### S

#### Courts don’t leak, but the executive does

D.A. Jeremy Telman 12 Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law at Valparaiso University Law School, PhD from Cornell, 2/24/2012, “INTOLERABLE ABUSES:RENDITION FOR TORTURE AND THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE,” Alabama Law Review Vol 63:3:429, http://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/Volume%2063/Issue%203/Telman.pdf

Moreover, in Tilden, neither the court, nor any other sources that I have been able to locate cite to a single example of a court being the source of a national security leak. Such leaks are much more likely to come from the Executive or Legislative Branch, as Wikileaks has now demonstrated.417 An argument can be made that courts are far better guardians of national security information than are either the Legislative418 or the Executive Branches.419¶ \*\*\*TO FOOTNOTES\*\*\*¶ 419. In the aftermath of the outing of Valerie Plame Wilson as a CIA agent, there was some discussion of the extent of leaks of such sensitive information by the Executive Branch. The consensus quickly emerged that there was no workable mechanism for controlling such leaks because they were often authorized by the persons responsible for the original classification of the information. See William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L.REV. 1453, 1470 (2008) (observing that previous investigations into leaks of classified information by the Executive Branch often resulted in the discovery that the leaks were authorized by a White House or cabinet official).

###  T---Restriction/General

#### We meet – the AUMF and LOAC are not being applied to TKs now, we create an enforcement mech

Berger 1Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then **it no longer is a deed restriction** -- **even though the paper on which it was written remains**. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### We meet – the prez has sole authority to sign off on TKs – we restrict it – FISA proves

John C. Eastman 6, Prof of Law at Chapman University, PhD in Government from the Claremont Graduate University, served as the Director of Congressional & Public Affairs at the United States Commission on Civil Rights during the Reagan administration, “Be Very Wary of Restricting President's Power,” Feb 21 2006, http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.467/pub\_detail.asp]

Prof. Epstein challenges the president's claim of inherent power by noting that the word "power" does not appear in the Commander in Chief clause, but the word "command," fairly implied in the noun "Commander," is a more-than-adequate substitute for "power." Was it really necessary for the drafters of the Constitution to say that the president shall have the power to command? Moreover, Prof. Epstein ignores completely the first clause of Article II -- the Vesting clause, which provides quite clearly that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President." The relevant inquiry is whether those who ratified the Constitution understood these powers to include interception of enemy communications in time of war without the permission of a judge, and on this there is really no doubt; they clearly did, which means that Congress cannot restrict the president's authority by mere statute.¶ Prof. Epstein's own description of the Commander in Chief clause recognizes this. One of the "critical functions" performed by the clause, he notes, is that "Congress cannot circumvent the president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his responsibilities to anyone else." Yet FISA does precisely that, assigning to the FISA court a core command authority, namely, the ability to authorize interception of enemy communications. This authority has been exercised by every wartime president since George Washington.

#### Restriction means a limit or qualification---includes conditions on action

CAA 8,COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT A, STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, Appellant., 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613

P10 The term "restriction" is not defined by the Legislature for the purposes of the DUI statutes. See generally A.R.S. § 28-1301 (2004) (providing the "[d]efinitions" section of the DUI statutes). In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to ordinary dictionary definitions and do not construe the word as being a term of art. Lee v. State, 215 Ariz. 540, 544, ¶ 15, 161 P.3d 583, 587 (App. 2007) ("When a statutory term is not explicitly defined, we assume, unless otherwise stated, that the Legislature intended to accord the word its natural and obvious meaning, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition.").

P11 The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "[a] limitation or qualification." Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999). In fact, "limited" and "restricted" are considered synonyms. See Webster's II New Collegiate Dictionary 946 (2001). Under these commonly accepted definitions, Wagner's driving privileges were "restrict[ed]" when they were "limited" by the ignition interlock requirement. Wagner was not only [\*7] statutorily required to install an ignition interlock device on all of the vehicles he operated, A.R.S. § 28-1461(A)(1)(b), but he was also prohibited from driving any vehicle that was not equipped with such a device, regardless whether he owned the vehicle or was under the influence of intoxicants, A.R.S. § 28-1464(H). These limitations constituted a restriction on Wagner's privilege to drive, for he was unable to drive in circumstances which were otherwise available to the general driving population. Thus, the rules of statutory construction dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.

#### Restrictions can happen after the fact

ECHR 91,European Court of Human Rights, Decision in Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1991/29.html

The main question in issue concerns Article 11 (art. 11), which provides:¶ "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.¶ 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ..."¶ Notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 (art. 11) must, in the present case, also be considered in the light of Article 10 (art. 10) (see the Young, James and Webster judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 23, § 57). The protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10 (art. 10), is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 (art. 11).¶ A. Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly¶ In the Government’s submission, Mr Ezelin had not suffered any interference with the exercise of his freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression: he had been able to take part in the procession of 12 February 1983 unhindered and to express his convictions publicly, in his professional capacity and as he wished; he was reprimanded only after the event and on account of personal conduct deemed to be inconsistent with the obligations of his profession.¶ The Court does not accept this submission. The term "restrictions" in paragraph 2 of Article 11 (art. 11-2) - and of Article 10 (art. 10-2) - cannot be interpreted as not including measures - such as punitive measures - taken not before or during but after a meeting (cf. in particular, as regards Article 10 (art. 10), the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 21, § 43, and the Müller and Others judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 19, § 28).

#### Key to ground – ex ante review is illegal

Bloomberg 13, Bloomberg Editorial Board, Feb 18 2013, “Why a ‘Drone Court’ Won’t Work,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-18/why-a-drone-court-won-t-work.html

As for the balance of powers, that is where we dive into constitutional hot water. Constitutional scholars agree that the president is sworn to use his “defensive power” to protect the U.S. and its citizens from any serious threat, and nothing in the Constitution gives Congress or the judiciary a right to stay his hand. It also presents a slippery slope: If a judge can call off a drone strike, can he also nix a raid such as the one that killed Osama bin Laden? If the other branches want to scrutinize the president’s national security decisions in this way, they can only do so retrospectively.

#### Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

### Norms CP

#### Plan solves Central Asia stability

Alexander Cooley 12, Prof of Poli Sci at Barnett College, PhD in Poli Sci from Columbia University, “Great Games, Local Rules: The New Power Contest in Central Asia,” p 48-49, google books

The increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2010 under the United States’ surge strategy also increased the importance of NDN and all of the Central Asian logistical partnerships cultivated by the U.S. military.81 But growing dependency on the network also appears to be empowering Central Asian elites to drive harder bargains and ratchet up political and economic demands. Politically, the Uzbek governments has been using its critical role in the NDN to push back against criticism of its human rights record. In a leaked cable from March 2009, U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland described how President Karimov gave him a “tongue-lashing” when broaching the topic of human rights and then implicitly threatened to suspend cooperation on NDN transit.82 Economically, the Uzbek government twice increased transit fees for goods bound for Afghanistan in 2010, while in February 2011 Tashkent announced a “significant” hike in NDN tariffs.83¶ On September 22, 2011, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations approved a waiver to lift restrictions, in place since 2004, on providing U.S. military assistance to Uzbekistan. The DOD and diplomats engaged in NDN negotations had long sought for the waiver, which appeared to be yet another concession made to Tashkent to obtain its cooperation on security matters. Tellingly, the Senate made the waiver contingent on the DOD providing reports on how Pentagon funds were being spent on NDN contracts, though these reports will be classified.84 The Senate report on the foreign aid bill included the statement, “The committee is concerned with reports of pervasive corruption [in] Uzbekistan and therefore expects to be informed of public and private entities that receive support, directly or indirectly, from United States Government funds used to pay the costs of Northern Distribution Network supply routes through that country.”¶ The rent seeking, hard bargaining, and allegations of corruption that have accompanied NDN expansion have created some inescapable paradoxes about U.S. policy in Central Asia that conflict with the U.S. mission in neighboring Afghanistan. On the one hand, most U.S. planners acknowledge that the greatest obstacle to building an effective and legitimate state in Afghanistan is the problem of corruption that continues to erode the legitimacy of the Karzai government and its political allies. At the same time, behind the scenes in neighboring Central Asia, the deals established by the NDN seem to be doling out private economic benefits and lucrative contracts to the Central Asian regimes to maintain their cooperation. Just as the United States has had to juggle its strategic interests and values agenda with respect to Central Asia’s promotion of democracy and human rights, it seems that maintaining U.S. operations in Afghanistan necessitates tolerating and actively contributing to Central Asia’s corruption and governance problems.

#### Nuclear war

Peimani 2 - Head of Energy Security and Geopolitics @ the Energy Studies Institute (Dr. Hooman, “Failed Transition and Bleak Future? War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Book, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101331065>

If the existing negative trend continues, the entire Caucasus and Central Asia will likely head toward long-term tension and instability. The first and foremost victims of this undesirable future will obviously be the three Caucasian and five CA countries. Yet, this bleak future will also have major implications for a number of regional (Iran, China, Turkey, and Russia) and nonregional (United States) powers with long-term interests in the two regions most of which share borders with them. The deteriorating situation will create a suitable ground for the emergence and growth of political extremism among the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, who are mostly dissatisfied with the status quo. These frustrated and disenchanted peoples will likely find the extremist political ideologies and programs more appealing and more convincing than those of their discredited rulers. The latter’s legitimacy is being questioned by a growing number of their nationals for a wide range of reasons, including incompetence, rampant corruption, and an antidemocratic style of government. ¶ In response to the rising internal threat, the ruling elites will likely resort to nationalism. In particular, they might promote extreme forms of nationalism, including chauvinism, as experienced in many other countries in different continents confronting the same situation. Creating an appealing alternative to that of the opposition extremist groups aimed at the dissatisfied people will be one of its major objectives. Extreme nationalism will be very attractive for the youth—the social stratum most vulnerable to extremist ideologies and the main targets of extremist groups. The ruling elites might also find their resort to extreme nationalism necessary for the sake of consolidating their challenged power apparatus. In this case, they could seek to manipulate the nationalist sentiment of their peoples as a means to increase their legitimacy and strengthen their social basis of support. However, using the nationalist card will have a negative backlash, with weakening and destabilizing effects on its users. Extreme nationalism could, and will likely, provoke ethnic conflicts within the multiethnic Caucasian and CA countries. It could therefore lead to civil wars. Moreover, it could spread fear in the neighboring countries. They might feel threatened by the surge of nationalism in their vicinity, which could easily take the form of expansionism in the Caucasian and CA countries characterized with territorial and border disputes. ¶ In addition to various external influences, many internal social, economic, and political factors will determine in what form and to what extent instability will surface in each Caucasian and CA country. Needless to say, based on the specific situation in each country there will be differences in its shape and in the extent of its initial emergence. Regardless of these differences, the logical and predictable outcome of the current trend will likely be instability in the form of civil, interstate, and regional wars in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The existence of unsettled, although currently inactive, violent conflicts (i.e., independence movements and civil wars) in these two regions have left no doubt about the feasibility of this scenario. To this list, one should also add the existence of many ethnic grievances and territorial and border disagreements, which will likely create a suitable ground for the instigation of new ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in violent forms. For a number of reasons, there is a great possibility that many of them could escalate to civil wars and interstate wars, respectively. Among other factors, the ethnic makeup of the Caucasus and Central Asia and the existence of many sources of conflict between their regional states will pave the way for their further escalation to the level of regional wars, despite the intention of their initiators. ¶ The presence of certain regional (Iran, China, Turkey, and Russia) and nonregional (United States) powers with long-term interests in the two regions will have a certain impact on the development of the scenarios mentioned above and will likely contribute to the extent, intensity, and duration of wars of various forms. In particular, the presence of these powers will increase the possibility of their intentional or unintentional involvement in those wars in support of one side or another, while preserving their interests. Depending on the situation, whether this involvement takes a direct or indirect form will be determined by many factors, including the importance of the affected Caucasian or CA countries for each of the five states and the latter’s political, economic, and military capabilities. These factors also include the geographical realities, which, depending on the case, facilitate or impede their access to the affected countries, and the overall political environment in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The latter determines whether a foreign intervention in whatever form can take place at all. The possibility of some or all of the five states being dragged into any future military conflict will therefore strengthen the potential for the escalation and expansion of military conflicts in either of the two regions. War and instability in these energy-producing regions bordering regional and global powers with strong conventional military and/or nuclear capabilities will have long-term political, economic, and security implications. They will not be confined only to the countries directly involved in any future regional military conflict. In one way or another, they could affect the stability of the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as that of the Asian and/or European regions in their proximity. As a result, wars in whatever form in those two regions could escalate and affect the stability of the international system and global peace.

### XO

#### Cause of action requires congressional authorization

Eric A. Posner 7, the Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; and Adrian Vermuele, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, 2007, “The Credible Executive,” https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/74.3/74\_3\_Posner\_Vermeule.pdf

For completeness, we mention that the well-motivated executive might in principle subject himself to legal liability for actions or outcomes that only an ill-motivated executive would undertake. Consider the controversy surrounding George W. Bush’s telecommunications surveillance program, which the president has claimed covers only communications in which one of the parties is overseas, not domesticto-domestic calls.103 There is widespread suspicion that this claim is false.104 In a recent poll, 26 percent of respondents believed that the National Security Agency listens to their calls.105 The credibility gap arises because it is difficult in the extreme to know what exactly the Agency is doing, and what the costs and benefits of the alternatives are. ¶ Here the credibility gap might be narrowed by creating a cause of action, for damages, on behalf of anyone who can show that domesticto-domestic calls were examined.106 Liability would be strict, because a negligence rule—whether the Agency exerted reasonable efforts to avoid examining the communication—requires too much information for judges, jurors, and voters to evaluate, and would just reproduce the monitoring problems that gave rise to the credibility gap in the first place. Strict liability, by contrast, would require a much narrower factual inquiry. Crucially, a commitment to strict liability would only be made by an executive who intended to minimize the incidence of (even unintentional and nonnegligent) surveillance of purely domestic communications. ¶ However, there are legal and practical problems here, perhaps insuperable ones. Legally, it is hardly clear that the president could, on his own authority, create a cause of action against himself or his agents to be brought in federal court. It is well within presidential authority to create executive commissions for hearing claims against the United States, for disbursing funds under benefit programs, and so on; but the problem here is that there might be no pot of money from which to fund damages. The so-called Judgment Fund, out of which damages against the executive are usually paid, is restricted to statutorily specified lawsuits.107 Even so, statutory authorization for the president to create the strict liability cause of action would be necessary,108 as we discuss shortly.109 Practically, it is unclear whether government agents can be forced to “internalize costs” through money damages in the way that private parties can, at least if the treasury is paying those damages.110 And if it is, voters may not perceive the connection between governmental action and subsequent payouts in any event.

#### Legitimacy DA---Judicial process key

Steven Clark 12, former Staff Sergeant in the US Army, BA in Poli Sci and Government from Campbell University, “Targeted Killings: Justified Acts of War or Too Much Power for One Government?” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Clark%20Targeted.pdf

Although Eric Holder was right when he distinguished between judicial process and due process, there is more than legality to this question. If the United States continues to ignore judicial oversight, this could also cause a loss of credibility and create a legitimacy problem. To prevent this, the United States needs to include judicial oversight while still maintaining national security and not revealing specific intelligence to the public. This could be done with a special court, similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 79 A court like this would also be able to act quickly in situations requiring immediate action

#### Exec fiat is a voting issue---our authors take squo Prez policies as given which makes aff offense impossible---and there’s no comparative lit

Richard H. Pildes 13, J.D. candidate at NYU school of law, and Samuel Issacharoff, J.D. candidate at NYU school of law, June 1st, 2013, "Drones and the Dilemma of Modern Warfare,"lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1408&context=nyu\_plltwp

As with all use of lethal force, there must be procedures in place to maximize the likelihood of correct identification and minimize risk to innocents. In the absence of form al legal processes, sophisticated institutional entities engaged in repeated, sensitive actions – including the military – will gravitate toward their own internal analogues to legal process, even without the compulsion or shadow of formal judicial review. This is the role of bureaucratic legalism 63 in developing sustained institutional practices, even with the dim shadow of unclear legal commands. These forms of self- regulation are generated by programmatic needs to enable the entity’s own aims to be accomplished effectively; at times, that necessity will share an overlapping converge with humanitarian concerns to generate internal protocols or process-like protections that minimize the use of force and its collateral consequences, in contexts in which the use of force itself is otherwise justified. But because these process-oriented protections are not codified in statute or reflected in judicial decisions, they typically are too invisible to draw the eye of constitutional law scholars who survey these issues from much higher levels of generality.

#### Internal fixes aren’t credible

Jack Goldsmith 13, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, May 1 2013, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism>

As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests.¶ A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure formal congressional support. Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have worked with Congress to update these laws, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a firmer political and legal foundation. But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants.¶ The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need sustained domestic and international support." ¶ Instead of seeking contemporary congressional support, the administration has relied mostly on government lawyers' secret interpretive extensions of the old laws to authorize new operations against new enemies in more and more countries. The administration has great self-confidence in the quality of its stealth legal judgments. But as the Bush administration learned, secret legal interpretations are invariably more persuasive within the dark circle of executive branch secrecy than when exposed to public sunlight. On issues ranging from proper targeting standards, to the legality of killing American citizens, to what counts as an "imminent" attack warranting self-defensive measures, these secret legal interpretations—so reminiscent of the Bushian sin of unilateral legalism—have been less convincing in public, further contributing to presidential mistrust.¶ Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled. ¶ The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust. ¶ A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war. The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words. Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.

### CP---Word PIC

#### Isolated instances of renaming fail to create change

Schram 95 (Sanford F., Associate Professor of Political Science at Macalester College, former Visiting Professor at the La Follette Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin and Visiting Affiliate at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, “Discourses of Dependency: The Politics of Euphemism,” Words of Welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and The Social Science of Poverty, Published by The University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0816625778, p. 21-23)

The deconstruction of prevailing discursive structures helps politicize the institutionalized practices that inhibit alternative ways of constructing social relations.5 Isolated acts of renaming, however, are unlikely to help promote political change if they are not tied to interrogations of the structures that serve as the interpretive context for making sense of new terms.6 This is especially the case when renamings take the form of euphemisms designed to make what is described appear to be consonant with the existing order. In other words, the problems of a politics of renaming are not confined to the left, but are endemic to what amounts to a classic American practice utilized across the political spectrum.7 Homeless, welfare, and family planning provide three examples of how isolated instances of renaming fail in their efforts to make a politics out of sanitizing language. [end page 21] Reconsidering the Politics of Renaming Renaming can do much to indicate respect and sympathy. It may strategically recast concerns so that they can be articulated in ways that are more appealing and less dismissive. Renaming the objects of political contestation may help promote the basis for articulating latent affinities among disparate political constituencies. The relentless march of renamings can help denaturalize and delegitimate ascendant categories and the constraints they place on political possibility. At the moment of fissure, destabilizing renamings have the potential to encourage reconsideration of how biases embedded in names are tied to power relations.8 Yet isolated acts of renaming do not guarantee that audiences will be any more predisposed to treat things differently than they were before.

The problem is not limited to the political reality that dominant groups possess greater resources for influencing discourse. Ascendant political economies, such as liberal postindustrial capitalism, whether understood structurally or discursively, operate as institutionalized systems of interpretation that can subvert the most earnest of renamings.9 It is just as dangerous to suggest that paid employment exhausts possibilities for achieving self-sufficiency as to suggest that political action can be meaningfully confined to isolated renamings.10 Neither the workplace nor a name is the definitive venue for effectuating self-worth or political intervention.11 Strategies that accept the prevailing work ethos will continue to marginalize those who cannot work, and increasingly so in a post­ industrial economy that does not require nearly as large a workforce as its industrial predecessor. Exclusive preoccupation with sanitizing names overlooks the fact that names often do not matter to those who live out their lives according to the institutionalized narratives of the broader political economy, whether it is understood structurally or discursively, whether it is monolithically hegemonic or reproduced through allied, if disparate, practices. What is named is always encoded in some publicly accessible and ascendent discourse. 12 Getting the names right will not matter if the names are interpreted according to the institutionalized insistences of organized society.13 Only when those insistences are relaxed does there emerge the possibility for new names to restructure daily practices. Texts, as it now has become notoriously apparent, can be read in many ways, and they are most often read according to how prevailing discursive structures provide an interpretive context for reading them.14 The meanings implied by new names of necessity [end page 22] overflow their categorizations, often to be reinterpreted in terms of available systems of intelligibility (most often tied to existing institutions). Whereas renaming can maneuver change within the interstices of pervasive discursive structures, renaming is limited in reciprocal fashion. Strategies of containment that seek to confine practice to sanitized categories appreciate the discursive character of social life, but insufficiently and wrongheadedly. I do not mean to suggest that discourse is dependent on structure as much as that structures are hegemonic discourses. The operative structures reproduced through a multitude of daily practices and reinforced by the efforts of aligned groups may be nothing more than stabilized ascendent discourses.15 Structure is the alibi for discourse. We need to destabilize this prevailing interpretive context and the power plays that reinforce it, rather than hope that isolated acts of linguistic sanitization will lead to political change. Interrogating structures as discourses can politicize the terms used to fix meaning, produce value, and establish identity. Denaturalizing value as the product of nothing more than fixed interpretations can create new possibilities for creating value in other less insistent and injurious ways. The discursively/structurally reproduced reality of liberal capitalism as deployed by power blocs of aligned groups serves to inform the existentially lived experiences of citizens in the contemporary postindustrial order.16 The powerful get to reproduce a broader context that works to reduce the dissonance between new names and established practices. As long as the prevailing discursive structures of liberal capitalism create value from some practices, experiences, and identities over others, no matter how often new names are insisted upon, some people will continue to be seen as inferior simply because they do not engage in the same practices as those who are currently dominant in positions of influence and prestige. Therefore, as much as there is a need to reconsider the terms of debate, to interrogate the embedded biases of discursive practices, and to resist living out the invidious distinctions that hegemonic categories impose, there are real limits to what isolated instances of renaming can accomplish.

#### Perm do both – reality can change language – the perm allows the transformation of meaning

Kidner 2K (David W, Nature and Psyche: Radical Environmentalism and the Politics of Subjectivity, pg 26-27)

In the absence of a language that is sufficiently resonant with the natural world, we will have to make do with what we have available; and this requires that we use words in a way that is self-critical, inconsistent, and sometimes ironic. This will not be the postmodernist use of language that problematizes *any* nondiscursive structure; but rather one that uncovers the naturalizing and legitimizing function of words so as to reveal the organic structures that they occlude. For example, in the sentence “the thug offered to rearrange my teeth,” the denial of structure is obvious; but in the Easterbrook statement above, the word “reposition” is all to easily accepted as an “objective” description of what happened, or at least as one of many equally valid descriptions. Similarly, words such as “pests,” “weeds,” or “development” also carry their own particular ideological baggage; and by pointing out their hidden implications we challenge the industrialist structures that they are part of, and so uncover the indigenous forms that lie beneath them. But in pointing out that language has practical implications for the ecological fate of the world, we should not ignore the other side of this dialectic, for language is itself affected by what frames it ideologically and physically. Just as those characteristics of nature that are difficult to name tend to disappear physically from the world when we restructure it, it is equally true that what has been post physically tends to disappear linguistically and conceptually. While the first part of this dialectic is accomplished through technological power, academia plays an important role in the second part. It is no coincidence, for example, that claims that nature is socially constructed are usually made by writers who inhabit “overdeveloped” parts of the world such as Britain where wilderness has already been virtually eliminated; and the effect of such claims is to deny the possibility of nature that transcends its current domesticated state. By making language consistent with this impoverished ecological reality and denying the possibility that is “beyond the text,” constructionism undermines any possible role of language in pointing to and formulating states of ecosystemic health that are potential rather than actual. In this case, the industrialist worldview becomes the only possible worldview; and the major task of environmental theory is to keep alive those ecological scenarios that do exceed such industrialized views of nature.

### DA---Israel

#### Relations low

Barak Ravid 11, Hareetz, "Israel envoy: US ties at their lowest ebb in 35 years", <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-envoy-u-s-ties-at-their-lowest-ebb-in-35-years-1.264758>

Israel's ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, has told the country's diplomats there that U.S.-Israeli relations face their worst crisis in 35 years, despite attempts by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office to project a sense of "business as usual."¶ Oren was speaking to the Israeli consuls general in a conference call on Saturday night.¶ Netanyahu consulted Sunday with the forum of seven senior cabinet ministers over a list of demands that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made in a telephone conversation Friday.¶ Clinton harshly criticized the announcement last week of plans to expand the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood in East Jerusalem while U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was visiting Israel.¶ Haaretz has learned that Clinton's list includes at least four steps the United States expects Netanyahu to carry out to restore confidence in bilateral relations and permit the resumption of peace talks with the Palestinians.¶ 1. Investigate the process that led to the announcement of the Ramat Shlomo construction plans in the middle of Biden's visit. The Americans seek an official response from Israel on whether this was a bureaucratic mistake or a deliberate act carried out for political reasons. Already on Saturday night, Netanyahu announced the convening of a committee to look into the issue.¶ 2. Reverse the decision by the Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee to approve construction of 1,600 new housing units in Ramat Shlomo.¶ 3. Make a substantial gesture toward the Palestinians enabling the renewal of peace talks. The Americans suggested that hundreds of Palestinian prisoners be released, that the Israel Defense Forces withdraw from additional areas of the West Bank and transfer them to Palestinian control, that the siege of the Gaza Strip be eased and further roadblocks in the West Bank be removed.¶ 4. Issue an official declaration that the talks with the Palestinians, even indirect talks, will deal with all the conflict's core issues - borders, refugees, Jerusalem, security arrangements, water and settlements.¶ Two advisers of the prime minister, Yitzhak Molcho and Ron Dermer, held marathon talks Sunday with senior White House officials in Washington and U.S. Mideast envoy George Mitchell and his staff to try to calm the situation. Mitchell will return to Israel Tuesday and expects to hear if Netanyahu intends to take the proposed steps.¶ At the beginning of Sunday's cabinet meeting, Netanyahu tried to convey a message that there was no crisis in relations with the United States. But he sent precisely the opposite message to Oren in Washington.¶ In Oren's Saturday conference call with the Israeli consuls general, he said that the current crisis was the most serious with the Americans since a confrontation between Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin in 1975 over an American demand for a partial withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.

#### No link---plan aligns the US with Israeli TK practices

NDN 13, No Drones Network, ""Targeted Killing" - The Heart of the U.S.-Israel Relationship", February 26, nodronesnetwork.blogspot.com/2013/02/targeted-killing-heart-of-us-israel.html#event

Amos Guiora, an Israeli "counter-terrorism expert," held forth on the difference between "good" targeted killing -- i.e. the kind Israeli practices (!) -- and "bad" targeted killing -- namely, the kind the Obama administration carries out.¶ Ostensibly, the talk was about the fact that the Obama administration is taking too many liberties with its "secret kill lists." Much mention was made of the secret legal memo justifying the Obama killings. (You can download the secret memo here.) On its surface, the talk was disguised to be "critical" of what the U.S. is doing.

#### Israel won’t backlash—know it’s a political loser

Tobin 11—Jonathan S., senior online editor of Commentary, "Can Israel Survive the Presidency?", July 3, <http://israelgreatest.blogspot.com/2011/07/can-israel-survive-obama-presidency.html>

To be sure, Israel should look to avoid unnecessary conflicts with Obama, as it would with any American president, because the potential cost of any such argument is worrisome even if Israel emerges, as it did in Netanyahu’s latest triumph, the winner. When possible, Israel’s leaders must try to find points of agreement with Obama, as Netanyahu tried do in his speech to Congress. And they must wait out his presidency, whether for the next 17 months or the next 65 months, and hope for a friendlier Oval Office occupant next time.

#### No strikes- Israel will compromise- red lines empirically denied

Graham Allison 8/1/13 the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, 8/1/13, "Will Iran Get a Bomb- or Be Bombed Itself- This Year?" The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/will-iran-get-a-bomb-or-be-bombed-itself-this-year/278253/

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will continue to press for an early decision, arguing that sanctions are ineffective and only give Iran more time to expand its nuclear program. Expect President Obama, key members of the Israeli national security establishment, and others to continue arguing that sanctions and covert actions must be allowed more time to work, and that new sanctions and covert actions will be even more effective.¶ At the UN last September, Netanyahu drew a clear red line, near to but short of a nuclear bomb, and threatened that crossing it would trigger an attack on Iran. But his speech revealed his own frustration about the predicament in which he finds himself. He knows that Israel and the U.S. have been complicit in a drama in which they have repeatedly drawn red lines, asserted that Iran would never be allowed to cross them but, after watching Iran cross the line, retreated to the next operational obstacle on the path to a bomb, and declared it to be the real red line (see Table 8).¶ [Table removed]¶ Netanyahu himself was sounding the alarm as long ago as 1992, when he suggested Iran was "3 to 5 years" from a bomb; in 1996, he warned Congress that the "deadline for preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb is getting extremely close." Since then, Israeli politicians and officials have announced numerous "last chances" and "points of no return." In 2003, the head of Israeli military intelligence forecast that Iran would soon cross the "point of no return" at which "it would require no further outside aid to bring the program to fruition." A year later, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned that Iran would cross this point if it were allowed to develop a "technical capability" for operating an enrichment facility. As Iran approached that capability, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described the tipping point not as the capability, but as the "enrichment of uranium" itself. Simultaneously, the head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, warned that Iran would reach this technological point of no return by the end of 2005. After Iran began enriching uranium, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert drew a new line in 2006 as enrichment "beyond a limited number of cascades."¶ As Iran has crossed successive red lines, Israel has retreated to the next and, in effect, hit the repeat button. From conversion of uranium; to production of LEU; to a stockpile of LEU sufficient (after further enrichment) to make one nuclear bomb; to a stockpile sufficient for a half dozen bombs; to enrichment beyond LEU to MEU; to the operation of centrifuges enriching MEU at the deep underground, formerly covert facility at Fordow, that created a "zone of immunity"; to achievement of an undefined "nuclear weapons capability," Israel's warnings have grown louder -- but no more effective. That these "points of no return" have been passed is a brute fact and hard to ignore.

#### Oversight stops arbitrariness but not flex

Stephen Holmes 9, Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, “The Brennan Center Jorde Symposium on Constitutional Law: In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror”, April, California Law Review, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 301, Lexis

Concerted efforts to shirk and deflect responsibility, moreover, provide an illuminating context in which to reconsider Vice President Dick Cheney's mantra, "The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action." n41 The risks of inaction, in Cheney's worldview, are the risks of being "strangled by law," n42 in Jack Goldsmith's phrase, of being hamstrung by due process of law and constitutional checks and balances. Cheney's warnings about the hazards of failing to act, therefore, suggest that the metaphor of a tradeoff between liberty and security is not as anti-dogmatic and anti-hysterical as one might have initially thought. Behind the associated images of balances and scales, we find in fact that a spurious urgency is being invoked to justify a psychological or ideological unwillingness to submit proposed policies to a nonpartisan and professionally conducted cost-benefit analysis. This is the ultimate paradox of the anti-liberal approach to national security. The misleading hypothesis of a tradeoff between liberty and security has been used, surreptitiously, to prevent the application of cost-benefit thinking to alternative proposals for managing [\*321] the risk of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism.¶ Cheney's maxim about the risks of inaction escapes being false only by being meaningless. Given the scarcity of resources, every action is an inaction; heightening security in one respect opens up security vulnerabilities along other dimensions. For example, assigning the majority of the CIA's Arabic speakers to Iraq means withdrawing them from other missions; if the attention of high-level officials is devoted to one problem, it will not be devoted to another.¶ And here is another familiar example. American intelligence agencies reportedly hesitate to hire native Farsi-or Pashto-or Arabic-speaking agents because the best-qualified candidates have relatives in Muslim countries, where reliable background checks are difficult to carry out. n43 This is a serious problem because only CIA and FBI agents fluent in these languages are capable of recruiting and handling informants. n44 This example, too, illustrates that the real tradeoffs in the war on terror do not involve a sacrifice of liberty for security, but rather a willingness to increase one risk in order to reduce another risk. In this case, American intelligence has to run the risk of hiring compromised personnel n45 in order to reduce the risk of failing to understand the enemy. The tradeoffs necessary in the war on terror, as I have been arguing, almost always involve this sort of gamble. The question is: who has the right to choose the set of security risks that we, as a country, would be better off running?¶ Policymakers misunderstand worst-case reasoning when they use it to hide from themselves and others the opportunity costs of their risky choices. The commission of this elementary fallacy by Vice President Cheney and other architects of the U.S. response to 9/11 has been extensively documented by Ron Suskind. n46 Allocating national-security resources without paying attention to opportunity costs is equivalent to spending binges under soft budget constraints, an arrangement notorious for its unwelcome consequences. One cannot reasonably multiply "the magnitude of possible harm from an attack" (for example, a nuclear sneak attack by al Qaeda using WMD supplied by Saddam Hussein) by the low "probability of such an attack" n47 and then conclude that one must act immediately to preempt that remote threat without [\*322] first scanning the horizon and inquiring about other low-probability catastrophic events that are equally likely to occur. One cannot say that a one-percent possibility of a terrifying Saddam-Osama WMD handoff justifies placing seventy percent of our national-security assets in Iraq. But this seems to be how the Bush administration actually "reasoned," perhaps because of its go-it-alone fantasies, as if scarce resources were not a problem. Or, perhaps those responsible for national security during the Bush years succumbed to commission bias, namely, the overpowering feeling, in the wake of a devastating attack, that inaction is intolerable. This uncontrollable urge to act is often experienced in emergencies, namely, in situations where decision makers need to do something but do not know what to do.¶ Among President Bush's many unfortunate bequests to President Obama is the desperate "readiness" problem that afflicts the American military, overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore unprepared to meet a third crisis elsewhere in the world. This problem was a direct result of the Bush administration's failure to take scarcity of resources and opportunity costs into account. What secret and unaccountable executive action made possible, it turns out, was not flexible adaptation to the demands of the situation but rather profligacy, arbitrariness and a failure to set priorities in a semi-rational way. Defenders of the half-truth that the capacity to adapt is increased when rules are bent or broken seem to have a weak grasp of the elementary distinction between flexibility and arbitrariness.¶ The Founders, by contrast, understood quite well the difference between the flexible and the arbitrary. The ground rules for decision making that they built into the American constitutional structure were meant to maximize the first while minimizing the second. From their perspective, therefore, the question "Can there be too much power to fight terrorism?" is poorly formulated. The right question to ask is: can there be too much arbitrary executive action in the United States' armed struggle with al Qaeda, potentially wasting scarce resources that could be more usefully deployed in another way? And the answer to this second question is obviously "yes."

### Politics

#### No impact---shutdown is short

Laura Matthews 13, January 22nd, 2013, "What Would Happen if the US Debt Ceiling Isn't Extended?" International Business Times, www.ibtimes.com/what-would-happen-if-us-debt-ceiling-isnt-extended-1031412

Political historian Thomas Whalen believes another credit downgrade need not happen this time. “It’s unnecessary,” Whalen, a professor at Boston University, said. “It’s a self-imposed economic crisis. It doesn’t need to happen.”¶ According to Whalen, a U.S. default is a scenario no one wants to think about, because if push comes to shove, U.S. financial institutions -- many of which support the Republicans -- will react.¶ "There's too much at stake," he said.¶ When asked how inaction on the debt ceiling could affect the wallets of ordinary Americans, Ron Haskins, a former White House and congressional advisor on welfare issues, sees two problems.¶ In the short-term, the impact won’t be so immediate if the Treasury doesn’t pay its bills on time. However, Haskins said payments would stop for people like defense contractors. The bigger impact, according to Haskins, who is now a senior fellow at Brookings, would be on U.S. interest rates.¶ “Our rates are low, and, if they go up, that would affect the market, impacting home sales and credit cards,” he said. “Interest rates are front and center for anyone with interest in America's debt.”¶ The U.S. Senate hasn’t approved a budget since 2009 and has been using “continuing resolutions” to sustain the flow of money that enables the government to keep functioning. Republicans are hoping that including language in the debt-ceiling measure that forces Senate Democrats to come up with a formal budget or go without a paycheck will up the pressure.¶ ¶ A government shutdown could affect teachers, health care workers and fire fighters, Haskins said. But he doesn’t believe that if this should happen, the shutdown would be for long enough to affect life and property greatly.¶ “If you close the government, it won’t last that long,” he said. “The pressure will be enormous. It won’t be long enough to have all these long-term impacts.”

#### Won’t pass---no compromise

Ana Radelat 9-20, September 20th, 2013, "Budget showdown could put Connecticut House delegation in a tight spot," www.ctmirror.org/story/2013/09/20/budget-showdown-could-put-connecticut-house-delegation-tight-spot

Washington – It was easy for the members of Connecticut’s House delegation, all Democrats, to vote against a bill Thursday that would avert a government shutdown for a few months, but defund Obamacare.¶ But their next vote on the budget won’t be as easy.¶ That’s because the lawmakers may have to eventually decide whether to vote for a bill that leaves Obamacare alone, but continues the so-called "sequester" spending cuts that threaten the state's defense industry and nick many social programs.¶ “I think it’s going to be a very tough moment for us,” said Rep. Joe Courtney, D-2nd District. ¶ House Republicans Friday voted on a continuing resolution that would fund the government until Dec. 15, giving lawmakers more time to work on a budget. But the resolution would also defund the Affordable Care Act, and the Democratic–controlled Senate won’t have it.¶ Rep. Joe Courtney, D-2nd District, predicts "A very tough moment for us."¶ So unless Congress agrees on a way to keep funding it -- a prospect partisan fighting seems to have made impossible -- the federal government will have to shut down most of its operations Oct. 1. ¶ "Any House bill that defunds Obamacare is dead,” Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., said at a press briefing Thursday.¶ That leaves Congress in gridlock, which more and more seems to be its normal state.¶ Since the Senate is expected to strip out the Affordable Care Act provision before it votes on the continuing resolution next week and sends it back to the House, the question becomes what comes next.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, must decide whether to schedule a vote on that Senate bill -- or more likely a compromise that would include some spending cuts the Senate now opposes -- and hope a bipartisan group of House members, including some Connecticut lawmakers, votes for it. Or Boehner could reject the notion of any compromise with the Senate and allow the government to shut down.

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

#### US not key to global

Peter Passell 12, Economics Editor of Foreign Policy’s Democracy Lab, Senior Fellow at the Milken Institute, 4/4/12, “Decoupling: Ties that No Longer Bind,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/03/ties\_that\_no\_longer\_bind?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

Everybody knows that the global economy is becoming more tightly integrated -- that factors ranging from the collapse of ocean shipping costs, to the rise of multinational manufacturing, to the growth of truly international securities markets, have bound national economies to each other as never before. This, of course, must mean we're now all in it together. Booms and busts in rich countries will reverberate ever more strongly through developing and emerging market economies. Right? ¶ Sounds reasonable, but that's not what's happened. The big emerging market economies (notably, China, India and Brazil) took only modest hits from the housing finance bubble and subsequent recession in the U.S., Japan and Europe, then went back to growth-as-usual. ¶ Hence the paradox: Emerging-market and developing countries have somehow "decoupled" from the Western business cycle in an era of ever-increasing economic integration. But the experts have yet to agree on why. Here are the two contending explanations:

#### Plan key to econ

Nathaniel Sheppard 11, correspondent for the Chicago Tribune and NYT, June 7 2011, “Why pint-sized Yemen has become a world player,” http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/07/152204.html

That Yemen could fall into the abyss is of great geopolitical significance that has put the bean-size nation at center stage. About 11 percent of the world’s seaborne petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden en route to the Suez Canal, regional refineries and points west. ¶ It is not the largest shipment by far but enough that disruptions in transit could spook world markets and set off a new spiral of inflation as the world tries to recover from four years of economic distress.¶ Yemen occupies the southwestern and southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west and Oman to the east. ¶ West bound oil must transit the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandab, a narrow strait that passes between Yemen and Djibouti then past the pirates’ paradise, Somalia before reaching open water. It is one of seven strategic world oil shipping chokepoints. ¶ Moreover, the area may contain significant untapped oil reserves, more reason for US concern since Saudi reserves may be diminishing and America is doing little to wean itself from fossil fuel.¶ Should Yemen polity fall apart, the country would be up for grabs. One of the grabbing hands would be that of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, one of the most notorious of Al Qaeda offshoots. Even before Osama Bin Laden was killed and his body dumped into the sea at the beginning of May, the Al Qaeda leader and best known symbol of world terror had lost control of Yemen’s Al Qaeda warriors. They marched to their own drum.¶ Able to operate freely in this poorest of poor, barely managed country with rugged, unforgiving terrain, Yemen’s Al Qaeda has been able to mount several attacks on the US from here. First there was the suicide bombing of the naval destroyer USS Cole while it refueled at the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen seamen were killed¶ Subsequent attacks launched from here included the failed Christmas Day bomb plot in 2009 and the parcel bomb plot of 2010, which also failed. ¶ In 2009, Nasir Al Wuhayshi, an Al Qaeda commander who trained under Bin Laden in Afghanistan and served as his secretary, announced the consolidation of Al Qaeda forces in the region as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, under his command.¶ The US went after Al Qaeda elements in the region that same year but in lawless Somalia with disastrous consequences.¶ Commander Wuhayshi pledged to take jihad from the Arabian Peninsula to Israel, striking at Muslim leaders he decreed “criminal tyrants,” along the way, such as the Saudi royal, family, Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh and recently deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. ¶ Once in Israel he would “liberate” Gaza and Muslim holy sites such as Haram Ash-Sharif, known by Jews as Temple Mount, the holiest of sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. It was here that God chose the Divine Presence to rest; from which the world we know expanded; and that God gathered the dust to make man.¶ US Navy SEALs would love to meet Mr. Wuhayshi to discuss diabolical ambitions for any serious attempt to carry out his apocalyptic quest most certainly would plunge the world into war of world proportions. His agenda and the passion and persistence with which he and his followers pursue it are a reason for stepped up US engagement in Yemen.¶ Before the current uptick in violence as disparate forces seek to send President Saleh packing for good, the long reigning strongman had begun to cooperate with the US counter terrorism efforts in the region, obliging with a series of air strikes and ground assaults on suspected Al Qaeda targets in Yemen. That cooperation may now be in tatters and Mr. Wuhayshi stands to gain ground.¶ The US’ waltz with the strongman was not by choice. While Mr. Saleh’s cooperation was probably more to save his utterly corrupt regime, he was viewed by the US as the lesser of evils in Yemen. The attitude toward President Saleh was the same as toward Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega, another US criminal client: “He may be an SOB but he’s our SOB.’’ ¶ With a bigger footprint and wider control in Yemen in the absence of a strong central authority, outright land grabs and possible alliances with Somalia warlords, it would be as if Al Qaeda had found its Holy Grail, a potential for disrupting the flow of oil to the west, and what it views as the devil incarnate, the US. ¶ Ships transiting the area already find the waters treacherous. Now it stands to get worse. They are frequently targeted by pirates from Somalia who kill or demand large ransoms if they are able to successfully board cargo-carrying vessels. Oil tankers are like crown jewels.¶ International forces, including the US, have treated the Somali pirates like flies at a picnic, swatting them away unscathed most of the time and sometimes killing them, but not enough times to make their confederates think about new careers. ¶ Hijacking or blowing up oil tankers and messing with the oil that powers the world is a different matter altogether. There is too much at stake to leave it to Yemen to handle its own affairs but overt meddling from the West would be unwelcome in the region.¶ No Western or Asian oil dependent nation would relish the idea of invading a Muslim nation at a time of such tensions with Muslims. The US is particularly reluctant, having already done so twice in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ Oil is oil however. While it might not matter to Muslim fundamentalists who want to turn the hands of time back to the 17th century, oil dependent nations would not sit by idly while an already fractured world economy worsened. The situation would get ugly.¶ Thus the tail wags the dog, the pint-sized nation that offers so little has forced the powerful behemoths to consider so much, like their limited options for doing anything about frightening events unfolding before their eyes.

#### Obama has no PC

Bloomberg 9/17 -- Mike Dorning and Kathleen Hunter, 2013, Obama Rifts with Allies on Summers-Syria Limit Debt Dealing, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-17/obama-s-summers-syria-rifts-with-allies-limit-room-on-debt-…

The backlash President Barack Obama faced from Democrats on both Syria and the prospect of Lawrence Summers leading the Federal Reserve underscore intraparty rifts that threaten to limit his room to strike budget and debt deals.¶ “There’s a large and growing portion of the Democratic Party that’s not in a compromising mood,” said William Galston, a former domestic policy adviser to President Bill Clinton.¶ Summers, one of Obama’s top economic advisers during the first two years of his presidency, withdrew from consideration for Fed chairman after a campaign against him led by Democratic senators who criticized his role in deregulating the financial industry during the 1990s.¶ That came just days after the Senate postponed deliberation on a request by Obama to authorize U.S. force in Syria, amid opposition from Democratic and Republican lawmakers wary of a new military action in the Middle East.¶ The two controversies raised “central issues” that divide Democrats at a time when the president needs unity to confront Republicans, Galston said. “The White House better make sure it and congressional Democrats are on the same page” as lawmakers face deadlines on government spending and raising the debt limit, he said.¶ Party Divisions¶ Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois, the chamber’s second-ranking Democrat, said today that Democrats are united with Obama on the need for a “clean” debt-ceiling increase. The anti-Summers movement reflected “strong feelings that many of us have” about making the Fed more responsive on issues such as income inequality, he said.¶ Republican leaders are dealing with their own divisions. House Speaker John Boehner, an Ohio Republican, had to pull back a vote last week on a plan to avoid a partial government shutdown in October after it became clear it couldn’t win enough support from members of his own party.¶ Congress and the Obama administration are facing fiscal decisions that include funding the government by Sept. 30 to avoid a federal shutdown and raising the nation’s $16.7 trillion debt ceiling. Boehner said in July that his party wouldn’t increase the borrowing limit “without real cuts in spending” that would further reduce the deficit. The administration insists it won’t negotiate on the debt ceiling.¶ Building Dissent¶ For Obama, the dissent on the left was already brewing before the Syria and Summers debates.¶ Congressional Democrats and union leaders accused him of being too eager to compromise with Republican demands to cut entitlement spending after he released a budget proposal that called for lower annual Social Security cost-of-living adjustments.¶ Some early Obama supporters also were disappointed that the president, who has relied on drone strikes to kill suspected terrorists and failed to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, hadn’t moved far enough from George W. Bush’s policies on civil liberties and national security. The complaints grew louder after the disclosure of National Security Agency surveillance practices this year.¶ Obama, who earlier this year watched his gun-control legislation fail in the Senate partly because of defections by Democrats from Republican-leaning states, also is limited in his capacity to enlist public support to win over lawmakers.

#### Obama won’t fight the plan

Kwame Holman 13, congressional correspondent for PBS NewsHour; citing Rosa Brooks, Prof of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, former Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former senior advisor at the US Dept of State, “Congress Begins to Weigh In On Drone Strikes Policy,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/04/congress-begins-to-weigh-in-on-drone-strikes-policy.html

In an October 2012 interview, Mr. Obama said of the drone program, "we've got to ... put a legal architecture in place, and we need Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president's reined in, in terms of some of the decisions that we're making."¶ The president has not taken up the drone issue in public again but White House press secretary Jay Carney, asked Wednesday about the drone hearing, said, "We have been in regular contact with the committee. We will continue to engage Congress...to ensure our counterterrorism efforts are not only consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but even more transparent to the American people and the world."¶ And after the hearing, Brooks, too, sounded optimistic.¶ "My own sense is that the executive branch is open to discussion of some kind of judicial process," she said.¶ While some experts have argued for court oversight of drone strikes before they're carried out, Brooks sides with those who say that would be unwieldy and unworkable.¶ Brooks says however an administration that knows its strikes could face court review after the fact -- with possible damages assessed -- would be more responsible and careful about who it strikes and why.