# 1

#### A. Interpretation: We defend that the Affirmative must write and defend a topical plan of action that should be implemented and enforced by the United States Federal Government.

#### The topic is defined by the phrase after the colon—the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2000

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### Resolved proves the intent to enact a policy.

Words and Phrases 1964 Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### B. Violation: The Affirmative has chosen their ground outside of the resolution, making it inherently unpredictable and provides a poor framework for an education debate.

#### C. Standards

#### The first is limits. A *targeted* dialogue with equal and clearly defined sides of controversy is key to cultivate agency and decision-making skills that affect our everyday lives – engaging with their advocacy conceptually does not equate to a valuable debate. A specific question is key to preserve debate as an activity.

Steinberg, University of Miami Communication Studies Lecturer and Freeley, Attorney, 2008

[David L.. and Austin J. “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 43-45]

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Next is ground. They’ll always win that their advocacy is good in the abstract, but we can only debate the merits of their aff if debate is confined to consequences of political action

Ignatieff 4 (Michael, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, 2004 Lesser Evils p. 20-1)

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

#### Third is grammar. Our reading of the resolution is the only predictable way to develop an interpretation because it is based off of grammatical rules and definitions. Grammar is the only way to prevent arbitrarily limited and unpredictable interpretations.

#### D. Framework is a voter for fairness and jurisdiction.

#### Fairness is a prerequisite to the aff- otherwise all contestation is meaningless

Shively 4 (Prof Politics at Tx A&M, ‘04 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p 180

The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### True challenges to authority require acts of dialogue and self criticism---they otherwise result in the same authoritative exclusion that they critique

Morson 4 Northwestern prof (Greg, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning, 317-23)

Sarah Freedman and Arnetha Ball describe learning as a dialogic process. It is not merely a transmission of knowledge, but an activity in which whole selves are formed and acquire new capacities for development. We live in a world of enormous cultural diversity, and the various languages and points of view – ideologies in Bakhtin’s sense – of students have become a fact that cannot be ignored. Teachers need to enter into a dialogue with those points of view and to help students do the same. For difference may best be understood not as an obstacle but as an opportunity. ¶ The range of “authoritative” and “innerly persuasive discourses” in our classrooms appears to be growing along with our cultural diversity. Freedman and Ball observe: “This rich and complex ‘contact zone’ inside the classroom yields plentiful opportunity for students to decide what will be internally persuasive for them, and consequently for them to develop their ideologies. This diversity presents both challenges and opportunities as teachers seek to guide their students on this developmental journey” (pp. 8– 9, this volume). The journey they have in mind does not so much lead to a particular goal as establish an ever-enriching process of learning. ¶ Freedman and Ball’s approach grows out of Bakhtin’s key concepts, especially one that has been largely neglected in research on him: “ideological becoming” (see Chapter 1, this volume). The implications of the essays in this volume therefore extend well beyond educational theory and practice to the humanities and social sciences generally. How does a thinking person– and we are all thinking people – develop? What happens when ideas, embodied in specific people with particular voices, come into dialogic contact? What factors guide the creation of a point of view on the world? The specific problematic of pedagogy serves as a lens to make the broader implications of such questions clearer.¶ 318¶ Authority and testing ¶ How does a person develop a point of view on the world, a set of attitudes for interpreting and evaluating it ? How systematic is that point of view? Is our fundamental take on the world a philosophy with implicit doctrines or is it more like a set of inclinations and a way of probing? Perhaps it is not one, but a collection of ways of probing, a panoply of skills and habits, which a person tries out one after another the way in which one may, in performing a physical task, reach for one tool after another? What does our point of view have to do with our sense of ourselves, whether as individuals or as members of groups? What role does formal education play in acquiring and shaping it? What happens when contrary evidence confronts us or when the radical uncertainty of the world impinges on us? Whatever that “point of view” is, how does it change over time ? ¶ In any given culture or subculture, there tends to be what Bakhtin would call an “authoritative” perspective. However, the role of that perspective is not necessarily authoritarian. Despite Bakhtin’s experience as a Soviet citizen, where the right perspective on just about all publicly identified perspectives was held to be already known and certain, he was well aware that outside that circle of presumed certainty life was still governed by opinion. It is not just that rival ideologies – Christian, liberal, and many others – were still present; beyond that, each individual’s experiences led to half-formed but strongly held beliefs that enjoyed no formal expression. Totalitarianism was surely an aspiration of the Soviet and other such regimes, but it could never realize its ideal of uniformity–“the new Soviet man” who was all of a piece – for some of the same reasons it could not make a centrally planned economy work. There is always too much contingent, unexpected, particular, local, and idiosyncratic, with a historical or personal background that does not fit. ¶ Bakhtin may be viewed as the great philosopher of all that does not fit. He saw the world as irreducibly messy, unsystematizable, and contingent, and he regarded it as all the better for that. For life to have meaning, it must possess what he called “surprisingness.” If individual people are to act morally, they cannot displace their responsibility onto some systematic ideology, whether Marxist, Christian, or any other. What I do now is not reducible to any ethical, political, or metaphysical system; and I – each “I”– must take responsibility for his or her acts at this moment. As Bakhtin liked to say, there is “no alibi.” ¶ Authoritative words in their fully expressed form purport to offer an alibi. They say, like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: we speak the truth and you need not question, only obey, for your conscience to be at rest. Yet, every authoritative word is spoken or heard in a milieu of difference. It may try to insulate itself from dialogue with reverential tones, a special script, and all the other signs of the authority fused to it, but at the margins¶ 319¶ dialogue waits with a challenge: you may be right, but you have to convince me. Once the authoritative word responds to that challenge, it ceases to be fully authoritative. To be sure, it may still command considerable deference by virtue of its past, its moral aura, and its omnipresence. But it has ceased to be free from dialogue and its authority has changed from unquestioned to dialogically tested. Every educator crosses this line when he or she gives reasons for a truth. ¶ My daughter once had a math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would reply, “because some old, dead guy said so.” Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student understands the “why.” In that case, one immediately admits that there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such questioning. ¶ Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. ¶ In short, authoritative words may or may not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit. Bakhtin’s embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. ¶ It follows from Bakhtin’s argument that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all objections perfectly – we are often convinced with qualifications, with a “just in case,” with “loopholes.”¶ 320¶ However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. ¶ An authoritative word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do “wrong.” Much of the moral complexity of this book lies in Huck’s self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed beliefs. ¶ our own authoritative words ¶ The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status as the one that everyone hears. Everyone has heard that democracy is good and apartheid is bad, that the environment needs preserving, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend their lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. In our academic subculture, we are, almost all of us, persuaded of the rightness of greater economic equality, of plans for inclusion and affirmative action, of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the people in the world in all their amazing diversity. These are our authoritative voices, and , too, we may accept either because they are simply not to be questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them and have thought about, if not ultimately accepted, their answers. Again, educators know the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of our beliefs and we experience the temptation to reply like that math teacher. Thinking of ourselves as oppositional, we often forget that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse and must work to remember that, in a world of difference, authority may not extend to those unlike us. ¶ The testable authoritative voice: we hear it always, and though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its nonauthoritarian power is based¶ 321¶ above all on its ubiquity. In a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction. We have all these accounts of Soviet dissidents – say, Solzhenitsyn – who tell their story as a “narrative of rethinking” (to use Christian Knoeller’s phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise some questions that by their nature could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If silence does not succeed in ending private questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of Soviet dissidents is typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied by guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether. Vulnerability accompanies too much power. ¶ But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in the process acquired the intonations of authority. ¶ In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. ¶ It is always a difficult moment when we realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its¶ 322¶ own terms, not like our parents’ voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents’ authoritative words may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the same thing we did – question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version – and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities).¶ Dialogue, Laughter, And Surprise ¶ Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. ¶ So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? ¶ We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. ¶ 323¶ For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. ¶ Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast, if one’s rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to more of a self-check if it does. Then one questions one’s own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become what one has rebopposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. ¶ Laughter at oneself invites the perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at one’s opponents as the unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must measure it, test it, against my own experience. Dialogue is a process of real testing, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that the result is not guaranteed. It may turn out that sometimes the voice of earlier authority turns out to be right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into our own “innerly persuasive voice.” Once one has done this, once one has allowed one’s own evolving convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions.

#### Failure to engage the opposite side creates an echo chamber that cuts off any possibility for change

Gitlin 2003 (Todd, Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Colombia and Former President of Students for a Democratic Society, Letters to a Young Activist, 120-121)

Green rectitude is one case of a larger pitfall: self-enclosure. When you belong to a small minority—as I did in the sixties—on the one hand, it’s a comfort to share your life with fellow believers: to read the same articles, get the same references, wince at the same insults, pass around the same jokes. Very much on the other hand, disbelievers are a drag. Why bother talking to them when there’s so much they don’t get? When you live in an echo chamber where your cheers boom and cheerleading substitutes for thought, you enclose yourself in a sect, though you may call it a movement. The world of the saved substitutes for the world as it is, full of the unsaved. So I appeal to you: Persevere, but don’t bury yourself in an army of the right-minded. Beware the perilous rapture of shrinking your world to the tribe of the saved, the cheerleading good guys who brandish the same slogans, curse the same enemies, thrill to the same saints, whether their names are Che, Fidel, Ho, Malcolm, Huey, Noam, whomever

#### E) Debating the topic is crucial to provide checks on the president—only an enlightened citizenry can protect the values of democratic government

Andrew Rudalevig, 2005 Associate Professor of Political Science, Dickinson College, 2005, The New Imperial Presidency, Ann Arbor, U of Mich Press, p. 281

Thus, as Justice Potter Stewart observed in the Pentagon Papers case, “The only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry –in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government.” Much rests on the hope that the American public will care, that they will seek out the information they need to hold elected officials in all branches of government responsible for the results of their leadership. Trust in the legitimacy of government – that it is “a government of laws, not men”—is critical. But blind trust in any particular government leads to complacency. Accountability depends as much on the electorate’s healthy skepticism as it does on healthy discourse between its branches of government. Ronald Reagan’s arms control aphorism—“trust, but verify”—is thus not bad advice for American voters. To verify, though, voters must take charge of their own government; they must inquire, probe, care—and vote.

# 2

#### Drones have decimated terrorists and prevent them from launching a massive attack, but safe havens could revive them if the U.S. does not keep up the pressure

*Peter* Bergen et al. – 2013. *(Director of the National Security Project, Fellow at Fordham Universities, Center on National Security and CNN’s National Security Analyst; Bruce Hoffman is a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he is also the director of both the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program. He previously held the corporate chair in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation and was the scholar-in-residence for counterterrorism at the CIA between 2004 and 2006; Michael Hurley, President of Team 3i LLC, an international strategy company, lead the 9/11 commission’s counterterrorism policy investigation and was formerly director on the National Security Council staff; Eroll Souhters is the associate director of research at the Department of Homeland Security’s National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events at the University of Southern California, where he is adjunct professor in the Sol Price school of Public Policy, Bipartisan Policy Center, “Jihadist Terrorism: A threat Assessment,” September 2013, Accessed 11/10/2013, WSH)*

Today the United States faces a different terrorist threat than it did on 9/11 or even three years ago when the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Homeland Security Project last published its threat assessment.¶ Al-Qaeda’s core in Pakistan exerts less control over its affiliated groups and the CIA’s campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan has decimated the group’s leadership. Al- Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia have also suffered significant losses as a result of U.S. and allied countries’ counterterrorism operations over the past three years. As a result, many counterterrorism officials believe the chances of a large-scale, catastrophic terrorist attack by al-Qaeda or an al-Qaeda-affiliated or -inspired organization occurring in the United States are small.¶ At the same time, however, al-Qaeda and allied groups today are situated in more places than on September 11, 2001. They maintain a presence in some 16 different theatres of operation—compared with half as many¶ as recently as five years ago. Although some of these operational environments are less amenable than others (South Asia, Southeast Asia), a few have been the sites of revival and resuscitation (Iraq and North Africa) or of expansion (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Syria).¶ In recent years, the threat from al-Qaeda and these allied groups has been confined to attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and Western economic interests abroad, as shown by the incident in Benghazi, Libya, on the 11th anniversary of 9/11 and by the attack on the In Amenas gas facility¶ in Algeria earlier this year. However, no al-Qaeda threat has ever remained completely localized, and it has always assumed some regional or even international dimension, as underlined most recently by the threat emanating from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that led to the unprecedented closure of 22 U.S. diplomatic facilities in 17 countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia in July.¶ At home, the threat from jihadist violence has shifted away from plots directly connected to foreign groups to plots by individuals who are merely inspired by them. Though the potential for these individuals to conduct mass-casualty attacks is limited, the Boston Marathon bombings in April served as a reminder that the United States still faces a terrorism threat from disaffected individuals influenced by al- Qaeda’s ideology. It demonstrated that even though core al- Qaeda may be in decline, “al-Qaeda-ism,” the movement’s ideology, continues to resonate and attract new adherents.¶ Finally, the Middle East is experiencing a level of instability unknown in recent years. The civil war in Syria may provide al-Qaeda with a chance to regroup, train, and plan operations, much as the U.S. invasion of Iraq revitalized the network and gave it new relevance. Returning foreign fighters from the war in Syria may destabilize the region, or they might try to conduct attacks in the West. Sunni-Shia tensions are rising across the region, and the military overthrow of¶ the Morsi government in Egypt may increase support among some disillusioned Islamists for al-Qaeda’s ideological rejection of democracy. Any of these factors might raise the level of threat from groups aligned with al-Qaeda.¶ A dozen years ago the enemy was clear and plainly in sight. It was a large terrorist organization, situated mostly in one geographic location, and led by an identifiable leader. Today, the borders between domestic and international terrorism have blurred, and the United States’ adversaries are not only organizations, but also individuals. The United States therefore needs to develop defenses against a more amorphous, diffuse threat posed by radicalized individuals while continuing to destroy and disrupt al-Qaeda and its associated groups, and the ideology that fuels and sustains them. It is too soon to predict the long-term threat posed by al- Qaeda and allied groups as the movement is undergoing a transition that may end up proving to be its last gasp; but the right set of circumstances in the unstable Middle East could also revive the network.

#### Particular concerns of the “War on Terror” require unrestrained drone use – targeting decisions should be left in the hands of the President and military personnel

David W. Opderbeck 13**,** Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, 8/2/13, “Drone Courts,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2305315

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, drones represent a new paradigm for both technological and geopolitical reasons. Technologically, drones allow for great stealth and precision without putting human assets in harm’s way. Geopolitically, drones can be dropped selectively into the sort of discrete tactical situations that may arise on an ad hoc basis in an interminable, global “war on terror.” In many ways, drones have evolved as weapons of choice precisely because of the demands imposed by the “war on terror.”304¶ This geopolitical context complicates and often obscures the public conversation over drone courts. The most substantial objection to a drone court is that courts do not possess the expertise to judge the strategic merits of a military strike. Where the target is not a U.S. citizen, is located inside a recognized battle zone in which U.S. forces have been committed pursuant to proper Congressional authorization, and is a member of or actively assisting military forces engaged in or threatening combat with U.S. forces, the rationale for a judicial role seems thin. These circumstances implicate the broad discretion traditionally entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief and to the military officers in his or her chain of command, subject to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Act and the international laws of war.305

#### Drones deny safe havens and limit operational capacity – plus no backlash

*Clinton Watts and Frank J. Cilluffo – 2013. (Watts is a Senior Analyst with the Navanti Group and a Senior Fellow at The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI). He is also a former U.S. Army Officer and former Special Agent with the FBI, and Frank J. Cilluffo is Director of HSPI, Homeland Security Policy Institute, “DRONES IN YEMEN: IS THE U.S. ON TARGET?,” 6/21/2012,* [*http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf*](http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf)*, Accessed 10/30/2013, WSH)*

country’s military capacity allowing for AQAP and its insurgent arm Ansar al-Sharia to successfully advance and hold territory. The Yemeni government’s continuing inability to provide for portions of the Yemeni population allows AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia space to fill a void in needed social services and secure local popular support. Most importantly, Yemeni incompetence breathed life into a dormant AQAP franchise allowing known al Qaeda operatives on at least two occasions to escape detention providing much of the group’s current energy.12 While some narrowly point to drones for manufacturing AQAP, many exogenous and endogenous factors propel the group’s current external terrorism campaign and internal insurgency against the Yemeni state.¶ What do critics of drones misunderstand about drone operations in Yemen?¶ Critics of the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen confusingly lump together disparate issues related to terminology, intelligence processes, legal authorities and terrorist propaganda to justify stopping the use of the U.S.’s most effective counterterrorism technique – all while failing to offer a viable alternative for countering AQAP’s immediate threat to the U.S. Although an imperfect tool, drone strikes suppress terrorists in otherwise denied safe havens and limit jihadists’ ability to organize, plan and carry out attacks. These strikes help shield us from harm and serve our national interests.

#### Terrorism highly likely --- causes extinction

**Hellman 8** [Martin E. Hellman, Professor @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also **significant**. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of **85 national security experts**, Senator Richard Lugar **found** a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of **an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring** somewhere in the world **in the next 10 years**,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a **full-scale nuclear war**, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western **civilization will be destroyed**” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a **nuclear winter** that might **erase homo sapiens from** the face of the **earth**, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have **devastating** long-lasting c**limatic consequences** due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

# Case

#### Drones key to stability – systematic analysis of data proves

Johnston and Sarbahi, July 2013

[Patrick B., is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Anoop K., UCLA, Former Stanford postdoctoral Scholar, "The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan," patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf, accessed: 9-18-13, SpS]

Do drone strikes against terrorists reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations, or do they unintentionally increase support for anti-U.S. militants and thus fuel terrorism?1 Empirical studies of targeted killings and civilian casualties in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism show that both outcomes are possible.2 Strikes conducted by remotely piloted aircraft may undermine counterterrorism efforts or enhance them depending on the nature of the violence, the intentionality attributed to it, or the precision with which it is applied.3 Existing research has studied the effects of coercive airpower,4 targeted killings,5 and civilian victimization,6 but social scientists have conducted little empirical analysis of the effects of drone strikes.7 This lack of attention is unfortunate: unmanned aerial vehicles, and their lethal targeting capabilities, are likely to represent a critical aspect of current and future counterterrorism efforts.
The consequences of drone strikes are a critical policy concern. The United States has frequently been called upon to cease drone strikes in Pakistan in order to protect noncombatants, but instead it has expanded its use of drones to other countries in which al Qa’ida-affiliated militants are believed to operate, such as Somalia and Yemen.8 The laws governing international armed conflict codify and strengthen norms against targeted killings, yet other interpretations of the laws of war leave civilian officials and military commanders with substantial latitude to target enemy combatants believed to be affiliated with terrorist organizations against which the U.S. has declared war. 9 Liberal democratic states face substantial pressures to protect civilians in war, but at the same time are often confronted with substantial uncertainty as to what abiding by legal principles such as “discrimination”—the obligation of military forces to select means of attack that minimize the prospect of civilian casualties—actually entails.10 Drone strikes are not the only instrument the U.S. can use to fight al Qa’ida terrorists; s t a t e s h a v e u s e d o t h e r m e t h o d s t o f i g h t t e r r o r i s m f o r c e n t u r i e s . The effectiveness of drone strikes at countering terrorism lies at the core of U.S. policymakers’ arguments for their continued use. Yet because of the drone program’s secretive nature and wide disagreement about the effects of drone strikes on terrorist organizations and civilian populations, U.S. government officials and human rights advocates have both failed to present compelling, systematic evidence in support of their positions. What is needed is a rigorous, evidence-based assessment of drone strikes’ impact on terrorism. Such an assessment should sharpen the debate on drone strikes and help counterterrorism officials and critics alike to evaluate the tradeoffs associated with drone warfare.

The present study provides such an assessment by using a data-driven approach to analyze the consequences of drone strikes. Based on detailed data on both drone strikes and terrorism in Pakistan throughout the course of the U.S. drone campaign there, the study examines how drone strikes have affected terrorist violence in northwest Pakistan and bordering areas of Afghanistan. In order to provide the most comprehensive analysis possible, this study investigates the relationship between drone strikes and a wide range of militant activities and tactics, including terrorist attack patterns, terrorist attack lethality, and especially deadly and intimidating tactics such as suicide and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.

A systematic analysis of the data reveals that drone strikes have succeeded in curbing deadly terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Specifically, the key findings of our study show that drone strikes are associated with substantial reductions in terrorist violence along four key dimensions. First, drone strikes a r e g e n e r a l l y associated with a reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks. Second, drone strikes are also associated with a reduction in the number of people killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Third, drone strikes tend to be linked to decreases in the use of particularly lethal and intimidating tactics, including suicide and IED attacks. Fourth, the study finds that this reduction in terrorism is not the result of militants leaving unsafe areas and conducting attacks elsewhere in the region; on the contrary, there is some evidence to suggest that drone strikes have a small violence reducing effect in areas near those struck by drones. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that despite drone strikes’ unpopularity, official claims that drones have aided U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan appear to be credible and should not be dismissed out of hand.

#### More ev. – Drones deny safe havens

*Clinton Watts and Frank J. Cilluffo – 2013. (Watts is a Senior Analyst with the Navanti Group and a Senior Fellow at The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI). He is also a former U.S. Army Officer and former Special Agent with the FBI, and Frank J. Cilluffo is Director of HSPI, Homeland Security Policy Institute, “DRONES IN YEMEN: IS THE U.S. ON TARGET?,” 6/21/2012,* [*http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf*](http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf)*, Accessed 10/30/2013, WSH)*

country’s military capacity allowing for AQAP and its insurgent arm Ansar al-Sharia to successfully advance and hold territory. The Yemeni government’s continuing inability to provide for portions of the Yemeni population allows AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia space to fill a void in needed social services and secure local popular support. Most importantly, Yemeni incompetence breathed life into a dormant AQAP franchise allowing known al Qaeda operatives on at least two occasions to escape detention providing much of the group’s current energy.12 While some narrowly point to drones for manufacturing AQAP, many exogenous and endogenous factors propel the group’s current external terrorism campaign and internal insurgency against the Yemeni state.¶ What do critics of drones misunderstand about drone operations in Yemen?¶ Critics of the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen confusingly lump together disparate issues related to terminology, intelligence processes, legal authorities and terrorist propaganda to justify stopping the use of the U.S.’s most effective counterterrorism technique – all while failing to offer a viable alternative for countering AQAP’s immediate threat to the U.S. Although an imperfect tool, drone strikes suppress terrorists in otherwise denied safe havens and limit jihadists’ ability to organize, plan and carry out attacks. These strikes help shield us from harm and serve our national interests.

#### Denying Safe Havens prevents the next 9/11

*Jim Arkedis – 2009. (Director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute, counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to 2007, Foreign Policy, “Why Al Qaeda Wants A Safe Haven,”* [*http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got\_safe\_haven?page=0,2*](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven?page=0,2)*, Accessed 10/22/2013, WSH)*

Objections like Haass's are rooted in the following arguments: that terrorists don't need physical space because [they can plot online](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091502977.html); that the [London and Madrid bombings prove](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=4168&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4168) deadly attacks can be planned in restrictive, Western, urban locations under the noses of local security services; and that denying terrorists one safe haven will simply compel them to [move to another lawless region](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/09/AR2009100902576_pf.html).¶ I spent five years as a counterterrorism analyst for the Pentagon and rigorously studied plots from Madrid to London to 9/11. The above arguments may have merit in a piecemeal or abstract sense, but fall apart in the specific case of what we all dread: a large-scale, al Qaeda operation aimed at the United States.¶ It is certainly true, for example, that terrorist groups can accomplish much online. Individuals can maintain contact with groups via chat rooms, money can be transferred over the Web (if done with extreme caution), and plotters can download items like instruction manuals for bomb-making, photographs of potential targets, and even blueprints for particular buildings.¶ But all the e-mail accounts, chat rooms, and social media available will never account for the human touch. There is simply no substitute for the trust and confidence built by physically meeting, jointly conceiving, and then training together for a large-scale, complex operation on the other side of the world.¶ As the 9/11 plot developed, mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) put the future operatives through [a series of training courses](http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/sec5.pdf) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Courses included physical fitness, firearms, close combat, Western culture, and English language. The [9/11 Commission report](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm) notes the extreme physical and mental demands KSM put on the participants -- even if the operation didn't require extensive firearms usage, KSM would have wanted the operatives to be proficient under intense pressure, should the need arise.¶ Juxtapose that with an online learning environment. While you can no doubt learn some amazing things from online courses, it is far preferable to have a dedicated professor physically present to supervise students and monitor their progress. Or think of it another way: You wouldn't want the U.S. Marine Corps to send recruits into battle without training under a drill instructor, would you? KSM was somewhere between a professor and sergeant.¶ Second, critics argue that the Madrid bombings of 2004 (which killed 191) as well those in London a year later (which killed 56) were largely -- though not entirely -- conceived, prepared, and executed within their respective countries, thus obviating the need for a safe haven.¶ True enough. However, unlike 9/11 (which killed nearly 3,000), those plots' successes were possible due to their simple concept and small scale. In both cities, the playbook was essentially the same: Four to eight individuals had to find a safe house, download bomb-making instructions, purchase explosive agents, assemble the devices, and deliver charges to the attack points. Without trivializing the tragic loss of life in the European attacks, building those explosive devices was akin to conducting a difficult high-school chemistry experiment.¶ On that scale, 9/11 was like constructing a nuclear warhead. In every sense, it was a grander vision, involving 20 highly skilled operatives infiltrating the U.S. homeland, who conducted a series of hijackings and targeted four national landmarks with enough know-how, preparation, and contingency plans to be success. In one instance, KSM taught the 9/11 operatives to shoot a rifle from the back of a moving motorcycle, just in case. You can't do that in someone's bedroom -- you need space, time, and the ability to work without worrying that the cops are listening in.¶ In other words, as a plot grows in number of operatives, scale of target, distance from base, and logistical complexity, so does the need for space to reduce the chances of being discovered and disrupted.¶ The final argument is that denying al Qaeda a safe haven is an exercise in futility: Drive Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan and he'd relocate to some place like Sudan, southern Algeria, Somalia, or other swaths of ungoverned territory. However, this logic makes two faulty assumptions: that al Qaeda is mobile, and that the group's international affiliates would automatically roll out the red carpet for the jihadi refugees. Neither is true. Bin Laden and his senior and mid level cadre are well-known to intelligence services the world over. Any attempt to travel, let alone cross an international border (save Afghanistan-Pakistan) would fall somewhere between "utterly unthinkable" and "highly risky." Moving would further require massive reorientation of al Qaeda's financial operations and smuggling networks.¶ Nor would bin Laden's senior leaders be automatically welcomed abroad in areas their regional partners control. Though al Qaeda has established "franchise affiliates" in places like North Africa and Southeast Asia, relationships between al Qaeda's leadership and its regional nodes are extraordinarily complex. Groups like the North African affiliate "al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM) are happy to co-opt the al Qaeda "brand" for recruiting and financial reasons, but they don't necessarily share the al Qaeda senior leadership's ideological goals. AQIM is much more focused on attacking the Algerian government or foreign entities within the country, having not displayed much capability or desire for grandiose international operations. And last, recruits come to North Africa more often through independent networks in Europe, not camps along the Durand Line. Think of the relationship like the one you have your in-laws: You might share a name, but you probably don't want them coming to visit for three full weeks.¶ Regional leaders aren't terribly loyal to senior leadership, either. Take Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of the group's Iraq affiliate. He was summoned to bin Laden's side numerous times in an attempt to exert control as the Iraqi commander's tactics grew more grotesque and questionable. Zarqawi declined, not wanting to risk travel or accept instruction from bin Laden.¶ In the end, a safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is as good as it gets for al Qaeda's chances to launch a large-scale attack against the United States. Certainly, smaller, less complex attacks could be planned without "Afghan real estate," but any such plot's death toll and long-term effect on American society will be far more limited. Unfortunately, that's a risk President Barack Obama has to accept -- no amount of intelligence or counterterrorism operations can provide 100 percent security. But to avoid the Big One, the U.S. president's best bet is to deny al Qaeda the only physical space it can access.

#### Strategic Logic of Targeted killings is overpowering

***Anderson - 09****. Kenneth Anderson is a law professor at Washington College of Law, American University, a research fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a blogger.Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law,” Brookings Institute, May 11, 2009.* [*http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/05/11-counterterrorism-anderson*](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/05/11-counterterrorism-anderson)

Obama was right as a candidate and is correct as president to insist on the propriety of targeted killings—that is, the targeting of a specific individual to be killed, increasingly often by means of high technology, remote-controlled Predator drone aircraft wielding missiles from a stand-off position. The strategic logic that presses toward targete**d** stand-off killing as a necessary, available and technologically advancing part of counterterrorism is overpowering. So too is the moral and humanitarian logic behind its use. Just as crucial programs of Predator-centered targeted killing are underway now in Afghanistan and, with increasing international controversy, Pakistan, over the long term these programs of stand-off targeted killing will be an essential element in United States counterterrorism into the future—and with targets having little or nothing to do with today’s iteration of the war on terror.[vi] Future administrations, even if they naturally prefer to couch the matter in softer terms, will likely follow the same path. Even if the whole notion seems to some disturbingly close to arbitrary killing, not open combat, it is often the most expedient—and, despite civilian casualties that do occur, most discriminatingly humanitarian—manner to neutralize a terrorist without unduly jeopardizing either civilians or American forces.

#### Drones make it very hard for terrorists to plot future missions

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**QUOTE:** Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target—one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Current targeted killing practices decimate terror cells and save lives

Gal *Luft - 2003. (Dr. Gal Luft is co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on energy security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, energy security, natural resources and economic warfare. He holds degrees in international relations, international economics and strategic studies and a doctorate in strategic studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University.“The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing,” Winter 2003,* [*http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels-targeted-killing*](http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels-targeted-killing)*, Accessed 7/29/2013, WH)*

**QUOTE:** This is exactly where they have it wrong. True, terror persists despite the assassinations, and the policy does have shortcomings. What is less apparent is the profound cumulative effect of targeted killing on terrorist organizations. Constant elimination of their leaders leaves terrorist organizations in a state of confusion and disarray. Those next in line for succession take a long time to step into their predecessors' shoes. They know that by choosing to take the lead, they add their names to Israel's target list, where life is Hobbesian: nasty, brutish, and short. Fighting terror is like fighting car accidents: one can count the casualties but not those whose lives were spared by prevention. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Israelis go about their lives without knowing that they are unhurt because their murderers met their fate before they got the chance to carry out their diabolical missions. This silent multitude is the testament to the policy's success.

#### Killing leaders devastates terror organizations

*Daniel L.* ***Byman - 2011.*** *(Professor at Georgetown University and Research Director of the Saban Center at Brookings Institution, “The Targeted Killings Debate”, 6/8/ 2011,* [*http://www.cfr.org/world/targeted-killings-debate/p25230*](http://www.cfr.org/world/targeted-killings-debate/p25230)*, Accessed 7/29/2013, WH)*

Killing terrorist leaders and key lieutenants not only brings justice to our enemies, but can devastate the group in question. Killing a leader like bin Laden removes a charismatic yet pragmatic leader--one who succeeded in transforming a small group into a household name and proved time and again he could attract recruits and funding. His replacement, be it Ayman al-Zawahiri or another senior al-Qaeda figure, may prove less charismatic and less able to unify this fissiparous movement. Some existing affiliates and cells may split off, and the core might be eclipsed by rivals. Less dramatic, but no less important, is a campaign against lieutenants and bomb-makers, passport-forgers, travel-facilitators, and others whose skills cannot easily be replaced--essentially what the United States has been doing since the end of the Bush administration in Pakistan through drone strikes. When these individuals are hit, and hit again, it is possible to exhaust the terrorist group's bench. During the Second Intifada, Israel found that initial strikes against Palestinian cell leaders and bomb-makers had only a limited impact on the terrorist groups it faced, as eager replacements quickly took over. Eventually, however, there was a bottom to the barrel and less skilled, less motivated people took over. An often-neglected impact of killing terrorist leaders is on what they and their group do not do. When a campaign against lieutenants is in full-gear, they must spend much of their time in hiding or moving from place to place. Communicating by phone becomes risky, and the circle of trust shrinks, making meetings or large-scale training harder to pull off. The hunt for spies within can become all-consuming. In the end, leaders are less able to lead, and the group's cohesion and strategic direction suffer. A targeted killing campaign, of course, is not a strategy by itself. At home and in most countries in the world, the United States can simply ask its allies to monitor suspected terrorists and arrest them--and, in so doing, gain intelligence--should they prove dangerous. And efforts to delegitimize terrorists and strengthen weak governments must also continue and become stronger. However, killing terrorists can complement other instruments of U.S. national policy.