKING – these pedagogical allergies are the means of denying underlying contradictions. To remember international relations, one needs to forget IR: our critical genealogy of the FATA is that process of forgetting and remembering.*

**KRISHNA** Dept of Political Science @ University of Hawaii @ Manoa **2k1** Sankaran-; *Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations*; ALTERNATIVES 26; p. 401-24 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3225/is_4_26/ai_n28886581/>

Before turning to the three contrapuntal readings of encounters that have consolidated the modern underpinnings of IR discourse through abstraction, I outline what I mean by "strategies of containment." This section is critical to understanding the very nature of contemporary IR discourse, its characteristic anxieties and obsessions, and the reasons why it is a quintessentially "white" discipline constructed around an amnesia on the question of race. IR discourse's valorization and fetishization of "theory" becomes more comprehensible as a "strategy of containment," to use Fredric Jameson's term from his The Political Unconscious. (10) For Jameson, a strategy of containment allows the wielders of a body of interpretive work to "project the illusion that their readings are somehow complete and self-sufficient" (p. 10). With a sharper political edge, he further defines strategies of containment as a process that "allows what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own terms, while repressing the unthinkable . . . which lies beyond its boundaries" (p. 53). Or, clearer still, a strategy of containment is a means at once of denying those intolerable contradictions that lie hidden beneath the social surface, as intolerable as that Necessity that gives rise to relations of domination in human society, and of constructing on the very ground cleared by such denial a substitute truth that renders existence at least partly bearable. (11) In Jameson's "strategy of containment," one can discern clear echoes of Heidegger's idea of knowledge as the simultaneous act of disclosure/concealment. Founded as it is on discourses that justified, abstracted, and rationalized the genocide of the populations of the so-called new world, the enslavement of Africans, and colonization of the Asians, the discipline of IR is one giant strategy of containment, "a substitute truth that renders existence at least partly bearable." It is also then a quintessentially white discipline. It is not that race disappears from IR; it is rather that race serves as the crucial epistemic silence around which the discipline is written and coheres. That which is made to appear in IR discourse is that which conceals the silent presence of race. Incidentally, from such a view, postcolonial IR is an oxymoron--a contradiction in terms. To decolonize IR is to deschool oneself from the discipline in its current dominant manifestations: to remember international relations, one needs to forget IR. The disciplining moves within the pedagogy of IR--the taboo against overly historical and descriptive narratives; the fetish for quantitative analyses that compress centuries of contested historical narratives into eviscerated numbers; the reduction of socially sentient human beings into rational utility-maximizers; the preference for problem-solving theory (in the guise of policy relevance) rather than for critical or genealogical theory; the putative anarchy of the system of nation-states that discredits possibilities of imagining non-national ways of being; the hypermasculine tetchiness and insecurity on questions of gender, androgyny, and queer identity; and, most significantly, the elision of themes such as the theft of land, racism, slavery, and colonialism can be collectively understood as a series of extraordinarily effective moves that preserve the ideology of IR discourse. Pressing on with Jameson, he makes a point of some significance for IR discourse when he notes that "strategies of containment are not only modes of exclusion; they can also take the form of repression in some stricter Hegelian sense of the persistence of the older repressed content beneath the later formalized surface." (12) I argue peremptorily here and now that the obsessive anxiety displayed by IR discourse on issues such as terrorism, third-world immigration, spread of infectious diseases such as AIDS or the Ebola virus, illegal drugs, or refugees, is the return of the repressed. The ideology of IR discourse, its gothic apparitions, premised as they are on an originary alienation and estrangement between a "civilized" West and a dangerous, incomprehensible, and barbaric "rest," is unable to repress the entailments of that alienation through its multiple strategies of containment--they resurface as IR gothic, perhaps the dominant literary genre in the discipline. They return to haunt the habitus of a discipline destined never to be at peace with itself because its origins and reproduction owes to a process of abstraction that represses the violent preconditions of its very locus of enunciation.(13) I am consequently arguing that the very foundations of IR discourse should be interpreted as an attempt at overcoming an originary alienation that clefts humanity with the discovery of the Americas by Columbus in 1492 and the slavery that accelerates thereafter. The encounter with the "other" constituted both the self of Europe from this point in time and space and the steady estrangement of the world thereafter into an enclosed zone that reserved for itself the attributes of civilization, culture, religiosity, science, rationality, private property, and humanity, and attributed to the other the precise opposites--barbarity, a lack of history, superstition, lack of private property, and inferiority. It is perhaps unsurprising that this originary alienation, an alienation that goes to the very heart of the modern condition, is sought to be energetically overcome by the creation and sustenance of a discipline that exemplifies the alienation, and through its devices of abstraction seeks both expiation and transcendence. To understand international relations, then, seek out that which IR discourse represses, hides, elides, conceals, and prematurely closes off as avenues for inquiry. As Toni Morrison has it on the impact of this originary alienation on the content of modernity: Modern life begins with slavery. ... Slavery broke the world in half, it broke it in every way. It broke Europe. It made them into something else, it made them slave masters, it made them crazy. You can't do that for hundreds of years and it not take a toll. They had to dehumanize, not just the slaves but themselves. They had to reconstruct everything in order to make that system appear true. It made everything in world war two possible. It made world war one necessary. Racism is the word we use to encompass all this. (14)

**Challenging this system is important: this regime of IR is responsible for unlimited violence at a global scale, from poverty, famine and environmental destruction to genocide and the creation of life and death zones.**

Balibar, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at The University of Paris-X, 2004 [Etienne, also Distinguished Professor of Humanities at University of California at Irvine, We, The People Of Europe?: Reflections On Transnational Citizenship, p. 115-116, 126-129]

I am aware of all these difficulties, but I would maintain that a reality lies behind the notion of something "unprecedented." Perhaps it is simply the fact that a number of heterogeneous methods or processes of extermination (by which I mean eliminating masses of individuals inasmuch as they belong to objective or subjective groups) have themselves become "globalized,” that is, operate in a similar manner everywhere in the world at the same time, and so progressively form a “chain,” giving full reality to what E. P. Thompson anticipated twenty years ago with the name “exterminism.” In this series of connected processes, we must include, precisely because they are heterogeneous—they do not have one and the same "cause," but they produce cumulative effects: 1. Wars (both “civil” and “foreign,” a distinction that is not easy to draw in many cases, such as Yugoslavia or Chechnya). 2. Communal rioting, with ethnic and/or religious ideologies of “cleansing.” 3. Famines and other kinds of “absolute” poverty produced by the ruin of traditional and nontraditional economies. 4. Seemingly “natural” catastrophes, which in fact are killing on a mass scale because they are overdetermined by social, economic, and political structures, such as pandemics (for example, the difference in the distribution of AIDS and the possibilities of treatment between Europe and North America on one side, Africa and some parts of Asia on the other), droughts, floods, or earth-quakes in the absence of developed civil protection. In the end it would be my suggestion that the "globalization" of various kinds of extreme violence has produced a growing division of the "globalized" world into life zones and death zones. Between these zones (which indeed are intricate and frequently reproduced within the boundaries of a single country or city) there exists a decisive and fragile superborder, which raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of [hu]mankind—something like a global and local “enmity line,” like the “amity line” that existed in the beginning of the modern European seizure of the world. It is this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of permanent show and a hot place for intervention but also for nonintervention. We might discuss whether the most worrying aspect of present international politics is "humanitarian intervention" or "generalized nonintervention," or one coming after the other. Should We Consider Extreme Violence to Be "Rational" or "Functional" from the Point of View of Market Capitalism (the "Liberal Economy")? This is a very difficult question—in fact, I think it is the most difficult question—but it cannot be avoided; hence it is also the most intellectually challenging. Again, we should warn against a paralogism that is only too obvious but nonetheless frequent: that of mistaking consequences for goals or purposes. (But is it really possible to discuss social systems in terms of purposes? On the other hand, can we avoid reflecting on the immanent ends, or "logic," of a structure such as capitalism?) It seems to me, very schematically, that the difficulty arises from the two opposite "global effects" that derive from the emergence of a chain of mass violence—as compared, for example, with what Marx called primitive accumulation when he described the creation of the preconditions for capitalist accumulation in terms of the violent suppression of the poor. One kind of effect is simply to generalize material and moral insecurity for millions of potential workers, that is, to induce a massive proletarianization or reproletarianization (a new phase of proletarianization that crucially involves a return of many to the proletarian condition from which they had more or less escaped, given that insecurity is precisely the heart of the "proletarian condition"). This process is contemporary with an increased mobility of capital and also humans, and so it takes place across borders. But, seen historically, it can. also be distributed among several political varieties: 1. In the “North” it involves a partial or deep dismantling of the social policies and the institutions of social citizenship created by the welfare state, what I call the "national social state," and therefore also a violent transition from welfare to workfare, from the social state to the penal state (the United States showing the way in this respect, as was convincingly argued in a recent essay by Loïc Wacquant). 2. In the "South," it involves destroying and inverting the “developmental” programs and policies, which admittedly did not suffice to produce the desired “takeoff” but indicated a way to resist impoverishment. 3. In the "semiperiphery," to borrow Immanuel Wallerstein's category, it was connected with the collapse of the dictatorial structure called "real existing socialism," which was based on scarcity and corruption, but again kept the polarization of riches and poverty within certain limits. Let me suggest that a common formal feature of all these processes resulting in the reproletarianization of the labor force is the fact that they suppress of minimize the forms and possibilities of representation of the subaltern within the state apparatus itself, or, if you prefer, the possibilities of more or less effective counterpower. With this remark I want to emphasize the political aspect of processes that, in the first instance, seem to be mainly "economic." This political aspect, I think, is even more decisive when we turn to the other scene, the other kind of result produced by massive violence, although the mechanism here is extremely mysterious. Mysterious but real, unquestionably. I am thinking of a much more destructive tendency, destructive not of welfare or traditional was of life, but of the social bond itself and, in the end, of “bare life.” Let us think of Michel Foucault, who used to oppose two kinds of politics: “Let live” and “let die.” In the face of the cumulative effects of different forms of extreme violence or cruelty that are displayed in what I called the “death zones” of humanity, we are lead to admit that the current mode of production and reproduction has become a mode of production for elimination, a reproduction of populations that are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always already superfluous, and therefore can be only eliminated either through “political” or “natural” means—what some Latin American sociologists call problacion chatarra, “garbage humans,” to be “thrown” away, out of the global city. If this is the case, the question arises once again, what is the rationality of that? Or do we face an absolute triumph of irrationality? My suggestion would be: it is economically irrational (because it amounts to a limitation of the scale of accumulation), but it is politically rational—or, better said, it can be interpreted in political terms. The fact is that history does not move simply in a circle, the circular pattern of successive phases of accumulation. Economic and political class struggles have already taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the result of limiting the possibilities of exploitation, creating a balance of forces, and this event remains, so to speak, in the "memory" of the system. The system (and probably also some of its theoreticians and politicians) "knows" that there is no exploitation without class struggles, no class struggles without organization and representation of the exploited, no representation and organization without a tendency toward political and social citizenship. This is precisely what current capitalism cannot afford: there is no possibility of a "global social state" corresponding to the "national social states" in some parts of the world during the last century. I mean, there is no political possibility. Therefore there is political resistance, very violent indeed, to every move in that direction. Technological revolutions provide a positive but insufficient condition for the deproletarianization of the actual or potential labor force. This time, direct political repression may also be insufficient. Elimination or extermination has to take place, "passive" if possible, "active" if necessary; mutual elimination is "best," but it has to be encouraged from outside. This is what allows me to suggest (and it already takes me to my third question) that if the "economy of global violence" is not functional (because its immanent goals are indeed contradictory), it remains in a sense teleological: the "same" populations are massively targeted (or the reverse: those populations that are targeted become progressively assimilated, they look "the same"). They are qualitatively "deterritorialized,” as Gilles Deleuze would say, in an intensive rather than extensive sense: they “live” on the edge of the city, under permanent threat of elimination, but also, conversely, they live and are perceived as "nomads," even when they are fixed in their homelands, that is, their mere existence, their quantity, their movements, their virtual claims of rights and citizenship are perceived as a threat for "civilization."

#### Thus the plan:

#### The United States Federal Government should prohibit presidential targeted killing authority.

Contention Two is Our Method:

#### Critical genealogy challenges established practices of remembering and forgetting to bring subjugated knowledges to the forefront as a challenge to dominant power structures. This epistemic insurrection is guerilla pluralism against the social fabric – a form of resistance that confronts the relational nature of power.

(Jose **Medina**, October **2011**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, 6/26/12,K.H.)

In order to understand the diversity and heterogeneity of forms of resistance, we need to understand the positionality and relationality of social agents in networks of power relations. Foucault insists that ‚resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power‛ and that in order to understand how resistance works, we need to understand ‚the strictly relational character of power relations.‛2 Although this is often obscured by the widely assumed opposition between power and resistance, the Foucaultian analysis of power and resistance makes clear that these are inter-nally related terms, and that resistance is not something that is exerted from outside power, but within it. One of Foucault’s great achievements is his critique of tradi-tional conceptions of power as something repressive, top-down, and homogeneous or monolithic. By contrast, Foucault makes clear that there are irreducibly multiple and heterogeneous forms of power flowing in every direction within the social fab-ric, and offering multiple points of resistance. Resistance is a complicated and heterogeneous phenomenon that defies unifi-cation and explication according to abstract and rigid principles of subversion. Our cognitive, affective, and political lives are caught up in various tensions among mul-tidirectional relations of power/resistance. Our ways of thinking, feeling, and acting become empowered and disempowered in specific respects, as they are formed and remained inscribed within the different networks of power relations and the dif-ferent forms of resistance that shape our lives in various (and not always fully co-herent) ways. Struggles of resistance should be studied in their specificity, but with-out thereby renouncing investigation of their connections, intersections, and points of convergence and divergence. In this paper I want to address the question of what a critical epistemology that places bodies of knowledge and ignorance—especially historical knowledge and ignorance—in the context of power networks and struggles of resistance has to offer. The central goal of this paper is to show the emancipatory potential of the epistemological framework underlying Foucault’s work. More specifically, I will try to show that the Foucaultian approach places practices of remembering and for-getting in the context of power relations in such a way that possibilities of resistance and subversion are brought to the fore. When our cultural practices of remembering and forgetting are interrogated as loci where multiple power relations and power struggles converge, the first thing to notice is the heterogeneity of differently situ-ated perspectives and the multiplicity of trajectories that converge in the epistemic negotiations in which memories are formed or de-formed, maintained alive or killed. The discursive practices in which memory and oblivion are manufactured are not uniform and harmonious, but heterogeneous and full of conflicts and tensions. Foucault invites us to pay attention to the past and ongoing epistemic battles among competing power/knowledge frameworks that try to control a given field. Different fields—or domains of discursive interaction—contain particular discursive regimes with their particular ways of producing knowledge. In the battle among power/ knowledge frameworks, some come on top and become dominant while others are displaced and become subjugated. Foucault’s methodology offers a way of exploiting that vibrant plurality of epistemic perspectives which always contains some bodies of experiences and memories that are erased or hidden in the mainstream frame-works that become hegemonic after prevailing in sustained epistemic battles. What Foucault calls subjugated knowledges3 are forms of experiencing and remembering that are pushed to the margins and rendered unqualified and unworthy of epistemic respect by prevailing and hegemonic discourses. Subjugated knowledges remain invisible to mainstream perspectives; they have a precarious subterranean existence that renders them unnoticed by most people and impossible to detect by those whose perspective has already internalized certain epistemic exclusions. And with the invisibility of subjugated knowledges, certain possibilities for resistance and subversion go unnoticed. The critical and emancipa-tory potential of Foucaultian genealogy resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed. The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subju-gated knowledges—that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges.4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, genealogical investigations should aim at these insurrections, which are critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic insur-rection requires a collaborative relation between genealogical scholars/activists and the subjects whose experiences and memories have been subjugated: those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to con-testation. On the other hand, the scholars and activists aiming to produce insurrec-tionary interventions could not get their critical activity off the ground if they did not draw on past and ongoing contestations, and the lived experiences and memories of those whose marginalized lives have become the silent scars of forgotten struggles. As I will try to show in detail in what follows, what makes the Foucaultian genealogical approach specifically critical is its capacity to facilitate insurrections of subjugated knowledges. In section 1, I will explain how exactly critical genealogies contribute ‚to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free,‛5 so that insur-rectionary struggles against coercive epistemic closures are revived. Critical genea-logies contribute to the production of counter-histories, which are centered around those experiences and memories that have not been heard and integrated in official histories. The counter-histories that critical genealogies can produce are possible be-cause there are people who remember against the grain, people whose memories do not fit the historical narratives available. Counter-histories feed off such counter-memories and at the same time transform them, revitalizing practices of counter-memory and offering them new discursive resources to draw on. The critical goal of genealogy is to energize a vibrant and feisty epistemic pluralism so that insurrec-tionary struggles among competing power/knowledge frameworks are always underway and contestation always alive. In section 2, I elucidate the specific kind of epistemic pluralism underlying Foucaultian critical genealogies. I argue that this is not just any kind of epistemic pluralism but a particularly radical and dynamic one: what I term a guerrilla pluralism. I argue that a commitment to guerrilla pluralism is what guides the role of scholars/activists as facilitators of insurrections; and I con-trast this particularly combative kind of pluralism with other epistemological plura-listic approaches to memory and knowledge of the past which have been prevalent in American philosophy. Finally, in section 3, I will lay out what Foucaultian genea-logy and the guerrilla pluralism that supports it have to offer to contemporary epis-temologies of ignorance in race theory and sstandpoint theory. Although the Fou-caultian approach has often been viewed as antithetical to standpoint epistemology (since it destabilizes and calls into question standpoints as problematic cultural arti-facts), I will show that there is an interesting and rich convergence between the Fou-caultian genealogical critique of standpoints and the self-interrogation of stand-points recently developed in critical race theory and feminist theory.

**Standard methods of research and policy debate replicate the kind of knowledge production that Krishna describes as epistemic containment, and Ahktar and Shaw describe as essential to the workings of the Predator Empire. To construct an IR praxis not founded on regimes of racist, colonialist, and militarist knowledge, we need to change the way we do research and construct arguments in academic debate.**

Chow, 2006 (Rey Chow, Professor of Literature at Duke, Age of the World Target, pg. 46-49, 2006)

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/“eye”— the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that— a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual world- ing that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber— such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, been, area studies has been since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.” As Harootunian goes on to argue, for all its investment in the study of other languages and other cultures, area studies missed the opportunity, so aptly provided by Said’s criticism of Orientalism, to become the site where a genuinely alternative form of knowledge production might have been possible. Although, as Harootunian writes, “ Said’s book represented an important intellectual challenge to the mission of area studies which, if accepted, would have reshaped area studies and freed it from its own reliance on the Cold War and the necessities of the national security the challenge was too fundamentally disruptive to the administrative and instrumentalist agendas so firmly routinized in area studies to be accepted by its practitioners. As a result, Said’s attempt to link an incipient neocolonial discourse to the history of area studies was almost immediately belittled, dismissed, and ignored, and his critique, for all its relevance to area studies’ future orientation, simply “migrated to English studies to transform the study of literature into a fullscale preoccupation with identity and its construction.” A long-term outcome of all this, Harootunian suggests, has been the consolidation of a type of postcolonial studies that, instead of fully developing the comparative, interdisciplinary, and multicultural potential that is embedded theoretically in area studies, tends to specialize in the deconstruction of the nature of language, in the amalgamation of poststructuralist theory largely with AngloAmerican literary studies, and in the investigation mostly of former British colonial cultures rather than a substantial range of colonial and semicolonial histories from different parts of the world. On its part, having voluntarily failed to heed Said’s call, area studies can only remain “locked in its own enclaves of knowledge” based on the reproduction of institutional and organizational structures with claims to normativity, while being defensively guarded against the innovations of poststructuralist theory that have radicalized North American humanistic and social scientific learning since the 1970s. As I have already suggested, the truth of the continual targeting of the world as the fundamental form of knowledge production is xenophobia, the inability to handle the otherness of the other beyond the orbit that is the bomber’s own visual path. For the xenophobe, every effort needs to be made to sustain and secure this orbit— that is, by keeping the place of the other-as-target always filled. With the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States must hence seek other substitutes for war. As has often been pointed out, drugs, poverty, and illegal immigrants have since become the new targets, which occupy— together with Moslems, Arabs, and communists (that is, Cuba, North Korea, and mainland China)—the status of that ultimate danger to be “deterred” at all costs.

**Power is fluid and diffuse, not concentrated along a single axis of political subjectivity. Genealogical discussions like the Affirmative are not empty – rather they open up sites of resistance within complicated regimes of biopower.**

Huysmans, 2008 (Jef Huysmans, Professor of Siociology and Chair in Security Studies at Open University, The Jargon of Exception – On Schmitt, Agamben, and the Absence of Political Society, Journal of Political Sociology 2008, vol 2, 165-183)

Contrasting Agamben’s reading of biopolitics with Foucault’s is instructive. Similarly to Agamben, Foucault’s work on biopolitics, discipline and governmentality addresses the emergence and governance of life in its biological existence as a form of power that considerably differs from legal-constitutional understandings of politics (Foucault 1976, 2004a,b). However, unlike Agamben this life is not an empty, that is, unmediated space or entity. In Foucault’s reading, life is rendered not primarily through ‘‘being freed’’ from the politico-legal order but by being constituted through, among others, the mediation of technologies and professional knowledges. The invention of political economy, knowledge -struggles within psychiatry, the invention of history, etc. deﬁned how modern life, its governance and its politics have been constituted as a biopolitical dispositifs. In analyzing how power operates through dispersed, fragmented practices that nevertheless weave a diagram of constituting and governing societal relations, the total categories in which politics has been conceptualized in the constitutional framing of exception—state versus society, law versus politics, sovereignty—collapse into a relational picture of various expert discourses, professional knowledges, institutional practices governing a biological and economic understanding of life, and a rich history of sociopolitical struggles (Foucault 1997, 2004a,b). Instead of being naked and anomic life, biopolitical life is constituted through an extremely detailed mediation of social and individual being and is steeped in a multidimensional history of strategic and tactical interactions. Not means without ends but the patching into a dispositifs of multiple strategies of connecting means and ends that have been enacted and struggled over in a multiplicity of sites and times. While the central characteristic of Agamben’s biopolitics is anomie, Foucault’s is extremely detailed and fragmented mediations that produce, reproduce, and shift strategic, governmental practice and resistance to it. These latter struggles over knowledge, truth and governmental technologies and their bearing upon social relations and individual being often are not articulated primarily within the ﬁeld of professional politicians and the state institutions. Politics as the contestation over the collective structuring of relations between human beings and between them and their environment has ‘‘left’’ the state and has been absorbed by societal practices. Politics becomes fragmented and dispersed within the societal. One of the central realms of Foucaultian biopolitics is the traveling and clustering of professional knowledge, skills and technologies, and the formulation of counter-knowledge, skills and technologies, as the sociological interpretations of Foucault in the so-called governmentality literature have most explicitly brought out (Dean 1991, 1994, 1999; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996; Hindess 1996; Rose 1999). Unlike the jargon of exception, this Foucaultian reading does not interpret the nature of modern politics from the perspective of its ultimate limit. As Marie Mu¨ hle’s reading of Agamben and Foucault shows, they fundamentally differ in that Foucault reads modern politics from the inside—from the practices that have constituted it—while Agamben interprets the nature of modern politics from its absolute outside (Mu¨ hle 2007).11 The idioms of exception and exception-as-the-rule seek to understand the nature of democratic politics from the perspective of its collapse. For Agamben, the concentration camps, that is, loci where the exception has become the rule, deﬁne the matrix of modern politics (Agamben 1998). The concentration camp has been the reference point of the absolute limit of modern, democratic government in Europe at least since the middle of the twentieth century. Schmitt deﬁnes the nature of politics through the specter of dictatorship. The relation to a total enemy and thus the possibility of total war as well as in the existence of an absolute normative vacuum in which the relation between norms and anomie can no longer be bridged but has to be reconstituted deﬁnes the ‘‘essence’’ of modern politics. Both points of view conceptualize the political from the point of view of the absolute limit of democratic governance both in its liberal and social-democratic forms. This thinking of democratic politics through its limit is a central characteristic of the jargon of exception (Bartelson 1997). It is therefore not surprising that the key category of democratic politics, ‘‘the people’’ as a political societal multiplicity of relations and political practices, slips out of the jargon of exception. After all, it seeks to understand democratic politics from sites and times where it no longer exists. Reading Foucault sharply brings out this peculiarity of the jargon of exception. Unlike Schmitt and Agamben, his interpretation draws us into the richness and transformations of biopolitical history through which modern governance and politics has developed (Neal 2006). The question is not what the camps tell us about the nature of modern politics but rather how practices such as camps and therapeutic policies exist within democratic forms of governance that aim to optimize and improve life and constitute freedom as a deﬁning category of subjects and governance (Mu¨ hle 2007). These histories, sites of governance and contestations of knowledge and truth always consist of highly relational and heavily mediated practices. As stated above, in Foucault’s work, biopolitics does not enact anomie but its contrary: an extremely detailed governance and self-governance of relations between humans and between humans and their environment. This view of biopolitical relationality is not totalitarian because change and resistance are internally generated within biopolitics and therefore political life is not simply imposition through governance but always also necessarily struggles over knowledge, technologies, living conditions, discriminations, etc. (for example, Foucault 1973, 1978, 1997). Such a reading of biopolitics reintroduces the societal as a history, a multiplicity of places and times, and traditions of thinking the political, thus taking exception to the erasure of the societal and the catastrophic conceptions of the political in the jargon of exception. Looked at from this perspective, debates about the reconciliation of liberty and security, for example, are not, as Agamben argues, an ideological practice that hides the fundamental break down of the dialectic between law and anomie that has been central to modern politics (Agamben 2003:144–148). Rather these debates insert questions of and challenges to the role of law and generalized norm-setting in highly charged biopolitical governance of insecurities. Instead of collapsing the dialectic between law and anomie, contestation of the protection of civil liberties, demands for re-negotiating balances between liberties and security are neither simply to be taken at face value as a matter of the necessity of balancing and rebalancing nor to be seen as the endgame of the validity of legal mediations of politics and life. Rather they open up a need to revisit the particular kind of work that law does and does not do in speciﬁc sites (Neocleous 2006), such as camps, and what the practices possibly tell us about if and how the dialectic between law and anomie operates in biopolitical governance. Fleur Johns’s analysis of the camp in Guantanamo Bay is one such example (Johns 2005). She argues that the camp is penetrated by a form of norm setting, thus implying that a dialectic between norms and anomie, political transgression and law is not absent from the organization and governing practice in the camp. Unlike some other analyses that focus on constitutional transgressions and battles in the constitutional courts, Johns emphasizes the importance for biopolitical governance of the detailed and in a sense banal regulations that seek to structure the everyday practices of the guards, the administrators and the prisoners. The norm setting is thus not primarily constitutional but administrative. The important point for this essay is that analyses like Fleur John’s unpack the contemporary predicaments and political stakes in a site like Guantanamo Bay by taking the practices and governmental technologies at face value and interpret the speciﬁc work they do for making camps possible within democratic polities. The understanding of the camp transﬁgures from an absolute limit that deﬁnes the fundamental nature of modern politics to a phenomenon that is constituted and contested by various banal practices and governmental techniques. The question becomes how these practices and sites we call camps are rendered within and through modern democratic governance in a biopolitical age. Such an approach does not read the nature of politics off of its limits but through the multiple relations that are shaped by means of objectiﬁed mediations and the struggles over them.

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## ---- Case – Util

We have offense against the Utilitarian system – Weighing rights against the lives of others inevitable leads to genocide

Dillon, ’99

[Michael; Professor Politics, University of Lancaster, Political Theory, April 99, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p155, 21p “Another Justice”]

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.([n33](http://web16.epnet.com/#bib33)) It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.([n34](http://web16.epnet.com/" \l "bib34)) They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.(n35) Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value--rights--may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."(n36) But how does that necessity present itself?. Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### Supposedly objective, predictive interpretations are cloaks for imperialism.

Marandi, 09 (head of dept. of North American studies, U Tehran (Seyed, Western Media Representations, Iran, and Orientalist Stereotypes, January 2009, http://conflictsforum.org/briefings/western-media-representations.pdf, AMiles) ellipses in orig)

Orientalism describes the various schools of thought and methods of investigation through which Europe came to know ‘the East.’ According to scholars such as Edward Said, it was and still is through this discourse and its construction of knowledge that the West has been able to legitimize and maintain its hold over the uncivilized ‘Other.’ A major and repeated feature of Oriental analysis in all its various forms is that it constantly confirms the thesis that the Orient is primitive, mysterious, exotic, and incapable of self-government. However, orientalism should not be looked upon as just the rationalization of colonial rule. Far more important, it seems, is how it knowingly or unknowingly justifies imperialism and colonialism even in advance of their actual manifestation. Orientalism can be “viewed in Foucauldian terms as a discourse: a manifestation of power/knowledge.”1 This is because, as Foucault sees it, discourse is a severely bounded area of social knowledge or “heavily policed cognitive systems which control and delimit both the mode and the means of representation in a given society.”2 It is a series of statements, through which the world can be known, as it is not recognized by simply analyzing objective data. Its recognition is brought into being through **discourse**, which **is** **ideologically loaded,** but independent of individual will and judgment. According to Said, discourse is the system of thought by which dominant powers establish spheres of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’, and it is through such discursive practices that religions, races, cultures, and classes are represented. Discursive practices are interwoven with social and power relations, while history itself is indivisible from discursive formations. The idea of representation is usually based upon a notion of being faithful to the original. However, representation is largely interwoven with many other things besides ‘truth’. It is defined not just by inherent common subject matter, but also by a common history, tradition, and universe of discourse that exists within a particular field.3 Representation is a phenomenon created by writers, intellectuals, artists, commentators, reporters, travelers, politicians, as well as others working within similar discursive formations. This Foucauldian perspective permits Said to consider numerous ‘Western’ texts, from apparently separate intellectual disciplines such as politics, media, history, linguistics, and literature, among others, as belonging to a single discourse called Orientalism. What brings these texts together is the common culture and ideology intrinsic to the discursive practices through which they produce knowledge about the Orient. These discursive “practices **make it difficult for individuals to think outside them** –

hence they are also seen as exercises of power and control”.4 However, it should be kept in mind that this does not mean that a discourse is either static or cannot admit internal contradictions. It is often the case that orientalist modes of thought and representation are actually able to survive contact with the reality on the ground with which it often seems to be at odds with. One reason for this may be that the need for creating an overall consistency in discourse may constantly prevent the realization of objective analysis as well as commitment to ‘truth’. The stronger the discourse becomes the longer it lives, and the better it is able to bring about consistency within its borders. This is helped through the continued repetition and adaptation of its motifs. Another explanation for the persistent Orientalist mode of representation is Said’s concept of latent and manifest Orientalism. Manifest Orientalism is basically comprised of openly stated ideas about Eastern civilization, history, government, or literature produced at different historical junctures. Latent Orientalism, however, is an “almost unconscious and certainly an untouchable positivity”5 that: […] contains the basic ‘truths’ of the Orient, so that while, for example historians might disagree about particular interpretations of the history of the Orient, underlying assumptions of oriental backwardness would remain unquestioned. As such latent Orientalism has strong affinities with certain concepts of ideology, particularly the ‘negative’ version of ideology as false consciousness, and the durability of ideological formations, especially when allied to strong institutions such as Orientalism, would also help to explain the survival of Orientalist attitudes.6 An important aspect of Said’s Orientalism is that it explains the methods through which ‘the Other’ was constructed by the West as its barbaric, irrational, despotic, and inferior opposite or alter ego. It is a type of surrogate and underground version of the West or the ‘self’.7 What may be even more significant is that through its position of domination, the West is even able to tell the ‘truth’ to non-Western cultures, in this case the Orient, about their past and present condition, as they are capable of representing the Orient more authentically than the Orient can itself. Such a ‘truthful’ representation not only aids the colonizer or imperialist in justifying their actions, but it also serves to weaken the resistance of ‘the Other’ as it **changes the way in which ‘the Other’ views itself.** Many western experts, historians, reporters, and analysts may not necessarily construct an intentionally misleading or dishonest image of the Other (though some do). Many may not even omit facts, which by doing so might lead readers or viewers to unacceptable conclusions (though many do). What often happens is that the truth is quickly mentioned and then the analyst focuses on other issues. In other words, facts are sometimes stated and then buried in a mass of other information, and at times misinformation. The issue at stake here is not about simplification or emphasis, which are both inevitable for reporters and experts alike. The subsequent distortions are perhaps at times necessary in order for a wider audience to understand the topic under discussion. The form of distortion that is of concern here is an ideological one rather than a technical one, where intentionally or otherwise, any chosen emphasis effectively backs some kind of interest. The distortion may not be intentional, because the expert or analyst, whether western or a westernized oriental, has been trained under the illusion that knowledge and education are essentially neutral and are not tools that can be used for contending centers of power, nations, or races. Hence, by emphasizing certain elements and deemphasizing others (if they are at all presented), at times major crimes and even **mass murder can be justified.** This can easily been seen in the discourse of the mainstream media in the ‘West’ regarding western support for Saddam Hussain’s brutal regime as well as it’s use of weapons of mass destruction against Iranian and Iraqi civilians and combatants. The same can be said about the western media’s relative silence and indifference towards the Zionist regime’s barbaric siege of the Gaza Strip. Such crimes against humanity are regularly accepted as appalling, yet somehow necessary in order to protect the interests of the so-called Free World. The media’s treatment of western governments, politicians, and other western or westernized figures of influence in comparison to that of their victims or antagonists, whether they are Iranian politicians, Afghani villagers, or hungry Palestinian children, is regularly influenced by ‘national interests’ and the interests of the ‘free world’. In other words, the mainstream media takes for granted that western actions are a necessary evil to ward of a greater evil. Hence, history and the present is told from the point of view of western governments, conquerors, and diplomats, because they deserve universal acceptance in the face of the uncivilized Other. Regardless of the morality of such a Eurocentric approach to world affairs, scholars like Howard Zinn question its very meaningfulness: The pretence is that there really is such a thing as “the United States,” subject to occasional conflicts and quarrels, but fundamentally a community of people with common interests. It is as if there really is a “national interest” represented by the U.S. Constitution, in territorial expansion, in the laws passed by U.S. Congress, the decisions of the courts, the development of capitalism, the culture of education and the mass media…Nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioner.8

## ---- Politics

**CP displaces the need to act ethically on institutional processes – no solvency and justifies racism**

Van Oenen 06 (Gijs, Senior Lecturer in Dept. of Philosophy @ Erasmus U. Rotterdam, “A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political Life,” Theory & Event, 9:2)

The observations by Pfaller and Zizek form the starting point for a discussion of some general features of the phenomenon of interpassivity (1). First, interpassivity seems to indicate a lack of interest in the aims and goals of our actions. Second, it is intimately related to the prominent role of 'media', especially their power to focus (and narrow) our attention to certain 'superficialities' involved in the process of either arts or politics. Third, it stands in the tradition of critique of ideology, as it originated in marxism and was continuated in the Frankfurter Schule. Building on these insights, I propose that interpassivity is a suitable diagnostic tool to explain and evaluate certain important socio-cultural developments that affect multiple spheres of social life. My thesis is that these spheres show a development towards 'interpassivization', and that this has negative consequences for the sense of well-being and the self-understanding of the people involved in the activities that constitute these domains. # Although my main analysis focuses on the sphere of politics, I will start off the second paragraph by discussing interpassive developments in the sphere of labor. This is useful, first, because labor constitutes one of the most important domains of social life, and the discovery of interpassive phenomena in this sphere thus testifies to their importance in general. Second, this discussion enables me to outline and develop some more general points concerning interpassivity in contemporary life. One of the most important of these themes is alienation. I find that interpassivity enables us to speak in a new, more insightful way about modes of alienation in contemporary life, especially in the domains of labor and politics. Such alienation implies an increased attachment to a process of production accompanied by a loss of interest in the product of this process. This explains how interpassivity can imply an increase in activity, while also in some important sense entailing a loss. In the third paragraph, I turn to the domain of politics. The developments here turn out to be similar in many ways to those in the domain of labor. Only the manifestations and consequences of interpassivity in politics are more invasive. By comparing labor and politics, I hope to show how, in both domains, differences in status and position in comparable ways determine how people are affected by interpassivity, or even suffer from it (4). Those in higher positions of management and policy-making are usually well off, while those who are being managed or ruled are most likely to experience the adverse effects of interpassivity. Moreover, both groups seem attracted to interpassive politics, although for different reasons that both typically misunderstand. 1 Interpassivity: the concept and its uses Let us first take a closer look at the concept of interpassivity. What does it refer to? What sort of phenomena does it try to explain, and in what way? First, interpassivity implies a lack of interest in the aims and goals of our actions. At first sight, this appears strange. Why act if we do not care much about the consequences? Yet this seems to be the problem of modern consumption society. The more passionately and intimately we are attached to the institutions that can provide us with goods to use or consume, the less we seem actually able to enjoy our action or consumption.2 Our acquisitions seem to constitute not merely the beginning, but the end of our action and enjoyment. This kind of interpassivity is illustrated by Pfaller and Zizek through examples like buying books or recording videotapes, without ever getting around to read or watch them.3 The VCR, as it were, watches TV on our behalf.

**Regardless of PC, Obama has no cred which wrecks his agenda**

**Milbank, 11/15**/13 [Dana, Washington Post, “Does the health-care fumble mean game over for Obama?”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-does-health-care-fumble-mean-game-over-for-obama/2013/11/15/77dc0b0a-4dfa-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html>, BJM]

But on the broader question of whether Obama can rebuild an effective presidency after this debacle, it’s starting to look as if it may be game over. The record for recent second-term presidents is not good: Reagan had Iran-contra, Clinton had impeachment and Bush had Katrina and Iraq. Once a president suffers a blow such as Obama is now suffering with his health-care law — in which the public not only disapproves of a president’s actions but starts to take a negative view of him personally — it is difficult to recover. This week’s Quinnipiac Universitypoll found Obama’s job-approval rating at its lowest ever, 39 percent. More ominous: Only 44 percent say Obama is honest and trustworthy, while 52 percent say he is not; that’s the first time more thought him untrustworthy than trustworthy. Polls show Obama’s personal favorability rating has dropped in tandem. We have seen this before. After the flubbed response to Katrina in 2005, George W. Bush’s honest-and-trustworthy rating fell below 50 percent for the first time, and it never returned. Bill Clinton began his second term with 42 percent calling him honest and trustworthy; he soon slipped into the 20s in Post polling and stayed there. The loss of trust will make even harder the already uphill effort to persuade Congress to enact other items on his agenda, such as immigration reform and a comprehensive budget deal. House Speaker John Boehner this week dashed hopes of immigration legislation getting through Congress anytime soon, saying the House wouldn’t even negotiate with the Senate over an immigration bill that chamber had passed. Also this week, House and Senate conferees meeting to discuss the budget they have been assigned to produce acknowledged they had given up hope for a far-reaching agreement. “As someone who’s been naive enough to believe that we could actually do a larger deal,” Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) told his fellow conferees, “at least getting something done for a year or two would, I think, have an extraordinarily positive effect.” Obama, in his Thursday news conference, spoke of regaining his clout as part of the game. His game plan: “My intention in terms of winning back the confidence of the American people is just to work as hard as I can, identify the problems that we’ve got, make sure that we’re fixing them.” “There are going to be ups and downs during the course of my presidency,” Obama said. “I think I said early on when I was running, I am not a perfect man and I will not be a perfect president.” He didn’t seem to consider that this may not be part of the usual ups and downs. And though he deserves credit for his apologies — seven times during his news conference, he said the problems with Obamacare are “on us” or “on me” — it’s not likely that the public’s loss of trust will be repaired no matter how often or how genuinely he says “my bad.” Even as he accepted responsibility for the debacle, he couldn’t resist transferring some blame to the assembled press (“the things that go right, you guys aren’t going to write about”) and to Republicans (“repeal, repeal, let’s get rid of this thing”). But Obama seemed genuinely puzzled by the notion that his leadership may have been the cause. He dismissed a question about whether his administration may be too insular (“I meet with an awful lot of folks”). And, he said, “when I do some Monday-morning quarterbacking on myself,” he concludes that maybe he should have been “breaking the mold” with the rollout earlier because “the federal government has not been good at this stuff in the past.” Wait a minute: Monday-morning quarterbacking? Maybe the president does understand that the game is over.

**The presentation of certain features of American political and institutional life as un-alterable and constricting of avenues for change is part of the political imaginary that necessitates crisis. The argument itself performs a restriction of politics. This is a question that goes all the way to the ballot: to vote negative means to construct politics as constraining; to vote affirmative is to think politics as empowering.**

**Unger 2007**,Self Awakened 49-51

Every culture must draw the line between the alterable features of social life and the enduring character of human existence. When we understate the extent to which the whole order of society and culture represents a **frozen politics**—the containment and interruption of fighting—we become the **slaves of our own unrecognized creations**, to which we bow down as if they were natural and even sacred. To replace a political vocabulary by a theological one, we then commit a sin of idolatry, confining infinite spirit within the perimeter of its finite constructions. If, on the other hand, we deny our own ignorance and finitude, and imagine ourselves able to escape them by acts of self-help or selfincantation, we risk losing not only our clarity but ourselves. We trade real reconstructive power for a **pretense that begins to imprison** us. The perennial philosophy—and, to a lesser extent, phenomenalism, naturalism, and democratic perfectionism as incomplete escapes from it— are themselves such forms of false transcendence and illusory liberation. A major element in American culture understates the mutable nature of social life while exaggerating the extent to which the individual can escape the consequences of his mortality, his fragility, and his cluelessness about the ultimate setting of human life. The source of the denial of the alterability of social life is a species of **institutional fetishism**: the belief that the genius of the founders and the favor of providence enabled the American Republic to hit, at the time of its foundation, on the definitive formula of a free society. The cult of the Constitution is merely the limiting case of this comprehensive idealization of an abstract conception of the market, of democracy, and of free civil society, unjustifiably identified with a **particular, contingent set of institutional arrangements**. This structure supposedly requires adjustment only at extraordinary moments of national crisis. However, it is part of the project of human empowerment a freedom to diminish the dependence of change on calamity.

The greater this dependence, the smaller our chance of combining engagement in a particular world with critical distance from its assumptions. And the greater the chance that institutions and habits will hold our opportunities of practical cooperation and passionate attachment hostage to a scheme of social division and hierarchy. In both these ways, institutional fetishism will make us less free, less godlike, less human. We shall be able to engage only by allowing ourselves to be marginalized. We shall succeed in connecting with others only by becoming masters or underlings, and in affirming our freedom only by betraying our attachments. Failure adequately to acknowledge the mutable character of social life coexists, in this vision, with a misunderstanding of our ability to deal with death and weakness. The individual imagines that he can lift himself up, all by himself, through repeated acts of self-reliance and self-construction. He accumulates things to depend less on people. He toys and tinkers with practices that he hopes will steel him against fate and quiet his terrors. Anxious to achieve a modest prosperity and independence, he dreams himself in his little realm—his business, his property, his family—a small-time king, self-crowned and selfanointed. In all these ways, he contrives to lift himself above both the dangers of life and the fear of death. The historical world of institutions and practices becomes a backdrop to the cycles of individual existence. It is a view that radically and dangerously underestimates the extent to which our efforts at self-construction are at the mercy of blind luck, of the social order, and of what others may give or deny us, by way of intangible grace as well as tangible help. It is true that in American experience this idea of self-making exists alongside a great wealth of forms of association, of voluntary cooperative action, extending, by a series of concentric circles, around the perimeter of the individual and his concerns. However, voluntary association is likened to a bubbling over of the energy and the magnanimity of individuals who stand solidly on the ground of their own existence. It is a form of consciousness that comes and goes, becoming stronger or weaker. It takes for granted, as its setting, the structure of established social life, naturalized as an intrinsic part of a scheme of ordered liberty. It is a spirit, filling, or failing to fill, an institutional vessel that it need not and cannot reshape, and that is in turn powerless to preserve it. Married once to naturalism as a philosophical doctrine, pragmatism has been remarried to this democratic perfectionism as the philosophical expression of a set of national attitudes. The price of the first marriage has been to blunt the force of the underlying themes of agency, transcendence, futurity, and experimentalism by combining them with ideas antagonistic to them. The price of the second marriage has been to corrupt the expression and the radicalization of those same themes at the hands of what is in fact a Western heresy. It is a heresy in the sense that it diverts and corrupts, through its error in drawing the line between the mutable and the immutable features of our existence, a way of thinking about humanity and history that for the last two hundred years has been taking the world by storm. Wrapped in the language of the attractive liberal experimentalism that the pragmatist philosophy provides, this form of consciousness confines the promises of democracy and economic progress to a **dogmatic institutional formula**—a particular institutional version of representative democracy, of the market economy, and of a free civil society. And it equates the project of individual emancipation and self-fulfillment with a moral program that denies or misrepresents the relation between self-help and solidarity. This **heresy** is now armed, and identified with the power of the United States. It is in the interest of humanity to resist it and to deny to its sponsors the prerogatives of Constantine. If pragmatism is to push forward its own animating themes of agency, contingency, futurity, and experimentalism, it must purge itself of its partnership with this sectarian democratic perfectionism as well as of its association with naturalism. The result may not resemble the pragmatist philosophy that history has delivered to us. It nevertheless deserves the name of pragmatism if anything does because it speaks to what, from the beginning, mattered most, and had most promise, in that tradition of thought.

**No risk of Middle East war**

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Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq.

The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq.

Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict.

Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries.

In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom.

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.

As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary.

So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.

The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

## ---- Terror DA

**Drones are the worst**

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On this point, the distinction between drone strikes inside and outside a theatre of active combat becomes relevant. One could plausibly argue that drone strikes are a more humane option for active theatres of war, where the alternatives— such as air strikes or ground operations—may kill more civilians.70 In this respect, the Pentagon-run drone programme in Afghanistan might be morally justifiable if the alternatives—such as US air strikes or Afghan ground operations—were worse from the vantage point of non-combatant casualties. At least in the first instance, this is an empirical question. If it is true that drones kill fewer Afghan civilians than NATO air strikes, it would be hard to argue that air strikes should be employed in preference to drones in active theatres of war, although hard questions would remain about the procedures and standards for selecting targets for those strikes.71 Yet this comparison breaks down when applied to the CIA-run drone programme operating in countries where the United States is not at war. In these cases, the comparison to normal war-fighting is fallacious: the alternative to drones in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere is not American-led ground operations or air strikes. The US is not formally at war with any of these states and is not legally entitled to use ground forces or air strikes on their territory (though this has not stopped the US from launching periodic air strikes in the past). The realistic alternatives to drones in these cases range from diplomatic pressure to capacity-building to even covert operations, all of which were employed to some benefit prior to the Obama administration’s escalation of drone strikes in 2009. In countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, a cost–benefit analysis of drones has to be measured against these plausible alternatives, not against options that are neither realistic nor legally permitted

outside a war zone. In these cases, drones are likely to be found wanting. It is hard to argue, for example, that drone strikes will consistently be more effective and kill fewer civilians than carefully constructed covert operations against HVTs. It is also hard to argue that drone strikes constitute a durable or long-term strategy in countries where there is a pressing need for capacity-building, especially in policing and intelligence work. The cost–benefit analysis for drones in these cases needs to be measured against these less violent alternatives, not against extreme examples from wartime like the firebombing of Dresden.

**Backlash to drone strikes is undermining international credibility and makes drone strikes ineffective**

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In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support

of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below. The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal capabilities of its drones. Although many of its plans are classified, the U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and costly factor—the human being.70 Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the technology in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71 History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space. In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies.

**One in three billion chance of nuclear terrorism**

**Mueller 10** John, professor of political science at Ohio State University, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science & Technology, Winter2010, Vol. 26, Issue 2

In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only **limited desire** and **even less progress in going atomic**. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the **tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.**

The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence.

**Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely** not only because of the resistance of guards, but because **chase would be immediate**

. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, "have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates."

**If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces**. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered.

Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home.

Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation.

Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group." They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine" whereas "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Stressing the "daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues," Younger concludes, "to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies" could fabricate a bomb "is farfetched at best."

**Under the best circumstances**, the process of making a bomb could take months or even **a year** or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals.

If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives.

The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily **become monumental**. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them.

Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting.

It is possible to calculate the chances for success. **Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists' favor** — for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles — the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be **less than one in a million**. If one assumes, somewhat **more realistically**, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to **one in well over three billion**.

Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.

## ---- Anthro

#### The permutation solves best: incorporating your counter-perspective increases total friction with the dominant narrative. That’s guerilla pluralism at its finest.

*We don’t need to commit to one perspective or interpretation – that’s a Western science-based way of thinking. Our history does not lie on the “truth” axis, but rather on the “discourse-power” axis. Your perspective is another subjugated knowledge. Our form of knowledge production denies the notion of mutual exclusivitiy because that is borne out of seeking truth. “Mine is true, so yours cannot be”. The ultimate goal is NOT “truth” but rather disunity. For this, a multiplicity of perspectives are key.*

(Jose **Medina**, October **2011**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, 6/26/12,K.H.)

In the 1975-76 lectures ‚Society Must Be Defended,‛ Foucault draws a contrast be-tween ‚the genealogy of knowledges‛ and any kind of linear intellectual history such as the history of the sciences: whereas the latter is located at ‚the cognition-truth axis,‛ ‚the genealogy of knowledges is located on a different axis, namely the discourse-power axis or, if you like, the discursive practice—clash of power axis.‛6 Genealogy traces the development of discursive formations that give rise to certain forms of knowledge and power relations. Through their meaning-generating acti-vities, through a grammar of meanings that makes certain things intelligible, sur-veyable, and the proper objects of investigation and knowledge (and others unintel-ligible, unsurveyable, and epistemically opaque), discursive practices have both (and simultaneously) epistemic and power effects. And it is of course crucial that we re-gard power and knowledge not only as intimately related but as inseparable, which is why Foucault and Foucaultians have used the cumbersome expression ‚power/ knowledge.‛ One may naively think that the opposite of power/knowledge would be powerlessness/ignorance, so that those excluded or marginalized in the discursive practices that produce certain epistemic and power effects would be simply subjects without any knowledge and any power, quasi-non-agents. But the pluralistic genea-logical approach that Foucault sketches goes completely against those views that portray the oppressed as merely powerless and ignorant. In fact, this approach un-masks as an important misconception the view that the oppressed simply lack power and knowledge because of the forms of exclusions and marginalization they suffer. That distorted characterization plays in the hands of the dominant ideologies and grants too much to them: namely, it grants the very definition of what counts as legitimate power and legitimate knowledge. Instead, a more accurate characteriza-tion would be the one that describes oppressed groups as those whose powers and knowledges have been demeaned and obstructed. This is why, after drawing the contrast between genealogy and history of knowledge, Foucault goes on to say that the critical task that genealogy confronts us with is ‚an immense and multiple battle, but not one between knowledge and ignorance, but an immense and multiple battle between knowledges in the plural—knowledges that are in conflict because of their very morphology, because they are in the possession of enemies, and because they have intrinsic power-effects.‛7 How do we fight against power on this view? Not by trying to escape it (as if liberation consisted in standing outside power altogether), but rather, by turning power(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of power against others. Similarly, how do we fight against established and official forms of know-ledge when they are oppressive? Not by trying to escape knowledge altogether, but rather, by turning knowledge(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of knowledge against others. The critical battle against the monopolization of knowledge-producing practices involves what Foucault calls ‚an insurrection of subjugated knowledges.‛ When it comes to knowledge of the past and the power associated with it, this battle involves resisting the ‚omissions‛ and distortions of of-ficial histories, returning to lost voices and forgotten experiences, relating to the past from the perspective of the present in an alternative (out-of-the-mainstream) way. And this is precisely what the Foucaultian notions of ‚counter-history‛ and ‚coun-ter-memory‛ offer. Official histories are produced by monopolizing knowledge-producing prac-tices with respect to a shared past. Official histories create and maintain the unity and continuity of a political body by imposing an interpretation on a shared past and, at the same time, by silencing alternative interpretations of historical experien-ces. Counter-histories try to undo these silences and to undermine the unity and continuity that official histories produce. Foucault illustrates this with what he calls ‚the discourse of race war‛ that emerged in early modernity as a discourse of resis-tance for the liberation of a race against the oppression of another, e.g. of the Saxons under the yoke of the Normans. Foucault argues that in Europe—and especially in England—‚this discourse of race war functioned as a counter-history‛8 until the end of the 19th Century, at which point it was turned into a racist discourse (aimed not at the liberation of an oppressed race, but at the supremacy of an allegedly superior race that views all others as an existential threat). In lecture IV of ‚Society Must Be Defended” Foucault sets out to analyze the ‚counterhistorical function‛ of the race-war discourse in early modernity.9 Part of what the race-war discourse did was to retrieve the untold history of a people which could be used as a weapon against the official history that legitimized their oppression. This counter-history tapped into the subversive power of a silenced historical experience and reactivated the past to create distinctive knowledge/power effects: new meanings and normative attitudes were mobilized, so that what was officially presented as past glorious victories that legitimized monarchs and feudal lords as the rightful owners of the land to whom taxes were owed, now appeared as unfair defeats at the hands of abusive conquerors who became oppressors and had to be overthrown.

Our Aff is an engagement with the processes by which some life is rendered intelligble, valuable and "human", while other life is subjected to extermination. This deconstructs notions of the "human".

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(Moya, and#34;Who counts? Understanding the relation between normative violence and the production of political bodiesand#34;, paper presented to the panel: ’Power, Violence and the Body’ Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Philadelphia, 31 August – 3 rd September 2006, dml)

It might be objected, of course, that extending the idea of violence any further in order to incorporate normative violence within it results in a proliferation of meaning that merely hampers the usefulness of ‘violence’ as a descriptive and evaluative political concept. 27 And, this is not just because the very idea of a normative violence may itself appear paradoxical, if not downright contradictory given that normative is conventionally used to designate something that ought to happen. It is also because it is not perhaps transparently obvious that some of the actions Butler identifies as sustaining normative gender (in the examples given) qualify as recognizable acts of violence in the first place (e.g. losing lovers and jobs). Moreover, given that so many die in wars, as a consequence of acts of internecine conflict, terrorism, random killings, and so many are brutalized in civil wars, in racially-motivated or homophobic assaults, through rape or acts of domestic violence, as a result of torture, not to mention the violence of child abuse, some critics will no doubt claim that time is better spent finding solutions to deal with these instances of actual violence rather than speculating about forms of figurative or categorical violence and how they do or do not relate to what happens in the ‘real world’. But what if what we recognize as physical violence depends on certain categorizations that are, in themselves, normatively violent, that operate, in other words, to exclude certain subjects and/or acts of violence? What if physical violence occurs precisely because some people are apprehended as less valuable than others? And, here we have only to think of homophobic or racist violence. What if we cannot see the violence that certain peoples suffer as violence at all because those people are invisible (‘unreal’, in Butler’s lexicon) to us; that is, fail to figure within our consciousness as human and are thus denied the rights, privileges, protections and 6 help that accrue to the human? Should we still argue for an exclusive focus on actual, empirical violence? Or would we be better evaluating how and why certain persons are construed as somehow deserving of, or soliciting, violence in the first place? It is my contention in this section that an analysis of normative violence is, in fact, something we cannot do without since it not only sheds valuable light on the kinds of political violence that characterize the contemporary world (including war, ethnic conflict, terrorism, racist violence to mention only some of the most obvious) but also because it forces us to consider how our ability to recognize certain actions as violent might itself depend on the effacement of other (violent) actions. To illustrate how this argument works, I now want to turn to Precarious Life. 28 Precarious Life is an interesting book for a number of reasons. Although published only in 2004, the essays contained within it were written in the immediate aftermath of the violent events of 9 September 2001, so it offers a series of almost contemporaneous reflections by one of the US’s leading Left intellectuals on those events and on the Bush administration’s response to them. Second, a central theme of the book concerns how in a context of global interdependence, where both the security and insecurity of particular nations, states or peoples depends on the actions of both known and anonymous others, it might be possible to arrest the ‘cycles of violence’ that mar international relations. Finally, and this is not something I want to develop here, in it Butler begins to explore the possibility of a non-violent ethics of responsibility towards the other, one with purchase internationally, a theme that has become increasingly prominent in her most recent works. 29 I, however, want to limit myself to considering the connections Butler discerns between discourse and violence and to do so, it is necessary to turn to her account of the relation between derealization and violence. As I have already stressed, according to Butler, ontologies (of gender, the human, whatever) secure intelligibility for certain bodies which, as a consequence, come to be understood as real, legitimate and recognizably human at the same time as they deny intelligibility to other bodieswhich, as a consequence, are rendered in her terms unreal, illegitimate and unrecognizable as human. While the former produces subjects, the latter spawns only what Butler, loosely following Kristeva, labels ‘abjects’: ‘those who are not yet “subjects”’, 30 non-normative persons, bodies that do not matter, condemned to what she calls, the ‘violence of the foreclosed life’, a life that does not count as ‘living’, but instead ‘implies a suspension of life, or a sustained death sentence’

Our kritik of the State of Exception is crucial to solving anthro - without it, spaces of exceptional violence will continue to exist against non-human others.

**Wadiwel 02** (Dinesh Joseph, Senior Policy Officer at the Council of Social Service of NSW, University of Western Sydney. "Cows and Sovereignty: Biopower and Animal Life," Vol 1(2), 2002.[http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no2\_2002/wadiwel\_cows.html](http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no2_2002/wadiwel_cows.html" \t "_blank) -Veeder)

But the relation of non-human life in the factory farm or laboratory, and human life held in the camps is not merely limited to outward appearance. For the *exceptionary* power of sovereignty, which Agamben suggests is central to the power exercised over the human in the camp, can also be applied to non-human animal life. Exception is an increasingly general principle for the organisation of vast sections of animal life across the planet as a whole.Animal life, even when not held in captivity and governed by specific regulations relating to the use of animals for food or research, is nevertheless contained by the powers of the sovereign. Oceans and rivers, forests and deserts, are not only physical territories held within the domain of the sovereign, but increasingly sites for the investment of resources and technologies towards the management of non-human animal life. Vast socio-technical networks may be mobilised for such operations, which, as Catharina Landström argues in her analysis of the release of Rabbit Calicivirus Disease in Australia, involves not only the deployment of means for control, but the development of narrative by which such means may be justified (Landström, 2001). Yet such management does not operate through some uniformly applied principle relating to all biological life (e.g. all life has a ‘right to live’): rather, to spaces of exception where each respective bio-population is given consideration, value and a tailored strategy. The extension of law over particular aspects of non-human animal life during the century, which in some cases has arguably allowed particular populations of species to enjoy the protection of the law, has also enabled the extension of the State’s managerial powers over an increasingly large section of both human and non-human life on the planet. 11. In the cases of factory farming, and animal experimentation, the lives of the animals involved in these industries is always caught in an exceptionary space. Thus the anti-cruelty acts which have been passed at various times over the last century, particularly in the West, have always provided an exception for animals used for science, and animals used for food. Hence the apparent contradiction, that it is illegal to act violently towards a dog on a public street, yet, this same dog, within a laboratory, may be used in a variety of painful experiments without attracting legal attention. 12. Further, in so far as it is licit to inflict violence upon a non-human animal in particular situations (e.g. for research or for food), the test for animal cruelty, that non-human animals are not to *unnecessarily* suffer, also contains within it an implicit exception, that non-human animal suffering deemed necessary is acceptable by law. Mike Radford, writing on the relation of animal welfare to law, states: the notion of unnecessary suffering means not only that the law contemplates there to be situations in which suffering can be regarded as necessary, and therefore lawful, but also treatment that might be regarded as unlawful in one context- on the basis that it causes unnecessary suffering- can be considered lawful in another because the court takes the view that suffering is necessary (Radford, 1996: 69). Yet the capacity of the law, to deem suffering necessary in particular circumstances is not a power that is limited in scope to non-human animals, but includes humans themselves, since this is the prerogative the sovereign exercises in the use of legitimised violence: the ability of the sovereign to make suffer, or "disallow to the point of death," is one that is inescapably part of the power to punish. The only discernible difference between the suffering imposed upon the human, and that of the non-human animal, is that humans, in so far as they have attributed themselves freedom of will, are also liable to suffer the weight of ‘guilt’ before the law, something non-human animals are usually exempt from since they are, at least in the modern era (Scott, 1995: 278), always ‘innocent.’ Yet if consideration over the innocence or guilt of non-human animal life is left aside, then any obscurity around the nature of all animal life (human included) in the state of exception vanishes. For it may be observed that the control of life, the power to allow and disallow life, extends to all living beings within the space of exception: in this sense, Agamben’s analysis of the relation of life to sovereign power may be extended to incorporate the life belonging to the non-human.

PERM - There is ZERO potential for solving Anthro without an effective critique of sovereign power. Our genealogy provides a means to assess the condition of non-human life under sovereign power.

**Wadiwel 02** (Dinesh Joseph, Senior Policy Officer at the Council of Social Service of NSW, University of Western Sydney. "Cows and Sovereignty: Biopower and Animal Life," Vol 1(2), 2002.[http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no2\_2002/wadiwel\_cows.html](http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no2_2002/wadiwel_cows.html" \t "_blank) -Veeder)

But such a political program has far reaching consequences, both for Western sovereignty, and the way that the business of politics is conducted. The living population of the earth has inherited a vision of sovereign power, which has spread cancerously into even the most seemingly inaccessible aspects of everyday life. This vision commands all, claims legitimacy for all, and determines the conduct of living for all within its domain. Politics ‘as we know it’ is caught inextricably in the web of sovereign power, in such a way that it seems that modern political debate cannot help but circulate around the same, routine issues: "What is the appropriate legislative response?"; "Is it within the State’s powers to intervene in this particular conflict?"; "How can we ensure the citizen’s rights are maintained in the face of the state?". To challenge such an encompassing and peremptory political discourse — where every question implies the sovereign absolutely, and every decision made refers to life itself — would require the most intensive rethinking of the way in which territory, governance and economy are imagined. In this sense, whilst Agamben’s analysis of bare life, and Foucault’s theory of bio-power, provide a means by which to assess the condition of non-human life with respect to sovereign power, the political project must reach beyond these terms, and embrace an intertwining of the human and the non-human: an intersection which may be found in the animal life shared by both entities.

Reject their root cause claims - our genealogical approach is best able to describe the multi-faceted causes of oppression.

STEVEN BEST – 06- The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, vol.2, no.3, (June 2006)- Rethinking Revolution: Animal Liberation, Human Liberation, and the Future of the Left- Online- <http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Best_rethinking_revolution.htm>

The best approach to theorizing hierarchy in its origins, development, and multifaceted, overlapping forms is through a multiperspectival, non-reductionist approach that sees what is unique to and common among various modes of domination. There are a *plurality* of modes and mechanisms of power that have evolved throughout history, and different accounts provide different insights into the workings of power and domination. According to feminist standpoint theory, each oppressed group has an important perspective or insight into the nature of society.[[21]](http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Best_rethinking_revolution.htm" \l "_edn21" \t "_blank) People of color, for instance, can illuminate colonialism and the pathology of racism, while women can reveal the logic of patriarchy that has buttressed so many different modes of social power throughout history. While animals cannot speak about their sufferings, it is only from the *animal standpoint* ―the standpoint of animal exploitation― that one can grasp the nature of speciesism, glean key facets of the pathology of human violence, and illuminate important aspects of misothery (hatred of nature) and the social and environmental crisis society now faces. The animal perspective offers crucial insights into the nature of power and domination. Any theory such as social ecology or ID that claims to understand the origin, development, and dynamics of hierarchy profits considerably from taking into account the wide body of literature revealing deep connections between the domination of humans over animals and the domination of humans over one another. Any critique of “instrumentalism” as a profound psychological root of hierarchy, domination, and violence must analyze the roots of this in the domination of animals that begins in the transition from hunting and gathering cultures to agricultural society. Instrumentalism emerges as speciesism and forms a key part of anthropocentrism more generally.

#### Critiques of Anthro must be combined with critiques of race, or they risk becoming exclusionary vehicles of white privilege. Only the perm solves.

Breeze Harper - PhD Candidate at University of California-Davis. - December 6, 2009- Revisiting racialized consciousness and black female vegan experiences: an interview  
Online- <http://sistahvegan.wordpress.com/2009/12/06/revisiting-racialized-consciousness-and-black-female-vegan-experiences-an-interview/>

What I mean by this is that when I mention that I am interested in how whiteness, racism, and racialization manifest within vegan praxis, a significant number of white identified people express that these legacies of colonialism have nothing to do with vegan praxis. However, whether people like it or not, we live in a society that is not “post-racial,” just because we have a non-white president. Many white people who practice veganism talk about how “race doesn’t matter,” in regards to vegan praxis. However, one’s perception of veganism, within the USA, will be deeply connected to each individual’s geopolitical  status , racialized consciousness,  and racialized socio-spatial epistemic grid. My scholarship focuses on (1) non-white racialized minorities who are conscious of how race/racialization shapes their praxis of veganism and; (2) white identified vegans/vegetarians and animal rights activists who believe that their particular praxis, epistemologies, and philosophies are: (a) not color conscious; (b) untouched by hundreds of years of racism and racialization; and (3) geopolitically universal. My focus on white identified vegans/vegetarians and animal rights activists manifested from noticing the overwhelming racially homogenous demographic of the USA based movement. Thus, I have become concerned about the diversity of epistemologies and praxes. In Satya magazine from a few years ago, I remember reading the following quote: [L]ike the peace and environmental movements, the AR movement is predominantly white and middle class. Andrew Rowan, a VP at the Humane Society of the U.S., said surveys indicate the AR movement is “less than three percent” people of color. In April, 316 people from over 20 states attended the first Grassroots AR Conference in NYC, but the people of color caucus numbered only eight. If no one is racist, why is the movement largely segregated? (Hamanaka 2005). Interestingly, it can be argued that white identified people in the USA are collectively unaware of racism and white domination as an ongoing covert, institutional, and systemic process. Most are simply not given the tools to even understand how racism can manifest; “racism” for most is defined as having a membership with the KKK. Few are literate in the covert manner of which racism and whiteness continue to function int the USA. Furthermore,this ignorance commonly manifests as a “raceless” approach to dealing with the world.  It can manifest into believing that an event about animal rights and animal-free consumption advocacy, with 308 white people and 8 people of color, has nothing to do with USA’s history (and current state) of institutionalized and environmental racism, as well as whiteness as the norm. The consequences of an individual’s “lack of color consciousness” approach, in vegansim and animal rights, is the ignoring of the socio-historical context of skin color and the accouterments of white privilege that affect access to, and production of, local and global resources; this includes the resources for vegan products purchased by vegan and animal rights activist in the USA, such as cotton (forced child labor in Uzbekistan), sugar (indentured cane harvesters in Dominican Republic and Haiti), and chocolate (child slavery in Ivory Coast); all which are vegan but are actually harvested by a non-white racialized global workforce who are working in cruel and exploitative ‘slave-like’ conditions. I know that one cannot assume that one will encounter this “race doesn’t matter” and white privileged perspective with every white-identified person involved in a progressive movement (such as veganism/animal rights). However, the vegan movement seeks to dismantle the exploitation and domination of non-human animals particularly through changing one’s consumption patterns. Unfortunately, write-offs such as “race doesn’t matter,” all while vegan products are being produced, often by exploiting non-white racialized human beings, is frustrating, challenging, and difficult for many non-white racialized vegan activists who must deal with battling both racism, white privilege, and animal exploitation in their lives.  I hope my own research, on the intersections of veganism and race/racism/racialized consciousness, will add a broader dimension to understanding how white epistemologies of ignorance function and is performed- particularly amongst certain “race doesn’t mater” whites involved in alternative food movements.