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## Off-Case

### Off

#### Enmity is a fundamental condition that defines the political---the aff ignores that the goal of politics must be to limit, not eradicate war---the affirmative’s project of embracing vulnerability can only end in a violent war on difference

**Prozorov 6** – Sergei Prozorov, collegium fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Politics and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State University, Russia, 2006, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 75-99

The Savage and the Barbarian: Natural Liberty and Supplementary Violence

Schmitt’s prophecy about the infinite plasticity of the category of the foe as ‘proscribed by nature itself’ may be elaborated with reference to the naturalistic political ontology of liberal government, discussed in Foucault’s analytics of governmentality and multiple post-Foucauldian studies in this field. In this section we shall argue that it is precisely the **combination of the universalist ethos**, at work in the deployment of the category of humanity, with a naturalist political ontology that accounts for the emergence of friend–foe ultra-politics in contemporary Western liberal democracies.¶ The radical innovation of liberal governmentality, which emerged as a critique of the theory of ‘police science’ and the practice of ‘police states’ of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, is the reinscription of the social order in terms of socio-economic processes, which, in the episteme of classical liberalism, are deemed to be natural, self-regulating, antecedent to authority and as having an intrinsic logic of their own that is not fully transparent to state knowledge: ‘Inscribed within the very logic of liberalism is a certain naturalism.’55 From this epistemic principle follows the central tenet of liberal government: **the suspicion that ‘one always governs too much’**.56 The liberal solution to this problem consists in adapting the techniques of government to the principles found in the naturalised reality of the social and making government itself accountable to these principles of the ‘system of natural liberty’.57¶ At the same time, liberal policies of laissez-faire are not a passive abandonment of an aboriginal reality to its own devices, but an elaborate activist and interventionist course that secures natural liberty by taking necessary measures to correct its perversions. This ‘corrective’ aspect points to what Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess have respectively termed **the ‘illiberality of liberalism’** and the ‘liberal government of unfreedom’.58 Within the ‘natural’ realm of the social, liberal government has historically identified manifold categories of the population, whose properties or acts were ‘**contrary to nature’** and had to be **rectified through governmental intervention**, which historically has taken manifold forms, from the confinement of madmen to the correction of juvenile delinquents.59¶ It is in this possibility of governmental ‘re-naturalisation’, which we have elsewhere described in terms of the ‘pedagogical technology’ of liberalism60 that we may locate the condition of emergence of the figure of the foe as the ‘enemy of liberalism’.¶ The centrality of pedagogical interventions to liberal governmentality demonstrates that despite its avowed naturalism, liberalism remains conditioned by the constitutive, asymmetric and individualising ‘pastoral power’ that Foucault has famously identified as the condition of emergence of modern governmentality as such.61 What unites all the objects of liberal corrections, irrespectively of whether they are deemed to be evil, mentally disabled, morally deficient or simply ‘irrational’, is their functioning in the liberal discourse as beings, whose existence is deemed to be contrary to nature. On the one hand, these individuals and groups belong to the social realm, cast as ontologically and axiologically prior to government in the liberal episteme. On the other hand, however, their practices are not in accordance with the liberal vision of ‘natural liberty’ and thus require corrective interventions of liberal government, whose modus operandi is itself adapted to the natural processes of the social. ‘Natural liberty’ is therefore not an aboriginal property of the subject, but an effect of governmental intervention. The Other, who was so generously let into the global liberal ‘homeland’, is endowed with liberty only on condition of his or her subjection to the corrective interventions that eradicate his or her alterity.¶ This Foucauldian thesis parallels Schmitt’s critique of the ‘educational theory’ involved in the valorisation of liberal democracy: The people can be brought to recognise and express their own will correctly through the right education. This means nothing else than that the educator identifies his will at least provisionally with that of the people, not to mention that the content of education that the pupil will receive is also decided by the educator. The consequence of this educational theory is a dictatorship that suspends democracy in the name of a true democracy that is still to be created.62¶ Thus, liberal government finds its condition of (im)possibility in the generalised illiberality of pedagogical interventionism, which manifestly violates liberalism’s own naturalist presuppositions but is nonetheless essential to its existence, functioning in the manner of the Derridean supplement, ‘a strange difference which constitutes [liberalism] by breaching it’.63¶ In Dean’s argument, **this paradox makes liberalism a potentially** ‘**total’ modality of government**, ‘because its program of self-limitation is linked to the facilitation and augmentation of the powers of civil society and its use of these powers, in conjunction with the sovereign, disciplinary and **biopolitical powers of the state itself**, to establish a comprehensive **normalisation of** social, economic and cultural existence’.64 The naturalisation of a certain artefactual conception of the social permits **perpetual interventions in the name of its natural values**, disavowing the constitutive and frequently violent character of governmental practices. At the heart of liberal government we may therefore observe the aporia whereby the naturalist ontology is always contaminated by the logic of supplementarity and every ‘natural liberty’ bears traces of governmental ‘corrective’ interventions.65¶ This relationship is at work not only in liberal domestic politics, but also, and with an even greater intensity, in the international domain, where liberal governmentality is deployed in such diverse contexts as **military interventions ‘in the name of democracy’**, neoliberal programmes of **development assistance and economic restructuring**, and even the global campaign for the **promotion of ‘human rights’**. As William Rasch argues in his reading of the discourse of human rights as a form of geopolitics, ‘the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. **To be truly human, one needs to be corrected**.’66 It is this object of **liberal corrective interventions**, whether domestic or international, that **epitomises the figure of the foe** – a ‘not truly human’ being ‘proscribed by nature itself’. The ‘incomplete’ humanity of this creature renders it **infinitely inferior** to the ‘fully’ liberal rights-holders, which **justifies the deployment of asymmetric subject–object relations** in **pedagogical practices of correction**, while the ‘unnaturality’ of this creature provokes a degree of apprehension:¶ even if the foe is infinitely weaker than ‘us’, any engagement with him is dangerous, as one never knows what these ‘monsters’ are capable of. To recall our discussion in the previous section, the **fear of the Other** that animates Schmitt’s discourse on enmity **does not disappear in the liberal political ontology** of monistic naturalism. Instead, it is **supplemented with a violent project of eradicating this dangerous alterity** that liberalism has itself incorporated into its ‘universal homeland’ through manifold corrective, disciplinary and **punitive practices**, which have no rationality whatsoever in the Schmittian pluriverse of irreducible alterity. The foe is therefore, as it were, a double enemy: both a transcendental Other that is intrinsically dangerous in Schmitt’s sense of radical alterity and an empirical Other, whose dangerousness is established by his or her actual resistance to the efforts of liberal government to purge this alterity. We may specify the liberal construct of the foe with the help of Foucault’s idiosyncratic contrast between the savage and the barbarian.¶ The savage (usually presented as ‘noble’) is manifestly a natural being, albeit probably a prehistoric one, a being that exists before society and who is central in founding society in the mythology of the ‘social contract’ – a central presupposition of liberal political ontology. Moreover, for the liberal economic rationality the savage is an essential presupposition that provides a referent to the abstract figure of the ‘homo economicus’, ‘a man without past or a history, who is motivated only by self-interest and who exchanges his product for another product’.67 The savage is therefore both a precursor of civilisation and a condition of its possibility. Thus, when modern liberal subjects perceive the Other as a ‘savage’, they may be said to be encountering their own selves in pure essence; hence the interest in and even a mild fondness for the ‘exotic otherness’ of the savage throughout the history of liberalism, from the colonial period to the contemporary ‘multiculturalism’.¶ The barbarian, on the other hand, is ‘someone who can be understood, characterised, and defined only in relation to a civilisation, and by the fact that he exists outside it. There can be no barbarian unless an island of civilisation exists somewhere, unless he lives outside it, and unless he fights it.’68 Crucially, unlike the savage, who becomes a subject only insofar as he enters or founds a civilised social relationship, the barbarian is an active subject from the outset, yet solely a negative subject of refusal, resistance and destruction. ‘Unlike the savage, the barbarian does not emerge from some natural backdrop to which he belongs. He appears only when civilisation already exists, and only when he is in conflict with it. He does not make his entrance into history by founding a society, but by penetrating a civilisation, setting it ablaze and destroying it.’69¶ What is the criterion that distinguishes the barbarian as the foe to be battled and annihilated from the ‘noble savage’, whose authenticity we might revel in and whose safe eccentricities we might even valorise in the spirit of liberal ‘tolerance’? The savage is manifestly the object of the liberal pastoral, whose transformation into a liberal subject does not, in the aporetic ontology of liberalism, detract from his naturality, but rather completes it, transforming a ‘not truly human’ being into a full-fledged ‘free subject’. The pedagogical endowment of the savage with a ‘natural liberty’ transforms this Other, that from the perspective of the ‘most extreme possibility’ is always a ‘potential enemy’, into a liberal ‘friend’, thereby creating the conditions for the universalisation of the ‘liberal peace’.¶ In contrast, the barbarian is simply the savage who resists this civilising correction and thus forfeits his own nature, becoming a monstrous foe. The barbarian is thus anyone who does not feel at home in the universal liberal homeland and continues to assert his Otherness despite his inclusion in global civilisation. It is thus resistance and daringness to resist that turns the savage, a mute and passive Other, into **the most extreme form of the enemy, the enemy of** both nature and **civilisation**, insofar as in the liberal ontology the two function in a mutually supplementary manner. The enemy of liberalism is thus, by necessity, a foe, which entails that a Schmittian relation of ‘just enmity’ is **entirely foreclosed in the liberal political ontology**. While in the latter relation a minimal identity of all interacting subjects as sovereign states provided a common framework of legitimate equality between particularistic communities, liberalism is constituted by a strict dividing line between societies that are in accordance with ‘natural liberty’ and those that are not. The latter may either function in the modality of the savage, the passively acquiescent objects of pedagogical correctional practices, or, in the case of their resistance to such interventions, **are automatically cast as inhuman** and unnatural foes, with whom **no relationship of legitimate equality may be conceivable**. If the transformation of the savage into a liberal subject functions as a condition for ‘liberal peace’, the ultrapolitical engagement with the foe may well be viewed as the continuation of the liberal peace by other means.¶ Thus, the distinguishing feature of the liberal ‘politics of enmity’ is that its utopian desire to eliminate enmity as such from the human condition **inevitably leads to the return of the foreclosed in the most obscene form** – for liberalism, there indeed are no enemies, just friends and foes. President **Bush’s infamous diatribe** ‘you are either with us or against us’ should not be read as an extreme deviation from the liberal standard of tolerance, but rather as an **expression**, at an ‘inappropriate’ site of the transatlantic ‘community of friends’, **of the binary liberal logic**. When both nature and humanity are a priori on the side of liberalism, there is no need for a Schmittian reflection on how to manage co-existence with radical alterity for the purposes of limiting a permanently possible confrontation. One is either with ‘us’ or against ‘us’, and, in the latter case, one forfeits not merely a place within ‘our’ community of friends, but also one’s belonging to nature and humanity.¶ Conclusion: Beyond the Ultra-Political Terrain¶ The present hegemony of liberal ultra-politics is well illustrated by the contemporary phenomenon of the global ‘war on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ offers a fruitful site for inquiring into the politics of enmity for two reasons. First, the widely perceived undecidability of the category of ‘terrorism’ to the extent that it is frequently attributed to the very same states that have launched the ‘war on terror’ illuminates starkly the contingency of the friend–enemy distinction. This contingency, i.e. the absence of both essence and necessity to any particular empirical form of enmity, points to the permanent gap between the transcendental function of the friend–enemy distinction and its particular historical modality. The deployment of the ultra-political **objectification of the enemy as a terrorist ‘rogue’** is a purely contingent option, **made possible by a fundamental asymmetry** that endows the subjects of the ‘war on terror’ with what Derrida terms the ‘reason of the strongest’, an epistemico-moral self-certitude that itself has something roguish about it:¶ [T]hose states that are able or are in a state to denounce or accuse some ‘rogue state’ of violating the law, of failing to live up to the law, of being guilty of some perversion or deviation, those states that claim to uphold international law and that take the initiative of war, of police or peacekeeping operations because they have the force to do so, are themselves, as sovereign, the first rogue states. This is true even before any evidence is gathered to make a case against them, however useful and enlightening such a case may be. There are always (no) more rogue states than one thinks.70¶ Secondly and consequently, the ‘war on terror’ is of particular interest, insofar as the perception of this fundamental inequality is arguably constitutive of the very subject-position of the ‘terrorist’ foe. Indeed, contemporary terrorist violence may be grasped as a retort of the foe, a paradoxical **refusal of the subject-position**, imposed on the enemy of liberalism, through its assumption in a hyperbolic and excessive manner, whereby the foe ‘acts out’, with a vengeance, an identity attributed to him or her. Let us suggest that the specificity of terrorist violence is not derivative of extra-political factors that may function as its background motives (poverty, economic inequality, underdevelopment, lack of education, etc.), but is rather a **direct expression of a properly political grievance**, a retort against the humiliation, **incurred in not being recognised as a legitimate enemy**. Our demonstration of the monistic nature of liberal pluralism and the artefactual character of liberal naturalism points to the fact that the subject-position of the foe is **preconstituted in the political ontology of liberalism**, insofar as the appropriation of the capacity to adjudicate what is human and what, within humanity, is natural **makes exclusion and stigmatisation a permanently available option** for dealing with expressions of dissent.¶ The image of the terrorist foe is thus both entirely contingent from the standpoint of a Schmittian transcendental function of enmity and always-already articulated within the ontological edifice of liberalism. While the motives for particular acts of terrorism might be distinct in each particular case, we may suggest that all these acts, first, take place in the preconstituted subject position of the ‘enemy of liberalism’ and, secondly, target precisely this subject position as a priori inferior. Terrorism is little more and nothing less than the resentful acceptance by the Other of the ultra-political terms of engagement, if only because there is no other way that the present global order can be legitimately opposed: the refusal to be liberalism’s ‘noble savage’ inevitably turns one into a barbarian. If our enemy can only be a monster, should we be surprised that the acts of our enemies are so monstrous? The uncanny effect of the liberal negation of pluralistic antagonism is that in the eyes of its adversaries liberalism may no longer be opposed other than by murderous and meaningless destruction. To the oft-cited empirical claims that contemporary terrorism has been produced as an effect of Cold War policies of Western powers, we must add a conceptual thesis: terrorism is the practical expression of **that mode of enmity** which the liberal West has **constituted as the sole political possibility due to its appropriation of both nature and humanity**. The ‘war on terror’ is not an accidental deviation from the maxims of Western liberalism but rather an exemplary model of **the only kind of ‘war’ that the liberal foreclosure of political enmity permits**, i.e. **a war against an a priori ‘unjust enemy’**. It should therefore not be surprising to see this model generalised beyond its original articulation, whereby it becomes a standard response to the **worldwide expressions of anti-liberal dissent**.¶ For this reason, **one gains nothing by attempting to battle terrorism** either on its constitutive ultra-political terms or, **as much of critical thought suggests**, on the extra-political fronts of development, poverty relief, civic education, democratisation, etc. Instead, any authentic confrontation with terrorism must logically pass through the stage of questioning what confrontation, struggle and antagonism actually mean today, who we fight, how we fight and, possibly, whether we still have any meaningful willingness to fight. During the 1970s, Foucault frequently lamented that the proverbial ‘class struggle’ tended to be theorised in critical thought in terms of ‘class’ rather than ‘struggle’, the latter term functioning as a mere metaphor.71 The same problem is still with us today – the proliferation of metaphors (‘culture wars’, ‘wars on drugs’, ‘fight against poverty’) is increasingly obscuring the reflection on the concrete meaning of antagonism in contemporary political life.¶ In the interbellum of the 1990s, one frequently encountered discussions of who the new enemy might be after the demise of the Soviet Union. As subsequent events have demonstrated, it is entirely redundant to attempt a theoretical deduction of the concrete enemy, which is after all always constituted in a political decision. However, while the ‘who’ question may be entrusted to history and politics, what requires reflection is a question of **how enmity is to be managed**. Should we maintain the present ultra-politics of the foe despite its evident boomerang effects on our societies, **or should we attempt to return to the structure of ‘legitimate enmity’** of the Westphalian era, expanding it beyond the European system to the entire international society? Should we put our trust in and surrender our freedom to the governmental apparatuses of ‘homeland security’ or should we heed Schmitt’s warning that no security may ever be attained as long as our sense of the world is that in which there is ‘only a homeland’?¶ This article has demonstrated that **it is impossible to evade these questions** by the plethoric yet repetitive **discourse on overcoming enmity in the chimerical project of ‘world unity’** and that answers to these questions **require an interrogation of many ontological assumptions** that frame the conduct of modern liberal politics. **We have seen that the desire to dispense with enmity as such**, arising out of liberal epistemicomoral certitude, **has not brought about a ‘universal friendship’** but rather produced a limited but universalistic community, **which permanently feels threatened** due to its incomplete embrace of the globe and, for the same reason, **threatens everyone outside itself**. The escape from the murderous ultra-politics of the foe is impossible unless it passes through the stage of an ontological critique of liberalism, hence the present importance of Schmitt.

**The framework of vulnerability presumes that our fear of danger is the cause of global war---by forgoing the reality of conflict, the affirmative’s strategy can only recreate a globalized war on violence**

David **Chandler 9**, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War', Security Dialogue 2009; 40; 243

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. ¶ Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global.¶ Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire¶ The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. ¶ There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:¶ war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. ¶ The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

**That generates total war through paranoia and genocidal conflicts of all against all**

**Reinhard 4** – Kenneth Reinhard, Professor of Jewish Studies at UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology- Of the Neighbor,” online: http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. **A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms** that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one **subject to radical instability**, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: ¶ The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question **would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities**; it would multiply ‘little **wars’ between nation-states**; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or **genocidal struggles**; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, **through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam?** Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) ¶ If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like **global psychosis**: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in **full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia.** ¶Hence, for Schmitt, **a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies**; as Derrida writes, **the disappearance of the enemy** opens the door for “an **unheard-of violence**, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its **unprecedented** – therefore **monstrous** –forms; a **violence** in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

**The alternative is to reject surrender in order to re-ground counter-terror within a framework of proper-political enmity---the aff misreads global war as a result of the US desire for control---the problem with the war on terror is that it is not instrumental or political enough**

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International law evolved on the basis of the ever-present possibility of real war between real enemies. Today’s global wars of humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’ appear to be bypassing or dismantling this framework of international order. Taken out of historical context, today’s period might seem to be analogous to that of the imperial and colonial wars of the last century, which evaded or undermined frameworks of international law, which sought to treat the enemy as a justus hostis – a legitimate opponent to be treated with reciprocal relations of equality. Such analogies have enabled critical theorists to read the present through past frameworks of strategic political contestation, explaining the lack of respect for international law and seemingly arbitrary and ad hoc use of military force on the basis of the high political stakes involved. Agamben’s argument that classical international law has dissipated into a ‘permanent state of exception’, suggesting that we are witnessing a global war machine – constructing the world in the image of the camp and reducing its enemies to bare life to be annihilated at will – appears to be given force by Guantánamo Bay, extraordinary rendition and Abu Ghraib.¶ Yet, once we go beyond the level of declarations of policy values and security stakes, the practices of Western militarism fit uneasily with the policy discourses and suggest a different dynamic: one where the lack of political stakes in the international sphere means that there is little connection between military intervention and strategic planning. In fact, as Laïdi suggests, it would be more useful to understand the projection of violence as a search for meaning and strategy rather than as an instrumental outcome. To take one leading example of the ‘unlimited’ nature of liberal global war: the treatment of terrorist suspects held at Guantánamo Bay, in legal suspension as ‘illegal combatants’ and denied Geneva Red Cross conventions and prisoner-of-war status. The ‘criminalization’ of the captives in Guantánamo Bay is not a case of reducing their status to criminals but the development of an exceptional legal category. In fact, far from criminalizing fundamentalist terrorists, the USA has politically glorified them, talking up their political importance. ¶ It would appear that the designation of ‘illegal combatants’ could be understood as an ad hoc and arbitrary response to the lack of a clear strategic framework and ‘real enemy’. In this context, the concept of criminalization needs to be reconsidered. Guantánamo Bay can be seen instead as an attempt to create an enemy of special status. In fact, with reference to Agamben’s thesis, it would be better to understand the legal status of the ‘illegal combatants’ as sacralizing them rather than reducing them to the status of ‘bare life’. In acting in an exceptional way, the USA attempted to create a more coherent and potent image of the vaguely defined security threat¶ This approach is very different, for example, from the framework of criminalization used by the British government in the fight against Irish republicanism, where the withdrawal of prisoner-of-war status from republican prisoners was intended to delegitimize their struggle and was a strategic act of war. Ironically, whereas the criminalization of the republican struggle was an attempt to dehumanize the republicans – to justify unequal treatment of combatants – the criminalization of global terrorists has served to humanize them in the sense of giving coherence, shape and meaning to a set of individuals with no clear internally generated sense of connection. Far from ‘denying the enemy the very quality of being human’, it would appear that the much-publicized abuses of the ‘war on terror’ stem from the Western inability to cohere a clear view of who the enemy are or of how they should be treated.¶ The policy frameworks of global war attempt to make sense of the implosion of the framework of international order at the same time as articulating the desire to recreate a framework of meaning through policy activity. However, these projections of Western power, even when expressed in coercive and militarized forms, appear to have little connection to strategic or instrumental projects of hegemony. The concept of ‘control’, articulated by authors such as Carl Schmitt and Faisal Devji, seems to be key to understanding the transition from strategic frameworks of conflict to today’s unlimited (i.e. arbitrary) expressions of violence. Wars fought for control, with a socially grounded telluric character, are limited by the needs of instrumental rationality: the goals shape the means deployed. Today’s Western wars are fought in a nonstrategic, non-instrumental framework, which lacks a clear relationship between means and ends and can therefore easily acquire a destabilizing and irrational character. To mistake the arbitrary and unlimited nature of violence and coercion without a clear strategic framework for a heightened desire for control fails to contextualize conflict in the social relations of today.

### Off

#### The United States federal judiciary should substantially increase restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by requiring that persons detained indefinitely receive either civilian trials or be released.

#### Solves the case

Joshua Alexander Geltzer 12, J.D. Yale Law School (2011), the Volume 120 Editor-In-Chief of the Yale Law Journal, law clerk in the chambers of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, February, "ARTICLE: Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process," University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 719, Lexis

In both cases, the invocation of the Due Process Clause's requirement that coerced statements be suppressed suggests one potential consequence of that Clause's extension to Guantanamo: if [\*728] Guantanamo detainees are entitled to due process protections, then the suppression of coerced statements by district courts evaluating habeas petitions from Guantanamo would flow directly from the Supreme Court's constitutional precedent, rather than remaining subject to an evidentiary balancing test involving a mix of semi-constitutional protections and pragmatic concerns about reliability. n36 (Whether Supreme Court precedent in this area itself constitutes essentially a balancing test is another matter.) Of course, suppression of coerced statements is just one of many possible ways in which the applicability of due process could affect courts' continuing evaluations of habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees: others might include the standard of proof, n37 the ability to present and to [\*729] exclude various types of evidence, n38 and the right to cross-examine witnesses. Indeed, to the extent that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is thought to offer the same protections against the federal government offered against the state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, n39 finding the Due Process Clause applicable to Guantanamo would essentially carry with it the rest of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights.¶ More specifically, a second consequence of the potential applicability of the Due Process Clause to Guantanamo would be the narrowing of the executive branch's discretion in resettling detainees cleared for release. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the D.C. Circuit's post-Boumediene statement of the inapplicability of due process to Guantanamo emerged in precisely this context, as Uighur detainees long cleared for release but lacking a viable destination for resettlement sought entry to the United States. n40 Other detainees also have objected to the destinations in which the United States has intended to resettle them. n41 If due process were found applicable to [\*730] such individuals, then their constitutional claims to entry onto American soil, or at least to a voice in their eventual destination, would be strengthened greatly. Moreover, the absence of due process rights also contributed to the D.C. Circuit's subsequent holding that the decision of where to resettle the Uighurs was immune from judicial challenge by the detainees and, instead, remained at the discretion of the political branches. n42 If due process were to apply to Guantanamo detainees, then their claim to a legally protected voice in their own resettlement would be significantly enhanced. Even short of that result, the applicability of due process could suggest a temporal limit on how long such detainees could be held once cleared for release. n43¶ Third, former Guantanamo detainees have begun filing civil lawsuits seeking compensation from the U.S. government for their alleged treatment while detained at Guantanamo. For example, one representative case filed in the Western District of Washington alleges torture and abuse, and identifies as the basis for its cause of action alleged violations of the Due Process Clause. n44 These civil suits are so-called Bivens actions in that they allege constitutional violations by federal agents, allegations permitted to go forward by the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. n45 A Bivens action [\*731] is only as credible as the constitutional right that it alleges to have been violated; in other words, if the former detainees possessed no due process rights at Guantanamo, then they may have no viable Bivens actions, either. n46 While there are numerous other potential obstacles to the detainees prevailing in their suits, including pleading requirements, n47 immunity claims, n48 and potential invocations of state secrets, n49 if there is no fundamental due process protection at Guantanamo, then the suits may lack even rudimentary foundations. In contrast, if due process does apply, then litigation is more likely to move forward, even if the aforementioned obstacles eventually become significant hurdles to plaintiffs prevailing on the merits.¶ Fourth, the applicability of due process to Guantanamo could alter dramatically the military commissions that continue to be held there. Because military commissions and courts-martial are not Article III trials but, instead, constitute Article I proceedings, the protections of the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, do not automatically apply to them. In 1994, the Supreme Court noted the President's authority to regulate military proceedings and explained: "We have never had occasion to consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or the attendant right to counsel during custodial interrogation, applies of its own force to the military, and we need not do so here." n50¶ The same uncertainty about the applicability of constitutional protections to military proceedings persists more broadly. n51 To be [\*732] sure, the current rules for military commissions, enacted by Congress and the President precisely to try current detainees at Guantanamo, depart significantly from constitutional guarantees, perhaps most notably in the admissibility of hearsay. n52 If the Due Process Clause were deemed applicable to Guantanamo, then military commissions might well have to conform to safeguards protected in civilian trials in ways that the commissions currently do not. Moreover, just as due process would require suppression of coerced statements in habeas petitions in civilian court, so, too, might due process require suppression of those statements in military commissions, in contrast to the ruling of at least one military commission admitting such statements. n53 In light of the Obama Administration's announcement that, after congressional urging, military commissions will recommence at Guantanamo, n54 the potential consequences of finding due process applicable to those proceedings are particularly salient and significant.¶ Other effects on ongoing litigation of an extension of due process rights to Guantanamo are conceivable. Moreover, extending due process to Guantanamo could have an impact outside of courtrooms: the daily treatment of detainees might well have to change, with potentially freer access to counsel and to outside information, n55 as well as the provision of other measures generally afforded to those held in pre-trial detention on American soil. Simply put, deriving from Boumediene an understanding of whether the Due Process Clause accompanies the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo is not just a fascinating question of constitutional law: it is also a pressing issue for which the legal and practical stakes are sizable. n56

### Off

#### The aff results in catastrophic terrorism---releases terrorists and kills intel gathering

Jack Goldsmith 9, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, 2/4/09, “Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/2/09%20detention%20goldsmith/0209\_detention\_goldsmith.pdf

These three concerns challenge the detention paradigm. They do nothing to eliminate the need for detention to prevent detainees returning to the battlefield. But many believe that we can meet this need by giving trials to everyone we want to detain and then incarcerating them under a theory of conviction rather than of military detention. I disagree. For many reasons, it is too risky for the U.S. government to deny itself the traditional military detention power altogether, and to commit itself instead to try or release every suspected terrorist. ¶ For one thing, military detention will be necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. For another, we likely cannot secure convictions of all of the dangerous terrorists at Guantánamo, much less all future dangerous terrorists, who legitimately qualify for non-criminal military detention. The evidentiary and procedural standards of trials, civilian and military alike, are much higher than the analogous standards for detention. With some terrorists too menacing to set free, the standards will prove difficult to satisfy. Key evidence in a given case may come from overseas and verifying it, understanding its provenance, or establishing its chain of custody in the manners required by criminal trials may be difficult. This problem is exacerbated when evidence was gathered on a battlefield or during an armed skirmish. The problem only grows when the evidence is old. And perhaps most importantly, the use of such evidence in a criminal process may compromise intelligence sources and methods, requiring the disclosure of the identities of confidential sources or the nature of intelligence-gathering techniques, such as a sophisticated electronic interception capability. ¶ Opponents of non-criminal detention observe that despite these considerations, the government has successfully prosecuted some Al Qaeda terrorists—in particular, Zacharias Moussaoui and Jose Padilla. This is true, but it does not follow that prosecutions are achievable in every case in which disabling a terrorist suspect represents a surpassing government interest. Moreover, the Moussaoui and Padilla prosecutions highlight an under-appreciated cost of trials, at least in civilian courts. The Moussaoui and Padilla trials were messy affairs that stretched, and some observers believe broke, our ordinary criminal trial conceptions of conspiracy law and the rights of the accused, among other things. The Moussaoui trial, for example, watered down the important constitutional right of the defendant to confront witnesses against him in court, and the Padilla trial rested on an unprecedentedly broad conception of conspiracy.15 An important but under-appreciated cost of using trials in all cases is that these prosecutions will invariably bend the law in ways unfavorable to civil liberties and due process, and these changes, in turn, will invariably spill over into non-terrorist prosecutions and thus skew the larger criminal justice process.16¶ A final problem with using any trial system, civilian or military, as the sole lawful basis for terrorist detention is that the trials can result in short sentences (as the first military commission trial did) or even acquittal of a dangerous terrorist.17 In criminal trials, guilty defendants often go free because of legal technicalities, government inability to introduce probative evidence, and other factors beyond the defendant's innocence. These factors are all exacerbated in terrorist trials by the difficulties of getting information from the place of capture, by classified information restrictions, and by stale or tainted evidence. One way to get around this problem is to assert the authority, as the Bush administration did, to use non-criminal detention for persons acquitted or given sentences too short to neutralize the danger they pose. But such an authority would undermine the whole purpose of trials and would render them a sham. As a result, putting a suspect on trial can make it hard to detain terrorists the government deems dangerous. For example, the government would have had little trouble defending the indefinite detention of Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden's driver, under a military detention rationale. Having put him on trial before a military commission, however, it was stuck with the light sentence that Hamdan is completing at home in Yemen.¶ As a result of these considerations, insistence on the exclusive use of criminal trials and the elimination of non-criminal detention would significantly raise the chances of releasing dangerous terrorists who would return to kill Americans or others. Since noncriminal military detention is clearly a legally available option—at least if it is expressly authorized by Congress and contains adequate procedural guarantees—this risk should be unacceptable. In past military conflicts, the release of an enemy soldier posed risks. But they were not dramatic risks, for there was only so much damage a lone actor or small group of individuals could do.18 Today, however, that lone actor can cause far more destruction and mayhem because technological advances are creating ever-smaller and ever-deadlier weapons. It would be astounding if the American system, before the advent of modern terrorism, struck the balance between security and liberty in a manner that precisely reflected the new threats posed by asymmetric warfare. We face threats from individuals today that are of a different magnitude than threats by individuals in the past; having government authorities that reflect that change makes sense.

**High risk of nuke terror---escalates and turns the case because civil-liberties crackdowns**

Vladimir Z. **Dvorkin 12** Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “**dirty bombs**” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of **panic and socio-economic destabilization**.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that **well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities**.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. **Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible**. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is **comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima**. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. **The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order**.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

**Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key**

Nathan **Myhrvold '13**, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a different set of technology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such ¶ a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our **military and intelligence capabilities** from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by **repeatedly attacking** us or hectoring **us for decades**.

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars** most associated with the critique of empiricismimplied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

### Off

#### Farm bill will pass but it’s very close --- impact is food price spikes

Reuters 11/11/13, “U.S. Congress has about 50/50 chance of passing farm bill in 2013 –analyst,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/usa-agriculture-farm-bill-idUSL2N0IX01T20131112

Nov 11 (Reuters) - The chances of the U.S. Congress passing a five-year farm bill by year's end are a little better than 50/50 given the gridlock over food stamps for the poor, a top farm policy expert said on Monday.¶ "There is a slightly better chance than 50/50 that we will get a bill rolled into a budget at the end of the year. But it's no better than that," Barry Flinchbaugh, a Kansas State University agricultural economist who advises legislators shaping the U.S. farm bill, told Reuters on the sidelines of a farm bankers meeting in Minneapolis.¶ The farm bill, already a year behind schedule, is the master legislation that directs government supports for farmers and food aid programs.¶ The bill is now with a conference committee of 41 members of Congress who are hammering out the difference between the House and Senate bills. The biggest difference: the Senate wants $4 billion cut from food stamps while the House wants to reduce the program by $40 billion.¶ "Food is the only division. The other issues can be settled," said Flinchbaugh, citing variations in how they address crop insurance for farmers along with other subsidies.¶ Historically, the conference committee reconciles differences and brings a compromise to a final vote. That process has been hampered by the deep divisions between the Republican-controlled House and the Senate, where Democrats are in the majority.¶ "There is a way perhaps we can get past this food stamp gridlock. We cut food stamps $6-$8 billion and then we put in all these caveats the far right wants to put in the food stamp program, like work requirements and drug tests," said Flinchbaugh, who has advised on farm policy for over 40 years.¶ The government extended the expired 2008 farm bill last year. Leaders of the House and Senate agricultural committees have a self-imposed deadline of reaching agreement by Thanksgiving and the White House has threatened to veto a bill with large food stamp cuts.¶ If Congress fails to pass a new bill, a second extension is likely, Flinchbaugh said.¶ "There is some talk we will do that for two years because we don't want to be messing with this during an election year," Flinchbaugh said. "Or, we implement the permanent legislation."¶ Without a new law, U.S. farm policy will be dictated by an underlying 1938 permanent law that would bring back the concept of "price parity" which led to sharply higher guaranteed crop prices, Flinchbaugh said.

#### Plan wrecks PC

Douglas L. Kriner 10, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 68-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital

Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea."¶ While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.60¶ In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's highest second-term domestic priorities, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61¶ When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### PC is key --- overcomes partisanship

Josh Lederman 10/18/13, reporter for the Associated Press, and Jim Kuhnhenn, “No safe bets for Obama despite toned-down agenda,” US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/10/18/no-safe-bets-for-obama-despite-toned-down-agenda

WASHINGTON (AP) — Regrouping after a feud with Congress stalled his agenda, President Barack Obama is laying down a three-item to-do list for Congress that seems meager when compared with the bold, progressive agenda he envisioned at the start of his second term.¶ But given the capital's partisanship, the complexities of the issues and the limited time left, even those items — immigration, farm legislation and a budget — amount to ambitious goals that will take political muscle, skill and ever-elusive compromise to execute.¶ "Those are three specific things that would make a huge difference in our economy right now," Obama said. "And we could get them done by the end of the year if our focus is on what's good for the American people."

#### New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

## Case

### 1NC Shift DA

#### Restricting detention policies means we kill and extradite prisoners

Jack Goldsmith 09, a professor at Harvard Law School and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, assistant attorney general in the Bush administration, 5/31/09, “The Shell Game on Detainees and Interrogation,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052902989.html>

The cat-and-mouse game does not end there. As detentions at Bagram and traditional renditions have come under increasing legal and political scrutiny, the Bush and Obama administrations have relied more on other tactics. They have secured foreign intelligence services to do all the work -- capture, incarceration and interrogation -- for all but the highest-level detainees. And they have increasingly employed targeted killings, a tactic that eliminates the need to interrogate or incarcerate terrorists but at the cost of killing or maiming suspected terrorists and innocent civilians alike without notice or due process.¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.¶ The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.¶ It is tempting to say that we should end this pattern and raise standards everywhere. Perhaps we should extend habeas corpus globally, eliminate targeted killing and cease cooperating with intelligence services from countries that have poor human rights records. This sentiment, however, is unrealistic. The imperative to stop the terrorists is not going away. The government will find and exploit legal loopholes to ensure it can keep up our defenses.¶ This approach to detention policy reflects a sharp disjunction between the public's view of the terrorist threat and the government's. After nearly eight years without a follow-up attack, the public (or at least an influential sliver) is growing doubtful about the threat of terrorism and skeptical about using the lower-than-normal standards of wartime justice.¶ The government, however, sees the terrorist threat every day and is under enormous pressure to keep the country safe. When one of its approaches to terrorist incapacitation becomes too costly legally or politically, it shifts to others that raise fewer legal and political problems. This doesn't increase our safety or help the terrorists. But it does make us feel better about ourselves.

### 1NC No Bare Life Impact

#### The prisoners are not bare life—there are rules that prevent true reduction

Halit Tagma 09, Professor of Political Science, Arizona State , “Homo Sacer vs. Homo Soccer Mom: Reading Agamben and Foucault in the War on Terror,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 2009), pp. 407-435

Thus in some respects, prisoners of the "war on terror" might be understood as homo sacer. However, there are also particularities in the way the prisoners are handled that call for a critical re-evaluation of the (non) space of Guántanamo. If in the classical Foucauldian teminology sovereign power is about "taking or granting life," and biopower is about "letting live and making life," then what can be said about the power operating in Guántanamo that "forces to live" when prisoners are carefully controlled to prevent them from committing suicide. Indeed, the prisoners of Guántanamo are force fed and even given mandatory health checks so as to insure they are kept, barely, alive. Unlike the homo sacer who may be killed but not sacrificed, the prisoners in Guantánamo may not be killed or sacrificed. In fact, extensive efforts are spent to keep the prisoners at Guantánamo alive, such as the creation of operating rooms for major health emergencies as well as facilities for dentistry. The prisoners are given health treatment similar to that provided to the troops at the base.60 No doubt the display of such "health benefits" could be read as window dressing conducted by the camp administrators. However, it is important to note that there are indeed serious efforts to keep the prisoners (often barely, but nevertheless) alive. Furthermore, punishment and interro- gation are orchestrated so that the use of violence does not result in death. Extensive efforts are made to prevent the prisoners from com- mitting suicide. In other cases, hunger-striking inmates have met with brutal forced feeding.61 Thus, in a striking unclassified army document that outlines procedures in Guántanamo Bay, guards are ordered to "defend detainees as you would yourself against a hostile act or intent, death, or serious bodily harm."62 Therefore it is correct to say that what goes in Guantánamo Bay is neither "letting live" nor "taking life," but instead "making live," or even "forcing to live."¶ Agamben argues that camps are places where sovereign "power confronts nothing but pure life."63 Guantánamo Bay, declared as being beyond the reach of law, is, in fact, regulated by many petty regulations that are characteristic of disciplinary power. Reading the re- ports of the Joint Task Force and prisoner testimonies, one comes to the conclusion that there is a plethora of rules and procedures that govern the treatment of Guántanamo prisoners.64 Whereas Agamben's statement on "zones of indistinction" would lead us to think that any- thing goes in the camp, this is far from the reality of Guántanamo. Every minuscule element of the lives of Guántanamo prisoners been planned and is, for the most part, regulated by a written a code of conduct. Many foreseeable and probable occurrences that would be expected in a prison population have been forethought and written into a manual. Titled Standard Operating Procedures this 250-page manual outlines the rules, regulations, and procedures for treatment of prisoners in many probable circumstances.65 The manual outlines, for example, what to do if there is a petty riot, when and how to spray pepper spray on rioters, religious burials rituals for prisoners, and so on.66 This clearly hints that it is not just an exceptional sovereign power at work in Guántanamo, as exemplified in Rumsfeldian rhetorical salvos on "exceptional times requiring exceptional measures." In- stead, there are multiple technologies of power that are at work in the day-to-day administration of this space.67

### 1NC Util

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences**

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse,)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

### AT: Patriarchy

#### Patriarchy isn’t the root cause of war

Goldstein, IR prof, 1—Professor of International Relations at American University, 2001 (Joshua S., War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412)

I began this book hoping to contribute in some way to a deeper understanding of war – an understanding that would improve the chances of someday achieving real peace, by deleting war from our human repertoire. In following the thread of gender running through war, I found the deeper understanding I had hoped for – a multidisciplinary and multilevel engagement with the subject. Yet I became somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end. The war system emerges, from the evidence in this book, as relatively ubiquitous and robust. Efforts to change this system must overcome several dilemmas mentioned in this book. First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

### AT: Endless War

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

### AT: Scheper-Hughes

#### Their Scheper-Hughes impact ev is wrong---everyday violence doesn’t cause war and genocide because of significant differences in the degree of intentionality

Bradby & Hundt 10 – Hannah Bradby, Co-Director of the Institute of Health at the University of Warwick, Lecturer in Sociology at Warwick Medical School, and Gillian Lewando Hundt, Professor of Social Sciences in Health at the University of Warwick, 2010, “Introduction,” in Global perspectives on war, gender and health: the sociology and anthropology of suffering, p. 5-6

Far from being a uniquely horrific activity Scheper-Hughes (2002) views genocide as an extension of the dehumanising processes identifiable in many daily interactions. Drawing on analysis of the holocaust as the outcome of the general features of modernity, Scheper-Hughes posits a ‘genocidal continuum’ that connects daily, routine suffering and concomitant insults to a person’s humanity with genocide (Scheper-Hughes 2002: 371). The institutional ‘destruction of personhood’, as seen in the withdrawal of humane empathy from the poor or the elderly, creates the conditions which eventually make genocide possible.

The argument that conditions of modernity including western rational legal metaphysics facilitate genocide has been criticised as too unifying and as conferring ‘super-eminence’ on the holocaust (Rose 1996: 11). The holocaust has become a crucial emblem through which we have sought to understand subsequent violence, wars and genocides. But the centrality of the holocaust in developing European thinking around conflict and suffering has made the resultant theoretical perspectives difficult to apply in non-European settings and in instances where conflict is less focussed around a clash of ideology. While the scale of the death toll of the holocaust should continue to shock, as should the organised nature of the attempted destruction of Jews, Roma, Gays and the disabled, there is very little to be gained in comparing scales or forms of suffering. It should be possible to use the study of the holocaust to inform understanding of other genocides in the context of other wars, to interrogate the link between war and suffering and to think through gendered perspectives without essentialising gender or making it the only explanatory variable.

This collection does not primarily seek to add to the discussion of the role of the holocaust in theories of human suffering. Our chapters are, however, an unfortunate witness to the fact that despite contemporary hopes and the scale of combatant and non-combatants deaths, the two World Wars were not the wars to end all wars. Rather wars, and their associated suffering, have been ongoing ever since, both in Europe and beyond.

War and Medicine

While structural approaches can problematise a division between intentional and unintentional suffering, intentionality is nonetheless crucial to the contradictory relationship that war and medicine have with suffering. War is an organised conflict between two military groups and armed conflict is bound to be accompanied by suffering. Although ‘rules of engagement’ and the rhetoric of ‘targeted interventions’ deploying ‘surgical strikes’ suggest that ‘unnecessary’ blood shed can be avoided, war entails suffering, even if this is restricted to combatants. A limited, or targeted war is an oxymoron since war tends to be found in company with the other horsemen of the apocalypse, that is, pestilence, famine and death. Moreover, while the effect of war on soldiers is closely monitored by both sides, the disproportionate way in which the apocalyptic horsemen affect non-combatants and particularly those who are already disempowered such as women, the old and the young, has been less subject to scrutiny.

# Block

## K

**2NC Enmity Inev**

**Ignoring evolutionary predisposition to violence and friend/enemy distinctions triggers mass violence---recognizing it is key to containing it and limiting violence**

**Dimijian 10** Dr. Gregory G. Dimijianm, Department of Psychiatry, The University of Texas Southwestern Medical School "Warfare, genocide, and ethnic conflict: a Darwinian approach" Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent) July; 23(3): 292–300. [www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2900985/](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2900985/)

We have neglected to teach the evolution of human nature to children—very young children—when they are forming their fundamental ideas about human behavior. We now know that the we-they dichotomy is a **feature of human nature** in **all cultures and across history**, and we are beginning to see how it may have evolved through **group selection**. If we teach children that outgroup hostility is a product of evolutionary logic, there is hope that they will see it as a **deep-rooted behavioral predisposition** to be **always aware of.¶** The golden opportunity to teach children about the dangers of we-they comes in their school years when they see examples all around. In schools one sees arbitrary social divisions created by the children themselves, based on clothing styles, ethnic identity, academic standing, skin color, sports team, fraternities, sororities, even the kind of car an older child drives.¶ Is Figure ​Figure1111 simply a page from a child's coloring book? Take another look. The Nazis used their educational system to demean, even to dehumanize, Jews, by incorporating their xenophobia into the everyday life of their children.¶ One page of an antisemitic coloring book widely distributed to children with a portrait of a Jew drawn by the German caricaturist known as Fips. In the upper left hand corner is the Der Stürmer logo featuring a Star of David superimposed over (more ...)¶ “Look around you,” we can tell them. These are the seeds of **dangerous adult conflicts** which **cross every conceivable boundary**. Very graphic examples are in the news every day and in the personal family histories of many. The teaching must be sensitively planned and pursued year after year.¶ This is no easy task if a child goes home and reports that he is being taught to respect and appreciate all other people, even if a clear distinction is made between respecting another person but not respecting their behavior. What if his family harbors a deep bitterness toward another ethnic or political group? Is he supposed to defy his own family's values? Family intervention may become a necessary part of the educational challenge.¶ It may take generations before the reality sinks in that **the dark side of human nature is to be feared and taken seriously**—in everyone, including you and me. Our large brains are unique in nature in being endowed with the ability to understand what's wrong with them and to work to overcome destructive behaviors that have been chiseled into them by natural selection. “Nature, Mr. Allnutt, is what we were put in this world to rise above.”¶ CLOSING THOUGHTS¶ In The Youngest Science, Lewis Thomas argued that civilization would be much improved if men retired for 100 years and allowed women to run everything.¶ I am, in short, swept off my feet by women, and I do not think they have yet been assigned the place in the world's affairs that they are biologically made for. Somewhere in that other X chromosome are coils of nucleic acid containing information for a qualitatively different sort of behavior from the instructions in the average Y chromosome. The difference is there, I think, for the long-term needs of the species, and it has something to do with spotting things of great importance (37).¶ I would like to see Thomas's wish come true. There is a caveat, however. If violent traits are more characteristic of men than of women, and if they are represented in genetic predispositions toward violence, how did those traits evolve? If they evolved by female choice (intersexual selection), then women have played a role. Could women have consciously or unconsciously (or both) favored mating with men who were strong and more aggressive, thus contributing to the spread of such predisposing genes, especially in their sons?¶ Or instead, did male-male competition (intrasexual selection) favor violence in men? Could men who were more inclined to be violent have more reproductive success than other men? Could both inter- and intrasexual selection have worked together to predispose men to violence? In addition, there is still the possibility of group selection, as discussed above, contributing to 1) ingroup cohesion and altruism and 2) outgroup hostility, in both men and women.¶ **Powerful reasons exist**, then, to consider **evolutionary predispositions to warfare, genocide, ethnic conflict**, and any other kind of **we-they segregation**. If these **innate predispositions exist**, we must acknowledge and understand them to **combat their devastating consequences**. We have come full circle to the three-tiered bridge of biology, culture, and development. **We disregard any of these levels at our peril**. Humans bond, love, spend a lifetime giving to others, yet **can also be cruel and commit atrocities** **on a vast scale**. The paradox of a bright side and a dark side coexisting in human nature is deeply **buried in ignorance**, ignorance born of turning our head the other way when there are rich opportunities to understand the evolutionary origins of the paradox.

**Refusing to demarcate terrorists doesn’t eliminate conflict – instead ---the drive to exclude becomes more violent --- such as preemptive strikes against terrorists before they reach they even reach the border**

**Prozorov 6** – Sergei Prozorov, collegium fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Politics and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State University, Russia, 2006, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 75-99

At the same time, the practical implementation of such a project is hardly conceivable as encountering no resistance. The project of world unity and the effacement of exteriority is therefore **bound to have its own enemies**, insofar as **alterity is ontologically ineradicable**. **Letting the Other into the global ‘homeland’** **does not eliminate** the **‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict** but makes it **impossible to manage it** **through the pluralistic disjunction of the Self and the Other**. In the world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, **radical alterity has no place**, both literally and figuratively. In this setting, **conflict appears no longer merely possible but actually inevitable**, as the Other is certain to resist its violent inclusion into the homeland of liberal humanity. Yet, having disposed of genuine political pluralism, liberalism finds itself lacking in any instruments to protect its universal homeland other than the **absolute existential negation of the Other** that parallels the conceptual negation of alterity in liberal monism. Thus, the universalisation of the liberal disposition to embrace the entire humanity **actualises the ‘most extreme possibility’** either by exposing the Self to the resentful violence of the Othoer or by **annihilating the Other to eliminate the former existential threat**. It is here that enmity, foreclosed in the symbolic register of liberalism with its monistic universalism, returns with a vengeance, since the sole consequence of the deployment of the concept of humanity as the referent of the liberal political project is the inevitable designation of the adversaries of this project in terms of the **negation of humanity** as, in a strict sense, **inhuman beings**:¶ When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress and civilisation in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the enemy.50¶ Indeed, denial is a central category in the discursive transformation of the enemy into the foe – through manifold gestures of denial the enemy is reduced to the purely negative figure that reminds us of Agamben’s homo sacer, a bare life that is both worthless and undesirable: ‘The enemy is easily expropriated of his human quality. He is declared an outlaw of humanity. … The absolute enemy encounters an undivided humanity that regards him as already always proscribed by God or by nature.’51 The effect of the liberal **foreclosure of enmity**, i.e. its bracketing off from the political discourse, is ironically **the de-bracketing of violence**, **its deregulation and intensification**, whereby the enemy is **absolutised as the inhuman monster**, ‘the negative pole of the distinction, [that] is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder’.52 In line with Zizek’s diagnosis of ultra-politics, **depoliticisation brings about** nothing other than **an extreme politicisation**, which can no longer be contained within the symbolic dimension of potentiality but **must pass into the actuality of existential negation**: “Depoliticisation is a political act in a particularly intense way.”53 It is thus **the liberal ‘peace project’ itself** that **produces its own opposite** or perhaps reveals its own essence in the guise of its antithesis.¶ As Schmitt notes, the practice of the constitution of the foe through the exclusion of ‘concrete Others’ from the abstract category of ‘humanity’ lends itself to **infinite replication and generalisation**: while one of the justifications for the extermination of American Indians consisted in the attribution to them of the crime of ‘eating human flesh’, ‘as civilisation progresses and morality rises, even less harmful things than devouring human flesh could perhaps qualify as deserving to be outlawed in such a manner. Maybe one day it will be enough if a people were unable to pay its debts.’54 In the following section we shall discuss the way in which Schmitt’s prophecy is being fulfilled through the proliferation of categories of population, whose acts and properties are deemed to be ‘proscribed by nature itself’.

**Cognitive psychology proves that evolution and neurology hardwire collective violence and the creation of friends and enemies into human nature---and, cog-sci is the most robust and effective methodology**

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4.4. Proximate psychological mechanisms and processes¶ A final important source of **evidence for evolutionary approaches to collective violence** comes from a **fairly extensive body of research in social, personality and cognitive psychology** which has examined the nature of social groups, inter-group relations, and the mechanisms and processes that might facilitate the perpetration of violence against others (in particular, other groups). This research is important, because not only does it **elucidate the proximate mechanisms that underpin collective violence**, but it also might provide insights into whether **the mind appears specifically “designed” to engage in collective violence**. In particular, we should be especially interested in mechanisms that appear to efficiently, precisely, and specifically promote collective violence in circumstances that would have been most likely to advance reproductive fitness.¶ At a proximate level, I suggest that two mechanisms or processes are necessary for collective violence to occur: (1) the capacity for coordinated collective action; and (2) an ability to differentiate in-group from out-group members. In addition, four key mechanisms or processes are likely to be important in facilitating collective violence: (1) a tendency to favour in-group members over out-group members (parochial altruism); (2) a tendency to be distrustful or hostile towards out-group members (xenophobia); (3) a capacity to selectively disengage “normal” emotional responses that inhibit the killing of conspecifics; and (4) an ability to facultatively engage in collective violence (or the threat of collective violence) under specific – adaptively relevant – circumstances.¶ Clearly humans have the capacity to engage in collective action: individuals are able to successfully coordinate their behaviour in order to achieve common goals. Coalitional behaviour is common in a wide range of primate species, although arguably the human capacity for coordinated action is unprecedented in terms of its precision and scale. It is easy to take this ability as given, but it depends on (or at least is facilitated by) the existence of moral emotions such as shame, guilt and pride, the ability and motivation to sanction free riders (what Fehr & Gächter, 2002 term “altruistic punishment”) and cognitive capacities such as “mind reading”, joint attention, and language. Without the ability to engage in collective action, warfare and other forms of collective violence would not be possible. However, given the widespread existence of coalitional behaviour in primates and the evolutionary benefits of co-operative behaviour (e.g., in collective foraging, scavenging, hunting, and predator defence) it is unlikely that our capacity for collective action has been specifically selected for inter-group violence, although once in place collective violence may favour the evolution of more effective and sophisticated coalitional mechanisms as groups (and individual group members) that are better able to coordinate the behaviour of their members are more successful relative to less coordinated groups.¶ **As many decades of research** in social psychology have demonstrated, **humans also clearly have the capacity for differentiating in-group from out-group members**, although there remains some debate regarding the mechanisms that enable this to occur. One possibility is that our ability to discriminate in-groups from out-groups is the by-product of general cognitive mechanisms underlying our classification and categorisation abilities (Gil-White, 2001). Cosmides, Tooby and Kurzban (2003), however, argue that group classification arises from psychological mechanisms that detect and track coalitions and alliances. Essentially in-group members are those that engage in coordinated cooperative behaviour. Our capacity to categorise individuals into groups is also strongly facilitated by the existence of – relatively hard to fake – “ethnic markers” such as language (including dialects), belief systems, styles of dress, food preferences and practises, and social norms ( [McElreath et al., 2003] and [Richerson and Boyd, 2005] ). McElreath et al. (2003) argue that such ethnic markers provide an indication that an individual shares the same social norms and hence is likely to cooperate with other group members. Humans, then, have the capacity to develop a sense of “collective identity” based on perceptions of coordinated activity, common fate, shared norms, values and attitudes, and a sense of collective history (David & Bar-Tal, 2009).¶ Social psychological research also demonstrates that humans have a **tendency to both favour in-group members** over out-group members and to **treat out-group members with suspicion, animosity, and hostility**. These two processes, however, appear to operate relatively independently from each other: that is, favouring in-group members doesn't necessarily imply overt hostility towards the out-group (Cashdan, 2001) although the two processes often go hand in hand (Hogg & Abrams, 2003). The ease with which humans can identify with – even arbitrarily defined – groups is **testimony to our enduring “need to belong**” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and has been demonstrated in numerous so-called “minimal group” experiments. The tendency to appraise in-group members more positively is also a robust social psychological phenomenon and **humans seem to readily display distrust**, **animosity and hostility towards out-group members** (Schaller & Neuberg, 2008), but this capacity seems much more fluid and context dependent (Hogg & Abrams, 2003). This pattern seems to be consistent with the idea that the identification with, and favouring of, in-groups is a relatively obligate feature of our nature, whereas our attitudes towards out-group members is more contingent on specific contexts. We may, however, be prone to develop negative responses to out-group members fairly readily (Schaller & Neuberg, 2008), and there is some emerging research to suggest that **the processes underlying ethnocentrism may be modulated at the neural level by the peptide, oxytocin** ( [De Dreu et al., 2011] and [De Dreu et al., 2010] ). From an evolutionary perspective, although there may be a number of reasons to be wary of out-group members (including disease avoidance — see Faulkner, Schaller, Park & Duncan, 2004), there are also benefits from peaceful and cooperative relations with out-groups and hence we might expect relatively flexible responses.¶ Many scholars have noted that humans appear to have a strong reluctance to killing their conspecifics, even if they are members of other groups and even in times of inter-group conflict (e.g., [Grossman, 1996] and [Roscoe, 2007] ; Smith, 2007). Grossman (1996), for instance, describes how a significant proportion of soldiers fail to fire their weapons or deliberately aim to miss their opponents during episodes of armed conflict. The reluctance that humans have in killing others is likely to largely reflect the evolution of emotions such as empathy (de Waal, 2008) and compassion (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010), which have evolved to facilitate altruistic and caring behaviour. Strong normative proscriptions against killing in most contexts are also largely universal in human groups and are often reinforced through explicit (though often inconsistent) religious endorsement.¶ [Bandura, 1999] and [Bandura, 2002] provides a useful model for understanding how normal moral mechanisms that inhibit killing in most circumstances may become disengaged in some contexts, particularly those involving collective violence. Bandura argues that moral agency can be disengaged through four processes. First, reprehensible conduct can be reconstrued through moral justification (e.g., the war was necessary to prevent the deployment of weapons of mass destruction or to depose a despot) or through a process of euphemistic labelling (e.g., civilian deaths are “collateral damage”). Second, responsibility for reprehensible conduct can be attenuated through diffusion (e.g., everyone is acting together and so no one is responsible) or displacement (e.g., I was just following orders) of responsibility. Third, the detrimental effects of the conduct can be minimised or ignored (e.g., through killing at a distance). Finally, through a process of blaming victims (“they initiated the conflict”) or dehumanising them (the enemy are “vermin” or “cockroaches”), killing becomes easier.¶ The existence of these processes is well documented during times of war, genocide, and other instances of collective violence and it is clear that humans have the capacity to suspend or disengage normal emotional and cognitive processes that inhibit killing in some contexts. It is less clear, however, how best to characterise these mechanisms. Smith (2007) argues that these mechanisms, especially the process of dehumanisation, can be viewed as psychological adaptations that have been selected for to “allow” humans to engage in episodes of collective violence. In particular, he suggests that during war the enemy may be viewed as “sub-human” because evolved predator detection modules are switched on that allow them to be viewed as dangerous predators or game, or anti-parasite modules are activated that allow them to be viewed as dangerous pathogens or parasites (see also Faulkner et al., 2004). However, for at least some of the mechanisms of moral disengagement posited by Bandura (e.g., moral justification, euphemistic labelling, blaming the victim), it is possible that they reflect, in part, conscious cognitive “rationalisations” that are deliberately employed so as to reduce the psychological consequence of inflicting harm on others. In practise it may be very hard to disentangle these possibilities as the end-product looks much the same regardless of whether they are largely unconscious product of specific evolved psychological mechanisms or whether they reflect largely conscious cognitive manoeuvres in order to maintain psychological equanimity.¶ If our capacity for collective violence is an adaptation we might expect mechanisms to operate in a facultative fashion, facilitating collective violence when it is likely to lead to the most benefits relative to costs. Research in this area is relatively limited; however, support for intergroup conflict appears to be more positive after instances of out-group aggression (e.g., [Carnagey and Anderson, 2007] and [Cheung-Blunden and Blunden, 2008] ), and under conditions of threat there is a tendency to categorise unfamiliar individuals as out-group members (Miller, Maner, & Becker, 2010). Moreover, consistent with evolutionary approaches that emphasise that collective violence is largely a male phenomenon, intergroup bias appears to be largely directed at males and results in different responses by males and females under threatening conditions with males more likely to respond to inter-group threats with aggression towards out-group members ( [Navarrete et al., 2010] and [Van Vugt et al., 2007] ).¶ 5. Evaluating evolutionary approaches to collective violence¶ The **available evidence** is **certainly consistent** with the view that **our capacity for collective violence has been selected for [us] during the course of our evolutionary history**. **This would explain the** **seeming ubiquity of war, genocide and other forms of group violence** in human societies and would account for the **psychological mechanisms and processes** that **parse humans into in-group and out-group members** and facilitate cooperation among the former and hostility against the latter. One distinct possibility, championed by a number of scholars, is that our capacity for coalitional aggression was a feature of our **shared common ancestor with chimpanzees** and thus has been an enduring part of hominid evolution.¶ The idea that our capacity for collective violence is a by-product, however, cannot be ruled out. The absence of clear evidence for warfare prior to the Mesolithic, doubts over the phylogenetic continuity of coalitional aggression, and the possibility that psychological mechanisms that facilitate collective violence have evolved primarily for in-group cooperation (and, perhaps, out-group avoidance) makes this alternative a viable possibility. **However**, **the idea that warfare is entirely a “cultural invention**” **emerging in a number of places and then spreading by diffusion** (along the lines of writing), or that is can be explained entirely as the product of general intelligence and “rational choice” **do not adequately explain the relevant evidence**. In other words, **although it is possible** that collective violence is a by-product of other evolved adaptations, the relevant adaptations are likely to relate specifically to intra and inter-group behaviour and reflect mechanisms that lead humans to favour in-group over out-group members.

### Nazi

#### Scholarly consensus agrees Schmitt’s arguments are valid and useful despite his Nazi affiliation

Odysseos & Petito 7 – Louiza Odysseos, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Sussex, and Fabio Petito, teaches International Relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, and the University ‘L’Orientale’ in Naples, 2007, “Introduction The international political thought of Carl Schmitt,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 2

This neglect is, perhaps, partly explained by the fact the Nomos was only made available in English in 2003. Moreover, the reluctance of International Relations to engage with Schmitt’s thought is often justified as the result of his own involvement with the National Socialist regime in the 1930s (Balakrishnan 2000; Schmitt 1950) – reluctance which, interestingly enough, has been resisted longer in International Relations than in other related disciplines such as political theory, legal theory and international law, and that arguably reveals the extent to which International Relations is still an ‘American social science’ (Hoffmann 1977). But also, and perhaps more interestingly, the ‘multidisciplinarity’ of Schmitt’s international thought – which lies at the intersection of international relations, international law and international history, while also drawing on philosophy and political and legal theory – has arguably exacerbated this unfortunate neglect.

#### Schmitt’s not wrong, Walter, he’s just an asshole---the most Nazi-influenced ideas Schmitt had are actually pretty factually correct from the view of objective history…

Brown 7 – Chris Brown, Professor of International Relations and Convenor of the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics, 2007, “From humanized war to humanitarian intervention Carl Schmitt’s critique of the Just War Tradition,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 63-64

Most of the rest of this chapter addresses this task, but first there are one or two preliminary features of Schmitt’s critique which need to be examined, specifically Schmitt’s politics and his rather selective use of historical materials. As to the former, it has become somewhat bad form to refer to Schmitt’s leanings towards Nazism, in much the same way that it is considered bad form to refer to Heidegger’s rather briefer flirtation with the Nazis, but it has to be said that Schmitt’s quasi-Nazi take on the world is not without significance in an assessment of his international thought (Scheuerman 1999). Although Schmitt was expelled from the Nazi Party in 1936, when The Nomos of the Earth was written in the early 1940s it certainly retained traces of his earlier allegiance. The claim that the barbarism of the two world wars could be attributed to Anglo- American liberal internationalism, and that Wilsonianism was, in effect, responsible for the Second World War needs to be assessed in this light. It is certainly a commonplace of realist analyses of 1930s international relations that liberal internationalism contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War by confusing Western public opinion as to the nature of the international order and preventing it from adequately assessing the nature of the threat posed by Hitler, but this is hardly the same as regarding liberal internationalists as actually responsible for the war.

One can read Schmitt as arguing the more passive point that the real failure of liberal internationalism lay in its inability to offer an alternative basis for order to the JPE, but still, on Schmitt’s account, Germany in 1939–1945 was fighting a defensive war against US and British imperialism and the horrors of the war, such as saturation bombing of cities, emerged directly from the crusading approach of the Anglo-Saxons, symbolized by their relentless demand for German unconditional surrender. Sixty years on, this appears every bit as selfserving an account of the war as it would have done at the time to the many victims of Hitler’s war.7

## Case

### Brown

**cx 2ac --- cooption -> the aff**

**Browne 3** – former Libertarian Party candidate and Director of Public Policy, American Liberty Foundation (Harry, 5/3, Libertarians & War, http://www.harrybrowne.org/articles/LibertariansAndWar.htm, AG)

Government is politics: Whenever you turn anything over to the government, it ceases to be a financial, medical, commercial, educational, or human-rights matter, and becomes a political issue — to be decided by whoever has the most political influence. And that will never be you or I. Why should military matters be any different? Should we be surprised that companies like Bechtel and Halliburton have already received hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts to rebuild Iraq without competitive bidding? Did you really think this war would be fought with no regard for political gain or abuse? 7. You don't control the government: You can look at the previous six items and say you would have handled some things differently. But who asked you? No one. And no one ever will. You don't make the decisions. The politicians use your support as endorsements for them to fulfill their objectives, not yours — in their way, not yours.

### AT: SVio

#### Nuke war threat is real and o/w structural and invisible violence---their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive omnipresence makes preventing war impossible

Ken Boulding 78 is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling,

certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

## WOT DA

### AT: Case Outweighs

**Terror attack turns the entire case---fear would cause public acquiescence to rights-violations and government crackdowns that outweigh the case by an order of magnitude**

Peter **Beinart 8**, associate professor of journalism and political science at CUNY, The Good Fight; Why Liberals – and only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, 110-1

Indeed, while the Bush administration bears the blame for these hor- rors, White House officials exploited a shift in public values after 9/11. When asked by Princeton Survey Research Associates in 1997 whether stopping terrorism required citizens to cede some civil liberties, less than one-t hird of Americans said yes. By the spring of 2002, that had grown to almost three- quarters. Public support for the government’s right to wire- tap phones and read people’s mail also grew exponentially. In fact, polling in the months after the attack showed Americans less concerned that the Bush administration was violating civil liberties than that **it wasn’t violating them enough**. What will happen the next time? It is, of course, impossible to predict the reaction to any particular attack. But in 2003, the Center for Public Integrity got a draft of something called the Domestic Security Enhance- ment Act, quickly dubbed Patriot II. According to the center’s executive director, Charles Lewis, **it expanded government power** five or **ten times as much as its predecessor**. One provision permitted the government to strip native-born Americans of their citizenship, allowing them to be indefinitely imprisoned without legal recourse if they were deemed to have provided any support—even nonviolent support—to groups designated as terrorist. After an outcry, the bill was shelved. But it offers a hint of what this administration—or any administration—might do if the United States were hit again. ¶ When the CIA recently tried to imagine how the world might look in 2020, it conjured four potential scenarios. One was called the “cycle of fear,” and it drastically inverted the assumption of security that C. Vann Woodward called central to America’s national character. The United States has been attacked again and the government has responded with “large- scale intrusive security measures.” In this dystopian future, two arms dealers, one with jihadist ties, text- message about a potential nuclear deal. One notes that terrorist networks have “turned into mini-s tates.” The other jokes about the global recession sparked by the latest attacks. And he muses about how terrorism has changed American life. “That new Patriot Act,” he writes, “went **way beyond anything imagined after 9/11**.” “The fear cycle generated by an increasing spread of WMD and terrorist attacks,” comments the CIA report, “once under way, would be one of the **hardest to break**.” And the more entrenched that fear cycle grows, the less free America will become. Which is why a new generation of American liberals must make the fight against this new totalitarianism their own.

### AT: CTS

#### Critical terror studies are garbage --- Jackson’s wrong

Jones and Smith 9 - \* University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND \*\* King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,“We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 **–** 302**,** Taylor and Francis)

The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead, the journal's ambition is to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word “terror,” its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of “orthodox” terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have any substance?¶ Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard Jackson, suggested some uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* appeared last on a list where the first choice was *Review of Terror Studies*. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve?¶ What it Means to be Critical¶ The editors and contributors explore what it means to be “critical” in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is “a growth industry,” observing with a mixture of envy and disapproval that “literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year” (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective.¶ Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation “terror” is, for the critical theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains, “acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few thousand casualties *per year over the entire world*” (original italics) (p. 1). The United States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects.1 At the same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been “silenced from public and … academic discourse” (p. 1).¶ The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism” (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten “myths” informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a “state centric security focus,” where analysts rarely consider “the violence perpetrated by the state” (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is “central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as political action,” that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to be “the terrorist's best friend” (p. 7).¶ Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on … grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.¶ Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position. Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).¶ Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes “*the* single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby *lack* turns to*excess*” (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65-79), reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).¶ Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy *petitio principii*. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.¶ Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of *Meibion Glyndwr* who would as a matter of principle avoid *pob sais* like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.¶ A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with “the particular dynamics of the political world” (p. 70). Analogously, Stohl claims that “the US and English [sic] media” exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces “structural and political problems” into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics.¶ By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, “reflexivity” is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity “to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling … is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation” (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore, somewhat repetitively, its implications.¶ Reflexive or Defective? ¶ Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse, the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce *ex cathedra*, “refers to the *response* to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.¶ In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism'” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke “*questions the question*.” This intellectual *potpourri* apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).¶ Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.¶ The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language.¶ The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.¶ It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.¶ What is To Be Done?¶ This ontological confusion notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics. “[*C*]*ritical knowledge*,” Booth declares, “*involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions*” (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with “*big-picture* navigation aids” (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, “God Almighty only gave us ten”). When not stating the staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory. Critical theorists thus should “avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,”3 “recognize that states can be agents of terrorism,” and “keep the long term in sight.” Unexceptional advice to be sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she or he lives within “Powerful theories” that are “constitutive of political, social, and economic life” (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to “stand outside” prevailing ideologies (p. 78).¶ In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an “academic international relations” whose role “is not only to interpret the world but to change it” (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academic—or more precisely, critical—international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists.¶ The political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar transformative praxis and this leads “critical global theorizing” into a curiously confused empathy with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between “those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify it—is not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press” (p. 66). The gap “between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm” (p. 66). So, while “terrorist actions are always—without exception—wrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable” (p. 66). From this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable.¶ On the basis of this worrying relativism a further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an “attractive force.” To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, “its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness.”4¶ The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their “responsible research ethics.” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the “ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other.” For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing “with the ethic of responsibility” faced by those who, “in extremis” “have some explosives” (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the analyst, not only to “critique” the “strategic languages” of the West, but also to “take in” the “side of the Other” or more particularly “engage” “with the highly developed forms of thinking” that provides groups like Al Qaeda “with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity” (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the “other,” but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his *Messages to the West* and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto *Milestones* not only offer “well observed” criticisms of Western decadence, but also “converges with elements of critical theory” (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape.¶ Histrionically Speaking¶ Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.¶ On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives … or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).¶ At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.¶ In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “*terror has multiple forms*” (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the *engagee* intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).¶ Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its “strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).¶ In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of *soi-disant* cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.¶ In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.¶ Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6¶ It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.¶ Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity¶ Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies. It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and *critical* contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.¶ Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved.¶ Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”¶ Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.¶ Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream *strategic doctrines* are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun.¶ Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.¶ Conclusion¶ In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged.¶ At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama *Boston Legal* Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are its natural home.

#### CTS is wrong---our authors are at least as objective as theirs

Verena Erlenbusch 13, Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Memphis., How (Not) to Study Terrorism, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698230.2013.767040

Even though CTS scholars correctly point out some of the major short- comings of conventional terrorism scholarship, some of their key objections are simply false. First, claiming that the field of terrorism research lacks historicity, interdisciplinarity, and a focus on state terrorism is disingenuous and factually wrong. While the way in which historical examples of terrorism are used in much of the more mainstream literature is indeed problematic (see the second section above), critical scholars of terrorism are wrong to accuse traditional scholarship of a lack of historicity and con- textualization. Even though one might harbor legitimate concerns about the motivations for and approach to historical examples, it is insincere, to say the least, to discount a whole body of literature examining the relevance of the history of political violence for terrorism studies. Second, it is certainly true that the bulk of terrorism research has traditionally been policy oriented or at least used for political purposes. Nevertheless, it does not follow that neutral or unbiased knowledge about terrorism, including knowledge about the contexts and conditions in which something like terrorism is mobilized as a form of violence or as a discursive representation of violence, is impossible. Neither does the overwhelmingly pejorative understanding of the term ‘terrorism’ necessarily preclude any objective knowledge of the concept, its meaning, and its use. Similarly, many more mainstream scholars in the field have documented the use of terrorism his- torically made by states and governments against their own populations. While it is true that these scholars have generally been unwilling to extend this kind of analysis to the United States and other liberal democracies, a wholesale dismissal of terrorism research for not considering state terrorism tout court is both false and dishonest.7 More interesting for the purpose of this article, however, is the solution proposed by CTS to the failure of Terrorism Studies to generate an accepted definition of terrorism. One might expect a certain reluctance to define terrorism, given CTS scholars’ commitment to the ‘inherent ontological instability of the “terrorism” category’ (Jackson 2007, p. 244) and their consequent skepticism towards [...] the ‘terrorism’ label because it is recognized that in practice it has always been a pejorative rather than analytical term and that to use the term is a powerful form of labeling that implies a political judge- ment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions. (p. 247) It is, therefore, all the more surprising that ‘CTS views terrorism funda- mentally as a strategy or a tactic of political violence’ which ‘involves the deliberate targeting of civilians in order to intimidate or terrorise for dis- tinctly political purposes’ (p. 248). Despite the claim that terrorism is neither a ‘brute fact’ nor an ‘analyti- cal term’ but instead a way of representing violence in a certain way (p. 247), CTS nevertheless conceptualizes terrorism as a ‘form of behaviour that can, within specific discursive and structural contexts, be understood as “terrorist”’ (Jackson et al. 2009, p. 9). Not only does this view reproduce key elements of many mainstream definitions of terrorism, but also it belies the alleged anti-naturalism, anti-essentialism, and anti-determinism of CTS by having to determine the specific difference that distinguishes the tactic of terrorism from other forms of political violence. Even though CTS scholars are critical of the attribution of the label ‘ter- rorism’ to certain kinds of violence, they agree with traditional accounts of terrorism that something like terrorism exists and that it is possible to identify it. The problem diagnosed by CTS, then, is not only that governments themselves seem to engage in what they define as terrorism, but also that governments apply the term to forms of violence that are, in fact, legitimate forms of resistance, insurgency, or civil conflict. CTS scholars claim to know that governments do this because of ideological reasons. They also argue that governments are not justified in doing so. Consequently, CTS scholars seek to reclaim and reserve the label terrorism for forms of vio- lence that are ‘properly’ terrorist. As Jackson explains, CTS consequently has to be ‘openly normative in orientation’ because through the identification of who the ‘terrorist other’ actually is – deciding and affirming which individuals and groups may be rightly called ‘terrorists’ is a routine practice in the field – terrorism studies actually provides an authoritative judgment about who may legitimately be killed, tortured, ren- dered or incarcerated by the state in the name of counter-terrorism. (Jackson 2007, p. 249) It is, however, not at all clear by what standards this distinction is made or on what basis CTS scholars can claim a privileged position in distinguishing between terrorist and non-terrorist or legitimate and illegitimate violence – let alone attribute authority to determine who may be tortured or killed on the basis of such problematic arguments. CTS scholars have to introduce a criterion by which to differentiate terrorism proper from legitimate violence, a criterion that is neither clear cut nor his- torically or contextually stable. Justifications of violence in terms of a natu- ral or moral right to violent resistance, for instance, are not too far away from the legitimation of state violence proffered by conventional terrorism research.8 Just like Terrorism Studies, CTS enshrines terrorism as an instrument for classifying particular types of behavior and then giving that classification the force of law. By announcing its critical stance towards governments’ opportunism and politicization of terrorism, CTS covers over its own complicity in the production of a powerful weapon that allows one to attribute legitimacy to certain forms of violence while criminalizing oth- ers.

### AT: Indefinite Detention Fails

#### Weak detention responses emboldens terrorists

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3. Terrorism prosecutions create the conditions for more terrorism. The treatment of a national security problem as a criminal justice issue has consequences that imperil Americans. To begin with, there are the obvious numerical and motivational results. As noted above, the justice system is simply incapable, given its finite resources, of meaningfully countering the threat posed by international terrorism. Of equal salience, prosecution in the justice system actually increases the threat because of what it conveys to our enemies. Nothing galvanizes an opposition, nothing spurs its recruiting, like the combination of successful attacks and a conceit that the adversary will react weakly. (Hence, bin Laden’s well-known allusion to people’s instinctive attraction to the “strong horse” rather than the “weak horse,” and his frequent citation to the U.S. military pullout from Lebanon after Hezbollah’s 1983 attack on the marine barracks, and from Somalia after the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident). For militants willing to immolate themselves in suicide-bombing and hijacking operations, mere prosecution is a provocatively weak response. Put succinctly, where they are the sole or principal response to terrorism, trials in the criminal justice system inevitably cause more terrorism: they leave too many militants in place and they encourage the notion that the nation may be attacked with relative impunity.

#### Intelligence cooperation solves WMD use

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Third, the nature of warfare against such unconventional enemies may well be different from the set-piece battlefield matches between nation-states. Gathering intelligence, from both electronic and human sources, about the future plans of terrorist groups may be the only way to prevent September 11-style attacks from occurring again. Covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency or unconventional measures by special forces may prove to be the most effective tool for acting on that intelligence. Similarly, the least dangerous means for preventing rogue nations from acquiring WMD may depend on secret intelligence gathering and covert action, rather than open military intervention. A public revelation of the means of gathering intelligence, or the discussion of the nature of covert actions taken to forestall the threat by terrorist organizations or rogue nations, could render the use of force ineffectual or sources of information useless. Suppose, for example, that American intelligence agencies detected through intercepted phone calls that a terrorist group had built headquarters and training facilities in Yemen. A public discussion in Congress about a resolution to use force against Yemeni territory and how Yemen was identified could tip-off the group, allowing terrorists to disperse and to prevent further interception of their communications.

### AT: TS Not Objective

#### Data is accurate

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**Is the quality of the data used by terrorism’s orthodox investigators as poor as the critics assert. Perhaps it was at one time, but it is no longer the case**. The **reliance on** newspaper accounts and other **secondary sources is diminishing**. Marc Sageman, for instance, has developed his own database on al-Qaeda’s core membership (Sageman 2004, pp. 61–135**). A number of researchers have conducted and continue to conduct interviews with individuals involved in terrorist activities** in Germany, Italy, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Iraq, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The family and friends of suicide bombers have been interviewed, as have those who have sent them on their missions. **Those who attempted to kill themselves but were apprehended before they could do so have been interviewed in prison**. Among the long list of orthodox terrorism researchers who have had these extended and systematic face-to-face encounters, we should mention Nicole Argo, Anat Berko, Mia Bloom, Mohammed Hafez, John Horgan, Ariel Merari, Donatella della Porta, Jerrold Post, the late Ehud Sprinzak, and Yoram Schweitzer.6 The list is partial and continues to grow. **Our understanding of terrorist motivations** – what causes them to become radicalised (or de-radicalised) – **expands correspondingly.**

#### No bias

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The critics also complain about the funding of terrorism research as well as its quality. In the case of social scientists in the US and to a lesser extent Britain, the complaint is that much of the money to support terrorism research comes from government agencies. The National Institute of Justice in the US and Britain’s Economic and Social Research Council come to mind. **The critics’ assumption is that government support is more than likely to determine the choice of topics and the results of those research projects which receive funding**; in short, a conflict of interest is created. Without much doubt there is something to be said for this contention. **We should bear in mind however, that government support in itself is hardly an evil. In the US, for example, major advances in the study of** HIV/AIDS, cancer and a long list of other **diseases would not have been achieved without the substantial financial support** of the National Institute of Health and the National Science Foundation. Even work reporting the damaging effects of global warming received grant support from government agencies. **The 9/11 attacks killed about 3000 people, more than the deaths suffered by American forces at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. In this context, it would have been surprising if the US government had not been willing to fund research projects**, on a competitive basis, devoted to understanding the sources of terrorist violence. Related to the question of funding is the assumption that those supported or employed by the government will produce results necessarily sympathetic to policies the government wishes to pursue. However, **former American executive branch officials whose jobs involved the study of terrorism and the formulation of terrorism policy wrote books highly critical of American responses**. Richard Clarke, a principal advisor to the Clinton and Bush administrations, wrote a highly critical book about the latter’s lack of interest in the emerging terrorist threat in the months leading up to 9/11 (Clarke 2004, pp. 182–287). Two members of Clinton’s National Security Council staff, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon wrote, The Next Attack, in which they argue the Iraq war had the unintended effect of confirming the suspicions of Jihadi about American intentions and consequently served as the basis for the recruitment of a new generation of terrorists – precisely the opposite of what the Bush administration hoped to accomplish by toppling Saddam Hussein (Benjamin and Simon 2005, pp. 126–193). After leaving government Clarke, Benjamin and Simon have gone on to become orthodox terrorism specialists working at Washington area think-tanks. **It is not the end of the matter even if we assume a refusal by government agencies to fund research projects whose results might prove embarrassing or contrary to what they wish to hear. Washington at least now abounds with well-funded oppositional research foundations and institutes or ‘think tanks’** (e.g. the CATO Institute, American Enterprise Institute, the New America Foundation, Brookings) **that have both the money and the will to support terrorism-related projects which might produce results that would make Republican or Democratic administrations exceedingly uncomfortable**