### Prev

#### Discursive focus fails

Adrian Hyde-Price (Professor of International Politics at Bath) 2001 “Europes new security challenges” p. 39

Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, it suggests that security studies – or what Waever calls securitization studies –should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed bgy politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can contribute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria. That is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it is important to understand the discursive moves involved in perception of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

#### Impossible to mobilize support for lashout

Mandelbaum 11 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011) <http://www.cfr.org/publication/23828/cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on_renewing_america.html?cid=rss-fullfeed-cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on-011811&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+cfr_main+(CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed>

HAASS: Michael, I think I know the answer to this question, but let me ask you anyhow, which is, the last 10 years of American foreign policy has been dominated by two extremely expensive interventions, one in Iraq, one now in Afghanistan. Will this sort of pressure both accelerate the end, particularly of Afghanistan? But, more important, will this now -- is this the end of that phase of what we might call "discretionary American interventions?" Is this basically over?¶ MANDELBAUM: Let's call them wars of choice. (Laughter.)¶ HAASS: I was trying to be uncharacteristically self-effacing here. But clearly it didn't hold. Okay.¶ MANDELBAUM: I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. ¶ Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

### Acct

#### Prolif doesn’t solve war---empirics go aff

Mark S. Bell 13, PhD student in Political Science at MIT, MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School, and Nicholas Miller, PhD Candidate in IR at MIT, August 19, 2013, “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, a peer-reviewed academic journal covering research on international conflict and conflict resolution, <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/08/19/0022002713499718.abstract>

Our results call into question several aspects of the conventional wisdom on nuclear weapons and conflict. Using more appropriate methodological approaches than previous studies, we find that symmetric nuclear dyads are not less likely to fight wars, nor significantly more likely to engage in low-level conflict than nonnuclear dyads. This pattern holds up even when one examines individual dyads. Thus, for all its theoretical plausibility, this component of the stability–instability paradox appears to lack strong empirical support, as do the predictions of nuclear optimists and pessimists: the conflict behavior of symmetric nuclear dyads appears much the same as that of nonnuclear dyads. It is important to note, however, that we have only examined one of the predictions of the nuclear pessimists—that the spread of nuclear weapons increase conventional conflict post-nuclearization. We have not tested the view of the nuclear pessimists that nuclear proliferation may cause incentives for preventive war prior to nuclearization or raise the possibility of nuclear war or accidental nuclear use.¶ With respect to asymmetric nuclear dyads, even after controlling for the factors that lead to proliferation, nuclear-armed states are more likely to initiate low-level conflict against nonnuclear states, but this effect is limited and conditional. Rather than aggressing against more conventionally powerful states, the evidence suggests that states possessing nuclear weapons tend to initiate disputes against new, weak adversaries.¶ These findings have important policy implications. At least with regard to its consequences for conventional conflict, the findings suggest that nuclear proliferation is neither as menacing or stabilizing as many have believed. The pessimists’ prediction that nuclear weapons exacerbate international conflict after nuclear acquisition seems to lack support, except in the case of nuclear-armed states’ propensity to initiate disputes against new adversaries. Meanwhile, the optimists’ hope that nuclear weapons significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict also appears largely illusory. Nonetheless, contrary to Mueller (2010), our findings do not imply that policy makers should be unconcerned about nuclear proliferation. Even if nuclear dyads behave similarly to nonnuclear dyads, if the mere presence of nuclear weapons generates some non-zero probability of nuclear war, policy makers still have reason to worry about proliferation given the severe consequences of any nuclear use.23 Moreover, as noted above, we do find that nuclear states are more likely to initiate low-level conflicts against new nonnuclear opponents, suggesting that nuclear weapons may not be completely irrelevant, and may lead states to expand their interests in world politics. This suggests at least a note of caution for those who see little danger in future proliferation.

#### Prefer experimental evidence

Kai Quek 12, Assistant Prof in the Dept of Politics and Administration at the university of Hong Kong, PhD in Poli Sci from MIT, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Risk of Nuclear War: An Experimental Approach,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2106695

Is the decision to use a nuclear option influenced by the number of nuclear actors in a crisis interaction? This question has particular importance in the context of nuclear proliferation and nuclear war. Lynn-Jones (2010, xi) observed that most policymakers have worried that nuclear war will become more likely when there are more nuclear armed states, and “[t]he most fundamental reason why scholars and analysts study nuclear proliferation is that the spread of nuclear weapons may increase the likelihood of nuclear war.”30 However, research on this question has remained largely theoretical in the existing literature.¶ I use experimental games with nuclear options to construct an empirical test. The main findings are summarized as follows:¶ (1) Interactions are largely peaceful at N = 2 despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage.¶ (2) Interacting actors are less likely to choose the nuclear option when they know that the number of nuclear actors is small, and more likely to choose the nuclear option when they know that the number of nuclear actors is large.¶ (3) A jump in the number of nuclear actors in crisis increases the proportion of decisions in which the nuclear option is chosen.¶ (4) Interactions are more peaceful between alliance groups when they have secondstrike countervalue capabilities.¶ (5) Nuclear framing has no significant effect on the use of nuclear options in the experiments implemented.¶ To my knowledge, this is the first randomized experiment in political science on the relationship between nuclear proliferation and the risk of nuclear conflict.31 In a fortunate world where nuclear war remains unobserved, there is strong justification for an experimental approach on theoretical, practical, as well as ethical grounds. Empirically, the use of a controlled experiment also allows for a clean identification of the causal relationship, which is hard to achieve with observational data due to potential confounders.

### S

#### Ex post means they’ll win their suits

Paul Taylor 13, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy & Research with a focus on national security policy, international relations, targeted killings, and drone operations, JD from Seton Hall University School of Law, “A FISC for Drones?” http://transparentpolicy.org/2013/02/a-fisc-for-drones/

Judges would likely be much more comfortable with ex post review. Ex post review would free them from any implication that they are issuing a “death warrant” and would place them in a position that they are much more comfortable with: reviewing executive uses of force after the fact. While there are clearly parallels that could be drawn between the ex ante review proposed here and the search and seizure warrants that judges routinely deal with, there are also important differences. First and foremost is that this implicates not the executive’s law enforcement responsibility but its war-making and foreign relations responsibilities, with which courts are loath to interfere, but are sometimes willing to review for abuse.¶ Additionally, in search and seizure warranting, there an ex post review will eventually be available. That will likely not be the case in drone strikes and other targeted killings unless such a process is specifically created. There are simply too many hurdles to judicial review (including state secrets, political questions, discovery problems, etc) for the courts to create such an opportunity without congressional action.¶ Chesney also noted that executive officials involved in the nomination process would prefer an ex ante review to shield them from unexpected civil liability by the victims or their families. I’m sure that it is true that administration officials would like to have “certainty ex ante that they would not face a lawsuit.” However, this is not a guarantee that the courts can provide to the executive. As noted above, as with search and seizure warrants, there are issues to consider after the approval of the executive action. Ex ante review does not allow for inquiry into important ancillary issues, such as the balancing of risk to civilian bystanders. Also, it provides no assurances that new, exculpatory intelligence forces a reassessment of the targeting decision. Only ex post review would achieve this.¶ There is also the problem that typified the FISC: permissiveness. Of the tens of thousands of FISA warrant requests, only a handful have been rejected. When allowing for modification of the requests, it is not clear whether any have been finally rejected. There is little reason to believe that the proposed “drone court” will be much different. It is far too likely that a court will hesitate to impede an operation that the executive believes is required to protect out national security. Once the operation is complete, however, the court will not be inclined to hold back its criticism on all manner of aspects of the operation, from the initial targeting decision to the final execution.

#### Immediate observer effect

Ashley Deeks 13, Associate Prof of Law at the University of Virginia Law School, “The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference,” Fordham Law Review Vol. 82, October 2013, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338667>

In another sense, though, much of substance has been decided since 2002—by the executive branch rather than the courts. This Article illustrated an important reason why the executive’s national security policies have changed significantly since 2001. Many of these changes are due not to the direct sunlight of court orders, but to the shadow cast by the threat or reality of court decisions on executive policymaking in related areas of activity. Court decisions, particularly in the national security realm, have a wider ripple effect than many recognize because the executive has robust incentives to try to preserve security issues as its sole domain. In areas where the observer effect shifts executive policies closer to where courts likely would uphold them, demands for deference by the executive turn out to be more modest than they might seem if considered from the isolated vantage of a single case at a fixed point in time. It remains critical for courts to police the outer bounds of executive national security policies, but they need not engage systematically to have a powerful effect on the shape of those policies and, consequently, the constitutional national security order.¶ A more detailed understanding of the observer effect has implications for national security developments on the horizon. In particular, the observer effect should have salience for those in Congress and the executive branch who are considering whether to create a new national security court that would review targeted killings.307 In this type of situation, the executive would have no jurisdictional uncertainty but ample substantive uncertainty, at least initially. This suggests that the observer effect might have a significant up-front effect on executive decisionmaking regarding targeted killings, shifting those decisions in a more rights-focused direction. As long as the court periodically challenged executive petitions, whether by rejecting a given petition or requiring additional information before approving it, we could predict that the executive would continue to make modest adjustments to its policies. Over time, as the court established baseline doctrine, that effect would flatten out, prompting fewer and fewer changes in executive policy, as with the Guantánamo habeas cases in the D.C. Circuit.

#### Political costs cause compliance

Stephen I. Vladeck 9, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, senior editor of the peer-reviewed Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Supreme Court Fellow at the Constitution Project, and fellow at the Center on National Security at Fordham University School of Law, JD from Yale Law School, 3-1-2009, “The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity / Legality Paradox,” http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=facsch\_bkrev

Moreover, even if one believes that suspensions are unreviewable, there is a critical difference between the Suspension Clause and the issue here: at least with regard to the former, there is a colorable claim that the Constitution itself ousts the courts from reviewing whether there is a “Case[ ] of Rebellion or Invasion [where] the public Safety may require” suspension––and even then, only for the duration of the suspension.179 In contrast, Jackson’s argument sounds purely in pragmatism—courts should not review whether military necessity exists because such review will lead either to the courts affirming an unlawful policy, or to the potential that the political branches will simply ignore a judicial decision invalidating such a policy.180 Like Jackson before him, Wittes seems to believe that the threat to liberty posed by judicial deference in that situation pales in comparison to the threat posed by judicial review. ¶ The problem is that such a belief is based on a series of assumptions that Wittes does not attempt to prove. First, he assumes that the executive branch would ignore a judicial decision invalidating action that might be justified by military necessity.181 While Jackson may arguably have had credible reason to fear such conduct (given his experience with both the Gold Clause Cases182 and the “switch in time”),183 a lot has changed in the past six-and-a-half decades, to the point where I, at least, cannot imagine a contemporary President possessing the political capital to squarely refuse to comply with a Supreme Court decision. But perhaps I am naïve.184

#### Pro bono lawyers empirically represent victims in other countries

Law and Disorder 11, weekly, independent radio program focused on legal issues related to civil liberties and national security, “Law and Disorder July 25, 2011,” http://lawanddisorder.org/2011/07/law-and-disorder-july-25-2011/

Michael Ratner is President of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) in New York and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) in Berlin. Both are non-profit human rights litigation organizations. He was part of the small group of lawyers that first took on representation of the Guantánamo detainees in January 2001, a case that resulted in a victory in the Supreme Court in 2004. CCR established a network of over 600 pro-bono lawyers to represent Guantánamo detainees and continues that work.¶ He has filed criminal complaints in the courts of Germany, France and Spain against former US officials including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld seeking the initiation of criminal prosecutions against them for the Abu Ghraib abuse and torture as well as for their actions at Guantánamo. Recently, CCR and ECCHR prepared papers to file in Switzerland against George W. Bush for torture. As a result Bush canceled his trip. A major area of Mr. Ratner’s litigation and writing is the enforcement of the prohibition on torture and murder against various dictators and generals who travel to the United States. He has sued on behalf of victims in Guatemala, East Timor, Haiti, Argentina, among other countries. He has also litigated numerous suits to prevent or stop illegal US wars ranging from Central America to Iraq. A constant in his work has been litigation against government spying and surveillance of activists.

### T

#### The authority to authorize without judicial permission is a war powers authority---we restrict it---FISA proves

John C. Eastman 6, Prof of Law at Chapman University, PhD in Government from the Claremont Graduate University, served as the Director of Congressional & Public Affairs at the United States Commission on Civil Rights during the Reagan administration, “Be Very Wary of Restricting President's Power,” Feb 21 2006, http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.467/pub\_detail.asp]

Prof. Epstein challenges the president's claim of inherent power by noting that the word "power" does not appear in the Commander in Chief clause, but the word "command," fairly implied in the noun "Commander," is a more-than-adequate substitute for "power." Was it really necessary for the drafters of the Constitution to say that the president shall have the power to command? Moreover, Prof. Epstein ignores completely the first clause of Article II -- the Vesting clause, which provides quite clearly that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President." The relevant inquiry is whether those who ratified the Constitution understood these powers to include interception of enemy communications in time of war without the permission of a judge, and on this there is really no doubt; they clearly did, which means that Congress cannot restrict the president's authority by mere statute.¶ Prof. Epstein's own description of the Commander in Chief clause recognizes this. One of the "critical functions" performed by the clause, he notes, is that "Congress cannot circumvent the president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his responsibilities to anyone else." Yet FISA does precisely that, assigning to the FISA court a core command authority, namely, the ability to authorize interception of enemy communications. This authority has been exercised by every wartime president since George Washington.

#### Restriction means a limit or qualification---it includes conditions

CAA 8,COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT A, STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, Appellant., 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613

P11 The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "[a] limitation or qualification." Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999). In fact, "limited" and "restricted" are considered synonyms. See Webster's II New Collegiate Dictionary 946 (2001). Under these commonly accepted definitions, Wagner's driving privileges were "restrict[ed]" when they were "limited" by the ignition interlock requirement. Wagner was not only [\*7] statutorily required to install an ignition interlock device on all of the vehicles he operated, A.R.S. § 28-1461(A)(1)(b), but he was also prohibited from driving any vehicle that was not equipped with such a device, regardless whether he owned the vehicle or was under the influence of intoxicants, A.R.S. § 28-1464(H). These limitations constituted a restriction on Wagner's privilege to drive, for he was unable to drive in circumstances which were otherwise available to the general driving population. Thus, the rules of statutory construction dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.

#### Restrictions can happen after the fact

ECHR 91,European Court of Human Rights, Decision in Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1991/29.html

The main question in issue concerns Article 11 (art. 11), which provides:¶ "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.¶ 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ..."¶ Notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 (art. 11) must, in the present case, also be considered in the light of Article 10 (art. 10) (see the Young, James and Webster judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 23, § 57). The protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10 (art. 10), is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 (art. 11).¶ A. Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly¶ In the Government’s submission, Mr Ezelin had not suffered any interference with the exercise of his freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression: he had been able to take part in the procession of 12 February 1983 unhindered and to express his convictions publicly, in his professional capacity and as he wished; he was reprimanded only after the event and on account of personal conduct deemed to be inconsistent with the obligations of his profession.¶ The Court does not accept this submission. The term "restrictions" in paragraph 2 of Article 11 (art. 11-2) - and of Article 10 (art. 10-2) - cannot be interpreted as not including measures - such as punitive measures - taken not before or during but after a meeting (cf. in particular, as regards Article 10 (art. 10), the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 21, § 43, and the Müller and Others judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 19, § 28).

#### Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

### K

#### Efforts to avoid death are inevitable and sustain dignity and value

Robert Wuthnow 10, Gerhard Andlinger Prof of Sociology at Princeton, PhD in Sociology from Cal Berkeley, “Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Response to Terror, Pandemics, Environmental Devastation, Nuclear Annihilation, and Other Threats,” p. 15, google books

The response to peril will consist in large measure of problem solving. Research demonstrates that humans are inveterate problem solvers. In laboratory experiments, human subjects faced with an utterly meaningless pattern of random numbers typically define it as a puzzle to be solved. Terminally ill cancer patients continue until their strength is all but gone seeking new treatments and possible cures. Doing so sustains hope and a sense of dignity. 15 Healthcare professionals find that one of the most common end-of-life activities is “putting one’s house in order”: arranging financial affairs, making a will, compiling a living will, organizing one’s funeral, figuring out ways to ease loved ones’ burdens. 16 What appears in some instances as a denial of death is actually a focused effort to make it through the day. Fictional portrayals of human extinction are most believable when the last people alive search for ways to extend their days. Apocalyptic scenarios focus less on cosmic wisdom than on such practical tasks as figuring out when the end will come and how best to prepare. Problem solving is equally evident in the organized responses to perils that have faced humanity in recent decades. No sooner had nuclear weapons been invented than efforts began to determine how best to control them or to better channel their destructive powers toward enemies. Going to war after the 9/11 attacks can also be seen as a form of problem solving in that it showed that the U.S. government, acting on the American public’s behalf, was taking action to rid the world of evil. Responses to pandemics and environmental threats have focused largely on the search for scientific and technological solutions.

#### Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal

Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: **there is pleasure in all consciousness** of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, **it is simply the very experience of liking things**, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, **there are many things the experience of which we like**. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation.

Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.

However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that **life has some** objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Seeking to change the world is an affirmation of life---answers the “why” question of the 1NC

Todd May 5, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531

And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.

#### Their rejection of normative state engagement causes worse violence

Zizek 4 Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2004, Organs Without Bodies, p. 72-73

However, even if there is a grain of truth in the reproach of Deleuze’s “dualism,” and in the remark that the opposition(s) between nomadic and State, molecular and molar, and so forth is not simply the opposition between the Good (nomadic...) and the Evil (state. .), Deleuze is as far as possible from asserting any kind of complementarity between the two poles (in the sense that, while the molar State alone is oppressive, suffocating the flow of desire, the opposite extreme, as the total abolition of the State, would mean “regression” into the psychotic, self-destructive rage of the pure, pre-Oedipal flow of desire). So, what we ostensibly need is the right balance between the two. This is how, among others, Julia Kristeva reads and appropriates Deleuze: while praising his liberation of the creativity of desire from the constraints of State Power, she nonethe¬less warns of the destructive consequences of seeing in the State only a negative barrier to be abolished: to avoid direct self-destruction, the total revolutionary abolition of the (existing) State always reverts into a new Order, even more oppressive than the previous one. In this sense, Kristeva praises revolt—the liberation of the “wild” pre-Oedipal creative forces, the liberation that is not primarily political but more intimate, psychic, religious, artistic... —and condemns revolution as the installation of a new Order, the coagulation of the creative energies of the revolt.77 From a truly Hegelian, Deleuzian, and/or Lacanian approach (a strange series of equivalences indeed), this line of argumentation should be rejected in toto: true radicality does not consist in going to the extreme and destroying the system (i.e., in disturbing too much the balance that sustains it) but consists in changing the very coordinates that define this balance. Say, once we accept the social-democratic idea of the modern capitalist market economy cum welfare state, it is easy to claim that one should avoid both extremes (i.e., the total freedom of the market, on one hand, and excessive state intervention, on the other hand) and find the right balance between the two. However, the true revolution would consist in transforming the very overall balance of the social edifice, in enforcing a new structural principle of social life that would render the very field of the opposition between market and state obsolete. Or, let us take the platitude about the right balance between the permissive indulgence of spontaneity and the rigors of discipline. Revolution is not the assertion of spontaneity and rejection of every discipline but the radical redefi¬nition of what counts as true spontaneity or discipline. For instance, in the Kantian philosophical revolution, true (transcendental) spontaneity occurs not when I follow my natural instincts and needs but when I exercise my freedom, which means when I act against my “spontaneous” natural impulses.

#### Their rejection of material engagement in favor of interrogation is utopian and can’t solve violence

Peter Hallward, Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University, London, 2006, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p. 161-162

Now Deleuze understands perfectly well why ‘most of the objections raised against the great philosophers are empty’. Indignant readers say to them: ‘things are not like that […]. But, in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not’ (ES, 106). Rather than test its accuracy according to the criteria of representation, ‘the genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts’ (LS, 6). In reality then, Deleuze concludes, ‘only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question’, that it ‘does not force the nature of things enough’ (ES, 107; cC WP, 82). Deleuze certainly forces the nature of things into conformity with his own question. Just as certainly however, his question inhibits any consequential engagement with the constraints of our actual world. For readers who remain concerned with these con­straints and their consequences, Deleuze’s question is not the best available question. Rather than try to refute Deleuze, this book has tried to show how his system works and to draw attention to what should now he the obvious (and perfectly explicit) limita­tions of this philosophy of unlimited affirmation. First of all, since it acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual, there is no place in Deleuze’s philosophy for any notion of change, time or history that is mediated by actuality In the end, Deleuze offers few resources for thinking the consequences of what happens within the actually existing world as such. Unlike Darwin or Marx, for instance, the adamantly virtual orientation of Deleuze’s ‘constructivism’ does not allow him to account for cumulative transformation or novelty in terms of actual materials and tendencies. No doubt few contemporary philosophers have had as an acute a sense of the internal dynamic of capitalism — but equally, few have proposed so elusive a response as the virtual ‘war machine’ that roams through the pages of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Like the nomads who invented it, this abstract machine operates at an ‘absolute speed, by being “synonymous with speed”’, as the incarnation of ‘a pure and immeasurable multiplicity; an irruption of the ephemeral and of the power of metamorphosis’ (TP, 336, 352). Like any creating, a war machine consists and ‘exists only in its own metamorphoses’ (T~ 360). By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state — by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth — the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction. Although no small number of enthusiasts continue to devote much energy and inge­nuity to the task, the truth is that Deleuze’s work is essentially indifferent to the politics of this world. A philosophy based on deterritorialisation, dissipation and flight can offer only the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue to condition so much of what happens in our world. Deleuze’s philosophical war remains ‘absolute’ and ‘abstract’, precisely, rather than directed or ‘waged’ [menee]. Once ‘a social field is defined less by its conflicts and con­tradictions than by the lines of flight running through it’, any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation or life. And since these dynamics are themselves anti-dialectical if not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze’s philosophy for relations of conflict or solidarity, i.e. relations that are genuinely between rather than external to individuals, classes, or principles.

#### No prior questions

Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Alt can’t solve drone violence---it’s insulated from external resistance and micropolitical mobilization---turns the K

Andrew Bacevich 12, Prof of History and IR at Boston University, PhD in American Diplomatic History from Princeton, visiting fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, “The New American Way of War,” http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2012/02/13/andrew-bacevich/the-new-american-way-of-war/

For a democracy, waging endless war poses a challenge. There are essentially two ways to do it. The first is for the state to persuade the people that the country faces an existential threat. This is what the Bush administration attempted to do after 9/11, for a time with notable success. Scaremongering made possible the invasion of Iraq. Had Operation Iraqi Freedom produced the victory expected by its architects, scaremongering would probably have led in due course to Operation Iranian Freedom and Operation Syrian Freedom. But Iraq led to an outcome that Americans proved unwilling to underwrite.¶ The second way is for the state to insulate the people from war’s effects, thereby freeing itself from constraints. A people untouched (or seemingly untouched) by war are far less likely to care about it. Persuaded that they have no skin in the game, they will permit the state to do whatever it wishes to do. This is the approach the Obama administration is now pursuing: first through the expanded use of aerial drones for both intelligence gathering and ‘targeted’ assassination; and, second, through the expanded deployment of covert special operations forces around the world, such as the team that killed Osama bin Laden. The New York Times reported today that the head of the Special Operations Command ‘is seeking new authority to move his forces faster and outside of normal Pentagon deployment channels’.¶ Drones and special forces are the essential elements of a new American way of war, conducted largely in secret with minimal oversight or accountability and disregarding established concepts of sovereignty and international law. Bush’s critics charge him with being a warmonger. But Obama has surpassed his predecessor in shedding any remaining restraints on waging war.

#### Our approach to engaging the state is productive

Max M. Mutschler 10 - doctoral candidate in social sciences at the University of Tübingen, Germany. He holds a M.A. in political science and history from the University of Tübingen where he worked as a lecturer and research associate from 2007 to 2009. For his current research on arms control in space, he was awarded a dissertation fellowship by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, “Preventive Arms Control in Space: Breaking the Deadlock,” Paper presented at ECPR-SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm 9-11 Sep. 2010,http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Mutschler\_SGIR2010\_Arms\_Control\_in\_Space.pdf

How can epistemic communities carry out their role as norm entrepreneurs? Uncertainty about how the world works and what consequences political decisions might have make policymakers turn to experts to seek advice. This provision of knowledge constitutes the power of epistemic communities (Haas 1997). They point out the alternatives decision-makers have and they can, on the basis of their causal or normative understanding, discount and sometimes even exclude certain alternatives. “If rationality is bounded, epistemic communities may be responsible for circumscribing the boundaries and delimiting the options” (Haas 1997, 16). What can be the role of epistemic communities in the process of the construction of national interests in regard to preventive arms control? Naturally, there is quite a high degree of uncertainty in the process of developing new weapon technology regarding the usefulness of this new technology. The central question for political decision-makers is: would this technology enhance our security? It seems natural that governmental decision-makers turn to actors of the state apparatus first to get advice on the military utility of potential weapons. These are the defence bureaucracy and the military, which cooperate with the defence industry in the field of research and development (R&D). Plenty has been written on the “military-industrial complex” and the tendency of the industry, the military and the defence officials to advocate certain weapons because they either hope for profitable contracts later on (in case of the defence-industry), or because the weapons are considered prestige projects (in case of the military).14¶ Epistemic communities outside of the state apparatus sometimes have a more critical view of certain technologies, and they can provide knowledge of the expected military utility of certain weapons and their role in national security. The central question from the theoretical point of view outlined above, however, is how do such epistemic communities manage to get heard and to make their knowledge consensual? I hypothesize that their chances to do so increase if they can portray the development of a particular weapon technology as detrimental to the security of the state. This is important because new norms do not emerge in a vacuum. In order to be seen as legitimate and hence be accepted, the new norm must be coherent with this existing normative framework (Florini 1996, 376–7). “Efforts to promote a new norm take place within the standards of ‘appropriateness’ defined by prior norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897).15 By using their information to present the development of certain weapons as counterproductive for national security, epistemic communities do exactly this; they make the link between a new norm – do not develop these weapons – and appropriate behaviour. The development of new weapons in order to improve the security of one’s country can be seen as the appropriate behaviour of any head of state. If convincing evidence can be presented that certain technologies compromise national security, the development of these weapons can be presented as in conflict with appropriate behaviour. Epistemic communities of scientist that have the technical expertise and authority to assess technologies for potential weapons are particularly suited to provide technical information in order to show consequences of differing policy choices.16