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#### Restrictions are prohibitions --- the aff is distinct

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Substantially” means the plan must be across the board

Brian Anderson 5, Becky Collins, Barbara Van Haren & Nissan Bar-Lev, WCASS Research / Special Projects Committee\* Report on: A Conceptual Framework for Developing a 504 School District Policy, http://www.specialed.us/issues-504policy/504.htm

A substantial limitation is a significant restriction as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.¶ The 504 regulation does not define substantial limitation, and the regulation gives discretion to schools to decide what substantial limitation is. The key here is to be consistent internally and to be consistent with pertinent court decisions.¶ The issue “Does it substantially limit the major life activity?” was clarified by the US Supreme Court decision on January 8th, 2002 , “Toyota v. Williams”. In this labor related case, the Supreme Court noted that to meet the “substantially limit” definition, the disability must occur across the board in multiple environments, not only in one environment or one setting. The implications for school related 504 eligibility decisions are clear: The disability in question must be manifested in all facets of the student’s life, not only in school.

#### Vote neg---

#### Ground---only prohibitions on particular authorities guarantee links to every core argument like flexibility and deference

#### Limits---there are an infinite number of small hoops they could require the president to jump through---overstretches our research burden

### Off

#### Farm bill will pass now, but PC is key

Dale Hildebrant, 11-17-2013, “Farm Bill Conference Committee wants to finish by Thanksgiving,” Minnesota Farm Guide, http://www.minnesotafarmguide.com/news/regional/farm-bill-conference-committee-wants-to-finish-by-thanksgiving/article\_2e07f0b2-4d4a-11e3-9894-001a4bcf887a.html

Little has been heard from the Farm Bill Conference Committee since its opening session on Oct. 30 – at least not publicly. But that doesn’t mean there hasn’t been progress. That’s because most of the negotiating is going on behind closed doors. In fact, several committee members have expressed optimism that a compromise bill could be hammered out by Thanksgiving. If that happens, it should allow adequate time for full House and Senate action on the compromise by the end of the year. That first official meeting of the committee on Oct. 30 allowed the 41 members to make their opening statements and offers on what they would like to see in the compromise bill. Since then private meetings have taken place with the nutrition spending level and Title I programs presenting the biggest challenges to an agreement. “We have a responsibility to reach consensus and do what is best for all of agriculture and rural America,” said Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) in his opening remarks after convening the conference committee. “Let’s give certainty and sound policy to our agricultural producers; let’s deliver taxpayers billions of dollars in deficit reduction; let’s continue to provide consumers the affordable and reliable food supply they have grown accustomed to. Let’s work together to get our work done.” Senate Ag Committee chair Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) echoed Lucas’ call for compromise and action. “There are 16 million men and women whose jobs rely on the strength of agriculture and I am confident we won’t let them down,” Stabenow said. Even though Congress has a scheduled recess coming up, ranking member on the House Committee, Rep. Collin Peterson (D-Minn.) expressed hope that the work of the conference committee would continue through the recess. “We need to get at this or we’re not going to get this done,” Peterson told reporters. In a short news conference later in the week, both Lucas and Stabenow expressed the desire to continue work on a compromise bill during the recess. The dialogue surrounding the nutrition part of the Farm Bill debate has already changed with the suspension of a 2009 increase in food stamps benefits as part of the effort to stimulate the economy. The Obama Administration had hoped to phase out those stimulus benefits over time, but Congress decided to speed up the schedule. This reduction, which kicked in on Nov. 1, will save an estimated $11 billion in savings over the next few years. Stabenow referenced this in her opening remarks to the Conference Committee noting that this $11 billion in savings should be added to the equation measuring the food stamp cuts in both versions of the bill. “That $11 billion, plus the $4 billion in original cuts in the Senate bill, means that accepting the Senate nutrition title would result in a total of $15 billion in cuts in nutrition,” she said. The House version of nutrition assistance originally cut $39 billion from the program, which doesn’t include the $11 billion in savings from the Nov. 1 cut in funding. Because of this large difference in the two versions of the bill, Peterson believes that President Obama’s intervention will prove useful in getting the issue resolved.

#### Plan wrecks PC

Douglas L. Kriner 10, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 68-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital

Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea."¶ While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.60¶ In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's highest second-term domestic priorities, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61¶ When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### That prevents a food price spike

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

### Off

#### Debates over force against Iran and diplomacy to induce changes in Iranian behavior naturalize the background of militarism. The focus of the 1AC ratifies an unending state of global war

Hamid Dabashi 7, the Hagop Kevorkian Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, February 18, Al-Ahram Weekly, “Thinking Beyond the Invasion of Iran,” online: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/831/focus.htm, accessed October 8, 2007

The practice of anti-war activism throughout the world has hitherto been a periodic and scattered mobilisation against one war or other that the US/Israel has launched -- very much chasing after the evolving military designs of the neo- conservatives in the US, and the reinvigorated Zionists in Israel, and simply reacting to their proactive acts of global terrorism. As we are waiting for the Iran war to happen (or not to happen), it is now perhaps time to step back and take stock of what this transcontinental axis of global terrorism -- the United States of America and the Jewish state of Israel -- is up to and thus rethink the civic manners of opposing and resisting it. When the US launched its wrath on Afghanistan in October 2001, even such progressive and astute American observers as Richard Falk (seconded by the editorial staff of *The Nation* ) thought that it was a "just war". This argument was no mere act of historical folly. It was a singular sign of political naiveté. ¶ We are now way beyond those perhaps innocent yet angry misreadings of what has fast come upon us. After the mayhem of Iraq, instead of constantly waiting for the other shoe to drop and wonder if US/Israel will or will not attack Iran, will or will not bomb Syria, will or will not completely take over Somalia, will or will not militarily engage North Korea, will or will not try for yet another coup in Venezuela, we need to think beyond such probabilities, and reach into the heart of the *state of war* that this very waiting game entails. As all indications testify, a Democratic US congress will not make any significant difference in this state of war. Looking at the emerging patterns of this state of war, it is now safe to suggest, for example, that what the US is *perhaps* (and such conjectural phrases are the symptoms of this very state of war) planning to do in Iran is modelled on what Israel did to Lebanon last July -- hence the necessity of no longer treating these two imperial and colonial nexus of warmongering in the world as two separate political propositions and state entities, but in fact collapse them into a singular axis of state terrorism aimed at undisputed global domination.¶ For that drive towards global domination to be politically effective and psychologically enduring, the *state of war* is far more important than the actual act of war, and the threat of violence politically far more destabilising than the act of violence itself. For the state of war, and the threat of violence, change the very political culture in which we receive and interpret any particular act of war, or occurrence of violence, so much so, that the enormity of the human cost, infrastructural damages, and the environmental catastrophes, for example, contingent on any act of war gradually begin to dwindle and dissipate in the miasmic emergence of the omnipresent state of war. For more than five years now, US/Israel and its European allies have been systematically at it inflaming acts of "shock and awe", as the former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld called it, in one place or another, so that now the law of diminishing returns has set in, and the staggering acts of violence in Iraq under the US- led occupation, or the barefaced barbarity of Israel in Palestine and Lebanon cease to register their enormous weight and unfathomable consequences. In other words, the state of war numbs the human consciousness, and thus we fail to respond (for we lack any meaningful language) to the fundamental acts of moral depravity that we witness on a daily basis in Palestine and Iraq in anything remotely resembling a corresponding calibre. ¶ So, as the US/Israeli military and intelligence agencies, think tanks, and, above all, mass media (all integral to the same militarised state of mind) are engaged in discussions on how to deal with "terrorism", the world, as well, needs to reverse the order, return the gaze, and begin to wonder how to deal with these two terrorist states and save humanity from their mutual, complementary, and strategically integrated acts of terrorising the world. These two galvanised military machineries masquerading as nation-states are today the most violent source of militarised madness on our planet (and beyond). The Iraq war, in particular, competing with Israeli atrocities in Palestine, has long since ceased to be a singular crime against humanity. Initiated and sustained as it is by the US-led colonial occupation of a sovereign nation-state, the world needs to invent new terms to name, and grasp it. ¶ For this military machinery to work best, the threat of violence or state of war is a more effective tool for creating fear and sustaining hegemony, than is the actual fact of violence or event of war, which is effectively the neutralising moment of its catharsis. The key to sustaining the state of war, the warmongers in Washington DC seem to have learned, is to constantly keep alive an immanent specter of the enemy, as the Nazi theorist of political power Karl Schmitt and his philosophical shadow Leo Straus both fully realised. Both Karl Schmitt (in theological terms) and Leo Straus (in philosophical conviction) believed that the absence of this enemy and the neutralising effect of liberal democracies will be tantamount to the death of state as the *modus operandi* of moral virtues. A pending war, predicated on the ghostly apparition of a monstrous Muslim goblin about to leap from darkness and swallow the earth, is thus politically far more expeditious than is the actual event of war. In this psychopathology of power, the American neo- conservatives have learned their lessons as much from the advocate of the German Nazi Karl Schmitt as from the guru of American neo- conservatism Leo Straus -- and then perfected their theory with widespread practice. ¶ CRAFTING A CHRONOLOGY: As the world is waiting to see if US/Israel will or will not attack Iran, we can begin to think through the state of war that this waiting game has generated and sustained. The laundry list of US/Israel litany against the Islamic Republic is long and tiresome: they sponsor terrorism, they do not support the Arab-Israeli peace process (never mind that Israelis are murdering Palestinians in Gaza on an hourly basis), they are fomenting trouble in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, and on top of it they intend to develop nuclear arms. But how this old and banal list is revamped and brought to a crescendo is the way that the state of war -- while both Afghanistan and Iraq are burning and the US is heavily engaged in Somalia -- is kept apace. ¶ In December 2006, Iran hosted a provocative conference on the Jewish holocaust, rightly attracting global condemnation. The conference, along with outlandish comments by Ahmadinejad were evidently meant to cover up the humiliating defeat of the Iranian president's faction during the City Council and the Assembly of Expert elections in the same month. At the same time, the UN Security Council voted to impose sanctions on Iran and its trade in sensitive nuclear materials and technology. The US/Israeli reaction to the holocaust conference was swift, angry, and over- determined. "Iranians" are insensitive to Jewish suffering. Their president has said he wants to wipe Israel off the map. They now intend to develop a nuclear arsenal. So two plus two equals let's bomb the living daylight out of Iran. The Security Council resolution, meanwhile, failed to silence Ahmadinejad's bellicosity. ¶ The new Christian year began on similarly ominous notes. According to a 7 January article in the British daily *Sunday Times*, two Israeli air force squadrons were "training to blow up an Iranian [nuclear] facility using low-yield nuclear 'bunker- busters". Quoting "several Israeli military sources", the *Sunday Times* reported: "as soon as the green light is given, it will be one mission, one strike and the Iranian nuclear project will be demolished." Moreover: "Israeli and American officials have met several times to consider military action. Military analysts said the disclosure of the plans could be intended to put pressure on Tehran to halt [uranium] enrichment, cajole America into action or soften up world opinion in advance of an Israeli attack." The Israelis denied that this report was in any way accurate. The net effect was an evident increase in the state of war -- a war that may or may not happen. ¶ Soon after this *Sunday Times* report, in a speech on 11 January 2007, President Bush announced a new Iraq strategy in which additional US troops were to be dispatched to Iraq. Many observers read this troop increase as being more a sign of preparation for a military engagement with Iran, than it was an attempt to bolster security in Iraq -- the latter, a seemingly impossible task for this administration. The day after President Bush's speech, US forces accompanied by military helicopters stormed the Iranian consulate in the Kurdish city of Arbil, arresting five employees. The US, the common wisdom suggested, was provoking Iran into some sort of rash military action, so it could use it as an excuse to attack Iran. But this was all in the realm of speculation -- precisely what the state of war (not the actual war) demands and exacts. ¶ Soon after that provocative act in Arbil, on 14 January, US Vice-President Dick Cheney upped the ante and declared Iran was "fishing in troubled waters". About a week after the Arbil incident, on 20 January, a US defence official (speaking to the press on the condition of anonymity) blamed Iran for the kidnapping and killing of a number of American soldiers in Karbala. This incident in Karbala, as suspicions and speculations had it, was in retaliation for the arrest of five Iranians by US troops in Arbil. But all of these were matters of doubt, suspicion, innuendo, anonymity and above all denial. There can of course be no doubt that the Islamic Republic will do anything that it can to affect developments in its neighbouring Iraq, in a manner that would be compatible with its interests. Nor is there any question that the Islamic Republic must not interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. But is US/Israel in a moral position to point the finger at the Islamic Republic? How could anyone blame the Islamic Republic for having five agents in Iraq, if that indeed is true, when US/Israel and its European allies have mobilised the army of Attila the Hun from half way around the globe and, officially, illegally, immorally, and murderously occupied Iraq against the will of its people. If five Iranians have been identified as interfering in Iraqi affairs, how many tens of thousands of Americans (Israelis?) and British share that shameful identification? ¶ Echoing Vice-President Cheney's threatening remarks and confirming these suspicions, a Kuwait-based newspaper *Arab Times* reported that the US might launch a military strike against Iran before April 2007. The report cited "a reliable source" and predicted that the attack would be launched from the sea, while Patriot missiles would guard all Arab countries in the Gulf. The news was brought home to the Ayatollahs in Qom and Tehran by their next-door neighbour. But why would the Kuwaitis know something that others did not? The question remained on the borderline of un/certainty, where the state of war is habitually intensified. ¶ Such speculations and haphazard guesses were rampant until President Bush's State of the Union address delivered on 23 January, when, as the BBC World Affairs correspondent Paul Reynolds put it, "one of the notable features of President George W Bush's State of the Union speech was its hostile attitude towards Iran. He accused the 'regime' in Iran of arming 'terrorists like Hizbullah' and of directing 'Shia extremists' in Iraq." Again: no particular declaration of war was evident. But the suggestion was as tall and thick as is the Israeli apartheid wall. You could not possibly overlook its threatening shadow. ¶ PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AS PSYOP: The following particular reference of President Bush in his State of the Union Address was quite noteworthy: ¶ "If American forces step back before Baghdad is secure, the Iraqi government would be overrun by extremists on all sides. We could expect an epic battle between Shia extremists backed by Iran, and Sunni extremists aided by Al-Qaeda and supporters of the old regime. A contagion of violence could spill out across the country -- and in time, the entire region could be drawn into the conflict." ¶ How did that happen? When did President Bush learn about the difference between Sunnis and Shias? This particular presidential pronouncement on Shia- Sunni hostilities seems to have been the handiwork of a certain Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, who teaches American military personnel about matters Islamic (and thus *ipso facto* dangerous and detrimental to American national security) at the Department of National Security Affairs of the Naval Postgraduate School. The latter, according to its website, "is an academic institution whose emphasis is on study and research programs relevant to the Navy's interests, as well as to the interests of other arms of the Department of Defense. The programs are designed to accommodate the unique requirements of the military." ¶ In his recently published book, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future* (2006), Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr reported to his students at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and whoever else wishes to learn about Islam and Shiism that Americans had better watch out because there is a new chimerical creature called the "Shia Crescent". Stretching its venomous posture all the way from Pakistan, through Iran and Iraq, and then down to Syria and Lebanon, this creature is about to gobble up the region in its "epic" hostility with Sunnism. With this, it threatens the moderate US allies and interests, for the protection of which Professor Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr has been hired by the US military, in his current position at the Naval Postgraduate School. It is precisely this presumed threat that appears in President Bush's State of the Union address. ¶ To be sure, there are such observers as Michael Hirsh of the *Newsweek* who believe that this particular attention of President Bush to the Shia- Sunni divide in the Muslim world is due to the presumed resurrection of Henry Kissinger in the US president's post-catastrophe strategy in Iraq. "In an extraordinary series of moves," Michael Hirsh reports in *Newsweek* on 1 February 2007, "Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other US officials have been seeking to create a united front of Sunni Arab regimes and Israel against Shia Iran as part of an aggressive new approach to Tehran." But whereas Henry Kissinger's "fingerprints", as Michael Hirsh calls it, can be gleaned in his classical line of negotiating from a position of power, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr's "fingerprints" (to borrow Michael Hirsh's term) are reflected in a more substantial and circumstantial stipulation. His significant imprint is reflected in the manner in which the state of war is not just sustained, but, as well, put on automatic piloting. If the role of Osama bin Laden was to give the US global imperialism ( *aka* "war on terror") a generically *Islamic* disposition, then the function of Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr's book (perhaps, as Michael Hirsh suggests, circumstantially commensurate with Henry Kissinger's strategies) is to give that cosmic battle with "Islamic terrorism" an innately *Islamic* disposition. In other words, if Afghanistan is in a state of utter desolation and the Taliban are about to take over, or if almost four years into the US-led invasion of Iraq the country is from one end to another, suffering total devastation, with hundreds of thousands of Iraqis maimed, murdered, tortured, raped, incarcerated, and made into refugees in their own homeland, then the United States has really nothing to do with any of this. It is really this "epic battle", as President Bush puts it, "between Shia extremists backed by Iran and Sunni extremists aided by Al-Qaeda" that is to blame. The circumstantial appearance of Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr's argument, Henry Kissinger's strategic council, and President Bush's renewed strategy of aggressive domination in Iraq, and the potential invasion of Iran are all integral to sustaining a state of war that is now almost entirely self-propelling, and on automatic piloting because the US is dragged into an epic (cosmic and pre-eternal) battle. This is not due to its own will or volition, but is in fact entirely despite itself, and against its best intentions. ¶ As a major ideological intervention in aiding and abetting the US/Israel "war on terrorism", Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr's book on *The Shia Revival*, published while he is employed by the US military, opens a whole new chapter on the politics and power of knowledge production. In the entire gamut of the sociology of knowledge, and in the deepest layers of Michel Foucault's theorisation of the relationship between knowledge and power, no one ever imagined a day when the military apparatus of a globalised empire, as Chalmers Johnson's groundbreaking Blowback Trilogy has convincingly demonstrated, will itself begin to generate its own homegrown knowledge about its enemy, and start disseminating it to the public at large. For this reason, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr's book on *The Shia Revival* is best read as a piece of military psyop meant to prepare the public at large for an even more prolonged state of war against "Islamic terrorism". The latter is ostensibly, a terrorism that is, because of "the epic battle" between Sunnis and Shias, actually entirely independent of the US good intentions, and squarely laid at the feet of mediaeval ("epic") hostilities between two factions of Muslims. President Bush was offering Muslims peace and prosperity on behalf of the Americans, however, the Muslims' own tribal barbarism prevents them from deserving such a splendid gift. ¶ SUSTAINING A SOURCE OF MENACE: The catastrophe that faces the whole world -- Americans included -- is not limited to this level of psyop chicanery. Something far more serious is the matter with the world. For five years now, every one to two years, George W Bush has perceived a new source of menace in the world, and launched a massive new war against Arabs and Muslims while telling them that he is really shooting at them, in order to save them from their own evil. The normative vacuity of these identical terms of fear and warmongering has reached incomprehensible proportions, to the point that except for the lives of yet another few hundred thousand waiting to be annihilated in the region, if the US/Israel attack Iran, it no longer makes any difference if they will or will not actually do so. What matters, and what remains a corrosive force in the soul of an entire nation, is the state of war in which the US/Israeli ideologues are determined to keep themselves. and the world which they systematically endanger. ¶ More than being at war, what works best for the US/Israeli warlords is being in "a state of war" -- for the fear of war is the best condition in which they want to keep the world. Come March, April, May or whenever, US/Israel may or may not, invade Iran. If the war indeed happens, no one will count the Iranian dead, for counting them will amount to no moral outrage loud enough to match what is happening to the world. CNN will count the US soldiers' casualties, but even this, too, will dissipate into a vacuous pomposity that could not care less about the poor and disenfranchised Americans who are grabbed by the throat of their poverty, and catapulted half way around the globe to maim, murder, torture, and rape their own brothers and sisters. For every one US casualty (which is one too many) there will be anywhere between one to two hundred Iranian casualties, if we were to take the Iraqi case as our measure. No one will hold anyone responsible. The Iranian neo-con contingency will have made their career and lucrative contracts, and still appear on television. Just like Fouad Ajami, they will tell Americans that these Iranians, just like Iraqis, did not deserve the gift of freedom and democracy that the Americans were offering them (as he proposes in his new book *The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq* ). The rest of the world will have gotten even more used to the state of war that US/Israel is imposing on the globe. The invasion of Iran will add yet another front to the US/Israeli global flexing of its military prowess. And if they -- the US government and Jewish state (the two most violent states on planet Earth) -- don't invade Iran, it still makes no difference. All it takes is a comment here by President Bush, or a suggestion there by Vice President Cheney, or yet another confession that Israel makes that it indeed has massive nuclear capacities -- or else planting of a news story that Israel may attack Iran. The actual context of these news, that the US/Israel may or may not attack Iran, is entirely irrelevant to the reality of positing these threats. It is this that keeps the world on the edge of its seat, making fear and warmongering the paramount condition of our lives. ¶ In his groundbreaking work on the "state of exception", the distinguished Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has begun the uncanny task of theorising what has hitherto been delegated to the realm of *necessities legem non habet* ("necessity has no law"). Defying this dictum, Agamben has taken Karl Schmitt's famous pronouncement in his *Political Theology* (that the sovereign is "he who decides on the state of exception") quite seriously and sought to theorise that state of exception. In Agamben's own project, what he calls the "no- man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life" remains paramount. But adjacent to that effectively juridical project, there remains a widespread culture of catastrophe that must systematically generate and sustain that state of exception, which here and now in the United States, and the world it ruthlessly rules, amounts to a perpetual state of war. It is to that state, and not merely its potential and actual evidence, that we must learn how to respond.

#### Our alt is to interrogate the psychological underpinnings of enemy creation–prevents war

Byles 3—English, U Cyprus (Joanna, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/articles/art\_byles01.shtml)

The problem of warfare which includes genocide, and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, brings into focus the need to understand how the individual is placed in the social and the social in the individual. Psychoanalytic theories of superego aggression, splitting, projection, and projective identification may be useful in helping us to understand the psychic links involved. It seems vital to me writing in the Middle East in September 2002 that we examine our understanding of what it is we understand about war, including genocide and terrorism. Some psychoanalysts argue that war is a necessary defence against psychotic anxiety (Fornari xx; Volkan), and Freud himself first advanced the idea that war provided an outlet for repressed impulses. ("Why War?"197). The problematic of these views is the individual's need to translate internal psychotic anxieties into real external dangers so as to control them. **It suggests** that culturally **warfare** and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism and the so-called ''war on terrorism," **may be a necessary object for internal aggression and not a pathology.** Indeed, Fornari suggests that "war could be seen as an attempt at therapy, carried out by a social institution which, precisely by institutionalizing war, increases to gigantic proportions what is initially an elementary defensive mechanism of the ego in the schizo-paranoid phase" (xvii-xviii). In other words, **the history of war might represent the externalization** and articulation **of shared unconscious fantasies**. This idea would suggest that the culture of war, genocide, and international terrorism provides objects of psychic need. If this is so, with what can we replace them? If cultural formations and historical events have their sources in our psychic functioningthat is to say, in our unconscious fears and desires, and culture itself provides a framework for expressing, articulating, and coming to terms with these fears and desires, then **psychoanalysis may help to reveal why war seems to be an inevitable and ineradicable part of human history.** Superego as an Agent of Aggression In "The Ego and the Id," Freud formulated a seemingly insoluble dilemma in the very essence of the human psyche; the eternal conflict between the dual instincts of eros, the civilizing life instinct, and the indomitable death instinct (thanatos). He also identified some aspects of the death instinct with superego aggression, suggesting that the superego was the agent of the death instinct in its cruel and aggressive need for punishment and that its operative feeling was frequently a punitive hatred, while other aspects of the superego were protective. As we know, Freud thought the source of the superego was the internalization of the castrating Oedipal father. In chapter seven of Civilization and its Discontents, he theorized that when de-fusion or separation of the dual instincts occurred, aspects of aggression frequently dominated and that it was the purpose of the ego to find objects for eros and/or aggression either in phanta sv or reality. The role phantasy plays in projective identification is something to which I shall return. Other theorists, such as Melanie Klein, trace the beginning of the superego back to early (infant) oral phantasies of self-destruction, which is a direct manifestation of the death instinct. Klein transformed the oedipal drama by making the mother its central figure and thus playing a vital role in object-relations theory, about which I shall say more later in this essay. Although Klein's work relied on the dual instinct theory postulated by Freud, she re-defined the drives by emphasizing the way in which the destructive instincts attached themselves to the object, in particular the good-bad breast. Thus for Klein, the site of the superego is derived from oral Incorporation of the good/bad breast, contrary to Freud, for whom the site of the superego is the paternal law. Although the formation of the superego is grounded on the renunciation ofloving and hostile Oedipal wishes, it is subsequently refined, by the contributions of social and cultural requirements (education, religion, morality). My argument in this paper is three-fold: (1) These social and cultural requirements in which the superego is grounded may be used by the superego of the state and/or its leader to mobilize aspects of the individual's aggression during war-time in a way that does not happen in peace-time. (2) Klein's theory of splitting and projective identification plays an important role in the concept of difference and otherness as enemy. (3) Bion's development of Klein's theory into what he called the "container" and the "contained" may offer some way out of the psychic dangers of projective identification by suggesting that we may be able to access our internal psychic world as a transformative power to combat violence both internal and external. In an early attempt to define war neuroses, or how war mentally traumatizes the psyche, Freud wrote of the conflict "between the soldier's old peaceful ego and his new warlike one" becoming acute as soon as the peace-ego realizes what danger it runs in losing its own life to the rashness of its newly formed parasitic double" (SE 17 209). Accepting the violence that is within ourselves as well as in the other, the so-called enemy, is a difficult lesson to learn, and learning to displace our instinctual destructive aggression peacefully is enormously more difficult. To the extent the individual superego is connected to society, which assumes its functions particularly in wartime, the problem of war brings into focus the psychoanalytic problem of the partial defusion (separation) of eros and psychic aggression brought about by war through specifically social processes. These social processes involve the mechanisms by which aspects of the violent and aggressive social superego of the State mobilizes and appropriates some of the dynamic aspects of the individual's superego aggression: the need to hate, and to punish, for its own purposes, such as genocide or so-called "ethnic cleansing," and for territorial and economic reasons. Many of these actions are often masked as defending civilization, or an idealized State and/or its leader. This is also true of the "holy jihads" that are rapidly becoming an enormous threat to the world. In his book Enemies and Allies, Vamik Volkan suggests that the individual may see the superego of the State as his/her own idealized superego. And indeed, this may in turn help to explain how during war-time the social superego is placed in the individual and how in turn the individual is positioned in the social. In Civilization and its Discontents, to which I have already referred, Freud wrote about the ways in which the regulations and demands of a civilized society harbor the risk of the death instinct (aggression) being released at any favorable opportunity, especially when combined with Eros i.e., under the pretext of idealism and patriotism. This is especially true when t here is a leader who elicits strong emotional attachments from a group or nation. Of course, I am not arguing that there are not some important aspects of the social superego that are beneficial, for example the ethical and moral laws which shape society and protect its citizens; nevertheless, in wartime and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, it is precisely these civilizing aspects of the social superego that are ignored or repressed. It seems to me that the **failure of civilization historically to control** the aggression, cruelty, and hatred that characterize **war** urgently **requires a psychoanalytic explanation**. Of course, I am speaking of psychic, not biological (survival of the fittest), aggression. In wartime the externalized superego of the state sanctions killing and violence that is not allowed in peace-time (in fact, such violence against others during peacetime would be considered criminal) sanctions, in fact, the gratification of warring aggression, thus ensuring that acts of violence need not incur guilt. Why do we accept this? Psychoanalysis posits the idea that aggression is not behavioral but instinctual; not social but psychological. To quote Volkan, who follows Freud, "It is man's very nature itself." Obviously, it is vital that humanity find more mature, less primitive ways of dealing with our hatred and aggression than war, genocide, and international terrorism. The most characteristic thing about this kind of violence and cruelty is its collective mentality: war requires group co-operation, organization, and approval. Some theorists argue that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human association is defence against psychotic anxiety. In Group Psychology Freud writes that "in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics he then displays are in fact the manifestation of this unconscious, **in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition**" (74). Later in the same essay, when speaking of the individual and the group mind, Freud quotes Le Bon : "Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings" (77). War is a collective phenomenon that mobilizes our anxieties and allows our **original sadistic fantasies of destructive omnipotence to be re-activated and projected onto "the enemy."** Some critics have argued that we "need" enemies as external stabilizers of our sense of identity and inner control. It has also been argued that the militancy a particular group shows toward its enemies may partly mask the personal internal conflicts of each member of the group, and that they may therefore have **an emotional investment in** the maintenance of the **enmity**. In other words, **they need the enemy and are unconsciously afraid to lose it**. **This fits in with the** well known **phenomenon of inventing an enemy when there is not one readily available**. The individual suicide bomber, or suicide pilot, is just as much part of this group psychology each bomber, each terrorist, is acting for his/her group, or even more immediately his or her family, from whom he/she derives enormous psychic strength and support. Just as importantly, she/he is acting in the name of his/her leader. All of these identifications require strong emotional attachments. Freud writes, "The mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification, based upon an important emotional common quality. . . . This common quality lies in the nature of the tie to the leader" (Group 1078). In Learning from Experience, Bion theorizes that a social groupfunctions to establish a fixed social order of things (the establishm ent), and that the individual has to be contained by the establishment of the group. Sometimes the rigidity of me system crushes the individual's creativity; alternatively, certain special individuals erupt in the group, which goes to pieces under their influence (Bion cites Jesus within the constraints of Israel). A final possibility is the mutual adaptation of one to the other, with a development of both the individual and the group. The development of a sense of self, its integration, its separation, and its protection all begin, or course, in early childhood. Psychoanalyses like Klein, Winnicott, and Bion have explored these ideas in what is known as object relations theory. Volkan writes that the concepts of enemy and ally and the senses of ethnicity and nationality are largely bound up with the individual's sense of self, and that individuals within an ethnic or national group tend to see their group as a privileged "pseudo-species" (Erikson) and enemy groups as subhuman (262). Of course enemies are threatening and do generate a reactive need for defenses; however, a basic psychoanalytic question might be to what extent the degree of defensiveness characteristic of **war behavior represents personal**, emotional **needs of individuals for an enemy to hate**, **so that they can keep their conflicted selves together**, and to what extent the State superego plays a role here. Our capacity for splitting and projection plays an important part in how we see others and feel about others, and through the process of projective identification, how we make others feel about ourselves and themselves. Projective identification involves a deep split, displacing onto and into others the hateful, bad parts of ourselves, and frequently making them feehateful to themselves through their own introjection of our hatred. This hatred is often racial or religious, frequently both. Moreover, in the process of projective identification, parts of the self are put into the other, thus depleting the ego. (This process can be a vicious circle, and it is a profoundly disturbing and characteristic pathology, often involving envy and/or rivalry, both corrosive, poisonous forces.) These Kleinian ideas, developed by other theorists, such as Winnicott and Bion, are hugely relevant to the problem of war and genocide, and most recently, of terrorism. Klein argues that in the paranoid schizoid position there is a splitting of good and bad objects, with the good being introjected and the bad being externalized and projected out into someone or onto something else. As with the infant and child, so with the adult, mechanisms of splitting and protection play upon negative and feared connotations of the other, of the enemy, and of difference; projection prevents warring nations from exploring and thus understanding what it is that actually divides them; it prevents mutual response and recognition by promoting exclusivity. As already mentioned, analysts such as Volkan and Erikson have written about the processes by which an enemy is dehumanized so as to provide the distance a group needs from its perceived enemy. First the group becomes preoccupied with the enemy according to the psychology of minor differences. Then mass regression occurs to permit the group to recover and reactivate more primitive methods. What they then use in this regressed state tends to contain aspects of childish (pre-oedipal) fury. The enemy is perceived more and more as a stereotype of bad and negative qualities. The use of **denial allows a group to ignore the fact that its own externalizations and projections are involved in this process**. The stereotyped enemy may be so despised as to be no longer human, and it will then be referred to in non-human terms. History teaches us that it was in this way that the Nazis perceived the Jews as vermin to be exterminated. As I write, Al Qaeda terrorist groups view all Americans as demons and infidels to be annihilated, and many Americans are comforted by demonizing all of bearded Islam. Many Israelis consider most Palestinians as dirt beneath their feet subhuman and most Palestinians think of most Israelis as despoilers of the land they are supposed to share. In other words, the problem of the mentality of war and of terrorism mobilizes our anxieties in such a way so as to **prevent critical reality testing**. If we could learn the enormously difficult and painful task of re-introjection, of taking back our projections, our hatreds, anxieties, and fears of the other and of difference, long before they harm the other, there might be a transition, a link, from the state sanctioned violence of war back to individual violence. We might learn to subvert negative projective identification into a positive identification as a means of empathizing with the other and thus containing difference. The violence of the individual could then be contained and sublimated in peaceful ways, such as reconciling and balancing competing interests by asking what exactly these opposing interests are and exploring what the dynamics, conscious and unconscious, are for the hatred of deep war-like antagonisms. In other words, we would need to change our relationship with the other, giving up the dangerously irresponsible habit of splitting, projective identification, and exclusivity by recognizing difference not antagonistically but through an inclusive process that recognises the totalitv of human relationships in a peaceful world. We might substitute for the libidinal object-ties involved in projective identification the re-introjection of the object into the ego, and thus reach a common feeling of sharing, of being part of the other, of empathy, in short. As Freud pointed our, the ego is altered bv introjection, as suggested by his memorable formulation: " The shadow of the object has fallen on the ego." In his book Second Thoughts, Bion theorizes that in the infant as in the adult, re-introjection can be dangerous if the dominance of projective identification confuses the distinction between s elf and the external object, since this awareness depends on the recognition of a distinction between subject and object. But Bion's theory of the pairing group, or the container and the contained, provides a way out of this predicament, suggesting that the outcome of such pairing is either detrimental to the contained, or to the container, or mutually developing to both. This idea is germane to my argument in this paper that the reciprocity of the container and the contained relationship, through both positive projective identification (empathy) and introjection or re-introjection, results in a positive allowance of difference in other words, a healthy acceptance of and adaptation to the other within the self and the self within the other.

### Off

#### The plan’s interbranch conflict over Iran makes Obama’s foreign policy look incoherent---collapses Israeli confidence in the U.S. position

Edward Luce 11-10, Financial Times columnist, 11/10/13, “Iran will test Obama’s diplomatic game plan,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/677ef8c0-48a6-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2l1JsYGNS

Having tiptoed up to a historic deal with Iran, the west – chiefly France – got cold feet. But they will try again next week and a deal is still within reach. There is little doubt how badly the White House wants one. An Iran deal could rejuvenate Barack Obama’s presidency and retrospectively earn him his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. Equally, it could show how easily he gets outflanked by tougher players. As diplomatic challenges go, it is about as tricky as it gets. Mr Obama’s mercurial handling of the Syria crisis suggests we should hope for the best but expect the worst. Just ask the French.¶ The forces opposed to almost any kind of a deal are formidable. In addition to France’s misgivings, Mr Obama faces the challenge of convincing Iran there is only one US negotiating stance. At the moment it must look to Tehran as though there are at least two. Two months ago Congress made it clear it would reject Mr Obama’s request for military strikes on Syria. Now Congress is itching to rebuff Mr Obama’s request for it to delay passing new sanctions on Iran. In matters of both war and peace, Mr Obama has less sway over Capitol Hill than France.¶ Opposition is solidly bipartisan. A number of Democratic and Republican senators, including Mark Kirk from Mr Obama’s home state of Illinois, have vowed to press ahead with a new layer of sanctions on Iran – an automatic deal breaker – unless Tehran agrees to dismantle its enrichment programme. This undermines the trade-off that John Kerry, Mr Obama’s secretary of state, offered in Geneva. His outline required Iran merely to freeze enrichment for a fixed period in exchange for releasing some overseas assets. In contrast, the hawks in Congress want a full Iranian climbdown before they will consider any financial reward.¶ Which is the actual stance of the US?¶ In days gone by, the Middle East would have viewed dissonance between the two main branches of US government as a form of good cop/bad cop routine that was ultimately one act. Few read Washington that way anymore.¶ Mr Obama’s word inspires neither fear nor love. For four years, Congress has failed to agree on a US budget. Yet it could probably rustle up a majority for tighter Iran sanctions by close of business on the same day. The danger now is that Congress will press ahead with sanctions and scupper the next round of Geneva talks before they begin.¶ Mr Obama’s second challenge will be to muffle the ire of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, who attacked Mr Kerry’s proposal as the “deal of the century” for Iran. Mr Obama’s relations with Mr Netanyahu were abysmal for most of his first term – the latter relished any chance to humiliate the White House. The US president eventually started to return the contempt with which he was treated. Mr Obama’s victory last year over Mitt Romney, Mr Netanyahu’s friend, whom he explicitly backed, seemed to give the Israeli prime minister pause for thought.¶ Now relations are turning icy again. Mr Netanyahu has made it clear that he sees Mr Rouhani as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” – worse even than his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad. It is a blatant misportrayal. But if there is to be a tug of war on Capitol Hill between Mr Obama and the influential American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, which usually takes Mr Netanyahu’s cue, the latter will have the upper hand. An open breach is possible in the coming week. To reach his destination Mr Obama must neutralise Israel’s opposition.¶ Third, America’s Middle East alliances are rapidly crumbling – not just the US-Israel relationship. Mr Obama has shown conviction in bringing Iran to the verge of an initial deal. These are the first US-Iran talks since the mullahs took over in 1979. Reports of longer-running back-channel negotiations between the US and Iran show that Mr Obama can set a strategy and pursue it – with Mr Kerry’s indefatigable help. Yet in the process the US is losing sway with almost every ally it has in the Middle East.¶ Egypt’s generals laughed off Mr Obama’s threat earlier this year to suspend $1.8bn in US military aid following their coup. A smaller portion was held back. Saudi Arabia and others instantly stepped into the breach with $12bn in commitments.¶ The Saudis, meanwhile, are terrified Iran is poised once again to profit from a clumsy US-led initiative. Under George W Bush, Iraq was in effect handed to Iran on a platter. Now in the Saudi view, Mr Obama is cementing the grip of Iran’s client regime in Syria and dangling the prospect of at least a temporary stay on Tehran’s nuclear programme. Mr Obama will also need to find a way to assuage Riyadh’s hostility.¶ The key fact underlying all this is Mr Obama’s good sense in sticking to the path of negotiation. The other options of either going to war with Iran or accepting its nuclear ambitions are far worse. Most of the world is hoping Mr Obama will use every tool at hand to exploit what could be a once in a generation opening. But he will have to play beyond his normal limits to avoid losing Israel and Congress. France, too, remains to be convinced that Iran is not getting the better of the bargain.

#### Israel’s prepared and willing to unilaterally strike if they don’t like the trajectory of negotiations

John Reed 11-17, Financial Times, 11/17/13, “Israel willing to strike Iran on its own, says ex-security chief,” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47d39c80-4f7f-11e3-8e99-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2l1JsYGNS

As the US and other world powers resume pursuit of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme, Israel’s outgoing national security chief has joined other officials in sounding a tough warning, insisting that the Jewish state has the ability to strike the Islamic Republic and is willing to go it alone.¶ In an interview with the Financial Times, Yaakov Amidror, who stepped down last month, said Israel could halt Iran’s nuclear weapons capability “for a very long time”, and added its air force had been conducting “very long-range flights . . . all around the world” as part of preparations for a possible military confrontation with Iran.¶ “We are not the United States of America, of course, and believe it or not they have more capabilities than us,” Mr Amidror said. “But we have enough to stop the Iranians for a very long time.”¶ Mr Amidror’s comments are the latest in a series of strong – and at times belligerent – remarks by Israeli government officials, who are in open disagreement with the US about the negotiations to get Iran to freeze its military nuclear capability. A new round of talks will open in Geneva on Wednesday.¶ Israel opposes the notion of an interim deal between Iran and world powers that falls short of dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme entirely. Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, last week gave one of his strongest hints yet that Israel might strike Iran when he said that a “bad deal” was liable to lead to war.¶ The US has consistently opposed an Israeli attack on Iran. Washington fears a unilateral strike would prompt huge retaliation against Israel, particularly from Iran’s Lebanon-based ally Hizbollah, as well as possible Iranian reprisals against US military installations in the Gulf.¶ Officials and analysts in the US and Israel also say Israel acting alone would inflict less damage to Iranian nuclear facilities than a US-led operation.¶ While the Pentagon has made available to Israel a broad range of military technologies, one of the weapons it has held back is its new generation of “bunker-buster” bombs. Military analysts believe it is the only weapon potentially able to destroy Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Fordow, which is buried deep under a mountain.¶ Mr Amidror, when asked whether Israel’s military capability included the ability to strike Iran’s underground nuclear installations, said: “including everything”, but declined to elaborate.¶ “We are not bluffing,” Mr Amidror said. “We are very serious – preparing ourselves for the possibility that Israel will have to defend itself by itself.”¶ He said Israel’s preparations for possible conflict included long-range flights to ready Israeli pilots for possible missions to Iran.¶ “From here to Iran, it is 2,000km, and you have to be familiar with such destinations,” Mr Amidror said.¶ He added: “All those who have radar cover of the Middle East know what we are doing.” He said that the flights had been taking place “for a few years”.¶ Mr Amidror, a two-star general, served as Israel’s national security adviser for two and a half years, longer than any of his predecessors. He has known Mr Netanyahu since 1969, when they took an intelligence course together near Tel Aviv.¶ When asked whether he was convinced the Israeli prime minister had it in him to take unilateral military action, he said: “If you ask about him personally as a prime minister, he is ready to take such decisions. The answer is a clear yes.” He added: “The situation will be the determining factor for any prime minister. The situation will dictate actions.”

#### Israel strike causes global great power war---turns case

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a **regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash**. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**, Iran has a second-strike capability** comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and **openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.** Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, **Iran’s response would likely be muted.** If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons**, but would probably not risk using force.**

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While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. **A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.**

### Off

#### The United States federal government should:

#### \* Lift a substantial amount of sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran and refrain from increasing or threatening to increase sanctions

#### \* Refrain from threatening Iran with the use of military force during ongoing negotiations

#### \* Require Congressional authorization prior to the use of offensive military force against Syria, unless to repel attacks by Syria.

#### The United States Federal Government should not require Congressional authorization prior to the use of offensive military force against Iran.

#### Congress lifting sanctions is sufficient to cause a deal

James Traub 11/15, fellow @ Center on Int’l Coop, 2013, “Et Tu, Menendez?” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/15/the\_iran\_sanctions\_stranglehold\_and\_the\_march\_to\_war

With Iran reportedly prepared to stop enriching uranium to the 20 percent level and to dispose of its existing stockpile of such fuel in exchange for very modest sanctions relief (and the release of a small fraction of the $50 billion in frozen Iranian assets), diplomats could well reach a first-stage agreement when they reconvene next week. But in order to advance further, Congress and the European Union will have to agree to remove sanctions incrementally as Iran reduces its stock of centrifuges, disables some facilities, and allows intrusive inspection of others. But if Senate Democrats continue to denounce the negotiations as a giveaway -- "wild-eyed hope" rather than "clear-eyed pragmatism," as Menendez puts it -- then the Iranians will recognize that the sanctions relief they demand is an illusion. Obama, it's true, can invoke national security in order to temporarily waive sanctions. But only Congress can permanently remove them. And Bob Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has drawn up, and threatened to introduce, a bill which would bar the president from waiving sanctions. That might be a Rubicon the Democratic hawks would not cross -- though Menendez did promise AIPAC that "every day in Tehran will be a worse day than the last until the regime foregoes its nuclear ambition." Barack Obama has dropped, one by one, his dreams of a "transformative" foreign policy. His policy of "mutual respect" in the Middle East has not elevated America in the eyes either of regimes or their peoples. The "reset" with Russia failed when Vladimir Putin returned to power. Syria has gone to hell on his watch. He has achieved far less than he had hoped on nuclear nonproliferation and on climate change. But on Iran, where the consequences of failure are most grave, Obama's policy of patient engagement has been vindicated by events. He now has a partner he might be able to work with, and an Iranian public desperate for relief from sanctions. The path to a solution, though full of obstacles, is clear. This would be a victory, should it come, which the president has fully earned. (And lord knows he needs one.) But with the Ayatollah on one side, and Benjamin Netanyahu and his Democratic chorus on the other, he -- and we -- may not get there. If and when diplomacy gives way to war, let's not forget who to blame.

#### Syria’s the symbolic lynchpin of war powers---bigger rallying point than the aff

Andrwe J. Bacevich 13, history and IR prof @ Boston, 9-9, “Congress Could now Alter our Militarized approach to the Middle East– But likely Won’t,” Juan Cole Informed Comment, http://www.juancole.com/2013/09/congress-militarized-bacevich.html

Sometimes history happens at the moment when no one is looking. On weekends in late August, the president of the United States ought to be playing golf or loafing at Camp David, not making headlines. Yet Barack Obama chose Labor Day weekend to unveil arguably the most consequential foreign policy shift of his presidency. In an announcement that surprised virtually everyone, the president told his countrymen and the world that he was putting on hold the much anticipated U.S. attack against Syria. Obama hadn’t, he assured us, changed his mind about the need and justification for punishing the Syrian government for its probable use of chemical weapons against its own citizens. In fact, only days before administration officials had been claiming that, if necessary, the U.S. would “go it alone” in punishing Bashar al-Assad’s regime for its bad behavior. Now, however, Obama announced that, as the chief executive of “the world’s oldest constitutional democracy,” he had decided to seek Congressional authorization before proceeding. Obama thereby brought to a screeching halt a process extending back over six decades in which successive inhabitants of the Oval Office had arrogated to themselves (or had thrust upon them) ever wider prerogatives in deciding when and against whom the United States should wage war. Here was one point on which every president from Harry Truman to George W. Bush had agreed: on matters related to national security, the authority of the commander-in-chief has no fixed limits. When it comes to keeping the country safe and securing its vital interests, presidents can do pretty much whatever they see fit. Here, by no means incidentally, lies the ultimate the source of the stature and prestige that defines the imperial presidency and thereby shapes (or distorts) the American political system. Sure, the quarters at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue are classy, but what really endowed the postwar war presidency with its singular aura were the missiles, bombers, and carrier battle groups that responded to the commands of one man alone. What’s the bully pulpit in comparison to having the 82nd Airborne and SEAL Team Six at your beck and call? Now, in effect, Obama was saying to Congress: I’m keen to launch a war of choice. But first I want you guys to okay it. In politics, where voluntarily forfeiting power is an unnatural act, Obama’s invitation qualifies as beyond unusual. Whatever the calculations behind his move, its effect rates somewhere between unprecedented and positively bizarre — the heir to imperial prerogatives acting, well, decidedly unimperial. Obama is a constitutional lawyer, of course, and it’s pleasant to imagine that he acted out of due regard for what Article 1, Section 8, of that document plainly states, namely that “the Congress shall have power… to declare war.” Take his explanation at face value and the president’s decision ought to earn plaudits from strict constructionists across the land. The Federalist Society should offer Obama an honorary lifetime membership. Of course, seasoned political observers, understandably steeped in cynicism, dismissed the president’s professed rationale out of hand and immediately began speculating about his actual motivation. The most popular explanation was this: having painted himself into a corner, Obama was trying to lure members of the legislative branch into joining him there. Rather than a belated conversion experience, the president’s literal reading of the Constitution actually amounted to a sneaky political ruse. After all, the president had gotten himself into a pickle by declaring back in August 2012 that any use of chemical weapons by the government of Bashar al-Assad would cross a supposedly game-changing “red line.” When the Syrians (apparently) called his bluff, Obama found himself facing uniformly unattractive military options that ranged from the patently risky — joining forces with the militants intent on toppling Assad — to the patently pointless — firing a “shot across the bow” of the Syrian ship of state. Meanwhile, the broader American public, awakening from its summertime snooze, was demonstrating remarkably little enthusiasm for yet another armed intervention in the Middle East. Making matters worse still, U.S. military leaders and many members of Congress, Republican and Democratic alike, were expressing serious reservations or actual opposition. Press reports even cited leaks by unnamed officials who characterized the intelligence linking Assad to the chemical attacks as no “slam dunk,” a painful reminder of how bogus information had paved the way for the disastrous and unnecessary Iraq War. For the White House, even a hint that Obama in 2013 might be replaying the Bush scenario of 2003 was anathema. The president also discovered that recruiting allies to join him in this venture was proving a hard sell. It wasn’t just the Arab League’s refusal to give an administration strike against Syria its seal of approval, although that was bad enough. Jordan’s King Abdullah, America’s “closest ally in the Arab world,” publicly announced that he favored talking to Syria rather than bombing it. As for Iraq, that previous beneficiary of American liberation, its government was refusing even to allow U.S. forces access to its airspace. Ingrates! For Obama, the last straw may have come when America’s most reliable (not to say subservient) European partner refused to enlist in yet another crusade to advance the cause of peace, freedom, and human rights in the Middle East. With memories of Tony and George W. apparently eclipsing those of Winston and Franklin, the British Parliament rejected Prime Minister David Cameron’s attempt to position the United Kingdom alongside the United States. Parliament’s vote dashed Obama’s hopes of forging a coalition of two and so investing a war of choice against Syria with at least a modicum of legitimacy. When it comes to actual military action, only France still entertains the possibility of making common cause with the United States. Yet the number of Americans taking assurance from this prospect approximates the number who know that Bernard-Henri Lévy isn’t a celebrity chef. John F. Kennedy once remarked that defeat is an orphan. Here was a war bereft of parents even before it had begun. Whether or Not to Approve the War for the Greater Middle East Still, whether high-minded constitutional considerations or diabolically clever political machinations motivated the president may matter less than what happens next. Obama lobbed the ball into Congress’s end of the court. What remains to be seen is how the House and the Senate, just now coming back into session, will respond. At least two possibilities exist, one with implications that could prove profound and the second holding the promise of being vastly entertaining. On the one hand, Obama has implicitly opened the door for a Great Debate regarding the trajectory of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Although a week or ten days from now the Senate and House of Representatives will likely be voting to approve or reject some version of an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), at stake is much more than the question of what to do about Syria. The real issue — Americans should hope that the forthcoming congressional debate makes this explicit — concerns the advisability of continuing to rely on military might as the preferred means of advancing U.S. interests in this part of the world. Appreciating the actual stakes requires putting the present crisis in a broader context. Herewith an abbreviated history lesson. Back in 1980, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would employ any means necessary to prevent a hostile power from gaining control of the Persian Gulf. In retrospect, it’s clear enough that the promulgation of the so-called Carter Doctrine amounted to a de facto presidential “declaration” of war (even if Carter himself did not consciously intend to commit the United States to perpetual armed conflict in the region). Certainly, what followed was a never-ending sequence of wars and war-like episodes. Although the Congress never formally endorsed Carter’s declaration, it tacitly acceded to all that his commitment subsequently entailed. Relatively modest in its initial formulation, the Carter Doctrine quickly metastasized. Geographically, it grew far beyond the bounds of the Persian Gulf, eventually encompassing virtually all of the Islamic world. Washington’s own ambitions in the region also soared. Rather than merely preventing a hostile power from achieving dominance in the Gulf, the United States was soon seeking to achieve dominance itself. Dominance — that is, shaping the course of events to Washington’s liking — was said to hold the key to maintaining stability, ensuring access to the world’s most important energy reserves, checking the spread of Islamic radicalism, combating terrorism, fostering Israel’s security, and promoting American values. Through the adroit use of military might, dominance actually seemed plausible. (So at least Washington persuaded itself.) What this meant in practice was the wholesale militarization of U.S. policy toward the Greater Middle East in a period in which Washington’s infatuation with military power was reaching its zenith. As the Cold War wound down, the national security apparatus shifted its focus from defending Germany’s Fulda Gap to projecting military power throughout the Islamic world. In practical terms, this shift found expression in the creation of Central Command (CENTCOM), reconfigured forces, and an eternal round of contingency planning, war plans, and military exercises in the region. To lay the basis for the actual commitment of troops, the Pentagon established military bases, stockpiled material in forward locations, and negotiated transit rights. It also courted and armed proxies. In essence, the Carter Doctrine provided the Pentagon (along with various U.S. intelligence agencies) with a rationale for honing and then exercising new capabilities. Capabilities expanded the range of policy options. Options offered opportunities to “do something” in response to crisis. From the Reagan era on, policymakers seized upon those opportunities with alacrity. A seemingly endless series of episodes and incidents ensued, as U.S. forces, covert operatives, or proxies engaged in hostile actions (often on multiple occasions) in Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, the southern Philippines, and in the Persian Gulf itself, not to mention Iraq and Afghanistan. Consider them altogether and what you have is a War for the Greater Middle East, pursued by the United States for over three decades now. If Congress gives President Obama the green light, Syria will become the latest front in this ongoing enterprise. Profiles in Courage? If Only A debate over the Syrian AUMF should encourage members of Congress — if they’ve got the guts — to survey this entire record of U.S. military activities in the Greater Middle East going back to 1980. To do so means almost unavoidably confronting this simple question: How are we doing? To state the matter directly, all these years later, given all the ordnance expended, all the toing-and-froing of U.S. forces, and all the lives lost or shattered along the way, is mission accomplishment anywhere insight? Or have U.S. troops — the objects of such putative love and admiration on the part of the American people — been engaged over the past 30-plus years in a fool’s errand? How members cast their votes on the Syrian AUMF will signal their answer — and by extension the nation’s answer — to that question. To okay an attack on Syria will, in effect, reaffirm the Carter Doctrine and put a stamp of congressional approval on the policies that got us where we are today. A majority vote in favor of the Syrian AUMF will sustain and probably deepen Washington’s insistence that the resort to violence represents the best way to advance U.S. interests in the Islamic world. From this perspective, all we need to do is try harder and eventually we’ll achieve a favorable outcome. With Syria presumably the elusive but never quite attained turning point, the Greater Middle East will stabilize. Democracy will flourish. And the United States will bask in the appreciation of those we have freed from tyranny. To vote against the AUMF, on the other hand, will draw a red line of much greater significance than the one that President Obama himself so casually laid down. Should the majority in either House reject the Syrian AUMF, the vote will call into question the continued viability of the Carter Doctrine and all that followed in its wake. It will create space to ask whether having another go is likely to produce an outcome any different from what the United States has achieved in the myriad places throughout the Greater Middle East where U.S. forces (or covert operatives) have, whatever their intentions, spent the past several decades wreaking havoc and sowing chaos under the guise of doing good. Instead of offering more of the same – does anyone seriously think that ousting Assad will transform Syria into an Arab Switzerland? — rejecting the AUMF might even invite the possibility of charting an altogether different course, entailing perhaps a lower military profile and greater self-restraint. What a stirring prospect! Imagine members of Congress setting aside partisan concerns to debate first-order questions of policy. Imagine them putting the interests of the country in front of their own worries about winning reelection or pursuing their political ambitions. It would be like Lincoln vs. Douglas or Woodrow Wilson vs. Henry Cabot Lodge. Call Doris Kearns Goodwin. Call Spielberg or Sorkin. Get me Capra, for God’s sake. We’re talking high drama of blockbuster proportions.

## Case

## Iran Adv

### 1NC SQ Solves Iran

#### SQ will solve in the next couple days – negotiations will succeed now and enrichment isn’t a deal-breaker

Lesley Wroughton, 11-16-2013, “'Quite possible' Iran, powers can reach nuclear deal next week: U.S. official,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/16/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSBRE9AF00I20131116

Major powers and Iran are getting closer to an initial agreement to curb Iran's nuclear program, a senior U.S. official said on Friday, adding it is "quite possible" a deal could be reached when negotiators meet November 20-22 in Geneva. "For the first time in nearly a decade we are getting close to a first-step ... that would stop the Iranian nuclear program from advancing and roll it back in key areas," the official told reporters. "I don't know if we will reach an agreement. I think it is quite possible that we can, but there are still tough issues to negotiate," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The official said EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif were to meet on November 20 in Geneva. They will be joined later the same day by a wider group known as the P5+1 comprising Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. The talks are likely to last through November 22, the official added. The talks will seek to finalize an interim deal to allow time to negotiate a comprehensive, permanent agreement with Iran that would end a 10-year deadlock and provide assurances to the six powers that its atomic program would not produce bombs. Iran has denied that it is seeking the capability to produce atomic weapons and insists its nuclear ambitions are limited to the peaceful generation of electricity and other civilian uses. Negotiations last week in Geneva ended without an agreement, although the sides appeared to be close to a deal that would defuse their standoff over the nuclear program. U.S. President Barack Obama has urged skeptical U.S. lawmakers not to impose new sanctions on Iran while negotiations are ongoing and called for a pause in U.S. sanctions to see if diplomacy can work. ALIGNED WITH WHITE HOUSE APPROACH In addition to lobbying lawmakers, the White House this week also reached out to progressive groups supportive of diplomacy with Iran to make sure they stay aligned with the Obama administration's approach, according to a source close to the matter. Senior administration officials told supporters that they are guardedly optimistic about reaching an interim deal with Iran in Geneva and that the P5+1, including the French, are ready to present a unified position there, the source said. The senior U.S. official who met with reporters Friday said that published estimates of direct sanctions relief being offered under a preliminary deal - which have ranged from $15 billion to $50 billion - were "wildly exaggerated." "It is way south of all of that and quite frankly it will be dwarfed by the restrictions that are still in place," the official said, saying to impose further sanctions threatened the negotiations not only with Iran but also among the six major powers. "The P5+1 believes these are serious negotiations. They have a chance to be successful," the official said. "For us to slap on sanctions in the middle of it, they see as bad faith." A senior administration official estimated that Iran has about $100 billion in reserves, the vast majority of which is held up in overseas bank accounts, which Tehran has limited or no access to. U.S.-imposed sanctions have hit Iran's economy hard. U.S. officials estimate that the economy contracted by more than 5 percent last year and its currency lost about 60 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar since 2011. Global oil prices slipped lower on Friday on the reports that Western powers may reach a deal but then rose slightly as markets weighed Libyan supply outages. Commenting on a U.N. inspection report released on November 14 that said Iran had stopped expanding its uranium enrichment capacity, the official said the development was "a good thing" but did not resolve fundamental questions and concerns about Tehran's nuclear ambitions. "We appreciate the step but the reason for our negotiation is to get at certainty that Iran can't have a nuclear weapon and we are a long way from that," the official added. Western diplomats said one of the sticking points during talks was Iran's argument that it retains the "right" to enrich uranium. The United States argues Iran does not intrinsically have that right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The official dismissed suggestions that the issue could be a deal breaker. "I think there is a way to navigate that," the official said. "We each understand where each other is and what is possible, and what is not."

Sq solves --- wrougton says that we’re gonna get a deal pretty soon --- bot

### 1nc iran impact d

#### They don’t solve ANY of the aff – the last part of the plan MEANS they solve NOTHING – no metric to determine a move to attack on Iran

#### No impact to Iranian adventurism

Kaplan & Kaplan 11 – Robert D., senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington and a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, and Stephen S., former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council as well as a longtime daily White House briefer and director of the president’s daily briefing, March/April 2011, “America Primed,” <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-primed-4892>

Indeed, the ascent of Iranian influence is not an altogether bad development. It was lethargic Sunni Arab dictatorships, nominally pro-American, whose societies supplied the social and political conditions for the emergence of the 9/11 terrorists. The toppling of Saddam Hussein, and the consequent rise of Shia Iran as a regional power, has finally shocked sclerotic Arab leaders into actions that benefit U.S. interests: moving a bit nearer to Israel and working more closely with America. An Iranian Shia power that balances against a Sunni Arab world, democratic or not, would be an ideal outcome were Iran to go through a whole or even partial political transformation. Shia power in the future will not necessarily speak with one voice, given the prospect of ongoing tensions between Tehran and Baghdad. For even a weak Shia state in Iraq will offer a political and theological alternative to the Islamic Republic. (This is not to justify the costs of invading Iraq, only to mention the few benefits that have emerged from the effort.) And Turkey, whose Islamic democracy makes the United States uncomfortable, still has an appeal to the Arab masses on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity which serves a useful purpose: it implicitly checks Iran.

A divided Middle East, coupled with an Arab world weakened by domestic strife, has much to recommend itself for the future of American power. And demographic, cultural and other indicators point to a positive ideological and philosophical shift in Iranian politics in the future. This prognosis, coupled with the difficulties inherent in a wholly successful U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, leads to the containment of a nuclear Iran—should sanctions and industrial sabotage not work in the long run—as the least-bad option, and the one least likely to embroil the United States even deeper in the Middle East.

#### Won’t deploy nukes---they’re rational

Schramm 11 Madison Schramm is a program associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Hey America, Iran still isn't threat No. 1" Oct 12 www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/1012/Hey-America-Iran-still-isn-t-threat-No.-1/(page)/3

Iran's nuclear program is a strategic, not a direct, threat. Despite Mr. Ahmadinejad's annual performance at the UN General Assembly, the leadership in Tehran is rational and would be highly unlikely to actually deploy nuclear weapons. Doing so would ensure the obliteration of Iran, and the leadership in Tehran is eccentric, not suicidal. In September, Ahmadinejad offered to stop uranium enrichment at 20 percent enrichment (90 percent is considered weapons grade) if Iran were guaranteed fuel for a medical research reactor.

Yes, Iran has almost hit the nuclear capable mark, at which point it would possess the technical expertise and materials to move quickly to create a weapon. But if Iran manages to cross that threshold, it will be in the company of the estimated 40 states already in the nuclear capable club. Were the Iranians to gain capability and then to arm, Washington would need to prepare for some muscle flexing – not Armageddon.

The United States is also concerned that a nuclear capable Iran would be emboldened to further support Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations in the region. But Israel’s superior conventional military (ranked 6th internationally in military expenditures), nuclear weapons capability, and unwavering support from the United States would counterbalance any extremes on this front. Further, both Hamas and Hezbollah hold elected positions. They may get military support from Iran, but Iran doesn’t have the power to unilaterally dictate terms.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned that Iran will instigate an arms race, but the arms race in the Middle East began in the 1960s when Israel armed. Since then, over half a dozen countries in the Middle East have sought nuclear capability, but Israel is the only country that has succeeded. A nuclear Iran could very well accelerate an arms race, but it could be contained. By leveraging US patronage to the region and continuing to supply Gulf states with conventional weapons, the US could dissuade other countries from joining the race.

#### No impact to Iran prolif---they’ll be cautious and moderate

Kenneth Waltz 12, senior research scholar @ Saltzman, Poly Sci Prof @ Columbia, September/October 2012, “Iran and the Bomb – Waltz Replies,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 157-162

In arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent an unacceptable threat to the United States and its allies, Colin Kahl rejects my contention that states tend to become more cautious once they obtain nuclear weapons and claims that I minimize the potential threat of an emboldened Islamic Republic. He accuses me of misreading history and suggests that I overestimate the stability produced by nuclear deterrence. In fact, it is Kahl who misunderstands the historical record and who fails to grasp the ramifications of nuclear deterrence.

In Kahl's view, new nuclear states do not necessarily behave as status quo powers and can instead be highly revisionist. Seeking a precedent, he highlights the fact that the Soviet Union encouraged North Korea to launch a potentially risky invasion of South Korea in 1950, shortly after the Soviets had tested their first nuclear bomb. But Kahl neglects to explain the context of that decision. Some time before, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly identified the United States' security commitments in Asia; defending South Korea was not among them. The United States had also signaled its lack of interest in protecting the South Koreans by declining to arm them with enough weapons to repel a Soviet-backed invasion by the North. The Soviet Union therefore had good reason to assume that the United States would not respond if the North Koreans attacked. In light of these facts, it is difficult to see Stalin's encouragement of the invasion as an example of bold, revisionist behavior. Contrary to Kahl's claims, the beginning of the Korean War hardly supplies evidence of Soviet nuclear adventurism, and therefore it should not be understood as a cautionary tale when considering the potential impact that possessing a nuclear arsenal would have on Iranian behavior.

Kahl seems to accept that nuclear weapons create stability -- or a form of stability, at least. But he notes -- as do most scholars of nuclear matters, myself included -- that nuclear stability permits lower-level violence. Taking advantage of the protection that their atomic arsenals provide, nuclear-armed states can feel freer to make minor incursions, deploy terrorism, and engage in generally annoying behavior. But the question is how significant these disruptive behaviors are compared with the peace and stability that nuclear weapons produce.

Kahl points to the example of Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons have probably increased its willingness to wage a low-intensity fight against India, which makes the subcontinent more prone to crises. As Kahl correctly argues, Pakistan's increased appetite for risk probably played a role in precipitating the so-called Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999. But the Kargil War was the fourth war fought by the two countries, and it paled in comparison to the three wars they fought before they both developed nuclear weapons. In fact, the Kargil conflict was a war only according to social scientists, who oddly define "war" as any conflict that results in 1,000 or more battlefield deaths. By historical standards, that casualty rate constitutes little more than a skirmish. Far from proving that new nuclear states are not swayed by the logic of deterrence, the Kargil War supports the proposition that nuclear weapons prevent minor conflicts from becoming major wars. Indeed, nuclear weapons are the only peace-promoting weapons that the world has ever known, and there is no reason to believe that things would be different if Iran acquired such arms.

Kahl also frets that a nuclear-armed Iran would step up its support for terrorist groups. Terrorism is tragic for those whose lives it destroys and unnerving for countries that suffer from it. But the number of annual fatalities from international terrorism is vanishingly small compared with the casualties wrought by major wars. Of course, like Kahl, I would not welcome increased Iranian support for Hezbollah or an increased supply of more potent Iranian arms to Palestinian militants. And I, too, hope for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the disputes between Israel and its neighbors. But the last several decades have not offered much reason to believe those goals can be easily attained, and I would rather see the possibility of major war reduced through nuclear stability, even if the price is an increase in disruptive activities and low-level conflict.

Just a few months ago in these pages, Kahl eloquently expressed his opposition to a proposed preventive strike on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities, warning that it could spark a regional war ("Not Time to Attack Iran," March/April 2012). I agree. But Kahl and I differ on what the United States can achieve in its showdown with the Islamic Republic. Kahl appears to believe that it is possible for the United States to forgo risky military action and still prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons through a combination of sanctions and diplomacy. I strongly doubt that. Short of using military force, it is difficult to imagine how Iran could be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if it is determined to do so. That outcome would produce a lamentable possible increase in terrorism and lower-level conflict. But the many benefits of regional stability would far outweigh the costs.

### 1nc Afghanistan

#### Stability increasing

DoD 13, Department of Defense, July 2013, "Report on¶ Progress Toward Security and¶ Stability in Afghanistan," http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section\_1230\_Report\_July\_2013.pdf¶

The conflict in Afghanistan has shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For the past 11 years, ¶ the United States and our coalition partners have led the fight against the Taliban, but now ¶ Afghan forces are conducting almost all combat operations. The progress made by the ¶ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led surge over the past three years has put the ¶ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) firmly in control of all of ¶ Afghanistan’s major cities and 34 provincial capitals and driven the insurgency into the ¶ countryside. ISAF’s primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency ¶ to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to ¶ hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—¶ half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014. ¶ As agreed by President Obama and President Karzai at their January 2013 meeting in ¶ Washington, D.C., and in line with commitments made at the Lisbon and Chicago NATO ¶ summits, "Milestone 2013" was announced on June 18, 2013, marking ISAF’s official transition ¶ to its new role. The ANSF has grown to approximately 96 percent of its authorized end-strength ¶ of 352,000 personnel and is conducting almost all operations independently. As a result, ISAF ¶ casualties are lower than they have been since 2008. The majority of ISAF bases has been ¶ transferred to the ANSF or closed (although most large ISAF bases remain), and construction of¶ most ANSF bases is complete. Afghanistan’s populated areas are increasingly secure; the ANSF ¶ has successfully maintained security gains in areas that have transitioned to Afghan lead ¶ responsibility. To contend with the continuing Taliban threat, particularly in rural areas, the ¶ ANSF will require training and key combat support from ISAF, including in extremis close air ¶ support, through the end of 2014.

#### Great power cooperation is far more likely --- they will also prevent a civil war

Hadar 11—former prof of IR at American U and Mount Vernon-College. PhD in IR from American U (1 July 2011, Leon, Saving U.S. Mideast Policy, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/saving-us-policy-the-mideast-5556)

Indeed, contrary to the warning proponents of U.S. military intervention typically express, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would not necessarily lead to more chaos and bloodshed in those countries. Russia, India and Iran—which supported the Northern Alliance that helped Washington topple the Taliban—and Pakistan (which once backed the Taliban) all have close ties to various ethnic and tribal groups in that country and now have a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing the rivalries.

### 1NC Central Asia

#### From 2001 – Starr empirically denied – Afghanistan didn’t draw in major powers

#### Powers will work together to stabilize the central asia—security and economic incentives

Gresh 12 (Dr. Geoffrey F., Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at National Defense University, “Russia, China, and stabilizing South Asia”, 3/12, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/12/russia\_china\_and\_stabilizing\_south\_asia)

As the U.S. begins to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Russia and China have both declared a desire to increase their military presence throughout Central and South Asia. This new regional alignment, however, should not be viewed as a threat to U.S. strategic national interests but seen rather as concurrent with strategic and regional interests of the United States: regional peace, stability and the prevention of future terrorist safe havens in ungoverned territories. As China and Russia begin to flex their military muscles, the U.S. military should harness their expanded regional influence to promote proactively a new period of responsible multilateral support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This past December it became clearer that Russia had begun to re-assert its regional presence when the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) granted Russia the veto power over any member state's future decision to host a foreign military. CSTO members, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have become increasingly valuable U.S. partners in the Northern Distribution Network after Pakistan shut down U.S. military supply routes running from the south into Afghanistan when NATO troops killed 24 Pakistani soldiers last November in the border area of Salala. Though it appears the route may soon open again, the United States must still adopt a new strategy that works more closely with Russia and the CSTO to maintain the Northern Distribution Network long into the future, which currently accounts for about 60 percent of all cargo transiting Central Asia en route to Afghanistan. Certainly, the U.S. risks being unable to control many aspects of the Northern Distribution Network as it withdraws from the region, and this may in turn adversely affect Afghanistan's future success. However, if the United States remains concerned about leaving the region to a historically obdurate regional rival like Russia, it should also bear in mind that Russia has a vital strategic interest in the future stability of the region. Russia has approximately 15 million Muslims living within its borders, with an estimated 2 million Muslims in Moscow. Russia is fearful of what occurs on its periphery and wants to minimize the spread of Muslim extremism that may originate from an unstable Afghanistan or Pakistan. In addition, Russia does not want regional instability that threatens its oil and gas investments. In particular, Russia wants to ensure that it continues to influence the planning and implementation of the potentially lucrative natural gas pipeline that may one day traverse Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In a recent meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed Russia's commitment to preserving peace and stability throughout the AfPak region, and rejected the use of violence by al-Qaeda and its affiliates that aim to undermine the current Afghan government. Furthermore, he pledged to bolster bilateral ties and work cooperatively with Pakistan to achieve stability in Afghanistan. A newly-elected President Vladimir Putin also recently wrote in a campaign brief that "Russia will help Afghanistan develop its economy and strengthen its military to fight terrorism and drug production." It is not lost on the U.S. government that Russia is proposing to succeed where the U.S. has struggled. However, if Russia does succeed in helping establish a secure Afghanistan and Pakistan that can prevent the spread of bases for terrorism then it is a victory for everyone. Aside from Pakistan, and in line with promoting security throughout the region, Russia announced recently that it will provide $16 million to Kyrgyzstan to assist with border security in the south. Russia also agreed recently to pay $15 million in back rent for its four military facilities across the country, including an air base, a torpedo test center on Lake Issyk-Kul, and a communications center in the south. Further, Russia signed a security pact with Tajikistan last fall to extend its basing lease for 49 years, in addition to a bilateral agreement that will enable Russia to become more integrated into Tajikistan's border security forces that oversee an 830-mile border with Afghanistan. Providing similar types of U.S. aid and security support will also help ensure that the valuable Northern Distribution Network remains open and secure for supply lines into Afghanistan. If the northern trade routes are shut down it would adversely affect aid arriving to Afghanistan and therefore jeopardize the stability of Afghanistan and the region. It would also be in opposition to Russia's regional interests. Rather than citing these examples in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a demonstration of how the U.S. will soon lose out in the region to a resurgent Russia, policymakers can view them as an indication of how Russian interests align with the U.S. to help maintain regional security. More importantly, if Russia wants to take a more active future role in Central Asia, the U.S. should address this shift and work directly with Russia and other CSTO members to ensure that the Northern Distribution Network remains operational in the distant future. Certainly, the U.S. should not be naïve to think that Russia will not at times oppose U.S. regional interests and that there will not be significant areas of conflict. In 2009, Russia tried to convince then President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev to terminate the U.S. contract for its base in Manas. In this case, the U.S. fended off the threat of expulsion successfully through promises of increased U.S. military and economic aid. Continuing to maintain significant amounts of aid to the Central Asia Republics will therefore provide additional incentives to ensure the U.S. is less vulnerable to Russian whims, while at the same time remaining present and active for the benefit of regional security and the maintenance of the Northern Distribution Network. Another powerful regional player, China, also has a vested interest in the stability of the AfPak region, and has already begun to play a more active security role. It was reported this past January, for example, that China intends to establish one or more bases in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Subsequently, at the end of February, Beijing played host to the first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue to discuss regional cooperation and stability. Due to China's shared borders and vibrant trade with both Afghanistan and Pakistan -- not to mention China's estimated 8 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs living in western Xinjiang Province -- it has a direct interest in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain stable long into the future. Bilateral trade between China and Pakistan, for example, increased 28 percent in the past year to approximately $8.7 billion. China also signed an oil agreement with Afghanistan in December that could be worth $7 billion over the next two decades. Additionally, China is concerned about the rise of its Uyghur separatist movement that maintains safe havens in both countries, in addition to the spread of radical Islam. The United States should push China to become more actively engaged in Pakistan's security affairs as China has a direct interest in moderating radicalism in Pakistan and keeping it stable. Indicative of Pakistan's strategic value to China, since 2002 China has financed the construction and development of Pakistan's Gwadar deep water port project. China has contributed more than $1.6 billion toward the port's development as a major shipping and soon-to-be naval hub, which is located just 250 miles from the opening of the Persian Gulf. A Pakistan Supreme Court decision in 2011 enabled China to take full control of Gwadar from a Singapore management company further establishing China's firm position in the Pakistani port city. The creation of a new Chinese military network in Pakistan between Gwadar and the FATA would enable China to oversee the transit and protection of Chinese goods and investments that travel from both the coast and interior through the Karakorum corridor to China's Xinjiang Province. China already has an estimated 4,000 troops in Gilgit Baltistan, part of the larger and disputed Kashmir, and just recently it was reported after a January 2012 trip by Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani to China that Pakistan is considering leasing Gilgit Baltistan to China for the next 50 years. Such a move would indeed escalate tensions with India to the south, but from a Pakistani perspective, China would be positioned better than it already is to assist with any future Pakistani national security concerns. And from a Chinese perspective, it would improve their ability to monitor any illicit Uyghur activities aimed at inciting further rebellion in western China. With interest comes responsibility, and in the wake of the recent reports predicting the establishment of a more robust Chinese military network across Pakistan, it is time that China begins to supplement its increased involvement in Pakistan by helping to maintain peace and stability throughout the entire AfPak region. Certainly after fighting two long wars, the United States can no longer be the sole world power responsible for the region, and both China and Russia have been U.S. security free-riders for too long. They have benefited financially while NATO continues to lose soldiers and accrue a massive war debt. After 11 years of war, it is time the United States work more proactively with Russia, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics to create solutions for the future stability and collective security of the region. Indeed, we may not have a choice, and the United States should embrace the transformation of a new era in Eurasia's heartland.

## Leadership Adv

### AT: Foreign Policy Impact

#### Liberal order is locked in

G. John Ikenberry 11, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “A World of Our Making”. Democracy A Journal of Ideas. Issue #21, Summer 2011. http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=1

The main alternatives to liberal order—both domestic and international—have more or less disappeared. The great liberal international era is not ending. Still, if the liberal order is not in crisis, its governance is. Yet, given the fundamental weakness of the past international orders—brought down by world wars and great economic upheavals—the challenges of reforming and renegotiating liberal world order are, if anything, welcome ones.

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system.

Second, the character of liberal international order itself—**with or without** American **hegemonic leadership**—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.

Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order.

Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow.

### AT: Treaty Power Impact

#### Weakening treaty clause is good, enhance US engagement with the international legal system.

Oona A. Hathaway 8, Associate Professor of Law at Yale, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 117, No. 7 (May, 2008), pp. 1236-1372

A B S T R A C T. Nearly every international agreement that is made through the Treaty Clause ¶ should be approved by both houses of Congress as a congressional-executive agreement instead. ¶ In making this case, this Article examines U.S. international lawmaking through empirical, ¶ comparative, historical, and policy lenses. U.S. international lawmaking is currently haphazardly ¶ carved up between two tracks of international lawmaking, with some areas assigned to the ¶ Treaty Clause route, others to the congressional-executive agreement route, and many ¶ uncomfortably straddling the two. Moreover, the process for making international law that is ¶ outlined in the U.S. Constitution is close to unique in cross-national perspective. To explain how ¶ the United States came to have such a haphazard and unusual system, this Article traces the ¶ history of U.S. international lawmaking back to the Founding. The rules and patterns of practice ¶ that now govern were developed in response to specific contingent events that for the most part ¶ have little or no continuing significance. The Treaty Clause process is demonstrably inferior to ¶ the congressional-executive agreement process as a matter of public policy on nearly all crucial ¶ dimensions: ease of use, democratic legitimacy, and strength of the international legal ¶ commitments that are created. Thus, this Article concludes by charting a course toward ending ¶ the Treaty Clause for all but a handful of international agreements. By gradually replacing most ¶ Article II treaties with ex post congressional-executive agreements, policymakers can make ¶ America's domestic engagement with international law more sensible, effective, and democratic.

#### Solves problems with withdrawal and enhances US credibility.

Oona A. Hathaway 8, Associate Professor of Law at Yale, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 117, No. 7 (May, 2008), pp. 1236-1372

This Article makes the case for a new direction: nearly everything that is ¶ done through the Treaty Clause can and should be done through ¶ congressional-executive agreements approved by both houses of Congress. The ¶ congressional-executive agreement includes the House of Representatives in ¶ the lawmaking process, is less subject than is a treaty to stonewalling by an ¶ extreme minority, and rarely requires the passage of separate implementing ¶ legislation to enter into effect. Moreover, the agreement is often easier to enforce and can be subject to more stringent rules regarding unilateral withdrawal, thus allowing the United States to make stronger and more ¶ consistent international commitments. A congressional-executive agreement ¶ might seem to lack the "'dignity' of a treaty."8 But in fact a congressional ¶ executive agreement that is expressly approved by Congress is more legitimate ¶ and more reliable than a treaty, and it can and should be used for even the most ¶ important international commitments.9

#### Treaty clause is unpopular. No chance of increased restrain.

Oona A. Hathaway 8, Associate Professor of Law at Yale, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 117, No. 7 (May, 2008), pp. 1236-1372

Why the backlash against the Treaty Clause? There were several reasons - ¶ the emergence of the Cold War, the growing hegemony of the United States, ¶ and rising isolationism, among others.19'6 Yet even more central than the ¶ geopolitical backdrop was an emerging backlash against the human rights ¶ revolution that had been led by the United States - a backlash that continues to ¶ inspire opposition to international law in the United States even today.

#### International treaties irrelevant

Eric A. Posner 9, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. The Perils of Global Legalism, 34-6

34 ¶ Most global legalists acknowledge that international law is created and enforced by states. They believe that states are willing to expand international law along legalistic lines because states’ long-term interests lie in solving global collective action problems. In the absence of a world govern- ment or other forms of integration, international law seems like the only way for states to solve these problems. The great difﬁculty for the global legalist is explaining why, if states create and maintain international law, they will also not break it when they prefer to free ride. In the absence of an enforcement mechanism, what ensures that states that create law and legal institutions that are supposed to solve global collective action prob- lems will not ignore them? ¶ For the rational choice theorist, the answer is plain: states cannot solve global collective action problems by creating institutions that themselves depend on global collective action. This is not to say that international law is not possible at all. Certainly, states can cooperate by threatening to retaliate against cheaters, and where international problems are matters of coordination rather than conﬂ ict, international law can go far, indeed.7 But if states (or the individuals who control states) cannot create a global government or q uasi-g overnment institutions, then it seems unlikely that they can solve, in spontaneous fashion, the types of problems that, at the national level, require the action of governments. ¶ Global legalists are not enthusiasts for rational choice theory and have ¶ 35¶ grappled with this problem in other ways.8 I will criticize their attempts in chapter 3. Here I want to focus on one approach, which is to insist that just as individuals can be loyal to government, so too can individuals (and their governments) be loyal to international law and be willing to defer to its requirements even when self-i nterest does not strictly demand that they do so. International law has force because (or to the extent that) it is legitimate.9 ¶ What makes governance or law legitimate? This is a complicated ques- tion best left to philosophers, but a simple and adequate point for present purposes is that no system of law will be perceived as legitimate unless those governed by that law believe that the law does good — serves their interests or respects and enforces their values. Perhaps more is required than this — such as political participation, for example — but we can treat the ﬁ rst condition as necessary if not sufﬁ cient. If individuals believe that a system of law does not advance their interests and respect their values, that instead it advances the interests of others or is dysfunctional and helps no one at all, they will not believe that the law is legitimate and will not voluntarily submit to its authority. ¶ Unfortunately, international law does not satisfy this condition, mainly because of its institutional weaknesses; but of course, its institutional weaknesses stem from the state system — states are not willing to tolerate powerful international agencies. In classic international law, states enjoy sovereign equality, which means that international law cannot be created unless all agree, and that international law binds all states equally. What this means is that if nearly everyone in the world agrees that some global legal instrument would be beneﬁ cial (a climate treaty, the UN charter), it can be blocked by a tiny country like Iceland (population 300,000) or a dictatorship like North Korea. What is the attraction of a system that puts a tiny country like Iceland on equal footing with China? When then at- torney general Robert Jackson tried to justify American aid for Britain at the onset of World War II on the grounds that the Nazi Germany was the aggressor, international lawyers complained that the United States could not claim neutrality while providing aid to a belligerent — there was no such thing as an aggressor in international law.10 Nazi Germany had not agreed to such a rule of international law; therefore, such a rule could not exist. Only through the destruction of Nazi Germany could international law be changed; East and West Germany could reenter international so-¶ 36¶ ciety only on other people’s terms. How could such a system be perceived to be legitimate? ¶ There is, of course, a reason why international law works in this fash- ion. Because no world government can compel states to comply with inter- national law, states will comply with international law only when doing so is in their interest. In this way, international law always depends on state consent. So international law must take states as they are, which means that little states, big states, good states, and bad states, all exist on a plane of equality. ¶

### AT: Treaty Power Key to ILaw Compliance

#### No uniform standard for how states need to implement

Oona A. Hathaway 8, Associate Professor of Law at Yale, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 117, No. 7 (May, 2008), pp. 1236-1372

International law provides strikingly little guidance to states about how ¶ they ought to make international law. The 1972 Vienna Convention on the Law ¶ of Treaties, which incorporates widely accepted principles of international law, ¶ provides states with some guidance. It dictates that in order for a state to bind ¶ itself to an international agreement, it must express its consent. But how that ¶ consent is expressed or determined is left entirely to domestic law.82 As a ¶ consequence, there is a wide variety of practices among states. The only way to know how states make internationalaw, then, is to look ¶ to the domestic legal rules that govern the process. Working with a team of ¶ researchers, I have taken a step in this direction by compiling a comprehensive ¶ database of the treaty-making and domestic lawmaking practices of every ¶ country in the world that had a constitution in the year 2007. It turns out that ¶ the U.S. Treaty Clause stands out as a remarkably unusual method of making ¶ international law. Only five other countries in the world-Algeria, Burundi, ¶ Iraq, Micronesia, and the Philippines - require a supermajority vote in their ¶ legislature in order for the country to ratify a treaty.83 By contrast, most states ¶ require that internationalaw be made through a simple or absolute majority ¶ vote in the legislature.

# Block

## CP

### 1AC

#### Judis is from June and says the CP solves – it’s generically about “concessions,” not the plan. Avoiding explicit threats and lifting sanctions solves, especially because Rouhani is already at the table

John B. Judis 13, Senior Editor at the New Republic, 6-28-2013, “Should the U.S. Continue to Threaten Iran With War?”, New Republic, 6-28, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113702/should-us-continue-threaten-iran-war#

"President Barack Obama is not bluffing," Vice President Joseph Biden told AIPAC’s annual conference last March. "We are not looking for war. We are looking to and ready to negotiate peacefully, but all options, including military force, are on the table.” Biden was only repeating the military threat against Iran that Obama had made repeatedly over the prior two years, often in response to prodding from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But with Iran having elected a new president, Hassan Rowhani, who ran on a promise to reduce Iran’s international isolation, should the Obama administration continue its bellicose posture toward Iran, or should it attempt to draw the new government into constructive negotiations by offering significant concessions? The usual suspects have come forward with arguments why the U.S. should continue to hang tough. Brookings Institution fellow Michael O’Hanlon, a prime backer of Iraq invasion in 2003, and former correspondent Marvin Kalb propose giving Rowhani a month or two after he takes office in August to move forward on negotiations. If he does not, they call for Congress when it returns in September to pass a resolution “authorizing the president to use force under certain conditions” against Iran. Dennis Ross, who works for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, takes a somewhat less warlike tack, but counsels “wariness” toward the new Iraqi president. Ross argues that since America’s approach toward Iran led to Rowhani’s victory, there is no reason to change it, and he warns that there is “not a lot” of time for diplomacy. I’ll leave it to better minds than my own to parse out this reasoning. Not everyone in Washington seems to agree with these hardline proposals. Matthew Duss and Lawrence Korb respond directly to O’Hanlon and Kalb’s argument for reliving those hoary days of October 2002 when Congress passed a resolution authorizing George W. Bush to use force against Iraq. Duss and Korb offer a needed corrective to O’Hanlon and Kalb’s framing the issue as whether the U.S. should conduct “pre-emptive aerial attacks against Iran” as it earlier had conduct “pre-emption” against Iraq. Duss and Korb point out—and it’s worth putting in capital letters—that the invasion of Iraq was not a PRE-EMPTIVE but a PREVENTIVE war, as would be aerial attacks against Iran. Iraq was not threatening to go to war against the U.S., nor is Iran threatening to go war against the United States. And preventive wars have never been sanctioned under any international agreement. Anyone but the perpetrator calls them international acts of aggression. Duss and Korb also suggest that O’Hanlon and Kalb’s argument—that Iran would be most likely to respond favorably if the threat of “pre-emptive aerial attacks” were issued—is dubious at best. And they have a good deal of history behind this point. Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, who served from 1997 to 2005, and for whom Rowhani served as the nuclear negotiator, made repeated offers to the United States. Iran also cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan during the fall of 2001, but for its efforts, it got denounced as part of the “Axis of Evil” and threatened with regime change. American intransigence contributed to hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in 2005 and to the ouster of Rowhani as nuclear negotiator. In other words, the prior instances of the O’Hanlon-Kalb and Ross strategies have netted the United States nothing but grief. Vali Nasr, a former State Department advisor from 2009 to 2011 and now the dean of John Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, calls for the United States to take the first step in bringing the new Iranian government to the negotiating table. Nasr writes,“For the past eight years, U.S. policy has relied on pressure—threats of war and international economic sanctions—rather than incentives to change Iran's calculus. Continuing with that approach will be counterproductive. It will not provide Rowhani with the cover for a fresh approach to nuclear talks, and it could undermine the reformists generally by showing they cannot do better than conservatives on the nuclear issue.” Nasr does not believe that Rowhani can pull off a deal by himself, and he reminds readers that Rowhani was undercut before by American intransigence and is unlikely to come to the table without the United States taking the first step, and he urges the Obama administration to take that step. “Rowhani's victory is not regime change in Iran—but it is a game-changer,” he writes. “The supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guards continue to control all the levers of power. However, the election result has altered the face of Iran, enough to put to question the continued viability of American policy.”

#### We solve Pillar – the CP bans coercive diplomacy without explicitly taking the option off the table and freaking out Iran

Dr. Paul R. Pillar 13, Professor and Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown, PhD Princeton, 9-15-2013, “Threats of Force Don't Always Help”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/threats-force-dont-always-help-9072

The danger of the commonly accepted conclusion comes from promoting a simple belief that “threats work” without considering all of the other reasons that lead them to work or not to work, and then to apply that belief to situations where they probably will not work. The situation most often invoked, of course, is Iran and the issue of its nuclear program. The simplistic belief about the supposed universal efficacy of threats of military force thus accentuates an already widely held and mistaken assumption that the more that Iranians fear a military attack the more likely they are to make concessions about their nuclear activities. A large corpus of scholarly work has addressed the subject of military threats and sought-after political or diplomatic outcomes, a subject that usually comes under the heading of coercive diplomacy. This research by political scientists has not arrived at some single grand conclusion that military threats do (or don't) work. Instead, the research has concerned the numerous conditions and variables that increase or decrease the chance they will work. The political scientists have had plenty of material to examine; successful and unsuccessful examples of the use of threats can be found throughout history. This is true both of threats of armed force that never materialized and ones that did. In modern U.S. history, for example, the Vietnam War and especially the air war against North Vietnam was a large and conspicuous example of a failed attempt to use armed force to get an adversary to change its policies—in this case, to get the North Vietnamese to abandon its objective of uniting all of Vietnam under its rule. Among the other variables that matter are whatever other pressures and constraints, besides the threatened military force, the targeted regime is experiencing. Failure to take such variables into account is a shortcoming of the frequent references to the air wars in the Balkans in the 1990s as supposedly having been successful in breaking the will of Slobodan Milošović. The references routinely ignore what else was going on at the time, such as what Croatian forces were doing on the ground in Bosnia. In Syria today, the Assad regime is engaged in an intense civil war and waging a struggle both domestically and internationally not only for its legitimacy but for its very existence. Nothing remotely resembling that is true of the government in Iran. Of particular importance are the nature of the specific issues in dispute and what they imply for the priority that each side places on them, the determination of the target regime to maintain its stance, and how defensible that stance is internationally. Here again there is a big difference between the Syrian and Iranian situations. The Syrian regime not only possesses but also, it appears, lethally used a weapon that is the subject of a near-universal prohibition. The type of (not quite so universally prohibited) weapon that is supposedly the concern with Iran is one that Iran does not possess, has never used, and hasn't even decided to build. The Iranian program that is the focus of concern is one that the Iranians believe, strongly and correctly, they are entitled to maintain under international law and the relevant international control regimes. An added aspect of the issue involved in the Iranian case is that to the extent there is any interest in Tehran in someday developing a nuclear weapon, probably the most important motivation would be a hope that such a weapon would help to deter foreign military attack on Iran. Threatening an attack is thus more likely to stoke than to diminish any interest in such a weapon. Among the reasons that threats of armed force often not only do not work but may even be counterproductive—stiffening the resolve of the decision-makers on the other side—is that regimes do not like to be bullied. They are even more likely than schoolkids to push back, once they have gotten their nationalist dander up. Another, somewhat related, reason is that domestic politics are affected by such threats, with hardliners being empowered or incumbent decision-makers having to modify their policies to avoid losing out to the hardliners. A little role-reversed thinking should make these dynamics easy for Americans to understand. What would be the political impact in the United States if it became the target of some other country's threats of armed attack? Would American hardliners cower and be silenced, and would there be a surge of sentiment in favor of making whatever concessions the threatener wants? Of course not. The result would be the opposite. One of the downsides of American exceptionalist thinking is a failure to understand how many foreigners' responses to what we do are basically the same as how we would respond to similar acts from them. In Tehran, President Rouhani has to contend with his own hardliners. Bullying Iran with threats of armed attack does not help him to do that. The conventional American wisdom, now amplified by simplistic conclusions extracted from the Syrian episode, that threats of armed force will help bring about more accommodating Iranian positions on the nuclear issue is almost certainly wrong. Not only wrong, but counterproductive. That is all the more true because such threats feed the suspicions of Iranians, who already have been given ample reason to hold such suspicions, that the United States is interested not in an agreement but only in regime change. Different elements in the United States will continue to push the mistaken conventional wisdom about the efficacy of threats for their different reasons. The Obama administration wants to continue to portray its Syria policy as a success and also wants to placate a rightist Israeli government that appears to have little compunction about starting wars. Many Americans, including many members of Congress, voice the conventional wisdom because they simply do not know better. Then there are those who do know better but continue to promote military threats because they do not want an agreement with Iran and understand how such threats may help to kill the prospects for one.

#### Thielmann will lose them the debate – explicitly agrees that the US has sufficient leverage to get a deal and removing overt threats is enough to prevent it being scuttled, NOT that permanently removing force is necessary

Greg Thielmann 13, Senior Fellow Arms Control Association, 8-6-2013, “Senators' Iran Letter Complicates Solution”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/senators-iran-letter-complicates-solution-8836?page=1

With tough economic sanctions now in place, and a broad political consensus holding among the six powers negotiating with Iran, the international community has the leverage it needs to achieve an acceptable agreement. However, the senators’ letter argues that more sanctions and more credible military threats will persuade Tehran to make a deal. Sanctions have certainly affected Iran’s economy and the government’s risk/benefit calculations, but they will not by themselves halt Iran’s nuclear program. It is fantasy to believe otherwise. The implementation of still tougher sanctions at the outset of renewed talks would harden Iran’s resolve and undermine the prospects for persuading its leaders to compromise. Likewise, overt threats of military attack would undermine P5+1 solidarity and reduce the likelihood of Iran agreeing to limits on its program. In any case, military action—short of a permanent occupation—cannot prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. In fact, military and intelligence experts agree that striking Iran’s nuclear facilities would only delay Iran’s program by two to three years and trigger an Iranian decision to openly build nuclear weapons.

#### Akinbiyi is from 2012 – doesn’t assume recent negotiations breakthroughs and says smaller moves like the CP are enough to get the ball rolling,

Ani Akinbiyi 12, MPA Princeton, et al, January 2012, “Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Phased Grand Agenda”, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports\_fy11/Preventing-a-Nuclear-Armed-Iran.pdf

Consequently, the most promising means of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is through a carefully constructed agreement that results in a constrained and transparent nuclear program in Iran, and that takes into account the broader security concerns of both the United States and Iran. A comprehensive negotiated agreement could allow the United States to minimize short-term risks and secure its long-term interests in the region, and to bring about conditions in which the Iranian government feels that the Islamic Republic’s future would be more secure without the possession of nuclear weapons. The Phased Grand Agenda (PGA) framework would avoid the pitfalls of past negotiations by addressing the primary security issues that have motivated Iran’s nuclear program. PGA negotiations would contend with the smallest set of non-nuclear issues upon which peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear ambitions depends. Negotiations would proceed in a set of phases, with each stage building confidence to permit deeper cooperation in the next stage. The most urgent actions, such as freezing Iran’s enrichment of uranium to levels below 5%, would be taken first, while the most difficult steps would come later. The Phased Grand Agenda would require roughly equal sacrifices by and provide roughly equal benefits to both the United States and Iran at each phase so that both parties are equally incentivized to continue negotiations. Reversibility would also be matched in each phase to minimize the temptation for either side to end implementation before completing the entire PGA.

#### Ameri says removing sanctions solves

Nasser Saghafi-Ameri 13, Former Senior Iranian Diplomat, and Scholar and Author in the Fields of Foreign Policy, International Security, and Nuclear Disarmament, 10-9-2013, Restoration of Iran-US Relations Benefits Both Sides”, Iran Review, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Restoration-of-Iran-US-Relations-Benefits-Both-Sides.htm

Thus, the opening in the Iran-US relations may influence mainly two important areas: First, is the nuclear issue, where a second track on the nuclear talks would be established in a bilateral framework and in parallel to the current P5+1 talk. Indeed in the Iran-US bilateral talks, the issue of sanctions looms high on the agenda. Presumably, in this fast track negotiation on the nuclear issues, the aim has to be reaching a timeframe for lifting the sanctions which are not only crucial in the progress of the rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, but it could have much advantageous consequence for the future trade and investment between the two sides. Despite three decades of sanctions Iran has developed much in terms of technology and industry, yet its vast economic potentials for trade and investment has to be tapped. In this respect, it seems that at present there are three areas in the Iranian economy that are more promising for cooperation with their respective counterparts in the United States. These are:

#### CP is still a CBM – Schechtman is about the CP, not the plan

Ken Schechtman 10-17, Medicine Prof @ Washington, 10-17-2013, “Negotiate with Iran before the Window of Opportunity Closes”, St. Louis Beacon, 2013, https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/33244/voices\_schechtman\_iran\_101513?coverpage=4161

Iranians have vivid memories of 1953 and of our sponsorship of the shah. Other grievances include the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists (presumably by Israel), Western silence when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, and the U.S. ignoring a conciliatory 2003 Iranian letter that sought dialogue. These circumstances help explain why Iran’s pride will not succumb pliantly to U.S. demands, no matter how onerous the sanctions. Moreover, Iran has repeatedly and correctly affirmed its sovereign right to process nuclear material and conceding this issue will be politically impossible. Alternative win-win approaches are essential. The president should seek a comprehensive inspection regime, the export of spent Iranian nuclear fuel to prevent reprocessing and a reduced number of Iranian centrifuges to preclude any rush to a bomb. He should acknowledge that 20 percent enriched uranium is necessary to produce medical radioisotopes and seek eased sanctions that permit Iran to import prescribed quantities of such isotopes as an alternative to domestic production. He should offer technical assistance to facilitate Iranian nuclear power plants. But most urgently, Mr. Obama must recognize that the time window is narrow. This is partly because negotiation avenues may close as Iran approaches the breakout phase of enrichment. Moreover, Rouhani faces intense pressure from Iranian hardliners and his options are constrained by a supreme leader who distrusts the United States and is sensitive to those same pressures. Without progress, Rouhani’s flexibility will erode as it did when he was fired as nuclear negotiator in 2003 when a temporary enrichment freeze led nowhere. So Mr. Obama must be decisive. He should take the high road and leave the military threat business to Israel. He should quickly propose a meaningful easing of sanctions, probably related to Iranian access to global banking, so Rouhani can demonstrate that moderation has benefits. The quid quo pro should include an enrichment moratorium. Both sides will understand that, without progress, all concessions will be reversed. Time will determine whether nuclear negotiations can succeed, if they presage broader discussions of other issues. But to have a chance, there must be mutual confidence building measures. Without such steps, today’s partly open window will close.

### Sanctions CP Solves

#### Iran wants sanctions relief – biggest issue driving them to negotiations

Abbas Milani, dir. Iranian Studies @ Stanford, 11-14-2013, “Two Reasons Why Iran Resumed Nuclear Negotiations,” New Republic, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115594/iran-nuclear-negotiations-us-resumed-two-reasons

The second important fact to consider is the cost of this break-out capacity. With the increasing bite of sanctions, and with eight years of utter corruption and incompetence during President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tenure, the Islamic regime has suddenly faced the reality that their long-sought break-out capacity has been bought at an exorbitantly high price. With oil revenues drying up, and increasing competition among factions within the regime for a bigger share of the shrinking pie, Iran urgently needed an agreement to end the sanctions. Those who oppose any deal with the regime believe that not only making no deal at this time, but increasing sanctions, will either bring about the collapse of the regime or convince it to roll back its nuclear program. That argument, however, overlooks a critical point: The regime, particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his allies, are surely inept but not suicidal. They have spent so much political and economic capital on achieving the break-out capacity that any agreement they could not sell to the Iranian people as a victory—or, in their new language, a "win-win"—would be tantamount to political suicide for them. It is thus as much folly to think that the regime will, in desperation, accept any deal—including one that requires a complete dismantlement of their enrichment program—as it is to think that any deal they offer is worth making. The many sides directly or indirectly involved in the nuclear negotiations have widely different endgames in mind: On the one hand the regime wants to give up as little of its break-out capacity as possible—a “hedge,” in the parlance of nuclear experts—in return for quick relief from sanctions. At the same time, caught in their own rhetorical prison-house, they cannot admit that the urgency they desire for an end of sanctions is because the sanctions are hurting. Countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and France believe that any concession, short of complete dismantlement of Iran’s program, is a dangerously bad deal. It will help the regime solve its current crisis, and embolden the radicals to further develop their break-out capacity.

#### Lifting small sanctions in exchange for ending enrichment is enough to solve – prevents Iranian breakout capacity

Leslie H. Gelb, 11-17-2013, “Stay the Dogs of War on Iran,” Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/17/stay-the-dogs-of-war-on-iran.html

The upside is a short-term deal that would lead to the Mideast equivalent of ending the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The deal could reduce, even sharply, the biggest threat to regional peace, an Iranian nuclear bomb, and open paths to taming dangerous conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And under the proposed deal, reportedly the only price to be paid for this would be giving Tehran a few billion dollars of its own money. No sanctions would be lifted that could not be quickly reimposed. Almost all of the U.S. sanctions regime would be totally unaffected. Those are the facts that opponents of a deal simply either ignore or lie about. The downside, failure, is that Iran, Israel, and the United States resume their march toward a terrible war in the Mideast and to the prospect of worldwide terrorist attacks. What a great alternative. And don’t think for a moment that toughening the sanctions would cause the collapse of the Ayatollahs’ regime in Iran. The U.S. has economically squeezed the guts out of North Korea and Cuba, for example. And the last anyone looked, those regimes are still around, thumbing their noses at Washington. Would the naysayers like to go to war against these countries? Ask any of America’s friends and allies if they would join such a venture. Not a chance. Even Israeli military and intelligence officials think such a course makes little sense. What, then, do the naysayers believe they can practically accomplish by increasing the sanctions and the military threats against Iran? Sure, they’ll insist that the regime in Tehran will either cave to Western pressures or even fall. But those naysayers have neither history nor current reality on their side. Iran is nowhere near the economic hardships of Cuba, North Korea, or the tottering Soviet Union of the 1990’s. Iran is nowhere near surrender. The naysayers can’t be that self-delusional. Most likely, they simply want to please right-wing Israelis, Saudi autocrats, and make President Obama look weak. Why do you think France (yes, France) has gotten so tough in the nuclear talks? Is there any chance whatsoever of Paris actually standing up to the consequences of a war with Iran? Not on your life. More plausibly, Paris is simply interested in pleasing those very same Saudi autocrats who have now become sanctified by buying shiploads of French arms. Ah, money does inspire toughness. Of course, the pact under discussion with Tehran won’t solve every nuclear problem to our satisfaction. But what negotiation can the naysayers cite, in modern times, that has ever been an outright capitulation? Is there any chance Tehran will abandon its “right” to enrich uranium? Not a chance. And everyone knows that; everyone. While I don’t like the clerical dictators in Tehran one bit, I can understand how they might feel threatened by Israel and the West. (And yes, I think they brought this on themselves, but here we all are.) President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry deserve lots of praise—and support—for plowing on with the talks in Geneva in the face of the baloney typhoon. The Obama administration has brought much of the political grief about these negotiations upon itself, as usual. They pretty much destroyed their foreign policy credibility with their Syria policy blunders. With Iran, they have failed to plainly and simply explain how the pact they’re pursuing will benefit the West. It’s not enough, not nearly enough, to assert that the U.S. would rather have “no agreement than a bad agreement.” What’s good or bad? Explain it, for heaven’s sake. While the temporary agreement under discussion now is far from perfect, it reportedly does do two critical things: first, by attempting to freeze most of Iran’s nuclear activities, it would lengthen the time for Tehran to “break out” with a nuclear weapon; second, it would increase the time for the U.S. and its allies to react to trouble. And the U.S. gives up only trifling sanctions in return. What on earth is wrong with that? Most of Iran’s nuclear weapons related programs would be on hold. And of equal importance, international inspectors—already on the scene and reporting—would have wide and better access to programs the U.S. needs to know about. And during the proposed six month freeze on Iran’s nuclear weapons-related programs, the West can seriously explore a more comprehensive and permanent agreement. Again, what on earth is wrong with that? President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry deserve lots of praise—and support—for plowing on with the talks in Geneva in the face of the baloney typhoon. And the media, as usual, hasn’t helped. They rarely explain how very little the U.S. and its partners would be giving away in return for the chance to revolutionize the diplomatic alignment in the Mideast. It should be clear to all, save the ideologically and politically impaired, that President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif are as close as the West is going to come to genuine negotiating partners. It should be equally apparent that they’re on a short leash as well—and that they need something of value to appease their hawks.

#### SQ deal will succeed now, despite fight over enrichment – Iran wants lifting sanctions, not the plan

Reuters, 11-17-2013, “Iran says it won't insist on other countries recognizing its 'right to enrich',” Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-points-to-possible-way-round-nuclear-sticking-point-331999

Iran has the right to enrich uranium, but does not insist others recognize that right, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator said on Sunday, in what could be a way around one of the main sticking points between Tehran and world powers in talks this week. Iran and the six world powers are moving closer to an initial agreement to curb Iran's nuclear program, a senior US official and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov both said in the last two days, raising hopes of a peaceful end to the 10-year dispute. Talks in Geneva between Iran and the so-called P5+1 - Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States - on November 7-8 appeared close to clinching a deal but ended without agreement. Western diplomats said one of the sticking points during the talks was Iran's argument that it retains the "right" to enrich uranium. The United States argues Iran does not intrinsically have that right under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The two sides nevertheless agreed to meet again in the Swiss city on November 20. "Not only do we consider that Iran's right to enrich is nonnegotiable, but we see no need for that to be recognized as 'a right', because this right is inalienable and all countries must respect that," Iran's chief negotiator and foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, told the ISNA news agency. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told visiting French President Francois Hollande on Sunday that Iran is willing to give up the demand to have other countries recognize its right to exist because it is already continuing to enrich in practice, so it does not need its "so-called right to enrich" recognize. The talks seek to reach an interim deal to allow time to negotiate a comprehensive, permanent agreement that would end a 10-year deadlock and provide assurances to the six powers that Iran's atomic program will not produce bombs. Iran denies that it wants to develop a nuclear weapons capability and insists its program is limited to the peaceful generation of electricity and medical research. Zarif said he was confident a deal could be struck, but cautioned that progress made in recent talks could be reversed if a "satisfactory result" was not reached. "We want to reach an agreement and understanding," he said. Few details of a prospective deal have emerged, but Western powers want tighter inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities and the closure of a reactor that could produce plutonium. Iran wants relief from international sanctions that have driven up inflation and seen oil revenues and the currency slump. "We have reached a very sensitive stage of negotiations, and at this stage we do not want to get into the details," Zarif said. "It is necessary for them to ... lift the sanctions and economic pressures they have put on the people of Iran. We are moving in that direction."

### AT: Threat of Force Key

#### Iran doesn’t view US threats of force as credible now – and Israel mistrust is on the brink

Rajan Menon, Poly Sci Prof @ CUNY, 11-15-2013, “Has Iran Outfoxed Netanyahu?” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/has-iran-outfoxed-netanyahu-9408

Now that the negotiations have aroused expectations, Iran may be confident, no matter what President Obama has said about all options being open, that the United States won’t torpedo the talks so long as they appear to possess momentum and promise. And Tehran is evidently doing what’s needed to ensure that the diplomats on the other side of the bargaining table remain hopeful. In short, Iran’s decision, following Hassan Rouhani’s election as president, to agree to negotiate without preconditions has put Netanyahu in a bad place. That Tehran took the decision because the sanctions had begun to bite hasn’t, oddly enough, seemed to vindicate the Israeli prime minister’s hang-tough stance. Moreover, Tehran’s change of course has increased the already abundant mistrust that Netanyahu harbors toward President Obama. The chemistry between them, never good, has been made worse by the positive comments emanating from the administration about the negotiations; and that will work to Tehran’s advantage.

### 2NC CP Solves Congressional Leadership

#### Requiring authorization for Syrian strikes resolves the most salient controversy over Congressional-Executive balance

Eric Posner 9/3/13, law professor at Uchicago, JD from Harvard, "Obama Is Only Making His War Powers Mighter," http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever.¶ It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.”¶ Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him.

## Adv 1

### 2NC SQ Solves Iran

#### Status quo deal will solve right to enrichment problems

Michael Crowley, 11-18-2013, “The Fight for a “Right”: How a Deal With With Iran Might Hinge on One Simple Word,” Time, http://swampland.time.com/2013/11/18/the-fight-for-a-right-how-a-deal-with-with-iran-might-hinge-on-one-simple-word/

Which means any currently plausible nuclear deal with have to perform a neat two-step, allowing Iran a de facto right to enrich without explicitly declaring a legal one. The good news is that Zarif may have signaled new flexibility on that point over the weekend “We do see right of enrichment not only nonnegotiable but see no necess[ity] for its recognition as a right,” he was quoted as saying by Iranian media. Zarif appeared to argued that the right is so self-evident that the major powers needn’t bother granting it. That agree-to-disagree language may suit the U.S. just fine. “Any deal will fudge the issue of right to enrichment,” says Gary Samore, who served until earlier this year as Obama’s White House nonproliferation czar. “We will agree that Iran can have a limited enrichment program without explicitly accepting right to enrichment, and Iran will claim we have recognized its right to enrichment because we agreed it could have a limited enrichment program.”

#### Right to enrich isn’t a dealbreaker

James Traub, fellow @ Center on Int’l Coop., 11-15-2013, “Et Tu, Menendez?” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/15/the\_iran\_sanctions\_stranglehold\_and\_the\_march\_to\_war

The negotiations in Geneva last week appear to have foundered on Iran's insistence that the so-called P5+1 powers explicitly acknowledge Tehran's "right to enrich." Washington and its allies were prepared to allow Iran to continue spinning its centrifuges in order to produce low-enriched fuel, though they seem to have balked at the language Tehran wanted. That problem can probably be solved through some form of constructive ambiguity -- but not, of course, if the P5+1 demands that all enrichment activity stop.

#### Talks aren’t dead

David Ignatius, 11-15-2013, “The stakes of an Iranian deal,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-the-stakes-of-an-iranian-deal/2013/11/15/4fad18fa-4d54-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4\_story.html

Despite the uproar since talks broke off last weekend, the process of negotiation seems about where it should be — at least from the U.S. standpoint. Iran has been asked to accept a freeze on its nuclear program in return for a limited release of its frozen assets. The Iranians, upset that the deal demands too many concessions without granting them a “right” to enrich uranium, have balked. Meanwhile, the vise of sanctions continues to squeeze their economy. If Iran accepts the deal, it would be a strong first step toward a final agreement to halt its nuclear program. During this initial phase, the sanctions framework would remain in place and Iran would allow greater inspection of facilities. Given Iranian resistance, it’s hard to see this as the “ deal of the century ” for Tehran or a “ fool’s game ” for the West, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius have charged, respectively.

### Iran impact d

#### Iran won’t be aggressive—history proves

Paul R. Pillar 12, Visiting Professor and Director of the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served in the Central Intelligence Agency for 28 years, "We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran," March/April, The Washington Monthly, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php?page=all>

Given the momentousness of such an endeavor and how much prominence the Iranian nuclear issue has been given, one might think that talk about exercising the military option would be backed up by extensive analysis of the threat in question and the different ways of responding to it. But it isn’t. Strip away the bellicosity and political rhetoric, and what one finds is not rigorous analysis but a mixture of fear, fanciful speculation, and crude stereotyping. There are indeed good reasons to oppose Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and likewise many steps the United States and the international community can and should take to try to avoid that eventuality. But an Iran with a bomb would not be anywhere near as dangerous as most people assume, and a war to try to stop it from acquiring one would be less successful, and far more costly, than most people imagine.¶ What difference would it make to Iran’s behavior and influence if the country had a bomb? Even among those who believe that war with the Islamic Republic would be a bad idea, this question has been subjected to precious little careful analysis. The notion that a nuclear weapon would turn Iran into a significantly more dangerous actor that would imperil U.S. interests has become conventional wisdom, and it gets repeated so often by so many diverse commentators that it seldom, if ever, is questioned. Hardly anyone debating policy on Iran asks exactly why a nuclear-armed Iran would be so dangerous. What passes for an answer to that question takes two forms: one simple, and another that sounds more sophisticated.¶ The simple argument is that Iranian leaders supposedly don’t think like the rest of us: they are religious fanatics who value martyrdom more than life, cannot be counted on to act rationally, and therefore cannot be deterred. On the campaign trail Rick Santorum has been among the most vocal in propounding this notion, asserting that Iran is ruled by the “equivalent of al-Qaeda,” that its “theology teaches” that its objective is to “create a calamity,” that it believes “the afterlife is better than this life,” and that its “principal virtue” is martyrdom. Newt Gingrich speaks in a similar vein about how Iranian leaders are suicidal jihadists, and says “it’s impossible to deter them.”¶ The trouble with this image of Iran is that it does not reflect actual Iranian behavior. More than three decades of history demonstrate that the Islamic Republic’s rulers, like most rulers elsewhere, are overwhelmingly concerned with preserving their regime and their power—in this life, not some future one. They are no more likely to let theological imperatives lead them into self-destructive behavior than other leaders whose religious faiths envision an afterlife. Iranian rulers may have a history of valorizing martyrdom—as they did when sending young militiamen to their deaths in near-hopeless attacks during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s—but they have never given any indication of wanting to become martyrs themselves. In fact, the Islamic Republic’s conduct beyond its borders has been characterized by caution. Even the most seemingly ruthless Iranian behavior has been motivated by specific, immediate concerns of regime survival. The government assassinated exiled Iranian dissidents in Europe in the 1980s and ’90s, for example, because it saw them as a counterrevolutionary threat. The assassinations ended when they started inflicting too much damage on Iran’s relations with European governments. Iran’s rulers are constantly balancing a very worldly set of strategic interests. The principles of deterrence are not invalid just because the party to be deterred wears a turban and a beard.¶ If the stereotyped image of Iranian leaders had real basis in fact, we would see more aggressive and brash Iranian behavior in the Middle East than we have. Some have pointed to the Iranian willingness to incur heavy losses in continuing the Iran-Iraq War. But that was a response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of the Iranian homeland, not some bellicose venture beyond Iran’s borders. And even that war ended with Ayatollah Khomeini deciding that the “poison” of agreeing to a cease-fire was better than the alternative. (He even described the cease- fire as “God’s will”—so much for the notion that the Iranians’ God always pushes them toward violence and martyrdom.)

### Karl

**Uncertainty solves war**

**Karl 96**—president of the Asia Strategy Initiative and a lecturer in IR, USC (David, Winter, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539274?seq=9, Aly M)

Optimists have relaxed views of the preventive-war dangers entailed in situations in which a nuclear power confronts a nuclearizing rival. The practical difficulties of ensuring a disarming strike to preclude any possibility of nuclear retaliation make preventive actions a military gamble that states are very unlikely to take. As Waltz explains, "prevention and pre-emption are difficult games because the costs are so high if the games are not perfectly played.... Ultimately, the inhibitions [against such attacks] lie in the impossibility of knowing for sure that a disarming strike will totally destroy an opposing force and in the immense destruction even a few warheads can wreak."25 To optimists, states will have to learn to live with a rival's emerging nuclear armory. Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect, optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of nuclear-armed states as an additional element of stability Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator, for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear powers will make all hesitant to strike individually26 As an example, they point to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when first the United States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action against China's nascent nuclear weapon sites. The net effect of the uncertain reaction of others is that "**the probability of** deliberate **nuclear attack falls to** near **zero** with three, four, or more nuclear nations."27 Similarly, Waltz reasons that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear weapons will prove "poor instruments for blackmail" because a "country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to **incalculable heights** because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers."28

### Central Asia

#### Structural barriers prevent instability

Weitz 12 (Richard, writes a weekly column on Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He is director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. His commentaries have appeared in the International Herald Tribune, The Guardian and Wall Street Journal (Europe), among other publications. “Stabilizing the Stans”, 6/1, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stabilizing-the-stans)

Social disorder in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and other Arab countries has invariably led observers to regard Central Asia’s autocracies as potentially vulnerable to similar upheaval. Some Central Asian leaders have been in power for many years, and only Kyrgyzstan, the most impoverished of the five, has developed a competitive multi-party political system. Elsewhere, political parties are weak or are tools of the regime. But other factors make the Arab scenario less plausible in Central Asia. ­­Security forces are more closely aligned with ruling elites; independent political groups and social-media networks are less well developed; economic performance remains high in some countries; and a previous wave of revolutions produced disappointing results in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

### Afghanistan

#### Regional peace talks are coming now --- issues have been resolved

Tahir 8/3/11—Washington DC Correspondent Radio Azatlyk (3 August 2011, Muhammad, Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S. hold meeting on Afghan peace process, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-08/03/c\_131025762.htm)

Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Javid Ludin said Tuesday that Pakistan can offer help in engaging the Taliban leadership with a view to bringing them over to the peace process.¶ Speaking at a joint press conference along with the top U.S. and Pakistani diplomats after a trilateral meeting in Islamabad, Ludin said that reconciliation process in Afghanistan depends on the cooperation from Pakistan.¶ "We want Pakistan to assist in bringing top leadership of Taliban into the process," he said.¶ He said Afghanistan is identifying lower and mid-level Taliban leaders who can contribute to peace and reconciliation. The Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister said he has come to Islamabad with a message of urgency for cooperation in making the peace process a success.¶ The trilateral meeting was also attended by Special Representative of the United States Marc Grossman and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir. Defence and intelligence officials from the three countries also took part in the discussions.¶ The trilateral forum was established earlier this year to promote peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan but the body has not yet succeeded to encourage the Taliban to join the peace process.¶ The U.S. envoy said they share interest in countering terrorism and supporting the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. He said apart from the Afghan reconciliation process, the Group also discussed the support that the regional countries can offer in this regard and regional economic vision.¶ Grossman said they would meet again in Turkey in November to talk about the regional aspect of the challenge confronting Afghanistan.¶ Another meeting would be held in December in Bonn where the participants would discuss the overall peace and reconciliation process, the transition and the regional economic prospects.¶ Pakistani foreign secretary said Pakistan fully supports the all inclusive broad-based process of reconciliation that is underway in Afghanistan. "The trilateral engagements have been very productive and we feel confident that our common interests based on broad degree of convergence of interests would help build peace, stability and prosperity," Bashir said.¶ In response to a question whether Pakistan raised the issue of cross-border incursions from the Afghan side, The foreign secretary said the two countries have a great degree of clarity on sources and nature of the problem and they are determined to deal with it accordingly.

## Da

### Link

#### US is keeping force on the table --- key to Obama’s carrot/stick strategy

Washington Times 11/10/13, “Kerry: Obama prepared to use force in Iran after nuclear talks collapse,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/10/john-kerry-obama-prepared-use-force-iran/?page=1

Secretary of State John F. Kerry defended the Obama administration’s carrot-and-stick approach to nuclear negotiations with Iran, saying Sunday that the conciliatory strategy needs to be given a chance to work — while vowing that the U.S. is prepared to use force if necessary to keep the Islamic republic from developing a nuclear bomb.¶ “We can’t let mythology and politics start to cloud reality,” said Mr. Kerry, who dismissed criticism that the administration has done a poor job leveraging American power in international talks — the latest round of which closed over the weekend without a breakthrough — over Iran’s disputed nuclear program.¶ “The president has been willing and made it clear that he is prepared to use force with respect to Iran’s weapon, and he has deployed the forces and the weapons necessary to achieve that goal if it has to be achieved,” Mr. Kerry said during an interview with NBC.¶ Congressional lawmakers, as well as U.S. allies including France and Israel, have expressed concerns that the Obama administration has veered dangerously close to making too many concessions in its pursuit of a deal for Iran to reconfigure its nuclear program and open it to close international scrutiny in exchange for lifting U.S.-led sanctions.¶ In order to lay the groundwork for such a deal, the Obama administration has spent the past month making rare diplomatic overtures toward Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, whom many Western analysts deem a moderate.¶ Despite the otherwise aggressive tenor of his remarks, Mr. Kerry defended the administration’s strategy of reaching out to Iran. “You have to act in some good faith, and an effort to be able to move towards the goal you want to achieve — if, as their act of good faith, they freeze their program and allow us absolutely unprecedented access to inspection and do other things,” he said.¶ Mr. Rouhani said Sunday that progress was made during recent talks in Geneva but that Iran will not be pressured to fully relinquish its uranium enrichment programs in order to achieve sanctions relief from Washington.¶ With the next round of negotiations to begin Nov. 20, Mr. Kerry told reporters over the weekend that although a deal may be in sight, “the window for diplomacy does not stay open indefinitely.”¶ SEE ALSO: No nuclear deal between 6 world powers, Iran¶ “You need to give diplomacy the chance to exhaust all the remedies available to it if you are ultimately going to exercise your ultimate option, which is the potential use of force,” said the secretary of state. “The world wants to know that it was a last resort, not a first resort.”

#### The plan causes Israel to strike

Kramer 9/17/13 Martin Kramer is President of Shalem College, a new undergraduate liberal arts college in Jerusalem. An authority on contemporary Islam and Arab politics, Kramer earned his undergraduate and doctoral degrees in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University. During a twenty-five-year academic career at Tel Aviv University, he directed the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Kramer has taught as a visiting professor at Brandeis University, the University of Chicago, Cornell University, Georgetown University, and The Johns Hopkins University (SAIS). He has served as a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/09/17/israel-likes-its-u-s-presidents-strong-2/>

Israel Likes Its U.S. Presidents Strong¶ …¶ But I focused instead on Obama’s earlier “turnaround”: his decision to seek authorization for military action from Congress. Excerpt: What Israelis found alarming was the way Mr. Obama shifted the burden of decision. Every one of Mr. Obama’s Syrian maneuvers was viewed as a dry run for his conduct in a likely future crisis over Iran’s nuclear drive. That’s where the stakes are highest for Israel, and that’s where Israelis sometimes question Obama’s resolve. Israelis always imagined they would go to Mr. Obama with a crucial piece of highly sensitive intelligence on Iranian progress, and he would make good on his promise to block Iran with a swift presidential decision. So Mr. Obama’s punt to Congress over what John Kerry called an “unbelievably small” strike left Israelis rubbing their eyes. If this is now standard operating procedure in Washington, can Israel afford to wait if action against Iran becomes urgent? Israel’s standing in Congress and U.S. public opinion is high, but the Syrian episode has shown how dead-set both are against U.S. military action in the Middle East. Israel won’t have videos of dying children to sway opinion, and it won’t be able to share its intelligence outside the Oval Office. Bottom line: The chance that Israel may need to act first against Iran has gone up. Why was Obama’s recourse to Congress so alarming? Israel has long favored strong presidential prerogatives. That’s because the crises that have faced Israel rarely ever leave it the time to work the many halls of Congress. Israel discovered the dangers of presidential weakness in May 1967, when Israel went to President Lyndon Johnson to keep a commitment—a “red line” set by a previous administration—and Johnson balked. He insisted he would have to secure congressional support first. That show of presidential paralysis left Israel’s top diplomat shaken, and set the stage for Israel’s decision to launch a preemptive war. 2013 isn’t 1967. But Israel long ago concluded that the only thing as worrisome as a diffident America is a diffident American president—and that a president’s decision to resort to Congress, far from being a constitutional imperative, is a sign of trouble at the top.

### AT: Won’t Do It w/o US

#### Their ev doesn’t actually cite Israeli intentions

#### Netanyahu would do it

Rajan Menon, Poly Sci Prof @ CUNY, 11-15-2013, “Has Iran Outfoxed Netanyahu?” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/has-iran-outfoxed-netanyahu-9408

But if the Iranians appear to have outmaneuvered Netanyahu of late, their apparent confidence that he cannot exercise the military option under the current circumstances may be misplaced. The Prime Minister has domestic constraints of his own, having drawn a big red line and staked his reputation, which he much prizes, as a leader who can be counted on not to flinch when hard decisions are required to defend Israel—something he believes that only he can reliably do. There is, in short, a game of chicken afoot between Israel and Iran. What’s not yet clear is which player, if either, will be the first to swerve.

#### They’ll move without informing the U.S.

Elise Labott 12, Senior State Department Producer for CNN, January 16, 2012, “Tense Triangle: Iran, Israel and US,” online: http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/16/tense-triangle-iran-israel-and-us/

This could lower tensions in the region, albeit probably only temporarily, although U.S. officials insist that was not the reason for the cancellation. Even Gen. Dempsey, who is expected to visit Israel later this week, admitted to CNN's Starr in that same interview that Washington has no guarantees that Israel will give the United States ample warning if it decides to attack Iran.

#### Israel will strike unilaterally if they perceive force being taken off the table – they’re reassured in the status quo

Mideast Mirror, 10-1-2013, “When Bibi met Barack,” ln

A FRIENDLY COMPROMISE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that, while Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and United States President Barack Obama have agreed on several issues that Israel sees as vital in the international handling of the Iranian nuclear issue, there were still significant gaps between them. "Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did not get everything that he wanted from his meeting yesterday with United States President Barack Obama. So much is clear. In fact, it was clear even before the meeting began. But as Amos Yadlin said last night, the United States and Israel share common ground in their understand of intelligence information and the same goal - preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-capable nation. Nonetheless, there are still gaps between Jerusalem and Washington in terms of how the danger is perceived. Israel carries the traumatic baggage of the Holocaust, Yadlin said yesterday in an interview on Channel 1, while the Americans have the baggage of their bloody wars in the Middle East. The essence of the gap is that while Israel does not feel the need to reevaluate Iranian rhetoric in order to know that the ayatollahs still want to destroy us, the United States and the Europeans plan to give Rowhani another chance. Taking a sober look at this gap which could manifest itself in future spats, it is clear that Netanyahu and Obama managed not only to avoid a divisive argument, but - most importantly - to formulate a joint position that allows them to agree to a compromise on two important issues: Firstly, the sanctions imposed on Iran will not be lifted precipitously. The successful imposition of sanctions which was encouraged by Israel and spearheaded by the United States, and which the rest of the world was to some extent press ganged into agreeing, is a key component of any hope that Tehran will accept to freeze its nuclear project. There are several elements to the sanctions and, as Secretary of State John Kerry said last week, no deal is better than a bad deal. There could be an argument in the future over what exactly constitutes a bad deal. As far as Israel is concerned, a bad deal would be one in which the West agrees to lift some or all of the sanctions in exchange for only a very minor Iranian concession. Secondly, the two leaders have agreed that the military option is still very much on the table. Obama said as much and when he did, Netanyahu almost glowed with pleasure. And let us not forget, as Yadlin reminded us last night, that Israel has the ability to act alone in order to thwart the Iranian nuclear project - even without a green light from Washington. What is needed most, Yadlin said, is American support in the days, months and years after such an attack. The chance of getting such support depends on whether or not Obama agrees that there was no other alternative. In order to ensure that this is the case, Israel needs to go along with the United States' efforts to forge a diplomatic solution.

#### Presidential strength key to keep Netanyahu secure

Eldar 10 Akiva, staff writer @ Haaretz, “A strong Obama is good for Israel,” 3/23, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/a-strong-obama-is-good-for-israel-1.265192

There is no way to know how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to the news that Obama had won the vote in the House of Representatives. On the one hand, he knows that Israel needs strong American leadership. Netanyahu spent formative years in the U.S., and four years as prime minister have taught him that even if this president may not be his cup of tea, it is always in Israel's favor to have a strong president sitting in the White House. Notwithstanding the disputes and the crises, the United States has remained Israel's security service. Even if the president is not the only player on the political field, the White House is, to a great extent, the cornerstone of the Jewish state. In the stark, zero sum game between Israel and Iran and its agents in the region, if Jerusalem needs a strong American president, Iran needs a weak one. That is obvious. If Obama had lost in the vote in the House of Representatives, and were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad not a practicing Muslim, he would have had reason to raise a glass to the president's mishap. For many in the world, including the Arab world, when a leader loses a struggle against domestic political rivals, it is hard to trust him in wars against external enemies.

### AT: Prolif Turns Strikes

#### Israeli strikes turn Iran prolif, not the other way around---TF key

Colin H. Kahl 12, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, January 17, 2012, “Not Time to Attack Iran,” online: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show#

Even if a U.S. strike went as well as Kroenig predicts, there is little guarantee that it would produce lasting results. Senior U.S. defense officials have repeatedly stated that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would stall Tehran's progress for only a few years. Kroenig argues that such a delay could become permanent. "Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked -- most recently Iraq and Syria," he writes, "have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs." In the case of Iraq, however, Saddam Hussein restarted his clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and it required the Gulf War and another decade of sanctions and intrusive inspections to eliminate it. Iran's program is also more advanced and dispersed than were Iraq's and Syria's, meaning it would be easier to reconstitute. A U.S. strike would damage key Iranian facilities, but it would do nothing to reverse the nuclear knowledge Iran has accumulated or its ability to eventually build new centrifuges.

A U.S. attack would also likely rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hard-liners, increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to building a bomb. Kroenig downplays the "rally round the flag" risks by noting that hard-liners are already firmly in power and suggesting that an attack might produce increased internal criticism of the regime. But the nuclear program remains an enormous source of national pride for the majority of Iranians. To the extent that there is internal dissent over the program, it is a discussion about whether the country should acquire nuclear weapons or simply pursue civilian nuclear technology. By demonstrating the vulnerability of a non-nuclear-armed Iran, a U.S. attack would provide ammunition to hard-liners who argue for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Kroenig suggests that the United States should essentially ignore "Iran's domestic political tussles" when pursuing "its vital national security interest in preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons." But influencing Iranian opinion about the strategic desirability of nuclear weapons might ultimately offer the only enduring way of keeping the Islamic Republic on a peaceful nuclear path.

Finally, if Iran did attempt to restart its nuclear program after an attack, it would be much more difficult for the United States to stop it. An assault would lead Iran to distance itself from the IAEA and perhaps to pull out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty altogether. Without inspectors on the ground, the international community would struggle to track or slow Tehran's efforts to rebuild its program.

#### Israel will escalate to nuclear first-use---they perceive Iran as an existential threat

James M. Lindsay 10, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2010, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2

Such a doomsday scenario could pan out. Whether it did would depend greatly on how the United States and others, starting with Israel, responded to Iran's nuclearization. Whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forgoes a preventive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities or opts for launching an attack and it fails, the Israeli government will continue to regard the Iranian regime as an existential threat to Israel that must be countered by any means possible, including the use of nuclear weapons. Given Israel's unique history and Ahmadinejad's contemptible denials of the Holocaust, no Israeli prime minister can afford to think otherwise.

### AT: CP Links

#### Israel would prefer a diplomatic solution – but they’ll strike if they think they have to

Robert Fulford, 11-16-2013, “Imagining an imperial Iran,” National Post, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/11/16/robert-fulford-imagining-an-imperial-iran/

If the leaders of Iran produce a nuclear weapon, will they use it to bomb Tel Aviv? Or do they have something else in mind?

Avoiding an attack on Israel has been one of the goals of the talks between the Iranians and six other countries, led by the United States. Many believe these meetings can only lead to failure, since the Iranians may well get the sanctions against them lifted and go ahead with their nuclear weapon anyway. The Obama administration, on the other hand, believes it has a chance to stop the weapons program, if only the U.S. Senate doesn’t strengthen the existing sanctions further and thereby anger the Iranians. The possibility that Israel might pre-emptively bomb Iran’s nuclear installations is of course the most pressing reason for the talks. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would much rather see the issue settled by the diplomats, but has no reason to think it will be. Washington believes his comments needlessly increase tension, and a New York Times editorial on Tuesday said that the so-far inconclusive negotiations have given Netanyahu a chance to “generate more hysterical opposition.” As if it were a sign of hysteria to worry about nuclear weapons in the hands of a declared enemy whose leaders deplore the very existence of Israel.

## Leadership

### Liberal Order Inevitable

#### Their internal link can’t affect the structural reasons why heg solves war---liberal institutions are locked in and so is our military presence

Richard Maher 11, adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America’s fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating---which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power---outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international---or even regional--- institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement---China, Russia, and Iran---have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions---such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history’s only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America’s strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions. The United States enjoys better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors. South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but perhaps even Beijing views the American military presence in East Asia as an assurance against Japanese revanchism), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact view good relations with the United States as indispensable for their own security.