## 1AC

### Accountability

#### Accountability mechanisms that constrain the executive prevent drone overuse in Pakistan and Yemen---that’s key to stability

Benjamin R. Farley 12, JD from Emory University School of Law, former Editor-in-Chief of the Emory International Law Review, “Drones and Democracy: Missing Out on Accountability?” Winter 2012, 54 S. Tex. L. Rev. 385, lexis

Use-of-force decisions that avoid accountability are problematic for both functional and normative reasons. Functionally, accountability avoidance yields increased risk-taking and increases the likelihood of policy failure. The constraints imposed by political, supervisory, fiscal, and legal accountability "make[] leaders reluctant to engage in foolhardy military expeditions... . If the caution about military adventure is translated into general risk-aversion when it comes to unnecessary military engagements, then there will likely be a distributional effect on the success rates of [democracies]." n205 Indeed, this result is predicted by the structural explanation of the democratic peace. It also explains why policies that rely on covert action - action that is necessarily less constrained by accountability mechanisms - carry an increased risk of failure. n206 Thus, although accountability avoidance seductively holds out the prospect of flexibility and freedom of action for policymakers, it may ultimately prove counterproductive.¶ In fact, policy failure associated with the overreliance on force - due at least in part to lowered barriers from drone-enabled accountability avoidance - may be occurring already. Airstrikes are deeply unpopular in both Yemen n207 and Pakistan, n208 and although the strikes have proven critical [\*421] to degrading al-Qaeda and associated forces in Pakistan, increased uses of force may be contributing to instability, the spread of militancy, and the failure of U.S. policy objectives there. n209 Similarly, the success of drone [\*422] strikes in Pakistan must be balanced against the costs associated with the increasingly contentious U.S.-Pakistani relationship, which is attributable at least in part to the number and intensity of drone strikes. n210 These costs include undermining the civilian Pakistani government and contributing to the closure of Pakistan to NATO supplies transiting to Afghanistan, n211 thus forcing the U.S. and NATO to rely instead on several repressive central Asian states. n212 Arguably the damage to U.S.-Pakistan relations and the destabilizing influence of U.S. operations in Yemen would be mitigated by fewer such operations - and there would be fewer U.S. operations in both Pakistan and Yemen if U.S. policymakers were more constrained by use-of-force accountability mechanisms.

#### Judicial review is key to prevent mistakes – executive targeting decisions are inevitably flawed

Ahmad Chehab 12, Georgetown University Law Center, “RETRIEVING THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TARGETED KILLINGS CONTEXT: A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW,” March 30 2012, available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B91bSAyxkYQWbktoTDRSWGJzNmc/edit?usp=sharing

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “[i]rrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147¶ Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153¶ Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.¶ D. THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY CHECKS¶ To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision-making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159¶ Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### In particular, current broad definitions of imminent threat guarantee blowback and collateral damage

Amos N. Guiora 12, Prof of Law at S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Fall 2012, “Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol 45 Issues 1 & 2, http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.13.Article.Guiora.pdf

Morality in armed conflict is not a mere mantra: it imposes significant demands on the nation state that must adhere to limits and considerations beyond simply killing “the other side.” For better or worse, drone warfare of today will become the norm of tomorrow. Multiply the number of attacks conducted regularly in the present and you have the operational reality of future warfare. It is important to recall that drone policy is effective on two distinct levels: it takes the fight to terrorists directly involved, either in past or future attacks, and serves as a powerful deterrent for those considering involvement in terrorist activity.53 However, its importance and effectiveness must not hinder critical conversation, particularly with respect to defining imminence and legitimate target. The overly broad definition, “flexible” in the Obama Administration’s words,54 raises profound concerns regarding how imminence is applied. That concern is concrete for the practical import of Brennan’s phrasing is a dramatic broadening of the definition of legitimate target. It is also important to recall that operators—military, CIA or private contractors—are responsible for implementing executive branch guidelines and directives.55 For that very reason, the approach articulated by Brennan on behalf of the administration is troubling.¶ This approach, while theoretically appealing, fails on a number of levels. First, it undermines and does a profound injustice to the military and security personnel tasked with operationalizing defense of the state, particularly commanders and officers. When senior leadership deliberately obfuscates policy to create wiggle room and plausible deniability, junior commanders (those at the tip of the spear, in essence) have no framework to guide their operational choices.56 The results can be disastrous, as the example of Abu Ghraib shows all too well.57 Second, it gravely endangers the civilian population. What is done in the collective American name poses danger both to our safety, because of the possibility of blow-back attacks in response to a drone attack that caused significant collateral damage, and to our values, because the policy is loosely articulated and problematically implemented.58 Third, the approach completely undermines our commitment to law and morality that defines a nation predicated on the rule of law. If everyone who constitutes “them” is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability, and other factors become meaningless. Self-defense becomes a mantra that justifies all action, regardless of method or procedure.¶ Accordingly, the increasing reliance on modern technology must raise a warning flag. Drone warfare is conducted using modern technology with the explicit assumption that the technology of the future is more sophisticated, more complex, and more lethal. Its sophistication and complexity, however, must not be viewed as a holy grail. While armed conflict involves the killing of individuals, the relevant questions must remain who, why, how, and when. Seductive methods must not lead us to reflexively conclude that we can charge ahead. Indeed, the more sophisticated the mechanism, the more questions we must ask. Capability cannot substitute for process and technology cannot substitute for analysis.¶ V. Conclusion¶ The state’s right to engage in pre-emptive self-defense must be subject to powerful restraints and conditions. A measured, cautious approach to targeted killing reflects the understanding that the state has the absolute, but not unlimited, right and obligation to protect its civilian population.¶ Targeted killing is a legal, legitimate, and effective form of active self-defense provided that it is conducted in accordance with international law, morality, and a narrow definition of legitimate target. Self-defense, according to international law, is subject to limits; otherwise, administration officials would not press for flexibility in defining imminent. The call for a flexible conception of imminence is a deeply troubling manifestation of a “slippery slope;” it opens the door to operational counterterrorism not conducted in accordance with international law or principles of morality. Therefore, analyzing the reliability of intelligence, assessing the threat posed, and determining whether the identified target is a legitimate target facilitates lawful, moral, and effective targeted killing.¶ Expansiveness and flexibility are at odds with a measured approach to targeted killing precisely because they eliminate our sense of what is proportional, in the broadest sense of the term. Flexibility with regard to imminence and threat-perception means that the identification of legitimate targets, the true essence of moral operational counterterrorism, becomes looser and less precise. In turn, broader notions of legitimate target and the right of self-defense introduce greater flexibility with regard to collateral damage—resulting in a wider understanding of who constitutes collateral damage and how much collateral damage is justified in the course of targeting a particular threat. Flexibility and the absence of criteria, process, and procedure result in notions of proportionality—which would normally guide decision making and operations— that are out of proportion. In the high-stakes world of operational counterterrorism, there is no room for imprecision and casual definitions; the risks, to innocent civilians on both sides and to our fundamental values, are just too high.

#### Overuse of targeted killings in Yemen strengthens AQAP and fuels instability

Danielle Wiener-Bronner 12/13/13, staff writer at the Wire and former Web Editor for Reuters, “Latest Drone Strikes Shows How U.S. Strategy in Yemen Is Backfiring,” http://www.thewire.com/global/2013/12/yemen-drones/356111/

Targeted drone killings are defended by the United States as means to combat al-Qaeda in the most effective way possible. If attacks are carried out correctly, they should minimize civilian casualties, eliminate risk to our own forces, and remove dangerous militant operatives, ideally dismantling terrorist groups from a safe distance.¶ But if the attacks are not carried out correctly, as they often aren't, the results can backfire, which is exactly what's been happening in Yemen, according to Reuters: ¶ Tribal leaders, who have a lot of influence within Yemen's complex social structure, warn of rising sympathy for al Qaeda. Awad Ahmed Mohsen from Majallah, a southern village hit by a drone strike that killed dozens in 2009, told Reuters that America had brought hatred with its drones. Asked if more people joined al Qaeda in the wake of attacks that killed civilians, Mohsen said: "Definitely. And even those who don't join, now sympathize with al Qaeda because of these strikes, these violations. Any American they see, they exact revenge, even if it's a civilian."¶ On Thursday, 14 Yemeni civilians were killed by a U.S. drone strike that mistakenly targeted a wedding convoy, according to Yemeni national security officials. Another official, however, said AQAP militants may have been traveling with the wedding party, but in either case it seems that civilians were not the original targets have been killed. The CIA didn't comment on the strike, per standard procedure. The attack threatens to undo the U.S.'s efforts to scale back its drone program, while making it more palatable to the countries it affects.¶ Reuters reports that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has started traveling in smaller groups to avoid the aerial strikes, which may actually make it more difficult to track their motions. And the strikes are angering some Sunni Muslims upset about strikes that kill their supporters, rather than anti-government Shi'ite rebels, fueling sectarian tensions which are already high in the region.¶ If those killed in this week's attack are confirmed to be civilians, according to the Associated Press, it could mean a surge of anti-American sentiment in Yemen: ¶ Civilian deaths have bred resentments on a local level, sometimes undermining U.S. efforts to turn the public against the militants. The backlash in Yemen is still not as large as in Pakistan, where there is heavy pressure on the government to force limits on strikes — but public calls for a halt to strikes are starting to emerge.¶ In May, President Obama promised to increase transparency on the drone strike program and enhance guidelines on their use. But the Bureau of Investigative Journalism found in November that the six months following Obama's speech actually saw an increase of drone strike casualties in Yemen and Pakistan. ¶ Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported in October that civilian casualties of drone strikes are higher than the U.S. admits. Around the same time, a U.N. human rights investigator said 400-600 of the 2,200 people killed by drones in the past decade were noncombatants. And in 2012, reports emerged that the Yemeni government works to help the U.S. hide it deadly errors. ¶ Data on drone strikes, like all counter-terrorism efforts, is necessarily shrouded in mystery, making it difficult to measure success. But if drone strikes continue to indiscriminately kill civilians, moderates in Yemen may be driven towards more extremist positions. Even governments working with Washington to coordinate the strikes could turn against the U.S. if drone casualties are not scaled back or eliminated.

#### That undermines the Saudi regime

Colonel Hassan Abosaq 12, US Army War College, master of strategic studies degree candidate, 2012, "The Implications of Unstable on Saudi Arabia," Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA560581

AQAP has been vociferous in its opposition to the Saudi regime, and is likely to continue targeting the Kingdom, particularly its oil installations and members of the royal family. In August 2009, an AQAP member attempted to assassinate Prince Mohammed bin Naif, the Saudi Assistant Interior Minister for security affairs. The prince’s attacker was trained in and launched his attack from Yemen, confirming to the Saudis that instability in Yemen poses a security threat to Saudi Arabia. A strengthened AQAP in Yemen is certain to try to put pressure on Saudi Arabia and to strike Saudi targets. AQAP’s military chief, Qasin al-Raymi, warned the Saudi Leadership in July 2011 that they are still regarded as apostates. And he specifically placed King Abdullah, the late Crown Prince Sultan, Interior Minister Prince Naif, and his son Mohammed Bin Naif on the target list.21 In March 2010, Saudi Arabia foiled several planned attacks on oil installation with the arrest of more than 100 suspected al-Qaeda militants. The arrests included 47 Saudis, 51 Yemenis, a Somali, a Bangladeshi, and an Eritrean.22 The wider domestic strife in Yemen has provided AQAP with some breathing space. More worrisome for Saudi Arabia is the increased lawlessness within Yemen. Not only does this provide the space that al-Qaeda needs to regroup, train, recruit, but it also deflects the state resources away from counterterrorism operations. Saudi Arabia has for years been working to infiltrate al-Qaeda in its unstable neighbor to south, Yemen. Saudi Arabia has also been giving Yemen a great deal of assistance to counterterrorism and it is worrying to the Saudis to see all of that assistance diverted from the purposes for which it was intended. In June 2011, AQAP leaped into the security vacuum created by Yemen’s political volatility, and 63 al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters escaped from a Yemeni prison.23 This exemplifies how Yemeni instability emboldens this lethal al-Qaeda affiliate. As the Yemeni military consolidates its strength in an attempt to maintain state control and fight two insurgencies and oppress the protesters, AQAP has further expanded its safe haven in the country’s interior, further increasing their operational capacity. This organization has not only attacked police, foreigners, and diplomatic missions within the country, but also served as a logistic base for acts of terrorism abroad. Yemen also has become the haven for jihad militants not just from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but from all over the world which includes some Arabs, Americans, Europeans, Africans and others. Al-Qaeda camps, where terrorists from all over the world train are also situated in Yemen. The growing anarchy and al-Qaeda presence could spill over into Saudi Arabia.

#### That destabilizes the Middle East

Anthony Cordesman 11, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, former adjunct prof of national security studies at Georgetown, PhD from London University, Feb 26 2011, “Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Different Nation,” http://csis.org/publication/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-very-different-nation

History scarcely means we can take Saudi stability for granted. Saudi Arabia is simply too critical to US strategic interests and the world. Saudi petroleum exports play a critical role in the stability and growth of a steadily more global economy, and the latest projections by the Department of Energy do not project any major reductions in the direct level of US dependence on oil imports through 2025.¶ Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the world’s economy. It is the key to the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to create local defenses, and for US strategic cooperation with the Southern Gulf states. It plays a critical role as a counterbalance to a radical and more aggressive Iran, it is the source of the Arab League plan for a peace with Israel, and it has become a key partner in the war on terrorism. The US strategic posture in the Middle East depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime.

#### Global nuke war

Primakov 9 [September, Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. This article is based on the scientific report for which the author was awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”]

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusionno longer conforms to the realit**y**. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect ofa nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world**.** The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched *Yevgeny Primakov* 1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

#### Overuse of drones in Pakistan empowers militants and destabilizes the government

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77

#### Global nuclear war

William Pitt 9, NYT and internationally bestselling author on US foreign policy, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183

It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real.¶ "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure."¶ "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 - the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say."¶ In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster.

### New Adv

#### US justifications for targeted killing will spill over to erode legal restraints on all violence and legitimize preventive war

Craig Martin 11, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, “Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defence, and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime,” Ch 8 in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD, p. 223, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1956141

IV. The potential impact of the targeted killing policy on international law

The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile systems to kill targeted individuals since at least 2002.98 An increasing number of countries have employed different methods of targeted killing that constitute a use of force under jus ad bellum.99 The evidence suggests that the United States intends to continue and indeed expand the program, and there is a growing body of scholarly literature that either defends the policy’s legality, or advocates adjustment in international law to permit such action. There is, therefore, a real prospect that the practice could become more widespread, and that customary international law could begin to shift to reflect the principles implicit in the U.S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it.¶ Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are obvious from the foregoing analysis. As discussed, there would be a rejection of the narrow principle of self-defense in favor of something much closer to the Grotian concept of defensive war, encompassing punitive measures in response to past attacks and preventative uses of force to halt the development of future threats. The current conditions for a legitimate use of force in self-defense, namely the occurrence or imminence of an armed attack, necessity, and proportionality, would be significantly diluted or abandoned. Not only the doctrine of self-defense, but other aspects of the collective security system would be relaxed as well. Harkening back to Grotian notions of law enforcement constituting a just cause for war, the adjusted jus ad bellum regime would potentially permit the unilateral use of force against and within states for the purpose of attacking NSAs as such, in effect to enforce international law in jurisdictions that were incapable of doing so themselves.100 This would not only further undermine the concept of self-defense, but would undermine the exclusive jurisdiction that the U.N. Security Council currently has to authorize the use of force for purposes of “law enforcement” under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, both of the exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded.¶ In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in the jus ad bellum regime. This less obvious injury would arise from changes that would be similarly required of the IHL regime, and the resulting modifications to the fundamental relationship between the two regimes. These changes could lead to a complete severance of the remaining connection between the two regimes. Indeed, Ken Anderson, a scholar who has testified more than once on this subject before the U.S. Congress,101 has advocated just such a position, suggesting that the United States should assert that its use of force against other states in the process of targeted killings, while justified by the right to self-defense, does not rise to such a level that it would trigger the existence of an international armed conflict or the operation of IHL principles.102 If customary international law evolved along such lines, reverting to gradations in the types of use of force the change would destroy the unity of the system comprised of the jus ad bellum and IHL regimes, and there would be legal “black holes” in which states could use force without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime.¶ The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL, albeit in a different and even more troubling way. His policy justification consists of two apparently independent and alternative arguments—that the United States is in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda and associated groups; and that the actions are justified as an exercise of self-defense. The suggestion seems to be that the United States is entitled on either basis to use armed force not just against the individuals targeted, but also against states in which the terrorist members are located. In other words, the first prong of the argument is that the use of force against another sovereign state, for the purposes of targeting Al Qaeda members, is justified by the existence of an armed conflict with Al Qaeda. If this is indeed what is intended by the policy justification, it represents an extraordinary move, not just because it purports to create a new category of armed conflict (that is, a “transnational” armed conflict without geographic limitation),103 but because it also suggests that there need be no jus ad bellum justification at all for a use of force against another state. Rather, the implication of Koh’s rationale is that the existence of an armed conflict under IHL can by itself provide grounds for exemption from the prohibition against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime.¶ This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the language of Mr. Koh’s speech alone, which he hastened to explain at the time was not a legal opinion.104 The two justifications could be explained as being supplementary rather than independent and alternative in nature. But the conduct of the United States in the prosecution of the policy would appear to confirm that it is based on these two independent justifications.105 The strikes against groups and states unrelated to the 9/11 attacks could be explained in part by the novel idea that force can be used against NSAs as such, wherever they may be situated. But even assuming some sort of strict liability for states in which guilty NSAs are found, that explanation still does not entirely account for the failure to tie the use of force against the different groups to specific armed attacks launched by each such group. This suggests that the United States is also relying quite independently on the argument that it is engaged in an armed conflict with all of these groups, and that the existence of such an armed conflict provides an independent justification for the use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating.¶ While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to bring into existence an international armed conflict and trigger the operation of IHL, the changes suggested by the policy would turn this on its head, by permitting the alleged existence of a “transnational” armed conflict to justify the initial use of force against third states. Whereas the two regimes currently operate as two components of an overall legal system relating to war, with one regime governing the use of force and the other the conduct of hostilities in the resulting armed conflict, the move attempted by the U.S. policy would terminate these independent but inter-related roles within a single system, and expand the role and scope of IHL to essentially replace aspects of the jus ad bellum regime. This would not only radically erode the jus ad bellum regime’s control over the state use of force, but it could potentially undermine the core idea that war, or in more modern terms the use of force and armed conflict, constitutes a legal state that triggers the operation of special laws that govern the various aspects of the phenomenon. There is a risk of return to a pre-Grotian perspective in which “war” was simply a term used to describe certain kinds of organized violence, rather than constituting a legal institution characterized by a coherent system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation.¶ There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so-called “global war on terror” to cherry-pick principles of the laws of war and to apply them in ways and in circumstances that are inconsistent with the very criteria within that legal system that determine when and how it is to operate. This reflects a certain disdain for the idea that the laws of war constitute an internally coherent system of law.106 In short, the advocated changes to the jus ad bellum regime and to the relationship between it and the IHL regime, and thus to the laws of war system as a whole,107 would constitute marked departures from the trajectory the system has been on during its development over the past century, and would be a repudiation of deliberate decisions that were made in creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108¶ The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently regressive. A rejection of recent innovations in favor of certain past practices might be attractive to some in the face of new transnational threats. The argument here is not even to deny the idea that the international law system may have to adapt to respond to the transnational terrorist threat. The point, rather, is that the kinds of changes to the international law system that are implicit in the targeted killing policy, and which are advocated by its supporters, would serve to radically reduce the limitations and constraints on the use of force by states against states. The modern principles that are being abandoned were created for the purpose of limiting the use of force and thus reducing the incidence of armed conflict among nations. The rejection of those ideas and a return to older concepts relating to the law of war would restore aspects of a system in which war was a legitimate tool of statecraft, and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109¶ The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed by transnational terrorist threats, and how to manipulate the legal limitations that tend to frustrate some of the desired policy choices, that there is insufficient reflection on the broader context, and the consequences that proposed changes to the legal constraints would have on the wider legal system of which they are a part. It may serve the immediate requirements of the American government, in order to legitimize the killing of AQAP members in Yemen, to expand the concept of self-defense, and to suggest that states can use force on the basis of a putative “transnational” armed conflict with NSAs. The problem is that the jus ad bellum regime applies to all state use of force, and it is not being adjusted in some tailored way to deal with terrorism alone. If the doctrine of self-defense is expanded to include preventative and punitive elements, it will be so expanded for all jus ad bellum purposes. The expanded doctrine of self-defense will not only justify the use of force to kill individual terrorists alleged to be plotting future attacks, but to strike the military facilities of states suspected of preparing for future aggression. If the threshold for use of force against states “harboring” NSAs is significantly reduced, the gap between state responsibility and the criteria for use of force will be reduced for all purposes. If the relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL is severed or altered, so as to create justifications for the use of force that are entirely independent of the jus ad bellum regime, then states will be entitled to use force against other states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally.¶ We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against terrorist groups that have been responsible for heinous attacks, and applied to states that have proven uniquely unwilling or unable to take the actions necessary to deal with the terrorists operating within their territory. But no clear criteria or qualifications are in fact tied to the modifications that are being advanced by the targeted killing policy. Relaxing the current legal constraints on the use of force and introducing new but poorly defined standards, will open up opportunities for states to use force against other states for reasons that have nothing to do with anti-terrorist objectives. Along the lines that Jeremy Waldron argues in chapter 4 in this volume,110 more careful thought ought to be given to the general norms that we are at risk of developing in the interest of justifying the very specific targeted killing policy. Ultimately, war between nations is a far greater threat, and is a potential source of so much more human suffering than the danger posed by transnational terrorism. This is not to trivialize the risks that terrorism represents, particularly in an age when Al Qaeda and others have sought nuclear weapons. But we must be careful not to undermine the system designed to constrain the use of force and reduce the incidence of international armed conflict, in order to address a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.

#### Robust norms restricting the use of force empirically prevent conflict escalation among great powers

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Wallensteen’s examination of the characteristics of particularist periods provides significant additional evidence that the steps-to-war analysis is on the right track. Realist practices are associated with war, and peaceful systems are associated with an emphasis on other practices. Peaceful systems are exemplified by the use of practices like buffer states, compensation, and concerts of power that bring major states together to form a network of institutions that provide governance for the system. The creation of rules of the game that can handle certain kinds of issues – territorial and ideological questions – and/or keep them off the agenda seems to be a crucial variable in producing peace.¶ Additional evidence on the import of rules and norms is provided in a series of studies by Kegley and Raymond (1982, 1984, 1986, 1990) that are operationally more precise than Wallensteen’s (1984) analysis. Kegley and Raymond provide evidence that when states accept norms, the incidence of war and military confrontation is reduced. They find that peace is associated with periods in which alliance norms are considered binding and the unilateral abrogation of commitments and treaties illegitimate. The rules imposed by the global political culture in these periods result in fewer militarized disputes and wars between major states. In addition, the wars that occur are kept at lower levels of severity, magnitude, and duration (i.e. they are limited wars).¶ Kegley and Raymond attempt to measure the extent to which global cultural norms restrain major states by looking at whether international law and commentary on it sees treaties and alliances as binding. They note that there have been two traditions in international law – pacta sunt servanda, which maintains that agreements are binding, and clausa rebus sic stantibus, which says that treaties are signed “as matters stand” and that any change in circumstances since the treaty was signed permits a party to withdraw unilaterally. One of the advantages the Kegley-Raymond studies have over Wallensteen (1984) is that they are able to develop reliable measures of the extent to which in any given half-decade that tradition in international law emphasizes the rebus or pacta sunt servanda tradition. This indicator is important not only because it focuses in on the question of unilateral actions, but because it can serve as an indicator of how well the peace system is working. The pacta sunt servanda tradition implies a more constraining political system and robust institutional context which should provide an alternative to war.¶ Kegley and Raymond (1982: 586) find that in half-decades (from 1820 to 1914) when treaties are considered non-binding (rebus), wars between major states occur in every half-decade (100 percent), but when treaties are considered binding (pacta sunt servanda), wars between major states occur in only 50 percent of the half-decades. The Cramer’s V for this relationship is .66. When the sample is expanded to include all states in the central system, Cramer’s V is 0.44, indicating that global norms have more impact on preventing war between major states. Nevertheless, among central system states between 1820 and 1939, war occurred in 93 percent of the half-decades where the rebus tradition dominated and in only 60 percent of the half-decades where the pacta sunt sevanda tradition dominated.¶ In a subsequent analysis of militarized disputes from 1820 to 1914, Kegley and Raymond (1984: 207-11) find that there is a negative relationship between binding norms and the frequency and scope of disputes short of war. In periods when the global culture accepts the pacta sunt servanda tradition as the norm, the number of military disputes goes down and the number of major states involved in a dispute decreases. Although the relationship is of moderate strength, it is not eliminated by other variables, namely alliance flexibility. As Kegley and Raymond (1984: 213) point out, this means “that in periods when the opportunistic renunciation of commitments” is condoned, militarized disputes are more likely to occur and to spread. The finding that norms can reduce the frequency and scope of disputes is significant evidence that rules can permit actors to successfully control and manage disputes so that they are not contagious and they do not escalate to war. These findings are consistent with Wallensteen’s (1984) and suggest that one of the ways rules help prevent war is by reducing, limiting, and managing disputes short of war.

#### Specifically, executive discretion over the legitimacy of targets will eviscerate legal restrictions on self-defense

Rosa Brooks 13, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing,” http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf

5. Setting Troubling International Precedents ¶ Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on drone strikes: Other states will follow America's example, and the results are not likely to be pretty. Consider once again the Letelier murder, which was an international scandal in 1976: If the Letelier assassination took place today, the Chilean authorities would presumably insist on their national right to engage in “targeted killings” of individuals deemed to pose imminent threats to Chilean national security -- and they would justify such killings using precisely the same legal theories the US currently uses to justify targeted killings in Yemen or Somalia. We should assume that governments around the world—including those with less than stellar human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. ¶ Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to armed drones, but that will not last long. We should use this window to advance a robust legal and normative framework that will help protect against abuses by those states whose leaders can rarely be trusted. Unfortunately, we are doing the exact opposite: Instead of articulating norms about transparency and accountability, the United States is effectively handing China, Russia, and every other repressive state a playbook for how to foment instability and –literally -- get away with murder. ¶ Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the Westphalian international legal order.42 In the international arena, all sovereign states are formally considered equal and possessed of the right to control their own internal affairs free of interference from other states. That's what we call the principle of non-intervention -- and it means, among other things, that it is generally prohibited for one state to use force inside the borders of another sovereign state. There are some well-established exceptions, but they are few in number. A state can lawfully use force inside another sovereign state with that state's invitation or consent, or when force is authorized by the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to the U.N. Charter,43 or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." ¶ The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United States don't violate another state's sovereignty as long as that state either consents or is "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted." That sounds superficially plausible, but since the United States views itself as the sole arbiter of whether a state is "unwilling or unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. ¶ It goes like this: The United States -- using its own malleable definition of "imminent" -- decides that Person X, residing in sovereign State Y, poses a threat to the United States and requires killing. Once the United States decides that Person X can be targeted, the principle of sovereignty presents no barriers, because either 1) State Y will consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case the use of force presents no sovereignty problems or 2) State Y will not consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case, by definition, the United States will deem State Y to be "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat" posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. ¶ This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, and has the potential to significantly destabilize the already shaky collective security regime created by the U.N. Charter.44 If the US is the sole arbiter of whether and when it can use force inside the borders of another state, any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim similar prerogatives. And, of course, if the US executive branch is the sole arbiter of what constitutes an imminent threat and who constitutes a targetable enemy combatant in an ill- defined war, why shouldn’t other states make identical arguments—and use them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?

#### Now is key---US targeted killing is driving a global shift in strategic doctrines---results in nuclear war

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Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in order to prevent a suspected enemy from changing the status quo in an unfavorable direction. Prevention is acting in anticipation of a suspected latent threat that might fully emerge someday. One might rightfully point out that preventive strikes are nothing new—the Iraq War is simply a more recent example in a long history of the preventive use of force. The strategic theorist Colin Gray (2007:27), for example, argues that “far from being a rare and awful crime against an historical norm, preventive war is, and has always been, so common, that its occurrence seems remarkable only to those who do not know their history.” Prevention may be common throughout history, but this does not change the fact that it became increasingly difficult to justify after World War II, as the international community developed a core set of normative principles to guide state behavior, including war as a last resort. The threshold for war was set high, imposing a stringent standard for states acting in self-defense. Gray concedes that there has been a “slow and erratic, but nevertheless genuine, growth of a global norm that regards the resort to war as an extraordinary and even desperate measure” and that the Iraq war set a “dangerous precedent” (44). Although our cases do not provide a definitive answer for whether a preventive self-defense norm is diffusing, they do provide some initial evidence that states are re-orienting their military and strategic doctrines toward offense. In addition, these states have all either acquired or developed unmanned aerial vehicles for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting.¶ Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm regarding the use of force as a last resort is waning, and that a preventive self-defense norm is emerging and cascading following the example set by the United States. At the same time, there is variation among our cases in the extent to which they apply the strategy of self-defense. China, for example, has limited their adaption of this strategy to targeted killings, while Russia has declared their strategy to include the possibility of a preventive nuclear war. Yet, the preventive self-defense strategy is not just for powerful actors. Lesser powers may choose to adopt it as well, though perhaps only implementing the strategy against actors with equal or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein.¶ With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter of time before countries that do not have drone technology are in the minority. While preventive self-defense strategies and drones are not inherently linked, current rhetoric and practice do tie them together. Though it is likely far into the future, it is all the more important to consider the final stage of norm evolution—internalization—for this particular norm. While scholars tend to think of norms as “good,” this one is not so clear-cut. If the preventive self-defense norm is taken for granted, integrated into practice without further consideration, it inherently changes the functioning of international relations. And unmanned aerial vehicles, by reducing the costs of war, make claims of preventive self-defense more palatable to the public. Yet a global norm of preventive self-defense is likely to be destabilizing, leading to more war in the international system, not less. It clearly violates notions of just war principles—jus ad bellum. The United States has set a dangerous precedent, and by continuing its preventive strike policy it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.

#### Credible external oversight is key to solve---the alternative is an anything-goes standard

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Further, the U.S. counterterrorism chief John Brennan has noted that the administration is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow." But, for now, other countries have no reason to believe that the United States carries out its own targeted killing operations responsibly. Without a credible oversight program, those negative perceptions of U.S. behavior will fill the vacuum, and an anything-goes standard might be the result. U.S. denunciations of other countries' programs could come to ring hollow. ¶ If the United States did adopt an oversight system, those denunciations would carry more weight. So, too, would U.S. pressure on other states to adopt similar systems: just as suspicions grow when countries refuse nuclear inspection, foreign governments that turned down invitations to apply a proven system of oversight to their own drone campaigns would reveal their disregard for humanitarian concerns.

#### A norm of preventive war pushes regional conflicts over the brink---causes nuclear war between India and Pakistan

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A final concern relates to the impact of the precedent set by the United States legitimating action that others might emulate, at the same time reducing its leverage to convince such countries not to use force. This concern is theoretical at one level, since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to actual U.S. actions. But it is very real at another level. Today's international system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate war. Developing doctrines that lower the threshold for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict.¶ Of course, no country will embark suddenly on a war of aggression simply because the United States provides it with a quasi-legal justification to do so. But countries already on the brink of war, and leaning strongly towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an action they already wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may make it harder for the international community in general, and the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy.¶ Potential examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps the clearest case is the India-Pakistan crisis. Last spring, India was poised to attack Pakistan, given Pakistan's suspected complicity in assisting Islamic extremist terrorists who went from Pakistan into the disputed territory of Kashmir. A combination of U.S. pressure on both countries, with some last-minute caution by the leaders of Pakistan and India, narrowly averted a war that had the potential to escalate to the nuclear level once it began. Although India might have intended to limit its action to eliminating terrorist bases in Pakistan-held Kashmir and perhaps some bases inside Pakistan, nuclear-armed Pakistan might well have believed that India's intentions were to overthrow the regime in Islamabad or to eliminate its nuclear weapons capability. That situation would have further exacerbated the risks of escalation. Unfortunately, the terrorist infiltrations from Pakistan to Kashmir that did much to spark the earlier crisis appear to be resuming. Kashmir's status remains contentious, meaning that the risk of conflict remains.¶ Should the crisis resume, a U.S. policy of preemption may provide hawks in India the added ammunition they need to justify a strike against Pakistan in the eyes of their fellow Indian decision-makers. Recently, India Finance Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Jaswant Singh welcomed the administration's new emphasis on the legitimacy of preemption.

#### Extinction

Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting\_us\_security\_strategy\_in\_south\_asia

A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. ¶ The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.

#### Legitimizing preventive war causes a Chinese attack on US missile defense

Stephen Walt 4, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, PhD in Political Science from UC Berkeley, October 1 2004, “The Strategic Environment,” Panel Discussion at “Preemptive Use of Force: A Reassessment,” Conference held by the Fletcher Forum on International Affairs, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/daalder/daalder_fletcher.pdf>

Finally, as Ivo has already noted, there is this precedent problem. By declaring that preventive war is an effective policy option for us, we make it easier for others to see it as an effective policy option for them. Why can’t India attack Pakistan before it develops more nuclear weapons? Why can’t Turkey attack Iraqi Kurdistan to prevent the emergence of an independent state there? Why was it wrong for Serbia to take preventive action against the Kosovars, given that there was a guerilla army attacking Serbs in Kosovo, and given that the Serbs could see a long term threat to their national security if the Kosovar-Albanians got more and more politically organized and tried to secede? Why couldn’t a stronger China decide that America’s national missile defense program was a direct threat to their nuclear deterrent capability, and therefore decide to order a preventive commando strike against American radar sites in Alaska? Now this sounds wildly far-fetched, of course, but imagine the situation being reversed. Imagine if another country threatened our second strike capability, wouldn’t we have looked for some way to prevent that from happening? Of course we would. So again, we’re creating a precedent here.

#### That goes nuclear

John W. Lewis 12, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, emeritus, at Stanford University, PhD from UCLA, and Xue Litai, research scholar at the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Making China’s nuclear war plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2012 vol. 68 no. 5 45-65, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/5/45.full

If the CMC authorizes a missile base to launch preemptive conventional attacks on an enemy, however, the enemy and its allies could not immediately distinguish whether the missiles fired were conventional or nuclear. From their perspective, the enemy forces could justifiably launch on warning and retaliate against all the command-and-control systems and missile assets of the Chinese missile launch base and even the overall command-and-control system of the central Second Artillery headquarters. In the worst case, a self-defensive first strike by Chinese conventional missiles could end in the retaliatory destruction of many Chinese nuclear missiles and their related command-and-control systems. That disastrous outcome would force the much smaller surviving and highly vulnerable Chinese nuclear missile units to fire their remaining missiles against the enemy’s homeland. In this quite foreseeable action-reaction cycle, escalation to nuclear war could become accelerated and unavoidable. This means that the double policies could unexpectedly cause, rather than deter, a nuclear exchange.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should create a statutory cause of action for damages for those unlawfully injured by targeted killing operations, their heirs, or their next friend.

### Solvency

#### The plan establishes legal norms and ensures compliance with the laws of war

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The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end, Congress should authorize federal damages suits by the immediate family members of individuals killed in drone strikes.¶ Such ex post review would serve two main functions: providing judicial scrutiny of the underlying legal basis for targeted killings and affording victims a remedy. It would also give judges more leeway to evaluate the facts without fear that an error on their part might leave a dangerous terrorist at large.¶ For review to be meaningful, judges must not be restricted to deciding whether there is enough evidence in a particular case, as they would likely be under a FISA model. They must also be able to examine the government's legal arguments and, to paraphrase the great Supreme Court chief justice John Marshall, "to say what the law is" on targeted killings.¶ Judicial review through a civil action can achieve that goal. It can thus help resolve the difficult questions raised by the Justice Department white paper, including the permissible scope of the armed conflict with al Qaeda and the legality of the government's broad definition of an "imminent" threat.¶ Judges must also be able to afford a remedy to victims. Mistakes happen and, as a recent report by Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict suggests, they happen more than the U.S. government wants to acknowledge.¶ Errors are not merely devastating for family members and their communities. They also increase radicalization in the affected region and beyond. Drone strikes -- if unchecked -- could ultimately create more terrorists than they eliminate.¶ Courts should thus be able to review lethal strikes to determine whether they are consistent with the Constitution and with the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which requires that such uses of force be consistent with the international laws of war. If a drone strike satisfies these requirements, the suit should be dismissed.

#### Cause of action creates a deterrent effect that makes officials think twice about targeted killing---drawbacks of judicial review don’t apply

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At first blush, it may seem like many of these issues would be equally salient in the context of after-the-fact damages suits. But as long as such a regime was designed carefully and conscientiously, I believe that virtually all of these concerns could be mitigated. ¶ For starters, retrospective review doesn’t raise anywhere near the same concerns with regard to adversity or judicial competence. With respect to adversity, presumably those who are targeted in an individual strike could be represented as plaintiffs in a post-hoc proceeding, whether through their next friend or their heirs. And as long as they could state a viable claim for relief, it’s difficult to see any pure Article III problem with such a suit for retrospective relief.¶ As for competence, judges routinely review whether government officers acted in lawful self-defense under exigent circumstances (this is exactly what the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Tennessee v. Garner20 contemplates, after all). And if the Guantánamo litigation of the past five years has shown nothing else, it demonstrates that judges are also more than competent to resolve not just whether individual terrorism suspects are who the government says they are (and thus members of al Qaeda or one of its affiliates), but to do so using highly classified information in a manner that balances—albeit not always ideally—the government’s interest in secrecy with the detainee’s ability to contest the evidence against him.21 Just as Guantánamo detainees are represented in their habeas proceedings by security-cleared counsel who must comply with court-imposed protective orders and security procedures,22 so too, the subjects of targeted killing operations could have their estates represented by security-cleared counsel, who would be in a far better position to challenge the government’s evidence and to offer potentially exculpatory evidence / arguments of their own. And although the Guantánamo procedures have been developed by courts on an ad hoc basis (a process that has itself been criticized by some jurists), 23 Congress might also look to provisions it enacted in 1996 in creating the little-known Alien Terrorist Removal Court, especially 8 U.S.C. § 1534,24 as a model for such proceedings. ¶ More to the point, it should also follow that courts would be far more able as a practical matter to review the relevant questions in these cases after the fact. Although the pure membership question can probably be decided in the abstract, it should stand to reason that the imminence and infeasibility-of-capture issues will be much easier to assess in hindsight—removed from the pressures of the moment and with the benefit of the dispassionate distance that judicial review provides. To similar effect, whether the government used excessive force in relation to the object of the attack is also something that can only reasonably be assessed post hoc.¶ In addition to the substantive questions, it will also be much easier for courts to review the government’s own internal procedures after they are employed, especially if the government itself is already conducting after-action reviews that could be made part of the (classified) record in such cases. Indeed, the government’s own analysis could, in many cases, go a long way toward proving the lawfulness vel non of an individual strike.¶ As I mentioned before, there would still be a host of legal doctrines that would likely get in the way of such suits. Just to name a few, there is the present (albeit, in my view, unjustified) hostility to judicially inferred causes of actions under Bivens; the state secrets privilege;and sovereign and official immunity doctrines. But I am a firm believer that, except where the President himself is concerned (where there’s a stronger argument that immunity is constitutionally grounded),25 each of these concerns can be overcome by statute—as at least some of them arguably have been in the context of the express damages actions provided for under FISA. 26 So long as Congress creates an express cause of action for nominal damages, and so long as the statute both (1) expressly overrides state secrets and immunity doctrines; and (2) replaces them with carefully considered procedures for balancing the secrecy concerns that would arise in many—if not most—of these cases, these legal issues would be vitiated. Moreover, any concerns about exposing to liability government officers who acted in good faith and within the scope of their employment can be ameliorated by following the model of the Westfall Act, and substituting the United States as the proper defendant in any suit arising out of such an operation.27¶ Perhaps counterintuitively, I also believe that after-the-fact judicial review wouldn’t raise anywhere near the same prudential concerns as those noted above. Leaving aside how much less pressure judges would be under in such cases, it’s also generally true that damages regimes don’t have nearly the same validating effect on government action that ex ante approval does. Otherwise, one would expect to have seen a dramatic upsurge in lethal actions by law enforcement officers after each judicial decision refusing to impose individual liability arising out of a prior use of deadly force. So far as I know, no such evidence exists.¶ Of course, damages actions aren’t a perfect solution here. It’s obvious, but should be said anyway, that in a case in which the government does act unlawfully, no amount of damages will make the victim (or his heirs) whole. It’s also inevitable that, like much of the Guantánamo litigation, most of these suits would be resolved under extraordinary secrecy, and so there would be far less public accountability for targeted killings than, ideally, we might want. Some might also object to this proposal as being unnecessary—that, given existing criminal laws and executive orders, there is already a sufficiently clear prohibition on unlawful strikes to render any such damages regime unnecessarily superfluous. ¶ At least as to this last objection, it bears emphasizing that the existing laws depend entirely upon the beneficence of the Executive Branch, since they assume both that the government will (1) willfully disclose details of unlawful operations rather than cover them up; and (2) prosecute its own in cases in which they cross the line. Given both prior practice and unconfirmed contemporary reports of targeted killing operations that appear to raise serious legality issues, such as “signature strikes,” it doesn’t seem too much of a stretch to doubt that these remedies will prove sufficient.¶ In addition, there are two enormous upsides to damages actions that, in my mind, make them a least-worst solution—even if they are deeply, fundamentally flawed:¶ First, if nothing else, the specter of damages, even nominal damages, should have a deterrent effect on future government officers, such that, if a targeted killing operation ever was carried out in a way that violated the relevant legal rules, there would be liability—and, as importantly, precedent—such that the next government official in a similar context might think twice, and might make sure that he’s that much more convinced that the individual in question is who the government claims, and that there’s no alternative to the use of lethal force. Second, at least where the targets of such force are U.S. citizens, I believe that there is a non-frivolous argument that the Constitution may even compel at least some form of judicial process. 28 Compared to the alternatives, nominal damages actions litigated under carefully circumscribed rules of secrecy may be the only way to balance all of the relevant private, government, and legal interests at stake in such cases.

#### Ex post review creates a credible signal of compliance and restrains future executives

Kwame Holman 13, congressional correspondent for PBS NewsHour; citing Rosa Brooks, Prof of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, former Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former senior advisor at the US Dept of State, “Congress Begins to Weigh In On Drone Strikes Policy,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/04/congress-begins-to-weigh-in-on-drone-strikes-policy.html

While some experts have argued for court oversight of drone strikes before they're carried out, Brooks sides with those who say that would be unwieldy and unworkable.¶ Brooks says however an administration that knows its strikes could face court review after the fact -- with possible damages assessed -- would be more responsible and careful about who it strikes and why.¶ "If Congress were to create a statutory cause of action for damages for those who had been killed in abusive or mistaken drone strikes, you would have a court that would review such strikes after the fact. [That would] create a pretty good mechanism that would frankly keep the executive branch as honest as we hope it is already and as we hope it will continue to be into administrations to come," Brooks said.¶ "It would be one of the approaches that would go a very long way toward reassuring both U.S. citizens and the world more generally that our policies are in compliance with rule of law norms."

#### Only judicial oversight can credibly verify compliance with the laws of war

Avery Plaw 7, Associate Prof of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Science from McGill University, “Terminating Terror: The Legality, Ethics and Effectiveness of Targeting Terrorists,” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, No. 114, War and Terror (December 2007), pp. 1-27

To summarize, the general policy of targeting terrorists appears to be defensible in principle in terms of legality, morality and effectiveness. However, some specific targetings have been indefensible and should be prevented from recurring. Critics focus on the indefensible cases and insist that these are best prevented by condemning the general policy. States which target terrorists and their defenders have insisted that self-defense provides a blanket justification for targeting operations. The result has been a stalemate over terrorist targeting harmful to both the prosecution of the war on terror and the credibility of international law. Yet neither advocates nor critics of targeting appear to have a viable strategy for resolving the impasse. A final issue which urgently demands attention, therefore, is whether there are any plausible prospects for a coherent and principled political compromise over the issue of targeting terrorists.¶ Conclusion: the Possibility of Principled Compromise ¶ This final section offers a brief case that there is room for a principled compromise between critics and advocates of targeting terrorists. The argument is by example—a short illustration of one promising possibility. It will not satisfy everyone, but I suggest that it has the potential to resolve the most compelling concerns on both sides.¶ The most telling issues raised by critics of targeting fall into three categories: (1) the imperative need to establish that targets are combatants; (2) the need in attacking combatants to respect the established laws of war; and (3) the overwhelming imperative to avoid civilian casualties. The first issue seems to demand an authoritative judicial determination that could only be answered by a competent court. The second issue requires the openly avowed and consistent implementation of targeting according to standards accepted in international law

—a requirement whose fulfillment would best be assured through judicial oversight. The third issue calls for independent evaluation of operations to assure that standards of civilian protection are robustly upheld, a role that could be effectively performed by a court.

#### Courts allow verification without the costs of full disclosure

Avery Plaw 8, Associate Prof of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Science from McGill University, “The Legality of Targeted Killing as an Instrument of War: The Case of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi,” Prepared for the 5th Global Conference on War, Virtual War and Human Security, Budapest 2008

However, the analysis suggests two further points. The first point is that there is an urgent need for more extensive oversight of targeting operations. Since terrorists do not wear uniforms, it is difficulty for those outside the targeting government(s) to know when the targets are legitimate combatants under either of the last two legal paradigms. This concern is illustrated by the al-Harethi case in a number of ways. First, the legitimacy of the operation is at best suggested by the evidence publicly available. Moreover, it seems likely that the available evidence is incomplete – that is, that the state or states cooperating in the targeting have further material that is not available to the public. In addition, information essential to making a just determination includes not only targets’ past actions, but also current activities and, where they can be discerned, future plans, and the quality of evidence the state has on these latter subjects. Such information is typically not publicly available. It may be added that the available material on the al-Harethi targeting is extensive in comparison with other, more recent cases such as the US operations in Somalia in 2007. For these reasons it will often be difficult for those outside the targeting governments to come to a clear determination of the combat status of targets. There is therefore an urgent need for more extensive oversight of targeting operations. ¶ At the same time, targeting states can make a strong case against making all available evidence on future targets publicly available. To disseminate such information in advance could obviously tip off the target and scuttle the operation. Even after the fact, however, the governments may legitimately point out that making sensitive intelligence publicly available may threaten to expose sources and to hamper the continued accumulation of intelligence. In either case, the government may argue that it would be failing in its primary duty to protect its citizens. One possible means of reconciling the need for greater oversight and the need to protect key information would be the creation of independent and authoritative judicial bodies to review the combat status of potential targets in camera. (Plaw 2007: 23-5)¶ Second, there is an urgent need to clarify the criteria for the determination of legitimate targets, and more broadly which of the legal paradigms (or what combination thereof) properly applies to such cases. If the decisive argument in defense of the al-Harethi targeting is, as suggested above, an appeal to the self-defense framework, that would suggest some important limits to who could legitimately be targeted. For example, the condition of necessity would require evidence that further attacks were planned. The state would also have to be prepared to show that there was no alternative means to neutralize the threat posed by the terrorist target. Moreover, the state would have to be able to show that it had reason to believe that it could neutralize the terrorist without posing a disproportionate threat to civilians. These criteria look like they may have been met in the al-Harethi case, although it cannot be known be certainty, at least based on the information available. Again, this unavoidable uncertainty points to the urgent need for a credible and independent body, preferably a judicial body, to review such evidence. This is all the clearer in light of two issues that remain unresolved to date: whether a criterion of immediacy or imminence should be applied to such cases, and how exactly the pertinent criteria should be interpreted. Finally, the urgency of judicial oversight is clearer still because some recent targeting operations do not appear to have met even the criteria of necessity and proportionality. For example, an American targeting attack on 13 January 2006 in Damadola, Pakistan, killed 18 unintended victims. However, Ayman Zawahiri, the intended target of the attack, appears not to have even been present.

## 2AC

### Prev

#### Obama’s credibility means he’s more likely to set dangerous precedents than Bush

Anthony Dworkin 12, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Executive Director of the Crimes of War Project, 19 June 2012, “Obama’s Drone Attacks: How the EU Should Respond,” http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\_obamas\_drone\_attacks\_how\_the\_eu\_should\_respond

Over time, the United States and its European allies might be able move closer to a common understanding of the concept of imminence through a process of discussion. But in any case there is an independent reason why the Obama administration’s policy of claiming expansive legal powers, while limiting them in practice on a voluntary basis, is a dangerous one. Precisely because he has greater international credibility than President Bush, the claims that Obama makes are likely to be influential in setting global standards for the use of the use of this new and potentially widely available technology. The United States is currently the only country that uses armed drones for targeted killing outside the battlefield, but several other countries already have remotely controlled pilotless aircraft or are in the process of acquiring them. The United States is unlikely to remain alone in this practice for long. At the same time, there have been several other examples in recent years of countries engaging in military campaigns against non-state groups outside their borders – as with Israel in Lebanon and Ethiopia in Somalia. For this reason, there is a strong international interest in trying to establish clear and agreed legal rules (not merely a kind of pragmatic best practice) to govern the use of targeted killing of non-state fighters.

#### Observer effect solves

Ashley Deeks 13, Associate Prof of Law at the University of Virginia Law School, “The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference,” Fordham Law Review Vol. 82, October 2013, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338667>

In another sense, though, much of substance has been decided since 2002—by the executive branch rather than the courts. This Article illustrated an important reason why the executive’s national security policies have changed significantly since 2001. Many of these changes are due not to the direct sunlight of court orders, but to the shadow cast by the threat or reality of court decisions on executive policymaking in related areas of activity. Court decisions, particularly in the national security realm, have a wider ripple effect than many recognize because the executive has robust incentives to try to preserve security issues as its sole domain. In areas where the observer effect shifts executive policies closer to where courts likely would uphold them, demands for deference by the executive turn out to be more modest than they might seem if considered from the isolated vantage of a single case at a fixed point in time. It remains critical for courts to police the outer bounds of executive national security policies, but they need not engage systematically to have a powerful effect on the shape of those policies and, consequently, the constitutional national security order.¶ A more detailed understanding of the observer effect has implications for national security developments on the horizon. In particular, the observer effect should have salience for those in Congress and the executive branch who are considering whether to create a new national security court that would review targeted killings.307 In this type of situation, the executive would have no jurisdictional uncertainty but ample substantive uncertainty, at least initially. This suggests that the observer effect might have a significant up-front effect on executive decisionmaking regarding targeted killings, shifting those decisions in a more rights-focused direction. As long as the court periodically challenged executive petitions, whether by rejecting a given petition or requiring additional information before approving it, we could predict that the executive would continue to make modest adjustments to its policies. Over time, as the court established baseline doctrine, that effect would flatten out, prompting fewer and fewer changes in executive policy, as with the Guantánamo habeas cases in the D.C. Circuit.

### T

#### We meet---plan restricts Presidential authority to construe the legal limits on targeted killing---assassination ban proves

Jonathan Ulrich 5, associate in the International Arbitration Group of White & Case, LLP, JD from the University of Virginia School of Law, “NOTE: The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President's Authority to Order Targeted Killing in the War Against Terrorism,” 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 1029, lexis

The discretionary authority to construe the limits of the assassination ban remains in the hands of the president. He holds the power, moreover, to amend or revoke the Executive Order, and may do so without publicly disclosing that he has done so; since the Order addresses intelligence activities, any modifications may be classified information. n24 The placement of the prohibition within an executive order, therefore, effectively "guarantees that the authority to order assassination lies with the president alone." n25 Congress has similar authority to revise or repeal the Order - though its failure to do so, when coupled with the three unsuccessful attempts to legislate a ban, may be read as implicit authority for the president to retain targeted killing as a [\*1035] policy option. n26 Indeed, in recent years, there have been some efforts in Congress to lift the ban entirely. n27

#### The authority to authorize without judicial permission is a war powers authority---we restrict it---FISA proves

John C. Eastman 6, Prof of Law at Chapman University, PhD in Government from the Claremont Graduate University, served as the Director of Congressional & Public Affairs at the United States Commission on Civil Rights during the Reagan administration, “Be Very Wary of Restricting President's Power,” Feb 21 2006, http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.467/pub\_detail.asp]

Prof. Epstein challenges the president's claim of inherent power by noting that the word "power" does not appear in the Commander in Chief clause, but the word "command," fairly implied in the noun "Commander," is a more-than-adequate substitute for "power." Was it really necessary for the drafters of the Constitution to say that the president shall have the power to command? Moreover, Prof. Epstein ignores completely the first clause of Article II -- the Vesting clause, which provides quite clearly that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President." The relevant inquiry is whether those who ratified the Constitution understood these powers to include interception of enemy communications in time of war without the permission of a judge, and on this there is really no doubt; they clearly did, which means that Congress cannot restrict the president's authority by mere statute.¶ Prof. Epstein's own description of the Commander in Chief clause recognizes this. One of the "critical functions" performed by the clause, he notes, is that "Congress cannot circumvent the president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his responsibilities to anyone else." Yet FISA does precisely that, assigning to the FISA court a core command authority, namely, the ability to authorize interception of enemy communications. This authority has been exercised by every wartime president since George Washington.

#### Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

#### Prefer it

#### a-Mixing burdens---they turn T into a solvency question because circumvention args would prove the prez can still do things

#### b-Limits---they let the aff do anything that impedes targeted killing, we require that they create legal barriers

#### Restrictions can happen after the fact

ECHR 91,European Court of Human Rights, Decision in Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1991/29.html

The main question in issue concerns Article 11 (art. 11), which provides:¶ "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.¶ 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ..."¶ Notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 (art. 11) must, in the present case, also be considered in the light of Article 10 (art. 10) (see the Young, James and Webster judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 23, § 57). The protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10 (art. 10), is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 (art. 11).¶ A. Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly¶ In the Government’s submission, Mr Ezelin had not suffered any interference with the exercise of his freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression: he had been able to take part in the procession of 12 February 1983 unhindered and to express his convictions publicly, in his professional capacity and as he wished; he was reprimanded only after the event and on account of personal conduct deemed to be inconsistent with the obligations of his profession.¶ The Court does not accept this submission. The term "restrictions" in paragraph 2 of Article 11 (art. 11-2) - and of Article 10 (art. 10-2) - cannot be interpreted as not including measures - such as punitive measures - taken not before or during but after a meeting (cf. in particular, as regards Article 10 (art. 10), the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 21, § 43, and the Müller and Others judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 19, § 28).

#### Competing interpretations is a race to the bottom---default to reasonability---T should be a check on abuse not a strategy

#### That answers their “FX T Increase” arg

### CP 1

#### Links to politics

Mr. Mirengoff 10 is an attorney in Washington, D.C. A.B., Dartmouth College J.D., Stanford Law School, June 23 The Federalist Society Online Debate Series, http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.41/default.asp

The other thing I found interesting was the degree to which Democrats used the hearings to attack the "Roberts Court." I don't recall either party going this much on the offensive in this respect during the last three sets of hearings. What explains this development? My view is that liberal Democratic politicians (and members of their base) think they lost the argument during the last three confirmation battles. John Roberts and Samuel Alito "played" well, and Sonia Sotomayor sounded like a conservative. The resulting frustration probably induced the Democrats to be more aggressive in general and, in particular, to try to discredit Roberts and Alito by claiming they are not the jurists they appeared to be when they made such a good impression on the public. I'm pretty sure the strategy didn't work. First, as I said, these hearings seem not to have attracted much attention. Second, Senate Democrats are unpopular right now, so their attacks on members of a more popular institution are not likely to resonate. Third, those who watched until the bitter end saw Ed Whelan, Robert Alt and others persuasively counter the alleged examples of "judicial activism" by the Roberts Court relied upon by the Democrats -- e.g., the Ledbetter case, which the Democrats continue grossly to mischaracterize. There's a chance that the Democrats' latest **partisan innovation** will **come back to haunt them**. Justice Sotomayor and soon-to-be Justice Kagan are on record having articulated a **traditional, fairly minimalist view of the role of judges**. If a liberal majority were to emerge -- or even **if the liberals prevail in a few high profile cases** -- the charge of "deceptive testimony" could be turned against them. And if Barack **Obama** is still president at that time, he likely **will receive** some of **the blame**.

#### No grounds, and only Congress can solve

Richard D. Rosen 11, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Military Law & Policy at Texas School of Law, “Drones and the U.S. Courts,” W. Mitchell L. Rev. Vol. 37:5, pp. 5280-5293, http://repository.law.ttu.edu/bitstream/handle/10601/1918/Drones%20and%20the%20U.S.%20Courts.pdf?sequence=1

Second, some have suggested the possibility of Bivens actions76 for the victims of drone attacks; that is, a damages claim against federal officials for violating constitutional rights.77 Constitutional tort claims are specifically excepted from the Westfall Act;78 nevertheless, these lawsuits face several barriers. As an initial matter, noncitizen victims of overseas drone strikes have no constitutional rights.79 While the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush80 held that the Suspension Clause reaches alien detainees confined at Guantanamo Bay, a territory over which the United States exercises de facto sovereignty,81 its decision was carefully circumscribed and neither extended the reach of habeas corpus beyond Guantanamo82 nor recognized that aliens outside the United States (including Guantanamo) enjoy substantive constitutional protections.83 Nor did the Court “disturb existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.”84¶ Even if the Constitution has universal extraterritorial application, a Bivens remedy for constitutional violations connected with the use of drones would still be unavailable. In Bivens, the Court recognized limits on the remedy, most notably the existence of special factors that may counsel hesitation against such a remedy in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.85 The lower courts have found special factors to exist in Bivens lawsuits against “military and foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad.”86 Given the Supreme Court’s “reluctan[ce] to extend Bivens liability ‘to any new context or new category of defendants,”’87 it is highly unlikely that the Court will recognize constitutional tort claims by foreign nationals who are victims of drone strikes in the nation’s war with al Qaeda and the Taliban.88

#### That means no precedent

Martha J. Dragich, Associate Professor of Law at Missouri-Columbia, 2-1995 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 757

Perhaps the most troublesome manner in which selective publication, summary dispositions, and vacatur weaken the development of the law is their failure to provide guidance for future conduct and for resolving future disputes. That is, even if a relevant decision can be located, and its precedential value ascertained, it may provide insufficient information about the facts of the case, the relevant rules, and the reasoning behind the rules' application. 260 Judges, no less than attorneys, must be able to evaluate prior decisions based upon a sophisticated understanding of what the court actually decided. Failing to provide sufficient guidance for future decisions jeopardizes the courts' ability to decide cases consistently and according to the law. 261 [\*798] Two examples illustrate the practical difficulties judges face in applying summary dispositions and unpublished opinions. In Burgin v. Henderson, 262 a district judge dismissed the complaint, relying on a previous, unreported decision that had been orally affirmed by the Second Circuit. 263 On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded Burgin for a factual hearing. 264 The appellate court stated that the question was still open because its affirmance of the district judge's earlier opinion was of no precedential value. 265 Thus, even though affirmance indicates that the lower court reached the correct result in the earlier case, it is impossible to know whether the lower court's analysis was sound. In future cases the trial judge cannot rely with confidence on the rationale previously employed.

#### Sovereign immunity blocks---only Congress solves

Richard D. Rosen 11, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Military Law & Policy at Texas School of Law, “Drones and the U.S. Courts,” W. Mitchell L. Rev. Vol. 37:5, pp. 5280-5293, http://repository.law.ttu.edu/bitstream/handle/10601/1918/Drones%20and%20the%20U.S.%20Courts.pdf?sequence=1

To the extent drone victims seek damages for personal injury or property damage from the United States, they must demonstrate that Congress has waived the government's sovereign immunity for such claims." Two statutes constitute the principal waivers of the United States' sovereign immunity from monetary claims-the 4' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Tucker Act. Neither affords a basis for money damages for the victims of drone attacks. The FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.48 Absent the FTCA, sovereign immunity would deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over most tort claims against the federal government.49 The FTCA does not, however, encompass all tort claims, expressly excepting certain classes of claims, including those that would be brought by the targets of drone attacks. Where an exception applies, Congress has not waived the sovereign immunity of the United States, thereby depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction over the excepted claim. Of particular relevance, the FTCA excludes claims "arising out of combatant activities of the military or naval forces" in time of war, claims based on injuries suffered in a foreign country, and claims for most intentional torts.54 The FTCA also bars claims based upon the performance or failure to perform a discretionary 56 function," that is, a decision based upon public policy. Any one or all of these exceptions would be fatal to a claim for damages from a drone attack. Such attacks may implicate combatant 57 activities, they always occur in foreign countries, and most are intentional in character. Moreover, the strikes involve discretion at the highest levels of the government based upon considerations of public policy. The Tucker Act affords a possible avenue of relief for property lost by drone victims under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 9 The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute" that waives sovereign immunity for (inter alia) non-tort money claims founded upon the Constitution.6' The Tucker Act itself does not afford a substantive basis for monetary relief. Instead, a plaintiff must identify a constitutional provision that-when violated-may be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation from the government. The Takings Clause is such a provision;4 however, it is inapplicable to claims for property lost during drone attacks unless the plaintiff is either a U.S. citizen or a foreign national with some 65 substantial connection to the United States. Moreover, courts have refused to recognize takings claims for property damaged or destroyed during combat operations or where the property 67 belongs to an enemy. Consequently, those who lose property during drone attacks will find no solace in a Tucker Act claim.

#### Courts alone don’t solve

Taylor 13 [Paul Taylor, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy & Research, JD from Seton Hall Law School, “A FISC for Drones?” Feb 9 2013, http://transparentpolicy.org/2013/02/a-fisc-for-drones/]

Judges would likely be much more comfortable with ex post review. Ex post review would free them from any implication that they are issuing a “death warrant” and would place them in a position that they are much more comfortable with: reviewing executive uses of force after the fact. While there are clearly parallels that could be drawn between the ex ante review proposed here and the search and seizure warrants that judges routinely deal with, there are also important differences. First and foremost is that this implicates not the executive’s law enforcement responsibility but its war-making and foreign relations responsibilities, with which courts are loath to interfere, but are sometimes willing to review for abuse.¶ Additionally, in search and seizure warranting, there an ex post review will eventually be available. That will likely not be the case in drone strikes and other targeted killings unless such a process is specifically created. There are simply too many hurdles to judicial review (including state secrets, political questions, discovery problems, etc) for the courts to create such an opportunity without congressional action.

### CP 2

#### That doesn’t set a precedent

Anthony Dworkin 12, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Executive Director of the Crimes of War Project, 19 June 2012, “Obama’s Drone Attacks: How the EU Should Respond,” http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\_obamas\_drone\_attacks\_how\_the\_eu\_should\_respond

Over time, the United States and its European allies might be able move closer to a common understanding of the concept of imminence through a process of discussion. But in any case there is an independent reason why the Obama administration’s policy of claiming expansive legal powers, while limiting them in practice on a voluntary basis, is a dangerous one. Precisely because he has greater international credibility than President Bush, the claims that Obama makes are likely to be influential in setting global standards for the use of the use of this new and potentially widely available technology. The United States is currently the only country that uses armed drones for targeted killing outside the battlefield, but several other countries already have remotely controlled pilotless aircraft or are in the process of acquiring them. The United States is unlikely to remain alone in this practice for long. At the same time, there have been several other examples in recent years of countries engaging in military campaigns against non-state groups outside their borders – as with Israel in Lebanon and Ethiopia in Somalia. For this reason, there is a strong international interest in trying to establish clear and agreed legal rules (not merely a kind of pragmatic best practice) to govern the use of targeted killing of non-state fighters.

### Court DA

#### No link---normal means is to substitute the USFG as the defendant by waiving sovereign immunity---that’s Vladeck---and the Westfall Act solves

Stephen Vladeck 13, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, answering a question from Doug Collins (R, Georgia), “Drones and the War on Terror: When can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?” Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Feb 27 2013, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg79585/html/CHRG-113hhrg79585.htm>

But my question is, and you brought this up, we wouldn't indict one of our own, and my colleague, I believe Mr. Gowdy from South Carolina, made this comment. We are not going to indict one of our own. And if we did, let us just play this out for a second. If we did decide who was at fault, my question for you is who would be at fault?¶ What we have seen many times is we are going to throw the lowest person under the bus. It is going to be the drone operator. He should have disobeyed--so explain to me, if you can, what is the process? Where would you stop in culpability, and would it stop at the President?¶ Mr. Vladeck. Congressman, I think it would depend on the decision-making process, which, as you mentioned---- Mr. Collins. Non-existent.¶ Mr. Vladeck. Or I doubt it is non-existent. We are certainly not privy to it. And so, I think it would very much depend on who actually was the one who made the decision that had the legal error in it. Who is the one who said, oh, in fact, even though this guy only was at this guest house, that is enough to decide that he is a senior operational leader of al-Qaeda. And I think that would be where the buck would stop.¶ But if I may just briefly, I think the Congress could write a statute where the damages piece of it wouldn't depend on who was actually at fault. The purpose of the Westfall Act is to say that when a Federal officer is acting within the scope of his employment, it is the Federal Government that is at fault writ large. We are not going to point the finger at one guy who is just doing his job.

#### Their link is about Bivens suits---the plan is distinct

Raffaela Wakeman 13, project manager at the Brookings Institution and Note Development Editor on the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, and Jane Chong, editor at the Yale Law Journal and Ford Foundation Law School Fellow at Brookings, citing Rosemary Collyer, United States District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, July 19 2013, “A Recap of Friday’s Oral Arguments in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/a-recap-of-fridays-oral-arguments-in-al-aulaqi-v-panetta/

The government’s fumbles seemed to stem from its refusal to acknowledge the full implications of its arguments with a simple yes or no. For example, Judge Collyer asked the government to confirm that its position was that Bivens could not possibly apply to officials dealing with military and foreign policy at the highest levels—and that a Bivens remedy was unavailable not just here but for any U.S. citizen making similar claims. The government’s answer: “Congress could create one.” This prompted Judge Collyer to point out that would create a statutory claim, not a constitutional one. The defendants responded by taking a hard turn back to its political question doctrine argument, pointing to other contexts in which important rights were at issue but could not be adjudicated, for reasons such as standing and the Federal Tort Claims Act foreign country exception. The courts weren’t going to reach the merits of every constitutional claim, Hauck continued, attributing this to constitutional design. Again, Judge Collyer declined to be lectured, dryly noting that yes, constitutional structure included three branches, and ”I happen to be the third.” This prompted courtroom chuckles, but Judge Collyer pressed on with the sobering breadth of the government’s claims: the U.S. is a nation of law, but the executive’s claim to power “ha[d] no end to it.” She stated simply, “I need to know the end of that argument.”

#### Demonstrating legality is key to avoid foreign lawsuits

Philip Alston 11, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at the NYU School of Law, former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders,” 2011, 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283, lexis

A more pragmatic reason is that judicial action against CIA personnel is certain to increase in the years ahead as the agency becomes more actively engaged at an operational level in targeted killings. The United States would be better placed to counter such actions if it could demonstrate that it is acting in compliance with the applicable international law.¶ Recent years have seen high-profile prosecutions in several countries in which the CIA has been operating. As noted above, Raymond Davis, a CIA official widely reported to have been involved in drone-based targeted killing operations, was accused in 2011 of two murders in Lahore. The United States indicated that diplomatic and other relations between the two countries would suffer greatly unless he was released. Although the local court system had insisted on proceeding to trial, blood money (diyya) was paid to the families of the two deceased and the case was closed, amid [\*440] allegations of coercion and bribery. n599 In 2007 courts in both Germany and Italy opened prosecutions against CIA agents. In Italy, an Egyptian cleric named Abu Omar was kidnapped on the streets of Milan, rendered to Egypt, and tortured and interrogated. Italian prosecutors charged 22 CIA officials. n600 In Germany, a Lebanese-born German national named Khaled el-Masri was seized in Macedonia and rendered to a CIA prison in Afghanistan where he was interrogated and tortured. Prosecutors issued arrest warrants for 13 CIA officers alleged to have been responsible. In both the German and Italian cases, United States diplomatic cables reveal strong and determined high-level lobbying by U.S. officials who warned their counterparts of extremely serious repercussions if the prosecutions went forward. In the German case, they were abandoned, n601 and in the Italian case the courts went ahead and convicted the CIA officers in absentia, but the Italian Government, responding to representations by the U.S. Secretary of Defense to the Italian Prime Minister, refrained from taking the steps necessary to pursue the convictions internationally. n602

#### Suits don’t hurt military effectiveness

Steve Vladeck 7/25/12, professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, “Bivens and/as Immunity: Richard Klingler Responds on Al-Aulaqi–and I Reply,” www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/bivens-andas-immunity-richard-klingler-responds-on-al-aulaqi-and-i-reply/

Richard thinks that this understanding makes me naive. But a closer reading of both my original post and the forthcoming article by Carlos Vazquez and me to which it linked should make abundantly clear that I take these concerns very seriously–I just think they come into play in other places. Qualified immunity, for example, allows government officers to move to terminate suits like Aulaqi long before any discovery takes place, and the denial thereof is immediately appealable (case in point: Padilla v. Yoo). So in a case in which the defendant’s conduct did not violate “clearly established” law, the concerns Richard articulated will quickly and readily be disposed of at the motion-to-dismiss stage even with recognition of a Bivens cause of action, with minimal intrusion into sensitive military affairs. The same can be said for the amorphous separation-of-powers concerns Richard identified (which are usually handled through either qualified immunity or, in appropriate cases, the political question doctrine), and the state secrets privilege (and “potentially adverse security consequences”). Indeed, what’s wholly missing from Richard’s critique (and all of these lower-court opinions) is any explanation for why these other doctrines don’t adequately account for the government’s (and government officer’s) interests on a case-specific basis. If such arguments are out there, I’m all ears…

#### Judicial review enhances expert decision-making---game theory proves

Tiberiu Dragu 13, Assistant Prof in the Dept of Politics at NYU, PhD in Poli Sci from Stanford University, and Oliver Board, associate in the Corporate Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, former Assistant Prof of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh, D.Phil. in Economics from the University of Oxford, J.D. from NYU School of Law, “On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System,” June 3 2013, https://files.nyu.edu/tcd224/public/papers/judicial.pdf

Our analysis has relevance for existing debates on the scope of judicial review in the context of terrorism prevention. The polemic whether drone strikes and other counterterrorism policies should be subjected to judicial oversight is framed as a tradeoff between the legal accountability benefits of judicial oversight and the public policy harms of reviewing expert counterterrorism policy by non-expert judges. But starting the debate on these terms already assumes that (non-expert) judicial review can only have a negative effect on (expert) governmental policy. As such, it glosses over the prior question of what is the effect of legal review on the information available for counterterrorism policy-making. To answer this question one needs to assess the counterfactual of how informed counterterrorism policy decisions are in the absence of judicial review as compared to the scenario in which a court can review the legality of those policies. Our game-theoretical analysis provides this counterfactual analysis, an otherwise difficult task to effect, and thus contributes to the current debates regarding the appropriateness of judicial review in the context of terrorism prevention. It suggests that judicial checks can lead to more informed counterterrorism policy-making if one considers the internal structure of the executive and the electoral incentives of the president, conditions which we discuss in more detail below.¶ First, the argument that judicial review of drone strikes, and counterterrorism policy more generally, has a detrimental effect on expert policy-making overlooks the internal ecology of the executive branch. When asserting the superior expertise of the executive branch, scholars and commentators treat the executive as a unitary actor, or perhaps consider its internal structure to be incidental to the expertise rationale for limiting judicial review. However, as the description of the drone policy suggests, there is a separation between expertise and policy-making: the president (and his closest advisers) decides on counterterrorism policy, while lower-level bureaucrats provide the expertise and intelligence to make informed decisions. This separation of expertise from policy-making is not unique to counterterrorism. Rather this is a general fact of modern-day government, and scholars of bureaucratic politics, going back to Max Weber, have attempted to unravel its myriad implications for democratic governance (Rourke 1976; Wilson 1991).¶ Second, the president, like all elected representatives, is a politician making choices under the pressure of re-election and public opinion, and such incentives are going to shape his counterterrorism choices. When it comes to the electoral incentives of public officials, scholars have noted that the political costs of not reacting aggressively enough in matters of terrorism prevention and national security are going to be higher than the costs of overreaction (Cole 2008; Fox and Stephenson 2011; Ignatieff 2004; Richardson 2006; Swire 2004). This observation implies that the president and other elected officials have an electoral bias to engage in counterterrorism policies that are more aggressive than what would be necessary on the basis of available information regarding the terrorist threat.36 Inside accounts of the decision-making process within executive branch (Goldsmith 2007), empirical analyses (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), and newspaper reports,37 they all document such electoral incentives to appear tough on terrorism. The former Vice-President Dick Cheney forcefully depicts this electoral bias in his articulation of the so-called one percent doctrine, which states that if there was even a one percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction, then the executive must act as if it were a certainty (Suskind 2007). In Cheney's view, “it is not about analysis; it's about our response... making suspicion, not evidence, the new threshold for action."38 The run-up to the invasion in Iraq provides a stark illustration of the one percent doctrine in action, the conflict between intelligence officials and policy-makers, and the issue of politicized expertise in the context of national security (Pillar 2011).¶ Our results suggest that (non-expert) judicial review has the potential to induce more informed counterterrorism decisions when the president makes security policy under the veil of public expectations to respond forcefully to terrorist threats. Courts are not immune to public opinion, of course, but precisely because judges are not elected, they are more insulated from public opinion than elected officials. This implies that, all else equal, the courts are less likely to prefer counterterrorism measures that respond to public expectations to be tough on terrorism. Under these conditions,39 our theory suggests a mechanism by which counterterrorism policy-making with judicial oversight can be superior to counterterrorism policy-making without it, even if courts are relatively ill-equipped to review executive decisions. Judicial review can serve as a commitment device to better align the preferences of policymakers with their experts, with the effect of inducing more information for counterterrorism decisions. This observation is missing from current public and scholarly discussions about the role of judicial review in the context of drone strikes and other counterterrorism policies. As such, our analysis has policy implications for ongoing debates on how to design the institutional structure of liberal governments when the social objective is terrorism prevention.

#### Military power is not key to peace

Christopher J. Fettweis 11, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Chance of acquiring one is 1 in 3.5 billion

Schneidmiller 9(Chris, Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism, 13 January 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php)

There is an "almost vanishinglysmall" likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, *Atomic Obsession*. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see *GSN*, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim**,** which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen.

### DA---CIR

#### Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5\_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

#### US not key to global

Peter Passell 12, Economics Editor of Foreign Policy’s Democracy Lab, Senior Fellow at the Milken Institute, 4/4/12, “Decoupling: Ties that No Longer Bind,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/03/ties\_that\_no\_longer\_bind?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

Everybody knows that the global economy is becoming more tightly integrated -- that factors ranging from the collapse of ocean shipping costs, to the rise of multinational manufacturing, to the growth of truly international securities markets, have bound national economies to each other as never before. This, of course, must mean we're now all in it together. Booms and busts in rich countries will reverberate ever more strongly through developing and emerging market economies. Right? ¶ Sounds reasonable, but that's not what's happened. The big emerging market economies (notably, China, India and Brazil) took only modest hits from the housing finance bubble and subsequent recession in the U.S., Japan and Europe, then went back to growth-as-usual. ¶ Hence the paradox: Emerging-market and developing countries have somehow "decoupled" from the Western business cycle in an era of ever-increasing economic integration. But the experts have yet to agree on why. Here are the two contending explanations:

#### Plan is key to the economy

Nathaniel Sheppard 11, correspondent for the Chicago Tribune and NYT, June 7 2011, “Why pint-sized Yemen has become a world player,” http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/07/152204.html

That Yemen could fall into the abyss is of great geopolitical significance that has put the bean-size nation at center stage. About 11 percent of the world’s seaborne petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden en route to the Suez Canal, regional refineries and points west. ¶ It is not the largest shipment by far but enough that disruptions in transit could spook world markets and set off a new spiral of inflation as the world tries to recover from four years of economic distress.¶ Yemen occupies the southwestern and southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west and Oman to the east. ¶ West bound oil must transit the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandab, a narrow strait that passes between Yemen and Djibouti then past the pirates’ paradise, Somalia before reaching open water. It is one of seven strategic world oil shipping chokepoints. ¶ Moreover, the area may contain significant untapped oil reserves, more reason for US concern since Saudi reserves may be diminishing and America is doing little to wean itself from fossil fuel.¶ Should Yemen polity fall apart, the country would be up for grabs. One of the grabbing hands would be that of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, one of the most notorious of Al Qaeda offshoots. Even before Osama Bin Laden was killed and his body dumped into the sea at the beginning of May, the Al Qaeda leader and best known symbol of world terror had lost control of Yemen’s Al Qaeda warriors. They marched to their own drum.¶ Able to operate freely in this poorest of poor, barely managed country with rugged, unforgiving terrain, Yemen’s Al Qaeda has been able to mount several attacks on the US from here. First there was the suicide bombing of the naval destroyer USS Cole while it refueled at the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen seamen were killed¶ Subsequent attacks launched from here included the failed Christmas Day bomb plot in 2009 and the parcel bomb plot of 2010, which also failed. ¶ In 2009, Nasir Al Wuhayshi, an Al Qaeda commander who trained under Bin Laden in Afghanistan and served as his secretary, announced the consolidation of Al Qaeda forces in the region as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, under his command.¶ The US went after Al Qaeda elements in the region that same year but in lawless Somalia with disastrous consequences.¶ Commander Wuhayshi pledged to take jihad from the Arabian Peninsula to Israel, striking at Muslim leaders he decreed “criminal tyrants,” along the way, such as the Saudi royal, family, Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh and recently deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. ¶ Once in Israel he would “liberate” Gaza and Muslim holy sites such as Haram Ash-Sharif, known by Jews as Temple Mount, the holiest of sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. It was here that God chose the Divine Presence to rest; from which the world we know expanded; and that God gathered the dust to make man.¶ US Navy SEALs would love to meet Mr. Wuhayshi to discuss diabolical ambitions for any serious attempt to carry out his apocalyptic quest most certainly would plunge the world into war of world proportions. His agenda and the passion and persistence with which he and his followers pursue it are a reason for stepped up US engagement in Yemen.¶ Before the current uptick in violence as disparate forces seek to send President Saleh packing for good, the long reigning strongman had begun to cooperate with the US counter terrorism efforts in the region, obliging with a series of air strikes and ground assaults on suspected Al Qaeda targets in Yemen. That cooperation may now be in tatters and Mr. Wuhayshi stands to gain ground.¶ The US’ waltz with the strongman was not by choice. While Mr. Saleh’s cooperation was probably more to save his utterly corrupt regime, he was viewed by the US as the lesser of evils in Yemen. The attitude toward President Saleh was the same as toward Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega, another US criminal client: “He may be an SOB but he’s our SOB.’’ ¶ With a bigger footprint and wider control in Yemen in the absence of a strong central authority, outright land grabs and possible alliances with Somalia warlords, it would be as if Al Qaeda had found its Holy Grail, a potential for disrupting the flow of oil to the west, and what it views as the devil incarnate, the US. ¶ Ships transiting the area already find the waters treacherous. Now it stands to get worse. They are frequently targeted by pirates from Somalia who kill or demand large ransoms if they are able to successfully board cargo-carrying vessels. Oil tankers are like crown jewels.¶ International forces, including the US, have treated the Somali pirates like flies at a picnic, swatting them away unscathed most of the time and sometimes killing them, but not enough times to make their confederates think about new careers. ¶ Hijacking or blowing up oil tankers and messing with the oil that powers the world is a different matter altogether. There is too much at stake to leave it to Yemen to handle its own affairs but overt meddling from the West would be unwelcome in the region.¶ No Western or Asian oil dependent nation would relish the idea of invading a Muslim nation at a time of such tensions with Muslims. The US is particularly reluctant, having already done so twice in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ Oil is oil however. While it might not matter to Muslim fundamentalists who want to turn the hands of time back to the 17th century, oil dependent nations would not sit by idly while an already fractured world economy worsened. The situation would get ugly.¶ Thus the tail wags the dog, the pint-sized nation that offers so little has forced the powerful behemoths to consider so much, like their limited options for doing anything about frightening events unfolding before their eyes.

#### There’s a skilled labor glut now

Schalin 12 [Jay Schalin, writer for the Pope Center for Higher Education Policy and former software engineer, “The Myth of STEM Labor Shortages,” May 31 2012, http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id=2701]

Everybody knows that the best way to get ahead today is to get a college degree. Even better is to major in one of the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) subjects, where the bulk of the jobs of the present and future lie. Politicians, business leaders, and academics all herald the high demand for scientists and engineers.¶ But they are, for the most part, wrong. The real facts suggest that, in many STEM specialties, there is a labor glut, not a shortage.¶ That is not to say that the STEM subjects aren’t worthy of study—there are many reasons to do so. And if a talented young person really wants a job in a STEM field, he or she can eventually get one, with a little perseverance.¶ But there is no urgent need for STEM graduates, at least not in a general sense.¶ The roots of STEM labor gluts go back over half a century, according to Michael Teitelbaum, a demographer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and a leading authority on this topic. Sputnik, the 1957 Soviet missile launch, created a national concern that we were falling behind in the race for technical superiority. Talk of labor shortages in science and engineering arose, and talk led to action. Beryl Lieff Benderly, a journalist who writes about employment for scientists for Science magazine and other publications, described the result of the national response to Sputnik: “Federal money swiftly poured into science and engineering scholarships and so successfully attracted students that, by the early 1970s, the market for young scientists was flooded.”¶ The flood grew in the 1980s, after the National Science Foundation (NSF) warned of imminent shortages of scientists. Eventually, the NSF’s predictions turned out to be so off-base that the agency was subjected to an investigation by a House subcommittee in 1995, during which NSF director Neal Lane flatly stated, “there really was no basis to predict a shortage,” according to Teitelbaum and Benderly. (Lane was not involved with the NSF at the time of shortage prediction).¶ More recently, a PhD. in electrical engineering who follows labor trends in his specialty, Dan Donahoe, wrote for the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) magazine that there has been a “myth of a qualified labor shortage” in his field for a long time. He says that the myth started in the late 1980s, and that the myth continues despite expansion and contraction of the labor market.

**Won’t pass until after election year**

Adam **O'Neal 12-23**, December 23rd, 2013, "Immigration reform in 2014? Not so fast," https://www.humanevents.com/2013/12/23/immigration-reform-in-2014-not-so-fast/

A California-based immigration reform activist, who spoke to CalWatchdog.com on the condition of anonymity to be more candid, said that Boehner’s recent behavior was “heart-warming” and seemed “honest.”¶ The activist, who has been involved in lobbying California Congressmen to push for reform, added, “It makes you think, ‘OK, maybe [Boehner will] play ball.’”¶ But he cautioned that, while activists are optimistic, they’re not blindly so. He expects that major immigration **reform won’t be able to pass until 2015, at the earliest**. It’s **difficult to pass major legislation in an election year**, he explained, and **it makes more strategic sense (from the Republican point of view) to wait**.¶ Republicans, who are at a politically advantageous position because of the trouble associated with the rollout of Obamacare, reasonably expect to pick up seats in the midterms. They could feasibly control the Senate — though that will be no easy task — by January 2015. So **why would they pass immigration** reform when they’re almost certain to pick up seats and enter a stronger bargaining position? The answer is simple: **They wouldn’t**.¶ So, yes, Speaker **Boehner has changed his tune. But that doesn’t mean he’ll change his strategy** just yet.

#### Obama’s PC not key

Dan Nowicki 10-25, October 25th, 2013, USA Today, "Pleas from Obama may hinder immigration bill push," www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/25/obama-immigration-bill-partisanship/3188629/

Limited influence Other observers, including two members of the Senate Gang of Eight, suggested that Obama's powers of persuasion probably are limited with many House Republicans. "I think that the Republican Party understands the majority of Americans want this issue resolved," said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. "There are many members of Congress that represent districts where the majority do not support immigration reform, and we understand and respect that." John J. "Jack" Pitney Jr., a political scientist at Claremont McKenna College in Southern California, also said rank-and-file House Republicans are more likely to take their cues on immigration reform from their conservative base than national GOP leaders who want to improve the party's image with Latino voters. "For the average House Republican, the No. 1 concern is his or her own district, and most Republicans are not getting much clamor for the liberalization of immigration laws in their own districts," Pitney said. "You can argue that it's in the party's long-term interest to address the issue, but 'long-term interest' doesn't get a vote in primaries and general elections."

#### Obama won’t fight the plan---he’s open to judicial review

Kwame Holman 13, congressional correspondent for PBS NewsHour; citing Rosa Brooks, Prof of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, former Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former senior advisor at the US Dept of State, “Congress Begins to Weigh In On Drone Strikes Policy,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/04/congress-begins-to-weigh-in-on-drone-strikes-policy.html

In an October 2012 interview, Mr. Obama said of the drone program, "we've got to ... put a legal architecture in place, and we need Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president's reined in, in terms of some of the decisions that we're making."¶ The president has not taken up the drone issue in public again but White House press secretary Jay Carney, asked Wednesday about the drone hearing, said, "We have been in regular contact with the committee. We will continue to engage Congress...to ensure our counterterrorism efforts are not only consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but even more transparent to the American people and the world."¶ And after the hearing, Brooks, too, sounded optimistic.¶ "My own sense is that the executive branch is open to discussion of some kind of judicial process," she said.¶ While some experts have argued for court oversight of drone strikes before they're carried out, Brooks sides with those who say that would be unwieldy and unworkable.¶ Brooks says however an administration that knows its strikes could face court review after the fact -- with possible damages assessed -- would be more responsible and careful about who it strikes and why.

#### Healthcare and income fights pound the DA

Jules Witcover 1/1, Chicago Tribune, "After a fruitless year in Washington, New Year's blues ahead", 2014, www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/sns-201312311630--tms--poltodayctnyq-a20140101-20140101,0,2474617.column

Dampening down administration pleasure that a budget compromise was reached through the rare bipartisan teamwork of Republican Paul Ryan in the House and Democrat Patty Murray in the Senate, the opposition party has renewed and sustained its pushback against Obamacare.¶ The White House had hoped to pivot from this exhausting fight to such objectives as immigration reform and another try at stiffer gun controls. Instead, Obama must count on a more robust public response to the health care program, not at all guaranteed, to clear the political playing field.¶ Also, while trying to fire up lower-income support with a proposal to boost the federal minimum wage, the White House must attempt to extend long-term unemployment benefits to more than a million hard-strapped jobless beneficiaries who now face a cutoff.¶ Prominent economists warn that if Congress fails to extend those benefits, it will only hamper the still-struggling recovery. Nevertheless, the political universe seems mired again in the old ideological class warfare:

the Republicans as beneficent creators of largess against the Democrats as extravagant redistributors of it to a nation of moochers.¶ It's a sad rerun of the final weeks of the 2012 presidential campaign, in which Mitt Romney sealed his doom with his witless declaration that the votes of "47 percent of Americans" were beyond his reach. The theme that they had been bought off by Democratic handouts through various social safety programs echoes again in the current debate.¶ Added to the old GOP insistence that Big Brother government has no right to require Americans to buy health insurance they don't want, more persuasive argument has blossomed that bureaucratic incompetence botched the heart of the Obama's domestic agenda.¶ Visions of a businessman's efficiency dance in the imaginations of the Republican faithful, if only one of their own were in charge. Yet, had they won the last election, Obamacare probably would be dead and buried by now, Romney having disavowed the law that was based, ironically, on his own health-care reform as Massachusetts governor.¶ In the midst of all this second-term gloom, the Democratic administration has sought to find political refuge and new energy by focusing on income inequality. The phenomenon is seen glaringly in the booming stock market and skyrocketing profits for big business, which is thriving on higher productivity from fewer workers, and its reluctance to hire more.¶ But the Democrats' effort to address this key issue also facilitates the old Republican ideological bromide of "socialistic" redistribution of wealth, which would make every conscientious attempt to heat up the economy sound like heated-up Karl Marx. Which apparently will be fine to the likes of the rabble-rousing Texas Sen. Ted Cruz and his merry tea party band, who are more than willing to fire up "class warfare" rhetoric.¶ In all, the outlook for Obama's fifth presidential year is neither bright nor hopeful for any positive resolution of current divisions, at least until the midterm congressional elections in November. Then, either one-party control will return on Capitol Hill, one way or the other, or divided government will likely slog on for the final two years of an Obama presidency born more of hope than of achievable aspirations.