# 1NC

## Off

### Off

#### a. Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### “Should” requires defending federal action

Judge Henry Nieto 9, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### b. Vote neg

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Simulated national security law debates preserve agency and enhance decision-making---avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue 13, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

### Off

**The political is defined by relationships of enmity and the inevitability of violence---the goal of politics must be to limit but not eradicate war---the affirmatives attempt at surrender destroys the foundation of the political itself**

**Rasch 5** – William Rasch, Professor of Germanic Studies at the University of Indiana, Spring 2005, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 104, No. 2, p. 253-262 [ ] = modified

In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt concludes that ‘‘**all genuine political theories presuppose [hu]man[s] to be evil**, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a **dangerous and dynamic being**.’’2 This anthropological fiction—and Schmitt is aware of the claim’s fictional status—serves as the logical premise that secures Schmitt’s definition of the political as the friend/enemy distinction. We live in a world, he says, in which associations with likeminded others are our **only means of security and happiness.** **Indiscriminate concourse of all with all** cannot be the foundation for **necessary political discriminations**. Thus, the anthropological presupposition of evil, guilt, and violence is designed to expose what Schmitt sees as the duplicity of liberal theory, which consists in using the promise of formal equality to **camouflage political power** by displacing it in the realms of economics and morality. **Liberal theory denies original enmity** by assuming the innate goodness of the human being. Those—communitarians and liberals alike— who say there is no war **presuppose a counterfactual ‘‘ontological priority of non-violence**,’’ a ‘‘state of total peace’’ 3 that invites **universal inclusion** based on the ‘‘essential homogeneity and natural virtue of mankind.’’ 4 If, in such a benign state of nature, violence were to break out, such violence would be considered a perversion and, if all else were to fail, would **have to be extirpated by an even greater violence**. To cite John Locke, this ‘‘State of perfect Freedom’’ and universal ‘‘Equality,’’ governed solely by reason and natural law, can be disturbed only by an ‘‘Offender’’ who ‘‘declares himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity.’’ Such a ‘‘Criminal’’ has ‘‘declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ 5 The political, on this view, emerges only as the result of the Fall—that is, emerges **only to fight the war against war**, a war always initiated by a **sinful or bestial other**. It seeks to make itself superfluous by restoring or, more progressively, establishing for the first time this natural order of peace. Should one demur and find the perfect state to be less than advertised, then one’s demurral would most assuredly be recog nized not as legitimate political opposition, but rather as evidence of greed, moral perversity, or some other pathological behavior.¶ With its pacific presuppositions, liberalism, according to Schmitt, **dissolves the specificity of the political** and hides the **necessarily asymmetric power relations** that mark all political maneuverings. By way of an anthropological sleight of hand, liberalism represents itself as an ethos, a moral and economic emancipation, and not as what it really is, namely, a power-political regime with traditional power-political aims. For Schmitt, **distinctions, rather than the effacement of distinctions**, structure the space within which we live, including the space of the political. **Only within structured space**, space **literally marked by** human activities, by **human groupings and the boundaries they draw**, **do terms achieve their meanings**. Norms, he repeatedly stated, are derived from situations, normal situations; they are not derived logically from underived first principles. Categories like ‘‘liberty’’ and ‘‘equality’’ can have political significance only when defined and delineated within the sphere of the political. They are neither natural nor innately human qualities; they are not self-evident truths. Consequently, Schmitt’s suspicion of liberalism, pacifism, or any other -ism that denies an initial and therefore ever-present potential war of all against all is a suspicion of those who wish to **make their operative distinctions invisible, and thus incontestable,** by claiming the immorality or illegality of all distinction. Schmitt’s insistence, then, on our ‘‘**evil’’ nature** is evidence **neither of his existential misanthropy** nor even, necessarily, of his **conservative authoritarianism**, but rather of his desire to secure the autonomy and necessity of that human mechanism called ‘‘the political.’’ To the question of whether there is a war, Schmitt emphatically answers ‘‘yes’’—by which he **means to affirm not armed conflict or bloodshed as a virtue** in and of itself, but rather the **necessity** of the view that **the proverbial state of nature is**, as Hobbes knew, a state **marked by imperfection**, and that this imperfection manifests itself as violence and the guilt associated with it.

**The alternative is to affirm the necessity of the sovereign to define the state of exception**

**de Benoist 7** – Alexis de Benoist, editor of the two French academic journals Krisis and Nouvelle Ecole, has translated articles by Carl Schmitt into French and has published the first full bibliography of Schmitt’s works, 2007, “Global terrorism and the state of permanent exception: The significance of Carl Schmitt’s thought today,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 85-87

The notion of the ‘state of emergency’ (Ernstfall) or the state of exception (Ausnahmezustand) plays a central role in Schmitt’s political and constitutional theory, where it is clearly linked to his critique of liberalism (see Schmitt 1985: chapter 1). For Schmitt, **the exception being unpredictable**, it is vain to believe that one can **determine in advance** the methods with which to respond to it. Liberalism, inspired either by neo-Kantian formalism or by Kelsenian positivism, cannot understand the nature of the exception, neither can it face the exception without betraying itself, because it adheres to a legal conception which is strictly formal or procedural, and which claims that a pre-established rule or norm can be applied to any situation.¶ Schmitt adds that, in suspending legal norms, the exception helps us to understand and appreciate **the nature of the political**, in the sense that it reveals to us the domain of the sovereign, meaning in this case the concrete capacity to make a decision in the face of an urgent or exceptional situation. The state of exception reveals both who is sovereign and also where sovereignty lies, in the very moment that it makes the decision appear (Entscheidung) in its ‘absolute purity’. In such conditions, one can see that **the politically sovereign instance** **does not coincide automatically with the state**. ‘Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet (Sovereign is he who decides on the exception)’, writes Schmitt (2004a: 13). This famous formula can be understood in two ways: first, he who is sovereign is he who decides in the case of exception, and second, also sovereign is he who decides about the exception itself, that is he who decides that it is no longer a normal situation and that the rules no longer apply. There is therefore a close connection between the exception and the decision, which Schmitt identifies as the ‘premier cause’ of all political society. To Schmitt, the purest expression of the political act is the decision in (and about) the case of exception (or emergency): the suspension of legal norms in the case of exception constitutes the ultimate manifestation of political sovereignty. Sovereignty, he underscores, is not so much the power to make laws as the power to suspend them. But **one would be wrong to interpret this affirmation as an apology for arbitrariness**. On the one hand, Schmitt emphasizes that in making decisions in a case of exception, **the sovereign is not rendered free by circumstances to act according to his own pleasure**, but he is, on the contrary, **obliged to act in a way that makes him responsible for them**. On the other hand, he stresses that the exception defines the rule in the sense that we cannot understand a rule without taking into consideration its limits, which is to say the circumstances that can make it inapplicable. In other words: whoever decides to derogate from the norm is **equally fixing the norm**.¶ The state of exception is also important because it reveals the original nonnormative character of the law. Moreover, it is not the law/right (Recht) which is suspended in the state of exception, but only the normative element of the law (Gesetz). Through this, the state of exception unmasks the ‘existential’ character of laws. The exception is essential, not because it is rare, but **because it is unpredictable**. Like the enemy himself, who cannot be determined beforehand by a pre-existing general norm – because enmity can only be defined in a specific temporal context – **the exception cannot be codified in advance**. In linking the law (Recht) to its non-legal source, that is the sovereign decision, Schmitt attacks all forms of constitutional rationalism, notably the theory of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) or the positivist theory, according to which the sovereign must, under all circumstances, submit himself to the rule of law. The occurrence of an exceptional case (Ausnahmezustand), with all that is implied, shows that it is **simply not possible to submit the sovereign unconditionally to the rule of law**, since norms cannot predict the exception. A constitution is, in this sense, always incomplete. The most it can do is predict a situation where it is no longer applicable. However, Schmitt also underscores that the exception is, by definition, exceptional; that is, **it can never be transformed into a permanent state**. Exception is to rules or norms what war is to peace. As in the case of the ancient Roman dictatorships, the suspension of the norms by the sovereign can only be provisional.¶ It **can also open a new cycle of law**. In his book on dictatorship (Schmitt 1921), Schmitt states clearly that dictatorship, which can be justified in certain cases of exception, suspends norms but does not change the legal order or the nature of the state, which means that it does not have any legitimacy except inasmuch as it aims to restore the pre-existing legal order. A dictatorship therefore remains a constitutional dictatorship: the suspension of legal order does not signify its abolition.9 In an exceptional situation, if the state suspends the rule of law, **it is because it wishes to preserve it**. Hence, to decide on the exception means also to decide on the concrete conditions in which the norm can still be applied.

### Off

#### Miles and I affirm that:

#### the authority of governments in the United States to employ capital punishment in the criminal justice system should be substantially restricted;

#### the war powers authority of the President of the United States to conduct war using remotely piloted aircraft armed with nuclear weapons and/or adjustable-, supervised-, or fully-autonomous robotic systems should be substantially restricted;

#### the war powers authority of the President of the United States in the area of so-called targeted killing should be preserved so long as targeted killings are carried out with an ethic of melancholy duty and an awareness that they are justified despite their problematic moral foundations, not because of them

#### Solves the case:

#### 1) Death penalty---the CP takes an ethical stance against state violence in the context of capital punishment---that’s sufficient, proven by their ev

Rupa Reddy 3, researcher at the Centre for Capital Punishment Studies, based at the School of Law in the University of Westminster, has multiple degrees in law, 2003, “The Changing Face of the Killing State,” http://www.westminster.ac.uk/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0014/43403/Occasional\_2.pdf

State killing symbolises “the vindication of absolute and ultimate power appropriated to governmental ends.”194 This exercise of power by the state is then also appropriated and exploited by groups in society, in order to achieve the exercise of their own ideology. Under the guise of the seemingly benign intention of diminishing the pain of those subjected to a legitimate punishment in a democracy, the death penalty in modern society in fact seems alarmingly similar to those situations described by Hay, Ignatieff, and Foucault, in the context of societies which did not purport to be democratic. The role of the crowds present at public executions in eighteenth century England and France was crucial, as was the potential power of these witnesses to overturn the ritual if they felt any injustice had occurred.195 Arguably, this power depended upon these witnesses having an awareness of their role in the ritual, which in turn depended upon their being conscious of the wider significance of the institution. In Foucault’s account particularly, the crowd were aware that the death penalty was part of the overall exercise of state power, and that they themselves had an important role to play in the practical limitation of this power.196

With regard to modern day America, this awareness no longer exists amongst a large proportion of the public. Not only is the modern execution witnessed by very few of the citizens in whose name it is carried out, but also the death penalty as an institution is no longer primarily viewed as a representation of the power of the state over its subjects. As in the eighteenth century England described by Douglas Hay, the perpetuation of the death penalty is to a large extent dependent upon the acquiescence and support of people who believe that they control it. In a democratic state this should indeed be the case. However, in the same way that the majority of the English population in Hay’s account were duped into believing they had some control over the death penalty by a veneer of equality and justice, the American public also falsely believe that they are in control of its exercise. This is simply not the case. Instead it seems possible that the distribution of the death penalty is being influenced by a certain section of society in order to further their own ideologies related to race, and other factors such as wealth and class.

Is this the same kind of sovereign power, merely disguised more effectively under the cloak of democracy? As Sarat argues, “the death penalty is the ultimate measure of sovereignty and the ultimate test of political power.”197 In modern American society, this power has been “transformed from an instrument of political terror used by ‘them’ against ‘us’”198, as was the case in the eighteenth century, into “our instrument used by some of us against others.”199 The composition of the elite or group, and the ideology underlying their use of the death penalty may have changed over time. Yet despite this, it appears that capital punishment continues to be used as an ideological tool of power.

CONCLUSION

In this discussion I have attempted to demonstrate that “capital punishment has played, and continues to play, a major, and dangerous, role in the modern economy of power.”200 For this reason I chose to focus upon the influence of symbolism and ideology in the use of the death penalty in order to highlight their possible roles in this distribution of power. Other mechanisms, such as sanitization, might also facilitate any power imbalance by masking ideological and symbolic aims or effects. Sanitization, particularly in the form of lethal injection, is at least partly responsible for the fact that “the killing state is taken for granted,”201 and the fact that the majority of executions are no longer considered newsworthy both reflects and perpetuates this attitude. Until the ideology behind capital punishment is fully identified, no effective counter-strategy can be devised to oppose it.202

One solution to this aspect of the problem then, must be to “bring violence out from behind the scenes, thus allowing it to impinge upon public consciousness and disturb the public conscience.”203 The debate must be returned to the moral legitimacy of executions rather than their methodology, and the public must be reminded that the reality of the death penalty is the calculated extinction of human life by the state. One controversial suggestion to achieve this has been to “blur the distinction between execution and murder,”204 and “reveal the sadism that is at the heart of the state’s tenacious attachment to capital punishment”205 by televising executions. Whilst a detailed discussion of the terms of this debate is unfortunately beyond the scope of this discussion,206 and although they may never be translated into reality, arguably merely raising such issues reminds people of the moral issues involved in executions.

By using such methods to raise public consciousness, might it be possible to show that the death penalty is not as neutral a punishment as it first appears? Perhaps nothing can displace well-established ideologies such as those discussed here, but arguments regarding their potential influence should be made in order to add positively to the case for abolition. For the longer this violent penalty is perpetuated, the greater the possibility becomes that it will “leave us in a killing state . . . [with] nothing but killing as the currency of social life.”207

#### 2) Autonomous drones---their impact ev is not about targeted killings, it’s about future autonomous drones which the CP bans---this is from earlier in their Singer article, making clear that it’s about autonomous robots

Peter W. Singer 9, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Winter 2009, “Robots at War: The New Battlefield,” http://www.cc.gatech.edu/classes/AY2009/cs4001c\_spring/documents/WilsonQuarterly-RobotsAtWar.pdf

So, despite what one article called “all the lip service paid to keeping a human in the loop,” autonomous armed robots are coming to war. They simply make too much sense to the people who matter.

With robots taking on more and more roles, and humans ever further out of the loop, some wonder whether human warriors will eventually be rendered obsolete. Describing a visit he had with the 2007 graduating class at the Air Force Academy, a retired Air Force officer says, “There is a lot of fear that they will never be able to fly in combat.”

The most controversial role for robots in the future would be as replacements for the human grunt in the field. In 2004, DARPA researchers surveyed a group of U.S. military officers and robotics scientists about the roles they thought robots would take over in the near future. The officers predicted that countermine operations would go first, followed by reconnaissance, forward observation, logistics, then infantry. Oddly, among the last roles they named were air defense, driving or piloting vehicles, and food service—each of which has already seen automation. Special Forces roles were felt, on average, to be least likely ever to be delegated to robots.

The average year the soldiers predicted that humanoid robots would start to be used in infantry combat roles was 2025. Their answer wasn’t much different from that of the scientists, who gave 2020 as their prediction. To be clear, these numbers only reflect the opinions of those in the survey, and could prove to be way off . Robert Finkelstein, a veteran engineer who now heads Robotic Technologies Inc. and who helped conduct the survey, thinks these projections are highly optimistic and that it won’t be until “2035 [that] we will have robots as fully capable as human soldiers on the battlefield.” But the broader point is that many specialists are starting to contemplate a world in which robots will replace the grunt in the field well before many of us pay of f our mortgages.

However, as H. R. “Bart” Everett, a Navy robotics pioneer, explains, the full-scale replacement of humans in battle is not likely to occur anytime soon. Instead, the human use of robots in war will evolve “to more of a team approach.” His program, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, has joined with the Office of Naval Research to support the activation of a “warfighters’ associate” concept within the next 10 to 20 years. Humans and robots would be integrated into a team that shares information and coordinates action toward a common goal. Says Everett, “I firmly believe the intelligent mobile robot will ultimately achieve sufficient capability to be accepted by the warfighter as an equal partner in a human-robot team, much along the lines of a police dog and its handler.”

A 2006 solicitation by the Pentagon to the robotics industry captures the vision: “The challenge is to create a system demonstrating the use of multiple robots with one or more humans on a highly constrained tactical maneuver. . . . One example of such a maneuver is the through-the-door procedure of ten used by police and soldiers to enter an urban dwelling . . . [in which] one kicks in the door then pulls back so another can enter low and move left, followed by another who enters high and moves right, etc. In this project the teams will consist of robot platforms working with one or more human teammates as a cohesive unit.”

Another U.S. military–funded project envisions the creation of “playbooks” for tactical operations by a robot-human team. Much like a football quarterback, the human soldier would call the “play” for robots to carry out, but like the players on the field, the robots would have the latitude to change what they did if the situation shifted.

The military, then, doesn’t expect to replace all its soldiers with robots anytime soon, but rather sees a process of integration into a force that will become, as the Joint Forces Command projected in its 2025 plans, “largely robotic.” The individual robots will “have some level of autonomy —adjustable autonomy or supervised autonomy or full autonomy within mission bounds,” but it is important to note that the autonomy of any human soldiers in these units will also be circumscribed by their orders and rules.

#### Rejecting all use of deadly force in counter-terrorism is just as immoral as saying the U.S. is purely innocent---the only true ethical option is the middle ground that views carrying out violence as a sad duty rather than a joyful act of revenge

Slavoj Zizek 2, international man of mystery, 2002, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, p. 48-52

September 11 is already being appropriated for ideological causes: from the claims in all the mass media that antiglobalization is now out, to the notion that the shock of the WTC attacks revealed the substanceless character of postmodern Cultural Studies, their lack of contact with 'real life'. While the second notion is (partially) right for the wrong reasons, the first is downright wrong. What is true is that the relatively trifling character of standard Cultural Studies critical topics was thereby revealed: what is the use of a politically incorrect expression with possible racist undertones, compared with the torturous death of thousands? This is the dilemma of Cultural Studies: will they stick to the same topics, directly admitting that their fight against oppression is a fight within First World capitalism's universe - which means that, in the wider conflict between the Western First World and the outside threat to it, one should reassert one's fidelity to the basic American liberal-democratic framework? Or will they risk taking the step into radicalizing their critical stance; will they problematize this framework itself? As for the end of antiglobalization, the dark hints from the first days after September 11 that the attacks could also have been the work of antiglobalist terrorists is, of course, nothing but a crude manipulation: the only way to conceive of what happened on September 11 is to locate it in the context of the antagonisms of global capitalism.

We do not yet know what consequences this event will have for the economy, ideology, politics and war, but one thing is certain: the USA, which, until now, perceived itself as an island exempt from this kind of violence, witnessing it only from the safe distance of the TV screen, is now directly involved. So the alternative is: will the Americans decide to fortify their 'sphere' further, or to risk stepping out of it? Either America will persist in - even strengthen the deeply immoral attitude of 'Why should this happen to us? Things like this don't happen here!', leading to more aggressivity towards the threatening Outside - in short: to a paranoiac acting out. Or America will finally risk through the fantasmatic screen that separates it from the Outside World, accepting its arrival in the Real world, making the long-overdue move from “A thing like this shouldn't happen here!” to “A thing like this shouldn't happen anywhere!”. That is the true lesson of the attacks: the only way to ensure that it will not happen here again is to prevent it happening anywhere else. In short, America should learn humbly to accept its own vulnerability as part of this world, enacting the punishment of those responsible as a sad duty, not as an exhilarating retaliation - what we are getting instead is the forceful reassertion of the exceptional role of the USA as a global policeman, as if what causes resentmesainst the USA is not its excess of power, but its lack of it.

The WTC attacks confront us with the necessity of resisting the temptation of a double blackmail. If we simply, only and unconditionally condemn it, we simply appear to endorse the blatantly ideological position of American innocence under attack by Third World Evil; if we draw attention to the deeper sociopolitical causes of Arab extremism, we simply appear to blame the victim which ultimately got what it deserved .... The only possible solution here is to reject this very opposition and to adopt both positions simultaneously; this can be done only if we resort to the dialectical category of totality: there is no choice between these two positions; each one is one-sided and false. Far from offering a case apropos of which we can adopt a clear ethical stance, we encounter here the limit of moral reasoning: from the moral standpoint, the victims are innocent, the act was an abominable crime, this very innocence, however, is not innocent-to adopt such an 'innocent' position in today's global capitalist universe is in itself a false abstraction. The same goes for the more ideological clash of interpretations: we can claim that the attack on the WTC was an attack on everything that is worth fighting for in democratic freedoms - the decadent Western way of life condemned by Muslim and other fundamentalists is the universe of women's rights and multiculturalist tolerancc;23 we could also claim, however, that it was an attack on the very centre and symbol of global financial capitalism. This, of course, in no way entails the compromise notion of shared guilt (the terrorists are to blame, but the Americans are also partly to blame ... ) -the point is, rather, that the two sides are not really opposed; that they belong to the same field. In short, the position to adopt is to accept the necessity of the fight against terrorism, but to redefine and expand its terms so that it will also include (some) American and other Western powers' acts: the choice between Bush and Bin Laden is not our choice; they are both 'Them' against Us. The fact that global capitalism is a totality means that it is the dialectical unity of itself and of its other, of the forces which resist it on 'fundamentalist' ideological grounds.

Consequently, of the two main stories which emerged after September 11, both are worse, as Stalin would have put it. The American patriotic narrative - the innocence under siege, the surge of patriotic pride - is, of course, vain; however, is the Leftist narrative (with its Schadenfreude: the USA got what it deserved, what it had been doing to others for really any better? The predominant reaction of European - but also American- Leftists was nothing less than scandalous: all imaginable stupidities were said and written, up to the 'feminist' point that the WTC towers were two phallic symbols, waiting to be destroyed ('castrated'). Was there not something petty and miserable in the mathematics reminding-us of Holocaust revisionism (what are the 3,000 dead against millions in Rwanda, Congo, etc.)? And what about the fact that the CIA (co-)created the Taliban and Bin Laden, financing and helping them to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan? Why was this fact quoted as an argument against attacking them? Would it not be much more logical to claim that it is precisely America's duty to rid us of the monster it created? The moment we think in the terms of 'Yes, the WTC collapse was a tragedy, but we should not fully solidarize with the victims, since this would mean supporting US imperialism', the ethical catastrophe is already here: the only appropriate stance is unconditional solidarity with all victims. The ethical stance proper is replaced here by the moralizing mathematics of guilt and horror, which misses the key point: the terrifying death of each individual is absolute and incomparable. In short, let us conduct a simple mental experiment: if you detect in yourself any reluctance to empathize fully with the victims of the WTC collapse, if you feel the urge to qualify your empathy with 'Yes, but what about the millions who suffer in Africa .. .', you are not demonstrating your Third World sympathies, but merely the mauvaise foi which bears witness to your implicit patronizing racist attitude towards Third World victims. (More precisely, the problem with such comparative statements is that they are both necessary and inadmissible: one has to make them, one has to make the point that much worse horrors are taking place around the world on a daily basis - but one has to do it without getting involved in the obscene mathematics of guilt.)

### Off

#### Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.

If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.

Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

**Al Qaeda’s actions, statements, and internal documents prove they want nuclear weapons and mass casualty attacks---if the US relents, it guarantees nuclear attacks**

Larry J. **Arbuckle 8**, Naval Postgraduate School, "The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism through an Attribution Capability", Thesis for master of science in defense analysis, approved by Professor Robert O'Connell, and Gordon McCormick, Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, June

However, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent history, and at least one presently, have nuclear ambitions. These groups include Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Of these, Al Qaeda appears to have made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise develop a nuclear weapon. Demonstrating these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives met with two Pakistani scientists to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin, 2006). Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass violence to its supporters. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that al Qaeda, “has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Indeed Bin Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Further evidence of intent is the following figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan. **It depicts a workable design for a nuclear weapon.** Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch includes some **fairly advanced weapons design parameters** (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). Clearly **maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals**. Thus their use of conventional means of attack presently appears to be a **result of their current capabilities** and not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005).

**High risk of nuclear terror now---escalates and turns the case because civil-liberties crackdowns**

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Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “**dirty bombs**” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of **panic and socio-economic destabilization**.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that **well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities**.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. **Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible**. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is **comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima**. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. **The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order**.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

**Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key**

Nathan **Myhrvold 13**, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a different set of technology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such ¶ a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our **military and intelligence capabilities** from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by **repeatedly attacking** us or hectoring **us for decades**.

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

 Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars** most associated with the critique of empiricismimplied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

## Case

### Util

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Consequentialism key---their existentialist focus is complicit with evil

**Isaac 2**—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness **undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that **politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions**; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

### Can’t find other cards for some reason --- no new ones from when we debated them at ky rr

# Block

## T

### Turns Case

#### Clash and in-depth deliberation create more effective decision making and advocacy skills---ensures that the aff’s advocacy is improved and more effectively carried out

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

 In addition to the basic equity norm, dismissing the idea that debaters defend the affirmative side of the topic encourages advocates to falsely value affirmative speech acts in the absence of a negative response. There may be several detrimental consequences that go unrealized in a debate where the affirmative case and plan are not topical. Without ground, debaters may fall prey to a siren’s call, a belief that certain critical ideals and concepts are axiological, existing beyond doubt without scrutiny. Bakhtin contends that in dialogical exchanges “the greater the number and weight” of counter-words, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be (Bakhtin, 1990). The matching of the word to the counter-word should be embraced by proponents of critical activism in the activity, because these dialogical exchanges allow for improvements and modifications in critical arguments. Muir argues that “debate puts students into greater contact with the real world by forcing them to read a great deal of information” (1993, p. 285). He continues, “[t]he constant consumption of material…is significantly constitutive. The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process shapes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena” (p. 285). Through the process of compreh

ensive understanding, debate serves both as a laboratory and a constitutive arena. Ideas find and lose adherents. Ideas that were once considered beneficial are modified, changed, researched again, and sometimes discarded altogether. A central argument for open deliberation is that it encourages a superior consensus to situations where one side is silenced. Christopher Peters contends, “The theory holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the process of decision making…creates decisions that are better for having been subjected to this trial by fire” (1997, p. 336). The combination of a competitive format and the necessity to take points of view that one does not already agree with combines to create a unique educational experience for all participants. Those that eschew the value of such experience by an axiological position short-circuit the benefits of the educational exchange for themselves, their opponents, as well as the judges and observers of such debates.

### Agency

#### Focusing on strategic ends and advocating the law is good---causes us to be less complacent about reforms

Smith 2012 (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)

Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The prisoner’s dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 Because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety.

## Da

### AT: Intel Losses from Not Capturing

#### Shifting to capture missions is impossible---every alternative to drones is worse for CT

Daniel Byman 13, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4

Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic. To be sure, in an ideal world, militants would be captured alive, allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful information. Raids, arrests, and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than lethal operations. That is why they should be, and indeed already are, used in stable countries where the United States enjoys the support of the host government. But in war zones or unstable countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, arresting militants is highly dangerous and, even if successful, often inefficient. In those three countries, the government exerts little or no control over remote areas, which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants hiding out there. Worse yet, in Pakistan and Yemen, the governments have at times cooperated with militants. If the United States regularly sent in special operations forces to hunt down terrorists there, sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists, likely leading to firefights, U.S. casualties, and possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians.

### Drones Key---General---2NC

#### Prefer our evidence---critics are wrong---drones are highly effective at CT, and don’t cause high civilian casualties or blowback

Alex Young 13, Associate Staff, Harvard International Review, 2/25/13, “A Defense of Drones,” Harvard International Review, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones

The War on Terror is no longer a traditional conflict. The diffuse, decentralized nature of terrorist organizations had already made this an unconventional war; now, the use of unmanned aircraft has added another non-traditional layer. Conventional military strategies have failed in Iraq and Afghanistan: the United States has, in many cases, stopped sending people into combat, opting instead for airstrikes by unmanned aerial vehicles. Over the past decade, US military and intelligence agencies have expanded their use of unmanned Predator and Reaper drones; these robotic aircraft are generally used to carry out targeted strikes against known members of terrorist groups. US reliance on drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries has changed the nature of the war on terror.

This strategy is not without controversy. The Obama administration’s heavy use of unmanned drones in the War on Terror has come under fire from a variety of opponents, including human rights groups, think tanks, and even foreign governments. Critics claim that drone strikes cause civilian casualties, incorrectly target only the most prominent leaders of terrorist groups, and create backlash against the US. To hear some tell it, the use of drones exacerbates, rather than solves, the problem of terrorism.

The reality is not so bleak: drones are very good at what they do. Unmanned attacks are highly effective when it comes to eliminating specific members of terrorist organizations, disrupting terrorist networks without creating too much collateral damage. Their effectiveness makes drone strikes a vital part of US counterterrorism strategy.

Predator and Reaper drones are not the indiscriminate civilian-killers that some make them out to be: strikes are targeted and selective. This has become increasingly true as drone technology has improved, and as the military has learned how best to use them. A confluence of factors has made drone strikes much better at eliminating enemy militants while avoiding civilians: drones now carry warheads that produce smaller blast radiuses, and the missiles carrying those warheads are guided using laser, millimeter-wave, and infrared seekers. The result has been less destructive drone strikes that reach their intended target more reliably. A number of non-technological shifts have also made drones a more useful tool: Peter Bergen, a national security analyst for CNN, summarized on July 13th, 2012 that more careful oversight, a deeper network of local informants, and better coordination between the US and Pakistani intelligence communities have also contributed to better accuracy. Data gathered by the Long War Journal indicates that the civilian casualty rate for 2012 and the beginning of 2013 is only 4.5 percent. Even Pakistani Major General Ghayur Mehmood acknowledges that, “most of the targets [of drone strikes] are hard-core militants.” Imprecise drone strikes that cause many civilian casualties are now a thing of the past. This improved accuracy may also help to mitigate anti-American sentiment that stems from civilian casualties.

#### Drones solve leadership decapitation – turns quality arg

Patrick B. Johnston 13, Associate Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, and Anoop Sarbahi, postdoctoral scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, July 2013, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” <http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf>

We expect drone strikes that kill terrorist leaders will be associated with reductions in terrorist attacks. Previous research convincingly demonstrates that conducting effective terrorist attacks requires skilled individuals, many of whom are well-educated and come from upper middle- class backgrounds. 21 Indeed, captured documents containing detailed biographical data on foreign al Qa’ida militants in Iraq illustrate that among the foreign terrorists—who are conventionally known to be more sophisticated than local fighters—their most commonly listed “occupation” prior to arriving in Iraq was that of “student.” For militants for whom information on “experience” was available, “computers” was the most commonly listed experience type, just ahead of “weapons.”22

In the context of northwest Pakistan, where militant freedom of movement is limited by the threat of drone strikes, we expect that militant groups will be unable to replace senior leaders killed in drone strikes because recruiting and deploying them, perhaps from a foreign country with a Salafi jihadist base, will be costly and difficult. This is not to say that leaders killed in drone strikes are irreplaceable. On the contrary, other militants are likely to be elevated within their organization to replace them. But we also anticipate that those elevated to replace killed leaders will be, on average, of lower quality to the organization than their predecessors. Thus, we predict that the loss of leaders will be associated with the degradation of terrorists’ ability to produce violence. This logic implies Hypothesis 3:

H3: All else equal, drone strikes that kill one or mor e terrorist leader(s) will lead to a decrease in terrorist violence.

#### Data proves

Patrick B. Johnston 13, Associate Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, and Anoop Sarbahi, postdoctoral scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, July 2013, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” <http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf>

Given that killing terrorist leaders or HVIs in terrorist organizations is the purpose of drone strikes, we evaluate whether patterns of militant attacks differ following strikes in which a militant leader was killed. Table 3 provides tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4 against the four metrics of militant violence examined here using the same 2FESL specifications as in table 2. The results are largely consistent with Hypothesis 3—that killing militant leaders is associated with decreased violence. There is little support for Hypothesis 4, that killing HVIs has counterproductive effects on violence. Controlling for the number of drone strikes per agency-week, the first column of table 3 shows that drone strikes that kill a HVI are associated with reductions in the number of militant incidents that occur. This result is statistically significant at the one-percent level. There is, however, weaker evidence that HVI removals reduce militant lethality and IED attacks.45

Overall, the evidence is somewhat consistent with the argument that individuals matter for a terrorist organization’s ability to produce violence at sustained rates. Along with other evidence from macro-level studies of leadership decapitation, the present results suggest that critics who argue against the efficacy of removing key figures may be overemphasizing the extent to which such individuals can be readily replaced.46

### AT: Recruiting

#### Targeted killings destroy operational effectiveness of terror groups---they can’t recruit new operatives fast enough to keep pace with losses

Alex Young 13, Associate Staff, Harvard International Review, 2/25/13, “A Defense of Drones,” Harvard International Review, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones

Moreover, drone strikes have disrupted al Qaeda’s system for training new recruits. The Times of London reports that in 2009, Al Qaeda leaders decided to abandon their traditional training camps because bringing new members to a central location offered too easy a target for drone strikes. Foreign Policy emphasized this trend on November 2nd, 2012, arguing that, “destroying communication centers, training camps and vehicles undermines the operational effectiveness of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and quotes from operatives of the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network reveal that drones have forced them into a ‘jungle existence’ where they fear for the lives on a daily basis.” The threat of death from the skies has forced extremist organizations to become more scattered.

More importantly, though, drone strikes do not only kill top leaders; they target their militant followers as well. The New America Foundation, a think tank that maintains a database of statistics on drone strikes, reports that between 2004 and 2012, drones killed between 1,489 and 2,605 enemy combatants in Pakistan. Given that Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the various other organizations operating in the region combined do not possibly have more than 1,500 senior leaders, it follows that many, if not most, of those killed were low-level or mid-level members – in many cases, individuals who would have carried out attacks. The Los Angeles Times explains that, “the Predator campaign has depleted [Al Qaeda’s] operational tier. Many of the dead are longtime loyalists who had worked alongside Bin Laden […] They are being replaced by less experienced recruits.” Drones decimate terrorist organizations at all levels; the idea that these strikes only kill senior officials is a myth.

### Impact D

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

## Case

### May

#### Seeking to change the world is a celebration of life not a negation

Todd May 5, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531

And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.

### AT: Camus

#### Their Camus evidence should not guide your decision---its discussion of rebellion is completely divorced from any actually existing historical situation---in a conflict where the other side wants to kill us, it’s morally required to maximize the enemy’s costs and minimize ours

Stephen Eric Bronner 99, Director of Global Relations and Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 1999, Ideas in Action: Political Tradition in the Twentieth Century, p. 161-163

But is it really the case that because "I rebel, we exist"? Circular reasoning underpins such neo-Cartesian claims. And they appear all the more arbitrary given the philosophical premise that "the first and only evidence that is supplied to me, within the terms of the absurdist experience, is rebellion."15 Camus knows that not every form of rebellion is justifiable. Neofascists and skinheads also see themselves as engaging in rebellion. But surely Camus would not consider it necessary to first legitimate their initial expression of outrage and only then condemn the exaggerated form their rebellion takes. Enough Nazis and communists were also quite willing to risk death in exchange for the murder of opponents in the brawls and street battles anticipating the rise of Hitler. The problem is obvious: rebellion is, ultimately, identified only with those actions of which Camus approves.

To make matters worse, The Rebel reveals nothing new about totalitarianism, and it lacks any practical referent for its metaphysical judgments. No antiauthoritarian movement willing to engage in violence, which includes the antifascist resistance, can begin with the idea of equally exchanging the lives of its partisans for those of its enemies; it must attempt to maximize costs for the enemy and minimize its own losses. Camus is, of course correct in noting the effect of ideology on action and the manner in which revolutions of the past generated organs of terror. But he never deals with the constraints in which such movements operated. He never makes any reference to institutions or interests or possible structural imbalances of power in defining "oppression" or "exploitation." He also never deals with the inherent differences between a theory of revolution and a theory of rule.

All this, however, generally got lost in the emotionally and politically charged climate in which discussion of The Rebel took place. Communist hacks blasted it unmercifully. More ominously, conservatives and Catholics applauded Camus for showing how revolutions only produce new hangmen. Camus surely dismissed the criticisms of the communists and deplored the "misunderstanding" of his work by the political right. But even liberal critics, who supported his attack on utopianism and his identification with democracy and the individual, expressed skepticism about his philosophical claims regarding the absolute value of rebellion. Raymond Aron was snide in complementing Camus only for being less of a romantic than Jean-Paul Sartre.16 Thus, there were already doubts about The Rebel even before what would become a bitter debate between friends.