# Off 1

1. **Interpretation – Substantial means “without material qualification”**

**“Substantially” is without material qualification**

**Black’s Law 91 (Dictionary, p. 1024)**

**Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification**

1. **Violation – the plan’s action is a conditional action**
2. **Reasons to Vote Neg**
3. **Limits – their affirmative opens the floodgates of to a slew of affirmatives that condition the plan upon any numbers of countries saying yes – these “country of the week” affirmative’s explodes the topic and moots negative preparation**
4. **Neg Ground – their interpretation allows the AFF to claim both “say yes” and “say no” which ruins negative ground by allowing the affs to no link out of disads by claiming they simply exert pressure on foreign governments**

# Off 2

#### Text: The Executive branch of the United States should require that the President acquire the approval of the Pakistani government for drone strikes within Pakistan.

#### The executive is in the best position to limit drones operations.

Josh Kuyers 4/4/13 ( Legal Extern at U.S. Department of State Senior Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group, CIA or DoD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate, http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2013/04/04/cia-or-dod-clarifying-the-legal-framework-applicable-to-the-drone-authority-debate/, Accessed 8/16/13 MRS)

Ultimately, as many of the recent editorials note, any shift in the operational authority over drone strikes from the CIA to the DoD may have little practical effect. This posting explains that the intended increase in accountability and transparency may actually be prevented by the Title 10-Title 50 legal framework meant to provide congressional oversight over drone operations. This is because Congress’ Title 50 oversight functions are meant to provide limited, yet timely information for those operations that, if made public, would prove damaging to U.S. national security or foreign relations. In contrast, Congress’ Title 10 oversight is less stringent because did not envision the military engaging in ongoing hostilities against a global terrorist threat. Given the legal framework governing operational oversight, the Obama Administration might consider providing more transparency and accountability through regularly scheduled, voluntary briefings rather than shifting operational command and control.

#### Aff kills flexibility

Vermeule 6 (Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, 2006,¶ “THE EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD ORDER: SELF-DEFEATING¶ PROPOSALS: ACKERMAN ON EMERGENCY POWERS,” Fordham Law Review, LN)

The reason for the failure of statutory frameworks is plain. When an emergency or war or

crisis arises, the executive needs flexibility; because statutory limitations determined in¶ advance can only reduce flexibility, and do so in a way that does not anticipate the particular¶ requirements of a new emergency, no one has any ex post interest in insisting that these limitations be respected.¶ Ackerman acknowledges the grim historical record but provides no valid reason for thinking that his framework statute - which is far¶ more ambitious than the other ones - might fare differently.

#### Executive flexibility key to prevent extinction

Yoo 2/1/12 (American attorney, law professor, and author. He served as a political appointee, the Deputy Assistant US Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration. “War Powers Belong to the President”¶ Posted Feb 1, 2012,¶ <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>, KB)

A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

# Off 3

#### Obama will win the debt ceiling standoff now:

Jason Easley, 9/18/2013 (staff writer, “Obama’s Genius Labeling of GOP Demands Extortion Has Already Won The Debt Ceiling Fight,” <http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/18/obamas-genius-labeling-gop-demands-extortion-won-debt-ceiling-fight.html>, Accessed 9/20/2013, rwg)

Obama use of the term extortion to describe the House Republican debt ceiling demands was a step forward in a strategy that has already made it a near certainty that he will win this standoff.¶ Video:¶ Transcript:¶ OBAMA: And I’ve heard people say, well, in the past, there have been negotiations around raising the debt ceiling. It’s always a tough vote because the average person thinks raising the debt ceiling must mean that we’re running up our debt, so people don’t like to vote on it, and, typically, there’s some gamesmanship in terms of making the President’s party shoulder the burden of raising the — taking the vote. And then there’s some political campaign later that smacks them around for saying, Joe Smith voted to raise the debt ceiling by $2 trillion. And it sounds terrible and it’s a fun talking point for politics, but it always gets done.¶ And if there is a budget package that includes the debt ceiling vote, it’s not the debt ceiling that is driving the negotiations; it’s just it’s stuck into the budget negotiations, because if you’re going to take a bunch of tough votes anyway, you might as well go ahead and stick that in there.¶ You have never seen in the history of the United States the debt ceiling or the threat of not raising the debt ceiling being used to extort a President or a governing party, and trying to force issues that have nothing to do with the budget and have nothing to do with the debt.¶ So here’s where we are — and I think this is the bottom line, and I want to make sure everybody is clear here. I have presented a budget that deals with — continues to deal with our deficit effectively. I am prepared to work with Democrats and Republicans to deal with our long-term entitlement issues. And I am prepared to look at priorities that the Republicans think we should be promoting and priorities that they think we should be — we shouldn’t be promoting. So I’m happy to negotiate with them around the budget, just as I’ve done in the past.¶ What I will not do is to create a habit, a pattern, whereby the full faith and credit of the United States ends up being a bargaining chip to set policy. It’s irresponsible. The last time we did this in 2011, we had negative growth at a time when the recovery was just trying to take off. And it would fundamentally change how American government functions.¶ And if you doubt that, just flip the script for a second and imagine a situation in which a Democratic Speaker said to a Republican President, I’m not going to increase the debt ceiling unless you increase corporate taxes by 20 percent. And if you don’t do it, we’ll default on the debt and cause a worldwide financial crisis. Even though that Democratic Speaker didn’t have the votes to force through that particular piece of legislation, they would simply say, we will blow the whole thing up unless you do what I want. That can’t be a recipe for government. ¶ President Obama effectively ended any Republican hopes of getting a political victory on the debt ceiling when he called their demands extortion. Nobody likes being extorted. The American people don’t like feeling like they are being shaken down. The White House knows this, which is why they are using such strong language to criticize the Republicans. Obama is doing the same thing to House Republicans that he has been doing to the entire party for the last few years. The president is defining them before they can define themselves.

#### **Presidential power is directly related to power to bargain and enact policy:**

Fiscal Times, 8/6/2013 (“The Reason Voters Choose Power-Hungry Presidents,”

<http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/08/06/The-One-Good-Thing-About-Power-Hungry-Presidents.aspx#page1>, Accessed 8/18/2013, rwg)

The presidential preoccupation with power is not a single-minded pursuit, but its attainment and maintenance affects all presidential efforts, whether they involve bargaining with others or new sources of influence, Howell argues in the book, Thinking about the Presidency: The Primacy of Power.¶ In fact, concerns about power are logical and necessary to enact public policy, undo the work of predecessors, respond to perceived public mandates, and secure a strong place in history.¶ “The president sits alone atop his governing institution and has eyes on a broader and longer horizon than legislators or judges or bureaucrats,” he says. “He represents the country as a whole. This is part and parcel of a president’s need to obtain power and to exert control. He needs to dominate his branch of government and the whole institution.”

#### Syria speech freed up Obama’s attention for debt talks – PC is key and finite

Bohan 9/11/2013

Caren, “Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda”, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52932>, MCR

(Reuters) - **Putting off a decision on** military strikes on **Syria allows** President Barack **Obama to** shift his attention **back to a weighty domestic agenda** for the fall **that includes budget fights**, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.¶ Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.¶ But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.¶ **The push for** a vote on **Syria** - **which has now been delayed** - had **threatened to crowd out the** busy **legislative agenda** for the final three months of 2013 **and drain Obama's** political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.¶ But analysts said **a proposal floated by Russia,** which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control **may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with** minimal political damage.¶ "He dodges a tough political situation this way," **said** John Pitney, **professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College** in California.¶ Pitney said **the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans**, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, **will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.**¶ He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration's "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.¶ "He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that's a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said.¶ BUDGET BATTLES¶ **Among Obama's** most immediate challenges **are** two looming **budget fights**. By September 30, Congress and the president must agree on legislation to keep federal agencies funded or face a government shutdown.¶ Two weeks later, **Congress must raise the limit on the country's ability to borrow or risk** a possible **debt default that could cause chaos in financial markets**.¶ On the first budget showdown, Obama may be at a strategic advantage because of divisions among opposition Republicans about whether to use the spending bill to provoke a fight over Obama's signature health care law, known as Obamacare.¶ House Republican leaders are trying to rally the party around a temporary spending measure that would keep the government funded until December 15 but are facing resistance within their own caucus from some conservatives who want to cut off funding for Obamacare, even if it means a government shutdown.¶ **The debt limit fight could end up going** down to the wire and unnerving financial markets. Republicans want to use that standoff to extract concessions from the Democratic president, such as spending cuts and a delay in the health law. But **Obama** has said he **has** no intention of negotiating **over the borrowing limit**.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling ensures collapse of the global economy:

Davidson 9/10/2013

Adam, co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money,” a podcast and blog, “Our Debt to Society”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, MCR

**If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted** again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, **the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter** what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). **In the case of the U**nited **S**tates, though, **it won’t be** an **isolated** national crisis. **If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency**, then **the global financial system will** very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth**. It would be**, by most accounts, **the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history**.¶ Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. **The U.S. economy would collapse** far worse **than anything we’ve seen in the past several years**.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, **the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier**.

#### **Global economic collapse causes multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict:**

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

(Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School and Gabriel, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., October 21, 2008, Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>, June 27, 2012) ALK

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

# Off 4

#### Their impact claims of war and conflict are not objective – they are produced by the specific history of the observer and the drive for state security

David Grondin 2004 (Masters in Political Science and Ph.D. Candidate – University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies, p. 12-17)

 Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

#### The process of security leads to unending violence and wars against populations of created threats

Duschinski 2009 – Assistant Prof of Sociology and Anthropology, Ohio University (Haley, “Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley.” Anthropological Quarterly, Volume 82, Number 3, Summer 2009, Project MUSE)

Patterns of war emerging in particular local worlds are tied to larger transformations in political-military economies of violence operating on a global scale (Lutz and Nonini 2000:79). The expansion of neoliberal market capitalism since World War II has fed the growth of permanent war economies while also creating large surplus populations that are considered peripheral to the workings of capitalist economies. "State armies, multilateral armed forces (IFOR, the United Nations), private armies, militarized police, and parasitical militias have come to wage a systematic form of 'low intensity warfare,' often against stigmatized populations 'outside the grids' of global capitalist activity and superfluous to labor, **[End Page 693]** capital, and consumption markets" (Lutz and Nonini 2000:78). These interlinked processes of neoliberalism and privatization, ethnic and racial discrimination, and jingoism and militarism have led to the proliferation of infinite and indefinite wars that consolidate collectively imagined national communities at the same time that they violently exclude certain categories of people from participation in the life of the nation. As Victoria Sanford argues, national security states are based, not on the outwardly focused defense of national territory, but rather on a national security ideology that " is grounded in the recourse of coercion and has no room for the participation or consent of civil society" (2003:394-395). Through such ideological work, national security states erase the everyday realities of violence and power their shadow zones and sensitive peripheries in the name of national integrity and cohesion and in the interest of wartime profit.This state practice of carving out differential patterns of citizenship through the waging of perpetual warfare leads to a blurring of boundaries between "crimes of war" and "crimes of peace," producing a continuum of violence that scales from the routine violence of everyday social spaces, such as emergency rooms, court rooms, prisons, detention centers, and schools, to the spectacular violence of hot zones, such as border clashes, ethnic conflicts, and frontiers in the global war on terror (Scheper-Hughes 2002, 2008). These sites of exclusion and concentration provide for the encapsulation and confinement of those forms of political life that have been stripped of rights, cast into a "zone of social abandonment" (Biehl 2005), and subjected to the brutal violence of the state. Such conceptual tools enable us to move past distinctions between " the exception" and "the rule" and examine patterns of militarization that define forms of social suffering for communities living in various domains of threat and "legitimate" destruction: marginalized peasants cast as indigenous rebels in the Oaxaca and Chiapas regions of contemporary Mexico (Stephen 2000); Latino communities cast as drug runners and illegal immigrants along the US-Mexican border (Nagengast 2002); foreign nationals cast as enemy combatants in US military prisons in the War on Terror (Feldman 2005); Catholic nationalist women cast as paramilitary insurgents in the prisons of Belfast (Aretxaga 1997); Black youth cast as criminals in post-Apartheid South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006); and Puerto Rican men cast as gang members in the barrios of East Harlem (Bourgois 2002). Comparative ethnographies of the political and juridical **[End Page 694]** conditions that similarly delimit possibilities of life in these and other heavily militarized zones leads to a better understanding of "how dominant representations of the dangerous, the subversive, the worthless, the marginal, and the unimportant become linked to making particular groups of people susceptible to violence abuses that allow them to be treated with less than human respect and dignity" (Stephen 2000:823).

#### Our alternative is to give back the gift of security. This reorients our conception of politics away from the realist state terrain that guarantees violence.

Neocleous 08. ( Mark Neocleous is a Professor of the critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, UK and a member of the Editorial Collective of “Radical Philosophy”. *Critique of Security.* 186)

Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text *Critical Security Studies,* inwhich the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put m the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity. It requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing It out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

# Instability ADV

#### 1. No link to instability – drones don’t cause US resentment: A. their data is bias and local populations don’t even care about drones – proves alt causes to stability Byman, August 2013

[Daniel L., Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy Saban Center for Middle East Policy, "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice," www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman, accessed: 9-8-13, SpS]

A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign. Similarly, in Yemen, as the scholar Gregory Johnsen has pointed out, drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes. This has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted: that it kills today’s enemies but creates tomorrow’s in the process.

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

#### The FPCCI is already on pace to resolve stability in Balochistan.

Daily Times, 9/5/13 ( FPCCI discusses projects for economic uplift of Balochistan, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C09%5C05%5Cstory_5-9-2013_pg5_9> Accessed 9/22/13 MRS)

KARACHI: Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) has prepared proposals for the economic revival of Balochistan pertaining to trade facilitation, fisheries, agriculture and mining which were discussed in meetings held with representatives of the federal and provincial governments in Gwadar. Mir Naveed Jan Baloch Vice President of FPCCI in meetings with Ahsan Iqbal Federal Minister for Planning and Development and Dr Abdul Malik Baloch Chief Minister of Balochistan briefed the government representatives about the need for creating greater opportunities for trade and transit trade with neighboring countries by opening Gwadar-Gabd, Mand-Pishin and Panjgur-Chedagi borders with Iran and Noshki border with Afghanistan for trade and immigration. He said Gwadar Port should be activated with maximum involvement of the local community, in order to ensure stability and prosperity in the areas surrounding the Port. Later a detailed presentation was made by FPCCI to the Balochistan Chief Secretary Babar Yaqoob Fateh Mohammad. Baloch said shrimp and fish farms should be set up on the coastal belt with the associated packing and processing infrastructure so that seafood might be exported directly from Balochistan instead of transporting it elsewhere. He said foreign assistance might be sought for developing the fisheries sector, as well as for developing expertise in livestock and dairy farming. Similarly, slaughter houses and meat processing plants could be set up with foreign assistance in border areas (such as Chaman and Taftan) to facilitate exports to Iran and Afghanistan. Baloch said he had asked the government of Balochistan to set up a Balochistan Stone Development Company on the pattern of Pakistan Stone Development Company, which would have equal representation from the public and private sectors and would be a more effective way of addressing issues pertaining to mining of marble, minerals and ores in Balochistan, which was now a provincial subject after the 18th Amendment. He said the Chief Minister had assured him the government of Balochistan was also working on the proposals FPCCI had submitted earlier for the uplift of the provincial economy.

#### No risk of terror attack—organizations weak

Zenko and Cohen 2013(Micah, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March 14, "Clear and Present Safety", Foreign Affairs, Accessed from http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety)

None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States’ vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States. ¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda’s leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is “within reach.” The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

#### No risk of nuclear terror

Mueller and Stewart 2012(John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, Senior Fellow at the CATO institute, and Mark, Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, Summer, "The Terrorism Delusion", International Security, Volume 37, Number 1, MUSE)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.[47](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f47) By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”[48](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f48)¶ Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.[49](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f49) In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.[50](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f50)¶ If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.[51](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f51) ¶ Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. ¶ There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones.[52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f52) And as explicitly rendered into U.S. law, the term was extended even further to include bombs of any kind, grenades, and mines; rockets having a propellant charge of more than four ounces; missiles having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce; and projectile-spewing weapons that have a barrel with a bore more than a half inch in diameter.[53](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.1.mueller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f53) It turns out then that the “shot heard round the world” by revolutionary war muskets was the firing of a WMD, that Francis Scott Key was exultantly, if innocently, witnessing a WMD attack in 1814; and that Iraq was full of WMD when the United States invaded in 2003—and still is, just like virtually every other country in the world.

#### No nuclear terrorism. If they haven’t done it with more power over 15 years, they won’t now.

**Sigger, 10** (Jason, Defense Policy Analyst focusing on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense issues, “Terrorism Experts Can Be Alarmists, Too”, http://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/my\_weblog/2010/01/terrorism-experts-can-be-alarmists-too-1.html)

You find the famous bin Laden 1998 quote about WMDs, references from George "slam dunk" Tenet's book on al Qaeda intentions and actions in the desert, meetings between Muslim scientists and suppliers, statements by terrorists that were obtained under "interrogations," and yes, even Jose Padilla's "dirty bomb" - a charge which people may remember the US government dropped because it had no evidence on this point. And no discussion about AQ would be complete without the "mobtaker" device that never really emerged in any plot against the West. That is to say, we have a collection of weak evidence of intent without any feasible capability and zero WMD incidents - over a period of fifteen years, when AQ was at the top of their game, they could not develop even a crude CBRN hazard, let alone a WMD capability. Mowatt-Larsen doesn't attempt to answer the obvious question - why didn't AQ develop this capability by now? He points to a June 2003 article where the Bush administration reported to the UN Security Council that there was a "high probability" that al Qaeda would attack with a WMD within two years. The point that the Bush administration could have been creating a facade for its invasion into Iraq must have occurred to Mowatt-Larsen, but he dodges the issue. This is an important report to read, but not for the purposes that the author intended. It demonstrates the extremely thin thread that so many terrorist experts and scientists hang on when they claim that terrorists are coming straight at the United States with WMD capabilities.

# Pakistan ADV

#### (--) Sharif gaining popularity now:

S RAHMAN, 9/22/2013 (staff writer, “A 100-day performance,” <http://www.brecorder.com/articles-a-letters/187/1233376/>, Accessed 9/22/2013)

However, the masses as a whole do possess the ability to judge their leaders given their (of the public) much enhanced prudence that was exercised by the general public at the time of election of their representatives. It was this public prudence that brought PML-N into power and it is the same public wisdom that has now adjudged Nawaz Sharif government in the Centre and Shahbaz Sharif government in Punjab as gaining popularity and recognition among their people. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) has drawn a candid picture of political leaders' popularity among the masses with credible public opinion polls in its Public Verdict (Survey) on Performance of Governance and Democracy in first 100 days of federal and provincial governments. According to the survey, 62% people have given positive rating to governance by the federal government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Likewise, according to the public opinion given in the survey, the Punjab government got the best rating out of the four provincial governments. In this survey, citizens from all the provinces voted irrespective of their province of residence. The resultant findings show that 59% voted in favour of Shahbaz Sharif as the best performing Chief Minister, followed by Syed Qaim Ali Shah at 18%, Pervez Khattak at 9% and Dr Abdul Malik at 4%.

#### (--) Multiple alt causes to Pakistani economy they don’t solve:

Dr Kamal Monnoo, 9/18/2013 (“Slipping economy!” <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/18-Sep-2013/slipping-economy>, Accessed 9/22/2013, rwg)

Despite a government change this summer Pakistan’s economic woes continue. There are no visible signs of an improved growth in an economy, which as we know, has been consistently slowing down over the last six years. A growing sense of desperation prevails, particularly amongst the young, as Nawaz Sharif’s economic team tries to grapple with some serious challenges relating to high inflation, low investment, rising current account deficit, declining reserves, an eroding Pak Rupee, high unemployment and persistent energy and security issues that continue to hold ‘economic growth’ hostage.

#### (--) No Indo-Pak war—mutually assured destruction deters:

Professor Stephen Cohen, 9/15/2013 (“NDTV Dialogues: The India-Pakistan Conundrum - full transcript,” [http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/ ndtv-dialogues-the-india-pakistan-conundrum-full-transcript-418651](http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/%20ndtv-dialogues-the-india-pakistan-conundrum-full-transcript-418651), Accessed 9/22/2013, rwg)

Of course, the Pakistanis have a different version I think, there is of Pakistan being primarily more right than yours. But again when we fought the Soviets, over 40 years in a cold war, we fought it in other countries, sometimes in South Asia. We didn't fight each other directly. We were very careful to avoid direct confrontation because of the nuclear weapons, that changes the nature of the dispute completely and the Arabs and the Israelis don't have that but you have.

#### **(--) India’s economy resilient:**

Press Trust of India, 7/30/2013 (“No need for IMF loan, India's economy fairly resilient: RBI chief,” <http://profit.ndtv.com/news/economy/article-no-need-for-imf-loan-indias-economy-fairly-resilient-rbi-chief-325163>, Accessed 9/22/2013, rwg)

Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India Governor D Subbarao said on Tuesday that India's current economic situation does not warrant any move to seek loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¶ "The answer is no. I don't believe that we are in a situation where we have to go to the IMF. We are fairly resilient," Mr Subbarao told reporters at the customary post-policy media briefing.

#### (--) India is de-linked from the global economy:

Anoop Singh, 10/25/2011 (staff writer, “India: Linked or De-linked from the Global Economy?” <http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2011/10/25/india-linked-or-de-linked-from-the-global-economy/>, Accessed 9/22/2013, rwg)

De-linked¶ In our latest Regional Economic Outlook for Asia, we expect India to grow by about 7½ percent in 2011 and 2012, only marginally below its estimated potential. Even within Asia, India does relatively well in this world.¶ India is less open to international trade than most other economies in the region. In particular, its rural consumption is fairly insulated from the world economy. More importantly, India’s exports are less dependent on advanced economies, so it suffers less from the current anemic outlook in those countries. The chart below shows that India’s exports are more diversified—both geographically and in terms of the products it sells—than its neighbors and competitors.¶ So, while a more protracted slowdown in the advanced economies will also lower India’s growth somewhat, we expect that it will still remain robust. In this scenario, India has to remain focused on the challenge of elevated inflation.

**(--)Economic decline does not cause war-prefer this thorough study**

**Miller, 2k** (Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

# S

#### Drones key to stability – systematic analysis of data proves

Johnston and Sarbahi, July 2013

[Patrick B., is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Anoop K., UCLA, Former Stanford postdoctoral Scholar, "The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan," patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf, accessed: 9-18-13, SpS]

Do drone strikes against terrorists reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations, or do they unintentionally increase support for anti-U.S. militants and thus fuel terrorism?1 Empirical studies of targeted killings and civilian casualties in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism show that both outcomes are possible.2 Strikes conducted by remotely piloted aircraft may undermine counterterrorism efforts or enhance them depending on the nature of the violence, the intentionality attributed to it, or the precision with which it is applied.3 Existing research has studied the effects of coercive airpower,4 targeted killings,5 and civilian victimization,6 but social scientists have conducted little empirical analysis of the effects of drone strikes.7 This lack of attention is unfortunate: unmanned aerial vehicles, and their lethal targeting capabilities, are likely to represent a critical aspect of current and future counterterrorism efforts.
The consequences of drone strikes are a critical policy concern. The United States has frequently been called upon to cease drone strikes in Pakistan in order to protect noncombatants, but instead it has expanded its use of drones to other countries in which al Qa’ida-affiliated militants are believed to operate, such as Somalia and Yemen.8 The laws governing international armed conflict codify and strengthen norms against targeted killings, yet other interpretations of the laws of war leave civilian officials and military commanders with substantial latitude to target enemy combatants believed to be affiliated with terrorist organizations against which the U.S. has declared war. 9 Liberal democratic states face substantial pressures to protect civilians in war, but at the same time are often confronted with substantial uncertainty as to what abiding by legal principles such as “discrimination”—the obligation of military forces to select means of attack that minimize the prospect of civilian casualties—actually entails.10
Drone strikes are not the only instrument the U.S. can use to fight al Qa’ida terrorists; s t a t e s h a v e u s e d o t h e r m e t h o d s t o f i g h t t e r r o r i s m f o r c e n t u r i e s . The effectiveness of drone strikes at countering terrorism lies at the core of U.S. policymakers’ arguments for their continued use. Yet because of the drone program’s secretive nature and wide disagreement about the effects of drone strikes on terrorist organizations and civilian populations, U.S. government officials and human rights advocates have both failed to present compelling, systematic evidence in support of their positions. What is needed is a rigorous, evidence-based assessment of drone strikes’ impact on terrorism. Such an assessment should sharpen the debate on drone strikes and help counterterrorism officials and critics alike to evaluate the tradeoffs associated with drone warfare.

The present study provides such an assessment by using a data-driven approach to analyze the consequences of drone strikes. Based on detailed data on both drone strikes and terrorism in Pakistan throughout the course of the U.S. drone campaign there, the study examines how drone strikes have affected terrorist violence in northwest Pakistan and bordering areas of Afghanistan. In order to provide the most comprehensive analysis possible, this study investigates the relationship between drone strikes and a wide range of militant activities and tactics, including terrorist attack patterns, terrorist attack lethality, and especially deadly and intimidating tactics such as suicide and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.

A systematic analysis of the data reveals that drone strikes have succeeded in curbing deadly terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Specifically, the key findings of our study show that drone strikes are associated with substantial reductions in terrorist violence along four key dimensions. First, drone strikes a r e g e n e r a l l y associated with a reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks. Second, drone strikes are also associated with a reduction in the number of people killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Third, drone strikes tend to be linked to decreases in the use of particularly lethal and intimidating tactics, including suicide and IED attacks. Fourth, the study finds that this reduction in terrorism is not the result of militants leaving unsafe areas and conducting attacks elsewhere in the region; on the contrary, there is some evidence to suggest that drone strikes have a small violence reducing effect in areas near those struck by drones. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that despite drone strikes’ unpopularity, official claims that drones have aided U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan appear to be credible and should not be dismissed out of hand.