### Off #1

**Their focus on drones trades-off with broad critique of the military-industrial complex and obscures the reality of militarized violence**

**Trombly 12** (Dan Trombly, “The Drone War Does Not Take Place”, 16 November 2013, http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/the-drone-war-does-not-take-place/, DA: 7 October 2013, mjb)

I’ll try to make this a bit shorter than my usual fare on the subject, but let me be clear about something. As much as I and many others inadvertently use the term, **there is no such thing as drone war.** There is no nuclear war, no air war, no naval war. There isn’t really even irregular war. **There’s just war.**¶ There is, of course, drone warfare, just as there is nuclear warfare, aerial warfare, and naval warfare. **This is verging on pedantry, but the use of language does matter. The changing conduct and character of war should not be confused with its nature**, as Colin Gray strives to remind us in so many of his writings. **When we believe that some aspect of warfare changes the nature of war – whether we do so to despair its ethical descent or praise its technological marvels, or to try to objectively discern some new and irreversible reality – we lose sight of a logic that by and large endures in its political and conceptual character.¶** Hence the title (with some, but not too much, apology to Baudrillard). **There is no drone war, there is only the employment of drones in the various wars we fight under the misleading and conceptually noxious “War on Terror.”** Why does this matter?¶ **To imbue a weapons system with the political properties of the policy employing it is fallacious, and to assume its mere presence institutes new political realities relies on a denial of facts and context. This remains the case with drones. The character of wars waged with drones is different – the warfare is different – but the nature of these wars do not change, and very often this argument obscures the wider military operations occurring.¶** Long before the first drone strikes occurred in Somalia, America was very much at war there. Before their availability in that theater, the U.S. had deployed CIA and SOF assets to the region. It supported Ethiopia’s armies and it helped bankroll and coordinate proxy groups, whether they were Somali TFG units, militias, or private contractors. It bombarded select Somali targets with everything from naval guns to AC-130 gunships to conventional strike aircraft. It deployed JSOC teams to capture or kill Somalis. That at some point the U.S. acquired a new platform to conduct these strikes is not particularly relevant to the character of that war and even less to its nature.¶ **We sometimes assume drones inaugurate some new type of invincibility or some transcendental transformation of war as an enterprise of risk and mutual violence. We are incorrect to do so**. The war in Somalia is certainly not risk free for the people who the U.S. employs or contracts to target these drones. It is not risk free for the militias, mercenaries, or military partners which follow up on the ground. Nor is it risk free for those who support the drones. Just ask Abu Talha al-Sudani, one of the key figures behind the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, who sent operatives to case Camp Lemonier and launch a commando raid – one which looks, in retrospect, very much like the one that crippled Marine aviation at Camp Bastion recently – that might have killed a great many U.S. personnel on a base then and now critical to American operations in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.¶ The existence of risk is an inherent product of an enemy whose will to fight we have not yet overcome. The degree of that inherent risk – whether it is negligible or great – is a product of relative military capabilities and war’s multifarious external contexts. Looked at through this lens, **it’s not drones that reduce U.S. political and material risk, it’s the basic facts of the conflict.** In the right context, most any kind of military technology can significantly mitigate risks. A 19th century ironclad fleet could shell the coast of a troublesome principality with basic impunity. When Dewey said, “You may fire when ready, Gridley,” at Manila Bay, according to most history and much legend he lost only one man – due to heatstroke! – while inflicting grievous casualties on his out-ranged and out-gunned Spanish foes. That some historians have suggested Dewey may have concealed a dozen casualties by fudging them in with desertions, which were in any case were a far greater problem than casualties since the Navy was still in the habit of employing foreign sailors expendable by the political standards of the day is even more telling. Yes, **there are always risks and almost always casualties even in the most unfair fights, but just as U.S. policymakers wrote off Asian sailors, they write off the victims of death squads which hunt down the chippers, spotters, and informants in Pakistan or the contractors training Puntland’s anti-piracy forces.** And no, not even the American spooks are untouchable, the fallen at Camp Chapman are testament to that.¶ **This is hardly unique to drones or today’s covert wars**. The CIA’s secret air fleet in Indochina lost men, too, and the Hmong suffered mightily for their aid to the U.S. in the Laotian civil war. The fall of Lima Site 85, by virtue or demerit of policy, resonated little with the American public but deeply marks the intelligence community and those branches of the military engaging in clandestine action. The wars we wage in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are not drone wars any more than our war in Laos was an air war simply because Operation Barrel Roll’s bombers elicit more attention than the much more vulnerable prop-driven spotting aircraft or Vang Pao’s men on the ground.¶ **There is a certain hubris in thinking we can limit war by limiting its most infamous weapons systems. The taboo and treaties against chemical weapons perhaps saved men [and womyn]** **(but not the Chinese at Wuhan, nor the Allied and innocents downwind of the SS John Harvey at Bari) from one of the Great War’s particular horrors, but they did nothing appreciable to check the kind of war the Great War was, or the hypersanguinary consequences of its sequel but a generation later.¶** **The Predators and Reapers could have never existed, and very likely the U.S. would still be seeking ways to carry out its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates under the auspices of the AUMF in all of today’s same theaters.** More might die from rifles, Tomahawks, Bofors guns or Strike Eagles’ JDAMs than remotely-launched Griffins, and the tempo of strikes would abate. **But the same fundamental problems – the opaque decisions to kill, the esoteric legal justifications for doing so, the obtuse objectives these further – would all remain. Were it not for the exaggerated and almost myopic focus on “killer robots,” the U.S. public would likely pay far less attention to the victims, excesses, and contradictions. But blaming drones qua drones for these problems. or fearing their proliferation at home, makes little more sense than blaming helicopters for Vietnam**, or fearing airmobile assaults when DC MPD’s MD-500s buzz over my neighborhood.¶ **That concern that proliferation of a weapons system equates to proliferation of the outcomes associated with them, without regard to context, is equally misleading**. Nobody in America should fear the expansion of the Chinese UAV fleet because, like the U.S. UAV fleet, it is merely going to expand their ability to do what similar aircraft were already doing. Any country with modern air defenses can make mincemeat of drone-only sorties, and for that reason China, which unlike Yemen and Pakistan would not consent to wanton U.S. bombing of its countryside, need not fear drones. For an enormous number of geographical, political, and military reasons, the U.S. ought fear the “drone war” coming home even less. **Drones do not grant a country the ability to conduct the kind of wars we conduct against AQAM. The political leverage to build bases and clear airspaces, and the military and intelligence capabilities to mitigate an asymmetric countermeasure operation do. If another country gains that ability to conduct them against a smaller country, even, it is not because they lacked the ability to put weapons on planes, but because of the full tapestry of national power and military capabilities gave them such an ability.¶** It was not asymmetry in basic technical ability that made the U.S. submarine blockade of Japan so much more effective than the Axis’s attempts to do the same against America’s shores, but the total scope of the assets in the field and context of their use. It was not because of precedent or moral equivalence, or lack thereof that the Axis could bomb Britain or lose the ability to do so, but because of the cumulative effect of military capabilities and the judgments guiding them. What might expand the battlefield of a “drone war” is much the same**. America’s enemies do not refrain from attacking bases in CONUS or targeting dissidents in the U.S**. (not that they have not before), **they wait for an opportunity and practical reason to do so, and that has very little to do with drones in particular and even less the nature of the war itself.**¶ **Fearing that the mere use of a weapons system determines the way in which our enemies will use it without regard to this context is not prophetic wisdom. It is quasi-Spenglerian hyperventilation that attributes the decision to use force to childlike mimesis rather than its fundamentally political purposes. Iran and Russia do not wait on drones to conduct extrajudicial targeted killings, and indeed drones would be of much less use to them in their own political contexts. Focusing on drones and the nature of targeted killings as some sort of inherent link ignores those contexts and ultimately does a disservice to understanding of war**spast, present, and future, **and by doing so, does little help – and possibly a great deal of harm – to understanding how to move forward.**

\*\*\*note: evidence edited for gendered language

**The affirmative is exemplary of how we have become conditioned to accepting the military-industrial complex—the impact is endless war and violence**

**Lawrence 9** (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer **every problem.** We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the **terms** promoted support the **conditioning of** its **citizens**. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is **dripping violence**. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. **The cycle of violence** that exists in our society **exists because it is useful to those that control society.** It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a **war consciousness that allows it to prosper.** That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy **could** have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines **what we experience** and **how we live.** As long as we choose to live in "War" in **our minds** then we will continue to get "War" in **our lives**. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

**Reject the aff: Embracing a strategy of dissent from militarism key to solve**

**Ivie 7** (Robert L. Ivie [Professor: University of Indiana, Ph.D., Washington State University, Rhetorical Critique of U.S. public culture; democracy; war propaganda; peace-building communication]], Published 2007 by Kumarian Press, “Dissent from War”, PRINT, note: scanned and run through OCR software, mjb)

Indeed, **militarism has become the mindset of American empire—the mindset**, Andrew Bacevich argues, **that seduces Americans to support a state of warfare**. **America has adopted the outlook of a security state, of an empire projecting its power worldwide rather than republic defending itself from foreign attack**. The American people in an age of empire have become persuaded that their “safety and salvation lies with the sword.” The citizen army has become a professional “imperial army.” **America’s “global military supremacy” has become central to its “national identity.”** International problems are seen first and foremost as “military problems,” and military means are believed to be the way to reshape the world consistent with American values and the nation’s self-professed utopian ends, which are perceived in turn as “universal truths.” **The very aesthetic of war is changing from an image of ugly, wasteful, and degrading brutality to a new, twenty-first century sport. In Bacevich’s blunt and considered assessment, contemporary America has fallen prey to militarism—romanticizing soldiers, fostering nostalgia for military ideals, and adopting military power as the measure of national greatness—to a “degree without precedent in US history.”** ¶ **The attitude of militarism that is running rampant in America**, Bacevich maintains**, is unlikely to disappear anytime soon**” because, even though it is unprecedented in its current intensity, it has deeps roots in the nation’s past and, consistent with Michael Sherry’s observation, has reshaped American politics, foreign policy, economics, social relations, and general culture over the past half-century so much that **it permeates all domains of life**. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 gave “added impetus to already exiting tendencies”; America became more itself rather than something different after 9/11, increasingly adopting a militaristic ethos with broad support and too little dissent from mainstream political leaders and the general public. **The present-day “infatuation with military power” is a bipartisan project and the handiwork of multiple and disparate groups of opinion leaders**. Moreover, it has developed over the last several decades “in full view and with considerable popular approval.” Thus, Bacevich argues, **“society at large. . .[cannot] abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass**,” **and what has come to pass is systemic, broad-based, and deeply ingrained in political culture rather than simply the outcome of a particular presidential election, the fault of an individual president, or the scheming of a single set of presidential advisors.** A late turning of public option in the fall elections of 2006 against a stymied occupation of Iraq, we might conclude, reflects impatience with a particular war, not a basic transformation of the war culture. ¶ The image of an imperial army fighting continuous wars of empire does not inspire confidence that an ingrained system of militarism can be changed, habits of war broken, the conscience of a nation restored, or a culture of peace established. Indeed, political theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri maintain that contemporary imperial warfare is perpetual because it functions to sustain the status-quo network of global power relations. War, they argue, is inevitable in a condition of “Empire” and constant as an instrument of rule.” It is the “general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination,” a “form of rule” for controlling populations and shaping “all aspects of social life,” Imperial war today regulates life in general and legitimizes itself in the process by propagandizing “the constant presence of an enemy and the threat of disorder.” The “presence of the enemy,” they note, “demonstrates the need for security.” The imagined presence of an enemy is crucial to the system and motive of war. ¶ Making evil enemies present by means of dehumanizing propaganda—propaganda that defies the US as it demonizes the nation’s adversaries—is a destructive ritual of redemption by vicarious sacrifice. It produces the heightened perception of a threat and intensified sense of national insecurity that motivates and excuses a call to arms. Evil, as in the image of an enemy evildoer, is the ultimate symbol of bedlam, babble, and disarray—the Biblical monster of chaos. In a condition of empire and imperial warfare, then, the routine rationalization for resorting to violence is to preserve global order against supposedly evil forces of disorder. This “abuse of evil”—this “discourse of good and evil [that] lacks nuance subtlety, and judicious discrimination”—Richard Bernstein insists is “extremely dangerous in a complex and precarious world” because it stifles thinking instead of promoting us to question and think. For this purpose, war rules. ¶ **Yet, resisting the rule of war is possible, according to Hardt and Negri, despite the dominant mindset of militarism in a controlling paradigm of empire that bases politics on coercion and violence. Indeed, resisting war is “the most important task for resistance today.”** They content it is reasonable to imagine, under emerging conditions of desire for democracy, peace, and justice, that **a multitude of ordinary people might contest militarism through cooperation and communication—what Hardt and Negri call “singularities” acting in common with deference to their differences and without reduction to a “unity”—may well erode the order of Empire to achieve a “peaceful life in common.” The need for peace corresponds with the need for enriched democracy to overcome “the global state of war**.” To be sure, “the only democracy that makes sense today is the one that poses peace as its highest value.” ¶ Consistent with Hardt And Negri and for the purpose of working toward a peacebuilding culture, democracy is usefully understood as a practice of collective self-rule constituted by matrices of individuals cooperating and communicating with one another at multiple points of intersection to produce fair and equitable social relations within and against a recalcitrant system of empire, a system of empire that relies on incessant violence and legitimizing images of evildoers to maintain a status-quo relations of global power. Democracy is expressed most directly, acutely, and cogently in collaborative acts of resistance to enemy-making discourses. **Surely, as a guiding model for contesting the mindset of militarism, the vision of resisting dehumanizing propaganda by cultivating matrices of democratic dissent makes the prospect of building peace and inhibiting war more plausible over the long haul and less daunting in immediate circumstances.** ¶ Understood as constructive democratic resistance, **dissent evokes the more judicious and relatively sustainable expectation that acts of peacebuilding can be augmented collectively and habits of war attenuated over time. Dissent cultivates democratic relations and coordinated resistance from the ground up by producing, humanizing acts of identification, that is, acts of communication and coordination that articulate practical points of intersection without effacing the distinguishing identities, cultures, religions, or nationalities of cooperating parties**. constructing intersecting points—points to be held in common by those who would oppose the war regime—is a bridging action rather than a fusing process. It is not an attempt to eliminate pluralism, diminish defining differences, or achieve a structured unity in which relative merit is determined for example, by how white or rich or Christian or Western or American a given category of people Is perceived to be. **Thus, peacebuilding activism and dissent from war can be imagined as a sustained boundary-spanning project of decentralized and overlapping networks of democratic resistance to the habit of dehumanizing propaganda.**

### Off #2

#### The United States federal government should prohibit the use of drones for targeted killing.

#### Observation One—the counterplan competes—it eliminates *presidential focus* from the plan text—any elimination of presidential focus severs the plan’s focus on the presidency

**And this distinction is meaningful—rhetoric matters—when Congress debates the plan the rhetoric they will use frames expectations and scope of policy—their Stoltz evidence indicates legislative debate is key to aff solvency—we just need to win that the CP causes a different debate to win competition.**

#### Best interpretation of fiat: imagine the representations associated with the plan are what are used in Congressional debates over the policy—this allows for a combination of real world policy analysis with scholarly insight—it maintains a focus on policies and institutions while at the same time acknowledging the complexities that language offer for our politics

#### The counterplan competes on discourse alone but even if they win functional competition there are meaningful functional differences between the plan and counterplan

#### Observation Two—Net benefit—hegemonic presidentialism

#### Framing the policy as presidential regulation triggers a media firestorm that undercuts legitimacy of the plan

#### Nelson 8 (Dana D. Nelson is a professor of English at Vanderbilt university and prominent author/activist. She received her MA and PhD from Michigan State University. “Bad for Democracy: How The Presidency Undermines the Power of the People”, University of Minnesota Press 2008, PRINT, mjb) The first part of my argument is simple enough: it's not particular presi­ dents who are a problem for l\S. democracy, it's presidentialism. Prcsi- dentialism characterizes the unconscious power that the presidency works on citizens, and it describes the gravitational symbolic and insti­tutional place that the presidency assumes within U.S. government. We understand the president's strength to be the strength of U.S. democracy Although the hallmark of constitutional democracy is the separated and balanced powers of the three governmental branches, executive, legisla­tive, and judicial, the fact is, when we think democracy, wrc think of the president, Legislatures and judges alike are factually more likely to assist than to impede the president. On the rare occasions that they set up a roadblock, they are often depicted by media and understood by citizens to be interferingwrith the president's power and the democratic process. Presidentialism has trained us for this conclusion, and insofar as it suc­ceeds, it works to undermine our democratic proclivities and skill build­ing. Baldly put, presidentialism has been bad for democracy. Despite the particular virtues and leadership skills of some presidents, presidential­ism works against peoples' civic cultivation of democratic skills. It trains us to want the president to take care of democracy for us instead of re-mt inhering that democracy, properly defined, is ourjob. Presidentialism depoliticizes citizens, making us less inclined to think and, thus, less likely to participate in self-governing. Presidentialism encourages people to see democracy as a winncr-takc-all endeavor in world politics as well as in the domestic sphere, an arena where presidential candidates go mano a muno and then when the winner ascends to office, the losers (and his supporter- constituents) fade from view. This teaches citizens to see negotiation and compromise as the weakness, not the strength, of democracy. Presiden­tialism trains people to sec democracy as being both led and symbolized by a single person, a strong leader standing for a strong consensus, instead unity, instead of helping us remember that a decently functioning disunity can provide better solutions and make an even stronger nation. ¶ The civically trained desire to sec the U.S. president as "the most pow­erful man in the world" has had the effect of allowing individual presi­dents incrementally and steadily to increase the power of that branch, most recently in the aftermath of 9/11, when Congress gave to the execu­tive their branch's right to supervise war powers (a constitutional power that Congress has in fact not exercised since December 8,1941), In this sense, presidentialism is colonizing democracy for its own powers and purposes, depending on the people to keep believing that the executive's power is somehow our power instead of recognizing that the truth is ex­actly the opposite. Whether particular presidents arc good or not, the in­crease of presidential power concretely diminishes our democracy, by tak­ing prestige as well as power from what was historically denominated the "people's branch," the legislature, and ultimately by taking it away from the people. No single person can make democratic decisions, since de­mocracy gets its vitality from people negotiating their differences to find positive solutions. And even if we account

#### Focus on the president implies “leadership” is to blame which reduces the complexity of the problem at hand

Edelman 88 (Murray – general badass Constructing the Political Spectacle pp. 64-65)

The term "leadership" (like the terms "problem" and "enemy") is itself a political weapon. It catalyzes an intricate language game that draws its appeal from a complex of psychological needs including an incentive to blame or praise identifiable people for changes in well-being and an effort to understand why changes take place.There is an important sense in which leaders derserve praise and blame for the conditions in which people live. They do identify themselves with particular courses of action and inaction and so deserve responsibility for them. But the assumption that leaders have caused the events for which they take responsibility is reductionist because it ignores the consequences of historical developments, material conditions, and interpretations of those conditions. Except as minor elements of a complex transaction, leaders cannot provide security or bring about change. Their posture of doing so confounds both understanding and public policy.

#### Focus on the president causes political passivity

Ivie 7 (Robert L. Ivie [Professor: University of Indiana, Ph.D., Washington State University, Rhetorical Critique of U.S. public culture; democracy; war propaganda; peace-building communication]], Published 2007 by Kumarian Press, “Dissent from War”, PRINT, note: scanned and run through OCR software, mjb)

Dissent from war is usefully thought of as a tactic or set of tactics of ordinary communication employed by everyday citizens who interact in settings that are saturated by media of one kind· or another at every point in the process. Thinking of dissent in this way is critical to determining how a people might feasibly resist the ubiquitous caricatures and dehumanizing images that goad them to kill a phantom enemy or to defend a vague symbol such as freedom that has been emptied of any significant meaning. Tactics are all that a people have at their disposal in a political system of representative, rather than direct, democracy. Power is wielded most immediately by political elites. Collective self-governance is achieved only indirectly, if at all, by pressuring elected and appointed officials. ¶ The latent power of the people resides in their ability to resist that which delegated authority is empowered to initiate. The main remaining check on the measures undertaken by political elites-the principal counterweight to the initiatives of governing authorities-is the recalcitrance of articulated public opinion. The governing principle of the commonwealth is to distribute direct political power-the power ro formulate, carry out, and justify or rationalize policy-to executive, legislative, and judicial authorities in various amounts and types. Little to none of this direct authority to originate policy and to author courses of action is granted to, or reserved for, the people themselves. ¶ On matters of foreign relations generally and war specifically, executive license to act prevails over all other political authority. The presidency not only sets and directs policy in this domain but also formulates the official rationale for engaging in warfare. The presidential persona speaks to and for the state on matters of national crisis. It is given license to act with minimal interference from the legislature, the judiciary, and the mainstream press. The president-or whoever wields executive authority in a given system of representative democracy-is presumed ro be in charge of defining the crisis and assumes responsibility for leading the way ro its eventual resolution. ¶ This is a system of governance that would lull the citizenry into mental passivity and encourage political quiescence, except to impel the people to participate in public displays of patriotic fervor or otherwise to affirm, sanction, endorse, or consent to official policy and its justification. It would co-opt the people's power to withhold assent, especially their potential to resist an official rationale for war, to hold executive authority to a higher standard of ¶ the prevailing framework of sense-making because that is the hinge of interpretation most vulnerable to resistance. ¶ The guiding perspective from which governing authority would have I people see warfare as the nation's only realistic option is vulnerable because is subject to daily challenge by ordinary people in small and large venues contributed throughout the land, The people, who are not well-positioned to formulate war policy, are capable of reacting against it. Indeed, they are called into existence as a collective entity on the subject of war by the executive authority's very efforts to vindicate armed hostilities. With the people so constituted, presidential strategy is rendered publicly accountable and subject citizen tactics that can make war propaganda problematic. ¶

#### Distance between citizen and politics results in extermination

Boggs 2000 Carl Boggs, Professor of Social Sciences and Film Studies at National University, Los Angeles, 2000, The End of Politics, p. 244-245 (PDAF3448)

The disintegration of political life in late-twentieth-century America poses a series of novel dilemmas and challenges that I have tried to illuminate in this volume. Many of the social phenomena explored here—metaphysics, the therapeutic culture, localism, deep ecology, urban revolt, and postmodernism, among them—intersect with and reinforce one another. While those intellectual and psychological responses to an increasingly harsh, atomized social order have deep origins in the popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the momentum of such responses has not noticably waned throughout the 1990s. Despite their often radically different constituencies, outlooks, and espoused goals, these modalities all share a profoundly depoliticized modus operandi. As the quagmire of political decay widens, urgent social problems go unsolved. Such problems, from urban decline to technological displacement of labor to global ecological crisis, cannot be grasped, much less acted on, without looking at the national and international context of markets, finance, and communications. Yet, paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, so often inspired by localist impulses, comes at a time when social agendas that ignore global factors will be, more than ever, reduced to impotence. Localistwithdrawalis in fact powerfully reinforced by the growing remoteness and devaluation of politics (especially state and federal politics) as increasing numbers of people turn away from difficult, frustrating public concerns toward more comfortable, manageable private ones. Of course, the private realm holds significance as a source of self-fulfillment and as a bulwark against an assortment of outside encroachments. Yet, by diminishing the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public good and social transformation.3 In the meantime, it may not be too hyperbolic to say that the fate of the world hangs in the balance.

### Case Stuff

#### Alt cause—surveillance drones

Wanenchek 13 Wanenchek, Sarah. "Toward a Drone Sexuality – Part 1: Knowledge and Consent."Cyborgology RSS. N.p., 12 Dec. 2013. Web. 16 Feb. 2014.

Drones have become a symbol of contemporary surveillance, a thing that’s always there and always watching and always potentially capable of doing harm. Sometimes this harm is through direct violence, and sometimes it’s merely the delivery of data to people who can use it against you. But either way, there are two aspects to the erotic power of drones, and they’re interrelated: Being known, and being controlled.¶ Robin James wrote [a fantastic response to my post linked above,](http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2013/10/26/drones-sound-and-super-panoptic-surveillance/) wherein she discusses the idea of droning as a process of the regulation and control of people (emphasis hers):¶ So, where the gaze regulates people by fixing them as objects (as, for example, Frantz Fanon argues the exclamation “Look, a Negro!” does), droning regulates people by creating the conditions that lead them to exhibit the wrong (or right) sort of profile, the sort of profile that puts you on watch lists, that disqualifies you for “discounted” credit, health insurance plans, etc…The gaze and the drone are absolutely not opposed or mutually exclusive; more often than not, they’re deeply and complexly implicated in one another. That’s why super-panoptic surveillance is above or on top of regular old visual panopticism; it’s an additional layer, not a replacement.

#### The executive will redefine the law to get around the plan

Pollack 13

Norman Pollack 13, Prof of History @ MSU and PhD in History from Harvard, “Drones, Israel, and the Eclipse of Democracy, Counterpunch, 2/5, [www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/05/drones-israel-and-the-eclipse-of-democracy/](http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/05/drones-israel-and-the-eclipse-of-democracy/)

Bisharat first addresses the transmogrification of international law by Israel’s military lawyers. We might call this damage control, were it not more serious. When the Palestinians first sought to join the I.C.C., and then, to receive the UN’s conferral of nonmember status on them, Israel raised fierce opposition. Why? He writes: “Israel’s frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestine’s status at the United Nations was motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over Palestinian claims of war crimes. Israeli leaders are unnerved for good reason. The I.C.C. could prosecute major international crimes committed on Palestinian soil anytime after the court’s founding on July 1, 2002.” In response to the threat, we see the deliberate reshaping of the law: Since 2000, “the Israel Defense Forces, guided by its military lawyers, have attempted to **remake the laws** of war by consciously violating them and then **creating** new legal concepts to provide juridical cover for their misdeeds.” (Italics, mine) In other words, habituate the law to the existence of atrocities; in the US‘s case, targeted assassination, repeated often enough, seems permissible, indeed clever and wise, as pressure is steadily applied to the laws of war. Even then, “collateral damage” is seen as unintentional, regrettable, but hardly prosecutable, and in the current atmosphere of complicity and desensitization, never a war crime. (**Obama is** hardly a novice **at** this game of **stretching the law to suit the convenience of**, shall we say, the **national interest**? In order to ensure the distortion in counting civilian casualties, which would bring the number down, as Brennan with a straight face claimed, was “zero,” the Big Lie if ever there was one, placing him in distinguished European company, Obama **redefined the meaning** of “combatant” status to be any male of military age throughout the area (which we) declared a combat zone, which noticeably led to a higher incidence of sadism, because it allowed for “second strikes” on funerals—the assumption that anyone attending must be a terrorist—and first responders, those who went to the aid of the wounded and dying, themselves also certainly terrorists because of their rescue attempts.) These guys play hardball, perhaps no more than in using—by report—the proverbial baseball cards to designate who would be next on the kill list. But funerals and first responders—verified by accredited witnesses–seems overly much, and not a murmur from an adoring public.

#### Conflating warfare and gender relations conflates disparate phenomena and reproduces traditional gender roles to reinforce domination

hooks 95 [bell, English professor and senior lecturer in Ethnic Studies at the University of Southern California “Feminism and Militarism: A Comment” *Women's Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3/4, Rethinking Women's Peace Studies (Fall - Winter, 1995), pp. 58-64]

By equaling militarism and patriarchy, these feminists often structure their arguments in sucha way as to suggest that to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression, and the will to dominate and do violence to others and that to be female is synonymous with weakness, passivity, and the will to nourish and affirm the lives of others. While these may be stereotypical norms that many people live out, such dualistic thinking is dangerous; it is a basic ideological component of the logic that informs and promotes domination in Western society. Even when inverted and employed for a meaningful purpose, like nuclear disarmament**,** it is nevertheless risky, for it reinforces the cultural basis of sexism and other forms of group oppression,suggesting as it does that women and men are inherently different in some fixed and absolute way. It implies that women by virtue of our sex have played no crucial role in supporting and upholding imperialism (and the militarism that serves to maintain imperialist rule) or other systems of domination. Often the women who make such assertions arc white. Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent and militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism.

#### By reifying traditional notions of sex-gender relations, the affirmative perpetuates Heteronormativity. Heteronormativity manifests in unending violence against the other

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These are injuries inflicted on others. Fuelled by heteronormativity, ex- ternalized homophobia is commonplace. It can be directed to any person who is perceived or assumed to be a sexual other and can be manifested in multi- ple ways: harassment, avoidance, verbal abuse, differential treatment and dis- criminatory behavior, and physical violence. The use of name-calling toward individuals who are perceived to be outside the boundaries of hetero- normativity (e.g., lesbian, gay, or transgender) is common in everyday inter- action. In U.S. middle and high schools, for example, verbal harassment is a pervasive problem:¶ One-third of eleventh grade students who responded to a 1999 CBS poll said that they knew of incidents of harassment of gay and lesbian stu- dents. Twenty-eight percent admitted to making antigay remarks them- selves. The average high school student in Des Moines, Iowa, public¶ schools hears an antigay comment every seven minutes, according to data gathered by students in a year-long study; teachers intervened only 3 percent of the time. (Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 31)¶ When administrators and fellow students overlook and disregard these situa- tions, they provide a clear message that it is permissible to hate those who are perceived to be sexual others; thus, the cycle of homophobia gets perpetuated in society. In addition, verbal harassment, if allowed to persist, can lead to an overall hostile environment and other forms of violence, including physical vi- olence and sexual assault.¶ Hate crimes are the most extreme expression of externalized homophobia. Antigay violence is increasing (Berrill, 1992; Fone, 2000) and victims are still being blamed for bringing it on to themselves (Herek & Berrill, 1992). Homo- phobic murder is, as Donna Minkowitz (2000) put it, “still open season on gays” (p. 293). Reports on gay bashing appear regularly in the media and¶ Every such incident carries a message to the victim and the entire commu- nity of which he or she is part. Each anti-gay attack is, in effect, a punish- ment for stepping outside culturally accepted norms [of heteronormativity] and a warning to all gay and lesbian people to stay in “their place,” the invis- ibility and self-hatred of the closet. (Herek & Berrill, 1992, p. 3)¶ Externalized homophobia, whether in the form of verbal or physical assault, is a potent, and at times deadly, mode of enforcement of the heteronormative order.

**Their modest tinkering with the law instantiates the worst violence of governmentality located at the level of rationality instead of politics—this turns the case and ensures that the aff doesn’t solve.**

**Williams 08** Williams, Daniel R. "After the Gold Rush - Part 2 Hamdi, the Jury Trial, and Our Degraded Public Sphere." Penn State Law Review 113 (11/13/2008): n. pag. Print.

**What is troublesome** with this picture—and what will herein be a¶ continuation of a theme introduced in After the Gold Rush, Part I—**is¶ that the instantiation of the state of exception has become a technique of¶governancedeployed in a globalizationenvironment embroiled in a war¶ of sorts that is unlike other “hot” wars** we have experienced. **It used to¶ be that a “hot” war called upon the total mobilization of a populace, but¶ no more, for this “war” depends on the acquiescence, or the passivity, of¶ we the people**.49 So, **when thejudiciary begs off the task of imposing the¶constitutional vision of limited government upon this particular¶ technique of governance, when it too becomes part of the passivity that¶ surrounds war-on-terror governmentality, it permits by omission what we¶are witnessing as the bloating of sovereign power**—indeed, the eruption¶ of a new kind of sovereignty.50 One might say, then, **that because “sovereignty emerges within the field of governmentality,”51 Hamdi¶mocks the very idea of our commitment to limited government under¶law**, which is the very foundation of our nation, and thus by extension¶ disavows a crucial feature of our Enlightenment heritage. **This¶ disavowal is done in the name of preserving that heritage**, or so we tell¶ ourselves**. There is what many might consider a comforting response to this¶ argument about bloated sovereignty. No suspension of law has taken¶ place, one might counter, and thus no retreat from our commitment to¶ limited government constrained by the rule of law.** In fact**, we can¶ applaud the Hamdi Court for boldly swatting down the Executive’s¶ insistence that war silences law: “a state of war,”** Justice O’Connor¶ writes**, “is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights¶ of the Nation’s citizens.”**52 More important, presumably, **the¶ instantiation of the current state of exception, which is the nation’s¶ commitment to prosecute a particular war against a technique deployed¶by a worldwide network of individuals unaffiliated with any state, is a¶ matter of national will, and of national identity, that is reserved to we the¶people**. **So long as we take seriously the idea of American democracy,¶ and so long as we believe that our democracy is working when it comes¶ to the exercise of sovereignty in matters of global management**¶ (ubiquitously expressed in our political discourse as “spreading¶ democracy”), **we really cannot regard ourselves as the civil-rights-and civil-¶ liberties-losing victims of an overreaching Sovereign, because the¶ state of exception itself, which is the juridical order brought about by a¶ war on terror that we have democratically endorsed, is a product of our¶ self-willing through the organs of our democracy.**53¶**I find comfort neither in this response, nor in this entire story of¶ democratic institutions re-calibrating the balance of security and liberty,¶**as if that balancing takes place in a world that is simply handed to us, **and¶ is untouched by our own affirmative quests for domination and control¶ unshackled by international legality.**This fraudulent neutrality of the¶ material setting in which the security-liberty balance is struck is the notso-¶ deeply hidden backdrop of the Court’s decision in Hamdi**.** Situating¶Hamdi within a story of democracy is dubious not simply because the¶ “sovereign people, in its collective capacity, is everywhere and nowhere,” a mythic symbol, as it were.54 It is not only that all such¶ legitimation theories are rooted in fictions, or that “civil society is a bluff¶ and the social contract a fairy tale.”55 The dubiousness is more¶ empirical. **What seems to be completely ignored** in all the commentary¶ about Hamdi and the other post-9/11 cases relating to the so-called war¶ on terror **is the rather stunning quiescence toward the real possibility that¶the United States, with its desiccated public sphere, has become “a¶ military empire.”56 It is that quiescence, and the troubling circumstances¶ surrounding it, that makes it so dubious to situate Hamdi in a storyline of¶ democracy in action.**

#### **By conflating drone violence with torture and creating a legal remedy to it, the affirmative performativly distances them from torture, making it palatable to the American public—creates the conditions for imperialism**

Sturken 2011 (Marita, Professor of Media at NYU, “Comfort, irony, and trivialization: the mediation of torture” in *International Journal of Cultural Studies*)

On June 10, 2004, when asked if torture was justified, President George W. Bush ¶ answered, ‘We’re a nation of law. We adhere to laws. We have laws on the books. You ¶ might look at these laws, and that might provide comfort to you’ (Mayer, 2007: 182). Of ¶ the many things one could say about Bush’s words, including noting the fact that his ¶ administration had in fact condoned the torture of many prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison ¶ in Iraq, at the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and at other undisclosed secret prisons, ¶ the word ‘comfort’ demands attention. The trope of comfort, and its invocation as a ¶ mode, aesthetic, and style, has been a key factor in enabling the project of American ¶ Empire, in particular in the years since 9/11 and in the aims of the so-called global ‘war on terror’. The culture of comfort in the United States permeates political discourse, ¶ social imperatives, and consumerism. It is a primary mechanism through which the ¶ project of U.S. imperialism is made palatable to the American public. It is also a primary ¶ mode through which the U.S. practice of torture is mediated. ¶ In this article, I address the interrelationship of torture and comfort as a key feature ¶ of the United States project of American Empire. My focus is on how the U.S. practice of ¶ torture is mediated in American culture, in particular through the distancing strategies of ¶ domestication, trivialization, kitschification, and irony. I use as a framing concept Roger ¶ Silverstone’s notion of ‘proper distance’, in particular its formulation of the relationship ¶ of mediation to morality. Torture is a practice that actively and violently others its ¶ victims in its aim to destroy subjectivity, that demands a moral response. Silverstone’s ¶ concept of proper distance is a key framework through which the relationship of media ¶ and morality can be understood, one that provides a framework for understanding the ¶ tensions of proximity and distance that define mediation. My central aim is to understand ¶ the mechanisms by which torture is both sanctioned and disavowed in American culture, ¶ how it functions as a shadow to U.S. concepts of liberal democracy that must deny its ¶ existence, and how the U.S. practice of torture is mediated in order to be accepted in ¶ American culture. Silverstone’s concept of proper distance offers a challenge to engage ¶ with the question of mediation not simply as an exercise in how meanings change and ¶ disavowal works, but to ask moral questions that strike at the core of how mediation can ¶ both uphold regimes of power and resist them. ¶ I am particularly interested in how a mediation of torture is enabled through modes of ¶ innocence and comfort culture, modes that are hugely powerful in American culture. ¶ American comfort culture is undergirded by the concept of American innocence and a ¶ culture of defense. Comfort as a mode to be consumed and a style is a key factor in ¶ the disavowal in American society about the nation’s current fragile state of being – ¶ disavowal about the actual threat Americans live within, economically and politically, ¶ and the role U.S. policies and political modes have played in making that threat worse, ¶ about the state of insecurity as the norm; and disavowal about the brutal impact of U.S. ¶ actions and policies on its own citizens and those of the world. Comfort culture is a ¶ mechanism of distancing. That is, it functions primarily to create experiences of proximity while offering comfortable modes of distancing.¶ This interrelationship of proximity, distance, and mediation is directly related to the ¶ question of how nations, and the mediating forms that affirm them, construct our relationship to the other. Silverstone argues for a definition of proper distance that:¶ refers to the importance of understanding the more or less precise degree of proximity ¶ required in our mediated interrelationships if we are to create and sustain a sense of the other ¶ sufficient not just for reciprocity but for a duty of care, obligation and responsibility, as well ¶ as understanding. (2007: 47)¶ That is, he argues for an epistemological and ontological commitment to understanding ¶ a relationship to the other. The carefulness with which this formulation defines a potential and idealized mediated relationship to the other is crucial. It may seem perhaps ¶ ironic that such a formulation offers a point of departure to understanding how the practice of torture is mediated, given that we can understand torture as proper distance’s opposite. Yet, as I will explore further, this complication of the concept of distance ¶ is key to understanding that process of mediation. There are enabling and disabling ¶ forms of distance; unpacking them can help us to see how mediation works, how these ¶ are not only processes of denial and disavowal but also processes through which relationships are affirmed and constructed. ¶ I see the mediation of torture in U.S. culture in relation to what I have called the ¶ ‘tourism of history’ that has characterized American culture throughout most of its ¶ history, and in particular in the past few decades (Sturken, 2007). By using the term ¶ ‘tourism of history’ I am pointing to the mediating forms through which the American ¶ public is encouraged to experience itself and the nation’s relationship to global politics ¶ and world history through consumerism, media images, souvenirs, popular culture, and ¶ museum and architectural reenactments, modes that have as their goal a cathartic yet ¶ distanced ‘experience’ of history. The tourist is a figure who stands outside of any particular location or history, who peers in while feeling no responsibility for the economic, ¶ cultural, and historical impact of tourist activity. It is a distanced relationship that offers ¶ a sense of closeness and proximity as part of its veneer. ¶ U.S. culture is fundamentally structured in ways that encourage a tourist relationship ¶ to history, one that allows Americans to feel distanced from global politics and world ¶ events, and to see our role in them as separate and exceptional. This tourist relationship ¶ disavows the impact of our often destructive and brutal policies, and maintains an ¶ innocence about them. The tourism of history, whether it is manifested in the consumerism ¶ of defensive design, in museum reenactments of traumatic events, in the kitschification ¶ of grief via 9/11 teddy bears, in the superficial and biased news media coverage of world ¶ politics created by the context of 24-hour news cycles, or in the trivialization of torture ¶ as a practice of the U.S. government, provides the means for consumer-citizens to feel ¶ ‘authentically’ close to traumatic events while also feeling innocent and detached.¶ The tourism of history that frames American culture allows the U.S. imperial project ¶ to be disavowed because it provides an image of the U.S. as an exceptional nation. This ¶ kind of imperialism must deny itself; it needs to be shadowed by a culture of comfort ¶ and innocence in order to be fully palatable to the American public (Campbell, 1998: 3). ¶ Comfort culture sells the idea of emotional connection. At its most extreme, it embodies ¶ many forms of kitsch. Yet, it effectively produces not a relation of proximity but one ¶ of distance, one aided and mediated by consumerism, media tropes, and narratives of ¶ popular culture.

#### Squo solves the aff

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In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and inter- national humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 per- cent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gun- ships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forc- ing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making signifi- cant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allow- ing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resis- tance—such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attack- ing Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.