### 1nc---disad

#### Debt ceiling will be raised now but it’s not certain --- Obama’s ironclad political capital is forcing the GOP to give in

Brian Beutler 10/3/13, “Republicans finally confronting reality: They’re trapped!,” Salon <http://www.salon.com/2013/10/03/republicans_finally_confronting_reality_theyre_trapped/>

After struggling for weeks and weeks in stages one through four, Republicans are finally entering the final stage of grief over the death of their belief that President Obama would begin offering concessions in exchange for an increase in the debt limit.¶ The catalyzing event appears to have been an hour-plus-long meeting between Obama and congressional leaders at the White House on Wednesday. Senior administration officials say that if the meeting accomplished only one thing it was to convey to Republican leaders the extent of Obama’s determination not to negotiate with them over the budget until after they fund the government and increase the debt limit. These officials say his will here is stronger than at any time since he decided to press ahead with healthcare reform after Scott Brown ended the Democrats’ Senate supermajority in 2010.¶ There’s evidence that it sunk in.¶ First, there’s this hot mic moment in which Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell tells Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., that the president’s position is ironclad.¶ Then we learn that House Speaker John Boehner has told at least one House Republican privately what he and McConnell have hinted at publicly for months, which is that they won’t execute their debt limit hostage. Boehner specifically said, according to a New York Times report, and obliquely confirmed by a House GOP aide, that he would increase the debt limit before defaulting even if he lost more than half his conference on a vote.¶ None of this is to say that Republicans have “folded” exactly, but they’ve pulled the curtain back before the stage has been fully set for the final act, and revealed who’s being fitted with the red dye packet.

#### Fights caused by the plan distract from congressional efforts to resolve the debt ceiling --- collapses the economy

Norm Ornstein 13, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy. Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

#### Debt ceiling collapses the global economy --- fast timeframe and no resiliency

Adam Davidson 9/10/13, economy columnist for The New York Times, co-founder of Planet Money, NPR’s team of economics reporters, “Our Debt to Society,” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.¶ Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

### 1nc---counterplan

#### CP:

#### The United States Federal Government should condition the use of the President’s authority for targeted killings as a first resort to instances of self-defense or response to attack by a non-state actor located within a state has consented to the United States’ carrying out targeted killing missions within its borders, or that is unwilling or unable to prosecute or neutralize such actors.

#### The standard of “unable or unwilling” should require offering notice, when feasible, to the targeted state and allowance of time for a good-faith effort to neutralize the threat to the United States. “Ability” should be defined by analysis of the level of sovereign control the state exercises over the territory in which the relevant non-state groups are located.

#### Competes---it’s functionally distinct from the plan because it makes no reference to active hostilities or geographical limits on targeted killing authority.

#### Solves the case---the U.S. and every other state already justify targeted killings with an “unable or unwilling” framework---no other legal model will ever achieve status as a norm---the plan forfeits the ability to shape that norm by clarifying its criteria

Ashley S. Deeks 12, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School, Spring 2012, “ARTICLE: "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law, 52 Va. J. Int'l L. 483

In an August 2007 speech, then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama asserted that his administration would take action against high-value leaders of al-Qaida in Pakistan if the United States had actionable intelligence about them and President Musharraf would not act. n1 He later clarified his position, stating, "What I said was that if we have actionable intelligence against bin Laden or other key al-Qaida officials ... and Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against them, we should." n2

On May 2, 2011, the United States put those words into operation. Without the consent of Pakistan's government, U.S. forces entered Pakistan to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. In the wake of the successful U.S. military operation, the Government of Pakistan objected to the "unauthorized unilateral action" of the United States. n3 U.S. officials, on the other hand, suggested that the United States declined to provide Pakistan with advance knowledge of the raid because it was concerned that doing so might have compromised the mission. n4 This failure to notify suggests that the United States determined that Pakistan was indeed "unwilling or unable" to suppress the threat posed by bin Laden. n5 Unfortunately, international law currently gives the United States (or any state in a similar position) little guidance about what factors are relevant when making such [\*486] a determination. Yet the stakes are high: the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has come under serious strain as a result of the operation. If, in the future, a state in Pakistan's position deems another state's use of force in its territory pursuant to an "unwilling or unable" determination to be unlawful, the territorial state could use force in response. The lack of guidance therefore has the potential to be costly.

President Obama's speech invoked an important but little understood legal standard governing the use of force. More than a century of state practice suggests that it is lawful for State X, which has suffered an armed attack by an insurgent or terrorist group, to use force in State Y against that group if State Y is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat. n6 Yet there has been virtually no discussion, either by states or scholars, of what that standard means. What factors must the United States consider when evaluating Pakistan's willingness or ability to suppress the threats to U.S. (as well as NATO and Afghan) forces? Must the United States ask Pakistan to take measures itself before the United States lawfully may act? How much time must the United States give Pakistan to respond? What if Pakistan proposes to respond to the threat in a way that the United States believes may not be adequate?

Many states agree that the "unwilling or unable" test is the correct standard by which to assess the legality of force in this context. For example, Russia used force in Georgia in 2002 against Chechen rebels who had conducted violent attacks in Russia, based on Russia's conclusion that Georgia was unwilling or unable to suppress the rebels' attacks. n7 Israel has invoked the "unwilling or unable" standard periodically in justifying its use of force in Lebanon against Hezbollah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, noting, "Members of the [Security] Council need scarcely be reminded that under international law, if a State is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory to attack another State, that latter State is entitled to take all necessary measures in its own defense." n8 Similarly, [\*487] Turkey defends its use of force in Iraq against the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) by claiming that Iraq is unable to suppress the PKK. n9 Several U.S. administrations have stated that the United States will inquire whether another state is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat before using force without consent in that state's territory. n10

Given that academic discussion of the test has been limited thus far, we may describe what "unwilling or unable" means only at a high level of generality. n11 In its most basic form, a state (the "victim state") suffers an armed attack from a nonstate group operating outside its territory and concludes that it is necessary to use force in self-defense to respond to the continuing threat that the group poses. The question is whether the state in which the group is operating (the "territorial state") will agree to suppress the threat on the victim state's behalf. The "unwilling or unable" test requires a victim state to ascertain whether the territorial state is willing and able to address the threat posed by the nonstate group before using force in the territorial state's territory without consent. If the territorial state is willing and able, the victim state may not use force in the territorial state, and the territorial state is expected to take the appropriate steps against the nonstate group. If the territorial state is unwilling or unable to take those steps, however, it is lawful for the victim state to use [\*488] that level of force that is necessary (and proportional) to suppress the threat that the nonstate group poses.

A test constructed at this level of generality offers insufficient guidance to states. Although many inquiries in the use of force area lack precision, including questions about what constitutes an "armed attack" and when force is proportional, states and commentators have discussed the possible meanings of these terms at length and in great detail. n12 The same is not true for the "unwilling or unable" test; strikingly little attention has been paid to the nature and consequences of -- or solutions to -- the imprecision surrounding the "unwilling or unable" test.

The test's lack of content undermines the legitimacy of the test as it currently is framed and suggests that it is not, in its current form, imposing effective constraints on a state's use of force. n13 To address this flaw, this Article first identifies the test's historical parentage in the law of neutrality and then conducts an original analysis of two centuries of state practice in order to develop normative factors that define what it means for a territorial state to be "unwilling or unable" to suppress attacks by a nonstate actor.

Identifying the test's pedigree demonstrates the legitimacy of the core test and helps to frame the relevant law that should inform the test's content. As Thomas Franck has noted, "Pedigree ... pulls toward rule compliance by emphasizing the deep rootedness of the rule." n14 Embedded in this argument is an assumption that states are reasonable actors, that they develop particular rules for good reasons, and that rules with a long pedigree may be seen as particularly instructive because they draw from the collective wisdom of states over time. While following precedent and tradition does not always result in the ideal normative outcome, n15 this Article will demonstrate why it is useful to consider the historical development and applications of the test in ascertaining what its meaning should be.

It is worth noting that this test is not the only standard around which states could have coalesced. Although it is possible to imagine a range of [\*489] alternative regimes, it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore those other regimes in detail. n16 Instead, this Article takes as a given that states currently view the "unwilling or unable" test as the proper test. The fact that states currently are acclimated to using the "unwilling or unable" test suggests that any other test would have to overcome a high bar to become the preferred test, a hurdle no other option is poised to meet.

In considering the appropriate content of the test, I argue that the "unwilling or unable" test, properly conceived, should advance three goals, derived from Abram Chayes's articulation of how international law can influence foreign policy decisions. n17 First, the "unwilling or unable" test should constrain victim state action by reducing the number of situations [\*490] in which a victim state resorts to force. Second, the test should be clear and detailed enough to serve to justify or legitimate a victim state's use of force when that force is consistent with the test. Third, the test should establish procedures that will improve the quality of decision-making by the victim and territorial states and by those international bodies that are seized with use of force issues. In considering these goals, I identify the relevance of the "rules versus standards" debate and discuss why, in this context, we should favor a more precise rule over a less determinate standard. A test that promotes the goals I have described within the framework of the UN Charter is likely to be seen as a credible international legal norm. It therefore will legitimize those uses of force that are consistent with the test's requirements and delegitimize (and possibly reduce the frequency of) those that stand in tension with the test.

#### Net-beneficial---restricting targeted killing as a first resort outside active hostilities collapses counter-terrorism by signaling availability of safe havens and immunity from strikes---the “unable-unwilling” framework’s a distinct and better alternative

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 5/16/13, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis

3. What is the geographic scope of the AUMF and under what circumstances may the United States attack belligerent targets in the territory of another country?

In my opinion, there is no need to amend the AUMF to define the geographic scope of military operations it authorizes. On the contrary, I believe doing so would fundamentally undermine the efficacy of U.S. counter-terror military operations by overtly signaling to the enemy exactly where to pursue safe-haven and de facto immunity from the reach of U.S. power. This concern is similar to that associated with explicitly defining co- belligerents subject to the AUMF, although I believe it is substantially more significant. It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non-state threats rarely seek the proverbial "toe to toe" confrontation with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous, and ostensibly caused the dispersion of operational capabilities that then necessitated the co-belligerent assessment. Imposing an arbitrary geographic limitation of the scope of military operations against this threat would therefore be inconsistent with the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States.

I believe much of the momentum for asserting some arbitrary geographic limitation on the scope of operations conducted to disrupt or disable al Qaeda belligerent capabilities is the result of the commonly used term "hot battlefield." This notion of a "hot" battlefield is, in my opinion, an operational and legal fiction. Nothing in the law of armed conflict or military doctrine defines the meaning of "battlefield." Contrary to the erroneous assertions that the use of combat power is restricted to defined geographic locations such as Afghanistan (and previously Iraq), the geographic scope of armed conflict must be dictated by a totality assessment of a variety of factors, ultimately driven by the strategic end state the nation seeks to achieve. The nature and dynamics of the threat -including key vulnerabilities - is a vital factor in this analysis. These threat dynamics properly influence the assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, which in turn drive the formulation of national strategy, which includes determining when, where, and how to leverage national power (including military power) to achieve desired operational effects. Thus, threat dynamics, and not some geographic "box", have historically driven and must continue to drive the scope of armed hostilities. The logic of this premise is validated by (in my opinion) the inability to identify an armed conflict in modern history where the scope of operations was legally restricted by a conception of a "hot" battlefield. Instead, threat dynamics coupled with policy, diplomatic considerations and, in certain armed conflicts the international law of neutrality, dictate such scope. Ultimately, battlefields become "hot" when persons, places, or things assessed as lawful military objectives pursuant to the law of armed conflict are subjected to attack.

I do not, however, intend to suggest that it is proper to view the entire globe as a battlefield in the military component of our struggle against al Qaeda, or that threat dynamics are the only considerations in assessing the scope of military operations. Instead, complex considerations of policy and diplomacy have and must continue to influence this assessment. However, suggesting that the proper scope of combat operations is dictated by a legal conception of "hot" battlefield is operationally irrational and legally unsound. Accordingly, placing policy limits on the scope of combat operations conducted pursuant to the legal authority provided by the AUMF is both logical and appropriate, and in my view has been a cornerstone of U.S. use of force policy since the enactment of the AUMF. In contrast, interpreting the law of armed conflict to place legal limits on the scope of such operations to "hot" battlefields, or imposing such a legal limitation in the terms of the AUMF, creates a perverse incentive for the belligerent enemy by allowing him to dictate when and where he will be subject to lawful attack.

I believe this balance between legal authority and policy and diplomatic considerations is reflected in what is commonly termed the "unable or unwilling" test for assessing when attacking an enemy belligerent capability in the territory of another country is permissible. First, it should be noted that the legality of an attack against an enemy belligerent is determined exclusively by the law of armed conflict when the country where he is located provides consent for such action (is the target lawful within the meaning of the law and will attack of the target comply with the targeting principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in the attack). In the unusual circumstance where a lawful object of attack associated with al Qaeda and therefore falling within the scope of the AUMF is identified in the territory of another country not providing consent for U.S. military action, policy and diplomacy play a decisive role in the attack decision-making process. Only when the U.S. concludes that the country is unable or unwilling to address the threat will attack be authorized, which presupposes that the nature of the target is determined to be sufficiently significant to warrant a non-consensual military action in that territory. I believe the Executive is best positioned to make these judgments, and that to date they have been made judiciously. I also believe that imposing a statutory scope limitation would vest terrorist belligerent operatives with the benefits of the sovereignty of the state they exploit for sanctuary. It strikes me as far more logical to continue to allow the President to address these sovereignty concerns through diplomacy, focused on the strategic interests of the nation.

### 1nc---disad

#### Uniqueness---there’s currently no legal consensus over how to define the battlefield in the war on terror---but clearly conflict takes place outside traditional battlefields

Laurie R. Blank 10, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 9/16/10, “DEFINING THE BATTLEFIELD IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT AND COUNTERTERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE PARAMETERS OF THE ZONE OF COMBAT,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2010, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677965>

The English language and traditional military discourse contain numerous terms to describe wartime areas. A battlefield is “a place where a battle is fought”; a combat area is a military area where combat forces operate.1 A theater of operations is a region in which active combat operations are in progress, and a theater of war refers to “the entire land, sea, and air area that is or may become involved directly in war operations.”2 These common terms provide generally clear descriptions of physical areas during traditional armed conflicts. United States Civil War enthusiasts thus visit battlefields at Antietam, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and elsewhere. World War II historians have the beaches at Normandy. We can identify the major battles of the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and even Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, with the exception of the second Gulf War, we can also identify—often to the day—when each of these conflicts began and ended.

We cannot say the same for the current struggle against terrorism, often called the “global war on terror.” Many contemporary conflicts, in which states fight against non-state actors and terrorist groups unbounded by sovereign territorial boundaries and preferring tactics aimed at civilians often far from any traditionally understood battlefield,3 can easily confound attempts to use these existing terms effectively. In particular, the present conflict between the United States and al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups poses significant yet seemingly fundamental questions about not only the law applicable to operations against terrorists but also about where the conflict is taking place and where that law applies. Beyond the obvious areas of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the border areas of Pakistan, there is, at present, little agreement on where the battlefield is—i.e., where this conflict is taking place—and an equal measure of uncertainty regarding when it started and how it might end. “A war against groups of transnational terrorists, by its very nature, lacks a well-delineated timeline or a traditional battlefield context . . . .”4 In addition to the clear political challenges these uncertainties produce, they also lead to complex legal conundrums regarding the application of the law to military and counterterrorism operations.

#### Legally codifying the plan loses the war on terrorism---sends a signal that terrorists can have safe havens outside conflict zones and grants immunity to terror groups that hop borders---it’s unique because the rules’ current status as non-binding policy doesn’t link

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 5/16/13, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis

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#### Constraining targeted killing’s role in the war on terror causes extinction

Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin ‘12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Limiting targeted killings in Pakistan causes a shift to ground assaults---turns the case and collapses the Pakistani government

Richard Weitz 11, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 1/2/11, “WHY UAVS HAVE BECOME THE ANTI-TERROR WEAPON OF CHOICE IN THE AFGHAN-PAK BORDER,” http://www.sldinfo.com/why-uavs-have-become-the-anti-terror-weapon-of-choice-in-the-afghan-pak-border/

Perhaps the most important argument in favor of using UAV strikes in northwest Pakistan and other terrorist havens is that alternative options are typically worse.

The Pakistani military has made clear that it is neither willing nor capable of repressing the terrorists in the tribal regions. Although the controversial ceasefire accords Islamabad earlier negotiated with tribal leaders have formally collapsed, the Pakistani Army has repeatedly postponed announced plans to occupy North Waziristan, which is where the Afghan insurgents and the foreign fighters supporting them and al-Qaeda are concentrated.

Such a move that would meet fierce resistance from the region’s population, which has traditionally enjoyed extensive autonomy. The recent massive floods have also forced the military to divert its assets to humanitarian purposes, especially helping the more than ten million displaced people driven from their homes.

But the main reason for their not attacking the Afghan Taliban or its foreign allies based in Pakistan’s tribal areas is that doing so would result in their joining the Pakistani Taliban in its vicious fight with the Islamabad government.

Yet, sending in U.S. combat troops on recurring raids or a protracted occupation of Pakistani territory would provoke widespread outrage in Pakistan and perhaps in other countries as well since the UN Security Council mandate for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan only authorizes military operations in Pakistan.

On the one known occasion when U.S. Special Forces actually conducted a ground assault in the tribal areas in 2008, the Pakistanis reacted furiously. On September 3, 2008, a U.S. Special Forces team attacked a suspected terrorist base in Pakistan’s South Waziristan region, killing over a dozen people. These actions evoked strong Pakistani protests. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, who before November 2007 had led Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), issued a written statement denying that “any agreement or understanding [existed] with the coalition forces” [in Afghanistan] allowing them to strike inside Pakistan.” The general pledged to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity “at all cost.” Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari also criticized the U.S. ground operation on Pakistani territory. On September 16, 2008, the Pakistani army announced it would shoot any U.S. forces attempting to cross the Afghan-Pakistan border.

On several occasions since then, Pakistani troops and militia have fired at what they believed to be American helicopters flying from Afghanistan to deploy Special Forces on their territory, though there is no conclusive evidence that the U.S. military has ever attempted another large-scale commando raid in Pakistan after the September 2008 incident.

Further large-scale U.S. military operations into Pakistan could easily rally popular support behind the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It might even precipitate the collapse of the Islambad government and its replacement by a regime in nuclear-armed Pakistan that is less friendly to Washington.

Given these alternatives, continuing the drone strikes appears to be the best of the limited options available to deal with a core problem, giving sanctuary to terrorists striking US and coalition forces in Afghanistan and beyond.

#### Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

### 1nc---k

#### The plan identifies the non-Western world as a space devoid of the rule of law---that sets the stage for aggressive intervention and colonial plunder, which locks in neoliberal structural violence---and their ev is based on distorted representations of the rule of law that have no relationship to reality

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental-European powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the ‘periphery’, both by itself and through a set of international institutions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism.

Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ‘lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ‘lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy.

The theory of ‘lack’ and the rhetoric of the rule of law have justified aggressive interventions from Western countries into non-Western ones. The policy of corporatization and open markets, supported today globally by the so-called Washington consensus3, was used by Western bankers and the business community in Latin America as the main vehicle to ‘open the veins’ of the continent—to borrow Eduardo Galeano’s metaphor4—with no solution of continuity between colonial and post-colonial times. Similar policy was used in Africa to facilitate the forced transfer of slaves to America, and today to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products, oil, minerals, ideas and cultural artefacts in the same countries. The policy of opening markets for free trade, used today in Afghanistan and Iraq, was used in China during the nineteenth century Opium War, in which free trade was interpreted as an obligation to buy drugs from British dealers. The policy of forcing local industries to compete on open markets was used by the British empire in Bengal, as it is today by the WTO in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people have been vehicles of plunder, not of legality. In all these settings the tragic human suffering produced by such plunder is simply ignored. In this context law played a major role in legalizing such practices of powerful actors against the powerless.5 Yet, this use of power is scarcely explored in the study of Western law.

The exportation of Western legal institutions from the West to the ‘rest’ has systematically been justified through the ideological use of the extremely politically strong and technically weak concept of ‘rule of law’. The notion of ‘rule of law’ is an extremely ambiguous one. Notwithstanding, within any public discussion its positive connotations have always been taken for granted. The dominant image of the rule of law is false both historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others ‘lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an ‘efficient’ market.

The rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new ground whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology. Moreover, when large corporate actors dominate states (affected by a declining regulatory role), law becomes a product of the economy, and economy governs the law rather than being governed by it.

#### Notions of US legal prestige and modeling solidify global inequality by replacing political violence with legal violence---turns the case because it subordinates effective domestic systems to predatory rule of law models

Ugo Mattei 3, Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, ¶ U.C. Hastings; Professore Ordinario di Diritto Civile, Università di Torino A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/pol160A/Mattei.pdf

This essay attempts to develop a theory of imperial law that is able to explain postCold War changes in the general process of Americanization in legal thinking. My claim is that “imperial law” is now a dominant layer of world-wide legal systems.1 Imperial law is produced, in the interest of international capital, by a variety of both public and private institutions, all sharing a gap in legitimacy, sometimes called the “democratic deficit.” Imperial law is shaped by a spectacular process of exaggeration, aimed at building consent for the purpose of hegemonic domination. Imperial law subordinates local legal arrangements world-wide, reproducing on the global scale the same phenomenon of legal dualism that thus far has characterized the law of developing countries. Predatory economic globalization is the vehicle, the all-mighty ally, and the beneficiary of imperial law. Ironically, despite its absolute lack of democratic legitimacy, imperial law imposes as a natural necessity, by means of discursive practices branded “democracy and the rule of law,” a reactive legal philosophy that outlaws redistribution of wealth based on social solidarity.2 At the core of imperial law there is U.S. law, as transformed and adapted after the Reagan-Thatcher revolution, in the process of infiltrating the huge periphery left open after the end of the Cold War. A study of imperial law requires a careful discussion of the factors of penetration of U.S. legal consciousness world-wide, as well as a careful distinction between the context of production and the context of reception3 of the variety of institutional arrangements that make imperial law. Factors of resistance need to be fully appreciated as well.

I. AMERICAN LAW: FROM LEADERSHIP TO DOMINANCE The years following the Second World War have shown a dramatic change in the pattern of world hegemony in the law. Leading legal ideas, once produced in Continental Civilian Europe and exported through the periphery of the world, are now for the first time produced in a common law jurisdiction: the United States.4 There is little question that the present world dominance of the United States has been economic, military, and political first, and legal only in a more recent moment, so that a ready explanation of legal hegemony can be found with a simple Marxist explanation of law as a superstructure of the economy.5 Nevertheless, the question of the relationship between legal, political, and economic hegemony is not likely to be correctly addressed within a cause-and-effect paradigm.6 Ultimately, addressing this question is a very important area of basic jurisprudential research because it reveals some general aspects about the nature of law as a device of global governance.

Observing historical patterns of legal hegemony allows us to critique the distinction between two main patterns of governance through the law (and of legal transplants).7 Scholars of legal transplants have traditionally distinguished two patterns. The first is law as dominance without hegemony, in which the legal system is ultimately a coercive apparatus asserting political and economic power without consent. This area of inquiry and this model have been used to explain the relationship between the legal system of the motherland and that of the colonies within imperialistic colonial enterprises. The opposing pattern, telling a story of consensual voluntary reception by an admiring periphery of legal models developed and provided for at the center, is usually considered the most important pattern of legal transplants. It is described by stressing on the idea of consent within a notion of “prestige.”8

Little effort is necessary to challenge the sufficiency of this basic taxonomy in introducing legal transplants. Law is a detailed and complex machinery of social control that cannot function with any degree of effectiveness without some cooperation from a variety of individuals staffing legal institutions. These individuals usually consist of a professional elite which either already exists or is created by the hegemonic power. Such an elite provides the degree of consent to the reception of foreign legal ideas that is necessary for any legal transplant to occur. Hence, the distinction between imperialistic and non-imperialistic transplants is a matter only of degree and not of structure. In order to understand the nature of present legal hegemony, it is necessary to capture the way in which the law functions to build a degree of consent to the present pattern of international economic and political dominance.9

In this essay I suggest that a fundamental cultural construct of presumed consent is the rhetoric of democracy and the rule of law utilized by the imperial model of governance, 10 triumphant worldwide together with the neo-American model of capitalism developed by the Reagan and Thatcher revolution early in the 1980s. I argue that the last twenty years have produced the triumph in global governance of reactive, politically irresponsible institutions, such as the courts of law, over proactive politically accountable institutions such as direct administrative apparatuses of the State.11

This essay attempts to open a radical revision of some accepted modes of thought about the law as they appear today, at what has been called “the end of history.”12 Its aim is to discuss some ways in which global legality has been created in the present stage of world-wide legal development. It will show how democracy and the rule of law, in the present legal landscape, are just another rhetoric of legitimization of a given international dynamic of power. It will also denounce the present unconscious state in which the law is produced and developed by professional “consent building” elites. The consequences of such unconsciousness are creating a legal landscape in which the law is “naturally” giving up its role of constraining opportunistic behavior of market actors. This process results in the development of faked rules and institutions that are functional to the interests of the great capital and that dramatically enlarge inequality within society. I predict that such a legal environment is unable to avoid tragic results on a global scale such as those outlined in the well-known parable of the tragedy of the commons.13

My object of observation is a legal landscape in transition. I wish to analyze this path of transition from one political setting (the local state) to another political setting (world governance) in which American-framed reactive institutions are asserting themselves as legitimate and legitimating governing bodies, which I call imperial law. Imperial law is the product of a renowned alliance between state and economic institutions, a cooperative game in which a very limited number of powerful players are at play.14 While in the ages of colonialism such political battles for international hegemony were mostly carried on with an open use of force and political violence (in such a way that final extensive conflict between superpowers was unavoidable), in the age of globalization and of economic Empire political violence has been transformed into legal violence.

#### Our alternative is to reject their emphasis on Western-models of law in favor of a fundamental rethink of democracy from the bottom-up

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

In the complex spectrum of global law, both throughout the era of colonialism and neo-liberal US-led Western imperialism within a pattern of continuity, the rule of law, together with the theory of ‘lack’ and other powerful rhetorical arguments, has been used in order to legitimize political interventions and plunder in the ‘emerging’ economies. The sacred concept of rule of law, whose positive connotations are ‘naturally’ assumed, has been portrayed as the embodiment of a professional and neutral technology, thus being capable of substituting the lack of democratic legitimacy of the institutions that are protagonist in the creation of global law. But its dark side has never been shown or discussed. An imperial rule of law is now a dominant layer for the worldwide legal systems. It is produced, in the interest of international capital, by a variety of institutions, both public and private, all sharing a gap in political legitimacy sometimes referred to as ‘democratic deficit’.31 At the same time, law has been constructively turned into a technology and a mere component of an economic system of capitalism, thus hiding its intrinsic political nature, and annulling the relevance of local political systems, now impotent in front of the dynamics of global law. The ‘dry technology’ of the rule of law penetrates worldwide legal systems without any political discussion at the local level, attempting to create the conditions for the development of market economies, often without success, and causing serious consequences for the less powerful.

Under the technology of the rule of law, in its imperial version capable of producing plunder, the essence of the United States’ law hides. In the aftermath of World War II, there was a dramatic change in the pattern of Western legal development. Leading legal ideas once produced in continental Europe and exported through the colonized world are now, for the first time, produced in a common law jurisdiction: the United States. Clearly, the present world dominance of the United States has been economic, military and political first, and only recently legal, so that a ready explanation of legal hegemony can be found within a simple conception of law as a product of the economy.32 Furthermore, US law has been capable of expanding worldwide thanks to its prestige, the high level of professionalization of its attorneys and a series of procedural institutions, that benefit plaintiffs, that allow US courts to have a certain capacity to attract jurisdiction, while showing themselves as courts for universal justice.33

The general attitude of the United States has been a very ethnocentric one, and precisely that of showing itself as the guardian of a universal legality, which it is legitimized to export through its courts of law, scholarly production, military and political intervention, and through a set of US-centric international institutions. In recent times, in particular after September 11th 2001 and the declaration of the ‘war on terror’, the US rule of law has come under attack 34, so that once admiring crowds of lawyers and intellectuals worldwide are now beginning to look upon the United States as an uncivilized old West from the perspective of legal culture, despite the professional prestige still enjoyed by the giant New York law firms and by the US academy.

Notwithstanding, there has been no decline in the rhetoric of the rule of law when it comes to foreign relations. Bringing democracy and the rule of law is still used as a justification to keep intruding in foreign affairs. The same can be said for the international financial institutions and their innumerable ‘development’ projects that come packaged with the prestigious wrapping of the rule of law.

A rethinking of the very idea of global law is necessary and it must derive from a revaluation of the local dimension, which is currently ignored by the neo-liberal model of development. The production of global law should change its direction, and follow a bottom-up approach, rather than a top-down one, thus being sensitive to the local particularities and complexities. Western spectacular ideas of democracy and the rule of law should be rethought. On this planet, resources are scarce, but there would be more than enough for all to live well. Nobody would admire and respect someone who, at a lunch buffet for seven, ate 90 percent of the food, leaving the other guests to share an amount insufficient for one. In a world history of capitalism in which the rule of law has reproduced this precise ‘buffet’ arrangement on the large scale, admiring the instruments used to secure such an unfair arrangement seems indeed paradoxical. People have to be free to build their own economies.

There is nothing inevitable about the present arrangements and their dominant and taken-for granted certainties. Indeed, it may be that the present legal and political hegemonies suffer from lack: the lack of world culture and of global political realism.

### 1nc---drone failure

#### Pakistan’s stabilizing---drone strikes are declining as precision increases---the status quo resolves their whole advantage

Cameron Munter 9-30, professor of practice in international relations at Pomona College, served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer for nearly three decades, was Ambassador to Pakistan 2010-2012, 9/30/13, “Guest Post: A New Face in the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship,” http://justsecurity.org/2013/09/30/cameron-munter-pakistan-relations/

In doing so, however, we have made the image of a soldier or a drone the image of America’s strategic vision for Pakistan and the region. As 2014 approaches, and American troops end their combat mission in Afghanistan; as drone strikes in the Pakistani tribal areas appear to be fewer in number and more precise in targeting; as the general trends of the U.S. “pivot toward Asia” become clear, the soldier and the drone will be less common. Even though the President’s commitment to U.S. security does not waver, the reminders of his commitment will be fewer and far between – at least it would seem, seen from the street in Pakistan.

Will that face of America – the M-16 and flak jacket, the film of a predator strike – remain, or can we replace it with something else? A different face of commitment, one that Americans have supported throughout the last decade but which has, in the Pakistani media (fairly or not) been shoved aside by the violence in the tribal areas and unrest throughout the country? That other commitment has been enormous expenditure by the U.S. government in support of economic growth, building schools, replacing crops destroyed by floods, refurbishing power plants, and improving health delivery services, to name just a few achievements. But few Pakistanis believe this aid has made a difference. Instead, they associate us only with the manifestations of the war on terror.

In the coming month this can change. No, it should not just be a PR campaign to convince Pakistanis of our commitment to what they care about (not just what we care about). Certainly, PR is necessary, but lacking a new face, it won’t be sufficient. It will require two things.

First, on the policy level, we must use the changes in 2014 to wrest U.S. policy toward Pakistan from its current status as derivative of the war in Afghanistan. Of course, Pakistan has an enormous role to play in security arrangements of the region in years to come. Its relationship to India, to China, to Iran, and of course to Afghanistan are very important as the international community seeks to find a just and equitable peace in the region. But we should make every effort to consider Pakistan’s needs. Not just the needs of the Pakistani military and intelligence leadership, important as they are. Rather, the needs of a country of nearly 200 million people whose stability and prosperity will be essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of the entire region. Pakistan’s success is not a guarantee of regional peace; but Pakistani failure is certainly a guarantee of regional strife.

Second, on a practical level, we should provide a face of American commitment that we know, through decades of effort, is welcome. Polling shows consistently that while most Pakistanis are angry at America (citing security policies as the reason), most Pakistanis – across the political spectrum, rural and urban, young and old – want a better relationship with us. Why? Because despite all the searing problems of the last decade, they admire us: they admire our educational institutions, our business acumen, our commitment to philanthropy. And here, I believe, they can find the practical partners to renew Pakistani understanding of American commitment to the relationship. Universities, businesses, foundations. Students and teachers, businesspeople and investors, donors and grassroots workers. These are the faces of the relationship in which America can play to its strengths, and in doing so, help build a successful Pakistan that is so necessary for us to achieve our own strategic interests in South Asia and beyond.

Recent press articles highlight just how worried we’ve been about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. And we should be worried. We need to know if that arsenal can be misused or fall into the wrong hands. But even a massive surveillance effort, while necessary, will be insufficient. We need to take modest but purposeful measures to help Pakistan remain stable. That’s not the same as focusing so overwhelmingly on immediate security concerns. We also need to engage in Pakistani politics, economics, society, where we have a much stronger hand to play than we perhaps realize.

Certainly, such changes cannot take place overnight. After all, the main reason that we see so few American university professors or businesspeople in Pakistan is that it’s still considered too dangerous. Yes, Pakistan’s government must take on the terrorist challenge, and it is enormous. And when Pakistan’s new Interior Minister propose plans to make the best use of Pakistan’s internal security forces, we should engage with him and take seriously any requests for help. But I believe we have a chance to do so, a chance afforded by the potential change in the face of America in Pakistan: difficult as it is, painful as our experiences in Pakistan have been, let’s listen to them and see if their plans to tackle terrorism have a place for our help. It’s certainly in our interest and theirs. Who knows? If Pakistan’s new leadership is able to make real progress against terrorism, there may be another new face – a face of a Pakistan that is not the negative image so common in recent years, but a Pakistan where people of good will are determined to succeed, and ask the help of an old friend in doing so.

#### New standard operating procedure for drones resolves their entire advantage while preserving combat effectiveness---this is the conclusion of their Streeter article

Devin C. Streeter 13, undergrad Wake author, 4/19/13, “U.S. Drone Policy: Tactical Success and Strategic Failure,” http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S.\_Drone\_Policy\_Tactical\_Success\_and\_Strategic\_Failure

However, the focus of the War on Terror is shifting, as Yemen is transforming into the new battleground. Over 362 strikes have been launched in Pakistan, while only 52 have occurred in Yemen.57 While almost one thousand innocents have died in Pakistan, only 178 have been killed in Yemen.58 Yemen has given the United States a chance to rectify the policy errors of drone use. A close look at Yemen will reveal a standard operating procedure for drones that will solve the image of the United States while maintaining combat efficiency.

First, the United States established a much greater level of cooperation with the Yemeni government before commencing with drone strikes.59 Cooperation with existing security forces is key.50 In Pakistan, the U.S. largely operated on its own, producing dismal collateral damage.51 However, cooperation with Pakistan increased in 2009.52 This level of cooperation resulted in over 1600 Taliban fighters killed by Pakistani authorities,53 an almost 50 percent drop in suicide bombings,54 and civilian deaths dropping to 6 percent of all reported fatalities.55 Cooperating with existing security forces can drastically improve effectiveness of drone strikes, as proven in Pakistan during the last few years.

However, working in conjunction with foreign security forces requires a human intelligence network on the ground to supplement intelligence on drone targets.55 The United States must be careful to operate and maintain an extensive human intelligence network to supplement the technical intelligence collection in the target nation.57 The Homeland Security Policy Institute succinctly states;

Precisely eliminating AQAP's senior leadership while minimizing civilian causalities requires interagency intelligence assets leading the effort.63

This is also substantiated by an opponent of drone use, Ken Gude, who clearly articulates;

The U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has put Al Qaeda and other militants there under intense pressure; it...relies on significant human intelligence sources.69

Similarly John Brennan, recently appointed Director of Central Intelligence, is recorded saying,

We will need to draw on not just our cooperation with Yemen and other partner nations against al-Oaida but also refine and develop intelligence relationships, security-screening processes and Yemeni counterterrorism forces.70

The proposals for a reformed drone program cannot be emphasized enough. The utilization of a deep, cultivated intelligence program in Pakistan resulted in a reduction of civilian casualties from almost 50 percent in 2008, to only 6 percent in 2011.J" With this kind of human intelligence integration, collateral damage can be expected to decrease substantially. Combined with increased cooperation with foreign intelligence services, the level of accuracy from drone strikes can be considerably improved.

To give an idea of the numerical importance of this new standard operating procedure, the cumulative average civilian casualty rate from 2002 to 2013 was 24 percent.72 Theoretically, this means that out of four thousand casualties (4000), almost 25 percent would be innocent civilians (960).'3 However, in the new model for drone operations, out of four thousand casualties (4000), only 240 would be considered collateral damage.74

The international reaction of new strike procedures, while unpredictable, would most likely be an acceptance of the drone program. The European Union specifically stated;

It is true that many European states would accept that the use of lethal force is permissible when it is the only way to prevent the imminent loss of innocent life.75

If collateral damage were substantially reduced, European nations would be less likely to question the practice, as innocent lives would be significantly safer. The first group of nations, those intimidated into seeking drone technology, need to have a standard of how to effectively use drones in counterterrorism efforts, especially when they begin their own programs.76 John Brennan is again recorded as promising;

...to institutionalize our approach more formally so that the high standards we set for ourselves endure over time, including as an example for other nations that pursue these capabilities."

A new set of drone operating procedures would help to repair international relations and decrease civilian casualties. Furthermore, nations like Yemen, Somalia, and others, will not feel threatened and will readily accept U.S. assistance in counterterrorism efforts.78 Cooperation with affected nations will ensure that their sovereignty is not violated '9 and the use of human intelligence programs will reduce civilian casualties, thus resulting in a sanitary, more effective drone operation.80

While the U.S. drone program has many noteworthy tactical successes, it simultaneously has suffered various strategic failures. Collateral damage has directly strained our relations with Pakistan, and indirectly stressed our relations with Europe, Asia, and South America. However, by increasing joint cooperation and decreasing civilian casualties, the harms inflicted on international relations can be reconciled. If this new system is implemented, not only will United States policy makers see the radical decrease of innocent deaths, but they will also see a decrease in terrorism and the terrorist recruiting pool.8' Confronting this issue and establishing a new set of standard operating procedures should be on the forefront of every elected official's agenda, for the purpose of improving foreign policy and repairing international relations.

#### No impact

Tepperman 9—Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

Note – Michael Desch = prof, polsci, Notre Dame

As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country’s chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they’re not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely—the nightmare scenario— the chance of a Taliban bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists “could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they’re very easy to disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous.”

#### No trade wars---international institutions check

Fordham 12—professor of political science at Binghamton University (Ben, International Economic Institutions and Great Power Peace, 8/12/12, http://gt2030.com/2012/08/15/international-economic-institutions-and-great-power-peace/)

I enjoyed Jack Levy’s comments on how the world would have looked to people writing in 1912. As part of my current research, I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about the three decades before World War I. As Levy pointed out, this last period of great power peace has some interesting parallels with the present one. Like today, the international economy had become increasingly integrated. For good reason, some even refer to this period as the “first age of globalization.” The period also saw the emergence of several new great powers, including Japan, Germany, and the United States. Like emerging powers today, each of these states sought to carve out its own world role and to find, as the German Foreign Secretary put it, a “place in the sun.” Like Levy, I don’t think these parallels we are doomed to repeat the catastrophe of 1914. I want to highlight the different institutional rules governing the international economic system today. The dangers discussed in the NIC report are real, but there is reason for hope when it comes to avoiding great power war. The rules of the game governing the “first age of globalization” encouraged great powers to pursue foreign policies that made political and military conflict more likely. Declining transportation costs, not more liberal trade policies, drove economic integration. There was no web of international agreements discouraging states from pursuing protectionist trade policies. As Patrick McDonald‘s recent book, The Invisible Hand of Peace, explains nicely, protectionism went hand-in-hand with aggressive foreign policies. Many of the great powers, including the emerging United States, sought to shut foreign competitors out of their home markets even as they sought to expand their own overseas trade and investment. Even though markets and investment opportunities in less developed areas of the world were small, great power policy makers found these areas attractive because they would not export manufactured products. As one American policy maker put it in 1899, they preferred “trade with people who can send you things you ant and cannot produce, and take from you in return things they want and cannot produce; in other words, a trade largely between different zones, and largely with less advanced peoples….” Great powers scrambled to obtain privileged access to these areas through formal or informal imperial control. This zero-sum competition added a political and military component to economic rivalry. Increasing globalization made this dangerous situation worse, not better, in spite of the fact that it also increased the likely cost of a great power war. In large part because of the international economic institutions constructed after World War II, present day great powers do not face a world in which protectionism and political efforts to secure exclusive market access are the norm. Emerging as well as longstanding powers can now obtain greater benefits from peaceful participation in the international economic system than they could through the predatory foreign policies that were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They do not need a large military force to secure their place in the sun. Economic competition among the great powers continues, but it is not tied to imperialism and military rivalry in the way it was in 1914.

#### The public won’t tolerate protectionism/lashout

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research is that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.35 The results show resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. 24 countries were surveyed in both 2007 and in at least one year after 2008, including a majority of the G-20 economies. Overall, 18 of those 24 countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, 20 of 24 countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5% to 83.6%. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system has strengthened, despite softening public support for freemarket economics more generally.36

### 1nc---sovereignty

#### Current U.S. drone doctrine doesn’t violate sovereignty

Amitai Etzioni 13, professor of international relations at George Washington University, Summer 2013, “Article: A Liberal Communitarian Paradigm for Counterterrorism,” Stanford Journal of International Law, 49 Stan. J Int'l L. 330

Seeking to act within the rules of the liberal international order and show respect for sovereignty, the United States provided "concurrent notification" to the Pakistani government when it is conducting drone strikes against suspected terrorists in Pakistan, n16 and its strikes in Yemen have occurred with at least the "tacit consent" of the Yemeni government. n17 Absent such consent, the use of drones (as well as the insertion of special forces, as in the killing of Osama bin Laden) n18 is viewed as a violation of national sovereignty and elicits widespread condemnation. On several occasions, these concerns have led to the United States either canceling or greatly limiting its use of drones and special forces in pursuing terrorists.

#### No risk of drone wars

Joseph Singh 12, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2eSvaZnfQ

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### No impact to global drone prolif and it’s impossible to solve

Alejandro Sueldo 12, J.D. candidate and Dean’s Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London of the University of London, 4/11/12, “The coming drone arms race,” <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=70B6B991-ECA7-4E5F-BE80-FD8F8A1B5E90>

Of particular concern are the legal and policy challenges posed if other states imitate the U.S. targeted killing program. For Washington is setting a precedent whereby states can send drones, often over sovereign borders, to kill foreigners or their own citizens, who are deemed threats.

Other states may also follow Washington’s example and develop their own criteria to define imminent threats and use drones to counter them.

Washington will find it increasingly difficult to protest other nations’ targeted killing programs — particularly when the United States has helped define this lethal practice. U.S. opposition will prove especially difficult when other states justify targeted killings as a matter of domestic affairs.

Should enough states follow the U.S. example, the practice of preemptively targeting and killing suspected threats may develop into customary international law.

Such a norm, however, which requires consistent state practice arising out of a sense of legal obligation, now looks unlikely. While targeted killing policies are arguably executed by states citing a legal obligation to protect themselves from imminent threats, widespread state practice is still uncommon.

But international law does not forbid drones. And given the lack of an international regime to control drones, state and non-state actors are free to determine their future use.

This lack of international consensus about how to control drones stems from a serious contradiction in incentives. Though drones pose grave challenges, they also offer states lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are of great appeal. Because the potential for drone technology is virtually limitless, states are now unwilling to control how drones evolve.

#### No Iran/Israel escalation

Thomas Rogan ‘12, BA in war studies from King's College London and an MSc in Middle East politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, 8/18/12, “Israeli could attack Iran without causing a major war in the region,” The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/18/israeli-attack-iran>

Over the last few days, Israeli newspapers have been consumed by reports that the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has decided to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities some time this autumn. Although Netanyahu has an obvious interest in increasing pressure on Iran, it would be an error to regard these reports as simple rhetorical sensationalism. In my opinion, whether this year or next, Israel is likely to use its airforce to attack Iran.¶ While it is impossible to know for sure whether Netanyahu will act, it is possible to consider the likely repercussions that would follow an Israeli attack. While it is likely that Iran would retaliate against Israel and possibly the US in response to any attack, it is unlikely that Iran will instigate a major war. Albeit for different reasons, Iran, Israel and the US all understand that a war would not serve their interests.¶ First, the Israeli policy angle. If Netanyahu decides to order an attack on Iran, his focus will be on maximising the success of that action and minimising any negative consequences that might follow. In terms of Iranian retaliation, Israel would expect Iran's core non-state allies Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah to launch rocket attacks into Israeli territory.¶ However, present success with advanced defence systems has helped increase Israeli confidence in their ability to absorb this method of retaliation. Beyond rocket attacks, the Israeli leadership also understands that a likely mechanism for Iranian retaliation is via attacks against Israeli interests internationally. Whether carried out by the Iranian Quds Force or Hezbollah, or a combination of both, various incidents this year have shown Israel that Iran continues to regard covert action as a powerful weapon.¶ The key for Israel is that, while these Iranian capabilities are seen as credible, they are not seen to pose intolerable threats to Israel. Faced with rocket strikes or limited attacks abroad – to which the likely response would be air strikes or short-duration ground operations (not a repeat of 2006) in Lebanon and Gaza – Israel would be unlikely to pursue major secondary retaliation against Iran. Certainly, Israel would not want to encourage intervention by Syria's Assad alongside Iran (an outcome that might follow major retaliatory Israeli action).¶ If Netanyahu does decide to take action, Israeli objectives would be clearly limited. The intent would be to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability while minimising escalation towards war. Israel has no interest in a major conflict that would risk serious damage to the Israeli state.¶ Though holding opposite objectives, Iran's attitude concerning a major war is similar to Israel's.¶ While Iran regards nuclear capability as prospectively guaranteeing the survival of its Islamic revolution, clerical leaders also understand that initiating a major war would make American intervention likely. Such intervention would pose an existential threat to the theocratic project that underpins the Islamic Republic.¶ Thus, in the event of an Israeli attack, Iran's response would be finely calibrated towards achieving three objectives:¶ • First, punishing Israel for its attack.¶ • Second, deterring further Israeli strikes and so creating space for a reconstituted Iranian nuclear programme.¶ • Finally, weakening US/international support for Israel so as to increase Israeli isolation and vulnerability.¶ Hezbollah, Hamas and other non-state allies would play a major role in effecting Iranian retaliation. Iran may also attempt to launch a number of its new Sajjil-2 medium-range missiles against Israel. Again, however, using these missiles would risk major retaliation if many Israeli citizens were killed.¶ As a preference, Iran would probably perceive that utilising Hamas and Hezbollah would allow retaliation without forcing Netanyahu into a massive counter-response. Crucially, I believe Iran regards that balancing its response would enable it to buy time for a reconstituted, hardened nuclear programme. In contrast to the relatively open current structure, sites would be deeper underground and far less vulnerable to a future attack. The nuclear ambition would not be lost, simply delayed. ¶ As a final objective for retaliation, Iran would wish to weaken Israel's relationship with the US and the international community. This desire might encourage Iran to take action against US navy assets in the Gulf and/or attempt to mine the Strait of Hormuz, so as to cause a price spike in global oil markets and increased international discomfort.¶ However, beyond their rhetoric, the Iranian leadership understand that they cannot win a military contest against the US, nor hold the strait for longer than a few days. For Iran then, as with Israel, regional war is far from desirable.¶ Finally, consider the US. It is now clear that Obama and Netanyahu disagree on Iran. In my opinion, Netanyahu does not believe Obama will ever be willing to take pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear programme. Conversely, Obama believes Netanyahu's diplomatic expectations are too hasty and excessively restrictive.¶ The policy distance between these two leaders appears increasingly irreconcilable. If Netanyahu decides to go it alone and attack Iran, the US president will face the unpleasant scenario of having to protect American interests while avoiding an escalation dynamic that might spin out of control towards war. This difficulty is accentuated by Obama's re-election race and his fear of the domestic economic fallout that may come from the decisions that he might have to make. Again, the simple point is that the US government has no interest in a war with Iran. ¶ If Netanyahu decides to take military action, he will do so in a strategic environment in which Israel, Iran and the US have no preference for a major war. Each state views the prospect of a war as counter to their particular long-term ambitions.¶ Because of this, while serious**,** Iranian retaliation would be unlikely to produce an escalatory dynamic leading to war. The leadership of each of these states will restrain their respective actions in the pursuit of differing long-term objectives but common short-term ones.

#### No Russian conflict escalation

Quinlan 9 [Michael Quinlan, former British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence, former Director of the Ditchley Foundation, Visiting Professor at King's College London, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects,” Oxford University Press, p. 63-4]

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain.

# 2NC CP

#### European allies specifically support the CP

Anthony Dworkin 13, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position”, July, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf>

Outside an armed conflict, the default European assumption would be that the threat of terrorism should be confronted within a law enforcement framework. This framework would not absolutely prohibit the deliberate killing of individuals, but it would set an extremely high threshold for its use – for example, it might be permitted where strictly necessary to prevent an imminent threat to human life or a particularly serious crime involving a grave threat to life.37 Where the threat was sufficiently serious, the state’s response might legitimately include the use of military force, but every use of lethal force would have to be justified as a necessary and proportionate response to an imminent threat. In any action that involved the deliberate taking of human life, there would have to be a rigorous and impartial post-strike assessment, with the government disclosing the justification for its action. Finally, EU states might perhaps agree that in the face of an armed attack or an imminent armed attack, states can use force on the territory of another state without its consent, if that state is unable or unwilling to act effectively to restrain the attack.¶ This consensus provides a basis on which the EU can step up engagement with the US on drones and targeted killing. At the heart of the EU position is the belief that the use of lethal force outside zones of active hostilities is an exceptional measure that can only be justified on the basis of a serious and imminent threat to human life. At a time when drone technology is proliferating rapidly, EU leaders should be more forthright in making this argument publicly – especially since Obama has adopted it, at least rhetorically, as an element of his policy. While Europeans may be reluctant to accuse Obama of having violated international law, they can assert their own vision and encourage Obama to follow through on his rhetoric by elevating the idea of a strict imminent threat-based approach to the use of deadly force outside the battlefield. European leaders and officials should welcome Obama’s latest moves to restrain drone strikes and his intimation that the armed conflict against al-Qaeda may be nearing its end. In this way they would reinforce the standards implicit in his speech and make clear that America’s closest allies will be watching to see how far he matches his words with action.

#### Allies increasingly support limited uses of first-resort targeted killing in self-defense missions that take place outside the bounds of active hostilities

Geoffrey S. Corn 12, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2012, “Blurring the Line Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello,” in Non-International Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, p. 75-78

The statement by Legal Advisor Koh following the Bin Laden raid addressing U.S. legal authority for the mission and for killing Bin Laden is perhaps as clear an articulation of a legal basis for a military action ever provided by the Department of State.175 Indeed, the fact that Koh articulated an official U.S. interpretation of both the jus ad helium and jus in bello makes his use of a website titled Opinio Juris176 especially significant (as such a statement by a government official in Koh's position is clear evidence of opinio juris). Unlike his earlier statement at a meeting of the American Society of International Law,'77 Koh did not restrict his invocation of law to the jus ad helium. Instead, he asserted the U.S. position that the mission was justified pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, but also that Bin Laden's killing was lawful pursuant to the jus in bello. Koh properly noted that as a mission executed in the context of the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the LOAC imposed no obligation on U.S. forces to employ minimum necessary force. Instead, Bin Laden's status as an enemy belligerent justified the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort, and Bin Laden bore the burden of manifesting his surrender in order to terminate that authority. Hence, U.S. forces were in no way obligated to attempt to capture Bin Laden before resorting to deadly force.178¶ A recent statement made by John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, further clarifies the current administration's justification for using deadly force as a first resort against al Qaeda operatives:¶ The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to "hot" battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the United States takes the legal position that... we have the authority to take action against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time----¶ This Administration's counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who are a threat to the United States, whose removal would cause a significant—even if only temporary—disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. Practically speaking, then, the question turns principally on how you define "imminence."¶ We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of "imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts… Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should be broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist organizations.1'9¶ These two articulations of the Obama administration's interpretation of international law reflect an important evolution of the U.S. legal framework for military operations directed against transnational terrorist operatives. They leave virtually no doubt that the United States has embraced the concept of transnational armed conflict, that the nation is engaged in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, that this armed conflict is non-international within the meaning of the jus in bello and that it transcends national borders. There is also no doubt that the United States invoked the jus in bello as the framework to regulate execution of the Bin Laden mission. Koh's clear emphasis on the in bello variants of the principles of distinction and proportionality cannot be read as meaning anything else.¶ Koh, however, included one qualifier that suggests possible uncertainty. Rejecting the criticism that attacks such as that on Bin Laden are unlawful extrajudicial killings, Koh noted that "a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force."180 What is perplexing is the "or" in the statement. Koh preserved a division between armed conflict and other actions in legitimate self-defense. It is significant that he asserts the right to kill as a measure of first resort in either context (which seems to rebut any inference that he is suggesting some actions in self-defense must be exercised pursuant to a law enforcement legal framework). Why was that "or" necessary? What was Koh suggesting if he was not suggesting a law enforcement limitation to some actions in self-defense?¶ One possible answer is that Advisor Koh is simply preserving the authority of the United States to act in limited self-defense against an imminent terrorist threat that is not considered associated with al Qacda or the Taliban. In such situations, the attack would accordingly be unrelated to the existing armed conflict the United States asserts is ongoing with these enemies. If this was the meaning of his use of the "or," it produces little confusion: imminent terrorist threats to the United States may justify military action as an exercise of jus ad helium self-defense, and use of force for such a purpose triggers LOAC applicability. However, distinguishing armed conflict from self-defense with an "or" could also be interpreted as an endorsement of self-defense targeting, suggesting that uses of military force are regulated by the jus in bello or jus ad helium principles. This is an unnecessary dichotomy, and hopefully one that Advisor Koh did not intend. There is no viable reason to attempt to establish such a distinction; as discussed in this essay, the suggestion that ad bellum principles are interchangeable with their in bello variants is flawed and operationally confusing.181¶ VII. Conclusion ¶ Transnational non-State threats are not going away any time soon. Indeed, it is likely that identifying a rational and credible legal basis for national response to such threats will continue to vex policymakers and legal advisors in the coming years. These threats will almost certainly lead States to continue to invoke the inherent right of national and/or collective self-defense to justify extraterritorial responses. This legal basis is not, however, an adequate substitute for defining the legal framework to regulate the operational exercise of this self-defense authority. Nonetheless, the advent of the self-defense targeting theory purports to be just that.

#### Restrictions are prohibitions---that means the plan prohibits first-resort targeted killings outside active hostilities---conditions are distinct because they don’t prohibit

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Only the CP solves norms because it’s based on reforming a long-standing precedent of action by states---the plan isn’t

Ashley S. Deeks 12, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School, Spring 2012, “ARTICLE: "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law, 52 Va. J. Int'l L. 483

Deriving factors largely from the statements and explanations of victim states means that those factors will be shaped by states that have the political power and military capacity to use force in another state's territory. This means the factors inevitably will contain some bias toward victim state equities, and will be shaped by states willing to use force. n115 However, if one believes that an "unwilling or unable" test that has greater legal content and that is consistent with the objectives in Part III.A will serve as a more effective restraint on the use of force, then the test will impose constraints on the very actors that helped shape the test. In response to skepticism that those actors will abide by such constraints, the fact that many of these factors have their roots in state practice drawn from a range of states across different time periods suggests that states generally will find these factors workable. This matters because state decision-makers, acting in good faith, "are more likely to respect standards rationally related to concerns they recognize as appropriate." n116

#### The CP bolsters legal norms by providing clarity in the conditions for the unable-unwilling standard---that makes condemning attacks that flout the law much more effective---solves drone prolif

Ashley S. Deeks 12, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School, Spring 2012, “ARTICLE: "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law, 52 Va. J. Int'l L. 483

When a rule is not clear, actions taken pursuant to the rule are of questionable legitimacy. Some states will be skeptical of the existence of the rule; others may not understand its parameters. When the rule is clear and a victim state can demonstrate that it acted consistent with the rule, its action is far more likely to be deemed legitimate by other states. Ironically, in the absence of clear rules, it is more difficult for states that object to a particular victim state's use of force to make compelling arguments that the victim state acted unlawfully. When the rule is clear and other states believe that a victim state has not complied with the rule, those other states are better situated to employ international law to condemn the victim state's acts. Put differently, a clearer and more detailed "unwilling or unable" test would provide a common vocabulary for all states to use in discussing and evaluating a victim state's use of force. n92 This aspect [\*512] provides an additional reason that certain powerful states, such as the United States, should be concerned about the test's current vagueness: By accepting reasonable restraints on their own action, they will make it more difficult for other states, whose interests often are different from their own, to take advantage of an open-ended test. As other states grow more powerful relative to the United States, this is not an insignificant consideration.

The legitimacy of a norm can strengthen its "compliance pull" as well. Among the elements that bolster the legitimacy of an international norm is its "determinacy" -- that is, the rule's clarity about where the boundary exists between what is permissible and impermissible. n93 When that clarity is absent, the norm's legitimacy falters. According to Franck, "Determinacy seems the most important [aspect of legitimacy], being that quality of a norm that generates an ascertainable understanding of what it permits and what it prohibits. When that line becomes unascertainable, states are unlikely to defer opportunities for self-gratification. The rule's compliance pull evaporates." n94

#### We have a backline against any solvency deficit to this advantage---even if the CP doesn’t reduce U.S. drone strikes to the same degree as the plan, it does more to limit the usefulness of U.S. drone strikes as a precedent for others

Ashley S. Deeks 12, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School, Spring 2012, “ARTICLE: "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law, 52 Va. J. Int'l L. 483

A clearer and more detailed "unwilling or unable" test also would allow the victim state to predict with greater accuracy reactions by other states to its use of force and to decide to act (or refrain from acting) accordingly. n95 The victim state will be on notice that it will need to justify its actions against set standards, which provides incentives for it to consider each element of the test before making a decision. n96 This, in turn, counsels more measured decision-making and may result in fewer decisions to use force.¶ Finally, a more clearly articulated "unwilling or unable" test could limit the precedential impact of a particular use of force. Even in the face of the current "unwilling or unable" test, states expect to and feel a need to defend their actions, possibly to signal that they view their use of force as cabined by certain elements and thus to guard against excessive uses of [\*513] force by others. n97 Former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser John Stevenson was explicit about this in his speech on the U.S. decision to use force in Cambodia against the Vietcong. He stated: ¶ It is important for the Government of the United States to explain the legal basis for its actions, not merely to pay proper respect to the law, but also because the precedent created by the use of armed forces in Cambodia by the United States can be affected significantly by our legal rationale... . The United States has a strong interest in developing rules of international law that limit claimed rights to use armed force and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes. n98 ¶ Clearer rules give victim states a greater ability to articulate why their actions should not be interpreted to broadly sanction the use of force.

#### Only the CP creates an effective international consensus around sovereignty---requiring states to meet the responsibility to combat terrorism as a condition of respect for sovereignty has broad international support and it’s key to counter-terror---only the CP can shape that norm positively

Amitai Etzioni 13, professor of international relations at George Washington University, Summer 2013, “Article: A Liberal Communitarian Paradigm for Counterterrorism,” Stanford Journal of International Law, 49 Stan. J Int'l L. 330

To move toward a new paradigm I suggest one needs to build a case against viewing sovereignty as an absolute value in favor of understanding sovereignty as citizenship. It is a communitarian approach that recognizes that states (like individuals) do not merely command rights, but also have some responsibilities; that they are entitled to self-determination and self-government, but also have some commitment to the common good, such as the protection of the environment, peace, and freedom from terror.

As a starting point for such a case, one should note that sovereignty was in fact never absolute. In the mid-twentieth century, Bertrand de Jouvenel argued that the sovereign will, traditionally understood to be of absolute authority, is itself subject to the constraints of morality that are independent of it. n43 Another political philosopher, Jacques Maritain, contended that the concept of sovereignty is intrinsically faulty in that it both separates the will of the state from that of the body politic and creates insurmountable complications for international law. n44

Stephen Krasner has demonstrated that throughout history the norm of sovereignty has been appealed to by rulers and statesmen when it was advantageous to them in holding onto their positions of power and authority. When it was [\*341] politically expedient to ignore the Westphalian norm, however Krasner finds that leaders were, by and large, weakly constrained by the norms of sovereignty.

For example, Krasner discusses many interventions by the Western powers into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire during the Empire's decline in the nineteenth century. The 1821 Greek struggle for independence was strictly a domestic affair well within the recognized borders of the Ottoman Empire, yet the revolt eventually drew intervention from Britain, France, and Russia. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin, which marked the end of the conflict, exacted numerous Ottoman concessions for minority and religious rights within the Balkan regions of the Empire. That same treaty imposed the independence of Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro, and settled the status of a semi-autonomous Bulgaria, all previously parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Krasner also highlights the ways Westphalian sovereignty has been sacrificed to both human rights and security concerns. British warships forcibly entered Brazilian ports in 1850 and destroyed those ships suspected of engaging in the slave trade. The pretext was that the Brazilian government was not adequately enforcing its own ban on slavery, which Brazil promised to Britain in an 1826 treaty in exchange for the latter's recognition of Brazilian statehood.

Twentieth-century examples of this phenomenon abound. In the first quarter of the century, U.S. marines were deployed to Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, with each nation being subject to either a U.S. governor or a U.S.-sponsored regime change in the aftermath.

From his survey of the concept's history, Krasner concludes by characterizing the norm of sovereignty as "organized hypocrisy," in that it is universally recognized but at the same time widely violated. n45 Many may quarrel with Krasner's choice of words, but he provides strong evidence that sovereignty was often violated for good and bad causes and thus does not have the inviolate standing those who favor it claim.

The second key to understanding sovereignty as citizenship is the recognition that no right, whether that of an individual or of a state, is absolute. This famously holds true even for the right many U.S. citizens consider the most absolute of them all, the right of free speech. Beyond the ban on shouting fire in a crowded theater, there are time and place limitations and laws against defamation and incitement. In the same vein, even liberty's most ardent supporters agree that individual freedom ought to be limited by respect for the liberty of others. The same should hold for sovereignty. It cannot be used to harm others, as is the case when a nation's territory serves as a base for terrorists. n46 As in the case of humanitarian interventions, where sovereignty is a shield used by dictators to keep out the international community when it seeks to stop a genocide, sovereignty is often used to shield terrorists - or has that effect even when not so intended. n47 It should not be automatically heeded in either case.

2. Sovereignty as Conditional

There is growing transnational consensus that sovereignty ought to be conditional. In the wake of World War II, the majority of states drafted and signed the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), thereby codifying the obligation incumbent upon nations to uphold these rights. n48 Although the Declaration did not include any enforcement mechanisms, it gave voice to the growing normative consensus that states have an obligation to respect human rights that is simultaneous with, and perhaps even overrides, the right to sovereignty. The Genocide Convention of the same year obliged states to both refrain from and work to punish genocide - an agreement that was followed by the adoption of two additional covenants, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in the mid-1960s. n49

#### The CP establishes an international doctrine of Responsibility to Counter Terrorism---that’s key to global normative dialogues which make sovereignty reflect positive obligations of states---and key to global CT

Amitai Etzioni 13, professor of international relations at George Washington University, Summer 2013, “Article: A Liberal Communitarian Paradigm for Counterterrorism,” Stanford Journal of International Law, 49 Stan. J Int'l L. 330

The next step is to formulate a third responsibility of sovereign states that takes into account the fading of the old world order of national borders and the evolution of a nascent global regime. n59 We ought to articulate one more condition that states must meet for their sovereignty to be respected, namely, that states forfeit part of their sovereignty if their government (i) uses terrorists as its agents, the way Muammar al-Gaddafi did in the U.K. and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has done in Afghanistan; (ii) allows its territory to be used as a safe haven or training grounds, or to raise funds for and by transnational terrorists; (iii) is unable to suppress such terrorists on its own, in general or in undergoverned or ungovernable regions n60 (as is the case in Pakistan and Yemen). n61 To put it in plain [\*345] English: If you will not attack us across national borders, we will not hit you back. If a country prevents terrorists from using its territory to launch attacks in other nations, then drones, special forces, and other such agents should not be used against terrorists within that nation (unless such interventions are requested or consented to by a representative national government).

If a country fails to uphold its Responsibility to Counter Terrorism (R2CT) - and if the terrorists from such a nation attack the people of other nations - it should be considered legitimate for counterterrorism measures to be applied in such territories from the outside. n62 Thus, rather than validating the idealized precept of sovereignty and pretending to abide by it while violating it, as for instance the United States does when it couples drone strikes with the provision of "concurrent notice," all sides would benefit from transnational normative dialogues on the reasons sovereignty must be redefined and the ways the new, conditional definitions are going to be worked out. States do have some responsibilities as citizens of an emerging, though nascent, world community. And if states fail, they should face corrective measures.

This is the case that ought to be made to change the norms, however gradually, to scale back the emotional outburst that occurs when people hold that their country has been invaded or violated, without acknowledging that they are using their territory to house assassins. This case must be made and restated when states employ transnational counterterrorism measures instead of denying that such measures took place, apologizing for them, or claiming that the local government actually consented to them privately - all steps that relegitimate the concept of sovereignty instead of scaling it back.

In short, there are numerous compelling and persuasive reasons not to view counterterrorism campaigns as wars and not to treat terrorists as soldiers. The responsibility of nations to prevent terrorists from using their land and assets is one that follows from the recognition that the world of national borders is losing its empirical footing and normative power.

Communitarians stress that individuals do not merely have rights but also responsibilities, to each other and the common good. n63 And the balance between rights and responsibilities must be adjusted over time, as either the normative systems tilt in one direction or the other (part of the general tendency of societies to require course correction) or the surrounding reality changes significantly. The period of decolonization was a period in which much stress was put on the value of independence, self-determination and hence sovereignty for the former colonies. But now, for reasons discussed above, there are strong reasons to treat nations as citizens of the world and expect them to assume more responsibilities for preserving the international order and promoting the common good. Curbing transnational terrorism ranks high on both these lists.

[\*346] A word of caution: Idealists sometimes - out of a combination of belief in positive thinking, inspiration, rhetoric, and an abiding commitment to progress - are quick to postulate a long list of responsibilities they believe or assume nations should take upon themselves, including fair trade practices, granting of foreign aid, helping to reduce global warming, and cutting pollution. Although the crux of the first part of the sovereignty as citizen paradigm holds that nations have responsibilities in addition to rights, it is important to remember that because the commitment of nations to the nascent global community is still rather limited, the community cannot impose a great number of missions upon states without potentially undermining itself. Hence we need a sort of moral triage - a focus on those items that are particularly vital. A nation should engage in armed hostilities only if all other means for resolving the conflicts at hand have been exhausted and innocent civilians are endangered. That is, only if the conditions of jus ad bellum (right to war) of the just war doctrine are met. n64 The use of force in response to attacks on the U.S. homeland in 2001 meets these criteria. n65 The attack was on innocent civilians rather than on U.S. military forces, and there were no other ways of preventing additional attacks than going after the terrorists before they attacked again.

The three responsibilities of conditional sovereignty considered here - protection, nonproliferation and counterterrorism - all stem from the most fundamental of all human rights, the right to life, which, absent the development of greater world governance, is the only legitimate and prudential ground for justifying intervention in the internal affairs of another nation. n66 In contrast, improving other people's political and economic regimes does not qualify. Regime change and nation building by outsiders should be limited to nonlethal means rather than the use of force. Because justifying this thesis would require greatly expanding this Article - and because I have addressed my case in some detail elsewhere - it is not further discussed here. n67

# 1 Drone Failure

#### No attacks from Yemen---crackdowns are working now

Spencer 11—retired infantry commander who specialised in low intensity conflict. He is a strategic analyst on political, security and trade issues of the Middle East and North Africa and a specialist on Yemen. (James, A False Dawn for Yemen's Militants, 8 June 2011, [www.foreignaffairs.com/ARTICLES/67883/james-spencer/a-false-dawn-for-yemens-militants?page=show](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ARTICLES/67883/james-spencer/a-false-dawn-for-yemens-militants?page=show))

Throughout Yemen's political crisis, the West's chief concern has been that spreading chaos in the country will offer al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) an opportunity to expand its operations. Now that Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is in Saudi Arabia for emergency medical treatment, leaving the country in uncertain hands, these worries have only become more urgent. Saleh has often argued that any political vacuum that would follow his rule could prove dangerously hospitable to al Qaeda and similar groups -- a warning that, in reality, is based far more on political posturing than on a real assessment of the terrorist threat.

For years now, Saleh has used the specter of al Qaeda to drum up political and financial support, mainly from the United States and Saudi Arabia. This strategy first took shape in November 2005, when he traveled to Washington to meet then U.S. President George W. Bush. Saleh expected his American hosts to congratulate him for eradicating the al Qaeda cells responsible for attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and the M.V. Limburg; instead, he was castigated for failing to achieve political and economic reforms. As he saw it, the danger of al Qaeda was the sole reason behind U.S. support for Yemen.

Three months later, the terrorist threat in Yemen took on new life when 23 experienced jihadis escaped from a high-security prison in Sana'a. A number of attacks on high-profile targets followed, mostly against Western tourists -- international oil workers in Marib and Hadhramaut in September 2006 and Spanish tourists at Marib in July 2007. Western diplomats were also targeted, most notably those at the U.S. Embassy, which came under a complex assault in September 2008. The attackers clearly wanted to damage Yemen's reputation and reduce tourism and oil revenues. Saleh, however, also stood to benefit from al Qaeda's rise: his less assertive response to terrorism than previously -- compared to, for example, his crackdown against those responsible for the Cole bombing -- may have been intended to raise the profile of jihadi groups in Yemen, and thus attract funding and training from the West for additional counterterrorist units to be controlled by members of his family.

In practice, the regular Yemeni army has performed most counterterrorist operations, and these special units have largely been deployed against domestic political opponents: the Zaydi revivalist Houthis in the north, who rebelled against governmental corruption and state sponsorship of Salafism; militants linked to the Joint Meeting Parties, the country's opposition coalition; and now the leaders of Hashid, Yemen's most powerful tribal confederation, who have come under attack after criticising Saleh for backing out of a deal to transfer power. Over the years, the Saleh regime has labelled each of these groups as terrorists in order to justify using forces that the state plainly regards as a sort of Praetorian Guard. In reality, the regime apparently feels far more threatened by domestic political enemies than by al Qaeda.

Not that Yemen isn't home to genuine terrorists. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula came into being in January 2009, when al Qaeda in Yemen merged with the remnants of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, which had been disrupted by Saudi security operations. At the same time, Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American Islamist cleric and propagandist, began to work with AQAP. Since January 2009, AQAP has assassinated scores of Yemeni security officials, mounted a sophisticated two-phase attack on South Korean targets (first attacking a tourist party at Seiyun in March 2009, then attacking the investigative team in Sana'a three days later), dispatched the now infamous "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and attempted to blow up commercial airliners with bombs hidden in computer printers. It has also targeted the neighbouring Saudi regime: in an August 2009 suicide attack, an AQAP terrorist injured\* Saudi Arabia's Deputy Minister of the Interior, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, and in October 2009 two more would-be suicide bombers were killed trying to cross the Yemeni-Saudi border. (Their exact targets are unknown -- probably Saudi royals -- but they had two additional suicide vests, suggesting a major operation.) And then, as a sign of its increasing savviness, AQAP launched a slick online publication called Inspire, aimed at aspiring jihadis around the globe, particularly in the West.

But this catalogue of putative successes masks a number of fundamental vulnerabilities. It remains unclear how many members AQAP actually has -- perhaps a few hundred -- because incidents are often attributed to it inaccurately. For example, the Abida tribe near Marib, an area in Yemen's east rich in oil and natural gas, became enraged after a U.S. drone strike killed a senior sheikh in May 2010, possibly due to Saleh's duplicity. In response, the tribe has severed the main road in the area, interrupted power supplies to Sana'a, and blocked oil exports -- strikes that the Saleh regime regularly blames on al Qaeda. (In truth, the similarity of tactics often makes it difficult to determine whether tribesmen or jihadis are responsible for a particular attack.)

Similarly, the Islamists who recently established a so-called Islamic Emirate in the southern province of Abyan have denied that they are affiliated with al Qaeda, although they confess to having a common Islamist philosophy. Indeed, they have patrolled Jaar, one of Abyan's major towns, in tanks captured from the Yemeni army -- hardly the actions of al Qaeda militants living under the constant threat of missile attacks from U.S. drones. Yet the Saleh government has consistently labelled these Islamist insurgents as al Qaeda members ever since they took de facto control of Abyan. (They have, however, since been repulsed from their footing in Abyan's capital, Zinjibar.)

Saleh and a number of Western analysts have argued that many of the country's tribes provide sanctuary to AQAP members, making uncooperative tribal leaders and Islamist militants equal targets. Yet Yemen's tribes function as statelets, entirely capable of repudiating members who transgress tribal law or who represent a greater risk than providing sanctuary is worth. Indeed, over the last couple of years, Yemen's tribes have arranged several handovers of AQAP members to state security forces. The tribes have also created special tribal counterterrorism militias (on the model of the Iraqi al-Sahwa), although their effectiveness is debatable. What is clear is that the tribes are more than capable of neutralizing any al Qaeda presence in their homelands. The fact that they have not vanquished al Qaeda to date is less a testament to AQAP's strength or to tribal military weakness (after all, the al-Hashid tribal confederation is currently battling elements of the Yemeni military on equal footing) than to the fact that the tribes use AQAP as a bargaining chip with the government -- for example, to demand employment in special counterterrorist militias, which, of course, would not exist without the danger of terrorists.

Yemen's tribes and AQAP have far more potential points of friction than they do common cause. For starters, many of Yemen's combative tribes are Zaydis, a pragmatic Shiite sect, for whom the fundamentalist Sunni members of al Qaeda have a vitriolic ideological aversion. Beyond that, the jihadis threaten entrenched tribal interests, such as the production and use of qat (a mildly stimulant leaf beloved by many Yemenis but abhorrent to Salafis) and the lucrative trade of smuggling drugs and alcohol into Saudi Arabia.

#### No horn of Africa conflict

Straus 12—professor of politics at the University of Wisconsin (Scott, WARS DO END! CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/03/01/afraf.ads015.full)

The principal finding is that in the twenty-first century both the volume and the character of civil wars have changed in significant ways.5 Civil wars are and have been the dominant form of warfare in Africa, but they have declined steeply in recent years, so that today there are half as many as in the 1990s. This change tracks global patterns of decline in warfare.6 While some students of African armed conflicts, such as Paul Williams, note the recent trend,7 it is fair to say that the change in the prevalence of civil wars is not recognized by most Africanists and generalists. Equally important but even less noted is that the character of warfare in Africa has changed. Today's wars are typically fought on the peripheries of states, and insurgents tend to be militarily weak and factionalized. The large wars that pitted major fighting forces against each other, in which insurgents threatened to capture a capital or to have enough power to secede, and in which insurgents held significant territory – from the Biafra secessionists in Nigeria, to UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, the TPLF in Ethiopia, the EPLF in Eritrea, the SPLM in Sudan, the NRM in Uganda and the RPF in Rwanda – are few and far between in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia's Al-Shabab holds territory and represents a significant threat to the Somali federal transitional government, but given the 20-year void at the centre of Somalia the case is not representative. In April 2011, rebel forces in Côte d'Ivoire captured Abidjan, but they did so with external help and after incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, facing a phalanx of domestic, regional, and international opposition, tried to steal an election.8 More characteristic of the late 2000s and the early 2010s are the low-level insurgencies in Casamance (Senegal), the Ogaden (Ethiopia), the Caprivi strip (Namibia), northern Uganda (the Lord's Resistance Army), Cabinda (Angola), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Chad and the Central African Republic (various armed groups in the east), Sudan (Darfur), and South Sudan, as well as the insurgent-bandits in eastern Congo (a variety of armed actors, including Rwandan insurgents) and northern Mali (al-Qaeda in the Maghreb). Although these armed groups are in some cases capable of sowing terror and disruption, they tend to be small in size, internally divided, poorly structured and trained, and without access to heavy weapons.9 Several of today's rebel groups have strong transnational characteristics, that is, insurgents move fluidly between states. Few are at present a significant military threat to the governments they face or in a position to seize and hold large swaths of territory.

#### New standard operating procedure for drones resolves their entire advantage while preserving combat effectiveness---this is the conclusion of their Streeter article

Devin C. Streeter 13, undergrad Wake author, 4/19/13, “U.S. Drone Policy: Tactical Success and Strategic Failure,” http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S.\_Drone\_Policy\_Tactical\_Success\_and\_Strategic\_Failure

However, the focus of the War on Terror is shifting, as Yemen is transforming into the new battleground. Over 362 strikes have been launched in Pakistan, while only 52 have occurred in Yemen.57 While almost one thousand innocents have died in Pakistan, only 178 have been killed in Yemen.58 Yemen has given the United States a chance to rectify the policy errors of drone use. A close look at Yemen will reveal a standard operating procedure for drones that will solve the image of the United States while maintaining combat efficiency.

First, the United States established a much greater level of cooperation with the Yemeni government before commencing with drone strikes.59 Cooperation with existing security forces is key.50 In Pakistan, the U.S. largely operated on its own, producing dismal collateral damage.51 However, cooperation with Pakistan increased in 2009.52 This level of cooperation resulted in over 1600 Taliban fighters killed by Pakistani authorities,53 an almost 50 percent drop in suicide bombings,54 and civilian deaths dropping to 6 percent of all reported fatalities.55 Cooperating with existing security forces can drastically improve effectiveness of drone strikes, as proven in Pakistan during the last few years.

However, working in conjunction with foreign security forces requires a human intelligence network on the ground to supplement intelligence on drone targets.55 The United States must be careful to operate and maintain an extensive human intelligence network to supplement the technical intelligence collection in the target nation.57 The Homeland Security Policy Institute succinctly states;

Precisely eliminating AQAP's senior leadership while minimizing civilian causalities requires interagency intelligence assets leading the effort.63

This is also substantiated by an opponent of drone use, Ken Gude, who clearly articulates;

The U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has put Al Qaeda and other militants there under intense pressure; it...relies on significant human intelligence sources.69

Similarly John Brennan, recently appointed Director of Central Intelligence, is recorded saying,

We will need to draw on not just our cooperation with Yemen and other partner nations against al-Oaida but also refine and develop intelligence relationships, security-screening processes and Yemeni counterterrorism forces.70

The proposals for a reformed drone program cannot be emphasized enough. The utilization of a deep, cultivated intelligence program in Pakistan resulted in a reduction of civilian casualties from almost 50 percent in 2008, to only 6 percent in 2011.J" With this kind of human intelligence integration, collateral damage can be expected to decrease substantially. Combined with increased cooperation with foreign intelligence services, the level of accuracy from drone strikes can be considerably improved.

To give an idea of the numerical importance of this new standard operating procedure, the cumulative average civilian casualty rate from 2002 to 2013 was 24 percent.72 Theoretically, this means that out of four thousand casualties (4000), almost 25 percent would be innocent civilians (960).'3 However, in the new model for drone operations, out of four thousand casualties (4000), only 240 would be considered collateral damage.74

The international reaction of new strike procedures, while unpredictable, would most likely be an acceptance of the drone program. The European Union specifically stated;

It is true that many European states would accept that the use of lethal force is permissible when it is the only way to prevent the imminent loss of innocent life.75

If collateral damage were substantially reduced, European nations would be less likely to question the practice, as innocent lives would be significantly safer. The first group of nations, those intimidated into seeking drone technology, need to have a standard of how to effectively use drones in counterterrorism efforts, especially when they begin their own programs.76 John Brennan is again recorded as promising;

...to institutionalize our approach more formally so that the high standards we set for ourselves endure over time, including as an example for other nations that pursue these capabilities."

A new set of drone operating procedures would help to repair international relations and decrease civilian casualties. Furthermore, nations like Yemen, Somalia, and others, will not feel threatened and will readily accept U.S. assistance in counterterrorism efforts.78 Cooperation with affected nations will ensure that their sovereignty is not violated '9 and the use of human intelligence programs will reduce civilian casualties, thus resulting in a sanitary, more effective drone operation.80

While the U.S. drone program has many noteworthy tactical successes, it simultaneously has suffered various strategic failures. Collateral damage has directly strained our relations with Pakistan, and indirectly stressed our relations with Europe, Asia, and South America. However, by increasing joint cooperation and decreasing civilian casualties, the harms inflicted on international relations can be reconciled. If this new system is implemented, not only will United States policy makers see the radical decrease of innocent deaths, but they will also see a decrease in terrorism and the terrorist recruiting pool.8' Confronting this issue and establishing a new set of standard operating procedures should be on the forefront of every elected official's agenda, for the purpose of improving foreign policy and repairing international relations.

#### The public won’t tolerate protectionism/lashout

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research is that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.35 The results show resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. 24 countries were surveyed in both 2007 and in at least one year after 2008, including a majority of the G-20 economies. Overall, 18 of those 24 countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, 20 of 24 countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5% to 83.6%. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system has strengthened, despite softening public support for freemarket economics more generally.36

#### Pakistan has to act like they’re kicking us out---but if they were going to, they would have already

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Granted, “lawyers at the State Department, including top legal adviser Harold Koh, believe this rationale veers near the edge of what can be considered permission” and are concerned because “[c]onducting drone strikes in a country against its will could be seen as an act of war.”62 Nevertheless, the notion of consent is one that is hotly debated by opponents of targeted killings. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that Pakistan “categorically rejects” the claim that it tacitly allows drone strikes in its territory63 and in the same New York

Times article discussed above an official with Pakistani intelligence “said any suggestion of Pakistani cooperation was ‘hogwash.’”64 However, these protests lack credibility as Pakistan has not exercised its rights under international law to prevent strikes by asking the U.S. to stop, intercepting American aircraft, targeting U.S. operators on the ground, or lodging a formal protest with the UN General Assembly or the Security Council. If the strikes are truly without consent, are a violation of Pakistani sovereignty, and are akin to acts of war, one would expect something more from the Pakistani government. With regard to Yemen, the question of consent is far clearer as Yemeni officials have gone on the record specifically noting their approval of U.S. strikes.65

# 2 Sov Violations

#### No risk of drone wars

Joseph Singh 12, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2eSvaZnfQ

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

# 1NR

#### Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin ‘12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### First-resort targeting outside conflict zones is key to deny terrorist safe havens---it’s reverse-causal---codifying the restriction in the plan signals a massive victory for terrorists across the globe---and it’s unique because Obama’s able to re-expand first-resort targeted killings as long as he has the legal authority

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2013, “Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring,” International Legal Studies, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77 (2013)

TAC=Transnational Armed Conflict

Prior to September 11 and the advent of TAC, there was virtually no discourse on the permissible geographic scope of armed conflict. This is un-surprising, considering almost all armed conflicts of this period were internal, or relatively confined inter–State conflicts.34 Even when internal armed conflicts “spilled over” into neighboring territories, no State asserted the authority to conduct “global” operations against the non–State insurgent enemy. Use of the term “Global War on Terror” fundamentally altered the existing paradigm. Suddenly, a State was invoking the authority to engage what it determined were belligerent operatives wherever the opportunity to do so arose. U.S. global reach and dominant combat capability made it clear that this new enemy could not afford the risk of “basing” operations out of operational clusters confined to one geographic area. Because dispersion had to, by necessity, become the modus operandi of this new enemy,35 it inherently drove operations to extend beyond the “hot zone” of Afghan-istan.36

Of course, it also fueled criticism of the armed conflict characterization. Critics, relying on the “organization” and “intensity” test for assessing the existence of non–international armed conflict adopted in the Tadic appeals judgment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-goslavia, insisted that TAC was a legal nullity.37 In contrast, the United States has adopted more of a totality–of–the–circumstances approach to assess the existence of armed conflict, relying on the intense risk presented by al Qaeda and that organization’s objective of inflicting harm on the United States and its interests wherever and whenever possible to offset the organization element of the Tadic test.38 Such an approach is justified when the effectiveness of operations against an opponent disables the abil-ity of that opponent to manifest traditional organizational characteristics. Indeed, proponents of TAC (a typology of armed conflict frequently asso-ciated with this author) implicitly understand that a strict two–prong test for assessing armed conflict produces a perverse windfall for the transna-tional terrorist enemy: as their operations become more unconventional and dispersed, the authority of the State to press the attack dissipates. Recent speeches by Obama administration officials seem to indicate that the assessed risk of future terrorist attacks is driving the decision to mount unrelenting pressure on al Qaeda.39 Depriving the State of legal freedom of maneuver to press the advantage against a degraded non–State enemy is ultimately inconsistent with its strategic and operational imperative. At a minimum, it raises the complex issue of assessing the point at which a non–international armed conflict recedes back into a category of non–conflict and nullifies LOAC applicability—an issue lacking clear and consistent standards.40

Where the United States presses this advantage has been and remains the other major source of consternation with the TAC concept. Critics assert an inherent invalidity to a claim of armed conflict authority that exceeds the geographic bounds of a “hot zone” of operations.41 While tactical spillover operations into contiguous States may be tolerable in limited cir-cumstances, extending combat operations to the territory of States far re-moved from a traditional battlespace is condemned as the ultimate mani-festation of an overbroad conception of armed conflict. This criticism cuts to the core of the TAC concept. Expansive geographic scope was the very genesis of TAC, an invocation of LOAC principles to address a transnational non–State belligerent threat.42 What these criticisms seem to overlook is a critical strategic foundation for TAC itself: the relationship between the scope of counterterror military operations and the evolution of the TAC concept reveals that like other evolutions of armed conflict typol-ogies, threat dynamics and strategic realities drove the law applicability assessment, and not vice versa.

The U.S. response to the September 11 terrorist attacks indicated the intent to leverage military power to maximum effect whenever and wher-ever the opportunity arose.43 Employing combat power in a manner indica-tive of armed conflict—by targeting terrorist operatives as a measure of first resort—would not be the exclusive modality to achieve this objective. However, unlike previous counterterror efforts it did become a significant, and in many cases primary, modality. Of course, selecting between military force and other capabilities involved a complex assessment of a variety of considerations, including the feasibility of alternate means to disable the threat—a classic illustration of national security policy making. What was clear, however, was that the nature of the threat drove a major shift in the response modality.

While the TAC typology seemed to defy accepted international law cat-egorizations of armed conflict, it was never really remarkable. National security strategy is always threat driven: intelligence defines the risk created by various threats; and strategy is developed to prioritize national effort to protect the nation from these threats, including defining the tools of na-tionalpower that will be leveraged to achieve this objective. When national security policy makers determine that military power must be used as one of these tools, this is translated into a military mission. That mission is then refined in the form of military strategy, which seeks to identify threat vul-nerabilities and match combat capabilities to address them.44 Once again, the nature of the threat becomes the dominant driving force in this strate-gic analysis. Thus, when the threat capability and/or vulnerability is identified outside a “hot zone,” it in no way nullifies the imperative of addressing the threat. In short, as others have noted, once the armed conflict door is open, threat–based strategy—focusing military action in response to threat dynamics in order to destroy or disable threat capabilities—is essentially opportunity driven: the conflict follows the belligerent target.45

#### Our link destroys all their spin about the plan merely codifying current policy---the current approach makes limits on first-resort killings part of the rules of engagement, not a legal restriction on authority---legally codifying them would destroy flexibility

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2013, “Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring,” International Legal Studies, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77 (2013)

Ironically, when Professor Gabrielle Blum proposed such a limitation in her article The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers,76 I was quite skeptical. However, my skepticism focused primarily on two considerations. First, her proposal extended to “hot zones”. I remain opposed to such an extension, as I believe it would inject a dangerous dilution of tactical initiative into the ex-ecution of combat operations.77 Second, it was unclear whether Professor Blum was proposing a legal norm, or a policy constraint on permissible legal authority. Once it was clear that we shared opposition to modifying the existing legal authority to attack even an inoffensive enemy belligerent operative (such as an enemy soldier sleeping in a barracks or assembly area or attempting to retreat from an ongoing attack), and that she was in fact proposing consideration of policy limits on that authority, we were much more closely aligned in our views.78

This latter aspect of the “capture or kill” debate is critical, and in my opinion, if such a limitation on targeting authority is justified, it must be framed as a policy limit on otherwise lawful authority: a rule of engagement.79 This is because there may be situations, even where these conditions are satisfied, when an attack is justified because of the influence it will produce on enemy leadership and other belligerent operatives. It is this corporate, as opposed to individualized, approach to attack justification that distinguishes targeting belligerent operatives from targeting civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. It therefore requires strictly limiting any “capture or kill” obligation to a policy applique restricting underlying legal authority. In short, even when capture is a completely feasible option to incapacitate an enemy belligerent operative, there still are times when attack is preferred because of the shock effect it will produce on the corporate enemy capability.80

#### The disad turns the entire case---legally codifying geographic limits causes the U.S. to circumvent the ban by relying on even worse legal justifications---that’s clearly net worse for both norms and allied perception

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2013, “Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring,” International Legal Studies, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77 (2013)

**\*\*NOTE**: “Sub rosa” denotes secrecy or confidentiality – Wikipedia

The law of conflict regulation is arguably at a critical crossroads. If threat drives strategy, and strategy drives the existence of armed conflict, the concept of TAC seems an unavoidable reality in the modern strategic environment. Opponents of TAC will continue to argue for limiting armed conflict to the well–accepted inter–State or intra–State hostilities frame-works, but this would only drive States to adopt sub rosa uses of the same type of power under the guise of legal fictions. Concepts such as self–defense targeting, or internationalized law enforcement, might avoid the armed conflict characterization, but they would do little to resolve the un-derlying uncertainties associated with TAC. Even worse, they would inject regulatory uncertainty into the planning and execution of military counter-terror operations, and expose those called upon to put themselves in harm’s way to protect the State to legal liabilities based on inapposite legal norms.

#### Prefer our evidence---critics are wrong---drones are highly effective at CT, and don’t cause high civilian casualties or blowback

Alex Young 13, Associate Staff, Harvard International Review, 2/25/13, “A Defense of Drones,” Harvard International Review, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones

The War on Terror is no longer a traditional conflict. The diffuse, decentralized nature of terrorist organizations had already made this an unconventional war; now, the use of unmanned aircraft has added another non-traditional layer. Conventional military strategies have failed in Iraq and Afghanistan: the United States has, in many cases, stopped sending people into combat, opting instead for airstrikes by unmanned aerial vehicles. Over the past decade, US military and intelligence agencies have expanded their use of unmanned Predator and Reaper drones; these robotic aircraft are generally used to carry out targeted strikes against known members of terrorist groups. US reliance on drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries has changed the nature of the war on terror.

This strategy is not without controversy. The Obama administration’s heavy use of unmanned drones in the War on Terror has come under fire from a variety of opponents, including human rights groups, think tanks, and even foreign governments. Critics claim that drone strikes cause civilian casualties, incorrectly target only the most prominent leaders of terrorist groups, and create backlash against the US. To hear some tell it, the use of drones exacerbates, rather than solves, the problem of terrorism.

The reality is not so bleak: drones are very good at what they do. Unmanned attacks are highly effective when it comes to eliminating specific members of terrorist organizations, disrupting terrorist networks without creating too much collateral damage. Their effectiveness makes drone strikes a vital part of US counterterrorism strategy.

Predator and Reaper drones are not the indiscriminate civilian-killers that some make them out to be: strikes are targeted and selective. This has become increasingly true as drone technology has improved, and as the military has learned how best to use them. A confluence of factors has made drone strikes much better at eliminating enemy militants while avoiding civilians: drones now carry warheads that produce smaller blast radiuses, and the missiles carrying those warheads are guided using laser, millimeter-wave, and infrared seekers. The result has been less destructive drone strikes that reach their intended target more reliably. A number of non-technological shifts have also made drones a more useful tool: Peter Bergen, a national security analyst for CNN, summarized on July 13th, 2012 that more careful oversight, a deeper network of local informants, and better coordination between the US and Pakistani intelligence communities have also contributed to better accuracy. Data gathered by the Long War Journal indicates that the civilian casualty rate for 2012 and the beginning of 2013 is only 4.5 percent. Even Pakistani Major General Ghayur Mehmood acknowledges that, “most of the targets [of drone strikes] are hard-core militants.” Imprecise drone strikes that cause many civilian casualties are now a thing of the past. This improved accuracy may also help to mitigate anti-American sentiment that stems from civilian casualties.

#### Shifting to capture missions is impossible---every alternative to drones is worse for CT

Daniel Byman 13, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4

Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic. To be sure, in an ideal world, militants would be captured alive, allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful information. Raids, arrests, and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than lethal operations. That is why they should be, and indeed already are, used in stable countries where the United States enjoys the support of the host government. But in war zones or unstable countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, arresting militants is highly dangerous and, even if successful, often inefficient. In those three countries, the government exerts little or no control over remote areas, which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants hiding out there. Worse yet, in Pakistan and Yemen, the governments have at times cooperated with militants. If the United States regularly sent in special operations forces to hunt down terrorists there, sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists, likely leading to firefights, U.S. casualties, and possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians.

#### Capture raids in Pakistan cause mass casualties and catastrophic mission failure

Michael Llenza 11, Senior Navy Fellow at the Atlantic Council and Foreign Affairs Specialist, NATO ISAF, Spring 2011, “Targeted Killings in Pakistan: A Defense,” Global Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Targeted%20Killings.pdf

In response to the call by several NGOs that the United States work with the Pakistani government in an attempt to arrest these targets, one must wonder the means by which this would be accomplished. Although it is correct to believe that the ideal manner by which to bring retribution upon these terrorists is through the legal process, it would imply that we are dealing with a government possessing such capabilities.

As mentioned earlier in the paper, the region has remained semi-autonomous throughout history specifically because of the difficulty in securing the area. Not only does it encompass a sizeable parcel of harsh mountainous terrain, the Pashtunwali code by which most in the region live by has been exploited by Al Qaeda and the Taliban for protection (Shah). Furthermore, recent attempts by the Pakistani military to enter the region and arrest such individuals have resulted in heavy fighting and little to no gain.

As in Somalia, an attempt to send in U.S. troops into the region to capture these individuals would be foolhardy at best and cost untold casualties on both sides (Anderson, 2009, p.7). The idea that these individuals could be prevented from carrying out further terror attacks by issuing an arrest order to the Pakistani government is tantamount to Israel demanding that the Palestinian Authority hand over all the Palestinians involved in plotting against it (Statman).

#### The U.S. won’t implement capture missions as an alternative to drone strikes

Romesh Ratnesar 13, Deputy Editor of Bloomberg-Businessweek, 5/23/13, “Five Reasons Why Drones Are Here to Stay,” http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/119384-five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-stay

3. They’re Necessary. Despite their comparatively low cost and relative accuracy, killing terrorists from the sky is still less desirable than capturing them on the ground. The trouble is that al-Qaeda continues to thrive in places where government institutions and security forces are weak, embattled—or, in the case of Syria, just as unappealing as the extremists. As upheaval continues to spread across the greater Middle East, the U.S. will have even fewer local allies to count on. But after almost 12 years of bloody counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither the president nor the Pentagon have any desire to send U.S. troops into such seething, jihadist-infested hotspots as Yemen, Mali, or Syria. In badlands like these, drones will continue to be the least worst option.