### Case

#### Their first argument in the 1AC is that “black students are trained to debate a certain style, make a particular ‘brand’ of argument, and engage in a melodramatic reading of the idealized black subject, the model minority, the ‘project’,” whereas their use of hip hop is a unique methodological approach. This argument is wrong for several reasons:

1. **Black students are not all trained by the same people**
2. **Debaters often write their own arguments – debaters are not coached or trained to make all arguments that are made in rounds.**
3. **Many debaters already incorporate hip hop – which they claim is unique to their aff**
4. **Black students do not all debate using the same style – they overlook notable stylistic differences between black teams**
5. **Since black students are not actually branded to one particular argument style, the affirmative should lose for perpetuating the myth that “all black teams are repeating the same arguments” because it turns their train tracks arg**

#### TURN—ELITE DISMISSAL—they denigrate the importance of the work that other black debaters are doing to raise awareness to white oppression in the debate community. The politics of their 1AC explicitly excludes readings of the “idealized black subject, the model minority, and the project.” Their elite, urban movement excludes the masses and reifies systems that sustain white privilege

Fanon 1963. (Frantz, psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary, and writer. *Wretched of the Earth*. Translation by Richard Philcox / 2004 Edition. Page 74-76)

Once the crucial phase of the liberation struggle begins to take¶ shape, a group of indigenous union leaders decides to create a¶ national labor movement. The locals desert en masse the previous¶ organization imported from the metropolis. The formation¶ of this union is another way for the urban population to exert¶ pressure on the colonial authorities. We have already said that¶ the proletariat in the colonies is embryonic and represents the¶ most privileged fraction of the population. The national labor¶ unions born out of the liberation struggle are urban organizations¶ and their program is above all political and nationalist. But¶ this national union born during the decisive phase of the fight¶ for independence is in fact the legal enlistment of dynamic,¶ politically conscious nationalist elements.¶ The rural masses, despised by the political parties, continue¶ to be kept on the sidelines. There is, of course, an agricultural¶ workers' union but such a formation is content to satisfy the formal¶ need for "a united front against colonialism." The union¶ leaders who began their careers in the context of the metropolitan¶ unions are at a loss when it comes to organizing the rural¶ masses. They have lost touch with the peasantry and are mainly¶ concerned with enlisting steelworkers, dockers and civil servants¶ in the utilities sector, etc.¶ During the colonial phase the nationalist labor unions represent¶ a spectacular strike force. In the towns these unions can paralyze¶ or at least disrupt at any moment the colonialist economy.¶ Since the European settlements are mostly confined to the towns,¶ the psychological repercussions are considerable: no gas, no electricity,¶ no garbage pickup, and produce lies rotting on the wharfs.¶ These metropolitan enclaves, which the towns represent in the¶ colonial context, are profoundly affected by this labor unrest. The¶ stronghold of colonialism, the capital, has difficulty withstanding¶ such a battering. But the rural masses of the interior remain¶ unaffected by this confrontation.¶ There is, therefore, a clear disproportion from the national¶ point of view between the importance of the labor unions and¶ the rest of the nation. After independence the workers enlisted¶ in the unions have the impression of running on empty. Once¶ the limited objectives they set themselves have been achieved,¶ they prove to be extremely precarious given the huge task of¶ nation building. Faced with a national bourgeoisie whose relations¶ with the government are often very close, the union¶ leaders discover they can no longer confine themselves to labor¶ disputes. Congenitally isolated from the rural masses, **incapable¶ of extending their influence beyond the urban periphery, the¶ unions adopt an increasingly political stance**. In fact they become¶ political candidates. They endeavor by every means possible¶ to drive the bourgeoisie into a corner: protests are made¶ against keeping foreign bases on national soil, commercial deals¶ are exposed, and criticism is voiced against the national government's¶ foreign policy. The workers, now "independent," are¶ getting nowhere. The unions realize in the aftermath of independence that if their social demands were to be expressed they¶ would scandalize the rest of the nation. The workers are in fact¶ pampered by the regime. They represent the most well-to-do¶ fraction of the people. Any unrest aimed at winning improved¶ living standards for the laborers and dock workers would not¶ only be unpopular but might very well stir up the hostility of¶ the disinherited rural population. The unions, banned from¶ union activities, make no headway.¶ This malaise conveys the objective need for a social program¶ which, at long last, concerns the entire nation. The unions suddenly¶ discover that the interior must also be enlightened and¶ organized. **But since they never bothered to establish working¶ links** between their organization and the peasantry, who represent¶ the only spontaneously revolutionary force in the country,¶ the unions prove to be ineffective and realize the anachronistic¶ nature of their program.¶ The union leaders, immersed in worker-control politics, inevitably¶ reach the preparatory stage for a coup d'etat. But here again¶ the interior is excluded. It is a showdown restricted to the national¶ bourgeoisie and the unionized workers movement. The national¶ bourgeoisie, appropriating the old traditions of colonialism, flexes·¶ its military and police muscle, whereas the unions organize¶ meetings and mobilize tens of thousands of their members. The¶ peasants shrug their shoulders as they muse over this national¶ bourgeoisie and these workers who after all have enough to eat.¶ The peasants shrug their shoulders for they realize that **both parties treat them as a makeshift force**. The unions, the parties and¶ the government, in a kind of immoral Machiavellianism, use the¶ peasant masses as a blind, inert force of intervention. As a kin¶ of brute force.

#### Turn—oversimplification--“Look, a White,” oversimplifies racial oppression and black-white race relations. While whiteness is perpetuated by white bodies, it can also be perpetuated vigorously by non-white bodies. The affs oversimplification papers over the nuances that allows whiteness to adapt and manifest in new ways

Fanon 1963. (Frantz, psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary, and writer. *Wretched of the Earth*. Translation by Richard Philcox / 2004 Edition. Page 92-94)

All this clarification, this subsequent raising of awareness and¶ the advances along the road to understanding the history of societies¶ can only be achieved if the people are organized and¶ guided. This organization is established by the revolutionary¶ elements arriving from the towns at the beginning of the insurrection¶ and those who make their way to the interior as the¶ struggle intensifies. It is this core which constitutes the embryonic¶ political body of the insurrection. As for the peasants, they¶ improve their knowledge through practical experience and prove¶ apt to lead the people's struggle. A wave of awareness and mutual¶ enrichment flows between the nation on a war footing, and¶ its leaders. Traditional institutions are reinforced, expanded and¶ sometimes literally transformed. The tribunal for local conflicts,¶ the djemaas, and the village assemblies are transformed into¶ revolutionary tribunals and politico-military committees. In every¶ combat unit and in every village, legions of political commissioners¶ are at work enlightening the people on issues which have¶ become stumbling blocks of incomprehension. If it were not for¶ these commissioners, who are not afraid to address certain issues,¶ the people would find themselves disoriented. For example, the¶ militant in arms often becomes irritated at the sight of much of¶ the local population going about their business in the towns as¶ if they were oblivious to what is going on in the mountains, as if¶ they did not know that the crucial operations have begun. The¶ silence of the towns and the continuation of the daily routine¶ give the peasant the bitter impression that an entire sector of the¶ nation is content to sit back and watch. Such observations disgust¶ the peasants and reinforce their tendency to despise and¶ generally condemn the townsfolk. The task of the political commissioner¶ is to nuance their position and make them aware that¶ certain segments of the population have their own specific interests¶ which do not always coincide with the national interest.¶ The people then realize that national independence brings to¶ light multiple realities which in some cases are divergent and¶ conflicting. At this exact moment in the struggle clarification is¶ crucial as it leads the people to replace an overall undifferentiated¶ nationalism with a social and economic consciousness. The¶ people who in the early days of the struggle had adopted the¶ primitive Manichaeanism of the colonizer-Black versus White,¶ Arab versus Infidel-realize en route that some blacks can be¶ whiter than the whites, and that the prospect of a national flag¶ or independence does not automatically result in certain segments¶ of the population giving up their privileges and their interests.¶ The people realize that there are indigenous elements¶ in their midst who, far from being at loose ends, seem to take¶ advantage of the war to better their material situation and reinforce¶ their burgeoning power. These profiteering elements realize¶ considerable gains from the war at the expense of the people¶ who, as always, are prepared to sacrifice everything and soak¶ the national soil with their blood. The militant who confronts¶ the colonialist war machine with his rudimentary resources realizes¶ that while he is demolishing colonial oppression he is¶ indirectly building another system of exploitation. Such a discovery¶ is galling, painful, and sickening. It was once all so simple¶ with the bad on one side and the good on the other. The idyllic,¶ unreal clarity of the early days is replaced by a penumbra which¶ dislocates the consciousness. The people discover that the iniquitous¶ phenomenon of exploitation can assume a black or Arab¶ face. They cry treason, but in fact the treason is not national but¶ social, and they need to be taught to cry thief. On their arduous¶ path to rationality the people must also learn to give up their¶ simplistic perception of the oppressor. The species is splitting¶ up before their very eyes. They realize that certain colonists do¶ not succumb to the ambient climate of criminal hysteria and¶ remain apart from the rest of their species. Such men, who were¶ automatically relegated to the monolithic bloc of the foreign¶ presence, condemn the colonial war. The scandal really erupts¶ when pioneers of the species change sides, go "native," and volunteer to undergo suffering, torture, and death.

#### Aff fails—SPECIFICITY--Their 1AC claims that “white supremacy fuels white nation building that always subjugates the black body.” Here they recognize that colonialism is not just an attitude but a political and military process. Yet their approach is “critique and recognition of white privilege,” which does nothing to address the materialization of this racial subjugation. Without a specification of means and tactics, a politics of recognition can never be transgressive

Fanon 1963. (Frantz, psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary, and writer. *Wretched of the Earth*. Translation by Richard Philcox / 2004 Edition. Page 21-22)

We have seen that this violence throughout the colonial period,¶ although constantly on edge, runs on empty. We have seen it¶ channeled through the emotional release of dance or possession.¶ We have seen it exhaust itself in fratricidal struggles. The challenge¶ now is to seize this violence as it realigns itself. Whereas it¶ once reveled in myths and contrived ways to commit collective¶ suicide, a fresh set of circumstances will now enable it to change¶ directions.¶ From the point of view of political tactics and History, the liberation¶ of the colonies poses a theoretical problem of crucial¶ importance at the current time: When can it be said that the¶ situation \_is ripe for a national liberation movement? What should¶ be the first line of action? Because decolonization comes in many¶ shapes, reason wavers and abstains from declaring what is a true¶ decolonization and what is not. We shall see that for the politically¶ committed, urgent decisions are needed on means and¶ tactics, i.e., direction and organization. Anything else is but blind¶ voluntarism with the terribly reactionary risks this implies.¶ What are the forces in the colonial period which offer new¶ channels, new agents of empowerment for the violence of the¶ colonized? First and foremost, the political parties and the intellectual¶ and business elite. However, what is characteristic of¶ certain political groups is that they are strong on principles but¶ abstain from issuing marching orders. During the colonial period¶ the activities of these nationalist political parties are purely for¶ electioneering purposes and amount to no more than a series of¶ philosophic-political discourses on the subject of the rights of¶ peoples to self-determination, the human rights of dignity and¶ freedom from hunger, and the countless declarations of the principle¶ "one man, one vote." The nationalist political parties never¶ insist on the need for confrontation precisely because **their aim¶ is not the radical overthrow of the system**. Pacifist and lawabiding,¶ partisans, in fact, of order, the new order, these political¶ groups bluntly ask of the colonialist bourgeoisie what to them¶ is essential: "Give us more power." On the specific issue of violence,¶ the elite are ambiguous. **They are violent in their words¶ and reformist in their attitudes.** While the bourgeois nationalist¶ political leaders say one thing, they make it quite clear it is not¶ what they are really thinking.

#### Turn--DEPOLITICIZIATION - the aff’s form of identity politics is in fact depoliticizing because it locks in power structures – A police apparatus is required in order to account for each identity

Zizek 1999 [Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, The Ticklish Subject, pgs. 208-09, 1999]

This is politics proper: the moment in which a particular demand is not simply part of the negotiation of interests but aims at some thing more, and starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of the global ­restructuring of the entire social space. There is a clear contrast between this subjectivization and today's proliferation of postmodern 'identity politics' whose goal is the exact opposite, that is, precisely the assertion of one's particular identity, **of one's proper place within the social structure**. The postmodern identity politics of particular (ethnic, sexual, etc.) life­styles perfectly fits the depoliticized notion of society, in which ever particular group is 'accounted for', has its specific status (of victim) acknowledged through affirmative action or other measures destined to guarantee social justice. The fact that this kind of justice meted out to victimized minorities requires an intricate police apparatus (for identify­ing the group in question, for punishing offenders against its rights – how legally to define sexual harassment or racial inquiry?, and so on – for providing the preferential treatment which should compensate for the wrong this group has suffered) is deeply significant: what is usually praised as ‘postmodern politics’ (the pursuit of particular issues whose resolution must be negotiated within the ‘rational’ global order allocating its particular component its proper place) is thus effectively the end of politics proper.

#### Turn – MIRRORED INVERSION--Their “Look, a white” strategy performs a mirror reversal of suffering without addressing subject constitution – this reinstates the structure of oppression which they attempt to fight

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, published by Princeton UP, p. 7)

But this opens rather than settles the problem of how to formulate a discourse¶ of freedom appropriate to contesting contemporary antidemocratic¶ configurations of power. One of the ironies of what Nietzsche boldly¶ termed the "instinct for freedom" lies in its inceptive self-cancellation, its¶ crossing of itself in its very first impulse. Initial figurations of freedom¶ are inevitably reactionary in the sense of emerging reaction to perceived¶ injuries or constraints of a regime from within its own terms.¶ Ideals of freedom ordinarily emerge to vanquish their imagined immediate enemies, but in this move they frequently recycle and reinstate¶ rather than transform the terms of domination that generated them. Consider¶ exploited workers who dream of a world in which work has been¶ abolished, blacks who imagine a world without whites, feminists who¶ conjure a world either without men or without sex, or teenagers who, fantasize¶ a world without parents. Such images of freedom perform mirror reversals of suffering without transforming the organization of the activity¶ through which the suffering is produced and without addressing the subject¶ constitution that domination effects, that is, the constitution of the social categories, “workers,” “blacks,” “women,” or “teenagers.”¶ It would thus appear that it is freedom’s relationship to identity-its¶ promise to address a social injury or marking that is itself constitutive of¶ identity – that yields the paradox in which the first imaginings of freedom¶ are always constrained by and potentially even require the very¶ structure of oppression that freedom emerges to oppose.

#### Turn—IDENTITY STRUGGLES—Aff postpones a violent struggle against colonial oppression. Aff fails to access a material change and cements in the phantasy that sustains privilege

Fanon 1963. (Frantz, psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary, and writer. *Wretched of the Earth*. Translation by Richard Philcox / 2004 Edition. Page 17-19, gender modified)

At the individual level we witness a genuine negation of common¶ sense. Whereas the colonist or police officer can beat the¶ colonized subject day in and day out, insult him and shove him¶ to his knees, it is not uncommon to see the colonized subject¶ draw his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive look from¶ another colonized subject. For the colonized subject's last resort is to defend htheir personality against their fellow countrypeople¶ Internecine feuds merely perpetuate age-old grudges entrenched¶ in memory. By throwing himself muscle and soul into his blood¶ feuds, the colonized subject endeavors to convince himself that¶ colonialism has never existed, that everything is as it used to be¶ and history marches on. Here we grasp the full significance of¶ the all too familiar "head-in-the-sand" behavior at a collective¶ level, as if this collective immersion in a fratricidal bloodbath¶ suffices to mask the obstacle and postpone the inevitable alternative,¶ the inevitable emergence of the armed struggle against colonialism.¶ So one of the ways the colonized subject releases his¶ muscular tension is through the very real collective self-destruction¶ of these internecine feuds. Such behavior represents a death wish¶ in the face of danger, a suicidal conduct which reinforces the¶ colonist's existence and domination and reassures him that such¶ men are not rational. The colonized subject also manages to lose¶ sight of the colonist through religion. Fatalism relieve~ the oppressor¶ of all responsibility since the cause of wrong-doing, poverty,¶ and the inevitable can be attributed to God. The individual¶ thus accepts the devastation decreed by God, grovels m front of¶ the colonist bows to the hand of fate, and mentally readjusts to¶ acquire the serenity of stone.¶ In the meantime, however, life goes on and the colonized¶ subject draws on the terrifying myths that are so prolific in underdeveloped¶ societies as inhibitions for their aggressiveness: malevolent'¶ spirits who emerge every time you put one foot wrong,¶ leopard men, snake men, six-legged dogs, zombies, a whole¶ never-ending gamut of animalcules or giants that encircle the¶ colonized with a realm of taboos, barriers, and inhibitions far¶ more terrifying than the colonialist world. This magical superstructure¶ that permeates the indigenous society has a very· precise¶ function in the way the libido works. One of the characteristics,¶ in fact, of underdeveloped societies is that the libido is primarily¶ a matter for the group and family. Anthropologists have amply¶ described societies where the man who dreams he has sexual¶ intercourse with a woman other than his own must publicly¶ confess his dream and pay the penalty in kind or in several days'¶ work to the husband or the injured family party-which proves,¶ by the way, that so-called prehistorical societies attach great¶ importance to the unconscious. . . .¶ In scaring me, the atmosphere of myths and magic operates like¶ an undeniable reality. In terrifying me, it incorporates me into the¶ traditions and history of my land and ethnic group, but at the same¶ time I am reassured and granted a civil status, an identification.¶ The secret sphere in underdeveloped countries is a collective¶ sphere that falls exclusively within the realm of magic. By entangling¶ me in this inextricable web where gestures are repeated with¶ a secular limpidity, my very own world, our very own world, thus¶ perpetuates itself. Zombies, believe me, are more terrifying than¶ colonists. And the problem now is not whether to fall in line with¶ the armor-plated world of colonialism, but to think twice before¶ urinating, spitting, or going out in the dark.¶ The magical, supernatural powers prove to be surprisingly ego¶ boosting. The colonist's powers are infinitely shrunk, stamped¶ by foreignness. There is no real reason to fight them because what¶ really matters is that the mythical structures contain far more¶ terrifying adversaries. It is evident that everything is reduced to¶ a permanent confrontation at the level of phantasy.¶ In the liberation struggle, however, this people who were¶ once relegated to the realm of the imagination, victims of unspeakable¶ terrors, but content to lose themselves in hallucinatory dreams, are thrown into disarray, re-form, and amid blood¶ and tears give birth to very real and urgent issues. Giving food¶ to the mujahideen, stationing lookouts, helping deprived families¶ and taking over from the slain or imprisoned husband-such¶ are the practical tasks the people are asked to undertake in the ¶ liberation struggle.

#### Turn – Hip hop is commodified by dominant culture – negative stereotypes are perpetuated, and whiteness is veiled rather than exposed

Cutler, 99 (Cecilia C. Cutler, Yorkville Crossing: White teens, hip hop and African American English, Journal of Sociolinguistics ¾, 1999: 428-442)

Mike is the son of a close friend of mine and I have watched him grow up since he was six years old. I have been observing his language practices since 1993 when he was about 13. And I began collecting data in late 1995 when he was 15. At around age 13 he began to identify quite strongly with hiphop culture.2 He wore baggy jeans, a reverse baseball cap, designer sneakers, and developed a taste for rap music - a 'wigga' or 'white nigga' according to Smitherman's definition (1994: 168). He became part of a growing cohort of white, well-to-do teenagers referred to as 'prep school gangsters' in the popular press (Sales 1996). At around the same time he began to change the way he spoke, 'crossing' into AA VE (Rampton 1995). His everyday linguistic repertoire was strongly influenced by AAVE3 phonology, prosody and hip -hop slang, and this was commented on negatively by family members who said he 'sounded like a street kid or hoodlum.' One incident in particular marks an early attempt at imitating AA VE. During a phone call with his best friend, Mike demonstrated a quick conversational repair to a typical AA VE form: l. Mike (age 13): I gotta ask. I mean aks reeks] my mom. . . In Britain, Hewitt (1986) showed that some white adolescents in primarily white neighborhoods pass through a phase 'in which they display their cultural allegiance with blacks' (1986: 159). When Mike was 13- 14 years old, this manifested itself in vocal criticism of groups he viewed as anti-African American (including Jews and Koreans), and he accused his mother of racism when she affectionately referred to one of his African American childhood friends as 'el negrito' (his mother is from Spain). He tried to hide the fact that he lived in an expensive neighborhood in Manhattan by giving out his older brother's Brooklyn phone number to friends and acquaintances, and in fact. this is somewhat in line with research done on hip-hop chat lines on the internet, where it is common for fans (who are primarily middle class) to try to prove their authenticity in hip-hop by claiming a connection with poverty (Rebensdorf 1996). Mike's self-alignment with hip-hop drew on stereotyped conceptions of gangs and African American urban street culture. Discussing formative sociolinguistic studies of AA VE, Morgan criticizes their Simplistic depiction of vernacular or core black culture and language as 'male, adolescent. insular. and trifling' (1994: 328), and indeed a comparable reductionism seems to be at work in the way that many white male teens interpret hip-hop culture, Mike's claims or authenticity took the form or activities he and others associated with urban black and Latino youth: he adopted a 'tag' name which he scrawled on the walls or banks and expensive apartment buildings near his house, he began experimenting with drugs, he joined a gang, and he had I'requent run-ins with the police, At the end or his first year or high school (when he was 14), a 'friend' (in his words) pushed him through a glass door. cutting through several tendons and a nerve in each wrist. Following surgery and several weeks of recovery . he went out to Central Park against the doctor's orders where some rival gang members - most or them also white held him down and broke his arms with baseball bats, His mother hoped that these experiences would scare him into changing his behavior but this was not played out immediately, Mike continued to see the same friends and was asked not to return to the private school he had been attending since kindergarten.

### Off

**Speech acts are not a mode of resistance – the debater is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations. Appealing to the ballot turns your attempted performance of resistance over to the reproductive economy**

**Phelan 96**—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 146-9)

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**Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology**. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivityproposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. **The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to** thelaws of **the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued**. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” **The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.** The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. **Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between** the **art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are** often recorded as **the stated goals** of museums and galleries, **the institutional effect** of the gallery often **seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it.** The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The factthat these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—onlylends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art objectand the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistantto the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if thereproduction is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memoryforget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personalmeanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptiverecovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it ratherhelps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. Thedescriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generatesrecovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers.The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; itrehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered. For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148 I **Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive**. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. **Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital.** Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149 Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animalwith whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. Themimicry of speech and writing, **the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it** necessarily **cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction**, technologically, economically, and **linguistically, is its greatest strength.** But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing aboutperformance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls inbehind the drive of the document/ary. **Performance’s challenge** to **writingis to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than,** as Benveniste warned, **constative utterances**.

**Their declaration of “not being on either side” might have rhetorical value to them, but they cant control what about their speech act gets circulated. The economic nature of debate means their speech act gets interpreted and deployed in the way that best suits the dominant narrative—just becomes part of one side or the other and does nothing to “stop the machine”.**

**Treating difference as a thing to be liberated only works by first establishing a criteria for what counts as difference—this criteria is established *internal* to the existing system of signification—this is especially true for gender identity—it is an abstraction defined only per its economic utility.**

**Grace 2000** (Victoria, Professor of Sociology at Canterbury University, *Baudrillard’s Challenge* p. 12-14)

Following on from his earliest work on objects and social dynamics of consumption (SO and CS), Baudrillard develops this critique of the ideology of needs in his book For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. He claims that **to ‘[speak] in terms of need is magical thinking’** (PES: 70) **precisely because of its status as a kind of origin myth**. Here he argues that **the positing of subject and object as autonomous and separate entities creates the necessity to devise a myth to establish their relation**. This, he says, is accomplished in the concept of need and its allied concepts of mana, instinct, motivation, choice, preference, utility. The **syntax of subject needs object is a tautological means of resolving the relationship between the subject and the object, whereby the one is defined in terms of the other: ‘positing the autonomy of the subject and its specular reflection in the autonomy of the object’** (PES: 71). **The logic of equivalence (axiomatic to economics) is an abstraction, a code, a rule. For objects to be abstractly and generally exchangeable, they must be thought and rationalised in terms of utility** (PES: 131). The **code equates the object to its useful end; its function becomes its ontological finality**. According to Baudrillard’s analysis, **this is where the economic is born** (PES: 132). In the same movement, **the social relation of use value requires the existence of the abstract individual who becomes not only the person with needs, but also the one with desires, with motivations, with a ‘self’ (and an unconscious) in the privacy of ‘his’ or ‘her’ psychological finitude.** 6 I have **placed the gendered pronoun in inverted commas here to signal what, I want to argue, is the provisional nature of the gendering of this individual**. **In the same way as the ‘subject’ is an abstraction necessitated by this dichotomous splitting of ‘subject’ and ‘object’, the notion that gender constitutes an identity of the individual is equally an abstraction. The abstract (gendered) individual with a ‘self’ has to have a relation to ‘him’ or ‘her’ self, a relation which Baudrillard argues is itself structured by the utilitarian imperative: In the process of satisfaction, he [sic] valorises and makes fruitful his own potentialities for pleasure; he ‘realises’ and manages, to the best of his ability, his own ‘faculty’ of pleasure, treated literally like a productive force. Isn’t this what all of humanist ethics is based on – the ‘proper use’ of oneself?**. (PES: 136) In his **critique of the naturalised assumption of utility and human needs, and its role in providing an anchoring point for the system of economic exchange value**, Baudrillard also analyses the relationship between the two forms of value as two terms of a binary opposition. He points out, as many have before and since, that the structural logic of binary oppositions always privileges one term, which becomes the dominant term. In this context, the logic of equivalence, articulated within a dichotomous structure of ‘same as’ or ‘different from’, is necessary for the construction of ‘identity’: identity is the dominant term (‘same as’). Here **we see the powerful significance of the parallel structure of identity/difference; same as/different from; equivalent to/not equivalent to; positive/negative; present not present. This rationalisation which permits the identity of objects to be rendered in their functionality also permits the object to enter the field of political economy as a positive** (+) value (PES: 134). Baudrillard characterises **the parallel structural form of economic value and signification** in the terms of two equivalent dichotomies: EV/UV = Sr/Sd. The ideological form of economic exchange value (EV) is to assume that EV obtains its value from use value (UV), whereas in fact, Baudrillard has argued, UV is an artefact of the social institution of a codified system of EV. 7 In the same way, rather than assuming that the meaning of the Sr obtains in the Sd, Baudrillard argues that the Sd is an artefact of the social institution of a codified system of representation. UV and Sds are only effects of EV and Sr respectively, and neither UV nor the Sd is an autonomous reality that either EV or the Sr ‘would express or translate in their code’ (PES: 137). Here Baudrillard argues that UV and the Sd are only simulation models, produced by the play of EV and Srs, providing the latter with the ‘guarantee of the real, the lived, the concrete’ (PES: 137). **As political economy needed UV to institute the order of EV** (in the same movement establishing equivalence as an abstract equation of all values), **so the Sd was needed to institute an order of meanings making possible the naturalisation of the relationship Sr– Sd. This naturalisation could then produce the appearance that concepts (Sds) exist and precede the Srs that name them**. 8 In Baudrillard’s words: **The system of use value involves the resorption without trace of the entire ideological and historical labour process that leads the subject in the first place to think of himself [sic] as an individual, defined by his needs and satisfaction, and thus ideally to integrate himself into the structure of the commodity**. (PES: 138) The inalienable point of origin instantiated by the myth of utility is not only parallel to, but inextricably coexistent with, the assumption of the unsurpassable ‘nature’ of meaning. As I mentioned above, whether the Sd conjured by a Sr is assumed to be fixed in Saussure’s terms, in the semantic conventions of a particular language, or whether the Sd is conceptualised as plural in its possibilities, inevitably deferred in poststructuralist, Derridian terms, the dichotomous structure of Sr/Sd remains, the bar that separates them is re-marked, and the assumption of **a codified system of meaning continues to underwrite the mode of representation**. I hope that the significance of this critique becomes clearer as we consider Baudrillard’s notion of symbolic exchange and seduction.

**The reduction of all existence to the economy of signification is the elimination of the value to life and extermination**

**Michael Dillon, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Lancaster, April 1999, Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, “Another Justice,” p. 164-5**

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being

**Power exists only to conceal that it does not exist—the affirmative only creates a space for oppressive power to re-constitute itself.**

**Grace 2000** (Victoria, Professor of Sociology at Canterbury University, *Baudrillard’s Challenge* p. 87)

**‘Deterrence’** is the term Baudrillard uses **to connote a process ensuring that the fiction of political stakes continues to animate the social**. Unlike surveillance, or ideology, **deterrence is void of any notion of agent, class, manipulator, interest; it operates precisely to activate these concepts in simulated form to conjure their (apparent) reality (who can say they are not real when they are simulated?**). Referring to power, Baudrillard writes: When it is threatened today by simulation (the threat of vanishing in the play of signs), power risks the real, risks crisis, it gambles on remanufacturing artificial, social, economic, political stakes. (SIM: 44) In Baudrillard’s analysis, **power ‘for some time now produces nothing but signs of its resemblance’** (SIM: 45). The political dynamic as a stake is empty, finished, appearing in simulated form in a logic of social demand. Here Baudrillard is referring to a demand for signs of power, signs of meaningful political social relations. ‘**True’ power was a relation of force with stakes and strategy, but Baudrillard argues that these things are now nothing more than an object of social demand, and so, like anything else in the logic of consumption, are subject to the law of supply and demand rather than to violence and death (which doesn’t mean there is no violence and death!). ‘Power is no longer present except to conceal that there is none’** (SIM: 46). Simulated power, simulated political stakes, ‘deter’ the collapse of power. Baudrillard suggests that **the only strategy against this collapse or ‘defection’ is to ‘reinject realness and referentiality everywhere’** (SIM: 42). It is this analysis that enables **Baudrillard to refer** elsewhere (FS: 57– 8) **to the apparent discovery by those on the political ‘left’ of the subversive nature of the claim that ‘everything is political’**, that the political was not confined to the level of governance of nationstates but that sport, fashion, household arrangements were all to be affirmed as ‘political’. Again, at precisely the moment when the ‘political’ implodes, it is ‘found’ everywhere. As discussed in Chapter 1, Baudrillard argues that **the hyperreal world of simulation is an order of totalitarian control far greater than any social form previously known. The implosion of dialectical polarity with the ascendancy of sign value, in addition to annihilating political stakes, reconstitutes the operational construct of ‘causality’ in a simulated mode. The notion of cause and effect is similarly reliant on the poles of subject/object, active/ passive, positivity/negativity. The notion of one thing/element/force causing/ impacting on/transforming another relies on the prior separation of that affected, or changed, from its changing agent.** Such separation implies a distance, in turn implying contingency: some thing, or act, may intervene and change the course of events, since there is a ‘causal relationship’. In social terms there can even be struggle and resistance. With the collapse of the poles sustaining this causal structure, Baudrillard argues that its fundamental dimensions have shifted. Rather than a relation of cause and effect, **the precession of simulacra ensures that the real is generalised from the model; the real proliferates from the modulation of differences in accordance with the model. Reality is coded**. The best example is perhaps found in the dominant discourses about genetics.

**Voting neg is an act of refusal—it is a negation of the question presented by the 1AC, of what debate should look like, about what this round should look like—it is a refusal to contribute to the symbolic economy of the debate space.**

**Halberstam 13** (J. Jack Halberstam, “The Wild Beyond: With and For the Undercommons”, Forward to “The Undercommons” by Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, Minor Compositions 2013, PRINT, mjb)

**Moten and Harney want to gesture to another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness**. The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is ongoing and exists in the present and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself.” While describing the London Riots of 2011, Harney suggests that the riots and insurrections do not separate out “the request, the demand and the call” – rather, they enact the one in the other: “**I think the call, in the way I would understand it, the call, as in the call and response, the response is already there before the call goes out. You’re already in something.”** You are already in it. For Moten too, you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. **What’s more, the call is always a call to dis-order and this disorder or wild- ness shows up in many places**: in jazz, in improvisation, in noise. The disordered sounds that we refer to as cacophony will always be cast as “extra-musical,” as Moten puts it, precisely because we hear some- thing in them that reminds us that our desire for harmony is arbitrary and in another world, harmony would sound incomprehensible. Lis- tening to cacophony and noise tells us that there is a wild beyond to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us.¶ **And when we are called to this other place, the wild beyond, “beyond the beyond” in Moten and Harney’s apt terminology, we have to give ourselves over to a certain kind of craziness.** Moten reminds us that even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks cra- zy” but, Fanon, as a psychiatrist, also knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he knew that it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild. Fanon, ac- cording to Moten, wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order to bring colonialism to an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism. Indeed, blackness, for Moten and Harney by way of Fanon, is the willingness to be in the space that has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule, by order. Moten takes us there, saying of Fanon finally: “Eventually, I believe, he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not (as John Donne would say).”¶ The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal**. In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with the right to refuse what has been refused to you**. Citing Gayatri Spivak, Moten and Harney call this refusal the “first right” and it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals the refusal of the choices as offered. We can under- stand this refusal in terms that Chandan Reddy lays out in Freedom With Violence (2011) – for Reddy, gay marriage is the option that can- not be opposed in the ballot box. While we can circulate multiple cri- tiques of gay marriage in terms of its institutionalization of intimacy, **when you arrive at the ballot box, pen in hand, you only get to check “yes” or “no” and the no, in this case, could be more damning than the yes. And so, you must refuse the choice as offered**

**The alternative is not an invitation to quit debate or a silencing of voice and style. The risk of debaters quitting adds argument to either side of the symbolic economy of the debate space. Rather, being present yet not adding to it is the necessary course of action.**

**This would be a shift towards symbolic exchange rather than use value exchange.**

**Grace 2000** (Victoria, Professor of Sociology at Canterbury University, *Baudrillard’s Challenge* p. 18-19)

¶ **Symbolic exchange is the radical other from the economic**. According to Baudrillard, the **economic,** in its classical and neo-classical form, 11 **is born when what the object ‘is’ is assumed to reside within it,** it has an essence; **when the object attains its value in accordance with an abstract code that enables its relation to other objects to be ascertained through a logic of equivalence which in turn obtains its rationale from the ideology of utility and use value**; and **when the individual emerges as a ‘subject’ whose relation to the world of objects is articulated primarily through the ideology of need (and, with psychoanalysis, desire**). From this critical viewpoint, **the notion of the ‘individual’ as it emerged from the Enlightenment period with needs, ‘liberated’ from the ties and constraints of a previous era, is an abstraction. And the discourse of liberation can be understood as a process of interiorising subjectivity resulting from the dichotomous separation of subject and object**. This ‘subject’ of industrialising modernity has an essence, ‘an abstract essence over which the identity of the subject comes to fix itself’ (MOP: 95). **By contrast, symbolic exchange is a form of exchange, a form of construction of objects and their meaning, that is antithetical to the economic. The poles of the exchange are not automatised; there is neither essence nor absolute separation of subject from object**. **Both are continually transformed through the exchange. There is no identity**. 12 The **ontology of objects is inexorably ambivalent**. Goods are not produced, nor do they exist as commodities or products. Most importantly, goods are destined to circulate in a social process of exchange that augments the social in terms of the creation and destruction, the giving and returning or passing on, of the ‘gift’. **This process negates the possibility of power through accumulation. The individual is not an ‘individual’ with an interior psychology, a subjectivity, an identity, with needs and desires. Within this construct of the symbolic exchange, language is symbolic, similarly ambivalent, and must be exchanged. Words evoke, point, seduce, act rather than connote and denote**. And they circulate. Stockpiles of words that do not circulate and are not exchanged are, as Baudrillard writes, more deadly than the accumulation of waste from industrialisation (SE&D: 203). The **logic of the symbolic and symbolic exchange is one of ambivalence and transformation through circulation; the positive and the negative, presence and absence (if one can talk in these terms), are always activated**