# Contention One

#### Contention One: Targeting the Other

#### The United States selects targets based on how people look or whether they’re “in the wrong place at the wrong time” – this Otherizing policy of racial profiling has not only resulted in the death of innocent people but also embodies America’s racial hypocrisy at home and abroad

Zenko, 7-22-2013

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President Barack Obama surprised the White House press corps on Friday when he preempted the normal daily briefing to offer his unscripted ideas on the Trayvon Martin case.

Obama departed from his usual reluctance to talk publicly about his personal experience with racial bias, reminding viewers that African-American men -- including him, before he became a senator -- experience prejudice based only on their appearance, not their personality or behavior. He added that the African-American community was interpreting the outcome of the case through a "set of experiences and a history that doesn't go away." And he noted that, while the African-American community is not naïve about violence involving its young men -- they are "disproportionately both victims and perpetrators" -- that fact is no excuse for different treatment under the law.

It is striking to compare Obama's deliberate and thoughtful commentary about the tragic killing of Trayvon Martin with the military tactic that will forever characterize his presidency: killing people with drones. The president posits that it is wrong to profile individuals based upon their appearance, associations, or statistical propensity to violence. By extension, he believes that, just because those characteristics may seem threatening to some, the use of lethal force cannot be justified as self-defense unless there are reasonable grounds to fear imminent bodily harm. But that very kind of profiling and a broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat are the foundational principles of U.S. "signature strikes" -- the targeted killings of unidentified military-age males.

The use of signature strikes began in early 2008, when "instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking," the New York Times reported, drones were permitted to "strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run." By the summer of 2008, as a Bush administration official recollected, "We got down to a sort of ‘reasonable man' standard. If it seemed reasonable, you could hit it." Early in his first-term, Obama actually authorized signature strikes before he knew what they were, as author Daniel Klaidman reported. When Steve Kappes, then the CIA's deputy director, explained to the president, "We can see that there are a lot of military-age males down there, men associated with terrorist activity, but we don't necessarily know who they are," Obama declared, "That's not good enough for me."

Apparently, it was good enough for him, though, since Obama vastly increased the scope and intensity of targeted killings in Pakistan and, in April 2012, expanded the practice into Yemen against unknown men, allowing the CIA to henceforth "hit targets based solely on intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior." As Jo Becker and Scott Shane reported last year, "Counterterrorism officials insist this approach [of signature strikes] is one of simple logic: people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good." Indeed, transnational terrorist plots directed against the United States have disproportionately originated from Pakistan and Yemen. But, if you apply Obama's logic concerning the Trayvon Martin tragedy, hanging around in the wrong neighborhood or with bad people should not make a person guilty.

Since November 2002, the United States has killed over 3,600 people in non-battlefield settings with drones, cruise missiles, AC-130 gunships, and special operations forces. It is unknown how many of them were unidentified men killed only because of their profile and a U.S. claim that they posed a "continuing and imminent threat." President Obama acknowledged in May that "it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties," though he said that "there's a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports." As first reported by Jonathan Landay, the still-classified CIA assessments of drone strikes conducted in Pakistan over 14 months in 2010 and 2011 found that roughly one-quarter of the 600 people killed were what the CIA termed "other militants," meaning that they were collateral damage or that they were targeted only because of their behavioral profile. Amazingly, no U.S. government official has ever acknowledged that the United States conducts signature strikes.

The day before Obama spoke about Trayvon Martin, Nasser al-Awlaki -- a former Fulbright scholar and Yemeni minister of agriculture and fisheries -- published a powerful op-ed in the New York Times titled "The Drone That Killed My Grandson." His 16-year-old grandson, an American citizen named Abdulrahman, was killed, along with six other individuals, by a U.S. drone strike in October 2011. A State Department spokesperson initially absolved the United States of any responsibility, claiming: "We have not received confirmation of his death from the government of Yemen. We have no additional information at this time." In May, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee that finally acknowledged that, since 2009, al-Awlaki and two other American citizens had died in U.S. counterterrorism operations, in which they "were not specifically targeted by the United States."

Over time, other officials acknowledged -- always anonymously -- that Abdulrahman al-Awlaki had been either inadvertently targeted or was collateral damage. Princeton University doctoral candidate and Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen wrote that the missile that killed al-Awlaki was actually intended for Ibrahim al-Banna, an Egyptian member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Whatever the reason, the available evidence suggests that a 16-year-old U.S. citizen was the unintended casualty of a signature strike.

Nasser al-Awlaki closed his Times op-ed by asking: "The government has killed a 16-year-old American boy. Shouldn't it at least have to explain why?" For a president invested in showing leadership by setting the tone for discussions of race at home, he should answer that question directly. He should then announce an end to signature strikes, since nobody should ever be killed based on how they look or for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

#### This racism is perpetrated through a colonial logic where the US aims to “bring justice” to the “uncivilized” by means of targeted killings – ultimately, this drone policy is sustained through a depoliticizing process of geographic Othering where strikes take place “someone over there” and is therefore “out of sight, out of mind” to the public

Bowsher, 2013

[Josh, Phd Candidate in Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham. Research on Transitional Justice, Human Rights and Sacrificial Violence. "Denaturalising Terror Suspects in the Age of Drone Strikes: British Sovereignty and Homo Sacer in the “War on Terror”," blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/criticalmoment/2013/03/20/denaturalising-terror-suspects-in-the-age-of-drone-strikes-british-sovereignty-and-homo-sacer-in-the-war-on-terror/, accessed: 9-12-13, SpS]

But like the early years of the “war”, we shouldn’t underestimate here the importance of the fact that the killing takes place in a different geographic locale. This enables a traversal of our own (British) principles of the law, inherited from an Enlightenment ethics in which the law is transcendent and absolute. An ethics where the exception is, theoretically speaking, sutured – chained even – to the legislative body. This is precisely because, as Agamben tells us, sovereignty has, in some senses dispersed to the individual: ‘subiectus superaneus, in other words, what is below, and, at the same time, most elevated.’ (Ibid, p. 124) Quite simply, the legislative body seems to be permanently in force, secured by what we know today as human rights. But as the great analytical work of Nasser Hussain’s A Jurisprudence of Emergency (2003) and Rande Kostal’s A Jurisprudence of Power (2008) demonstrates, there has always been a contradiction between the transcendental nature of the law at home, and the need for exceptional powers in order to bring “law and order” to the colonies. At the heart of this is of course a kind of racist othering of the colonised, brought about by their geographic location (a land other than ours, which dictates the utilisation of a (non)-law different to ours) and their racial identity (a human different to us, which dictates a different (non)-law for their management), enabling the establishment a kind of “needs must” approach to the “law”. Once again, this colonial moment renders visible the disjunction between man (colonised) and citizen (coloniser), the latter of which is bequeathed rights by virtue of his citizenship.

Today’s situation reiterates and makes use of this kind geographic otherness to ensure that this exceptional killing is seen as part of a “needs must” approach to international relations, and, as such, exists in a separate space of sovereign contingency. In this sense, while the stripping of citizenship reduces the British citizen purely to their role as the Islamic terror suspect (bare life), it is only the combination of the Othered terror suspect in an Other place (Northern Pakistan) that enables the bypassing of the transcendental nature of the law, as the undoing – and absolute visibility – of the contradiction between the sovereign rights of man (sic) , and their necessary bequeathing by a state; the removal of both “blood” (citizenship) and soil (geographic location within the boundaries of the state). This is, indeed, despite the territory in question coming under the remit of international law, to which Britain has signed up, and which it should therefore operate under. In short, we are brought back to the sovereignty of the British government declared in its ambivalence to international law and abandonment of the absolute and sovereign rights of man.

#### This Otherization logic is the root cause of systemic oppression and genocidal violence

Todres, 2009

[Jonathan, GMU Associate Law Professor, “Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking,” <http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=lawreview>, accessed: 9-11-13, SpS]

First, and fundamentally, othering serves to devalue and dehumanize the Other. The Other is perceived as different from the Self, and any difference is viewed as aberrant. Thus early voyagers to the "New World"33 characterized American Indians as "savages. '34 The subsequent colonial mandate of conquering the world in the name of "spreading civilization" reflected European colonial powers' view that the rest of the world was "uncivilized" and of lesser standing. In this narrative, the dominant group depicts the Other as barbaric, amoral, and of lesser intelligence. 6

This dehumanization of the Other, in turn, provides the dominant group's rationale for treating the Other less humanely. Thus, in the U.S. version of the othering narrative, "[f]rom this Nation's inception, the race line was used to demarcate and patrol the divide between those who constituted the 'We' in 'We The People.' "" The Three-Fifths Clause of the U.S. Constitution enshrined in the very foundational document of the nation the concept that certain individuals were worth less than others and by law could be treated as less than human, a perception that remained codified at the constitutional level for nearly one hundred years.38 More recently, narratives offered during the Vietnam War and the current War on Terror, including suggestions that "they don't value life like we do,"39 have been used to justify differential treatment-that is, harsher and poorer treatment-of the Other.

Second, in the Self/Other dichotomy, the Self is glorified and the behavior or characteristics of the Self (or dominant group) are taken to be the norm by which all are judged.4 ° Thus the narrative of the Other asserts that only the Other commits savage or barbarous acts.4 ' The humanity of the dominant group is presumed. 2

The result is that acts by the dominant group that do not fit with the conception of the virtuous Self are often denied or overlooked. 3 So, for example, though the dominant narrative of the Holocaust aptly describes the atrocities committed by the Nazis and the liberation of the concentration camps by the Allies, it also engages in the process of othering by attributing all evil to the Nazis and ignoring the support of the Holocaust by many Allied powers.44 While the United States denounced Nazi theories of Aryan supremacy, it governed a society that subjected blacks to Jim Crow laws, interned over 110,000 Japanese-Americans following Pearl Harbor, and maintained immigration policies severely biased against all non-whites.45 In other words, othering operates to block the Self from seeing any of its actions that do not fit with the view of the Self as virtuous, humane, just, and intelligent.4 6

Imbedded in this concept of the virtuous Self is the idea that the Self acts altruistically.47 This element of the Self image produces mixed results. There are aspects of the altruistic Self that contain good. That individuals in the dominant group seek to act, either alone or collectively through their government, in an altruistic manner towards others can produce good results and should be encouraged. However, problems arise when related elements of otherness operate to shape the Self s view of how to be altruistic. Thus, for example, European colonial powers thought they were acting in a noble manner by "spreading civilization" but of course the reality was drastically different.4 " Similarly, today many in the dominant group want to help trafficking victims, but their misperceptions of the Other's experience and needs and their myopic view of the Self, which forecloses the possibility that their actions might not be helping, often lead well-intentioned individuals and governments to exacerbate the harm, or waste resources on initiatives that provide little meaningful assistance.49

Third, the Self/Other dichotomy operates based also on an ongoing distancing between the Self and Other.5 ° As the Self is assigned positive attributes and the Other negative attributes, the distancing serves to ensure that no negative attributes are incorporated into conceptions of the Self, and conversely only negative attributes are ascribed to the Other. The distancing between the Self and Other serves to perpetuate presumed differences between the two and deter the development of a common experience. This distancing through otherness reinforces the nobility of the Self and its actions and entrenches the view of a lesser Other. Through ongoing distancing, the lesser Other is presumed to be only "over there," far removed from the virtuous Self "over here." 1

# Contention Two

#### Contention Two: Public Engagement and the Debate Space

#### The use of robotic drones has turned war into a spectator sport for Americans – because drones supposedly reduce the risk of harm to American soldiers, the public has less reason to care about the executive’s unrestrained war politics

Druck, 2012

[Judah, Cornell Law School JD Candidate, “DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE,” Cornell Law Review, Vol. 98, 209, accessed: 9-11-13, SpS]

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand, the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit,124 as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that, we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens sharing in its importance.”125 As a result, the American public has slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy.126

In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez, where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because the mission was perceived to be a success.128 Yet we can imagine that most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success,129 we can expect even less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime.

Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces.131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces, which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have generally complied with domestic law.132

The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134

#### Fortunately, our advocacy solves – two reasons:

#### First is our performance – Using technical policy language to advocate specific and pragmatic proposals bridges the deliberation gap between the public and policy elite by disseminating policy discourse into mainstream discussion

Hawkes, 1987

[Dr. Glenn is the Executive Director for the Parents, Teachers and Students for Social Responsibilty, “Sex, power, and nuclear language,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, September 1987, Vol. 43, Issue 7., p. 60, EBSCO, accessed: 9-16-13, SpS]

 As an activist, however, I am most interested in Cohn's call to action. She does not go into detail regarding strategies, nor was that her purpose, but she does advocate the dismantling of technostrategic discourse in order for other voices to be heard—"rich and imaginative alternative voices'—that will help create "compelling alternative visions of possible futures." I have three related concerns about Cohn's analysis of the challenge we face. (And I use "we" as Cohn does: we "who seek a more just and peaceful world.")

 First, I think Cohn overestimates the influence of the technostrategic thinkers in stating that their "professional language sets the terms for public debate." A good case can be made that they actually have very limited power to set the terms of public discourse. In fact, the technical language of the war planners usually becomes public only when it piggybacks successfully onto a much broader-based language that prevails in society at large. The voices I most often hear in public debate use terms like "defense," "security," "soft on communism," "national interest," "free world," "the enemy," "liberty," "peace," "strength," "freedom," "self-determination," "democracy," and so forth. This is the vocabulary of the public language that is most pervasive and powerful in determining national policy, and it provides opportunities for discourse in which all can participate.

 A related concern is Cohn's definition of ourselves as "outsiders." Surely the high priests of technostrategic discourse are a force, but it is also possible that our perceptions of their being the insiders, with power, and of our being the outsiders, without power, is itself of the problem, and possibly even a self-fulfilling prophecy.

 My third concern is with Cohn's call for "alternative voices." I agree that we must explore alternatives, and in the process we will no doubt create something of a new language that will guide us on new paths. But there is a strong tendency in the peace community to employ language that is perceived on Main Street, U.S.A., as "alternative"— and thus as unacceptable. We have a rich tradition of exposing nukespeak for what it is, but we have not been skillful in using the public language to our advantage. We have generally avoided using motherhood and apple pie symbols, like the flag.

 We've seen those symbols abused, and consequently have chosen not to identify with them. Meanwhile, the right wing has successfully manipulated main-stream language to advance its agenda. Just as there is an elitist core of men who monopolize the technostrategic discourse, there is also (to a lesser degree, I think) in the progressive ranks a core of thinkers who tend to use alternative language in a way that diminishes rather than enhances our power. In fact the very idea of possessing political power is often construed as something negative from the activist perspective of which I speak, and from which I hail.

The struggle for an alternative future is thus, at times, led by individuals and organizations with an aversion to power politics and a disdain for the public language, a stance that most surely guarantees failure in the political arena.

 There is an ironic dialectic at work here: the pursuit of alternative futures depends in part upon our understanding and using mainstream symbols. We must use the system to beat the system, employing mainstream language to change mainstream patterns of thought and action.

 For example, if we are to increase the prospects for a new world order, we might promote nationalism in order to transcend nationalism. We can use any number of historical examples from the founding of our nation: national sovereignty on this continent was pursued in order to preserve the several states, all threatened —as nations arc today—with destruction in their condition of disunity, in other words, if we love our nation we must promote a more viable international order to preserve it. It was Jefferson, I think, who always claimed to be a Virginian first and foremost, even after serving as president. He supported national sovereignty because he thought it was the best way to protect and preserve his beloved Virginia. Let's dig out such examples and put them to work in the public language, reinforcing concerns for defense, security, and national interest.

 Rather than calling for "compelling alternative visions," we should explore "compelling mainstream visions." Changing that one word alerts us to the importance of communicating with the farmer, the auto mechanic, the school teacher, the person selling insurance, and the people who live next door. One way of dealing with the technostrategic thinkers might be to ignore them while at the same time developing the political clout needed to change national policy.

#### Second is our method –

#### Our approach to debate is uniquely key to challenge the ongoing War on Terror – Switching sides on this year’s resolution cultivates practical agency skills that transfer outside of this round to challenge the Otherizing “us/them” dichotomy that underpins modern-day McCarthyism

English et al. 2007

[Eric, Stephen Llano, Gordon Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief and Carly Woods, First author Eric English led work on this DAWG essay, while the co-authors each contributed substantially in areas of conceptual design, research, and writing. Gordon Mitchell is Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh. Each of the other co-authors is a graduate student in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh., "Debate as a weapon of mass destruction," Communication and critical/cultural studies. vol. 4, no. 2, june 2007, pp. 221-225, www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf, accessed: 9-11-13, SpS]

It is 2002, nearly a year after 9/11. A New York City high school receives a package emblazoned with the words ‘‘WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.’’ The police are summoned, the building evacuated, and the sender of the package frantically called. Inside the package, investigators find... evidence.¶ Debate evidence. The school had received a package of documents for New York Urban Debate League students, who were preparing to debate the national interscholastic debate topic for that year, ‘‘Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should establish a foreign policy significantly limiting the use of weapons of mass destruction.’’ Was the package dangerous? It did not contain a bomb. Yet suspicions about the box’s contents and those involved in the transaction lingered.¶ This episode is a representative anecdote for the ‘‘global war on terror,’’ where lines separating friend and foe are persistently blurred, forcing combatants and bystanders alike to perform their allegiances in word and deed. A hyper-politicization of speech contours contemporary public discourse, policing the line between the sayable and unsayable and sorting people into neat categories such as ‘‘with us or with the terrorists.’’ We have seen this before. In another indefinite war of ideology, debate was similarly suspected of being a weapon of mass destruction capable of jeopardizing homeland security. As the Soviets tested their atom bomb in August of 1949, Americans worried that nuclear secrets had been passed to the USSR from communist sympathizers within the US government. Fear of being ‘‘sold out’’ by ‘‘fifth columnists’’ at home increased penalties for dissent, placing blame at the feet of anyone who dared undermine American security by sowing division.¶ Within this context, the Speech Association of America (precursor to today’s National Communication Association) invited thousands of college students to debate the relative merits of an American diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1954. Anxiety spread about the ability of students to engage the topic safely; every team would be asked to defend both sides of this resolution, a common tournament procedure known as ‘‘switch-sides’’ debate. Some argued that the practice would indoctrinate America’s youth, while giving aid and comfort to the enemy. ‘‘For even a small segment of American college students to rise at this time to the defense of this Communist Government would be sweet music to the ears of Moscow and Peiping,’’ wrote debate instructor Charles R. Koch, as he pulled his own team from competition in protest.1¶ Given the switch-side norm of academic debate and the highly controversial nature of the resolution, ‘‘the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution.’’2 A predominant military concern was that, ‘‘a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country’s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends abroad and to distortion by our enemies.’’3 Karl Wallace, then president of the scholarly organization that now sponsors this journal, was pressured heavily to change the China topic.4 His firm and principled resistance is documented in an official statement emphasizing that ‘‘inherent in the controversy’’ over the 1954 debate resolution ‘‘is an alarming distrust of the processes essential to a free society.’’5 The fierce controversy even drew in journalist Edward R. Murrow, who backed Wallace’s position in an edition of the See it Now television program seen by millions. Some complained that ‘‘discussions of this topic were channeled to bring out criticism’’ of McCarthy himself.6 The timing of the red-baiting senator’s political implosion, which followed shortly after the Wallace and Murrow statements, suggests that the great 1954 ‘‘debate about debate’’ indeed may have helped rein in McCarthyism run amok.¶ But this outcome seems paradoxical. How can an activity that gives voice to extreme views moderate extremism? Speech professor Jeffrey Auer’s 1954 statement may hold the key: ‘‘A person, because he supports the recognition of Communist China, isn’t a communist, any more than because he supports the recognition of Communist China, he is a Chinaman (sic).’’7 Just as walking a mile in unfamiliar shoes lends perspective, switch-side debating increases appreciation of contrary opinions as the debater ‘‘tries on’’ an unfamiliar idea rather than relying on simplification, reduction, or rejection. In fact, debating both sides encourages participants to dismantle absolutist ‘‘us versus them’’ dichotomies. This may explain why those invested in the stability of such polar categories find debate so threatening.¶ The shadow of 1954 suggests that academic debating in a post-9/11 political environment could be hazardous. The New York City high school debaters described above certainly had cause for alarm. But police confiscation of their speaking briefs was more accident than trend. A closer look at contemporary academic debate reveals features that make it seem markedly less subversive than its 1954 version.¶ This year’s intercollegiate policy debate topic calls on affirmative teams to overrule one of four Supreme Court decisions, including Ex parte Quirin, the precedent frequently invoked to justify homeland security policies such as military tribunals for Guantanamo detainees.8 In arguing to overturn Quirin, debaters employ a variety of approaches. Most teams contend that the Supreme Court’s 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, while helpful, does not go far enough in limiting the scope of military commissions. In this view, leaving Quirin on the books enables a troubling expansion of presidential power, with the potential to destroy transatlantic relations and abrogate US obligations to the Geneva Convention. Others use testimony, narratives, and poetry from ex-detainees like Afghan poet Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost and British memoirist Moazzam Begg to highlight the human rights abuses and torture allegations at Guantanamo Bay. If this sounds radical, consider that such cases have been met with objections from negative opponents that piecemeal reforms are cosmetic drops in the bucket, with durable systemic change only likely to come from more revolutionary measures such as presidential impeachment, anarchy, or world government.¶ Today’s intercollegiate debaters find themselves in a political landscape resembling 1954 in several respects. Once again, we find prominent political figures attempting to define the contours of public debate by portraying critics as unpatriotic. Vice President Cheney says that ‘‘disagreement, argument and debate are the essentials of democracy,’’ yet stipulates that charges of pre-war intelligence manipulation are ‘‘dishonest and reprehensible.’’9 Such contortions are typical examples of how skillfully McCarthy’s ideological descendants attack the process of democracy in the name of democracy. The conservative punditry also does its part. While Ann Coulter accuses Iraq war critics of treason, David Horowitz revives fears of a liberal (and therefore ‘‘dangerous’’) academic elite poisoning the minds of America’s young adults. Despite these and countless other examples of McCarthyist tendencies, many directed specifically at academia, there has been no outcry about college students ‘‘taking the side of terrorists’’ in competitive debate tournaments. Why?¶ One answer is that intercollegiate policy debate has become remarkably isolated and esoteric. Competitive pressures have molded the activity into a highly technical art form, where students argue in jargon at breakneck speeds that regularly top 300 words per minute. Because so few people can participate in these debates, virtually no one observes them; untrained spectators are often baffled. The coin has two sides, for the isolation of this form of debate both protects it from criticism and prevents it from having a broader social effect. The result is an odd oasis of intellectual ferment bearing resemblance to the carefully demarcated ‘‘free speech zones’’ that dot the periphery of today’s controversial public events.¶ Second, while the pedagogical benefits of switch-side debating for participants are compelling,10 some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 controversy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that the articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a ‘‘technology’’ of liberal participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCarthy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints. The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence.¶ It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13¶ Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14¶ The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

#### Independently, the 1AC speech act unites our local position to stand in solidarity with an ongoing global grassroots movement against drone strikes – this is necessary to expose the status quo targeted killing policy as a manifestation of white supremacy’s tool for high-tech lynching

Kinane, 2013

[Ed, ““Think Global, Act Local: Grassroots Opposition to Weaponized Drones,” accessed: 9-11-13, SpS]

And I especially must highlight the vigorous, imaginative and gutsy CODEPINK anti-drone campaign radiating out from Washington, DC. However, both Col. Ann Wright and Ally McCracken can speak from direct involvement about these essential efforts to rouse the nation to resist the weaponized drone.

But back to upstate New York: since 2009 a few of us – and as time goes on, dozens more of us – have been working to expose the weaponized Reaper drone war crime perpetrated from Hancock air base. Twenty minutes’ drive from my home, Hancock is the home of the 174th Attack Wing of the NY Air National Guard. The issue is global; the work local.

Safely removed from the battlefield, costumed in aviator jumpsuits, air-conditioned and sitting ergonomically at computer screens, jiggling joy sticks linked to earth-orbiting satellites, the 174th Attack Wing technicians “pilot” the unmanned weaponized Reaper over Afghanistan. Further, Hancock is the national center for training technicians to maintain the Reaper. Those technical skills are fungible; such skills can be used not only to service the Afghanistan Reaper, but also the Reaper clandestinely terrorizing other nations – with whom the US has not declared war. In these nations – Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan and others – the CIA, with scant accountability, deploys the Reaper to commit extrajudicial executions. During his re-election campaign last fall, the White House leaked that the President signs off on such killing every Tuesday.

Many politicians and talking heads purvey the premise that the Reaper and other weaponized airborne robots are key assets in the “war on terrorism.” These deliberate or unwitting propagandists –some with snug perches in academia –miss a key point: while the Reaper wins a host of extremely asymmetrical battles, it may well be losing the war. The Reaper may be tactically clever, but thanks to the blowback and proliferation it spawns, deploying the Reaper is strategically stupid.

Further – and it’s hard not to emphasize this enough – weaponized drones are themselves terrorist. Those who so readily invoke the boogey man of “terrorism” seldom define terrorism. According to the US State Department definition terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence against civilians for political purposes. By that definition the weaponized drone – indeed aerial warfare generally – is itself one of the planet’s major instruments of terrorism.

The weaponized drone not only perpetrates terrorism, but thanks to the quite justifiable hatred it incites toward the United States,it may perpetuate terrorism – mostly of the retaliatory and asymmetric kind. The Pentagon and CIA’s wholesale and cowardly terrorism surely has been a boon for “Al Qaeda’s” recruiters. Such state terrorism, lucrative for university research institutes and US weapons systems corporations spread across numerous Congressional districts, keeps the pot boiling, keeps us locked in perpetual war.

Upstate Drone Action is a grassroots, decentralized, informally-organized group made up primarily from people from Syracuse, Buffalo, Rochester, Utica, Binghamton and Albany, New York. But our direct actions at Hancock have involved activists from as far away as Iowa and Virginia, Illinois and Hawaii. Two years ago Kathy Kelly of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, and Col. Ann Wright spoke at a drone rally in St. Lucy’s parish gym in Syracuse, galvanizing our first civil resistance.

That April 22, 2011 die-in at the base led to the week-long trial of the “Hancock 38,” in November 2011 – a bench trial before Judge David Gideon in the DeWitt Town court. Former US attorney general Ramsey Clark spent several hours testifying on our behalf. Ramsey told Judge Gideon that the Hancock Reaper committed war crimes and that the Nuremburg principles require citizens to expose and challenge their nation’s war crime.

Through direct actions and ensuing endless court appearances, through frequent legal demonstrations and street theatre, and through both mainstream and movement media, Upstate Drone Action has sought to educate the public about Reaper assassinations and extra-judicial killings. We seek to educate about the drone’s harrowing impact on civilians and about drone proliferation and blowback, as well as the surveillance and civil liberties threat the Reaper and other airborne robots pose domestically. We also hope our message reaches Hancock base personnel. Who knows, such exertions just might inspire the next Bradley Manning!

Legitimized by international law, including the Nuremburg Principles, and by the First Amendment of the US Constitution, Upstate Drone Action members seek to expose and impede our nation’s Reaper war crimes. In theory the First Amendment protects our freedom of assembly, our freedom of speech, and especially relevant in this case, our right to petition our government for a redress of grievance. At Hancock each time we approach the main gate we attempt to deliver a peoples’ war crimes indictment. When we are rebuffed, typically we block that gate with banners and with our bodies, either standing or, once, lying on the pavement wrapped in bloody shrouds. But our actions don’t require the warrant of legality: we are acting on our respect for life; we are heeding our conscience.

And speaking of conscience, I must mention Brian Terrell. Brian was one of one of the “Hancock 38” and one of the “Creech 14.” He is now serving six months in Yankton federal prison for seeking to deliver a citizens’ drone war crimes indictment to Whiteman Air Force Base, a drone hub in Missouri.

Anti-military drone activists like Brian and Upstate Drone Action are committed to nonviolent direct action at the entrance to the offending military base. And as at Benning, we keep coming back. We call such recurring civil resistance “Gandhian Waves.” We periodically endure arrest, trial and even incarceration. Typically in court we “go pro se,” i.e. each of us defends his or herself, declaring to the court why we did what we did in an effort to put the Hancock drone itself on trial.

We say our Hancock actions are civil resistance not civil disobedience. Civil disobedience entails (justifiably) breaking the law, whereas our direct actions seek to enforce the law – international law. Despite such law being widely ignored by local, state and federal courts, under Article 6 of the US Constitution, international law is the supreme law of the land.

[Let me remind you of how Article 6 reads: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.]

As historians you’ll surely recall how, back in the day, white mobs would periodically lynch blacks. For generations they did so with impunity, such torture and murder being ignored or enabled by all levels of the judiciary. Likewise today the judiciary thus far seems extremely tolerant of, or implicitly enables, if not condones, drone assassination and extra-judicial execution.

You can decide whether or not the killing – virtually exclusively – of people of color in Islamic lands, is a kind of 21st century high-tech lynching…and whether or not such killing is yet another expression and tool of white, Western supremacy….

# Plan

#### Thus, Josh and I demand that the United States federal government should ban drone strikes.