# 1NC

## T

#### Topical detention cases must deal with persons designated as enemy combatants---that’s how war powers authority is used in the area

CFC 4 – The Committee on Federal Courts, 2004, “THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF "ENEMY COMBATANTS": BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR,” The Record of The Association of The Bar of the City of New York, 59 The Record 41

The President, assertedly acting under his "war power" in prosecuting the "war on terror," has claimed the authority to detain indefinitely, and without access to counsel, persons he designates as "enemy combatants," an as yet undefined term that embraces selected suspected terrorists or their accomplices.

Two cases, each addressing a habeas corpus petition brought by an American citizen, have reviewed the constitutionality of detaining "enemy combatants" pursuant to the President's determination:

- Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696), concerns a citizen seized with Taliban military forces in a zone of armed combat in Afghanistan;

- Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd sub nom., Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, [\*42] 2004) (No. 03-1027), concerns a citizen seized in Chicago, and suspected of planning a terrorist attack in league with al Qaeda.

Padilla and Hamdi have been held by the Department of Defense, without any access to legal counsel, for well over a year. No criminal charges have been filed against either one. Rather, the government asserts its right to detain them without charges to incapacitate them and to facilitate their interrogation. Specifically, the President claims the authority, in the exercise of his war power as "Commander in Chief" under the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), to detain persons he classifies as "enemy combatants":

- indefinitely, for the duration of the "war on terror";

- without any charges being filed, and thus not triggering any rights attaching to criminal prosecutions;

- incommunicado from the outside world;

- specifically, with no right of access to an attorney;

- with only limited access to the federal courts on habeas corpus, and with no right to rebut the government's showing that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

#### The Kiyemba petitioners are no longer being detained as enemy combatants---their status is based on exclusion from the U.S. founded in immigration authority

Samuel Chow 11, Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Summer 2011, “NOTE: THE KIYEMBA PARADOX: CREATING A JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK TO ERADICATE INDEFINITE, UNLAWFUL EXECUTIVE DETENTIONS,” Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 19 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 775

In addition to its immigration-based analysis, the government interpreted Boumediene narrowly and Munaf broadly to support the argument that the Kiyemba petitioners had been legally released, despite their continued detention. n182 According to the government, Munaf supported the argument that "the Government retains the sovereign authority, independent of the authority to detain enemy combatants, to hold petitions incident to barring them from the United States, and pending efforts to resettle them elsewhere." n183 This was a Mezei-type argument and an effort by the government to extend it to terrorist-based detentions, which it successfully did. As the government would have it, Boumediene's emphasis on the constitutional importance [\*801] of release had been met in Munaf and the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in Kiyemba. The government analogized the Kiyemba petitioners' request to be released into the United States to the Munaf petitioners' request for release as well as an injunction protecting them from the possibility of criminal prosecution. n184 Accordingly, the government argued that the Kiyemba petitioners had already been "released," and merely needed appropriate resettlement. n185 Alternatively, as the government distinguished in Mezei, the Kiyemba petitioners were no longer being "detained" but were simply being excluded from the United States. n186 It seems "release" becomes a mere status determination rather than functionally serving as relief from unlawful detention, since the detention, for all intents and purposes, is continuing. Munaf was, indeed, the first limitation of the writ's remedial application after Boumediene had so largely expanded its scope. n187

#### Vote neg:

#### 1) Limits---they explode the topic to include any class of petitioners whose detention is functionally indefinite but not justified as an expression of war powers---all immigration detention, disease quarantine, the domestic prison system all become viable aff areas.

#### 2) Precision---only our evidence speaks to the actual justification used to detain the Kiyemba petitioners---key to legal precision and topic education.

## K

### 1NC Poz Peace Link

#### The affirmative reduces the problem of executive authority to temporally distinct conjunctions of war and peace time---legal restrictions inevitably fail because they ignore the permanence of war in politics

Mary L. Dudziak 10, chaired prof of history and pol-sci and USC, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1669

When President George W. Bush told the American people in September 2001 that the nation was at war, he drew upon an iconic American narrative. The onset of war, in American legal and political thought, is more than a cata- lytic moment. It is the opening of an era: a wartime. Wartime is thought to be an era of altered governance. It is not simply a time period when troops are sent into battle. It is also a time when presidential power expands, when individual rights are often compromised. An altered rule of law in wartime is thought to be tolerable because wartimes come to an end, and with them a government's emergency powers. That, at least, is the way law and wartime are understood.

War is thought to break time into pieces. War often marks the beginning of an era, the end of another, as in antebellum, postbellum, and simply "postwar" (meaning after World War II). War has its own time. During "wartime," regular, normal time is thought to be suspended. Wartime is when time is out of order.

Ideas about the temporality of war are embedded in American legal thought. A conception of time is assumed and not examined, as if time were a natural phenomenon with an essential nature, providing determined shape to human action and thought. This understanding of time is in tension with the experience of war in the twentieth century. The problem of time, in essence, clouds an understanding of the problem of war.

Much attention has been paid in recent years to wartime as a state of exception,' but not to wartime as a form of time. For philosopher Giorgio Agamben, a state of exception "is a suspension of the juridical order itself," marking law's boundaries.2 Viewing war as an exception to normal life, however, leads us to ignore the longstanding persistence of war. If wartime is actually normal time, as this Essay suggests, rather than a state of exception, then law during war can be seen as the form of law we in fact practice, rather than a suspension of an idealized understanding of law.

In scholarship on law and war, time is seen as linear and episodic. There are two different kinds of time: wartime and peacetime. Historical progression consists of moving from one kind of time to another (from wartime to peacetime to wartime, etc.). Law is thought to vary depending on what time it is. The relationship between citizen and state, the scope of rights, and the extent of government power depend on whether it is wartime or peacetime. A central metaphor is the swinging pendulum-swinging from strong protection of rights and weaker government power to weaker protection of rights and stronger government power.3 Moving from one kind of time to the next is thought to swing the pendulum in a new direction.

This conceptualization is embedded in scholarship in law and legal history,4 it is written into judicial opinions,5 it is part of popular culture.6 Even works that seek to be revisionist aim largely for a different way to configure the pendulum, leaving the basic conceptual structure in place.7 But the conception of time that has been embedded in thinking about law and war is in tension with the practice of war in the twentieth century. This understanding of time no longer fits experience, but it has continued to shape our thinking.8

There are three significant impacts of viewing wartime as exceptional, or viewing history as divided into different zones of time based on peace and war. First, there is a policy problem: war-related time zones cause us to think that war-related laws and policies are temporary. Second, there is a historiography problem: time zones can cause scholars to fail to look for war-related impacts on American law outside of the time zone of war. Finally, the model of the swinging pendulum does not lend itself to a broader analysis of the relationship between war and rights over time, or to the way rights are impacted by war- related state-building, which tends to endure.9

This Essay explores the role of wartime in legal thought. The starting point is an examination of time itself. Scholarship on time shows that "time" does not have an essential nature.' 0 Instead, as sociologist Emile Durkheim and others have argued, our understanding of time is a product of social life. This helps us to see that "wartime," like other kinds of time, does not have an essential character, but is historically contingent.

The Essay then turns to the way wartime is characterized in scholarship on law and war, arguing that a particular understanding of war and time is a feature of this literature. The idea of wartime found in twentieth-century legal thought is in tension with the American experience with war. To examine this dynamic, the Essay takes up an iconic twentieth-century war, World War II, finding that this war is harder to place in time than is generally assumed, in part because the different legal endings to the war span over a period of seven years.

Next, the Essay considers the way that scholarship on the history of rights during war attempts to periodize World War II, and finds that the fuzziness in the war's timing repeats itself in scholarship on law and war. Scholars who believe themselves to be writing about the same wartime are not always studying the same span of years.

The difficulty in confining World War II in time is an illustration of a broader feature of the twentieth century: wartimes bleed into each other, and it is hard to find peace on the twentieth-century American timeline. Meanwhile, although the Pearl Harbor attack was on the Territory of Hawaii, all twentieth- century military engagement occurred outside the borders of American states. Because of this, a feature of American military strategy has been to engage of the American people in a war at some times," and at other times to insulate them from war. Isolation from war in the late twentieth century, through the use of limited war and advanced technology, enabled the nation to participate in war without most citizens perceiving themselves to be in a wartime.12

The Essay closes with a discussion of the way the tension between war's seamlessness and our conception of temporally distinct wartimes surfaces in contemporary cases relating to Guantinamo detainees. In these cases, Supreme Court Justices first attempted to fit the post-September 11 era into the traditional and confined understanding of wartime. But ultimately, anxiety about war's temporality informed Justice Kennedy's argument for judicial review in Boumediene v. Bush.13

My aim in this Essay is to critique the way that the concept of wartime affects thinking about war and rights, but not to argue that war itself has no impact. One reason that wartime has so much power as a way of framing history is that the outbreak of war is often experienced as ushering in a new era, particularly when war follows a dramatic event like Pearl Harbor.14 After that attack, for example, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter said to his law clerk: "Everything has changed, and I am going to war."15 The onset of war is seen, however, not as a discrete event, but as the beginning of a particular era that has temporal boundaries on both sides. I do not wish to question the power of these catalytic moments, but rather to call attention to the way they bring into being a set of assumptions about their endings, because they are seen as the onset of a temporally confined war. Pearl Harbor, for example, was thought to launch the United States into an era-World War II-that would, by definition, come to an end. Unpacking war's temporality can be a path toward a more satisfactory understanding of the ongoing relationship between war and American law and politics.

### 1NC Security Lawfare Link/Impact

#### Security renders lawfare a tool of violent biopolitical governance---the result is endless violence

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Security, not liberty: the ‘permanent emergency’ of the security society

The US military’s evident disdain for international law, indifference to the pain of ‘Others’ and endless justifying of its actions via the language of ‘emergency’ have prompted various authors to reflect on Giorgio Agamben’s work, in particular, on bare life and the state of exception in accounting for the functioning of US sovereign power in the contemporary world.111 Claudio Minca, for example, has used Agamben to attempt to lay bare US military power in the spaces of exception of the global war on terror; for Minca, “it is precisely the absence of a theory of space able to inscribe the spatialisation of exception that allows, today, such an enormous, unthinkable range of action to sovereign decision”.112 This critique speaks especially to the excessive sovereign violence of our times, all perpetrated in the name of a global war on terror.113 Minca’s argument is that geography as a discipline has failed to geo-graph and theorise the spatialization of the ‘pure’ sovereign violence of legitimated geopolitical action overseas. He uses the notion of the camp to outline the spatial manifestation and endgame of a new global biopolitical ‘nomos’ that has unprecedented power to except bare life.114

In the ‘biopolitical nomos’ of camps and prisons in the Middle East and elsewhere, managing detainees is an important element of the US military project. As CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid made clear to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2006, “an essential part of our combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan entails the need to detain enemy combatants and terrorists”.115 However, it is a mistake to characterize as ‘exceptional’ the US military’s broader biopolitical project in the war on terror. Both Minca’s and Agamben’s emphasis on the notion of ‘exception’ is most convincing when elucidating how the US military has dealt with the ‘threat’ of enemy combatants, rather than how it has planned for, legally securitized and enacted, its ‘own’ aggression against them. It does not account for the proactive juridical warfare of the US military in its forward deployment throughout the globe, which rigorously secures classified SOFAs with host nations and protects its armed personnel from transfer to the International Criminal Court. Far from designating a ‘space of exception’, the US does this to establish normative parameters in its exercise of legally sanctioned military violence and to maximize its ‘operational capacities of securitization’.

A bigger question, of course, is what the US military practices of lawfare and juridical securitization say about our contemporary moment. Are they essentially ‘exceptional’ in character, prompted by the so-called exceptional character of global terrorism today? Are they therefore enacted in ‘spaces of exceptions’ or are they, in fact, simply contemporary examples of Foucault’s ‘spaces of security’ that are neither exceptional nor indeed a departure from, or perversion of, liberal democracy? As Mark Neocleous so aptly puts it, has the “liberal project of ‘liberty’” not always been, in fact, a “project of security”?116 This ‘project of security’ has long invoked a powerful political dispositif of ‘executive powers’, typically registered as ‘emergency powers’, but, as Neocleous makes clear, of the permanent kind.117 For Neocleous, the pursuit of ‘security’ – and more specifically ‘capitalist security’ – marked the very emergence of liberal democracies, and continues to frame our contemporary world. In the West at least, that world may be endlessly registered as a liberal democracy defined by the ‘rule of law’, but, as Neocleous reminds us, the assumption that the law, decoupled from politics, acts as the ultimate safeguard of democracy is simply false – a key point affirmed by considering the US military’s extensive waging of liberal lawfare. As David Kennedy observes, the military lawyer who “carries the briefcase of rules and restrictions” has long been replaced by the lawyer who “participate[s] in discussions of strategy and tactics”.118

The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’.119 This is a ‘liberalism’ defined by what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid see as a commitment to waging ‘biopolitical war’ for the securitization of life – ‘killing to make live’.120 And for Mark Neocleous, (neo)liberalism’s fetishization of ‘security’ – as both a discourse and a technique of government – has resulted in a world defined by anti-democratic technologies of power.121 In the case of the US military’s forward deployment on the frontiers of the war on terror – and its juridical tactics to secure biopolitical power thereat – this has been made possible by constant reference to a neoliberal ‘project of security’ registered in a language of ‘endless emergency’ to ‘secure’ the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of US foreign policy.122 The US military’s continuous and indeed growing military footprint in the Middle East and elsewhere can be read as a ‘permanent emergency’,123 the new ‘normal’ in which geopolitical military interventionism and its concomitant biopolitical technologies of power are necessitated by the perennial political economic ‘need’ to securitize volatility and threat.

Conclusion: enabling biopolitical power in the age of securitization

“Law and force flow into one another. We make war in the shadow of law, and law in the shadow of force” – David Kennedy, Of War and Law 124

Can a focus on lawfare and biopolitics help us to critique our contemporary moment’s proliferation of practices of securitization – practices that appear to be primarily concerned with coding, quantifying, governing and anticipating life itself? In the context of US military’s war on terror, I have argued above that it can. If, as David Kennedy points out, the “emergence of a global economic and commercial order has amplified the role of background legal regulations as the strategic terrain for transnational activities of all sorts”, this also includes, of course, ‘warfare’; and for some time, the US military has recognized the “opportunities for creative strategy” made possible by proactively waging lawfare beyond the battlefield.125 As Walter Benjamin observed nearly a century ago, at the very heart of military violence is a “lawmaking character”.126 And it is this ‘lawmaking character’ that is integral to the biopolitical technologies of power that secure US geopolitics in our contemporary moment. US lawfare focuses “the attention of the world on this or that excess” whilst simultaneously arming “the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege”, redefining horrific violence as “collateral damage, self-defense, proportionality, or necessity”.127 It involves a mobilization of the law that is precisely channelled towards “evasion”, securing 23 classified Status of Forces Agreements and “offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment, while parcelling out responsibility, attributing it, denying it – even sometimes embracing it – as a tactic of statecraft and war”.128

Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant lawfare to legally securitize, regulate and empower its ‘operational capacities’ in its multiples ‘spaces of security’ across the globe – whether that be at a US base in the Kyrgyz Republic or in combat in Iraq. I have sought to highlight here these tactics by demonstrating how the execution of US geopolitics relies upon a proactive legal-biopolitical securitization of US troops at the frontiers of the American ‘leasehold empire’. For the US military, legal-biopolitical apparatuses of security enable its geopolitical and geoeconomic projects of security on the ground; they plan for and legally condition the ‘milieux’ of military commanders; and in so doing they render operational the pivotal spaces of overseas intervention of contemporary US national security conceived in terms of ‘global governmentality’.129 In the US global war on terror, it is lawfare that facilitates what Foucault calls the “biopolitics of security” – when life itself becomes the “object of security”.130 For the US military, this involves the eliminating of threats to ‘life’, the creating of operational capabilities to ‘make live’ and the anticipating and management of life’s uncertain ‘future’.

Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years have divulged how discourses of ‘security’, ‘precarity’ and ‘risk’ function centrally in the governing dispositifs of our contemporary world.131 In a society of (in)security, such discourses have a profound power to invoke danger as “requiring extraordinary action”.132 In the ongoing war on terror, registers of emergency play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization strategies, where ‘risk’, it seems, has become permanently binded to ‘securitization’. As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster point out, the “perspective of risk management” seductively effects practices of military securitization to be seen as necessary, legitimate and indeed therapeutic.133 US tactics of liberal lawfare in the long war – the conditioning of the battlefield, the sanctioning of the privilege of violence, the regulating of the conduct of troops, the interpreting, negating and utilizing 24 of international law, and the securing of SOFAs – are vital security dispositifs of a broader ‘risk- securitization’ strategy involving the deployment of liberal technologies of biopower to “manage dangerous irruptions in the future”.134 It may well be fought beyond the battlefield in “a war of the pentagon rather than a war of the spear”,135 but it is lawfare that ultimately enables the ‘toxic combination’ of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization.

### 1NC Jabri Impact

#### The impact is permanent warfare---security and fear-driven politics create the enabling conditions for executive overreach and violence which means it’s try or die and we turn the case

Vivienne Jabri 6, Director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, War, Security and the Liberal State, Security Dialogue, 37;47

LATE MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS are often conceived in terms of the sociopolitical and economic manifestations of change emergent from a globalized arena. What is less apparent is how late modernity as a distinct era has impacted upon our conceptions of the social sphere, our lived experience, and our reflections upon the discourses and institutions that form the taken-for-granted backdrop of the known and the knowable. The paradigmatic certainties of modernity – the state, citizenship, democratic space, humanity’s infinite capacity for progress, the defeat of dogma and the culmination of modernity’s apotheosis in the free-wheeling market place – have in the late modern era come face to face with uncertainty, unpre- dictability and the gradual erosion of the modern belief that we could indeed simply move on, assisted by science and technology, towards a condition where instrumental rationality would become the linchpin of government and human interaction irrespective of difference. Progress came to be associated with peace, and both were constitutively linked to the universal, the global, the human, and therefore the cosmopolitan. What shatters such illusions is the recollection of the 20th century as the ‘age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm, 1995), and the 21st as the age of the ever-present condition of war. While we might prefer a forgetting of things past, a therapeutic anamnesis that manages to reconfigure history, it is perhaps the continuities with the past that act as antidote to such righteous comforts.

How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions disappear, where war is conceived, or indeed articulated in political discourse, in terms of peace and security, so that the political is somehow banished in the name of governmentalizing practices whose purview knows no bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions. Boundaries, however, do not disappear. Rather, they become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without, the all-pervasive presence, the defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool of war.

Any scholarly take on the present juncture of history, any analysis of the dynamics of the present, must somehow render the narrative in measured tones, taking all factors into account, lest the narrator is accused of exaggeration at best and particular political affiliations at worst. When the late modern condition of the West, of the European arena, is one of camps, one of the detention of groups of people irrespective of their individual needs as migrants, one of the incarceration without due process of suspects, one of overwhelming police powers to stop, search and detain, one of indefinite detention in locations beyond law, one of invasion and occupation, then language itself is challenged in its efforts to contain the description of what is. The critical scholarly take on the present is then precisely to reveal the conditions of possibility in relation to how we got here, to unravel the enabling dynamics that led to the disappearance of distinctions between war and criminality, war and peace, war and security. When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, accountability shifts beyond sight, and violence comes to form the linchpin of control. We can reveal the operations of violence, but far more critical is the revelation of power and how power operates in the present. As the article argues, such an exploration raises fundamental questions relating to the relationship of power and violence, and their mutual interconnection in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence are hence separable analytical categories, separable practices; they are at the same time connected in ways that work on populations and on bodies – with violence often targeted against the latter so that the former are reigned in, governed. Where Michel Foucault sought, in his later writings, to distinguish between power and violence, to reveal the subtle workings of power, now, in the present, this article will venture, perhaps the distinction is no longer viable when we witness the indistinctions I highlight above

The article provides an analysis of the place of war in late modern politics. In particular, it concentrates on the implications of war for our conceptions of the liberty–security problematique in the context of the modern liberal state. The first section of the article argues the case for the figure of war as analyser of the present. The second section of the article reveals the con- ditions of possibility for a distinctly late modern mode of war and its imbri- cations in politics. The final section of the article concentrates on the political implications of the primacy of war in late modernity, and in particular on possibilities of dissent and articulations of political agency. The aim through- out is to provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that might begin to meet the challenges of the present and to open an agenda of research that concentrates on the politics of the present, the capacities or otherwise of contestation and accountability, and the institutional locations wherein such political agency might emerge.

The Figure of War and the Spectre of Security

The so-called war against terrorism is constructed as a global war, transcend- ing space and seemingly defiant of international conventions. It is dis- tinguished from previous global wars, including the first and the second world wars, in that the latter two have, in historiography, always been analysed as interstate confrontations, albeit ones that at certain times and in particular locations peripherally involved non-state militias. Such distinc- tions from the old, of course, will be subject to future historical narratives on the present confrontation and its various parameters. What is of interest in the present discussion is the distinctly global aspect of this war, for it is the globality1 of the war against terrorism that renders it particularly relevant and pertinent to investigations that are primarily interested in the relation- ship between war and politics, war and the political processes defining the modern state. The initial premise of the present article is that war, rather than being confined to its own time and space, permeates the normality of the political process, has, in other words, a defining influence on elements con- sidered to be constitutive of liberal democratic politics, including executive answerability, legislative scrutiny, a public sphere of discourse and inter- action, equal citizenship under the law and, to follow liberal thinkers such as Habermas, political legitimacy based on free and equal communicative practices underpinning social solidarity (Habermas, 1997). War disrupts these elements and is a time of crisis and emergency. A war that has a permanence to it clearly normalizes the exceptional, inscribing emergency into the daily routines of social and political life. While the elements of war – conflict, social fragmentation, exclusion – may run silently through the assemblages of control in liberal society (Deleuze, 1986), nevertheless the persistent iteration of war into politics brings these practices to the fore, and with them a call for a rethinking of war’s relationship to politics.

The distinctly global spatiality of this war suggests particular challenges that have direct impact on the liberal state, its obligations towards its citizenry, and the extent to which it is implicated in undermining its own political institutions. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the practices involved in this global war are in any way anathema to the liberal state. The analysis provided here would argue that while it is crucial to acknowledge the transformative impact of the war against terrorism, it is equally as important to appreciate the continuities in social and political life that are the enabling conditions of this global war, forming its conditions of possibility. These enabling conditions are not just present or apparent at global level, but incorporate local practices that are deep-rooted and institu- tionalized. The mutually reinforcing relationship between global and local conditions renders this particular war distinctly all-pervasive, and poten- tially, in terms of implications, far more threatening to the spaces available for political contestation and dissent.

Contemporary global politics is dominated by what might be called a ‘matrix of war’2 constituted by a series of transnational practices that vari- ously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents, bureaucracies of states and supranational organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by the United States, but that nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of ‘practice’, for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself constitutive of structural continuities, both discursive and institutional. As Paul Veyne (1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucault’s use of the term, ‘practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of produc- tion), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover’. It is in this recursive sense that practices (of violence, exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become structurated in the routines of institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a ‘war against terrorism’ confers upon these practices a certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too real and requires state responses, many of these responses appear to assume a wide remit of operations – so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic state, or indeed the rights of individuals and communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices.

When security becomes the overwhelming imperative of the democratic state, its legitimization is achieved both through a discourse of ‘balance’ between security and liberty and in terms of the ‘protection’ of liberty.3 The implications of the juxtaposition of security and liberty may be investigated either in terms of a discourse of ‘securitization’ (the power of speech acts to construct a threat juxtaposed with the power of professionals precisely to so construct)4 or, as argued in this article, in terms of a discourse of war. The grammars involved are closely related, and yet that of the latter is, para- doxically, the critical grammar, the grammar that highlights the workings of power and their imbrications with violence. What is missing from the securitization literature is an analytic of war, and it is this analytic that I want to foreground in this article.

The practices that I highlight above seem at first hand to constitute differ- ent response mechanisms in the face of what is deemed to be an emergency situation in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the incarceration without due process of prisoners in camps from Afghanistan to Guantánamo and other places as yet un- identified, the use of torture against detainees, extra-judicial assassination, the detention and deportation – again without due process – of foreign nationals deemed a threat, increasing restrictions on refugees, their confine- ment in camps and detention centres, the construction of the movement of peoples in security terms, and restrictions on civil liberties through domestic legislation in the UK, the USA and other European states are all represented in political discourse as necessary security measures geared towards the protection of society. All are at the same time institutional measures targeted against a particular other as enemy and source of danger.

It could be argued that the above practices remain unrelated and must hence be subject to different modes of analysis. To begin with, these practices involve different agents and are framed around different issues. Afghanistan and Iraq may be described as situations of war, and the incarceration of refugees as encompassing practices of security. However, what links these elements is not so much that they constitute a constructed taxonomy of dif- ferentiated practices. Rather, what links them is the element of antagonism directed against distinct and particular others. Such a perspective suggests that the politics of security, including the production of fear and a whole array of exclusionary measures, comes to service practices that constitute war and locates the discourse of war at the heart of politics, not just domes- tically, but, more crucially in the present context, globally. The implications for the late modern state and the distinctly liberal state are monumental, for a perpetual war on a global scale has implications for political structures and political agency, for our conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state in meeting the claims of its citizens,5 and for the workings of a public sphere that is increasingly global and hence increasingly multicultural.

The matrix of war is centrally constituted around the element of antago- nism, having an association with existential threat: the idea that the continued presence of the other constitutes a danger not just to the well-being of society but to its continued existence in the form familiar to its members, hence the relative ease with which European politicians speak of migrants of particular origins as forming a threat to the ‘idea of Europe’ and its Christian origins.6 Herein lies a discourse of cultural and racial exclusion based on a certain fear of the other. While the war against specific clandestine organiza- tions7 involves operations on both sides that may be conceptualized as a classical war of attrition, what I am referring to as the matrix of war is far more complex, for here we have a set of diffuse practices, violence, disci- plinarity and control that at one and same time target the other typified in cultural and racial terms and instantiate a wider remit of operations that impact upon society as a whole.

The practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 combine with societal processes, reflected in media representations and in the wider public sphere, where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other, and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the ‘state of exception’, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the invasion of Iraq. All are practices that draw upon a discourse of legitimization based on prevention and pre-emption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a ‘profile’ to the state of exception and its experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with difference.

While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in the UK or increasing surveillance of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cul- tural signification. Those targeted by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that under- pins the measures highlighted above is one that is now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identi- fication, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a particular brand associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of antagonism, no distinctions are made between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed in the name of some ‘pre- cautionary’ practice that targets all in the name of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed, place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its indi- vidual members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices. When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the present, which is that the Muslim community is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a distinctly racial profiling is taking place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures.

Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no boundaries as limits to its practices – indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces – what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean that boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political. The paradox of the current context is that while the war against terrorism in all its manifestations assumes a boundless arena, borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the exclusionist practices that sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as threats to security. It is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects that lies at the heart of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified in practices of direct war, in the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned detention. We might, then, ask if such measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 70–93) suggests, a relation of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacifica- tion of the Middle East as a political region.

When legislative and bureaucratic measures are put in place in the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses utilized in its legitimiza- tion are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations. One option is to limit policing, military and intel- ligence efforts through the targeting of particular organizations. However, it is the limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal democratic state. In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, war permeates discourses on politics, so that these come to be subject to the restraints and imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands of security against an existential threat. The implications for liberal democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are far-reaching,11 for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every aspect of public life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external.

One of the most significant lessons we learn from Michel Foucault’s writ- ings is that war, or ‘the distant roar of battle’ (Foucault, 1977: 308), is never quite so distant from liberal governmentality. Conceived in Foucaultian terms, war and counter-terrorist measures come to be seen not as discontinuity from liberal government, but as emergent from the enabling conditions that liberal government and the modern state has historically set in place. On reading Foucault’s renditions on the emergence of the disciplinary society, what we see is the continuation of war in society and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that wars happen at the outskirts of society and its civil order. The disciplinary society is not simply an accumulation of institutional and bureaucratic procedures that permeate the everyday and the routine; rather, it has running through its interstices the constitutive elements of war as continuity, including confrontation, struggle and the corporeal removal of those deemed enemies of society. In Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2003) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1998), we see reference to the discursive and institutional continuities that structurate war in society. Reference to the ‘distant roar of battle’ suggests confrontation and struggle; it suggests the ever-present construction of threat accrued to the particular other; it suggests the immediacy of threat and the construction of fear of the enemy; and ultimately it calls for the corporeal removal of the enemy as source of threat. The analytic of war also encompasses the techniques of the military and their presence in the social sphere – in particular, the control and regulation of bodies, timed pre- cision and instrumentality that turn a war machine into an active and live killing machine. In the matrix of war, there is hence the level of discourse and the level of institutional practices; both are mutually implicating and mutually enabling. There is also the level of bodies and the level of population. In Foucault’s (1998: 152) terms: ‘the biological and the historical are not con- secutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly com- plex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern technologies of power that take life as their objective’.

What the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and political life. The matrix of war suggests both discursive and institutional practices, technologies that target bodies and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of this form of analysis is to point out that war is not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the elements of war, present as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply rooted and enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This implies a continuity of sorts between the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent manifestations of government.

### ILAW/Sov---Colonialism Link

Mahmud ---- their conception of international order that legitimacy cements

#### Sovereignty is a western-construct that ignores alternate forms of political organization---SQ legal regimes not only inevitably fail to contain the aff’s impacts, but also result in a violent extermination of alterity

Tayyab Mahmud 10, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle University School of Law. ARTICLE: COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES, POSTCOLONIAL BORDERS, AND ENDURING FAILURES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNENDING WARS ALONG THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN FRONTIER, 36 Brooklyn J. Int'l L.

During the phase of decolonization, borders became a crucial issue for postcolonial states. In most cases, the inherited borders were in large measure determined by geopolitical, economic, and administrative policies of colonial powers that had occupied these territories. Colonial claims were often carved up with little regard to the coherence of historic, cultural, and ethnic zones. As a result, historical and cultural units were split, and different cultures, religions, languages, identities, and affiliations were enclosed in demarcated territorial units. The connection between a people and their territory, assumed and prescribed by Eurocentric theories of the "nation-state," found no room in these configurations. These inherited colonial demarcations, reinforced by postcolonial states, often provoke challenge and resistance from below by assertions of identity and difference. Power-blocs of postcolonial formations, in an effort to legitimize their new-found hegemony, impose a firm control over the inherited borders to draw "sharper lines between citizens, invested with certain rights and duties, and 'aliens' or 'foreigners.'" n135 The [\*26] result is territorial disputes with adjacent polities and/or suppression of difference within, two intractable issues that quickly become the primary preoccupations of the postcolonial states. The career of the Durand Line is an evocative story of these intractable conflicts and the inability of existing legal regimes to resolve them.

 III. IMPERIAL GREAT GAMES AND DRAWING OF LINES

 What the map cuts up, the story cuts across. n136

 A. Great Game I: The Genesis of the "Buffer to a Buffer"

 The Durand Line emerged as an instrumentality in the so-called Great Game, n137 the contest between British colonial expansion in India and eastward colonial expansion of Czarist Russia, one that turned the intermediate region into "a cockpit of international rivalry." n138 During the nineteenth century, issues of frontiers, boundaries, and borders within the Persian Plateau as a geographical unit were contentious. n139 Imperial efforts to fix boundaries of control that conflicted with the practices and experience of native populations for whom frontiers were essentially mobile and porous, compounded these contentions. This mobility and porosity stemmed from the region's location at the junction of historic trade routes between China, India, Central Asia, Persia, and the Arab [\*27] world. n140 The Great Game was a contest, both overt and shadowy, over territory where different imperial orders came into volatile proximity. The conflicts turned on questions of territory, zones of influence, and spatial buffers.

 The British were unequivocal about their empire's need to have "scientific frontiers" that had to be demarcated under "European pressure and by the intervention of European agents." n141 Lord Curzon, the arch-imperialist and Viceroy of India, proposed a specific recipe for colonial India--a "threefold Frontier." n142 British imperial strategists were mindful of the simultaneous expansion of British and Russian empires in the heartland of Asia. A "frontier of separation" rather than a "frontier of contact" was to be the solution which led to the creation of protectorates, neutral zones, and buffers in between. n143 This policy of a "three-fold frontier" was choreographed and implemented in the northwest of colonial India. The first frontier, at the edge of directly controlled territory, enabled the colonial regime to exercise full authority and impose its legal and political order. The second frontier, just beyond the first, was a zone of indirect rule where colonial domination proceeded through existing institutions of social control. The third frontier was a string of buffer states which, while maintaining formal political autonomy and trappings of statehood, aligned foreign relations with the interests of the British.

 [\*28] Fig. 2: Contemplated Northwest Frontier of Colonial India n144

 The story of the Durand Line shows that colonial map-making simultaneously exhibits "both delusions of grandeur and delusions of engulfment." n145 Historically, the river Indus was seen as the western boundary of India. n146 The region west of the Indus and south of the Oxus river, was home to the dominant ethnic group of the region, the Pashtun, who have a recorded history going well before 500 B.C. n147 Located at the southern [\*29] edge of Central Asia and flanking the Chinese, Persian, and Indian empires, the Pashtun saw different phases of unity and fragmentation, along with Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim cultural influences. Regional geopolitical maneuverings shaped the formation of the modern state of Afghanistan out of shards of rival tribal fiefdoms, ethnic loyalties, and shifting alliances and allegiances. n148 In 1747, as the Mughal and Persian empires were imploding, Ahmad Khan Durrani, a Pashtun military commander, took control of the region and created an Afghan tribal confederacy dominated by the Pashtuns, as a distinct political entity in the region--giving birth to what came to be called Afghanistan. n149 Given the circumstances of its emergence, Lord Curzon was to call the state "purely accidental." n150 The Durrani dynasty came to an end only in 1974, when Afghanistan became a republic.

 Just as Afghanistan was emerging as a unified political entity, the British East India Company established political control over the fertile delta [\*30] of Bengal in 1757, and began the process of colonizing India. n151 Over the next century, British colonial rule in India expanded westward. At the time, Russia's sense of its eastern border was "vague and protean, shaped by the constellation of power on its frontiers at any given moment." n152 Imperial Russia started to expand southwards and eastwards through the Caucasus, just when British colonial rule was expanding westward and northward in India. n153 Unavoidably, Central Asia, the zone of confluence of two expanding imperial empires, became the terrain of the Great Game. As the frontlines of two empires approached each other, the Great Game intensified. n154 To check Russia's growing presence in Central Asia in the early nineteenth century, the British aimed to turn Afghanistan into a "buffer state" governed by a compliant ruler. The "three fold frontier," that Curzon was later to articulate, n155 came into play.

 An internal struggle for the throne of Kabul in the 1830's gave the British their first opening to play kingmakers in Afghanistan. In June 1838, the British signed a secret agreement with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of Punjab, and Shah Shujah, a claimant to the Kabul throne. n156 In return for their help in putting him in power, Shujah renounced Afghan claims to Kashmir and substantial areas between the Indus river and the Khyber Pass in favor of Ranjit Singh and agreed to become an ally of the British in their struggle with Russia. This agreement triggered what mainstream history styles the First Afghan War, when a 21,000-strong British "Army of the Indus" invaded Afghanistan in 1839 and installed Shujah as the Amir. n157 The license to colonize and dominate granted by contemporaneous international law to the "Great Powers" of the day [\*31] proved useful. However, the initial British success proved short-lived--resistance against the occupation force and their puppet leader broke out, and in 1842 the deposed Amir, Dost Mohammad Kahn, was returned to power, and the British invasion force was decimated. n158

 During the subsequent twenty years, the British started to bring the region west of the Indus river under colonial rule. Occupation of the Punjab in 1849, until then an independent state, brought under British control traditionally Afghan areas up to the eastern end of the legendary Khyber Pass that Punjab had annexed before the First Afghan War. n159 In 1857, India erupted in an anti-colonial revolt ignited by a mutiny of the Bengal Army. The revolt proved to be a watershed moment in the history of colonial rule, and led to a reordering of the Punjab as the "sword arm of the Raj." n160 British forces finally suppressed the revolt, and the governance of colonial India passed from the East India Company to the Crown, but "British fears of rebellion, conspiracies, holy wars, and possible foreign provocation" heightened. n161 Through innovative colonial legal regimes, a "military-fiscal state" was turned into a "military state," the Bengal Army was disbanded, and a reconstituted Punjab began to serve as "the military bulwark of the Raj." n162 The British deployed a racist recruiting doctrine known as the "martial race theory," to raise a new "Indian Army," with over half of it recruited from the Punjab, to serve as the "Empire's 'fire brigade.'" n163 This army was to be "the iron fist in the velvet glove of [\*32] Victorian expansionism . . . the major coercive force behind the internationalization of industrial capitalism." n164

 As the pace of Russian eastward expansion picked up after the Crimean War (1854-56), the British "became obsessed with the Great Game," and the Punjab as "the garrison province of the Raj . . . [was] reoriented . . . to meet[] the challenge of an external danger." n165 The rapid transformation of the Punjab into a "garrison state" involved novel colonial legal orders of land tenure, revenue extraction, military recruitment, resettlement of indigenous communities, rural social control, and political governance. n166 Colonial social engineering included refashioning of religious affiliations, identities, and practices. n167 To orchestrate this enterprise, a suitable administrative system was fashioned for the Punjab that "in both form and spirit . . . had a strong military flavor." n168 A century later, this reconstruction of the Punjab became the grounds for "Punjabisation of the state" n169 of Pakistan, its praetorian tenor, and the source of its "post-independence propensity towards a military-dominated state." n170

 [\*33] British occupation and reordering of the Punjab in the middle of the nineteenth century produced the northwest border problem in the territories to the west of the river Indus that remains a source of conflict to this day. The northwest edge of this region, a great belt of mountains stretching over 1200 miles from Pamir to Persia, was home of scores of Pashtun tribes that had a long history of effective armed resistance against encroachers and of retaining their autonomy from the political orders around them. n171 Fierce resistance by these tribes started as soon as colonial rule came to their vicinity. n172 It was then that the British policy of creating a frontier zone between Afghanistan and colonial directly-administered areas came into force. n173 This so-called "close border" policy, also known as "masterly inactivity," provided that no further westward expansion of direct colonial rule was possible or warranted, and therefore British sovereignty should not be extended to areas and tribes that could not be subdued and governed effectively. n174 First implemented in Baluchistan and later further north, n175 the close border policy created a peculiar frontier zone--a narrow stretch of territory inhabited by Pashtun tribes maintaining their modes of self-governance, dotted with colonial military outposts, absent direct colonial administration, but discouraged from maintaining their traditional political relations with Afghanistan. Foothills at the edge of directly-administered "settled" areas were fortified to keep out the tribes, who, in exchange for monetary subsidies, were to keep access to military outposts open, and, in contravention to their tribal code, were to deny sanctuary to fugitives from the settled areas. n176 The system did not work well. The Pashtun tribes of the frontier zone remained restive, resulting in twenty-three British military operations between 1857 and 1881 to subdue them. n177

 A new British policy, initiated by the Disraeli government to build a new strategic line of defense against Russian pressure in Central Asia, led in 1876 to the abandonment of the "close border" policy in favor of the so-called "forward policy." n178 The new policy called for aggressive [\*34] expansion into and control over the frontier regions. Strong points in the tribal belt were to be captured, fortified, garrisoned, and connected with protected roads. This "forward policy," in its extreme, envisaged pushing the boundary as far west as the Hindu Kush mountain range in the middle of Afghanistan, with the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar arc forming the first line of defense for colonial India. n179 As the new policy unfolded, British meddling in Afghan and Persian affairs increased. n180 Decisions of a British Commission demarcating the disputed border between Afghanistan and Persia and permanent stationing of British garrisons nearby, heightened Afghan concerns about hostile encirclement. n181 The Afghans made overtures towards the Russians to counter-balance the growing British influence. n182 The result was the Second Afghan War, when, in November 1878, the British launched a three-pronged attack on Afghan territory. n183 The Amir abdicated in favor of his son. n184 The son then ceded control over the Khyber Pass and agreed to become a vassal of the British, who were to control the external relations of his country. n185 After some pacification campaigns around the country, the British troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1880. n186 One result of the Second Afghan War was the institution of a joint Russo-British commission to determine the border between Russia and Afghanistan, with the latter to serve as a buffer between the two imperial empires. n187

 [\*35] Confronted with increasing demands for more concessions by the colonial government of India, in 1892, the Afghan Amir sought to visit Britain to negotiate directly with the British government. n188 The algebra of differentiated sovereignties came into play--British authorities refused his request, forcing him to negotiate with British colonial authorities in India. n189 The Amir yielded to British pressure to delineate Afghanistan's eastern boundary. n190 The British proceeded to "dictate a boundary settlement," n191 signed by the Amir and Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, on 12 November 1893. n192 This agreement adjusted the "the eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's [the Amir's] dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border." n193 The result was the Durand Line, which pushed colonial India's border with Afghanistan from the eastern foot of the frontier hills to their crest. n194 Curzon's dream of "scientific frontiers" demarcated under "European pressure and by the intervention of European agents," appeared to be coming true. n195

 The Durand Line proved more difficult to delineate on the ground than to draw on paper. n196 Initially surveyed in 1894-5, most of the demarcation was completed by 1896, though the section around the Khyber Pass was only demarcated after the Third Afghan War in 1921. n197 While some [\*36] inaccessible sections remained unmarked, the line created a strategic frontier that "did not correspond to any ethnic or historical boundary." n198 Slicing through tribes, villages, and clans, it "cut the Pukhtoon people in two." n199 The Pashtun tribes resisted attempts at demarcation, including, in some cases, burning down camps of the Boundary Commission. The British response was to station substantial permanent garrisons. n200 The Pashtuns remained restive, with religious leaders often playing leading roles in the insurgencies. n201

 In tune with the colonial project of reordering colonized bodies and spaces, in 1901, British authorities severed the "settled areas" of the northwest region under British control from the Punjab to form an evocatively named North-West Frontier Province ("NWFP"), though with a status not on par with other provinces. n202 Control over the tribal belt between the "settled areas" of NWFP and the Durand Line remained with the central government. The belt, now designated Federally Administered Tribal Area ("FATA"), was to serve as a "buffer to a buffer." n203 The legal order of colonial India did not extend to this zone and the tribes on the grounds that "[r]igour is inseparable from the government of such a people. We cannot rein wild horses with silken braids." n204 Tribes were to conduct their internal affairs under their customary norms. However, to supervise matters that touched the security interests of the British, a unique set of rules and procedures, draconian even by colonial standards, were enforced under the Frontier Crimes Regulation. n205 This created yet another "anomalous legal zones" n206 like others that came into existence in many European colonies. In the case of FATA, Pashtun tribes, "though not [] fully-fledged British subject[s] in the legal sense of the [\*37] term, lived within the territorial boundaries of India." n207 To facilitate such territorial arrangements within British colonies, the Parliament had established a process for outlying districts intended "to remove those districts from beyond the pale of the law." n208 Tribes on both sides of the Durand Line continued to disregard it, and incessant tribal resistance prompted successive punitive expeditions. Even the semblance of order broke down with the Third Afghan War of 1919, when Afghanistan declared war, an effort joined by FATA tribes and Pashtun troops who deserted the colonial forces. n209 This short war resulted in Afghanistan regaining control over its foreign affairs. n210 However, the FATA tribes remained restive, and colonial efforts to quell incessant revolts included the first use of aerial bombardment in the history of India, laying waste to the country where local tribes had supported the invasion. n211 The tribes maintained their traditional connections with Afghanistan while negotiating the new FATA dispensation.

 When the Indian struggle for decolonization gained momentum in the early 20th century, Pashtuns of "settled areas" quickly gravitated towards the movement. n212 The struggle forced the British to take initial steps towards allowing natives to participate in political governance in 1920 under the Montagu-Chelmsford "reforms," which envisaged an "advance towards self-government in stages." n213 The NWFP and FATA, however, were left out of the scheme on the grounds that, as the chief colonial administrator of the region put it, the Pashtuns "w[ere] not ready for ... 'responsible government." n214 In response, Pashtuns gave their anticolonial movement an organized form aimed at braiding "factors of history, geography, culture, and language to transform the relatively back-ward, [\*38] divided, and disorganized Pukhtuns into a national community." n215 This movement, which came to be known as Surkhposh (Red-shirts), expressly adopted non-violence as a foundational principle of social and political action and became politically allied with the Indian National Congress, the spearhead of India's independence movement. n216

 When India's anti-colonial struggle escalated into a civil-disobedience movement in the early 1930s, it had "only a marginal effect on the Punjab" thanks to the entrenched administrative, political, and social order in that "garrison province." n217 NWFP, on the other hand, proved receptive to the call, and in 1930 colonial authorities declared martial law in order to quell the civil-disobedience movement and to prevent armed tribes of FATA from making common cause with residents of the settled areas. n218 In 1935, the British enacted the Government of India Act in response to the ascending independence movement in India. n219 This Act provided for increased political participation through an enlarged franchise to elect provincial legislative assemblies with broadened powers. n220 When the first-ever elections took place in NWFP in 1937, the Indian National Congress, the secular nationalist party, won handily and formed the provincial government. n221 Because the 1935 Act was applicable only to provinces, FATA, the "buffer to a buffer," remained outside the ambit of constitutional reforms and the right to vote and representation. n222 The result was a spike in armed resistance in FATA, triggering more campaigns of "'pacification' by British and Indian troops." n223

 [\*39] In 1947, "the tectonic plates of South Asian politics shifted abruptly." n224 The British partitioned colonial India into two independent states--India and Pakistan--surgically dividing "Hindi majority" areas from "Muslim majority" ones, substantiating once again the wonderful artificiality of states, n225 and triggering "one of the great human convulsions of history." n226 That Pashtuns, while overwhelmingly Muslim, had consistently voted for the secular Indian National Congress and helped it form the provincial government in NWFP, struck the colonial Viceroy's office, which presided over the religion-based partition, as "a bastard situation." n227 To bring NWFP in line with the designed partition, the colonial authorities bypassed the generally prescribed process of allowing elected representatives of provinces in their respective legislative assemblies to determine the future of the province. A referendum to choose between India and Pakistan was offered instead. n228 Most Pashtuns, including both the "Red Shirts" and the governing political party of the province, boycotted the referendum in protest against NWFP having been made an exception to the prescribed process, and because the substitute process of referendum did not offer a third option, namely, separate independent statehood. n229 This demand for a separate state for the Pashtuns, styled Pashtunistan, emerged as the partition of India became [\*40] inevitable. n230 In the end, NWFP was awarded to Pakistan following a controversial referendum. n231 For FATA tribes, yet another mode to determine their fate was devised. In special tribal jirgas (tribal assemblies) orchestrated by the colonial administrators, hand-picked leaders of the FATA tribes were asked to signify their allegiance to Pakistan and received the assurance that monetary allowances and autonomous status of the tribes would continue undisturbed. n232

 Decolonization and the partition of India drew into sharp relief the contested status of the Durand Line, which now became a disputed matter between Afghanistan and Pakistan. n233 As soon as India was partitioned, Afghanistan renewed claims to the area between the Durand Line and the Indus. n234 In 1947, Afghanistan joined the demand for Pashtunistan, opposed Pakistan's admission to the United Nations, and later conditioned its recognition upon granting the right of self determination to the people of NWFP and FATA, who were caught in between. n235 "In 1949, an Afghan loya jirga [(grand tribal assembly) formally] declared the Durand Line invalid." n236 Thus, Pakistan started its postcolonial career as successor to a territorial dispute and with an ambivalent relationship with a section of the population located within its designated territorial bounds.

 B. Great Game II. The Cold War and the Frontline State

 The partition of India and inclusion of NWFP and FATA in Pakistan was, in no small measure, connected with the next phase of the Great Game--the Cold War. The British colonial authorities saw the partition of colonial India as offering the possibility to remain in the northwest [\*41] region "for an indefinite period ... [with] British control of the vulnerable North-Western . . . frontiers." n237 The northwest region was envisaged as "the most suitable area from which to conduct the defense" of oil supplies of the Middle East, and "the keystone of the strategic arc of the wide and vulnerable waters of the Indian Ocean." n238 As the importance of oil from the Persian Gulf increased, Western powers called for a "close accord between the States which surround this Muslim lake, an accord underwritten by the Great powers whose interests are engaged." n239 The Western world "went east in search of oil--and found Islam." n240 Pakistan, the only state in the modem world created in the name of Islam, was to now be turned into a frontline state of the Cold War, with the Durand Line to serve as the frontline.

 After cultivating close military ties with Britain and the U.S., Pakistan formally entered a Mutual Defense Agreement with the US and joined the Central Treaty Organization ("CENTO") in 1954 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ("SEATO") a year later. n241 It is important to note that British military officers retained control of Pakistan's military, now seen as "the kingpin of U.S. interests," n242 for many years after decolonization. n243 Pakistan provided the U.S. with military bases in the NWFP. n244 All this helped Pakistan secure recognition by Britain n245 and [\*42] the U.S. n246 of the Durand Line as a legitimate international border. As Pakistan consolidated its role in the anti-Communist military alliances of the Cold War, Afghanistan drew closer to the Soviet Union, hardened its position about the Durand Line, and again raised the issues of self-determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan and the formation of Pashtunistan. n247 In December, 1955, the Soviet Union declared support for the Afghan position regarding the Durand Line and Pashtunistan. n248

 Pakistan's assumption of the role as a frontline state in the Cold War had a profound impact on the political order within the country. This included ascendency of the military as a political force, derailment of constitutional governance, and centralization of political power in defiance of the federal architecture of the state. This turn to praetorianism had a direct impact on the NWFP and FATA. In 1954, the same year that Pakistan formalized its partisan role in the Cold War, a "gang of four" n249 representing the military-bureaucracy combine overturned the constitutional order in Pakistan, a step validated by a docile judiciary under the doctrine of state necessity. n250 The new order then moved to erase the separate existence of NWFP in 1955, when the bureaucratic-military combine ruling Pakistan amalgamated all four provinces of the western wing of the country into the so-called "One Unit." n251 FATA, however, retained its status as a distinct federally administered zone. Afghanistan reacted sharply to the dissolution of NWFP and accelerated its demand for Pashtunistan, leading to a break in diplomatic relations. n252 Trade blockades and border skirmishes followed. Relations remained seriously strained [\*43] until 1963, when the King of Afghanistan removed his prime minister, Sardar Daud, a Pastun and an ardent advocate of Pashtunistan. n253 In the meantime, strengthened and emboldened by its Cold War alliances, Pakistan's military formally usurped political power by declaring martial law in 1958, a move validated by the courts through a misapplication of Kelsen's theory of revolutionary legality. n254 In 1969, a mass-protest movement forced the removal of Pakistan's military dictator. The new government dissolved the "One Unit" and restored NWFP as a separate province. n255 FATA, however, retained its distinct dispensation.

 A serious downturn in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan came in 1973, when Afghanistan declared itself a republic, and Sardar Daud, now its new president, revived the issue of Pashtunistan. n256 Pakistan immediately responded by giving sanctuary to Afghan dissidents and began training and arming disaffected Afghans to destabilize the new Afghan regime. n257 From 1973-77, Pakistan trained an estimated 5,000 Afghan militants and channeled material support to groups inside Afghanistan. n258 This was the beginning of Pakistan's prolonged engagement in training and arming Afghan militants professing the establishment of an "Islamic order." n259 This also ushered in an era when the FATA, the "buffer to a buffer," became the staging ground for Pakistani military's involvement in Afghan militants' operation across the Durand Line with its intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence ("ISI") taking the lead. n260 It is important to note that this engagement was choreographed by Pakistan's Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, a self-professed master of [\*44] geopolitics, who held that "geography continues to remain the most important single factor in the formation of a country's foreign policy . . . . Territorial disputes . . . are the most important of all disputes." n261 This was by no means the first instance of the use of FATA by Pakistan in its military strategies. As early as 1948, Pakistan had used sections of the FATA tribes in its campaigns in Kashmir. n262

 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 dramatically accelerated the decline of Afghan-Pakistan relations. During the 1979-84 Afghan "jihad," FATA served as a "launching pad for the mujahidin" and as a "base for their covert operation[s]." n263 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia poured in $ 7.2 billion in covert aid for the jihad, channeled through the ISI, and given primarily to the most radical religious groupings, thus bypassing the moderate Afghan nationalists. n264 The Afghan jihad furnished a justification for the tacit support by Western powers for the consolidation of military dictatorship in Pakistan under General Zia ul-Haq, a development that initiated and entrenched the process of "Islamization" of Pakistan. n265 After the Geneva Accord of 1984 to end the Afghan conflict, and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces, Afghanistan plunged into a civil war, with Pakistan and other regional powers supporting different factions. n266 The relative disengagement of the U.S. during this period is now seen by the American policy makers as a "strategic mistake." n267

 FATA continued to be used by the ISI and Afghan Islamist groups for their engagements in the Afghan civil war. By now, Pakistan's military had developed the so-called doctrine of "strategic depth" with regards to Afghanistan, because it regarded India to the east as the primary military [\*45] threat to Pakistan's interests. n268 In order to counter India, Pakistan, given its significantly smaller territorial size, sought a compliant Afghanistan on its western border. It was against this backdrop that Pakistan in effect created the Taliban in the early 1990s, a development that dramatically affected the Afghan civil war and, later on, the whole region. n269 Pakistan's military saw continued support for the Taliban as a strategic imperative. n270 Pakistan's desire to open trade routes to former Soviet Central Asian republics contributed to its patronage of the Taliban in Afghanistan. n271 Having helped the Taliban capture power in Afghanistan in 1996, Pakistan was among the handful of states that quickly recognized the new regime, and for some time even paid the salaries of the Taliban administration in Kabul. n272 Pakistan's search for "strategic depth," however, remained elusive. While Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country, the Taliban were exclusively Pashtuns, who make up over 50% of the country's population. n273 Consequently, Pakistan's patronage notwithstanding, the radical Islamic regime of the Taliban refused to accept the Durand Line as a legitimate international border or to drop Afghan claims over FATA and areas of NWFP east of the Line. n274

 [\*46] Taliban's brutal political and social order n275 did not derail global geopolitics of energy supplies, when all neighboring states and many others, including the U.S., started "romancing the Taliban" during a "battle for pipelines" in the late 1990s. n276 By the late twentieth century, global capital and its attendant state machinations had moved well beyond territorial colonialism to neo-imperial modes of exploitation and accumulation. n277 The spatial dimension to the cycle of accumulation, however, remained indispensable. n278 This is particularly true of the geopolitical imperatives of the global energy markets. n279 The break-up of the Soviet Union triggered an intense competition between global oil companies and their sponsoring states, including the U.S. and Pakistan, to extract and transport oil and gas from Central Asia via Afghanistan. n280 In immediate contention were two plans for alternative gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to run through Afghanistan: one would go to Pakistan, and the other would go to Iran and Turkey with a possible link to Europe. Alternatives to transport oil from Kazakhstan via the Caspian Sea further complicated the picture. n281

 The events of September 11, 2001, dramatically transformed the geopolitical profile of the region. The very next day the U.S. demanded that Pakistan stop terrorist operatives in its border areas or "be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age." n282 Pakistan made its decision "swiftly . . . [\*47] [and] agreed to all . . . demands," n283 also making available airbases and transit facilities for supplies for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. n284 However, Pakistan's military continued its special relations with the Taliban across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. When the U.S. launched its attack on Afghanistan, the Taliban "escaped in droves into Pakistan, where they melted into their fellow tribesmen in the FATA." n285 After the now infamous "battle of Tora Bora," n286 Pakistani authorities "looked the other way as foreign fighters crossed over to the Pakistani side and many in the ISI arranged safe passage[s]." n287 In collaboration with ISI, the borderlands became a "safe haven for the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist elements." n288 FATA, long a sanctuary for fugitives from state law, n289 now became a sanctuary and staging ground for Afghan militants resisting the U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan. n290

 As Pakistan's active support of U.S. war efforts increased, Afghan militants made common cause with religious militants among the Pashtun tribes of FATA. n291 Pakistan's military, designed for conventional warfare on its eastern border with India, was "ill-prepared to tackle this new kind of . . . conflict that slipped across its western border." n292 As a result, Pakistan vacillated between military operations against the militants and peace deals with them. n293 In the meantime, militants started to extend their area of influence beyond FATA, the "buffer to a buffer," into [\*48] NWFP and beyond. n294 In the midst of all this, Pakistan stood firm that the Durand Line be recognized and respected as an international border, while its military considered Afghanistan "within Pakistan's security perimeter." n295 On the other hand, Afghanistan continued to reject the Durand Line because "it has raised a wall between the two brothers." n296

 This story of the Durand Line is a more than century-long saga of predatory colonialism, postcolonial insecurities, and incessant conflict. This is a tale of colonial cartography bequeathed to a postcolonial formation, bringing in its wake bitter fruits of oppression, violence, and war. This leads to the broader questions of the challenges colonial borders present to postcolonial states and the role of international law.

 IV. COLONIAL BORDERS AND POSTCOLONIAL INSECURITIES

 Every established order tends to produce . . . the naturalization of its own arbitrariness. n297

 A. Inherited Borders and Postcolonial State-nations

 Forged on the anvil of modern European history and enshrined in modern international law, modern statehood and sovereignty are deemed the preserve of differentiated "nations" existing within exclusive and defined territories. While "the struggle to produce citizens out of recalcitrant people accounts for much of what passes for history in modern times," n298 the prototype of the "nation-state" combines a singular national [\*49] identity with state sovereignty, understood as the territorial organization of unshared political authority. "The territoriality of the nation-state" seeks to "impose supreme epistemic control in creating the citizen-subject out of the individual." n299 "Inventing boundaries" n300 and "imagining communities" n301 work together "to naturalize the fiction of citizenship." n302 Modem international law underscores this schema. It extends recognition only to the national form, with acceptance attached to the ability to hold territory in tune with "Western patterns of political organization." n303 As a result, the "nation-state" is the dominant model of organized sovereignty today. This spatially bounded construct, one that frames both the geography of actualizing self-determination and the order of the resulting political unit, put in circulation a "territorialist epistemology." n304 Postcolonial formations had to subscribe to this Eurocentric grammar of state-formation to secure eligibility in the inter-state legal order. n305 This statist frame precludes imaginative flowerings of self-determination in tune with the interests and aspirations of diverse communities both within and beyond received colonial boundaries.

 Across the global South, colonial demarcations of zones of control and influence left in their wake political units lacking correspondence between [\*50] their territorial frame and the cohesion of culture and political identity. n306 The colonial demarcations, with little regard for the history, culture, or geography of the region, often split cultural units or placed divergent cultural identities within a common boundary. n307 As a consequence, the crisis of the postcolonial state stems from its artificial boundaries and the specter of the colonial still haunt the postcolonial nation. n308 The "retrospective illusion" n309 of nationalism remains "suspended forever in the space between the ex-colony and not-yet-nation." n310 Decolonization movements and postcolonial states adopted and retained the construct [\*51] of a territorially bound "nation-state" even as they attempted to imagine the "nation" at variance from its European iterations. n311 Imprisoned in inherited colonial territorial cartographies, postcolonial formations inverted this grammar to produce state-nations. While conventional understanding assumes a preexisting nation that subsequently forms a state, post-colonial formations start with a territorial state that aims to constitute a homogenized nation.

 Building state-nations generates conflicts about minorities, ethnicities, ethno-nationalism, separatism, and sub-state nationalism. "[T]he nation dreads dissent" n312 and "the nation-state's limits implicate its geographic peripheries as central to its self-fashioning." n313 In the process, a co-constitutive role of "nation and ethnicity" develops as a "productive and dialectical dyad." n314 It is by the construction of ethnicity as a "problem" that the "nation" becomes the resolution and the state incarnates itself as the authoritative problem solver. In this way often "the very micropolitics of producing the nation are responsible for its unmaking or unraveling." n315 Incessant rhetoric of endangerment and discursive production of threats to the nation render "nation-building" a coercive enterprise and facilitate the overdevelopment of the coercive apparatuses of the state. n316 While inherited boundaries represent the postcolonial state-nation's "geo-body," n317 cultural and ethnic heterogeneity within induces "geopiety." n318 It is no surprise, then, that most postcolonial states have as their raison d'etre the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the discourses and apparatuses of national security. n319 The career of Pakistan as [\*52] a postcolonial state circumscribed within an inherited territorial frame substantiates this political grammar.

 Fig 3. Major Ethno-Linguistic Groups of Pakistan in relation to international boundaries of the region n320

 Pakistan, hailed as "the triumph of ideology over geography," n321 is literally caught and exists between lines drawn by colonial powers--the Durand Line (1893) in the northwest, the Goldsmid Line (1872) to the west, the Radcliffe Line (1947) in the east, and the MacMahon Line (1904) to the north. n322 For good measure, in the northeast, a Line of Control, [\*53] "a sequence of ellipses" "[d]rawn and redrawn by battles and treaties . . . identifiable by traces of blood, bullets, watchtowers, and ghost settlements left from recurring wars," n323 provisionally divides Kashmir into areas held by India and Pakistan. n324 The "state-building" and "nation-building" saga that unfolded between these lines since 1947 has produced what is variously characterized as the "viceregal system," n325 the "overdeveloped state," n326 the "hyper-extended state," n327 and the "praetorian" state. n328 In efforts to constitute a state-nation, coercion always outweighed persuasion in claims of domination, in tune with a political grammar set in place by colonial rule. n329 The project of "conjuring Pakistan," n330 that would envelop ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences within inherited borders, necessitated deployment of "security as hegemony." n331 Festering territorial disputes with neighboring states furnished the primary justification for the military to consume a disproportionate [\*54] share of resources and to play a leading ideological and political role. n332 Denial of representation, suppression of federalism, and destruction of alterity are the hallmarks of the state since its inception. As successor to the colonial "garrison state" in the Punjab, a Punjab-centered military-bureaucracy oligarchy retains a dominant position in the ruling bloc. n333 Denial of equal citizenship to the people of the provinces of Balochistan, East Bengal, NWFP, and Sind--even when they constituted the majority of the population--remains a defining feature of the state. Dissent and resistance were squelched by unbridled state violence, including repeated military actions--the most infamous being the one in 1971 that prompted the eastern wing of Pakistan to break off and establish a separate state of Bangladesh. n334 Phases of coups d'etat, martial laws, abrogation of constitutions, and declarations of emergency rule constitute the "constitutional" history of the country. A docile judiciary serially deployed doctrines of "state necessity," "revolutionary legality," "constitutional deviation," and de facto power to furnish legitimacy to repressive orders. n335

 In building a postcolonial state-nation, the FATA, the colonial "buffer to a buffer," retained its special status--approximating spaces of exception as invoked by Giorgio Agamben. n336 Today, FATA is "a Massachusetts-sized [\*55] wedge between Afghanistan and NWFP of Pakistan," with a population of about 4 million, "virtually all of whom are Pashtuns." n337 Since 1901, this zone has been governed by a unique colonial-era administrative and judicial order--an indirect rule that combines modern technologies of power with instrumental use of customary norms and traditional power structures. n338 The colonial design aimed to govern through selected tribal notables who would be loyal to the British in exchange for fixed monetary allowances. No taxes would be levied on the tribes, who would be left alone to manage their internal affairs through the customary Pakhtunwali code in their tribal jirgas, which has been characterized as "probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy that has existed since the original." n339 However, any matter that implicated the security [\*56] interests of colonial authorities was to be handled by a parallel system--a hybrid construct that retains the name jirga, but empties it of any semblance to "Athenian democracy" to make room for a process and a set of sanctions designed for harsh control and violent discipline to facilitate external domination. n340 This system took the shape of the Frontier Crimes Regulation ("FCR"), originally formulated in 1858, and amended in 1872 and 1901, turning FATA into a constitutional and legal anomaly. n341 Decolonization did not bring any change. Since 1947, FATA is formally a part of Pakistan. n342 However FCR remains entrenched, and sets the FATA tribes apart from and unequal to other citizens of the country. n343

 To enable this state and space of exception, Pakistan's constitution reposes all executive and legislative authority for FATA in the President of Pakistan, who is given the authority to exercise his powers regarding FATA "as he may deem necessary." n344 Parliamentary enactments do not apply to FATA, unless the President so directs. n345 FATA is placed outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts that otherwise have extensive powers to guarantee fundamental rights. n346 The Supreme [\*57] Court has recognized these "special provisions" for the area "so that their inhabitants are governed by laws and customs with which they are familiar and which suit their genius." n347

 The FATA itself stands divided into 7 administrative units styled "agencies." An evocatively titled "Political Agent" ("PA"), appointed in each agency by the federal government and backed by a para-military militia, is the locus of Pakistan's authority. Besides exercising extensive executive, judicial, and revenue powers, the PA is also each agency's development administrator. n348 He is assisted by maliks, paid intermediaries from among tribal elders, who are appointed and removed at his discretion. n349 Maintenance of order and suppression of crime are deemed the PA's primary responsibilities. n350 The PA is authorized to dispose of any civil or criminal matter at his discretion. n351 The PA may decide the matter himself, or refer it to a tribal jirga, consisting of tribal maliks chosen by the PA. The PA initiates cases, appoints the jirga, presides over trials, and the final decision is subject to his discretion. n352 The jirga is supposed to decide the matter under FCR, supplemented by customary tribal norms. n353 The PA retains the discretion to sentence the accused as determined by the jirga, refer the matter back to the jirga, or appoint a new jirga. n354 The determinations of the PA are not subject to review by any court of law. n355 The process is that of an inquiry rather than presentation [\*58] of evidence and cross examination. Assistance of counsel is prohibited. n356

 Draconian sanctions under the FCR, executed at the discretion of the PA, include: detention and imprisonment to prevent crime or sedition; requiring "a person to execute a bond for good behavior or for keeping the peace;" expulsion from the agency of "dangerous fanatics" and those involved in blood feuds; removal or prevention of settlements close to the border; demolition of buildings used for "criminal purposes;" collective punishment of fines and blockade; and the "right to cause the death of a person" on suspicion of intent to use arms to evade arrest. n357 The federal agency charged with overseeing FATA considers FCR an "effective 'iron-hand'" whose withdrawal would create an "administrative vacuum." n358

 In 1962, under a design of limited franchise, an electoral college of 35,000 tribal maliks, appointed by the PA, selected representatives to the national parliament. n359 In 1996, direct election of representatives was introduced, though "politics and political parties are curse words in official circles." n360 Because the law prohibits political parties from extending their activities in FATA, only "non-party/independent" representatives can be elected. This makes for a unique political anomaly: FATA residents elect representatives to a legislature whose legislation does not extend to FATA. FATA also suffers from abysmal levels of poverty, illiteracy, and lack of health care. n361 Analysts find FATA "a virtual prison for public-spirited and reform-minded individuals. Dissenting voices are quickly dubbed anti-state and silenced by imprisonment." n362 State functionaries, however, claim that the system in place for over a hundred years "suits the genius of the people and has stood the test of time." n363 It is more appropriate to characterize FATA as a zone where bodies and [\*59] spaces are placed on the other side of universality, a "moral and legal no man's land, where universality finds its spatial limits." n364

 FATA, admittedly an extreme case, is symptomatic of the problem of reconciling territorial straitjackets with the principle of self-determination. n365 For the territorial state, self-determination has always been a concept "loaded with dynamite." n366 In postcolonial formations, its explosive potential increases. The primary problem is not how to determine identities and desires of a people eligible for self-determination; n367 the problem, rather, is how to reconcile realization of this right with existing territorial configurations. The unresolved questions surrounding the Durand Line, FATA, and Pashtun political identity persist because their resolution is sought within a territorial "nation-state." Nesiah terms the imprisonment of postcolonial polities within modern territorial constructs of statehood "failures of the imagination." n368 A major hurdle in breaking free of this imprisonment is international law itself.

 B. International Law and the Territorial Straitjacket

 For many a postcolonial "contrived state" n369 the crisis of identity and security "lies in its 'artificiality."' n370 International law enforces the territorially-bound grammar of the "nation-state" upon postcolonial formations plagued by cartographicc anxiety inscribed into [their] very genetic code," n371 through the doctrine of uti possidetis. Based on a maxim of Roman law, the doctrine of uti possidetis ita possidetis (as you possess, so you possess), treats the acquisition and possession of a state's territory as given, with no territorial adjustments allowable without the consent of the currently occupying parties. n372 Applied to international [\*60] borders, it favors actual possession irrespective of how it was achieved, assumes that valid title belongs to current possessor, and does not seek to differentiate between the de facto and de jure possession. n373 By recognizing legitimate title to de facto territorial holdings, it becomes an instrument to maintain the status quo and impedes imaginative resolutions of territorial conflicts.

 The doctrine of uti possidetis was formulated in connection with colonialism in Latin America in the early nineteenth century when Spanish colonies agreed to apply the principle both in their frontier disputes with each other and in those with Brazil. n374 During the decolonization era of the twentieth century, this norm was extended to the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asia and Africa. n375 The principle mandated that "new States . . . come to independence with the same borders that they had when they were administrative units within the territory or territories of one colonial power." n376 This froze colonial boundaries and presented a challenge to postcolonial formations to imagine and manage a "nation" and "national identity" in the heterogeneity contained within inherited boundaries. n377 In some instances, particularly in Africa, this attempt failed completely and ended in genocide and/or fracturing of the state. n378

 [\*61] The ICJ n379 and international tribunals n380 were quick to put their imprimatur on the doctrine of uti possidetis and its application to postcolonial states. The ICJ has designated it "a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of [] obtaining [] independence, wherever it occurs." n381 The ICJ went on to state that "[i]ts obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power." n382 The bottom line is that through "application of the principle of uti possidetis," colonial "administrative boundaries" are "upgraded" and "transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term." n383

 The ICJ acknowledged that by giving fixity and legitimacy to colonial boundaries, the principle uti possidetis "at first sight . . . conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples to self-determination." n384 In [\*62] the face of this dilemma, the ICJ fell back on pragmatism to claim that "maintenance of the territorial status quo" is essential to "preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for their independence." n385 The Court sought support for this claim with a gesture toward the practice of post-colonial states:

 [t]he essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination. n386

 Here Nesiah rightly sees a "double bind" infecting the Court as it is committed to decolonization but "[t]erritorial integrity emerges here as a statist spatial representation intelligible to international law, and posited as indispensable to the self-determination of the postcolony." n387

 As the saga of the Durand Line shows, colonial frontiers, boundaries, and borders fluctuated over time. This raises the question of the exact territorial bounds of postcolonial states. The ICJ injected an unequivocal temporal cut-off in this historically ambivalent temporal and spatial issue, by holding that:

 [U]ti possidetis--applies to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive effect, but immediately and from that moment onwards. It applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the photograph of the territorial situation then existing. The principle of uti posidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock but does not put back the hands. n388

 As fashioned by the ICJ:

 [\*63] the critical date as a legal concept posits that there is a certain moment at which the rights of the parties crystallize, so that acts after that date cannot alter the legal position. It is a moment which is more decisive than any other for the purpose of the formulation of the rights of the parties in question. n389

 This freeze-framing of boundaries on the date of decolonization by one definitive gesture renders the issue of the history of these boundaries moot. The rationale appears to be that "freezing the carved-up territory in the format it exhibited at the moment of independence" n390 will deter territorial disputes among post-colonial states. Pervasive postcolonial territorial and self-determination conflicts, however, reveal that such a mandated spatial fixity and temporal clarity of boundaries does not keep these conflicts in check. n391 Uti posidetis combined with critical date as a legal concept trumps conflicting post-colonial assertion and exercise of effective authority as grounds for sovereign title under the doctrine of effectivites. n392 Post-colonial effectivities has significance only if colonial practice fails to furnish definitive demarcation and thus trigger application of uti posseditis. n393

 The concern with order has been central to modern international law. n394 Decolonization, coming on the heels of two World Wars, raised the specter [\*64] of disorder. As a result, the norm of self-determination gave way to the caveat of order. n395 Order trumped self-determination, deemed a concept "loaded with dynamite," n396 and the transition from colonialism to postcoloniality proceeded with the basic requirement that external boundaries remain in place. Managers of postcolonial formations were equally quick to subscribe to the doctrine, and international bodies like the United Nations were quick to give their imprimatur. The same 1960 UN resolution that affirmed that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination," also declared that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." n397 As a way out of this contradiction, the United Nations contemplates the possibility of non-state modes of actualizing self-determination, by holding that "[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination." n398 This contradiction points to the Janus-faced nature of the right of self-determination in a system of states with fixed and inviolable territorial bounds. The right has a "justifying, stabilizing, conserving effect and it has a criticizing, subversive, revolutionizing one." n399 International law and the practice of states have been content with the justifying, stabilizing, and conserving effect. n400

 This bias in favor of existing states is augmented by a doctrinal lacuna, with profound political implications, that remains at the heart of the uti possidetis doctrine as reformulated by modem international law and endorsed by the ICJ. In jus civil, rightful title via de facto possession could only be acquired by a prescriptive claim of usucapio established in good [\*65] faith. n401 Furthermore, in Roman law, uti possidetis is deemed an interim measure in contested vindication proceedings to determine title. n402 A critical restrictive qualifier, nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (without force, without secrecy, without permission), limits the scope of the doctrine. Possession would ripen into good title only if possession did not run afoul of the limitations. Modern international law conveniently elides this critical limitation, perhaps because given the colonial modes of acquisition of territory, colonial boundaries run afoul of it. n403 This gloss over the spatial history of colonialism, now bequeathed to post-colonial formations, by treating de facto control as rightful title is a foundational reworking of the original construct. n404

### Rana Alt

#### Our alternative is to refuse technical debates about war powers in favor of subjecting the 1ac’s discourse to rigorous democratic scrutiny

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, “NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417

But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit.

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this meahn for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. **To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants**-danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently-it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

## Case

## Legitimacy

### No solve

#### No solvency---will just use replace detention w/ drones or rendition

Robert Chesney 11, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, “ARTICLE: WHO MAY BE HELD? MILITARY DETENTION THROUGH THE HABEAS LENS”, Boston College Law Review, 52 B.C. L. Rev 769, Lexis

The convergence thesis describes one manner in which law might respond to the cross-cutting pressures associated with the asymmetric warfare phenomenon—i.e., the pressure to reduce false positives (targeting, capture, or detention of the wrong individual) while also ensuring an adequate capacity to neutralize the non-state actors in question. One must bear in mind, however, that detention itself is not the only system of government action that can satisfy that latter interest. Other options exist, including the use of lethal force; the use of rendition to place individuals in detention at the hands of some other state; the use of persuasion to induce some other state to take custody of an individual through its own means; and perhaps also the use of various forms of surveillance to establish a sort of constructive, loose control over a person (though for persons located outside the United States it is unlikely that surveillance could be much more than episodic, and thus any resulting element of “control” may be quite weak).210¶ From the point of view of the individual involved, all but the last of these options are likely to be far worse experiences than U.S.-administered detention. In addition, all but the last are also likely to be far less useful for purposes of intelligence-gathering from the point of view of the U.S. government.211 Nonetheless, these alternatives may grow attractive to the government in circumstances where the detention alternative becomes unduly restricted, yet the pressure for intervention remains. The situation is rather like squeezing a balloon: the result is not to shrink the balloon, but instead to displace the pressure from one side to another, causing the balloon to distend along the unconstrained side. So too here: when one of these coercive powers becomes constrained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative mechanisms. On this view it is no surprise that lethal drone strikes have increased dramatically over the past two years, that the Obama administration has refused to foreswear rendition, that in Iraq we have largely (though not entirely) outsourced our detention operations to the Iraqis, and that we now are progressing along the same path in Afghanistan.212¶ Decisions regarding the calibration of a detention system—the¶ management of the convergence process, if you will—thus take place in the shadow of this balloon-squeezing phenomenon. A thorough policy review would take this into account, as should any formal lawmaking process. For the moment, however, our formal law-making process is not directed at the detention-scope question. Instead, clarification and development with respect to the substantive grounds for detention takes place through the lens of habeas corpus litigation.

#### Drones tubes all their advs---resentment, rule of law, legitimacy, etc

Jeremy Scahill 13, 10/29/13, national security correspondent for the Nation magazine and author of the New York Times bestsellers Blackwater, Obama Presidency Marred by Legacy of Drone Program, www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/10/obama-drone-counterterrorism-war-legacy

Using drones, cruise missiles, and Special Ops raids, the United States has embarked on a mission to kill its way to victory. The war on terror, launched under a Republican administration, was ultimately legitimized and expanded by a popular Democratic president. Although Barack Obama's ascent to the most powerful office on Earth was the result of myriad factors, it was largely due to the desire of millions of Americans to shift course from the excesses of the Bush era.¶ Had John McCain won the election, it is difficult to imagine such widespread support, particularly among liberal Democrats, for some of the very counterterrorism policies that Obama implemented. As individuals, we must all ask whether we would support the same policies—the expansion of drone strikes, the empowerment of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the use of the State Secrets Privilege, the use of indefinite detention, the denial of habeas corpus rights, the targeting of US citizens without charge or trial—if the commander in chief was not our candidate of choice.¶ But beyond the partisan lens, the policies implemented by the Obama administration will have far-reaching consequences. Future US presidents—Republican or Democratic—will inherit a streamlined process for assassinating enemies of America, perceived or real. They will inherit an executive branch with sweeping powers, rationalized under the banner of national security.¶ Assassinating Enemies¶ In 2012, a former constitutional law professor was asked about the US drone and targeted killing program. "It's very important for the president and the entire culture of our national security team to continually ask tough questions about 'Are we doing the right thing? Are we abiding by the rule of law? Are we abiding by due process?'" he responded, warning that it was important for the United States to "avoid any kind of slippery slope into a place where we're not being true to who we are."¶ That former law professor was Barack Obama.¶ The creation of the kill list and the expansion of drone strikes "represents a betrayal of President Obama's promise to make counterterrorism policies consistent with the US constitution," charged Boyle. Obama, he added, "has routinized and normalized extrajudicial killing from the Oval Office, taking advantage of America's temporary advantage in drone technology to wage a series of shadow wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Without the scrutiny of the legislature and the courts, and outside the public eye, Obama is authorizing murder on a weekly basis, with a discussion of the guilt or innocence of candidates for the 'kill list' being resolved in secret." Boyle warned:¶ "Once Obama leaves office, there is nothing stopping the next president from launching his own drone strikes, perhaps against a different and more controversial array of targets. The infrastructure and processes of vetting the 'kill list' will remain in place for the next president, who may be less mindful of moral and legal implications of this action than Obama supposedly is."¶ In late 2012, the ACLU and the New York Times sought information on the legal rationale for the kill program, specifically the strikes that had killed three US citizens—among them 16-year-old Abdulrahman Awlaki. In January 2013, a federal judge ruled on the request. In her decision, Judge Colleen McMahon appeared frustrated with the White House's lack of transparency, writing that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests raised "serious issues about the limits on the power of the Executive Branch under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and about whether we are indeed a nation of laws, not of men."¶ She charged that the Obama administration "has engaged in public discussion of the legality of targeted killing, even of citizens, but in cryptic and imprecise ways, generally without citing to any statute or court decision that justifies its conclusions." She added, "More fulsome disclosure of the legal reasoning on which the administration relies to justify the targeted killing of individuals, including United States citizens, far from any recognizable 'hot' field of battle, would allow for intelligent discussion and assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it) remains hotly debated. It might also help the public understand the scope of the ill-defined yet vast and seemingly ever-growing exercise."¶ Ultimately, Judge McMahon blocked the release of the documents. Citing her legal concerns about the state of transparency with regard to the kill program, she wrote:¶ "This Court is constrained by law, and under the law, I can only conclude that the Government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret."¶ How to Make Enemies and Not Influence People¶ It is not just the precedents set during the Obama era that will reverberate into the future, but also the lethal operations themselves. No one can scientifically predict the future consequences of drone strikes, cruise missile attacks, and night raids. But from my experience in several undeclared war zones across the globe, it seems clear that the United States is helping to breed a new generation of enemies in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and throughout the Muslim world.¶ Those whose loved ones were killed in drone strikes or cruise missile attacks or night raids will have a legitimate score to settle. In an October 2003 memo, written less than a year into the US occupation of Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld framed the issue of whether the United States was "winning or losing the global war on terror" through one question: "Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?"¶ More than a decade after 9/11, that question should be updated. At the end of the day, US policymakers and the general public must all confront a more uncomfortable question: Are our own actions, carried out in the name of national security, making us less safe or more safe? Are they eliminating more enemies than they are inspiring? Boyle put it mildly when he observed that the kill program's "adverse strategic effects… have not been properly weighed against the tactical gains associated with killing terrorists."¶ In November 2012, President Obama remarked that "there's no country on Earth that would tolerate missiles raining down on its citizens from outside its borders." He made the statement in defense of Israel's attack on Gaza, which was launched in the name of protecting itself from Hamas missile attacks. "We are fully supportive of Israel's right to defend itself from missiles landing on people's homes and workplaces and potentially killing civilians," Obama continued. "And we will continue to support Israel's right to defend itself." How would people living in areas of Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan that have been regularly targeted by US drones or missile strikes view that statement?¶ Toward the end of President Obama's first term in office, the Pentagon's general counsel, Jeh Johnson, gave a major lecture at the Oxford Union in England. "If I had to summarize my job in one sentence: it is to ensure that everything our military and our Defense Department do is consistent with US and international law," Johnson said. "This includes the prior legal review of every military operation that the Secretary of Defense and the President must approve."¶ As Johnson spoke, the British government was facing serious questions about its involvement in US drone strikes. A legal case brought in the United Kingdom by the British son of a tribal leader killed in Pakistan alleged that British officials had served as "secondary parties to murder" by providing intelligence to the United States that allegedly led to the 2011 strike. A U.N. commission was preparing to launch an investigation into the expanding kill program, and new legal challenges were making their way through the US court system. In his speech, Johnson presented the US defense of its controversial counterterror policies:¶ "Some legal scholars and commentators in our country brand the detention by the military of members of al-Qaeda as 'indefinite detention without charges.' Some refer to targeted lethal force against known, identified individual members of al-Qaeda as 'extrajudicial killing.'¶ "Viewed within the context of law enforcement or criminal justice, where no person is sentenced to death or prison without an indictment, an arraignment, and a trial before an impartial judge or jury, these characterizations might be understandable.¶ "Viewed within the context of conventional armed conflict—as they should be—capture, detention, and lethal force are traditional practices as old as armies."¶ The Era of the Dirty War on Terror¶ In the end, the Obama administration's defense of its expanding global wars boiled down to the assertion that it was in fact at war; that the authorities granted by the Congress to the Bush administration after 9/11 to pursue those responsible for the attacks justified the Obama administration's ongoing strikes against "suspected militants" across the globe—some of whom were toddlers when the Twin Towers crumbled to the ground—more than a decade later.¶ The end result of the policies initiated under President Bush and continued and expanded under his Democratic successor was to bring the world to the dawn of a new age, the era of the Dirty War on Terror. As Boyle, the former Obama campaign counterterrorism adviser, asserted in early 2013, the US drone program was "encouraging a new arms race for drones that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an international system that is increasingly violent."¶ Today, decisions on who should live or die in the name of protecting America's national security are made in secret, laws are interpreted by the president and his advisers behind closed doors, and no target is off-limits, including US citizens. But the decisions made in Washington have implications far beyond their impact on the democratic system of checks and balances in the United States.¶ In January 2013, Ben Emmerson, the U.N. special rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, announced his investigation into drone strikes and targeted killing by the United States. In a statement launching the probe, he characterized the US defense of its use of drones and targeted killings in other countries as "Western democracies… engaged in a global [war] against a stateless enemy, without geographical boundaries to the theatre of conflict, and without limit of time." This position, he concluded, "is heavily disputed by most States, and by the majority of international lawyers outside the United States of America."¶ At his inauguration in January 2013, Obama employed the rhetoric of internationalism. "We will defend our people and uphold our values through strength of arms and rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully—not because we are naive about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear," the president declared. "America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe; and we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation."¶ Yet, as Obama embarked on his second term in office, the United States was once again at odds with the rest of the world on one of the central components of its foreign policy. The drone strike in Yemen the day Obama was sworn in served as a potent symbol of a reality that had been clearly established during his first four years in office: US unilateralism and exceptionalism were not only bipartisan principles in Washington, but a permanent American institution. As large-scale military deployments wound down, the United States had simultaneously escalated its use of drones, cruise missiles, and Special Ops raids in an unprecedented number of countries. The war on terror had become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

### AT: Soft Power Impact

#### Soft power fails---empirics

Drezner 11 Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?", <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67869>

What went wrong? The administration, and many others, erred in believing that improved standing would give the United States greater policy leverage. The United States' standing among foreign publics and elites did rebound. But this shift did not translate into an appreciable increase in the United States' soft power. Bargaining in the G-20 and the UN Security Council did not get any easier. Soft power, it turns out, cannot accomplish much in the absence of a willingness to use hard power. The other problem was that China, Russia, and other aspiring great powers did not view themselves as partners of the United States. Even allies saw the Obama administration's supposed modesty as a cover for shifting the burden of providing global public goods from the United States to the rest of the world. The administration's grand strategy was therefore perceived as promoting narrow U.S. interests rather than global public goods.

### 1NC Heg Impact

#### Legitimacy isn’t key to peace

Christopher J. Fettweis 11, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited** S**tates** cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

## Judicial Globalism

### 1NC No Impact

#### Friendly democracies can decipher between good and bad US norms, and authoritarian nations don’t care either way

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The second benefit to foreigners of distinctive U.S. legal norms is information. The costs and benefits of our norms will be visible for all to see. n268 Particularly in an era of increased empirical social science testing, over time we will be able to analyze and identify the effects of differences in norms between the United States and other nations. n269 Such diversity benefits foreigners as foreign nations can decide to adopt our good norms and avoid our bad ones.

The only noteworthy counterargument is the claim that U.S. norms will have more harmful effects than those of raw international law, yet other nations will still copy them. But both parts of this proposition seem doubtful. First, U.S. law emerges from a democratic process that creates a likelihood that it will cause less harm than rules that emerge from the nondemocratic processes [\*1235] that create international law. Second, other democratic nations can use their own political processes to screen out American norms that might cause harm if copied.

Of course, many nations remain authoritarian. n270 But our norms are not likely to have much influence on their choice of norms. Authoritarian states are likely to select norms that serve the interests of those in power, regardless of the norms we adopt. It is true that sometimes they might cite our norms as cover for their decisions. But the crucial word here is "cover." They would have adopted the same rules, anyway. The cover may bamboozle some and thus be counted a cost. But this would seem marginal compared to the harm of allowing raw international law to trump domestic law.

### Demo---No Solve War 1NC

#### Democratic peace is wrong

Baliga 11—prof of managerial economics and decision sciences at Kellog School of Business, NU. PhD from Harvard—AND—Tomas Sjöström—chaired prof of economics at Rutgers—AND—David O. Lucca—economist with the Federal Reserve Board (Sandeep, Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?, The Review of Economic Studies, July 2011, 78;3)

The idea that democracy promotes peace has a long history. Thomas Paine argued that monarchs go to war to enrich themselves, but a more democratic system of government would lead to lasting peace: “What inducement has the farmer, while following the plough, to lay aside his peaceful pursuit, and go to war with the farmer of another country?” (Paine, 1985 p. 169). Immanuel Kant agreed that if “the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business” (Kant, 1795, 1903, p. 122). More recently, the democratic peace hypothesis has influenced the “neoconservative” view of international relations (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003). U.S. policy makers of different political persuasions have invoked it in support of a policy to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”1 But some anecdotal observations seem to support a more “realist” viewpoint. For example, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, democratic reforms were followed by war, not peace. When given a chance in the legislative elections of 2006, the Palestinians voted for Hamas, which did not have a particularly peaceful platform. Such anecdotes suggest that democratization does not always promote peace. Even fully democratic countries such as the U.S. sometimes turn aggressive: under perceived threats to the homeland, the democratically elected President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq. ¶ We develop a simple game-theoretic model of conflict based on Baliga and Sjöström (2004). Each leader can behave aggressively or peacefully. A leader's true propensity to be aggressive, his “type”, is his private information. Since actions are strategic complements, the fear that the other leader might be an aggressive type can trigger aggression, creating a fear spiral we call “Schelling's dilemma” (see Schelling, 1960; Jervis, 1976, Jervis, 1978; Kydd, 1997). Unlike Baliga and Sjöström (2004), we assume a leader may be removed from power. Whether a leader can stay in power depends on the preferences of his citizens, the political system, and the outcome of the interaction between the two countries. The political system interacts with Schelling's dilemma to create a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace.¶ Like the leaders, citizens have different types. By hypothesis, the median type prefers to live in peace. This imposes a “dovish bias” on a dyad of two full democracies (whose leaders can be replaced by their median voters). Thus, a dyadic democratic peace is likely to obtain. However, when facing a country that is not fully democratic, the median voter may support aggression out of fear and may replace a leader who is not aggressive enough. (For example, Neville Chamberlain had to resign after appeasing Hitler.) This gives rise to a “hawkish bias”. Thus, in a fully democratic country, a dovish bias is replaced by a hawkish bias when the environment becomes more hostile.

 In contrast, a dictator is not responsive to the preferences of his citizens, so there is neither a hawkish nor a dovish bias. Accordingly, a dyad of two dictators is less peaceful than a fully democratic dyad, but a dictator responds less aggressively than a democratically elected leader to increased threats from abroad.¶ In the model, the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power if hawks in his population turn against him. For instance, the German leaders during World War I believed signing a peace agreement would lead to their demise (Asprey, 1991, pp. 486–487, 491). Conversely, the support of the hawkish minority trumps the opposition of more peaceful citizens. Thus, a limited democracy experiences a hawkish bias similar to a full democracy under threat from abroad but never a dovish bias. On balance, this makes limited democracies more aggressive than any other regime type¶ . In a full democracy, if the citizens feel safe, they want a dovish leader, but if they feel threatened, they want a hawkish leader. In dictatorships and limited democracies, the citizens are not powerful enough to overthrow a hawkish leader, but the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power by appearing too dovish. This generates a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace.¶ Our empirical analysis reassesses the link between democracy and peace using a flexible semiparametric functional form, where fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity across country dyads. We use Polity IV data to classify regimes as dictatorships, limited democracies or full democracies. Following the literature on the democratic peace hypothesis, we define a conflict as a militarized dispute in the Correlates of War data set. The data, which span over the period 1816–2000, contain many military disputes between limited democracies. In the nineteenth century, Britain had a Parliament, but even after the Great Reform Act of 1832, only about 200,000 people were allowed to vote. Those who owned property in multiple constituencies could vote multiple times.2 Hence, Britain is classified as a limited democracy for 58 years and becomes a full democracy only after 1879. France, Italy, Spain, and Germany are also limited democracies at key points in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These countries, together with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, were involved in many militarized disputes in Europe and throughout the world. For much of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had many skirmishes and outright wars in the “Great Game” for domination of Central Asia (Hopkirk, 1990). France is also involved in many disputes and is a limited democracy during the Belgian War of Independence and the Franco-Prussian War. Germany is a limited democracy at the start of the First World War.¶ Over the full sample, the data strongly support a dyadic democratic peace hypothesis: dyads consisting of two full democracies are more peaceful than all other pairs of regime types. This is consistent with previous empirical studies (Babst, 1972, Levy, 1988, , maozrussett, Russett and Oneal, 2001). Over the same period, limited democracies were the most aggressive regime type. In particular, dyads consisting of two limited democracies are more likely to experience militarized disputes than any other dyads, including “mixed” dyads where the two countries have different regime types. These results are robust to changing the definitions of the three categories (using the Polity scores) and to alternative specifications of our empirical model. The effects are quantitatively significant. Parameter estimates of a linear probability model specification, suggest that the likelihood that a dyad engages in a militarized dispute falls roughly 35% if the dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of dictatorships. We also find that if some country j faces an opponent which changes from a full democracy to another regime type, the estimated equilibrium probability of conflict increases most dramatically when country j is a full democracy. This suggests that as the environment becomes more hostile, democracies respond more aggressively than other regime types, which is also consistent with our theoretical model.¶ A more nuanced picture emerges when we split the data into subsamples. Before World War II, the data strongly suggest that limited democracies were the most conflict prone. It is harder to draw conclusions for the post World War II period, when very few countries are classified as limited democracies, and full democracies have very stable Polity scores. The Cold War was a special period where great power wars became almost unthinkable due to the existence of large nuclear arsenals (Gaddis, 2005). Did the weakening and demise of the Soviet Union bring a return to the pre-1945 patterns? Although the time period is arguably short, in the post-1984 period, it does seem that dyads of limited democracies are again the most prone to conflict.¶ It is commonly argued that a process of democratization, e.g. in the Middle East, will lead to peace (Bush, 2003). But both theory and data suggest that the relationship between democracy and peace may be complex and non-monotonic. Replacing a dictatorship with a limited democracy may actually increase the risk of militarized disputes. Even if a dictatorship is replaced by a full democracy, this may not reduce the risk of militarized disputes if the region is dominated by hostile non-democratic countries. In the data, only dyads consisting of two full democracies are peaceful. Democratic countries such as Israel and India, with hostile neighbours, do not enjoy a low level of conflict.

### AT: Iraq

#### Iraq instability doesn’t escalate

Cook 7 [Steven A. Cook and Ray Takeyh, fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution, International Herald Tribune, “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,” 6-28-2007, www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/28/opinion/edtakeyh.php]

It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country.

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq.

The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq.

Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback

scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict.

Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries.

In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom.

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.

As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary.

So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.

The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

Iraq's civil war is the latest tragedy of this hapless region, but still a tragedy whose consequences are likely to be less severe than both supporters and opponents of Bush's war profess.

# Block

### Legitimacy/Cred

#### Drone strikes worse for cred

Dan Roberts 13, The Guardian, BUSH LAWYER: Drone Strikes Are Worse Than Indefinite Detention, http://www.businessinsider.com/bush-administration-lawyer-drone-strikes-being-used-as-alternative-to-guantnamo-2013-5#ixzz2oyzJ1m30

BUSH LAWYER: Drone Strikes Are Worse Than Indefinite Detention

The lawyer who first drew up White House policy on lethal drone strikes has accused the Obama administration of overusing them because of its reluctance to capture prisoners that would otherwise have to be sent to Guantánamo Bay.

John Bellinger, who was responsible for drafting the legal framework for targeted drone killings while working for George W Bush after 9/11, said he believed their use had increased since because President Obama was unwilling to deal with the consequences of jailing suspected al-Qaida members.

"This government has decided that instead of detaining members of al-Qaida [at Guantánamo] they are going to kill them," he told a conference at the Bipartisan Policy Center.

Obama this week pledged to renew efforts to shut down the jail but has previously struggled to overcome congressional opposition, in part due to US disagreements over how to handle suspected terrorists and insurgents captured abroad.

An estimated 4,700 people have now been killed by some 300 US drone attacks in four countries, and the question of the programme's status under international and domestic law remains highly controversial.

Bellinger, a former legal adviser to the State Department and the National Security Council, insisted that the current administration was justified under international law in pursuing its targeted killing strategy in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen because the US remained at war.

"We are about the only country in the world that thinks we are in a conflict with al-Qaida, but countries under attack are the ones that get to decide whether they are at war or not," he said.

"These drone strikes are causing us great damage in the world, but on the other hand if you are the president and you do nothing to stop another 9/11 then you also have a problem."

Nevertheless, the legal justification for drone strikes has become so stretched that critics fear it could now encourage other countries to claim they were acting within international law if they deployed similar technology.

A senior lawyer now advising Barack Obama on the use of drone strikes conceded that the administration's definition of legality could even apply in the hypothetical case of an al-Qaida drone attack against military targets on US soil.

Philip Zelikow, a member of the White House Intelligence Advisory Board, said the government was relying on two arguments to justify its drone policy under international law: that the US remained in a state of war with al-Qaida and its affiliates, or that those individuals targeted in countries such as Pakistan were planning imminent attacks against US interests.

When asked by the Guardian whether such arguments would apply in reverse in the unlikely event that al-Qaida deployed drone technology against military targets in the US, Zelikow accepted they would.

"Yes. But it would be an act of war, and they would suffer the consequences," he said during the debate at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington.

Hina Shamsi, a director at the American Civil Liberties Union, warned that the issue of legal reciprocity was not just a hypothetical concern: "The use of this technology is spreading and we have to think about what we would say if other countries used drones for targeted killing programmes."

"Few thing are more likely to undermine our legitimacy than the perception that we are not abiding by the rule of law or are indifferent to civilian casualties," she added.

### 2NC Role of Ballot

#### Our framework is necessary to reclaim the political from state-focused methods that constrict democratic dialogue. Vote negative to reject simplistic yes/no legal debates and the threat of immediate consequences in favor of intellectual recalibration

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

### 2NC K Prior-Ethics > Law

#### The rush to pragmatic legal solutions forcloses a broader set of ethical questions beyond the law---investigating the discursive frame through which juridical solutions are proposed is a prerequisite to sound legal analysis

Craig Jones 13, PhD student at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Department of Geography. Scholar at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at UBC. Research update – method in the madness?, warlawspace.com/2013/09/30/research-update-method-in-the-madness/

Steven Keeva called the First Gulf War the first ‘lawyers war’, though in fact this isn’t quite correct because lawyers were involved in Panama a couple of years earlier and – albeit in a very different way – in Vietnam too; but that’s for a later post. While the last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented rise in the provision of legal advice in operational decision making, crucial questions still remain about what military lawyers do and how they contribute to the targeting process, and I’ll get to these questions in a moment. Before asking the more theoretical questions that interest me, I have found it more useful to begin with seemingly straightforward and pragmatic questions. I use ‘seemingly’ advisedly: targeting is a very technical process and to understand the role that the lawyer plays, one first has to understand how targeting works. There is a lot of jargon; there are many different types of targeting; many different ‘phases’ and ‘rhythms’; many different rules; endless information feeds; numerous intelligence (re)sources and analyses; countless technicalities and calibrations; and, I could go on. My point is that, just as the military lawyer must learn the technical specifics of military operations (and I mean everything from RoE and ‘place-based’ knowledge to munitions and weaponeering), we, as scholars and publics, too must understand how the thing gets done if we want write and think responsibly and – I hope – critically and authoritatively about the role of the lawyer in targeting and (more broadly) the role of law in war. Of course, such proximity requires extra vigilance, else understanding quickly turns on empathizing and with it comes an apology for pragmatism – what Costas Douzinas once called the ideology of Empire.

Research update – method in the madness?

September 30, 2013 by jonescraig

After a long radio silence – my apologies – I’m back in the UK (although whether I’m back ‘home’, I’m not so sure…). I’m here for a number of reasons, and want to thank Peter Adey and the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway University of London for hosting me as a visiting scholar for the semester. It has been an action-packed first week, and I’m glad to confirm that I’ll be giving a departmental talk, ‘The War Lawyers & The Targeting Machine’, later in the semester and will be leading a one-off guest seminar, ‘war/law/space’ (!), for the MSc Geopolitics & Security group, a bright and diverse bunch who I had the pleasure of meeting last week.

The other reason I’m here is to conduct the final component of my research: to try to figure out how the Royal Air Force approaches and executes its targeting missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For those who are new to the blog, my study is a multi-site investigation of the role that legal advice and operational law play in the conduct of lethal targeting operations. So far my focus has been on Israel and the U.S. and I have been busy (hence the silence, I think) interviewing former and current legal advisors on their practical and often nail-biting role in what is a tremendously complicated and variegated targeting process. It is impossible to condense the lawyers role into a few sentences, not least because it changes from one state/air force to another and is a highly contextual practice which also varies from one operation to the next. I have written very some preliminary notes on the U.S. and Israeli cases here and here and I promise to fill in the U.K. blanks shortly.

Steven Keeva called the First Gulf War the first ‘lawyers war’, though in fact this isn’t quite correct because lawyers were involved in Panama a couple of years earlier and – albeit in a very different way – in Vietnam too; but that’s for a later post. While the last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented rise in the provision of legal advice in operational decision making, crucial questions still remain about what military lawyers do and how they contribute to the targeting process, and I’ll get to these questions in a moment. Before asking the more theoretical questions that interest me, I have found it more useful to begin with seemingly straightforward and pragmatic questions. I use ‘seemingly’ advisedly: targeting is a very technical process and to understand the role that the lawyer plays, one first has to understand how targeting works. There is a lot of jargon; there are many different types of targeting; many different ‘phases’ and ‘rhythms’; many different rules; endless information feeds; numerous intelligence (re)sources and analyses; countless technicalities and calibrations; and, I could go on. My point is that, just as the military lawyer must learn the technical specifics of military operations (and I mean everything from RoE and ‘place-based’ knowledge to munitions and weaponeering), we, as scholars and publics, too must understand how the thing gets done if we want write and think responsibly and – I hope – critically and authoritatively about the role of the lawyer in targeting and (more broadly) the role of law in war. Of course, such proximity requires extra vigilance, else understanding quickly turns on empathizing and with it comes an apology for pragmatism – what Costas Douzinas once called the ideology of Empire.

Fortunately, the airforces in my study are more open and frank than is frequently assumed, and I am only repeating what my supervisor Derek Gregory first told me years ago when I say that the U.S. armed forces are prolific publishers on these matters (for the tip of the ice-berg see here). CIA and secret and classified operations are, of course, something else entirely and often so too are the RAF and Israeli Air Force. Anyhow, I am slowly reconstructing and understanding the targeting process and will be sharing any new material that I find over the coming months. In the meantime, Derek Gregory remains our best source for a critical understanding of the kill-chain (at the very least see his ‘drones’ tab here). I should also say that targeting/military language is not the only lexicon I have had to learn – or at least have tried to learn – in this project; I am also trying my best to become conversational in law and legalese. Needless to say, one wouldn’t get very far with a military lawyer who has 30 years service under his/her belt without at least some knowledge of the relevant law. As one former military lawyer for the IDF told me, “you’d have no chance; they’d eat you for breakfast”. But as it was, one or two of the lawyers invited me to breakfast not to eat (me) but to talk, and it is through such discussions that I have been realising that – surprise surprise – the text is not the practice and that what happens in the manual is one thing; the real world of military operations and legal advice, quite another.

Having nearly completed the Israeli and U.S. components of my study I am now better placed to understand what the pertinent questions are. Now that I am in the U.K., I’ll be asking questions which will help me to compare the different approaches taken by the U.S., Israel and the U.K. toward legal advice and targeting. The following are some tensions which have arisen thus far:

a) What is the formal and non-formal (by which I mean unspoken, implicit and de facto) role of the legal advisor? Does s/he merely (sic) advise and leave it for the commander to decide, or has the legal advisor gained an effective veto power as to whether a strike goes ahead? Many lawyers have been reticent to admit the latter, though others have assured me that it frequently takes place and that they have been personally responsible for giving the effective final word on life and death operations.

b) Where should the lawyer be located? Should s/he accompany troops on potentially life-threatening missions (as is common in the U.S. Army) or should s/he stay at the military base or the Air Operations Centre (AOC) (as is common in the U.S. Air Forces)? It may be surprising to some – it certainly was to me – that U.S. legal advisors die on the battlefield while on active duty. Not in Israel, because they are not forward deployed. One U.S. lawyer spoke of going out on multiple IED de-activation missions as a way of gaining respect from soldiers whose daily life and death was marked by ‘tours’ outside of the green zone in Baghdad. There are many commentators who think lawyers have no place at what the military call the ‘tip of the spear’, but the commanders who rely on their legal advice beg to differ; to them the lawyer has been likened to a priest bringing redemption. Not quite ‘forgive me Lord for I have sinned’, but ‘advise me Lawyer so that I may not’, perhaps?

c) When should the lawyer be involved? Few in the respective military establishments now doubt that military lawyers perform an important role in operations; they provide a clear legal analysis as to whether this or that action is legal and thus serve as a safety valve for the commander who is not so sure. This may or may not be a good thing and many question whether the power to decide has not been delegated away from the commander, only to be taken by a lawyer who may have little experience in military operations. But the crux of the issue here is whether legal advisors should be involved only in the planning part of the targeting process, or whether they should also be involved in time-sensitive decision making where legal calls are required in seconds, not hours and days. The cartoon parable of this, which I can’t find now, is of the military lawyer, rule book in hand ,running after the soldier onto the battlefield and the soldier asks “can I…”

I am putting all of this (and much more) together to ask a different kind of question at once practical yet also political and philosophical: what effects do the military lawyer and operational law have on the targeting process? This Foucauldian inspired question seeks to understand the functioning of a legal practice and of certain legal experts in the production of a discourse which we might broadly characterize as the ‘judicialization of war’. As legal questions have come, more and more, to dominate discussions about war, I think it is worth pausing to reflect on the consequences and to ask at what cost have legal questions come to the fore? The problem with law (though clearly not everyone sees it as a problem) is that it confers legitimacy and at the political level, this legal-legitimate amalgam has come to stand in for the other questions we might be asking about war; not ‘is it legal?’ but rather ‘is it right?’ or more simply, ‘why war?’ Military lawyers are not stupid people and modern militaries are not the buffoons they may once have been; both are attuned to and tune into how publics perceive what they do, hence why the Israeli military have become social media fanatics. To paraphrase Foucault, and to borrow from Derek Gregory, modern militaries have become obsessed with the ‘conduct of their conduct’. This means that they are surprisingly reflective and reflexive about what they do and how it is represented. Representing war – or targeted killing – as legal provides lethal action with a skein of legitimacy, but what difference does the law make, and *on what difference is international law founded?* For, and at my most provocative I ask, what difference does it make to the victim of a drone strike whether or not the strike was legal? The answer for a legalistic discourse of war is that many never stop to consider that there is something beyond the law.

### Alt

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

In the complex spectrum of global law, both throughout the era of colonialism and neo-liberal US-led Western imperialism within a pattern of continuity, the rule of law, together with the theory of ‘lack’ and other powerful rhetorical arguments, has been used in order to legitimize political interventions and plunder in the ‘emerging’ economies. The sacred concept of rule of law, whose positive connotations are ‘naturally’ assumed, has been portrayed as the embodiment of a professional and neutral technology, thus being capable of substituting the lack of democratic legitimacy of the institutions that are protagonist in the creation of global law. But its dark side has never been shown or discussed. An imperial rule of law is now a dominant layer for the worldwide legal systems. It is produced, in the interest of international capital, by a variety of institutions, both public and private, all sharing a gap in political legitimacy sometimes referred to as ‘democratic deficit’.31 At the same time, law has been constructively turned into a technology and a mere component of an economic system of capitalism, thus hiding its intrinsic political nature, and annulling the relevance of local political systems, now impotent in front of the dynamics of global law. The ‘dry technology’ of the rule of law penetrates worldwide legal systems without any political discussion at the local level, attempting to create the conditions for the development of market economies, often without success, and causing serious consequences for the less powerful.

Under the technology of the rule of law, in its imperial version capable of producing plunder, the essence of the United States’ law hides. In the aftermath of World War II, there was a dramatic change in the pattern of Western legal development. Leading legal ideas once produced in continental Europe and exported through the colonized world are now, for the first time, produced in a common law jurisdiction: the United States. Clearly, the present world dominance of the United States has been economic, military and political first, and only recently legal, so that a ready explanation of legal hegemony can be found within a simple conception of law as a product of the economy.32 Furthermore, US law has been capable of expanding worldwide thanks to its prestige, the high level of professionalization of its attorneys and a series of procedural institutions, that benefit plaintiffs, that allow US courts to have a certain capacity to attract jurisdiction, while showing themselves as courts for universal justice.33

The general attitude of the United States has been a very ethnocentric one, and precisely that of showing itself as the guardian of a universal legality, which it is legitimized to export through its courts of law, scholarly production, military and political intervention, and through a set of US-centric international institutions. In recent times, in particular after September 11th 2001 and the declaration of the ‘war on terror’, the US rule of law has come under attack 34, so that once admiring crowds of lawyers and intellectuals worldwide are now beginning to look upon the United States as an uncivilized old West from the perspective of legal culture, despite the professional prestige still enjoyed by the giant New York law firms and by the US academy.

Notwithstanding, there has been no decline in the rhetoric of the rule of law when it comes to foreign relations. Bringing democracy and the rule of law is still used as a justification to keep intruding in foreign affairs. The same can be said for the international financial institutions and their innumerable ‘development’ projects that come packaged with the prestigious wrapping of the rule of law.

A rethinking of the very idea of global law is necessary and it must derive from a revaluation of the local dimension, which is currently ignored by the neo-liberal model of development. The production of global law should change its direction, and follow a bottom-up approach, rather than a top-down one, thus being sensitive to the local particularities and complexities. Western spectacular ideas of democracy and the rule of law should be rethought. On this planet, resources are scarce, but there would be more than enough for all to live well. Nobody would admire and respect someone who, at a lunch buffet for seven, ate 90 percent of the food, leaving the other guests to share an amount insufficient for one. In a world history of capitalism in which the rule of law has reproduced this precise ‘buffet’ arrangement on the large scale, admiring the instruments used to secure such an unfair arrangement seems indeed paradoxical. People have to be free to build their own economies.

There is nothing inevitable about the present arrangements and their dominant and taken-for granted certainties. Indeed, it may be that the present legal and political hegemonies suffer from lack: the lack of world culture and of global political realism.

### 2NC Perm

#### Links swamp the permutation---it instrumentalizes the alternative which only masks the plan’s violent governmentality---internal contradictions means it inevitably fails

Laura Sjoberg 13, Department of Political Science, University of Florida , Gainesville The paradox of security cosmopolitanism?, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 29-34

Particularly, Burke suggests that security cosmopolitanism ‘rejects a procedural faith in strongly post-Westphalian forms of government and democracy’ (p. 17) and reiterates that such an approach includes ‘no automatic faith in any one institutional design’ (p. 24). This seems to move away from one of the prominent critiques of, in Anna Agathangelou and Ling’s (2009) words, the ‘neoliberal imperium,’ as reliant on Western, liberal notions of governance to the detriment of those on whom such a form of government is imposed. Burke clearly problematizes this imposition, framing many of the serious problems in global politics as a result of ‘choices that create destructive dynamics and constraints’ (p. 15) at least in part by Western, liberal governments – characterizing modernity as culpable for insecurity. At the same time, the solution seems to be clearly situated within the discursive framework of the problem. Burke suggests that there should be a primary concern for ‘effectiveness, equality, fairness, and justice – not for states, per se, but for human beings, and the global biosphere’ (p. 24). Unless the only problem with modernity is the post- Westphalian structure of the state (which this approach does not eschew, but claims not to privilege), then this statement of values might entrench the problem. Many of the ideas of equality, fairness, and justice that come to mind with the (somewhat rehearsed) use of those words in progressive politics are inseparable from an ethos of enlightenment modernity.

This may be problematic on a number of levels. First, it may fail to interrupt the series of choices that Burke suggests produce a cycle of insecurity. Second, it may fold back onto itself in the recommendations that security cosmopolitanism produces. This especially concerned me in Burke’s discussion of how to end ‘dangerous processes,’ where he places ‘greater faith in the ethical, normative, and legal suppression of dangerous processes and actions than in formalistic or procedural solutions’ (p. 24). It seems to me that there is a good argument that ‘suppression’ is itself a ‘dangerous process,’ yet Burke’s framework does not really include a mechanism for internal critique.

Another problem that seems to confound security cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the ‘state as an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and depen- dencies,’ (citing Burke 2013a, 5). This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burke’s approach to government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to ‘theorize and defend norms for the respon- sible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance’ (p. 21). At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His practical approach of looking for the ‘solidarity of the governing with the governed’ seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says:

Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21)

This attachment to the improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the failure of the radical potential in the idea of security cosmopolitanism. When discussing how the power dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that ‘voluntary renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a necessary feature of such an order’ (p. 25). Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative.

This seems to be at the center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious, but the Western liberal state does not have to be. Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be discarded fully. Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. Dangerous processes must be stopped, even if by dangerous processes. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but ther e is no clear foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for (and indeed demands) to ‘take responsibility for it’ (p. 23) in terms of ‘both formal and moral accountability’ (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booth’s vision of) ‘moral progress’ (p. 25), despite understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others.

Security cosmopolitanism, then, is a proclamation for radical change that is initially stalled by its internal contradictions and further handicapped by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. The result seems to be the (potential) reification of existing governments/governmentality through what essentially appears to be a non-anthropocentric ‘human security’ which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of human security (p. 15). It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while claiming significant improvement over existing approaches. This appearance/seduction of improvement without real promise for change might be more insidious than the nihilism of which many post-structuralists are accused, as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve.

## T

### AT: C/I

#### Indefinite detention refers to the detention of enemy combatants until the end of hostilities, not just without a timeframe

Schwinn 11 [Steven D. Schwinn, Associate Prof of Law at the John Marshall Law School, “The National Defense Authorization Act,” Dec 20 2011, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/12/national-defense-authorization-act.html]

It turns out, both sides are right. In short, the plain language of the NDAA expands detention authority beyond the plain language of the Authorization to Use Military Force, P.L. 107-40, but it only codifies the authority already claimed by President Obama and granted by the D.C. Circuit under the AUMF. Here are some of the highlights:

Indefinite Detention. Section 1021(c)(1) says that "[t]he disposition of a person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) may include . . . [d]etention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force." (Emphasis added.) This is the definition of indefinite detention. But it's also an authority that President Obama claimed from the early days of the administration. In fact, the definition of a "covered person" in Section 1021(b)(2) almost exactly tracks the administration's proposed definition of a "detainable person" under the AUMF in its March 13, 2009, filing in a Guantanamo habeas case in the D.C. District. (More below.) So while this authority in the NDAA is significant for representing clear congressional support for indefinite detention, and while it's deeply troubling, it also merely reflects the administration's long-standing position.

Detainable Persons. Section 1021(b)(2) says that the government can detain (indefinitely) "[a] person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces." This is new, and adds to the definition of detainable person under the AUMF (and tracked in Section 1021(b)(1)) that allows detention of "[a] person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occured on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks." Moreover, Section 1022(a) requires military detention for anyone who is "a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in coordination with or pursuant to the direction of al-Qaeda" and anyone who "participated in the course of planning or carrying out an attack or attempted attack against the United States or its coalition partners." (Section 1022 covers a subset of detainable persons in Section 1021. U.S. citizens and resident aliens are excepted from the requirement; more below.) In short, the NDAA authorizes indefinite detention, and in some cases requires military detention, for those who not only participated in the 9/11 attacks or harbored those who did (as under the AUMF), but also for those who currently attack the United States or its partners. But again, this is an authority that the administration claimed from its early days. Thus the NDAA tracks almost exactly the adminsitration's proposed definition of a detainable person in Guantanamo habeas cases. And it seems congruent with the D.C. Circuit's "part of" test--that under the AUMF the government can detain anyone who is "part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban." So here, too, the plain language of the NDAA seems to expand authority beyond the AUMF, but it also seems consistent with the government's long-standing position and the courts' interpretation of the government's authority under the AUMF.

### AT: Lewittes

#### The plan’s ruling would have to be based exclusively on immigration authority---it’s the only relevant legal question

Samuel Chow 11, Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Summer 2011, “NOTE: THE KIYEMBA PARADOX: CREATING A JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK TO ERADICATE INDEFINITE, UNLAWFUL EXECUTIVE DETENTIONS,” Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 19 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 775

There are three elements that must be taken into account in concluding that the Kiyemba petitioners were entitled to functional release. First, the illegality of the detainee's detention had been determined. This factor is derived from the traditional application of habeas relief, i.e. release, in the context of executive detentions discussed in Part II.B. Second, the liberty interests of a detainee being indefinitely held trump the interests the government has in maintaining absolute control over its borders. [\*808] This principle is illustrated in Zadvydas. n231 Finally, and most important, the maintenance of the integrity of habeas corpus is dependent on the meaningful opportunity for release - that is, functional release. This concept is derived from the historical development of the writ and the subsequent holding in Boumediene which emphasized the application of the writ as the primary check the courts have on the Executive in terrorist detentions. n232

#### The Kiyemba detainees are not being held under war powers authority---the Obama administration doesn’t justify their detention under war powers---the only relevant legal question is immigration authority – proves they don’t result in release so no solvency

Samuel Chow 11, Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Summer 2011, “NOTE: THE KIYEMBA PARADOX: CREATING A JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK TO ERADICATE INDEFINITE, UNLAWFUL EXECUTIVE DETENTIONS,” Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 19 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 775

The Kiyemba petitioners were seventeen Uighurs from China's Xinjiang Province who had traveled to Afghanistan and then to Pakistan prior to September 11, 2001. n124 They were subsequently captured by United States military in Pakistan during its military campaign in Afghanistan. n125 All seventeen had been held in Guantanamo Bay since 2002 on CSRT determinations made in 2004 that they were enemy combatants. n126 After Parhat v. Gates, n127 the government retracted that determination. n128 There, the D.C. Circuit Court determined that there was insufficient evidence linking the petitioner, Huzaifa Parhat, to the ETIM. n129 In fact, the court acknowledged that even if it had determined that Parhat was affiliated with the ETIM, that determination would be insufficient to sustain an enemy combatant status in light of the unreliability of the evidence linking the group to al Qaeda or the Taliban. n130 This finding was subsequently applied to all the [\*794] Kiyemba petitioners. n131

Following Parhat, the government conceded that the Uighurs' detention was unlawful. n132 In Kiyemba, the government admitted that it no longer had a legal basis to hold the Uighurs. n133 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit Court agreed that the Uighurs may be entitled to release based on their habeas petition. n134 However, it also held that it did not have the authority to release the detainees into the United States nor could it overturn the government's transfer determinations. n135 This conclusion was based on the understanding that the court had no authority to intrude on the Executive's immigration authority, n136 which effectively precluded the court's ability to provide a meaningful remedy for release. The Uighurs sought release into the United States because the United States government could not legally return them to their home country of China on the basis of a high likelihood of torture upon their return. n137 Additionally, despite the Executive's attempts to find an alternative asylum destination, no other third-party countries were willing to receive them. n138 Political pressure from the Chinese government n139 and the Executive's prior [\*795] determination that the Uighurs were enemy combatants n140 may have contributed to the government's inability to resettle them.

After the D.C. Circuit Court issued its opinion and while the petition for certiorari was pending, the Executive expressly recognized the troubling scenario that the continued detention of the Kiyemba petitioners posed. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates concluded that it was "difficult for the State Department to make the argument to other countries they should take these people that we have deemed, in this case, not to be dangerous, if we won't take any of them ourselves." n141 Indeed, the Executive was poised to send as many as seven of the petitioners to the United States in 2009. n142 However, in response to the threat of such action, Congress attached a rider to the Supplemental Appropriations Act which prevented the use of defense funds to release any Guantanamo detainees into the United States. n143 Congress also passed two additional pieces of legislation restricting the ability of Guantanamo detainees to enter the United States. n144 The National Defense Authorization Act n145 granted Congress a substantial degree of control over such releases and a spending provision banned the Department of Homeland Security from effectuating such release. n146 The detainees' hope for release, therefore, turned again on the pending petition for certiorari.

#### The Kiyemba petitioners are not legally being DETAINED---they’re being denied entry into the U.S.

Samuel Chow 11, Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Summer 2011, “NOTE: THE KIYEMBA PARADOX: CREATING A JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK TO ERADICATE INDEFINITE, UNLAWFUL EXECUTIVE DETENTIONS,” Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 19 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 775

The government's argument in Kiyemba was based on Shaughnessy v. Mezei n164 and broad interpretations of Boumediene and Munaf. n165 The government's argument was twofold. First, the government relied on Mezei to ground the legal authority for excluding the Kiyemba petitioners from entering the United States. n166 Second, Munaf was used to reconcile the petitioners' right to release with their continued detention. n167

A. Mezei and the Government's Immigration-Based Framework

In Mezei, the Supreme Court held that the indefinite detention of a non-citizen on Ellis Island was not a "[deprivation] of any statutory or constitutional right." n168 The petitioner, Ignatz Mezei, was born in Gibraltar and lived in the United States for [\*799] over twenty-five years. n169 He left to visit his dying mother in Romania but was denied entry to the country and attempted to return to the United States, only to discover that a change in immigration laws while he was abroad meant that he could no longer legally re-enter. n170 He was stuck on Ellis Island and attempts at resettling him failed miserably. n171 The government argued that rather than viewing Mezei's confinement as detention, it should be construed as exclusion n172 - the authority of which was, the government argued, based on well-founded legal foundations in United States immigration law. n173 The Court agreed. n174 Employing habeas corpus to order the release of Mezei into the United States, it argued, was an improper exercise of judicial discretion. n175 In Kiyemba, much like in Mezei, the government argued that releasing the petitioners into the United States would amount to an unlawful intrusion into the authority of the political branches to exclude non-citizens from entering United States territory. n176

#### The fact that Kiyemba’s continued detention relies on Habeas rulings doesn’t mean it’s inherently a war powers question---Habeas is also relevant in immigration exclusion cases unrelated to war powers

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As a sub-category of foreign relations, immigration is an area of law where the Executive has traditionally established itself as the final authority - much like national security. n195 Classic immigration cases have regularly held that the Executive's authority to exclude is both exclusive and absolute. n196 However, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court conditioned that exclusivity on liberty interests and reasonableness grounds. n197 There, the Executive ordered the removal of resident non-citizens. n198 A provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) created a 90-day removal period during which the non-citizens were to be held pending removal. n199 The Executive was unable to remove the non-citizens within the ninety day period, after which they filed a habeas petition seeking release. n200 The Court held that because continued detention was "potentially permanent," n201 and therefore undesirable, the judiciary's role was to determine the reasonable likelihood of securing removal. n202 In making that determination, [\*805] courts have the authority to decide when a reasonably sufficient period of time has passed. n203 If a court indeed finds that the Executive has detained non-citizens beyond a reasonable period, the court must carry out its "historic purpose" n204 and order a conditioned release of the non-citizens. n205 The Court did recognize that it was intruding on an area traditionally within the sole province of the Executive. n206 Indeed, it pointed out that immigration law is most efficiently addressed by the executive branch. n207 However, the Court concluded that the government's interest was sufficiently protected by creating a "presumptively reasonable period of detention" which would limit when the courts are entitled to act. n208 Ultimately, it decided that six months was a reasonable period for which to hold an alien pending removal. n209 The Court reaffirmed and subsequently extended this analysis in Clark v. Martinez by applying it to inadmissible non-citizens. n210

## Modeling

### No Modeling

#### We should’ve learned by now

Nathan Brown 11, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 8, 2011, Americans, put away your quills, mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/08/americans\_put\_away\_your\_quills

Later this month, the representatives just elected by Tunisian voters will begin the task of designing a new political order for the country. If all goes well (though it may not) Egyptians and Libyans will follow suit by drafting new constitutions. It is still not inconceivable that other Arab societies will join them in an attempt to reinvent political systems on a more democratic basis. People in these societies are about to engage in an unprecedented process for them -- while they have all lived under constitutions before, those documents generally enabled authoritarian government. Now they want to write constitutions that will allow them to live democratically. As Americans, this seems to be a story we know well -- a people rises up, throws off oppression, and then deliberates carefully how to write a set of rules for a new republican order fit for a free people. Therefore, we will soon hear lots of well-meaning advice on how Arab societies should write their constitutions and what those constitutions should say.

We saw in Iraq how much U.S. understanding of the constitution drafting process was colored by the U.S. experience. Commentators rushed to speak about a "Philadelphia moment," recommended favorite clauses from the Bill of Rights, and even argued over judicial review by reference to Marbury vs. Madison or Roe vs. Wade. We should have learned our lesson: much of our advice will be bad and most will be irrelevant.

First, when outsiders give advice, they tend to ask an abstract question: what would be the best constitution for a given society? Not only do they often know little about that society, they forget that constitution writing is a supremely political process. It is not carried out by philosopher kings but pushed through by real political forces playing a gritty political game. Despite what some of us may dimly remember from junior high school U.S. History, our process was no different. Constitutional kibitzing rarely finds an enthusiastic audience. After the initial election in the various Arab countries, the constitution will be the first test of the new balance of political forces -- and it will be the first real opportunity for them to discover not simply how to compete, but how to cooperate. Even more important than the text they produce, the patterns of interaction they establish as they draft will produce lasting patterns for politics. They need to keep their eyes on each other -- and that is precisely what they will do.

Second, there are few points of entry for foreigners to press their ideas. Where states have failed or been occupied, international advice and even oversight has had a strong role. But the Tunisian and Egyptian states are very much intact and unoccupied. While NATO planes helped to advance the revolution, they will likely play little role in Libya's constitutional process. Instead it is powerful indigenous structures and actors who will guide the process. And when it comes to fundamental questions about their political futures, they tend to prefer the answers that they themselves give. Tunisians debating the country's identity -- so far the biggest hot button issue in constitutional debates -- are hardly likely to pull in foreign consultants to draft language. The Egyptian committee of one hundred people is unlikely to want to be seen as allowing outsiders to vet their work in a political context in which "foreign agendas" are the topic of daily denunciations in the press.

Third, the Arab world actually has a long set of constitutional traditions that will serve as the reservoir for drafting efforts. Tunisia received its first constitution when France was an empire and Germany was not yet a state. Egypt has a long and rich tradition of constitutional experiments dating back almost as long. Much of that heritage is deeply troubled to be sure, but most Arab societies are full of people who already speak their own constitutional language. Constitutional law professors and lawyers have already begun to play prominent political roles. And when they find something troubling in past documents, they generally react by attempting to write the precise opposite of detested practices into the constitution. Constitutional drafters in most countries act like generals fighting the last war. It is their own history that serves as a positive and negative model, not that of the United States. And while this attitude can lead to some odd results (drafters in Iraq, for instance, tried hard to make a military coup unconstitutional), the attitude is, by and large, sensible. Constitutions have made a difference in Arab politics (as Egypt found when its rulers tottered and were revealed to have booby trapped the constitutional documents to make a gentle transition virtually impossible to negotiate). But those documents, while significant, have not been democratic. The problem lay not in their general promises, which were lofty, but in their fine print. Now there is a chance to fix that -- not by borrowing still more lofty phrases from foreign documents but by carefully rewriting the details and closing the loopholes of the ones they already have.

Fourth, when Arabs turn outwards to spot analogous cases, they are more likely to look to Europe and selected other countries (such as South Africa) where they are far more likely to find some similarities both in historical experience and constitutional structures. The U.S. experience, rich as it is, is very idiosyncratic. From a constitutional perspective, the United States is a marsupial: exotic and sometimes even cuddly, but also a product of a completely different evolutionary path. The U.S. attempt to graft some familiar structures, terms, and concepts familiar into the Iraqi text often left Iraqi politicians baffled -- and largely had to be abandoned as the United States finally concluded that any constitution Iraqis agreed upon was better than one that made sense to Americans.

### Iraq

#### Finishing Cook

 in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict.

Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries.

In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom.

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.

As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary.

So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.

The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

Iraq's civil war is the latest tragedy of this hapless region, but still a tragedy whose consequences are likely to be less severe than both supporters and opponents of Bush's war profess.