### Off 1

**Restriction is a limitation on activity by statute, regulation, or provision**

**People’s Law Dictionary 2013**. (by Gerald and Kathleen Hill: Gerald has practiced law for more than four decades in San Francisco, has an A.B. from Stanford and Juris Doctor from University of California.dictionary.law.com)

*Restriction*

n. **any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision**. In multi-unit real estate developments, condominium and cooperative housing projects managed by homeowners' associations or similar organizations, such organizations are usually required by state law to impose restrictions on use. Thus, the restrictions are part of the "covenants, conditions and restrictions" intended to enhance the use of common facilities and property which are recorded and incorporated into the title of each owner.

**Indefinite detention relates to the authority to hold people without charge not the qualitative character of their treatment**

**Tenth Amendment Center 2010**

<http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/legislation/liberty-preservation-act/#.Ukb7HWTEqjU>

This legislative package is a state and local-level response to constitutional violations by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (and other so-called federal “laws”) – primarily provisions that **authorize indefinite detention**. Activists, we encourage you to take action now. Work to get legislation passed in your city, town, county and state level today.¶ TRACK THE PROGRESS of the Liberty Preservation Act across the country here:¶ http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/nullification/ndaa/¶ \*\*\*\*\*\*\*¶ STATE: Model legislation for introduction on a state-level to reject indefinite detention.¶ LOCAL: Model Ordinance for introduction on a local level – city, county, town. You should start with whatever local government you feel you can have the most effect, then move on to the next. i.e. Start with city, then move on to County. From there, you’ll want to reach out to people in neighboring communities to encourage the same.¶ \*\*\*\*\*\*\*¶ Liberty Preservation Act¶ The people of the State of (STATE) do enact as follows:¶ SECTION 1. THIS ACT SHALL BE KNOWN AS THE (STATE) LIBERTY PRESERVATION ACT.¶ (A) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:¶ (1) The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution authorizes the United States federal government to exercise only those powers specifically delegated to it in the United States Constitution.¶ (2) The guarantee of the constitutional limitations on federal power is a matter of contract between the People of the several states, including the State of (STATE), and the federal government at the time the United States Constitution was ratified and subsequently amended by the Bill of Rights.¶ (3) Article VI of United States Constitution, by using the words “in pursuance thereof,” provides that the laws of the United States federal government are the supreme law of the land only if those laws are adopted in accordance with the powers delegated to the federal government in the United States Constitution.¶ (4) The President of the United States has asserted that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40), enacted in 2001, **authorizes the President to indefinitely detain**, **without charge, any per**son, including a citizen of the United States or a lawful resident alien, regardless of whether the person is apprehended inside or outside the borders of the United States.¶ (5) Language in Sections 1021 and 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2012 purports to permit **indefinite military detention without public trial, military tribunals and the transfer to foreign jurisdictions, of persons, including US citizens, captured on US soil**.¶ (6) Indefinite detention without trial, military tribunals, and the transfer of to foreign jurisdictions are inimical to the liberty, security, and well-being of the people of the state of (STATE) by violating all of the following, and more:

**Violation: The affirmative restricts the president’s authority over what happens to those that are indefinitely detained without restricting his authority to detain indefinitely.**

**C. Reasons to Prefer:**

**1. Explodes the topic allowing anything related to the topic areas**

**2. Ground – We lose links to disads and kritiks when the aff never accesses a decrease in authority.**

**3. Topic Education –we need to set a precedent for debating a legal topic, grounded in legal precision**

**D. T is a voter for competitive equity, education, and jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is more true on this topic than others because questions of legal authority beget questions of jurisdiction**

### Off 2

#### **Presidential power is that it is non-existant – politics acts as a distracting theater from the military-industrial complex acting behind the scenes – institutional action is hopeless – only an active citizenry can solve**

Bacevich 10 (Andrew – PhD in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University. Chair of International Relations; Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University “Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War” pg. 31-33) f

Pretending to the role of Decider, a president all too often becomes little more than the medium through which power is exercised. Especially on matters related to national security, others manufacture or manipulate situations to which presidents then react. Only in the most nominal sense did Harry Truman decide to bomb Hiroshima. By the summer of 1945 the momentum dictating that the atomic bomb should be used had become all but irresistible. Much the same can be said about John F. Kennedy's 1961 decision to launch the Bay of Pigs operation, Lyndon Johnson's 1965 decision to commit U.S. combat troops to Vietnam, or even George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In each case, the erstwhile commander in chief did little more than ratify a verdict that others had already rendered. Yet with rare exceptions, all presidents-even those held responsible for astonishing blunders-maintain the fiction of having remained fully in charge from start to finish. Thus do they sustain the cult of the modern presidency. Dwight D. Eisenhower's justly famous "Farewell Address" stands out as one of those rare exceptions.18 On the eve of leaving office-although not before-Eisenhower offered the American people a glimpse of powerful forces that lay behind and beyond presidential control. He honestly, accurately, and courageously (if belatedly) let his fellow citizens in on the secret that, in Washington, appearances were profoundly deceptive. In describing and decrying what he called the "military-industrial complex," Ike provided a sobering tutorial in political reality, disabusing Americans of civics book notions of a political apparatus purposefully committed to advancing some collective vision of the common good. What Americans mistook for politics-the putative rivalry that pitted Democrats against Republicans, the wrangling between Congress and the White House-actually amounted to little more than theater, he implied. Behind the curtain, a consensus forged of ambition, access, money, fevered imaginations, and narrow institutional interests determined the nation's actual pri0rities. Although Eisenhower was about to surrender his office to a handsome young successor who promised dramatic change-neither the first nor last president to make such a commitment-he knew that John Kennedy's personal qualities, however attractive, counted for little given the forces arrayed against him. "The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist," the outgoing president warned. "We should take nothing for granted." Eisenhower's unvarnished warning reflected his own appreciation of a troubling new reality. The nation's "immense military establishment" married to a "permanent armaments industry of vast proportions" wielded influenceeconomic, political, even spiritual"-that reached into "every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government." In effect, by 1961, semiwarriors-those who derived their power and influence by perpetuating an atmosphere of national security crisis-had gained de facto control of The U.S. government. Eisenhower chose not to acknowledge that he himself had served as their ally and enabler. Nor did he explain why he had waited until the eve of his return to private\_ Iife to expose the existence of this misplaced power. Still, given the source, Ike's admission was nothing less than revelatory: Initiatives undertaken to ensure national security had given rise to new institutions and habits deeply antithetical to traditional American values. These new forces had yielded unwelcome consequences that Eisenhower himself, whether as general or as president, had neither intended nor anticipated, threatening American democracy. To expect that Washington would remedy a problem that Washington itself had created was, as Eisenhower understood, a delusion. "Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry," he insisted, could keep semiwarriors on a sufficiently short leash "so that security and liberty may prosper together." The outgoing president urged ordinary Americans to wake up, pay attention, and reclaim their democracy

#### The president’s real ability lies in his symbolic economy – their application of widespread authority and power to the president invigorates him with that symbolic power.

Rubenstein 08 (Diane – Professor of Political Rhetoric and Science at Cornell University “This Is Not a President: Sense, Nonsense, and the American Political Imaginary” pp. 74-75)

-We might as well insert the "id" -a president without depth. The scandal that the trompe l'oeil poses for political and esthetic representation since the Renaissance is situated in its "unreal reversion" (S, 6o). The aim of the reconstructed Oval Office in both Disneyland and Washington is to supply a sign that will fool (trompe) the eye and abolish the distinction of reference. (Or, as in Bush's own words: "This isn't any signal. It's a direct statement. If it's a signal, fine.")5 In the history of the late-twentieth-century presidency, Bush marks a peculiar instance of the relation of reference to signification. While American presidents since Gerald Ford have been empty signifiers, rarely has there been such a Lacanian relation to language as the one that Bush daily enacts. Bushspeak may be the closest approximation outremer of the Lacanian unconscious: c;a parle: "It says what it knows while the subject does not know it. "6 With Bush, we have a presidential subject that cannot be understood as a signified (i.e., as objectively knowable). This is preparation for the· final turn of the screw: Quayle as Baudrillard's fatal strategy, where "the metamorphosis, tactics and strategies of the object exceed d>e subject's understanding."7 (Carter posed problems of a different psychoanalytical order. For he demonstrated the fissure between idea and affect. Carter always seemed to smile at the wrong time.) The end-of-the-millenni= presidency is a twin appeal to the "image repertoire" and the symbolic order. As image repertoire, it can be read as a litany of bad presidential performances: "LBJ abusing his dogs and exposing his belly; Nixon hunched and glistening like a concerned toad, Gerald Ford tripping over .... " Reagan, as a hyperreal president, could always satisfy our iconic interests: "Reagan was nice as Iago was honest because his image repertoire required it of him."8 Moreover, Reagan was always tangible as symbol if not as image. In the difference between image repertoire and the symbolic order we can first glimpse the subde passage from hyperreality to seduction. What sets Bush apart from Reagan is his intractable opacity. For Bush is a simulacra without perspective. He appears as a pure artifact (our "environmental" president, our "education" president) against a vertical backdrop. Bush replaces Reagan's tangibility with the "tactile vertigo of the afterimage." Richard Goldstein concurs: "now we're in the grip of something that no longer requires a spokesman. "9 This tactile vertigo recounts "the subject's insane desire to obliterate his own image and thereby vanish" (S. 62). Life becomes a "Jeff Koons tableau." Koons the artist and Bush the seducer know how to let the signs hang. Bush/Koons, suspended in ether. This Is Not a President I 7 5 Bush not only follows the hyperrealism of neo-geo/Reagan but recalls the surrealism of Ger.ald Ford. Both share the same knack for the tautology: "Things are more like they are now than they ever have been" (Ford) 10 ; "It's no exaggeration to say the undecideds could go one way or another" (Bush)." They juxtapose physical against linguistic slapstick: Ford trips; Bush slips linguistically. If Gerald Ford recalls the Jerry Lewis of the Lewis-Martin movies in which a subjective irony might still be possible, Bush is most reminiscent of the movies Lewis produced after his split with Martin.12 An internally dissociated subject emerges in the linguistic parapraxis as Bush stages his own disappearance. Pronouns flee, then verbs, in the vanishing act of his State of the Union address: "Ambitious aims? Of course! Easy to do? Far from it." 13 We are left with nothing but the irony of the object, which underscores the tie between Lacan's linguisterie ("linguistricks") and Bushspeak: "what might be called a man, the male speaking being strictly disappears as an effect of discourse by being inscribed within it solely as castration." 14 Ghosts that haunt the emptiness of the stage -Baudrillard (S, 6o) I'm going to be so much better a president for having been at the CIA that you are not going to believe it. -George H. W. Bush 15 What seduces us with Bush, as in the trompe l'oeil, is its missing dimension. And if Ronald Reagan was a hologram, Bush is, in Baudrillard's words, "a superficial abyss." Opposed to Reagan's televisual sarcasm ("How do I spell relief? V-E-T-0"), Bush is a visual non sequitur. Bush affords the same perspectual pleasure as that of the trompe l'oeil (as well as its secret undermining of language), even as he takes us back to our earliest lessons of political representation. Since Machiavelli, power has always-already been a simulation model, only an effect of perspective. Baudrillard recounts that at the heart of the ducal palaces of Urbina and Gubbio were tiny trompe l'oeil sanctuaries, inverted microcosms whose space was actualized by simulation. These sanctuaries (studio los) were blind spots in the palace and were placed at the heart of the prince's politico-architectural space. Through a subversive metonymy, they invite an allegorical reading: that the prince's power is only mastery of a simulated space. This is the prince's secret.16

#### This endless war causes structural violence, environmental destruction, and destroys deliberative democracy

Bacevich 10 (Andrew – PhD in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University. Chair of International Relations; Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University “Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War” pg. 223-226)

The world-we are incessantly told-is becoming ever smaller, more complex, and more dangerous. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the nation to intensify the efforts undertaken to "keep America safe," while also, of course, advancing the cause of world peace. Achieving these aims-it is said-requires the United States to funnel ever greater sums of money to the Pentagon to develop new means of projecting power, and to hold itself in readiness for new expeditions deemed essential to pacify (or liberate) some dark and troubled quarter of the globe. At one level, we can with little difficulty calculate the cost of these efforts: The untold billions of dollars added annually to the national debt and the mounting toll of dead and wounded U.S. troops provide one gauge. At a deeper level, the costs of adhering to the Washington consensus defy measurement: families shattered by loss; veterans bearing the physical or psychological scars of combat; the perpetuation of ponderous bureaucracies subsisting in a climate of secrecy, dissembling, and outright deception; the distortion of national priorities as the military-industrial complex siphons off scarce resources; environmental devastation produced as a by-product of war and the preparation for war; the evisceration of civic culture that results when a small praetorian guard shoulders the burden of waging perpetual war, while the great majority of citizens purport to revere its members, even as they ignore or profit from their service. Furthermore, there is no end in sight, even though the conditions that first gave rise to the Washington rules haw ceased to exist. U.S. allies in Western Europe and East Asia, weak and vulnerable in the immediate wake of World War II, are today stable, prosperous, and perfectly capable of defending themselves. The .totalitarian ideologies that challenged liberalism in the twenti~th century have definitively and irrevocably failed. Josef Stalin is long gone, as is the Soviet Empire. Red China has become simply China, valued by Americans as a bountiful source of credit and consumer goods. Although Communists still call the shots in Beijing, promoting exports ranks well above promoting Mao's teachings in the party's list of priorities. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, once thought to be the incubator of powerful revolutionary forces, the mullahs find \_themselves hardpressed just to maintain order in the streets. Washington's quasi-official enemies list now consists mostly of pygmies: North Korea, a nation unable to feed its own population; Syria, an Israeli punching bag; Venezuela, governed by a clown; and, for old times' sake, Cuba. The world has by no means entered an era of peace and harmony. Far from it. Yet the threats demanding attention today-terrorism, climate change, drug cartels, Third World underdevelopment and instability, perhaps above all the proliferation of genocidal weapons invented and first employed 5 by the West-bear scant resemblance to the threats that inspired Washington to devise its sacred trinity in the first place. The problem set has changed, while the solutions proffered by Washington remain largely the same. The conviction that the obligations of leadership require the United States to maintain a global military presence, configure its armed forces for power projection, and employ them to impose change abroad persists, forms the enduring leitmotif of U.S. national security policy. Washington clings to its credo and trinity not out of necessity, but out of parochial self-interest laced with inertia. Dwight D. Eisenhower for one would have been appalled. Early in his first term as president, Ike contemplated the awful predicament wrought by the Cold War during its first decade. "What can the world, or any nation in it, hope for," he asked, "if no turning is found on this dread road?" The president proceeded to answer his own question. The worst to be feared would be a ruinous nuclear war. The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The president illustrated his point with specifics: The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two finew, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This is, I repeat, the best way of life to be found on the road the world has b\_een taking. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.1 Eisenhower urged Soviet leaders to join ·him in lifting humankind from its iron gibbet. His speech had little practical effect. Perhaps inevitably, the Cold War and its associated arms race continued. Worth recalling, however, is this soldier-statesman's acute discomfort with the progressive militarization of U.S. policy.

#### Reject the aff: Embracing a strategy of dissent from militarism key to solve

Ivie 7 (Robert L. Ivie [Professor: University of Indiana, Ph.D., Washington State University, Rhetorical Critique of U.S. public culture; democracy; war propaganda; peace-building communication]], Published 2007 by Kumarian Press, “Dissent from War”, PRINT, note: scanned and run through OCR software, mjb)

Indeed, militarism has become the mindset of American empire—the mindset, Andrew Bacevich argues, that seduces Americans to support a state of warfare. America has adopted the outlook of a security state, of an empire projecting its power worldwide rather than republic defending itself from foreign attack. The American people in an age of empire have become persuaded that their “safety and salvation lies with the sword.” The citizen army has become a professional “imperial army.” America’s “global military supremacy” has become central to its “national identity.” International problems are seen first and foremost as “military problems,” and military means are believed to be the way to reshape the world consistent with American values and the nation’s self-professed utopian ends, which are perceived in turn as “universal truths.” The very aesthetic of war is changing from an image of ugly, wasteful, and degrading brutality to a new, twenty-first century sport. In Bacevich’s blunt and considered assessment, contemporary America has fallen prey to militarism—romanticizing soldiers, fostering nostalgia for military ideals, and adopting military power as the measure of national greatness—to a “degree without precedent in US history.” ¶ The attitude of militarism that is running rampant in America, Bacevich maintains, is unlikely to disappear anytime soon” because, even though it is unprecedented in its current intensity, it has deeps roots in the nation’s past and, consistent with Michael Sherry’s observation, has reshaped American politics, foreign policy, economics, social relations, and general culture over the past half-century so much that it permeates all domains of life. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 gave “added impetus to already exiting tendencies”; America became more itself rather than something different after 9/11, increasingly adopting a militaristic ethos with broad support and too little dissent from mainstream political leaders and the general public. The present-day “infatuation with military power” is a bipartisan project and the handiwork of multiple and disparate groups of opinion leaders. Moreover, it has developed over the last several decades “in full view and with considerable popular approval.” Thus, Bacevich argues, “society at large. . .[cannot] abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass,” and what has come to pass is systemic, broad-based, and deeply ingrained in political culture rather than simply the outcome of a particular presidential election, the fault of an individual president, or the scheming of a single set of presidential advisors. A late turning of public option in the fall elections of 2006 against a stymied occupation of Iraq, we might conclude, reflects impatience with a particular war, not a basic transformation of the war culture. ¶ The image of an imperial army fighting continuous wars of empire does not inspire confidence that an ingrained system of militarism can be changed, habits of war broken, the conscience of a nation restored, or a culture of peace established. Indeed, political theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri maintain that contemporary imperial warfare is perpetual because it functions to sustain the status-quo network of global power relations. War, they argue, is inevitable in a condition of “Empire” and constant as an instrument of rule.” It is the “general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination,” a “form of rule” for controlling populations and shaping “all aspects of social life,” Imperial war today regulates life in general and legitimizes itself in the process by propagandizing “the constant presence of an enemy and the threat of disorder.” The “presence of the enemy,” they note, “demonstrates the need for security.” The imagined presence of an enemy is crucial to the system and motive of war. ¶ Making evil enemies present by means of dehumanizing propaganda—propaganda that defies the US as it demonizes the nation’s adversaries—is a destructive ritual of redemption by vicarious sacrifice. It produces the heightened perception of a threat and intensified sense of national insecurity that motivates and excuses a call to arms. Evil, as in the image of an enemy evildoer, is the ultimate symbol of bedlam, babble, and disarray—the Biblical monster of chaos. In a condition of empire and imperial warfare, then, the routine rationalization for resorting to violence is to preserve global order against supposedly evil forces of disorder. This “abuse of evil”—this “discourse of good and evil [that] lacks nuance subtlety, and judicious discrimination”—Richard Bernstein insists is “extremely dangerous in a complex and precarious world” because it stifles thinking instead of promoting us to question and think. For this purpose, war rules. ¶ Yet, resisting the rule of war is possible, according to Hardt and Negri, despite the dominant mindset of militarism in a controlling paradigm of empire that bases politics on coercion and violence. Indeed, resisting war is “the most important task for resistance today.” They content it is reasonable to imagine, under emerging conditions of desire for democracy, peace, and justice, that a multitude of ordinary people might contest militarism through cooperation and communication—what Hardt and Negri call “singularities” acting in common with deference to their differences and without reduction to a “unity”—may well erode the order of Empire to achieve a “peaceful life in common.” The need for peace corresponds with the need for enriched democracy to overcome “the global state of war.” To be sure, “the only democracy that makes sense today is the one that poses peace as its highest value.” ¶ Consistent with Hardt And Negri and for the purpose of working toward a peacebuilding culture, democracy is usefully understood as a practice of collective self-rule constituted by matrices of individuals cooperating and communicating with one another at multiple points of intersection to produce fair and equitable social relations within and against a recalcitrant system of empire, a system of empire that relies on incessant violence and legitimizing images of evildoers to maintain a status-quo relations of global power. Democracy is expressed most directly, acutely, and cogently in collaborative acts of resistance to enemy-making discourses. Surely, as a guiding model for contesting the mindset of militarism, the vision of resisting dehumanizing propaganda by cultivating matrices of democratic dissent makes the prospect of building peace and inhibiting war more plausible over the long haul and less daunting in immediate circumstances. ¶ Understood as constructive democratic resistance, dissent evokes the more judicious and relatively sustainable expectation that acts of peacebuilding can be augmented collectively and habits of war attenuated over time. Dissent cultivates democratic relations and coordinated resistance from the ground up by producing, humanizing acts of identification, that is, acts of communication and coordination that articulate practical points of intersection without effacing the distinguishing identities, cultures, religions, or nationalities of cooperating parties. constructing intersecting points—points to be held in common by those who would oppose the war regime—is a bridging action rather than a fusing process. It is not an attempt to eliminate pluralism, diminish defining differences, or achieve a structured unity in which relative merit is determined for example, by how white or rich or Christian or Western or American a given category of people Is perceived to be. Thus, peacebuilding activism and dissent from war can be imagined as a sustained boundary-spanning project of decentralized and overlapping networks of democratic resistance to the habit of dehumanizing propaganda.

### Off 3

### Counter Plan

#### Text: The United States Congress should substantially increase statuatory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by requiring that people detained indefinitely be released.

#### Net Benefit: The counterplan recognizes the unknowability of the other through eschewing the possibility of the trial which only seeks to master and know the other. This creates the precondition for a new ethics as a precursor to socio-political change.

Nunes No Date. Nunes, Charlotte. *Rhetorical Ethics*. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Jan. 2014. <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Frhetoricalethics.pbworks.com%2Ff%2FButler-Bowen%252Bpaper.doc&ei=CubZUvLnEI7jsATJpIHgBg&usg=AFQjCNHtOZ5u0T>. Charlotte Nunes is a professor of English at the University of Texas Austin.

In Giving an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler evidences Derrida’s influence by establishing the tension between the conditional and the unconditional as a generative tension, the very site of ethics. Butler’s exploration of this tension manifests most saliently in her discussions of recognition and language. The unconditional state of full recognition of and by the other is checked by the practical condition of our “foreignness” (84) both to ourselves and to others; similarly, the will toward unconditional, consummate narration of the self is restricted by the limited, conditional scope of discourse. In Butler’s text, the relationship between the unconditional and the conditional reflects Derrida’s figuration of the poles as irreconcilable yet indissociable. Butler argues that due to our “fundamental sociality[,]… we cannot exist without addressing the other and without being addressed by the other”; yet “No matter how much we each desire recognition and require it, we are not therefore the same as the other” (33). Similarly, in regard to self-narration, “No one can live [a]… non-narratable life,” yet “articulations… have their necessary limits” (60). There is an implicit criticism here of the sovereign subject, which, to paraphrase Derrida, assumes and asserts its own legitimacy (Cosmopolitanism 58). Butler seeks “not the death of the [sovereign] subject, … but an inquiry into the modes by which the subject is instituted and maintained” (110); she concludes that it is our very exposedness to the other in all “our vulnerability and singularity” (31)—not, as more traditional philosophers such as Kant would have it, our self-contained sovereignty—that determines our “being” (39). We are constituted not by sufficiency, but by lack.¶ Just as “recognition” is, “in principle, unsatisfiable” (43) Butler argues that “any discourse, any regime of intelligibility, constitutes us at a cost. Our capacity to reflect upon ourselves, to tell the truth about ourselves, is correspondingly limited by what the discourse… cannot allow into speakability” (121). Yet it is exactly this “cost,” or lack, that emerges over the course of the treatise as the determinative benefit of the ethics Butler proposes. The impossibility of reconciling need and limitation in both cases of recognition and narration facilitates what Butler establishes as the ultimate “ethical resource—namely, an acceptance of the limits of knowability in oneself and others” (63). Here, she integrates the emphasis of Levinas, Derrida, and others on the vast potential for something approximating peace engendered by the recognition of the impossibility of knowing the other, and then posits the equally vital imperative that we recognize the limits of knowing ourselves. Both are necessary conditions of the “new sense of ethics” (42) for which she lays the groundwork, wherein the recognition we inherently impose upon and demand of others as social beings is “based less on knowledge than on an apprehension of epistemic limits” (43). To fully recognize and be recognized is impossible, but it is an impossibility towards which we are destined to strive in the interest of an ethical life. ¶ Butler eschews relying on a survey of historical contexts in order to demonstrate her principles, but she is unambiguous that “an ethics based on our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves” (41) is the necessary precursor to socio-political transformation (130). Elizabeth Bowen’s 1929 novel The Last September registers the transformative power of an ethics based on non-knowledge in the particular socio-political context of the Irish War of Independence, fought between 1919 and 1921. The novel follows the inhabitants and houseguests of an Anglo-Irish country estate as they face the imminent obsolescence of the Ascendancy. Although the war rages all around the estate—Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) barracks are attacked and burned (64), Irish-Catholic girls have their hair cut off publicly as punishment for “walking out” with British soldiers (84), and roads are rendered treacherous by armed Black and Tan convoys (107)—Sir and Lady Naylor continue to emphasize propriety, composure, and the maintenance of centuries-old social rituals (they are well-known for their “‘awfully nice parties’” [65]). Yet Bowen’s novel is less concerned with the conflict between the Irish and the Anglo-Irish than with fissures within the Anglo-Irish community itself. There emerges over the course of the narrative a disconnect between the elders of the Ascendancy, who cling to palliative conventions rooted in self-knowledge and sovereignty, and the rising generation, which faces an utterly uncertain future and correspondent uncertainties in terms of both self and collective identity. ¶ Artfully reflecting Butler’s assertion of individuals’ “fundamental sociality” (33), Bowen depicts the inhabitants of the estate as perpetually eavesdropping, or inadvertently overhearing the conversations of others. Early in the novel, Lois, the 19-year-old niece of the Naylors and the central protagonist of the novel, is horrified to overhear her aunt’s friend discussing Lois’s nature: “when Mrs. Montmorency came to: ‘Lois is very—’ she was afraid suddenly. She had a panic. She didn’t want to know what she was, she couldn’t bear it: knowledge of this would stop, seal, finish one” (83). Here, Bowen demonstrates Butler’s positioning of “narrative coherence”—which the Naylors and their peers pride themselves on maintaining at all times in order to demonstrate confident self-knowledge—as “foreclos[ing]” the generative potential of un-knowability as an “ethical resource” (63). When Lois approaches her aunt, who is trimming lamp wicks, to announce her engagement to a young R.I.C. soldier named Gerald, Lady Naylor promptly replies, “‘You have no conception of love—You are in my light’” (245). Dismayed, Lois is awed by her aunt’s ability to “bring the matter on to an intellectual plane at once” (245). She, for her part, is inept when it comes to the precision of language by which her aunt identifies herself. Gerald is not much better, rarely managing to articulate a complete sentence (Lady Naylor is not incorrect in her tart observation that “‘At the best of times he has not much conversation’” [246]). The verbal exchanges between Lois and Gerald are generally choppy, consisting more in fragments, dashes, and ellipses than in coherent expressions of thought; yet their narrative incoherence is key to the charting of new ethical territory necessitated by the impending extinction of the social context in which they grew up. Just as Lois continues, over the course of the novel, to wonder “what [she] [i]s” while simultaneously acknowledging the fact that “She would never know” (83), Lois and Gerald continue to narrate themselves to each other despite understanding that their attempts can never be sufficiently expressive to facilitate full recognition. In doing so, they enact an ethics based on epistemic limits that, unlike the ethics of their forebears, has the potential to buoy them in a post-Independence, post-Ascendancy future.

### Off 4

#### The focus on bare life and the theoretical apparatus of sovereignty risks impoverishing our conceptual framework and vocabulary for analyzing complex systems of power which produce statelessness. Even if you agree the magnitude of the aff impact claims, they should be rejected because their reductionist explanation only reifies the power of sovereignty and prevents effective resistance against biopower

Butler and Spivak, 2010. (Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, *Who Sings the Nation-State?* Page 38-43)

¶ It may be the case that one crucial and¶ central operation of sovereign power is the¶ capacity to suspend the rights of individuals or groups or to cast them out of a polity.¶ 'When cast out, one is cast out into a space¶ or a condition of bare life, and the bios of¶ the person is no longer linked to its political¶ status. By "political" here is meant¶ membership in the ranks of citizenship.¶ But does this move not precisely place an¶ unacceptable juridical restriction on the¶ political? After all, if to be "bare life" is to¶ be exposed to power, then power is still on¶ the outside of that life, however brutally it¶ imposes itself, and life is metaphysically¶ still secured from the domain of the political.¶ We can argue that the very problem is¶ that life has become separated from the¶ political (i.e. conditions of citizenship), but¶ that formulation presumes that politics and¶ life join only and always on the question of¶ citizenship and, so, restricts the entire¶ domain of bio-power in which questions of¶ life and death are determined by other¶ means. But the most important point here¶ is that we understand the jettisoned life,¶ the one both expelled and contained, as¶ saturated with power precisely at the moment¶ in which it is deprived of citizenship.¶ To describe this doubled sense of the "state"¶ through recourse to a notion of "power"¶ that includes and exceeds the matter of the¶ rights of citizens, and to see how state¶ power instrumentalizes the criteria of citizenship¶ to produce and paralyze a population¶ in its dispossession. This can happen¶ through complex modes of govermnentality¶ in ways that are not easily reducible to sovereign¶ acts, and they can happen through¶ modes of instrumentality that are not¶ necessarily initiated or sustained by a sovereign¶ subject. Of course, it is counterintuitive,¶ even exhilarating, to show how¶ sovereignty insists itself in the midst of¶ constitutionalism and at its expense, but it¶ would surely be a mistake if this important¶ way of tracing contemporary power ended¶ up romancing the subject once again. It is¶ one thing to trace the logic of how constitutionalism¶ secures the rights of the sovereign¶ to suspend constitutional protections,¶ but it is quite another to install this logic as¶ the exclusive way in which to apprehend the¶ workings of contemporary power. If our¶ attention is captured by the lure of the¶ arbitrary decisionism of the sovereign, then¶ we risk inscribing that logic as necessary¶ and forgetting what prompted this inquiry¶ to begin with: the massive problem of statelessness¶ and the demand to find postnational¶ forms of political opposition that¶ might begin to address the problem with¶ some efficacy.¶ The focus on the theoretical apparatus¶ of sovereignty risks impoverishing our conceptual¶ framework and vocabulary so that¶ we become unable to take on the representational¶ challenge of saying what life is like¶ for the deported, what life is like for those¶ who fear deportation, who are deported,¶ what life is like for those who live as gastarbeiiers¶ in Germany, what life is like for¶ Palestinians who are living under occupation.¶ These are not undifferentiated¶ instances of "bare life" but highly juridified¶ states of dispossession. We need more complex¶ ways of understanding the multivalence¶ and tactics of power to understand¶ forms of resistance, agency, and countermobilization¶ that elude or stall state power.¶ I think we must describe destitution and,¶ indeed, we ought to, but if the language by¶ which we describe that destitution presumes,¶ time and again, that the key terms¶ are sovereignty and bare life, we deprive¶ ourselves of the lexicon we need to understand¶ the other networks of power to which¶ it belongs, or how power is recast in that¶ place or even saturated in that place. It¶ seems to me that we've actually subscribed¶ to a heuristic that only lets us make the¶ same description time and again, which¶ ends up taking on the perspective of sovereignty¶ and reiterating its terms and,¶ frankly, I think nothing could be worse.

#### The alternative is to neither be pro-sovereign or anti-sovereign but to analyze the CONTINGENT ways in which sovereignty is evoked, extended, and de-territorialized. Rejection of the aff’s universalism is the only way towards an accurate map of the complex power matrix responsible for the 1AC harms

Butler and Spivak, 2010. (Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, *Who Sings the Nation-State?* Page 102-105)

BUTLER. I think one perhaps needs to slow¶ down since I'm not sure anybody wants to¶ be post-sovereign. The one thing that I had¶ to say about sovereignty is that I think it¶ would be a mistake to take the Schmittian¶ strain in Agamben as the exclusive lens¶ through which one understands the operation¶ of power. I'm trying to open up an¶ analytics of power that would include sovereignty¶ as one of its features but would¶ also be able to talk about the kinds of¶ mobilizations and contaimnents of populations¶ that are not conceptualizable as the¶ acts of a sovereign, and which proceed¶ through different operations of state power.¶ But we could talk about many other analytics¶ as well. Interestingly enough, Arendt¶ says that the exemplary moment of sovereignty¶ is the act of deportation. This is very important¶ for us to think about now, given how¶ sovereign power in the US works. Let's¶ remember as well that Bush is, to a certain¶ degree, post-sovereign. In the sense that¶ when the argument was presented that¶ Iraq, whatever its problems, is a sovereign¶ state and on what basis could the US¶ invade it, it was very clear that whatever¶ sovereignty they might have had was illegitimate¶ by virtue of the fact that Bush did¶ not regard that particular government as¶ democratically elected or, even if it were, it¶ was not necessarily legitimate because of its¶ despotic or tyrannical actions. And, of¶ course, that's complicated; the moment this¶ state decides it can invade that one, it exercises¶ a sovereignty that is extra-territorial.¶ So, in our new analytics of power, we are¶ going to have to rethink territoriality and¶ sovereignty alike. Asserting its sovereignty¶ in order to override *that* sovereignty. Then¶ Guantanamo and apparently various detention¶ centers throughout Europe and¶ Central Asia-the notion of a certain kind¶ of outsourcing of interrogation, imprisonment,¶ torture-which, I think, have to be¶ understood as an exercise of sovereignty¶ outside of the territorial bounds of the US¶ precisely in order to evade the restrictions¶ of habeas corpus but, also, to extend the¶ operation of sovereignty so that it becomes¶ synonymous with Empire. It seems to me¶ that we are seeing new exercises of sovereignty¶ as well as the illegitimacy of the¶ sovereign character of other states as having¶ any kind of final check on US state¶ power. I don't think that the International¶ Criminal Court has criminalized sovereignty¶ but it is true that it wants to develop a¶ set of international protections that are not¶ formulated on the basis of nation-states,¶ which is what the Geneva Treaty did. So,¶ part of its promise is to come up with a¶ postnational understanding of what human¶ rights might be. That does not keep that¶ particular mechanism from being taken¶ over by certain states, being run by certain¶ hegemonic interests selectively deciding¶ which kinds of criminal acts it will pursue¶ and which it will not and using all kinds of¶ national and, I would also say, neoliberal criteria¶ in the selection process. Therefore, the¶ point is to be neither pro-sovereign nor to¶ be anti-sovereign but to watch the ways in¶ which sovereignty is invoked, extended,¶ deterritorialized, aggregated, abrogated in¶ the name of sovereignty as well as against¶ the name of sovereignty. A whole map seems¶ to be emerging that's quite important.

### Case

#### The social construction of masculinity and femininity are the root cause of modern militarism—not confronting this link reifies this connection and stabilizes gendered hierarchies and turns securitization

Scales 13 (Ann Scales, Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 20.1, “Soft on Defense: The Failure to Confront Militarism”,<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1244&context=bglj>, DA: 10 November 2013, mjb)

I hope that I have demonstrated the influence of militarism, at least in my own line of work. I'm sure that readers can come up with other manifestations of militarism in the law school curriculum. It may be useful to speculate about why we don't make more of it, especially in the examination of the intersection of women and war. I think there are at least four interrelated reasons.¶ First, I remain convinced that militarism is gendered to the ground. As I reported in my first article on this topic in 1989, at least one Marine believes that "[wlhen you get right down to it, you've got to protect the manliness of war." 103 I hope it goes without saying that, in agreeing with that statement, I am not male- bashing. I do not believe that males are warlike and females are peaceful. I do believe, however, that the social construction of masculinity and femininity are the underpinnings of a symbiotic system of socially sanctioned aggression that makes anyone able to tolerate war as an answer to any problem. I am surely not the only person who believes so, and am glad to see more scholarship being devoted to the connections between gender and war. If we're not confronting that connection, we're feeding the beast.¶ I suspect I'm not the only person who was made both anxious and depressed by the contours of the 2004 Presidential contest. Senator Kerry and President Bush went on a masculinity bender, letting the campaign be a giant arm wrestle about who would be the manliest commander-in-chief.104 The President's posture was expressly about the masculine virtues of aggression, instinctively certain volition, and control (as opposed to peacemaking, deliberation, and accommodation). Think of the President's dramatic appearance on May 1, 2003 aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. Mr. Bush arrived in the co- pilot's seat of a Navy fighter jet after making two fly-bys of the carrier. The President emerged wearing a "Top Gun" suit. Later he stood in front of a (mysteriously placed) "Mission Accomplished" banner and proclaimed that major combat operations in Iraq were over.105 I cannot imagine witnessing this performance and thinking anything other than, "what a man" or a less¶ opprobrious equivalent.¶ Senator Kerry, other than showcasing his own military service as a primary¶ qualification for office, was less blatantly masculine. He relied, however, on courage, sacrifice, principled action, and transcendence - what are historically understood in U.S. political discourse as manly virtues, 1°6 if not always or only understood in opposition to feminine virtues. 10 7¶ Legal institutions in the United States have not quite gotten a grip on the problem of gendered violence. In the cases of the Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel, for example, the problem is less the lack of female entry to gendered institutions, but the gendered nature of the institutions themselves. Thus, I believe our friend Justice Ginsburg's opinion in UnitedStates v. Virginia108 quite missed the point. Our girls with shaved heads shouldn't have been admitted to the institutions; the institutions should have been shut down. Professor Valerie Vojdik, a participant in the March 2004 conference and counsel for Shannon Faulkner in the Citadel case,t°9 has as much insight as anyone about the self- defeating nature of winning the military school cases.110¶ It is still academically unpopular to talk about gender qua gender in any context. I hope this fashion is passing, because it is extraordinarily difficult to talk about militarism without taking all the institutions of gender into account. That is, while we academics are busy problematizing and de-stabilizing gender (at least in our own minds), militarism-above all other institutions in my estimation-is busy reinforcing gender, in its worst non-fluid forms. Militarism is the most powerful essentializing force in the world."'¶ Second, on a deeper level, I believe this is a struggle among feminists for a reliable concept of autonomy. Particularly in the United States, if one wants to have political persuasive power, one has to adhere to the concept of realpolitik. One has to conform with what is called "realism" at least in external expression; even better if one believes it. One must allow that the rule of law doesn't really apply when it comes to matters of national security, which really means a wink¶ and nod to global capitalism and the global arms trade. One must embrace the militaristic mandate to promote the objectification of the enemy, so we feel okay about killing them. It is the same seduction of realpolitik that underlies most efforts-feminist and otherwise-to oppose prostitution and pornography. A lot of people seem really to believe that war, the poor, and the systematic consumption of women are simply "always with us." I cannot believe in that view or let it disempower me. When we fall for that version of self, for that version of authority, we are grasped in the falsely-patriotic talons of a depressing post-Cartesian axiom: "I objectify, therefore I am."¶

#### And bare life is inevitable – they don’t change the way our society is constructed

#### The plan buys off critiques of state and authority—turns the case

Brown 2006 (Wendy, Professor of Political Theory at Berkeley, *Regulating Aversion*, p. 102)

On one level this is obvious enough and old news: throughout modernity, raison d’état, especially in the international sphere, has always enjoyed modest independence of liberal institutions and values, an independence justified within liberalism by the state’s security function rather than its equality function. However, particularly as a globalized economy and transnational social and political forces erode state sovereignty and the efficacy of state action in the international sphere, thereby attenuating the state’s capacity to fulfill its security function, state legitimacy depends on a sustained identification of the state with liberal principles of equality and liberty; it depends as well on the capacity of the state to maintain an unrestive citizenry, one that does not turn against itself or turn against the state. Tolerance talk is, among other things, a vehicle for producing this quietude, passivity, even submission. Tolerance calls out a docile, individuated, deactivated citizenry in the context of a volatile multicultural order striated with potent transnational alliances—Afghan, Islamic, Jewish, Iraqi, Arab. Tolerance, combined with the post-9/11 injunction to “shop, spend, buy” to boost a war economy, figured a somnambulant population— unified by the culture of commerce—that stood in sharp contrast to the vigilant, violent, and divisive posture of the state and in sharp contrast as well to the potential mobilization of sub- and transnational identity among the citizenry that such a crisis could engender.

#### Your focus on guantamano this distracts activist energy from more generalized critique

Johns 2005 (Fleur, Lecturer at the University of Sydney. “Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of Exception”)

In arguing against Agamben and others that the experience of the exception anticipated by Schmitt is in retreat at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, it is important to¶ acknowledge the extent to which the legal order of Guantánamo Bay often looks and¶ sounds like a domain operating as one of ‘pure’ sovereign discretion and thus exceptionalism. Lawyers for the US Justice Department have asserted that the US President has unlimited discretion to determine the appropriate means for interrogating¶ enemy combatants detained at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere.97 Likewise, counsel¶ for the US Government contended, before the US Supreme Court, that ‘[a] commander’s¶ wartime determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief¶ authority’.98¶ By assuming the affect of exceptionalism, the normative order of Guantánamo Bay¶ has soaked up critical energies with considerable effectiveness, for it is the exception¶ that rings liberal alarm bells. Accordingly, the focus falls on less than 600 persons¶ being abused in Cuba, rather than upon the millions subjected to endemic sexual,¶ physical and substance abuse in prisons across the democratic world. In a similar¶ way, attention is captured by the violation of rights of asylum-seekers, rather than by¶ the over-representation of immigrants in the most informal and vulnerable sectors of¶ the contemporary economy.99¶ For detention decisions taken at Guantánamo Bay to correspond to Schmitt’s understanding of the exception, however, ‘[t]he precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be unlimited’. ‘From the liberal¶ constitutional point if view’, Schmitt wrote, ‘there would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate who can act¶ in such a case.’100 Yet in respect of Guantánamo Bay, both the content and competence of¶ the US executive is repeatedly cast as pre-codified in presidential and governmental¶ statements. At times, the ‘code’ is said to be that of ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ or ‘justice’.101 At other times, it is that of God.102 On still further occasions, constitutional norms are¶ invoked to frame a decision.103 The acts of the would-be sovereign, in each case, are¶ characterized by repeated references to some higher source of competence and direction, overt deference to a pre-determined programme in the course of implementation,¶ and insistence upon the conduit or vessel-like status of executive authority.

#### The 1AC performs a mediated distance from torture, offloading the experience of torture to institutions in a cathartic move that creates comfort by displacing personal responsibility with facile institutional action. Moreover by foregrounding actions taken on foreign Others and not emphasizing civic responsibility the 1AC acts like a distanced “tour” through the contemporary history of American violence

Sturken 2011 (Marita, Professor of Media at NYU, “Comfort, irony, and trivialization: the mediation of torture” in *International Journal of Cultural Studies*)

On June 10, 2004, when asked if torture was justified, President George W. Bush ¶ answered, ‘We’re a nation of law. We adhere to laws. We have laws on the books. You ¶ might look at these laws, and that might provide comfort to you’ (Mayer, 2007: 182). Of ¶ the many things one could say about Bush’s words, including noting the fact that his ¶ administration had in fact condoned the torture of many prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison ¶ in Iraq, at the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and at other undisclosed secret prisons, ¶ the word ‘comfort’ demands attention. The trope of comfort, and its invocation as a ¶ mode, aesthetic, and style, has been a key factor in enabling the project of American ¶ Empire, in particular in the years since 9/11 and in the aims of the so-called global ‘war on terror’. The culture of comfort in the United States permeates political discourse, ¶ social imperatives, and consumerism. It is a primary mechanism through which the ¶ project of U.S. imperialism is made palatable to the American public. It is also a primary ¶ mode through which the U.S. practice of torture is mediated. ¶ In this article, I address the interrelationship of torture and comfort as a key feature ¶ of the United States project of American Empire. My focus is on how the U.S. practice of ¶ torture is mediated in American culture, in particular through the distancing strategies of ¶ domestication, trivialization, kitschification, and irony. I use as a framing concept Roger ¶ Silverstone’s notion of ‘proper distance’, in particular its formulation of the relationship ¶ of mediation to morality. Torture is a practice that actively and violently others its ¶ victims in its aim to destroy subjectivity, that demands a moral response. Silverstone’s ¶ concept of proper distance is a key framework through which the relationship of media ¶ and morality can be understood, one that provides a framework for understanding the ¶ tensions of proximity and distance that define mediation. My central aim is to understand ¶ the mechanisms by which torture is both sanctioned and disavowed in American culture, ¶ how it functions as a shadow to U.S. concepts of liberal democracy that must deny its ¶ existence, and how the U.S. practice of torture is mediated in order to be accepted in ¶ American culture. Silverstone’s concept of proper distance offers a challenge to engage ¶ with the question of mediation not simply as an exercise in how meanings change and ¶ disavowal works, but to ask moral questions that strike at the core of how mediation can ¶ both uphold regimes of power and resist them. ¶ I am particularly interested in how a mediation of torture is enabled through modes of ¶ innocence and comfort culture, modes that are hugely powerful in American culture. ¶ American comfort culture is undergirded by the concept of American innocence and a ¶ culture of defense. Comfort as a mode to be consumed and a style is a key factor in ¶ the disavowal in American society about the nation’s current fragile state of being – ¶ disavowal about the actual threat Americans live within, economically and politically, ¶ and the role U.S. policies and political modes have played in making that threat worse, ¶ about the state of insecurity as the norm; and disavowal about the brutal impact of U.S. ¶ actions and policies on its own citizens and those of the world. Comfort culture is a ¶ mechanism of distancing. That is, it functions primarily to create experiences of proximity while offering comfortable modes of distancing.¶ This interrelationship of proximity, distance, and mediation is directly related to the ¶ question of how nations, and the mediating forms that affirm them, construct our relationship to the other. Silverstone argues for a definition of proper distance that:¶ refers to the importance of understanding the more or less precise degree of proximity ¶ required in our mediated interrelationships if we are to create and sustain a sense of the other ¶ sufficient not just for reciprocity but for a duty of care, obligation and responsibility, as well ¶ as understanding. (2007: 47)¶ That is, he argues for an epistemological and ontological commitment to understanding ¶ a relationship to the other. The carefulness with which this formulation defines a potential and idealized mediated relationship to the other is crucial. It may seem perhaps ¶ ironic that such a formulation offers a point of departure to understanding how the practice of torture is mediated, given that we can understand torture as proper distance’s opposite. Yet, as I will explore further, this complication of the concept of distance ¶ is key to understanding that process of mediation. There are enabling and disabling ¶ forms of distance; unpacking them can help us to see how mediation works, how these ¶ are not only processes of denial and disavowal but also processes through which relationships are affirmed and constructed. ¶ I see the mediation of torture in U.S. culture in relation to what I have called the ¶ ‘tourism of history’ that has characterized American culture throughout most of its ¶ history, and in particular in the past few decades (Sturken, 2007). By using the term ¶ ‘tourism of history’ I am pointing to the mediating forms through which the American ¶ public is encouraged to experience itself and the nation’s relationship to global politics ¶ and world history through consumerism, media images, souvenirs, popular culture, and ¶ museum and architectural reenactments, modes that have as their goal a cathartic yet ¶ distanced ‘experience’ of history. The tourist is a figure who stands outside of any particular location or history, who peers in while feeling no responsibility for the economic, ¶ cultural, and historical impact of tourist activity. It is a distanced relationship that offers ¶ a sense of closeness and proximity as part of its veneer. ¶ U.S. culture is fundamentally structured in ways that encourage a tourist relationship ¶ to history, one that allows Americans to feel distanced from global politics and world ¶ events, and to see our role in them as separate and exceptional. This tourist relationship ¶ disavows the impact of our often destructive and brutal policies, and maintains an ¶ innocence about them. The tourism of history, whether it is manifested in the consumerism ¶ of defensive design, in museum reenactments of traumatic events, in the kitschification ¶ of grief via 9/11 teddy bears, in the superficial and biased news media coverage of world ¶ politics created by the context of 24-hour news cycles, or in the trivialization of torture ¶ as a practice of the U.S. government, provides the means for consumer-citizens to feel ¶ ‘authentically’ close to traumatic events while also feeling innocent and detached.¶ The tourism of history that frames American culture allows the U.S. imperial project ¶ to be disavowed because it provides an image of the U.S. as an exceptional nation. This ¶ kind of imperialism must deny itself; it needs to be shadowed by a culture of comfort ¶ and innocence in order to be fully palatable to the American public (Campbell, 1998: 3). ¶ Comfort culture sells the idea of emotional connection. At its most extreme, it embodies ¶ many forms of kitsch. Yet, it effectively produces not a relation of proximity but one ¶ of distance, one aided and mediated by consumerism, media tropes, and narratives of ¶ popular culture.