### Off 1

#### Interp— Targeted Killing refers to the premeditated killing of an individually selected person

Melzer, 2008. (Dr Nils Melzer has served for 12 years with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a Legal Adviser and Deputy Head of Delegation in various conflict zones, as well as at the ICRC’s headquarters in Geneva. Targeted Killing in International Law. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. Print)

Targeted killing denotes the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them.

#### AND Signature strikes are the majority of strikes and are against unknown targets. The Obama administration also makes a distinction between signature strikes and targeted killing.

Zenko 12, Micah. (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning.¶ Dr. Zenko has published on a range of national security issues, including articles in Foreign Affairs, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Defense and Security Analysis, and Annals of the American Academy of Politicaland Social Science, and op-eds in the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and the New York Times.) Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 16 July 2012. Web. 17 Oct. 2013. <http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/>.

More recently, military-age male reentered the lexicon of American warfare with a New York Times passage describing the Obama administration’s methodology for “signature strikes” by drones against unnamed individuals:¶ It in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent. Counterterrorism officials insist this approach is one of simple logic: people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good. As I have noted [elsewhere](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/06/04/how-many-civilians-are-killed-by-u-s-drones/), “signature strikes” against military-age males did not begin under Obama, but originated in early 2008 under Bush. As first revealed in a February 2008New York Times [article](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/washington/22policy.html" \t "_blank):¶ Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking, this shift allowed American operators to strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of civilian casualties is judged to be low.¶ In the summer of 2008, President Bush lowered the threshold even further for who could be targeted in Pakistan. According to a [Bush administration official](http://books.google.com/books?id=V5VbbZMS1AsC&q=reasonable+man" \l "v=snippet&q=reasonable%20man&f=false" \t "_blank): “We got down to a sort of ‘reasonable man’ standard. If it seemed reasonable, you could hit it.”¶ One of the more disturbing recent revelations into White House foreign policy decision-making is that President Obama authorized targeted drone strikes while unaware that he had actually authorized signature strikes. According to [Daniel Klaidman](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/02/daniel-klaidmans-revelations/), when Obama was first made aware of signature strikes, the CIA’s deputy director clarified: “Mr. President, we can see that there are a lot of military-age males down there, men associated with terrorist activity, but we don’t necessarily know who they are.” Obama reacted sharply, “That’s not good enough for me.” According to one adviser describing the president’s unease: “‘He would squirm…he didn’t like the idea of kill ‘em and sort it out later.’” Like other controversial counterterrorism policies inherited by Obama, it did end up “good enough,” since he allowed the practice to stand in Pakistan, and in April authorized the CIA and JSOC to [conduct](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/05/14/escalating-americas-third-war-in-yemen/) signature strikes in Yemen as well. Although signature strikes have been known as a U.S. counterterrorism tactic for over four years, no administration official has acknowledged or defended them on-the-record. Instead, officials emphasize that targeted killings with drones (the official term is “targeted strikes”) are only carried out against specific individuals, which are usually lumped with terms like “senior” and “al-Qaeda.”¶ [Harold Koh](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/05/how-the-obama-administration-justifies-targeted-killings/): “The United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.”¶ [John Brennan](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/05/how-the-obama-administration-justifies-targeted-killings/): “This Administration’s counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who are a threat to the United States.”¶ [Jeh Johnson](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/05/how-the-obama-administration-justifies-targeted-killings/): “In an armed conflict, lethal force against known, individual members of the enemy is a long-standing and long-legal practice.”¶ [Eric Holder](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/05/how-the-obama-administration-justifies-targeted-killings/): “Target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated forces.”¶ In April, Brennan was [asked](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy/" \t "_blank), “If you could address the issue of signature strikes, which I guess aren’t necessarily targeted against specific individuals?” He replied: “You make reference to signature strikes that are frequently reported in the press. I was speaking here specifically about targeted strikes against individuals who are involved.” Shortly thereafter, when the White House spokesperson was [asked](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/29/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-52912" \t "_blank) about drone strikes, he simply stated: “I am not going to get into the specifics of the process by which these decisions are made.”

#### Violation—The affirmative’s advantages and evidence conflates targeted killing and signature strikes; they draw advantages off of the effects of signature strikes.

#### Prefer our interpretation it’s key for legal precision, topic education, limits, and ground. At best they are extra topical which is a voting issue for fairness and education. Vote Neg—T is an a-priori voter for competitive equity, education, and jurisdiction.

#### Legal Precision—legal precision on a legal topic about presidential powers is essential; the president can circumvent restrictions so easily because of a lack of legal precision in such restrictions

#### Topic Education—we end up talking about a policy that might not be a war power that is also not part of the topic instead of targeted killing.

#### Limits—they explode the topic; they set precedent for all drone affs to get advantages from signature strikes

#### Ground and moving target—they can de-link our disads and counterplans about one type of drone strike by saying they’re a different type of strike; kills neg ground and makes them a moving target

#### At best they are extra topical as their case draws advantages from things that aren’t targeted killing, which is a voting issue for fairness and education by itself.

#### Vote Neg—T is an a-priori voter for competitive equity, education, and jurisdiction.

### Off 2

#### Focusing on drones trades-off with broad critique of the military-industrial complex

Trombly 12 (Dan Trombly, “The Drone War Does Not Take Place”, 16 November 2013, http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/the-drone-war-does-not-take-place/, DA: 7 October 2013, mjb)

I’ll try to make this a bit shorter than my usual fare on the subject, but let me be clear about something. As much as I and many others inadvertently use the term, there is no such thing as drone war. There is no nuclear war, no air war, no naval war. There isn’t really even irregular war. There’s just war.¶ There is, of course, drone warfare, just as there is nuclear warfare, aerial warfare, and naval warfare. This is verging on pedantry, but the use of language does matter. The changing conduct and character of war should not be confused with its nature, as Colin Gray strives to remind us in so many of his writings. When we believe that some aspect of warfare changes the nature of war – whether we do so to despair its ethical descent or praise its technological marvels, or to try to objectively discern some new and irreversible reality – we lose sight of a logic that by and large endures in its political and conceptual character.¶ Hence the title (with some, but not too much, apology to Baudrillard). There is no drone war, there is only the employment of drones in the various wars we fight under the misleading and conceptually noxious “War on Terror.” Why does this matter?¶ To imbue a weapons system with the political properties of the policy employing it is fallacious, and to assume its mere presence institutes new political realities relies on a denial of facts and context. This remains the case with drones. The character of wars waged with drones is different – the warfare is different – but the nature of these wars do not change, and very often this argument obscures the wider military operations occurring.¶ Long before the first drone strikes occurred in Somalia, America was very much at war there. Before their availability in that theater, the U.S. had deployed CIA and SOF assets to the region. It supported Ethiopia’s armies and it helped bankroll and coordinate proxy groups, whether they were Somali TFG units, militias, or private contractors. It bombarded select Somali targets with everything from naval guns to AC-130 gunships to conventional strike aircraft. It deployed JSOC teams to capture or kill Somalis. That at some point the U.S. acquired a new platform to conduct these strikes is not particularly relevant to the character of that war and even less to its nature.¶ We sometimes assume drones inaugurate some new type of invincibility or some transcendental transformation of war as an enterprise of risk and mutual violence. We are incorrect to do so. The war in Somalia is certainly not risk free for the people who the U.S. employs or contracts to target these drones. It is not risk free for the militias, mercenaries, or military partners which follow up on the ground. Nor is it risk free for those who support the drones. Just ask Abu Talha al-Sudani, one of the key figures behind the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, who sent operatives to case Camp Lemonier and launch a commando raid – one which looks, in retrospect, very much like the one that crippled Marine aviation at Camp Bastion recently – that might have killed a great many U.S. personnel on a base then and now critical to American operations in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.¶ The existence of risk is an inherent product of an enemy whose will to fight we have not yet overcome. The degree of that inherent risk – whether it is negligible or great – is a product of relative military capabilities and war’s multifarious external contexts. Looked at through this lens, it’s not drones that reduce U.S. political and material risk, it’s the basic facts of the conflict. In the right context, most any kind of military technology can significantly mitigate risks. A 19th century ironclad fleet could shell the coast of a troublesome principality with basic impunity. When Dewey said, “You may fire when ready, Gridley,” at Manila Bay, according to most history and much legend he lost only one man – due to heatstroke! – while inflicting grievous casualties on his out-ranged and out-gunned Spanish foes. That some historians have suggested Dewey may have concealed a dozen casualties by fudging them in with desertions, which were in any case were a far greater problem than casualties since the Navy was still in the habit of employing foreign sailors expendable by the political standards of the day is even more telling. Yes, there are always risks and almost always casualties even in the most unfair fights, but just as U.S. policymakers wrote off Asian sailors, they write off the victims of death squads which hunt down the chippers, spotters, and informants in Pakistan or the contractors training Puntland’s anti-piracy forces. And no, not even the American spooks are untouchable, the fallen at Camp Chapman are testament to that.¶ This is hardly unique to drones or today’s covert wars. The CIA’s secret air fleet in Indochina lost men, too, and the Hmong suffered mightily for their aid to the U.S. in the Laotian civil war. The fall of Lima Site 85, by virtue or demerit of policy, resonated little with the American public but deeply marks the intelligence community and those branches of the military engaging in clandestine action. The wars we wage in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are not drone wars any more than our war in Laos was an air war simply because Operation Barrel Roll’s bombers elicit more attention than the much more vulnerable prop-driven spotting aircraft or Vang Pao’s men on the ground.¶ There is a certain hubris in thinking we can limit war by limiting its most infamous weapons systems. The taboo and treaties against chemical weapons perhaps saved men [and womyn] (but not the Chinese at Wuhan, nor the Allied and innocents downwind of the SS John Harvey at Bari) from one of the Great War’s particular horrors, but they did nothing appreciable to check the kind of war the Great War was, or the hypersanguinary consequences of its sequel but a generation later.¶ The Predators and Reapers could have never existed, and very likely the U.S. would still be seeking ways to carry out its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates under the auspices of the AUMF in all of today’s same theaters. More might die from rifles, Tomahawks, Bofors guns or Strike Eagles’ JDAMs than remotely-launched Griffins, and the tempo of strikes would abate. But the same fundamental problems – the opaque decisions to kill, the esoteric legal justifications for doing so, the obtuse objectives these further – would all remain. Were it not for the exaggerated and almost myopic focus on “killer robots,” the U.S. public would likely pay far less attention to the victims, excesses, and contradictions. But blaming drones qua drones for these problems. or fearing their proliferation at home, makes little more sense than blaming helicopters for Vietnam, or fearing airmobile assaults when DC MPD’s MD-500s buzz over my neighborhood.¶ That concern that proliferation of a weapons system equates to proliferation of the outcomes associated with them, without regard to context, is equally misleading. Nobody in America should fear the expansion of the Chinese UAV fleet because, like the U.S. UAV fleet, it is merely going to expand their ability to do what similar aircraft were already doing. Any country with modern air defenses can make mincemeat of drone-only sorties, and for that reason China, which unlike Yemen and Pakistan would not consent to wanton U.S. bombing of its countryside, need not fear drones. For an enormous number of geographical, political, and military reasons, the U.S. ought fear the “drone war” coming home even less. Drones do not grant a country the ability to conduct the kind of wars we conduct against AQAM. The political leverage to build bases and clear airspaces, and the military and intelligence capabilities to mitigate an asymmetric countermeasure operation do. If another country gains that ability to conduct them against a smaller country, even, it is not because they lacked the ability to put weapons on planes, but because of the full tapestry of national power and military capabilities gave them such an ability.¶ It was not asymmetry in basic technical ability that made the U.S. submarine blockade of Japan so much more effective than the Axis’s attempts to do the same against America’s shores, but the total scope of the assets in the field and context of their use. It was not because of precedent or moral equivalence, or lack thereof that the Axis could bomb Britain or lose the ability to do so, but because of the cumulative effect of military capabilities and the judgments guiding them. What might expand the battlefield of a “drone war” is much the same. America’s enemies do not refrain from attacking bases in CONUS or targeting dissidents in the U.S. (not that they have not before), they wait for an opportunity and practical reason to do so, and that has very little to do with drones in particular and even less the nature of the war itself.¶ Fearing that the mere use of a weapons system determines the way in which our enemies will use it without regard to this context is not prophetic wisdom. It is quasi-Spenglerian hyperventilation that attributes the decision to use force to childlike mimesis rather than its fundamentally political purposes. Iran and Russia do not wait on drones to conduct extrajudicial targeted killings, and indeed drones would be of much less use to them in their own political contexts. Focusing on drones and the nature of targeted killings as some sort of inherent link ignores those contexts and ultimately does a disservice to understanding of wars past, present, and future, and by doing so, does little help – and possibly a great deal of harm – to understanding how to move forward.

\*\*\*note: evidence edited for gendered language

#### The affirmative is exemplary of how we have become conditioned to accepting the military-industrial complex—the impact is endless war and violence

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer **every problem.** We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the **terms** promoted support the **conditioning of** its **citizens**. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is **dripping violence**. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. **The cycle of violence** that exists in our society **exists because it is useful to those that control society.** It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a **war consciousness that allows it to prosper.** That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy **could** have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines **what we experience** and **how we live.** As long as we choose to live in "War" in **our minds** then we will continue to get "War" in **our lives**. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### Reject the aff: Embracing a strategy of dissent from militarism key to solve

Ivie 7 (Robert L. Ivie [Professor: University of Indiana, Ph.D., Washington State University, Rhetorical Critique of U.S. public culture; democracy; war propaganda; peace-building communication]], Published 2007 by Kumarian Press, “Dissent from War”, PRINT, note: scanned and run through OCR software, mjb)

**Indeed,** militarism has become the mindset of American empire—the mindset**, Andrew Bacevich argues,** that seduces Americans to support a state of warfare**.** America has adopted the outlook of a security state, of an empire projecting its power worldwide rather than republic defending itself from foreign attack**. The American people in an age of empire have become persuaded that their “safety and salvation lies with the sword.” The citizen army has become a professional “imperial army.”** America’s “global military supremacy” has become central to its “national identity.” **International problems are seen first and foremost as “military problems,” and military means are believed to be the way to reshape the world consistent with American values and the nation’s self-professed utopian ends, which are perceived in turn as “universal truths.”** The very aesthetic of war is changing from an image of ugly, wasteful, and degrading brutality to a new, twenty-first century sport. In Bacevich’s blunt and considered assessment, contemporary America has fallen prey to militarism—romanticizing soldiers, fostering nostalgia for military ideals, and adopting military power as the measure of national greatness—to a “degree without precedent in US history.” **¶** The attitude of militarism that is running rampant in America**, Bacevich maintains**, is unlikely to disappear anytime soon**” because, even though it is unprecedented in its current intensity, it has deeps roots in the nation’s past and, consistent with Michael Sherry’s observation, has reshaped American politics, foreign policy, economics, social relations, and general culture over the past half-century so much that** it permeates all domains of life**. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 gave “added impetus to already exiting tendencies”; America became more itself rather than something different after 9/11, increasingly adopting a militaristic ethos with broad support and too little dissent from mainstream political leaders and the general public.** The present-day “infatuation with military power” is a bipartisan project and the handiwork of multiple and disparate groups of opinion leaders**. Moreover, it has developed over the last several decades “in full view and with considerable popular approval.” Thus, Bacevich argues,** “society at large. . .[cannot] abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass**,”** and what has come to pass is systemic, broad-based, and deeply ingrained in political culture rather than simply the outcome of a particular presidential election, the fault of an individual president, or the scheming of a single set of presidential advisors. **A late turning of public option in the fall elections of 2006 against a stymied occupation of Iraq, we might conclude, reflects impatience with a particular war, not a basic transformation of the war culture. ¶ The image of an imperial army fighting continuous wars of empire does not inspire confidence that an ingrained system of militarism can be changed, habits of war broken, the conscience of a nation restored, or a culture of peace established. Indeed, political theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri maintain that contemporary imperial warfare is perpetual because it functions to sustain the status-quo network of global power relations. War, they argue, is inevitable in a condition of “Empire” and constant as an instrument of rule.” It is the “general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination,” a “form of rule” for controlling populations and shaping “all aspects of social life,” Imperial war today regulates life in general and legitimizes itself in the process by propagandizing “the constant presence of an enemy and the threat of disorder.” The “presence of the enemy,” they note, “demonstrates the need for security.” The imagined presence of an enemy is crucial to the system and motive of war. ¶ Making evil enemies present by means of dehumanizing propaganda—propaganda that defies the US as it demonizes the nation’s adversaries—is a destructive ritual of redemption by vicarious sacrifice. It produces the heightened perception of a threat and intensified sense of national insecurity that motivates and excuses a call to arms. Evil, as in the image of an enemy evildoer, is the ultimate symbol of bedlam, babble, and disarray—the Biblical monster of chaos. In a condition of empire and imperial warfare, then, the routine rationalization for resorting to violence is to preserve global order against supposedly evil forces of disorder. This “abuse of evil”—this “discourse of good and evil [that] lacks nuance subtlety, and judicious discrimination”—Richard Bernstein insists is “extremely dangerous in a complex and precarious world” because it stifles thinking instead of promoting us to question and think. For this purpose, war rules. ¶** Yet, resisting the rule of war is possible, according to Hardt and Negri, despite the dominant mindset of militarism in a controlling paradigm of empire that bases politics on coercion and violence. Indeed, resisting war is “the most important task for resistance today.” **They content it is reasonable to imagine, under emerging conditions of desire for democracy, peace, and justice, that** a multitude of ordinary people might contest militarism through cooperation and communication—what Hardt and Negri call “singularities” acting in common with deference to their differences and without reduction to a “unity”—may well erode the order of Empire to achieve a “peaceful life in common.” The need for peace corresponds with the need for enriched democracy to overcome “the global state of war**.” To be sure, “the only democracy that makes sense today is the one that poses peace as its highest value.” ¶ Consistent with Hardt And Negri and for the purpose of working toward a peacebuilding culture, democracy is usefully understood as a practice of collective self-rule constituted by matrices of individuals cooperating and communicating with one another at multiple points of intersection to produce fair and equitable social relations within and against a recalcitrant system of empire, a system of empire that relies on incessant violence and legitimizing images of evildoers to maintain a status-quo relations of global power. Democracy is expressed most directly, acutely, and cogently in collaborative acts of resistance to enemy-making discourses.** Surely, as a guiding model for contesting the mindset of militarism, the vision of resisting dehumanizing propaganda by cultivating matrices of democratic dissent makes the prospect of building peace and inhibiting war more plausible over the long haul and less daunting in immediate circumstances. **¶ Understood as constructive democratic resistance,** dissent evokes the more judicious and relatively sustainable expectation that acts of peacebuilding can be augmented collectively and habits of war attenuated over time. Dissent cultivates democratic relations and coordinated resistance from the ground up by producing, humanizing acts of identification, that is, acts of communication and coordination that articulate practical points of intersection without effacing the distinguishing identities, cultures, religions, or nationalities of cooperating parties**. constructing intersecting points—points to be held in common by those who would oppose the war regime—is a bridging action rather than a fusing process. It is not an attempt to eliminate pluralism, diminish defining differences, or achieve a structured unity in which relative merit is determined for example, by how white or rich or Christian or Western or American a given category of people Is perceived to be.** Thus, peacebuilding activism and dissent from war can be imagined as a sustained boundary-spanning project of decentralized and overlapping networks of democratic resistance to the habit of dehumanizing propaganda.

## Drone Courts

### 1NC No Solve Soft Power

#### Doesn’t solve soft power or relations adv

Roma 2013

(Gabor Roma, international legal director at Human Rights First, February 27, 2013, “The pro-rule of law argument against a 'drone court',” The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/285041-the-pro-rule-of-law-argument-against-a-drone-court#ixzz2W7ZqeRtN)

But a “drone court” would be worse than ineffective: it would harm national security. Throughout the “war on terror,” policies that offend international law, including the broad scope of the government's claimed authority to kill, have inhibited allies from sharing essential intelligence with the United States and damaged the country’s reputation as a beacon on human rights. A secret court would only reinforce the perception that the United States concocts its own secret rules while insisting that other countries follow the international public ones.¶Pre-targeting judicial intervention is also probably unconstitutional because the U.S. constitution empowers courts to hear "cases and controversies," but not to render "advisory opinions." Adjudication of an act to take place in the future would seem to violate this restriction.

### Solvency

#### Sets the OPPOSITE international precedent--- rubber stamping

Vladeck 2013 (Steve Vladeck, professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, February 10, 2013, “Why a “Drone Court” Won’t Work–But (Nominal) Damages Might…,” Lawfare Blog, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work/)

That brings me to perhaps the biggest problem we should all have with a “drone court”–the extent to which, even if one could design a legally and practically workable regime in which such a tribunals could operate, its existence would put irresistible pressure on federal judges to sign off even on those cases in which they have doubts.¶As a purely practical matter, it would be next to impossible meaningfully to assess imminence, the existence of less lethal alternatives, or the true nature of a threat that an individual suspect poses ex ante. Indeed, it would be akin to asking law enforcement officers to obtain judicial review before they use lethal force in defense of themselves or third persons–when the entire legal question turns on what was actually true in the moment, as opposed to what might have been predicted to be true in advance. At its core, that’s why the analogy to search warrants utterly breaks down–and why it would hardly be surprising if judges in those circumstances approved a far greater percentage of applications than they might have on a complete after-the-fact record. Judges, after all, are humans.¶In the process, the result would be that such ex ante review would do little other than to add legitimacy to operations the legality of which might have otherwise been questioned ex post. Put another way, ex ante revew in this context would most likely lead to a more expansive legal framework within which the targeted killing program could operate, one sanctioned by judges asked to decide these cases behind closed doors; without the benefit of adversary parties, briefing, or presentation of the facts; and with the very real possibility that the wrong decision could directly lead to the deaths of countless Americans. Thus, even if it were legally and practically possible, a drone court would be a very dangerous idea.

#### Fails – no transparency

**Barnes**, Wall Street Journal, **2013** [Julian, March, ‘Drone Court’ Idea Called Into Question, WSJ Online]

Criticism of drone strikes and targeted killings--especially involving American citizens--has fueled interest in Congress and elsewhere in the creation of aspecial court to oversee the lethal operations. In a speech Monday at Fordham University School of Law in New York, Mr. Johnson said the government should be more transparent about its counterterrorism operations. As it stands, Mr. Johnson said, the government doesn't disclose classified CIA counterterrorism successes and cannot "confirm, deny or clarify" accusations of errant strikes or civilian casualties.

#### Information Bias ensures continuation of targeting

**Goodman**, Public Defender, **May 2013** [Leonard, “Drone Justice Is Blind”, SECTION: VIEWS; Public Defender; Pg. 16 Vol. 37 No. 5]

In the rare cases in which Obama does personally review evidence and approve a drone strike, he is hearing only one side of the story. Just as criminal suspects always seem guilty after a briefing by law enforcement, Muslim men living in remote and lawless regions of Pakistan or Yemen will always seem like terrorists to Obama after a CIA briefing. Moreover, much of the information used for drone targeting comes from informants, who are notoriously unreliable. For example, agent "Curveball" composed elaborate drawings of Saddam's mobile weapons labs that existed only in Curveball's head, but were nevertheless used to justify the Iraq War.

#### Drone court doesn’t appropriately promote effective control over drones.

Roth 2013 (Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, April 4, 2013, “What Rules Should Govern US Drone Attacks?,” New York Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/apr/04/what-rules-should-govern-us-drone-attacks/?pagination=false)

Whatever the rules governing drone attacks, many object to the covert, unilateral way the administration decides who should be killed. In the heat of battle, that is a necessity. But drone targets are typically selected over lengthy periods, with more than enough time for independent scrutiny. Under US law, the executive branch cannot even secure a wiretap without court oversight, so why should it be allowed to select drone targets unilaterally? Senator Dianne Feinstein has thus put forward the idea of a drone court similar to the courts that review wiretap applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).¶But replicating the FISA courts would provide little by way of effective control because, by their nature, they must be kept secret from the target, so they provide no opportunity for an independent attorney to challenge the government’s claims. At least for wiretaps the law is reasonably settled. But the administration, as we have seen, seems to accept in only vague terms the law governing drone attacks. In the absence of an adversarial process, a judge cannot be counted on to challenge the administration’s permissive interpretation of the law.¶Moreover, a drone court could at most approve placing someone on a kill list, not whether the circumstances of a prospective attack, including the risk to civilians in a changing situation, would be lawful. That would require a determination of the sort that a court can’t possibly undertake in advance. In any event, most proposals for drone courts envision them being used only for targeted US citizens—not much help to the great majority of targets from other nationalities. Though of no help to those killed, permitting after-the-fact lawsuits against the government would be a better way to allow the courts to define the limits of the law. But the administration has blocked such suits through various claims of secrecy.

#### Drone court can’t solve – too many legal hurdles.

Rosen 2013

(Jeffrey, professor of law at The George Washington University and the legal affairs editor of The New Republic, "Courting disaster: A new idea to limit drones could actually legitimize them,” The New Republic, February 11, 2013, [http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112392/drone-courts-congress-should-exercise-oversight-instead#](http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112392/drone-courts-congress-should-exercise-oversight-instead) accessed 8/2)

On Sunday, Robert Gates, the former Pentagon chief for Presidents Obama and Bush, endorsed an idea that has been floated by Democratic lawmakers in the wake of John O. Brennan's confirmation hearings to be CIA Director: a drone court that would review the White House’s targeted killings of American citizens linked to al Qaida. The administration has signaled its openness to the idea of a congressionally created drone court, which would be modeled on the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that reviews requests for warrants authorizing the surveillance of suspected spies or terrorists. But although senators at the Brennan hearings were rightly concerned about targeted killings operating without any judicial or congressional oversight, the proposed drone court would raise as many constitutional and legal questions as it resolved. And it would give a congressional and judicial stamp of approval to a program whose effectiveness, morality, and constitutionality are open to serious questions. Rather than rushing to create a drone court, Congress would do better to hold hearings about whether targeted drone killings are, in fact, morally, constitutionally, and pragmatically defensible in the first place.¶ From the administration’s perspective, the appeal of a drone court is obvious: Despite the suggestion in the recently released Department of Justice White Paper white paper that the president’s unilateral decisions about targeted killings can’t be reviewed by judges, the administration cites Supreme Court cases that suggest the opposite: namely, that the president’s decision to designate Americans as enemy combatants can only be justified when authorized by Congress, with the possibility of independent judicial review.¶ Although the Supreme Court has been most sympathetic to bold claims about executive power when they’re supported by Congress and reviewed by independent judges, a congressionally created drone court would be open to a series of practical and constitutional objections. On the practical side, there’s the question of what, precisely, the court would be reviewing. The administration claims the power to order targeted assassinations when three conditions are met: 1) a high level U.S. officials decides the target is a “senior operational leader of Al-Qaida” who “poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States”; 2) “capture is infeasible”; and 3) the operation would be conducted according to the laws of war. But it’s infeasible for judges to make split second decisions about whether or not an attack is, in fact, imminent or capture is feasible. For that reason, the most likely focus of a drone court would be the administration’s decision to put a suspect on the targeted killing list in the first place. But, as Steve Vladek of American University has argued, it’s not clear that judges have the constitutional power to issue warrants that can’t be challenged by the targets in a future judicial proceeding. And there are also serious questions about whether or not Congress has the constitutional power to forbid the president from exercising his war powers without getting judicial approval in advance.

#### Drone Courts Suck – Pres can ignore

Epps 2/16Epps, Garrett. "Why a Secret Court Won't Solve the Drone-Strike Problem." The Atlantic. The Atlantic, 16 Feb. 2013. Web. 21 Aug. 2013. <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/why-a-secret-court-wont-solve-the-drone-strike-problem/273246/>.  
  
Look up: that buzz you hear overhead is the "drone court."¶ Washington's idea of the week is a secret court, based on the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court](http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html), which issues secret wiretap warrants in certain espionage cases. Executive officials would go before the drone court and present their evidence that an individual abroad, perhaps a U.S. citizen, is an Al Qaeda affiliate and an imminent danger. Judges on the panel would issue, in effect, a secret death warrant--a certification that lethal force can be used against the "enemy combatant."¶ Sen. Dianne Feinstein [spoke favorably](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/feinstein-says-lawmakers-may) about the idea at confirmation hearings for C.I.A. Director-designate John Brennan. So did former Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Thursday, the New York Times [joined in the chorus](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is-needed-to-review-targeted-killings.htm). ¶ Americans love courts and judges. But they trust them because, in our system, they are independent of elected officials--not part of the political machine. They are also what lawyers call "courts of limited jurisdiction." In carefully chosen language, Article III of the Constitution extends "the judicial power" of the United States to a specific and limited set of "cases and controversies."Federal courts decide cases; they do not fight wars, collect the garbage, or set health-care policy. And most particularly, they may not become an advisory agency of the executive branch.¶The idea of a "drone court" would send federal courts into areas they have never gone before, and indeed from which, I think, the text of the Constitution bars them.It could also put the integrity of our court system at risk.¶Let's frame the issue properly. The present administration does not claim that the president has "inherent authority" to attack anyone anywhere. Instead, from the documents and speeches we've seen, the administration says it can order drone attacks only as provided by the [Authorization for the Use of Military Force](http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/sjres23/text)passed by Congress after the September 11 attacks--that is, against "those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." ¶ Unlike the fictional President Bennett in Tom Clancy's Clear and Present Danger, then, President Obama can't suddenly send the drone fleet down to take out, say, Colombian drug lords or the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. That's a marked change from the overall position of the last administration, and it's an important limitation on the president's claimed authority.¶ But because of that limitation, a court would be supervising the president's command decisions in a time of authorized military action--after, that is, the legal equivalent of a "declaration of war." As commander in chief, the president has been given a mission by Congress. By passing the AUMF, Congress has delegated to him its full war power to use in that mission. Nothing in the AUMF is directed to the courts; in fact, I have trouble finding authority for target selection anywhere in Article III. And whatever the technological changes, constitutionally I see no difference between targeting an enemy with a drone and doing the same thing with a Cruise missile or a SEAL Team. Courts simply aren't equipped to decide military tactics.¶ The FISA Court, on the other hand, doesn't really reach beyond Article III--judges since ancient times have issued warrants for searches and arrests, and the individuals being spied on are suspected of crimes against the United States. But I don't know of a deep-rooted tradition of common-law courts telling the shire reeve he can hunt someone down and kill him without trial. There's yet another problem: what criteria would a "drone court" apply? In the ["white paper"](http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf) obtained by NBC News earlier this month, the Department of Justice says that a decision to order a strike involves three requirements: (1) the target represents "an imminent threat of violent attack"; (2) capturing the target would be "infeasible"; and (3) a lethal attack can be carried out "in a manner consistent with law of war principles." A court might be able to apply the first criterion, though just barely; but there is simply no precedent for an Article III judge balancing the prospective risks of a capture operation vs. that of a missile, or assessing the probability of "collateral damage" if the strike goes forward. We have left "the judicial power" behind altogether, and created a panel of poorly trained generals in sloppy black uniforms.¶ Finally, in time of war, there will be occasions when a target emerges and decisions must be made too quickly for even a secret court proceeding. And thus the "drone court" would not be able to rule on some cases; an ambitious president could find many exceptions.¶ In addition, an ambitious executive might also use the secret court as a means to extend the drone-strike authority beyond actions in time of authorized military action. With such a review mechanism in place, the argument might go, there's no danger in ceding the president's authority to use drones against enemies not so designated by Congress.

#### Drone court doesn’t check the executive.

Roma 2013 (Gabor Roma, international legal director at Human Rights First, February 27, 2013, “The pro-rule of law argument against a 'drone court',” The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/285041-the-pro-rule-of-law-argument-against-a-drone-court#ixzz2W7ZqeRtN)

The instinct to regulate the government's claimed unilateral killing power is understandable. But a U.S. court empowered to issue death warrants against people who have not been charged, let alone convicted, would be a revolutionary re-write of separation of powers and of the very meaning of judicial review. It would be unjust, ineffective, and counterproductive. It may be unconstitutional as well.¶A “drone court” would be unjust because the proposed target would be unable to appear and make the case for preserving his life. A secret judicial process in which the right to life is at stake but the owner of that life has no say is an affront both to American values and international legal principles. ¶While doing much harm, a “drone court” would do little, if any, good. Supporters like the idea because it appears to provide some check on the President’s secretive exercise of this lethal unilateral power. But what judge would risk preventing the interception of a terrorist? What’s more likely is that the drone court would be a rubber stamp, creating only the appearance, not the reality, of justice.

## US-Saudi

### A2 – Uniqueness

**Even though there are tensions over Oil and Democracy ties remain strong**

**Glaser**, staff at Anti War, **1-2-14** [John, blog, “Poor Saudi Arabia Unhappy With US Foreign Policy”, http://antiwar.com/blog/2014/01/02/poor-saudi-arabia-unhappy-with-us-foreign-policy/]

According to Bremmer, the reason the Saudis are unsatisfied can be summed up in two words: oil and democratization. Saudi Arabia wants to continue to use, as it has for decades, U.S. power to maintain its oil-centered geo-strategic predominance in the Middle East. Additionally, Saudi Arabia wants to be able to continue to count on U.S. backing in spite of the fact that it is one of the most backwards authoritarian regimes in the world. Somehow I can’t play the violin for them. All that said, I think the talk of a lasting split between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is hyperbolic, or at least premature. After all, Washington has firmly opposed the pro-democracy movement in neighboring Bahrain, which was in part a key Saudi interest. Saudi Arabia continues to be perceived as an important ally to Washington. And while the Obama administration may not obey Saudi demands to needlessly isolate Iran into perpetuity, that does not erase the myriad ways the U.S.-Saudi alliance is copacetic. Besides, another administration will come along soon that could easily become a slave to more traditional pressures.

**Ties are growing**

**Arab News**, staff, **1-6-14** [“Saudi-US talks focus on expanding cooperation”, http://www.arabnews.com/news/504316]

Crown Prince Salman, Deputy Premier and Minister of Defense, discussed expanding Saudi-American military cooperation during his meeting with Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of US Central Command, in Riyadh on Sunday. The two discussed latest Middle East developments emphasizing the strong relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

### A2- US-Saudi Relations

#### US-Saudi relations resilient

Reed ‘12

[Mathew M, Middle East specialist for a consulting firm in Washington, DC. He completed his graduate studies at George Washington University in 2011. http://alajnabee.wordpress.com/2012/01/23/note-on-us-saudi-relations-after-2011/ ETB]

Firstly, the stakes are too high in the region and the U.S and Saudi Arabia are still animated by terrorism, the Iranian threat, and oil. Secondly, U.S.-Saudi relations are more institutionalized than ever, with cooperation taking place not just at the executive level, but most often–and most importantly–at the bureaucratic level, among mid-level officials. This allows the relationship to continue on “autopilot,” even when there are hiccups at higher levels of officialdom. Finally, let’s remember the relationship has always suffered from a certain amount of friction. The Palestinian issue is a chronic irritant to name but one. And yet in spite of this and the seeming incompatibility of U.S. and Saudi government traditions, cultures, and faith, the relationship endures, buoyed by permanent interests which have overlapped for decades. This is not a “Pakistan scenario.” The U.S. and Saudi Arabia agree on what constitutes a genuine threat. There is no double game to be played. And there is no alternative to American military might in the Persian Gulf, which will remain in place for years. Unlike relations with Pakistan, U.S.-Saudi relations are characterized by mutual respect–rather than convenience or unfortunate circumstances that force cooperation. I’d like to know what more people think about this issue since claims made last year have seemingly crystallized into conventional wisdom. I can’t say how many times I’ve heard the canard repeated. But it did prompt me to write last July about why I believe U.S.-Saudi relations will continue moving forward. I still stand by that post, titled “Nowhere Near Rock Bottom.

#### Relations can survive any disagreements- arms sales ensure

NYT ‘11

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billion-arms-deal-united-states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.html> ETB

“When you look at the size of this package, what does it tell you about U.S.-Saudi relations?” said a senior Saudi official, who spoke anonymously because he was not authorized to speak publicly. “It says it’s very strong and very solid. Any disagreements from time to time don’t affect the core relationship.” ¶ The weapons package is remarkable, both for its size and for its technical sophistication. Under the terms of the $29.4 billion agreement signed on Dec. 24, Saudi Arabia will get 84 new F-15SA jets, manufactured by Boeing, and upgrades to 70 F-15s in the Saudi fleet with new munitions and spare parts. It will also get help with training, logistics and maintenance.

#### More evidence

NYT ‘11

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billion-arms-deal-united-states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.html> ETB

The weapons deal, Mr. Gause said, also illustrated that the two countries could put aside their differences and focus on larger strategic priorities. “After some tension-filled months this year over Egypt and Bahrain, both sides have agreed to disagree on that, and agree on their common interests,” he said.

#### US-Saudi relations will survive any strains

Financial Times ‘11

[Anna Fifield, June 16, 2011. “Arab Spring Tests US-Saudi Relationship.”

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4082dc70-984d-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuT3vWiZ> ETB]

But this marriage of convenience is likely to survive the latest strains, analysts say. “Where are they going to go?” asked Thomas Lippman, a scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington and an expert on US-Saudi relations. “When there is real danger, who are they going to call? Beijing? Moscow? Islamabad? I don’t think so.” Indeed, the two remain in sync on many issues – ensuring stability in Yemen, combating al-Qaeda and containing Iran. And the military co-operation remains close. The Saudis are pressing ahead with a $60bn deal to buy arms and F-15 fighter jets, while the US is training a “facilities security force” to protect the kingdom’s vital oil infrastructure.

### A2- Saudi Relations k2 Solve Terrorism

#### Terror co-op will continue despite disagreements

NYT ‘11

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billion-arms-deal-united-states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.html> ETB

Early this year, the Saudis were furious when Mr. Obama withdrew support for Egypt’s embattled president, Hosni Mubarak, after he faced massive protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Later, it was the White House’s turn to be upset, when Saudi tanks rolled into neighboring Bahrain to help quash a mainly Shiite rebellion against that kingdom’s Sunni monarchy. ¶ Yet Saudi Arabia and the United States continue to cooperate in areas like counterterrorism. In recent weeks, the two have worked to resolve the crisis in Yemen, where President Ali Abdullah Saleh has formally agreed to cede power in a Saudi-brokered agreement and has applied for a visa to travel to the United States for medical treatment.

#### Saudi Arabia isn’t key to counter-terror

Askari ‘11

[Hossein Askari is Iran Professor of International Business and professor of international affairs at the George Washington University. <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-friends-the-gulf-5393> ETB]

Fighting Islamic Extremism:

Anyone who says that Saudi Arabia is a helpful partner in fighting Islamic extremism has his head in the sand! Saudi schools, more precisely their curricula and books, and Saudi-financed madrassas are the breeding ground for Islamic extremism. Read the fatwas and pronouncements of Saudi religious ‘scholars’ to get an idea of their views on democracy. They have even determined that peaceful protests are un-Islamic. Social conditions in Saudi Arabia—no constitution, no free press, no national elections, no freedom of worship, no church or synagogue, no freedom to congregate and protest, severely limited rights for women—make the Iran of the mullahs look wildly liberal.

Partner in Counterterrorism:

While it is possible that Saudi Arabia has provided the US with useful intelligence, it should be remembered that Saudi Arabia has been the financier of al-Qaeda, bred Osama bin Laden and provided fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers.

### A2- Saudi Relations k2 Check Iran

#### Saudi support not key to check Iranian expansion

Askari ‘11

[Hossein Askari is Iran Professor of International Business and professor of international affairs at the George Washington University. <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-friends-the-gulf-5393> ETB]

Iranian Expansionism:

The mullahs have been their own (and Iran’s) worst enemy and have embarked on a number of stupid things, but expansionism has not been one of them. They have interfered here and there, especially in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Gaza, because they have felt threatened by US military encirclement and growing Saudi influence in the region. If Iran had expansion in mind, Kuwait, not Saudi Arabia, would be its obvious target. After the demise of Communism, the Saudis and the other Arab monarchies have adopted Iran as the convenient bogeyman. Blaming everything that goes awry on Iran seems to be the best way to get US support and the attention of the rest of the world.

### A2- Saudi Relations k2 Oil

#### No impact to Saudi cutting off exports to the US

Askari ‘11

[Hossein Askari is Iran Professor of International Business and professor of international affairs at the George Washington University. <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-friends-the-gulf-5393> ETB]

Oil:

Yes, Saudi Arabia sells the US oil and is our third largest source of foreign oil supplies, but as I have said before, this hardly means that the US has to protect the al-Sauds in order to have stable energy supplies at market prices. Such a proposition is the nonsense perpetrated by those who either don’t understand oil markets or who benefit from US ties to the al-Sauds. What would actually happen if Saudi Arabia refused to sell its oil to the US? We would get our oil from another oil exporter while Saudi Arabia sold what it would have sold the US to another importer. For most major oil exporters, oil is all they export. They need oil revenues as much as we need oil. It would be a problem if one or two countries took over all the Persian Gulf oil, cornered the market, acted as a monopoly and jacked up prices to punish importers, but that is not the case today. The world, China included, would not stand for such a concentration of oil resources. Also don’t forget that while Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter today, another exporter at some point in the future may replace it in this role; some executives in the oil industry expect Iraq to replace Saudi Arabia as the biggest oil exporter within the next ten years. We cannot have a special relationship with whoever happens to be the largest oil exporter at any given time. What matters is that oil markets are orderly and supplies do not become concentrated in one or two hands. We have no need to support the al-Sauds.

### A2- Saudi Relations k2 Peace Process

#### Saudi Arabia isn’t a key player in the peace process

Askari ‘11

[Hossein Askari is Iran Professor of International Business and professor of international affairs at the George Washington University. <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-friends-the-gulf-5393> ETB]

Key Player in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process:

How did Washington dream this one up? Yes, King Abdullah has put forward a “plan,” as have many others, but with no earth-shattering new ideas. Saudi Arabia’s money has influenced Fatah, Arafat and now Abbas, while to Palestinians the al-Sauds are a symbol of Arab decadence and ineptitude. These credentials hardly add up to the label of ‘key player’ in the peace process.

### A2- Oil Key to Saudi Relations

#### Oil not key- strong relations on other issues

Smith ‘10

[James B., US Ambassador to Riyadh. Interview with Majalla: The Leading Arab Magazine. <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2010/06/article5563713> ETB]

I agree that the relationship has been characterized as oil-for-security, but I would argue that it’s been different for a long, long time…[and now] is infinitely more nuanced and complicated than it’s ever been. And it’s involved in many more things than just oil and security. We will continue to have strong relationships on the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] side, strong relationships on energy, not just oil. And in the business, education and medical fields, those ties are going to get even stronger.

#### Oil not key- military and economic ties

Cockburn ‘11

[Alexander Cockburn is co-editor with Jeffrey St. Clair of the muckraking newsletter CounterPunch. He is also co-author of the new book "Dime's Worth of Difference: Beyond the Lesser of Two Evils.” <https://www.commondreams.org/view/2011/10/07-8> ETB]

## Under its terms, the United States will provide Saudi Arabia with 84 advanced F-15 fighter planes with electronics and weapons packages tailored to Saudi needs. An additional 70 F-15's already in Saudi hands will be upgraded to match the capabilities of the new planes. Saudi Arabia will purchase a huge fleet of nearly 200 Apache, Blackhawk and other U.S. military helicopters, along with a vast array of radar systems, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and guided bombs.¶ The U.S. trains and supplies all Saudi Arabia's security forces. U.S. corporations have huge investments in the Kingdom

## Senkaku Answers

### 1NC China No Use Drones

#### China won’t use drones to resolve territorial disputes – fears international backlash and creating a precedent for U.S. strikes in the area

Erickson and Strange 5-29

Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, and Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 (Andrew and Austin, China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13) PC

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

### 1NC No Trigger Asian War

#### Drone prolif inevitable BUT they won’t trigger Asian war

Park 13 (Richard Parker, NYT Staff Writer, May 12th 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/opinion/drones-and-the-rivalry-between-the-us-and-china.html?\_r=0, “Pilotless Planes, Pacific Tensions”, AB)

To project this kind of power, China must rely not only on the quantity of its ships but also on the quality of its technology. Keeping the Americans half an ocean away requires the capability for long-range precision strikes — which, in turn, require the satellite reconnaissance, cyber warfare, encrypted communications and computer networks in which China has invested nearly $100 billion over the last decade.¶ Ideally for both countries, China’s efforts would create a new balance of power in the region. But to offset China’s numerical advantage and technological advances, the United States Navy is betting heavily on drones — not just the X-47B and its successors, but anti-submarine reconnaissance drones, long-range communications drones, even underwater drones. A single hunter-killer pairing of a Triton reconnaissance drone and a P-8A Poseidon piloted anti-submarine plane can sweep 2.7 million square miles of ocean in a single mission.¶ The arms race between the world’s largest navies undermines the likelihood of attaining a new balance of power, and raise the possibility of unintended collisions as the United States deploys hundreds, even thousands of drones and China scrambles for ways to counter the new challenge. And drones, because they are cheap and don’t need a human pilot, lower the bar for aggressive behavior on the part of America’s military leaders — as they will for China’s navy, as soon as it makes its own inevitable foray into drone capabilities (indeed, there were reports last week that China was preparing its own stealth drone for flight tests).¶ By themselves, naval rivalries do not start wars. During peacetime, in fact, naval operations are a form of diplomacy, which provide rivals with healthy displays of force that serve as deterrents to war. But they have to be enveloped in larger political relationships, too.¶ At present, the United States-China relationship is really just about economics. As long as that relationship remains vibrant, confrontation is in neither country’s interest. But should that slender reed snap, there is little in the way of a larger political relationship, let alone alliance, to take its place. The only thing between crisis and conflict, then, would be two ever larger, more dangerous navies, prepared to fight a breed of drone-centric war we don’t yet fully understand, and so are all the more likely to fall into.

### 1NC No Senkaku Impact

#### No Senkaku or Asian conflict- empirically denied, economic interdependence checks, and China avoids nationalism.

Carlson ’13

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At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the **Senkaku** (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. **Yet,** months later,nothing has happened. And **despite** their **aggressive posturing** in the disputed territory, **both** sides **now show** glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability**.** Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, **China** cannot afford military conflict **with** any of its **Asian neighbors.** It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However**, Chinese officials see** thateven the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damagethat such a use of force would cause **to Beijing's** two most fundamental national interests **--** economic **growth and preventing the escalation of** radical **nationalist sentiment at home.** These constraints, rather than any external deterrent**, will keep** Xi Jinping, **China's new leader, from** authorizing the use of deadly **force** in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, **Beijing has promoted** peace and stability **in Asia** to facilitate conditions amenable to **China's** **economic** **development**. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, **although** often seen as **a promoter of conflict**, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. **Ever since** the **Tiananmen Square** massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, **successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance** between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the **coming months it will quietly** seek a way to **shelve the dispute in return for** securing **regional stability**, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

## Caucuses

### AT Caucasus

#### Powers will work together to stabilize the region—security and economic incentives

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(Dr. Geoffrey F., Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at National Defense University, “Russia, China, and stabilizing South Asia”, 3/12, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/12/russia\_china\_and\_stabilizing\_south\_asia)

As the U.S. begins to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Russia and China have both declared a desire to increase their military presence throughout Central and South Asia. This new regional alignment, however, should not be viewed as a threat to U.S. strategic national interests but seen rather as concurrent with strategic and regional interests of the United States: regional peace, stability and the prevention of future terrorist safe havens in ungoverned territories. As China and Russia begin to flex their military muscles, the U.S. military should harness their expanded regional influence to promote proactively a new period of responsible multilateral support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This past December it became clearer that Russia had begun to re-assert its regional presence when the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) granted Russia the veto power over any member state's future decision to host a foreign military. CSTO members, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have become increasingly valuable U.S. partners in the Northern Distribution Network after Pakistan shut down U.S. military supply routes running from the south into Afghanistan when NATO troops killed 24 Pakistani soldiers last November in the border area of Salala. Though it appears the route may soon open again, the United States must still adopt a new strategy that works more closely with Russia and the CSTO to maintain the Northern Distribution Network long into the future, which currently accounts for about 60 percent of all cargo transiting Central Asia en route to Afghanistan. Certainly, the U.S. risks being unable to control many aspects of the Northern Distribution Network as it withdraws from the region, and this may in turn adversely affect Afghanistan's future success. However, if the United States remains concerned about leaving the region to a historically obdurate regional rival like Russia, it should also bear in mind that Russia has a vital strategic interest in the future stability of the region. Russia has approximately 15 million Muslims living within its borders, with an estimated 2 million Muslims in Moscow. Russia is fearful of what occurs on its periphery and wants to minimize the spread of Muslim extremism that may originate from an unstable Afghanistan or Pakistan. In addition, Russia does not want regional instability that threatens its oil and gas investments. In particular, Russia wants to ensure that it continues to influence the planning and implementation of the potentially lucrative natural gas pipeline that may one day traverse Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In a recent meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed Russia's commitment to preserving peace and stability throughout the AfPak region, and rejected the use of violence by al-Qaeda and its affiliates that aim to undermine the current Afghan government. Furthermore, he pledged to bolster bilateral ties and work cooperatively with Pakistan to achieve stability in Afghanistan. A newly-elected President Vladimir Putin also recently wrote in a campaign brief that "Russia will help Afghanistan develop its economy and strengthen its military to fight terrorism and drug production." It is not lost on the U.S. government that Russia is proposing to succeed where the U.S. has struggled. However, if Russia does succeed in helping establish a secure Afghanistan and Pakistan that can prevent the spread of bases for terrorism then it is a victory for everyone. Aside from Pakistan, and in line with promoting security throughout the region, Russia announced recently that it will provide $16 million to Kyrgyzstan to assist with border security in the south. Russia also agreed recently to pay $15 million in back rent for its four military facilities across the country, including an air base, a torpedo test center on Lake Issyk-Kul, and a communications center in the south. Further, Russia signed a security pact with Tajikistan last fall to extend its basing lease for 49 years, in addition to a bilateral agreement that will enable Russia to become more integrated into Tajikistan's border security forces that oversee an 830-mile border with Afghanistan. Providing similar types of U.S. aid and security support will also help ensure that the valuable Northern Distribution Network remains open and secure for supply lines into Afghanistan. If the northern trade routes are shut down it would adversely affect aid arriving to Afghanistan and therefore jeopardize the stability of Afghanistan and the region. It would also be in opposition to Russia's regional interests. Rather than citing these examples in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a demonstration of how the U.S. will soon lose out in the region to a resurgent Russia, policymakers can view them as an indication of how Russian interests align with the U.S. to help maintain regional security. More importantly, if Russia wants to take a more active future role in Central Asia, the U.S. should address this shift and work directly with Russia and other CSTO members to ensure that the Northern Distribution Network remains operational in the distant future. Certainly, the U.S. should not be naïve to think that Russia will not at times oppose U.S. regional interests and that there will not be significant areas of conflict. In 2009, Russia tried to convince then President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev to terminate the U.S. contract for its base in Manas. In this case, the U.S. fended off the threat of expulsion successfully through promises of increased U.S. military and economic aid. Continuing to maintain significant amounts of aid to the Central Asia Republics will therefore provide additional incentives to ensure the U.S. is less vulnerable to Russian whims, while at the same time remaining present and active for the benefit of regional security and the maintenance of the Northern Distribution Network. Another powerful regional player, China, also has a vested interest in the stability of the AfPak region, and has already begun to play a more active security role. It was reported this past January, for example, that China intends to establish one or more bases in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Subsequently, at the end of February, Beijing played host to the first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue to discuss regional cooperation and stability. Due to China's shared borders and vibrant trade with both Afghanistan and Pakistan -- not to mention China's estimated 8 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs living in western Xinjiang Province -- it has a direct interest in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain stable long into the future. Bilateral trade between China and Pakistan, for example, increased 28 percent in the past year to approximately $8.7 billion. China also signed an oil agreement with Afghanistan in December that could be worth $7 billion over the next two decades. Additionally, China is concerned about the rise of its Uyghur separatist movement that maintains safe havens in both countries, in addition to the spread of radical Islam. The United States should push China to become more actively engaged in Pakistan's security affairs as China has a direct interest in moderating radicalism in Pakistan and keeping it stable. Indicative of Pakistan's strategic value to China, since 2002 China has financed the construction and development of Pakistan's Gwadar deep water port project. China has contributed more than $1.6 billion toward the port's development as a major shipping and soon-to-be naval hub, which is located just 250 miles from the opening of the Persian Gulf. A Pakistan Supreme Court decision in 2011 enabled China to take full control of Gwadar from a Singapore management company further establishing China's firm position in the Pakistani port city. The creation of a new Chinese military network in Pakistan between Gwadar and the FATA would enable China to oversee the transit and protection of Chinese goods and investments that travel from both the coast and interior through the Karakorum corridor to China's Xinjiang Province. China already has an estimated 4,000 troops in Gilgit Baltistan, part of the larger and disputed Kashmir, and just recently it was reported after a January 2012 trip by Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani to China that Pakistan is considering leasing Gilgit Baltistan to China for the next 50 years. Such a move would indeed escalate tensions with India to the south, but from a Pakistani perspective, China would be positioned better than it already is to assist with any future Pakistani national security concerns. And from a Chinese perspective, it would improve their ability to monitor any illicit Uyghur activities aimed at inciting further rebellion in western China. With interest comes responsibility, and in the wake of the recent reports predicting the establishment of a more robust Chinese military network across Pakistan, it is time that China begins to supplement its increased involvement in Pakistan by helping to maintain peace and stability throughout the entire AfPak region. Certainly after fighting two long wars, the United States can no longer be the sole world power responsible for the region, and both China and Russia have been U.S. security free-riders for too long. They have benefited financially while NATO continues to lose soldiers and accrue a massive war debt. After 11 years of war, it is time the United States work more proactively with Russia, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics to create solutions for the future stability and collective security of the region. Indeed, we may not have a choice, and the United States should embrace the transformation of a new era in Eurasia's heartland.

#### No US-Russian war

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[Dr. Leonid Ryabikhin, expert of the Russian Science Committee for Global Security, General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov, Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, June 2009, “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces,” http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf]

The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and 5 the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

#### Conventional weapons disprove the Caucasus impact

Sultanova, 13

[Neighbourhood Watches as Azerbaijan Arms Up Unable to match Baku’s big spending, Armenia relies on special relationship with Moscow. By Shahla Sultanova, Yekaterina Poghosyan - Caucasus CRS Issue 695, 25 Jul 13,http://iwpr.net/report-news/neighbourhood-watches-azerbaijan-arms]

Azerbaijan’s rapid arms build-up is cause for concern in the region, with some defence analysts warning that it heightens the risk of renewed conflict. President Ilham Aliyev frequently boasts of the amount of money his oil-rich state can afford to spend on weaponry. Appearing at a military parade in Baku on June 26. he took the opportunity to remind everyone that at 3.7 billion US dollars, annual defence expenditure is nearly twice the size of neighbouring Armenia’s entire government budget. A decade ago, Azerbaijan’s defence budget stood at 160 million dollars. “In recent years we have purchased the most sophisticated hardware,” Aliyev said in his address at the parade. “We have purchased about 100 combat and transport helicopters, dozens of combat aircraft, and the most advanced anti-aircraft systems. [Our] armoured vehicles, modern tanks and artillery pieces are capable of destroying any enemy target.” The armoured vehicles rolling past included new tanks bought from Russia. Overhead, 100 military aircraft flew by as 40 naval vessels floated offshore in the Caspian Sea. Aliyev noted that all this hardware was not just for show; it was needed because of the unresolved conflict with Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh. Yashar Jafarli, a defence expert who heads the Baku-based Association of Reserve and Retired Officers, said the arms acquisitions came from traditional suppliers Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and increasingly also from Israel, Turkey, South Africa and Pakistan. In mid-June, the Moscow paper Vedomosti reported that Russia was supplying armoured vehicles and artillery worth up to one billion US dollars to Azerbaijan. The news was of particular concern to Armenian officials, since Moscow is both a close ally and part of the three-member OSCE group mediating in the Karabakh conflict, but appears happy to profit from Azerbaijan’s spending spree. On a visit to Armenia, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, tried to portray the sales as no more than normal business, and argued that it would not change the military balance in the region. Patrushev’s counterpart Artur Baghdasaryan, secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council, also downplayed the significance of the deal. “We must not fall into a panic because Azerbaijan has acquired military equipment from Russia. Azerbaijan buys weapons from other countries as well. Russia has its own relationship with Azerbaijan, and it bases that relationship on its own interests,” Baghdasaryan said. Richard Giragosian, director of the Centre for Regional Studies in Yerevan, said reports of massive arms shipments from Russia had revived fears that the delicate balance of power in the South Caucasus was tipping in Azerbaijan’s favour. It might also indicate an intention to re-take Karabakh by force. The Nagorny Karabakh region was part of Soviet-era Azerbaijan but has been controlled by a local Armenian administration since the early 1990s war that ended in a truce but no peace deal. “Although international reactions to Azerbaijan’s latest procurement of offensive weapons have been largely muted, there is a clear imperative for greater concern over the now shifting balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is an inherent threat to the fragile ceasefire,” he said.

#### No escalation—great powers don’t want it

**Kucera 10**—regular contributor to U.S. News and World Report, Slate and EurasiaNet (Joshua, Central Asia Security Vacuum, 16 June 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/16/central-asia%E2%80%99s-security-vacuum/)

Note – CSTO = Collective Security Treaty Organization

Yet when brutal violence broke out in one of the CSTO member countries, Kyrgyzstan, just days later, the group didn’t respond rapidly at all. Kyrgyzstan’s interim president, Roza Otunbayeva, even asked Russia to intervene, but Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded that Russians would only do so under the auspices of the CSTO. And nearly a week after the start of the violence—which some estimate has killed more than 1000 people and threatens to tear the country apart—the CSTO has still not gotten involved, but says it is ‘considering’ intervening. ‘We did not rule out the use of any means which are in the CSTO’s potential, and the use of which is possible regardless of the development of the situation in Kyrgyzstan,’ Russian National Security Chief Nikolai Patrushev said Monday. On June 10-11, another regional security group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, held its annual summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The SCO has similar collective security aims as the CSTO, and includes Russia, China and most of the Central Asian republics, including Kyrgyzstan. But despite the violence that was going on even as the SCO countries’ presidents met in Uzbekistan, that group also didn’t involve itself in the conflict, and made only a tepid statement calling for calm. Civil society groups in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (much of the violence is directed toward ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, and the centre of the violence, the city of Osh, is right on the border of Uzbekistan) called on the United Nations to intervene. And Otunbayeva said she didn’t ask the US for help. Even Uzbekistan, which many in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere feared might try to intervene on behalf of ethnic Uzbeks, has instead opted to stay out of the fray, and issued a statement blaming outsiders for ‘provoking’ the brutal violence. The violence has exposed a security vacuum in Central Asia that no one appears interested in filling. In spite of all of the armchair geopoliticians who have declared that a ‘new Great Game’ is on in Central Asia, the major powers seem distinctly reluctant to expand their spheres of influence there. Why? It’s possible that, amid a tentative US-Russia rapprochement and an apparent pro-Western turn in Russian foreign policy, neither side wants to antagonize the other. The United States, obviously, also is overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan and has little interest in getting in the middle of an ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan. It’s possible that the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force isn’t ready for a serious intervention as would be required in Kyrgyzstan. (It’s also possible that Russia’s reluctance is merely a demure gesture to ensure that they don’t seem too eager to get involved; only time will tell.)

#### No war—lesson learning and tension management

Irina **Zviagel'skaia**, leading research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, June **2005**. “Russia and Central Asia: Problems of Security,” Central Asia at the End of the Transition, ed. Boris Rumer, <http://books.google.com/books?id=cnXVyW1QIIYC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=%22central+asia%22+numerous+challenges+stability&source=web&ots=-3Uve6KFdU&sig=62TKLdSLAgBp6rszCPvbUBtjjVY&hl=en#PPR5,M1>.

Notwithstanding these numerous challenges, in general the countries of Central Asia have demonstrated stability in the course of their existence as independent states. This region, in contrast to the Caucasus, has not witnessed armed conflicts between states, or wars driven by separatist or irredentist movements. To be sure, such movements do in fact exist, and interethnic tensions are constantly felt. The exception, as already noted, is Tajikistan, where a civil war unfolded in the early 1990s. However, it was precisely the **lessons** of Tajikistan that **have been learned** by the regimes in other states. Nowhere else has a single leader permitted the creation of organized opposition. Although differing in the degree of harshness used to repress political opponents, these former leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are well versed in political-bureaucratic games and have demonstrated a high level of survivability.

#### Alt causes prove disprove escalation and/or solvency

**Stratfor, 12** [“Annual Forecast 2012”, global intelligence company, http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/annual-forecast-2012]

Numerous factors will undermine Central Asia's stability in 2012, but they **will not lead to a major breaking point** in the region this year. Protests over deteriorating economic conditions will occur throughout the region, particularly in Kazakhstan, though these will be contained to the region and will not result in overly disruptive violence. Serious issues in Kazakhstan's banking sector could lead to a financial crisis, though the government will be able to manage the difficulties and contain it during 2012 by using the oil revenues it has saved up.