# 1NC

## off

### Off

#### a. Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### “Should” requires defending federal action

Judge Henry Nieto 9, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### b. Vote neg

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Simulated national security law debates preserve agency and enhance decision-making---avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue 13, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

### Off

#### Flexible OCO capabilities are critical to heg --- determines victory in future war

Claudette Roulo 13, American Forces Press Service, “DOD Must Stay Ahead of Cyber Threat, Dempsey Says,” DOD, June 27, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120379

To ensure this force is able to operate quickly, the Defense Department now has a “playbook” for cyber, Dempsey said, noting that a presidential directive codifies how each part of the government will respond in the event of a serious cyberattack. Under this directive, the department has developed emergency procedures to guide its response to imminent, significant cyber threats, the chairman said.¶ The Defense Department is updating its cyber rules of engagement for the first time in seven years, he added, and also is improving mission command for cyber forces.¶ While cyber may be the nation’s greatest vulnerability, Dempsey said, it also presents the military with a tremendous asymmetric advantage. “The military that maintains the most agile and resilient networks will be the most effective in future war,” he told the audience. “This is the kind of force we are building for the future.”¶ Each branch of the military is doing its part, the chairman said, by investing in equipment and personnel that will ensure the joint force can operate in cyberspace as capably as it can on land, sea, air, and space. The next step is the planned Joint Information Environment, he said -- a single, easy to secure, joint network delivering data to the department’s personnel wherever and whenever they need it.

#### The threat of preemptive strikes is key to deter rising challengers

Leigh Drogen 13, founder and chief investment officer of Surfview Capital, LLC, a New York based investment management firm, “Why Cyber Weapons Will Make The World Even Safer,” 3/4, http://www.leighdrogen.com/why-cyber-weapons-will-make-the-world-even-safer/

Scene: China has just exchanged fire with Japan over the East China Sea Islands. The US Navy is in theatre and has as promised under its security umbrella treaty with Japan vows to protect the sovereignty of Japanese territory. In response China has threatened to hold US infrastructure (power, water, transportation) hostage and gives the US 48 hours to exit the theatre. The US immediately responds with a similar threat to cripple Chinese infrastructure via cyber attacks unless China relinquishes cyber attacks within 48 hours.¶ Now you can bet your last dollar that the US has been holding war games designed to simulate exactly this scenario. And while we don’t know how they’ve played out, we can make some pretty informed assumptions based on the corollary of nuclear war theory.¶ The ability for foreign agents to hijack critical infrastructure and cripple it within a short period of time is now to the point where we, and our potential adversaries, could face damage many magnitudes higher than a nuclear strike, not in lives lost, but economic, social, and political damage.¶ Cyber warfare has reached a level where we can say that there is mutually assured destruction of critical infrastructure in a war between the US and China.¶ Which is exactly why I’m ready to say that cyber warfare will make the world an even safer place.¶ There is no argument against the claim that nuclear weapons have massively decreased overall warfare across the world since World War II. During that time we haven’t seen a war between two nuclear states.¶ But the more important development, as Tom Friedman loves to point out, we haven’t seen a major conflict between two countries with a McDonalds. Now, look past the frivolity of that statement through to the bigger point, lives lost is no longer the major determinant of why countries decide to forgo war, it is now primarily an economic and social decision.¶ The cost in treasure and political capital that it takes to go to war as a developed economy with another state is massive. The US has had a huge hand in this no doubt playing the world’s policeman since World War II. Police are not very effective at hunting down transgressors, their job is primarily prevention, a job that the US has pretty much perfected at this point.¶ China will not follow through on its cyber war threat because the cost in economic, social, and political damage to the regime from a crippling US cyber attack would be far too much to handle versus the benefit from its move on the islands. What do you think middle and upper class urban Chinese citizens would do if China risked everything they’ve worked so hard to build over the past 25 years for the islands? They risk nothing less than the regime being toppled. They are already walking on thin ice under the unwritten deal they’ve made, continued economic development for the regime’s position in power.¶ Cyber war has reached the level of mutually assured destruction as the damage caused will lead to popular revolt. It certainly would here in the US.¶ The flip side to this argument, as it is made with nuclear weapons, is that non state actors are not tied to the same consequences and therefor are much more dangerous. I would agree, and in the case of cyber war they it’s even scarier as their capability to inflict damage is far greater (this was the theme of Skyfall), it’s hard to obtain and deliver a nuclear weapon.¶ That said, I believe cyber weapons will add to global security as they become more pervasive.

#### U.S. hegemony is vital to global stability---decline causes nuclear great power war

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### Off

Miles and I advocate affirming the war powers authority of the President to launch preemptive cyber attacks, but only if approved by a human.

### Off

#### Miles and I advocate shaping defense intellectuals through statutory limitations on the war powers of the president to authorize the preemptive use of cyber attacks

#### Advocating the debate space as a site for change degenerates into academic self-congratulation that locks in the SQ

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, itfunctions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries outits autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities).

Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic politicaltheory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse.

The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

## Case

**Util**

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical considerat

ion to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences**

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse,)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

### V2L

#### “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

### AT: Pure War

#### Tech’s not deterministic – “speed” won’t cause war or oppression.

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A key concept in his work is dromology, which is derived from Greek - dromas: running, fast - and may be translated as the science of speed. For Virilio, the one and simple rule of technology development has been that of an ever-increasing speed; and this rule seems to define fundamental aspects of warfare and society. In short, the logic of speed has driven the development of warfare, which on its part has defined the architecture of cities, finally setting the conditions for political regimes. To spell this thesis out. let us focus on the evolution of warfare, which can be characterized by three phases. The first and longest was based on defence and weapons of obstruction, designed to block attackers. In this phase, fortified cities could survive sieges for months (even years), and this created a space for political life, thus centred on a local, geographically defined unit. The phase of defence ended with the invention of artillery, weapons of destruction, against which walls could no longer offer protection. In the second phase, the war of siege was replaced by the offensive war of movement -and the medieval city lost its role as political centre, to be replaced by the nation state. Since then, however, technological development has brought warfare into the third phase: the combination of high-precision bombs and communication satellites (representing a fourth front) to guide them to their target has annihilated the advantage of movement. Arms of interdiction and absolute speed have rendered vulnerable the mechanised forces based on relative speed. And this development has brought new conditions for political regimes, reducing the role of the nation state, and of any form of political debate. Allowing for some degree of simplicity, the causal relations implied by this line of argument may be depicted somewhat like this: Speed/technology —> military and warfare —> architecture of cities —> political regimes/structures This argument - which is neatly summarised by Briigger and Petersen (1994) in their introduction to Virilio. The War, the City, the Political - clearly illustrates the more controversial aspects of Virilio's thinking. For one, the basic technological determinism may raise some critique, i.e. from those arguing the social construction of technology. Furthermore, the idea that society is fundamentally shaped by military considerations is also somewhat unique and incompatible with more common explanations. Finally, some might argue that only an architect would regard the architecture of cities as decisive for political life.

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

### Squo Improving

#### Squo is structurally improving---health, environment and equality

Bjorn Lomborg 10/16, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, "A Better World Is Here", 2013, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-the-declining-costs-of-global-problems-by-bj-rn-lomborg

COPENHAGEN – For centuries, optimists and pessimists have argued over the state of the world. Pessimists see a world where more people means less food, where rising demand for resources means depletion and war, and, in recent decades, where boosting production capacity means more pollution and global warming. One of the current generation of pessimists’ sacred texts, The Limits to Growth, influences the environmental movement to this day.¶ The optimists, by contrast, cheerfully claim that everything – human health, living standards, environmental quality, and so on – is getting better. Their opponents think of them as “cornucopian” economists, placing their faith in the market to fix any and all problems.¶ But, rather than picking facts and stories to fit some grand narrative of decline or progress, we should try to compare across all areas of human existence to see if the world really is doing better or worse. Together with 21 of the world’s top economists, I have tried to do just that, developing a scorecard spanning 150 years. Across ten areas – including health, education, war, gender, air pollution, climate change, and biodiversity – the economists all answered the same question: What was the relative cost of this problem in every year since 1900, all the way to 2013, with predictions to 2050.¶ Using classic economic valuations of everything from lost lives, bad health, and illiteracy to wetlands destruction and increased hurricane damage from global warming, the economists show how much each problem costs. To estimate the magnitude of the problem, it is compared to the total resources available to fix it. This gives us the problem’s size as a share of GDP. And the trends since 1900 are sometimes surprising.¶ Consider gender inequality. Essentially, we were excluding almost half the world’s population from production. In 1900, only 15% of the global workforce was female. What is the loss from lower female workforce participation? Even taking into account that someone has to do unpaid housework and the increased costs of female education, the loss was at least 17% of global GDP in 1900. Today, with higher female participation and lower wage differentials, the loss is 7% – and projected to fall to 4% by 2050.¶ It will probably come as a big surprise that climate change from 1900 to 2025 has mostly been a net benefit, increasing welfare by about 1.5% of GDP per year. This is because global warming has mixed effects; for moderate warming, the benefits prevail.¶ On one hand, because CO2 works as a fertilizer, higher levels have been a boon for agriculture, which comprises the biggest positive impact, at 0.8% of GDP. Likewise, moderate warming prevents more cold deaths than the number of extra heat deaths that it causes. It also reduces demand for heating more than it increases the costs of cooling, implying a gain of about 0.4% of GDP. On the other hand, warming increases water stress, costing about 0.2% of GDP, and negatively affects ecosystems like wetlands, at a cost of about 0.1%.¶ As temperatures rise, however, the costs will rise and the benefits will decline, leading to a dramatic reduction in net benefits. After the year 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the decades to come.¶ Yet, to put matters in perspective, the scorecard also shows us that the world’s biggest environmental problem by far is indoor air pollution. Today, indoor pollution from cooking and heating with bad fuels kills more than three million people annually, or the equivalent of a loss of 3% of global GDP. But in 1900, the cost was 19% of GDP, and it is expected to drop to 1% of GDP by 2050.¶ Health indicators worldwide have shown some of the largest improvements. Human life expectancy barely changed before the late eighteenth century. Yet it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the gain since 1900: in that year, life expectancy worldwide was 32 years, compared to 69 now (and a projection of 76 years in 2050).¶ The biggest factor was the fall in infant mortality. For example, even as late as 1970, only around 5% of infants were vaccinated against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. By 2000, it was 85%, saving about three million lives annually – more, each year, than world peace would have saved in the twentieth century.¶ This success has many parents. The Gates Foundation and the GAVI Alliance have spent more than $2.5 billion and promised another $10 billion for vaccines. Efforts by the Rotary Club, the World Health Organization, and many others have reduced polio by 99% worldwide since 1979.¶ In economic terms, the cost of poor health at the outset of the twentieth century was an astounding 32% of global GDP. Today, it is down to about 11%, and by 2050 it will be half that.¶ While the optimists are not entirely right (loss of biodiversity in the twentieth century probably cost about 1% of GDP per year, with some places losing much more), the overall picture is clear. Most of the topics in the scorecard show improvements of 5-20% of GDP. And the overall trend is even clearer. Global problems have declined dramatically relative to the resources available to tackle them.¶ Of course, this does not mean that there are no more problems. Although much smaller, problems in health, education, malnutrition, air pollution, gender inequality, and trade remain large.¶ But realists should now embrace the view that the world is doing much better. Moreover, the scorecard shows us where the substantial challenges remain for a better 2050. We should guide our future attention not on the basis of the scariest stories or loudest pressure groups, but on objective assessments of where we can do the most good.

### Macy 2K

#### Fear is a legitimate and productive response to the modern condition---working through it by validating our representations is the only way to create an authentic relationship to the world and death

Macy 2K – Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. ¶ Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self. ¶ It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body. ¶ This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

### Debating Solves

#### Debating Risk Analysis avoids psychotic lashouts

Langford 3 (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)

The above case studies show that other perspectives on risk perception can be gained by examining underlying existential anxieties, and existential analysis can provide a link between widely differing risk issues and across very different methodologies. Existential analysis is, of course, only one of a number of theoretical and practical approaches that can be taken towards risks, but it is potentially capable of transcending the difference between cultures and histories. Whilst the challenges and risks posed by living today in a techno-logically advanced society are very different from those faced a thousand years ago in the same geographical locations, the existential anxieties remain the same, as they are a common property of being human, although coping strategies may change somewhat. ‘Millenium anxiety’ in 1999 was not so different from that displayed in 999 AD.

Further, existential analysis can reflect on the societal challenges posed by ‘modern’ risks as well as the individual adaptations required in order to survive in the 21st century. Giddens (1991) links existential anxiety to loss of trust, and Beck (1999) comments on how the World Risk Society brings people together as well as separating them though the operation of the global political economy. There are winners and losers, but all are beginning to play on the same field. Although cross-cultural comparisons are not the focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning that from research conducted in the UK, and also in Greece (Kontogianni et al., 2001), it is possible to see the commonalities between at least these two cultures, as well as the differences. With regard to risks, respondents in the UK generally took a more individualistic ‘personal specialness’ approach, for example, in the research on perceptions of climate change, whilst in Greece respondents still held more belief in the divine order of things. Greek respondents often expressed a belief in θεοπρωνια (theo-pronia), which has no direct English translation, but can be interpreted as meaning that ‘if you do the right thing, God will give you luck’. So, for example, if you fish according to ‘natural laws’, God will make sure the fish don’t run out.……....in general, Greeks favoured the ‘ultimate rescuer’ defense.

In terms of the World Risk Society, and individual coping mechanisms, it appears that death anxiety is particularly prevalent when people consider their fears of the unknown and unknowable. The unknown is represented by uncertainties over the future, given the current rate of technological change, and conflicting messages received from the scientists, government and the media about a wide range of risk issues. The unknowable is represented by fear of the complexity of scientific knowledge, and its inaccessibility to lay people, as well as the complex and interwoven nature of many environmental and health risks. With many ‘20th century diseases’, such as allergic and immunocompetence conditions, traditional epidemiological methods of finding a single cause for a single disease fail because the 26 causes are multiple and synergistic, and the conditions ill-defined and variable between individuals.

Existential isolation anxiety is characterized by feelings of hopelessness and helplessness in the face of the global political economy, and the striving for ‘community’ or ‘togetherness’ is often founded on making joint protests or opting out of conventional lifestyles and discourses. This can sometimes lead to ‘idealistic tribalism’, which replaces ‘geographical tribalism’ via the sharing and reinforcement of common ideas amongst similar thinking people via the ease of modern day travel and information/communication technologies such as email and the internet. Alienation is often a matter of scale, with individuals feeling powerless in the face of world markets and international agreements. However, modern forms of communication and lifestyles and the social structures they support may themselves be alienating in containing little face-to-face human contact or ‘quality time’. Freedom and responsibility are again often framed in terms of not being subjugated by the global political economy or the discourses it promotes – the modern equivalent of Hiedegger’s impersonal ‘They-Self’. Individuals and groups can choose to opt out, give up, try their best, or carry on regardless – but it is always in opposition to or in collusion with political and economic forces seen as being at a scale beyond the individual’s power to change, and individual action is hence usually framed in terms of personal lifestyle choice to reduce risks, protect the environment or promote social equity.

Meaninglessness anxiety seems to be a common response in the World Risk Society. Identity and self-esteem are either maintained by small-scale successes, or reliance on being informed and using common sense, but pessimism, crusad-ism, nihilism and vegetativeness are all common responses to technological and environmental risks. Unfortunately, the great increase in information in techno-logical societies has created more confusion and, in the opinion of many people, devalued all information – leading to more reliance on ‘folklore’, lay epidemiology and ‘common sense’ to evaluate uncertain and ill-defined risks. Rebellion against political and institutional structures has often been reduced to stigmatization of particular organizations (such as the privatized water companies, see Langford et al., 1999a; Georgiou et al., 1998) or products (such as GM foods). This atomization of protest increases the sense of meaningless-ness, where one can only hope to achieve something small – and hence potentially meaningless – or else give up hope of things ever being different and merely find a comfortable way to survive the inevitable.

In conclusion, this paper has attempted, via theoretical argument, case studies and discussion, to present a different analysis of risk perception by individuals within social and political systems. Existential issues and anxieties, that are common to being human across space and time, have been explored whilst at the same time examining the relationship between humans and risk in contemporary post-industrial society. One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the range of individual and social responses to risk are symptomatic of far more global anxieties about the functioning and future of the world in general. Risk issues and conflicts are therefore not merely a product of a risk society, but an integral part of its operation. Only by providing people with a genuine chance to understand, have hope and believe in the possibility of instigating change, can risk managers provide risk communication strategies that actually communicate about risk. This is because of the complex and profound role that risk perception plays in structuring identities, defining discourses and bringing order and sense to the world. Otherwise, fear of the unknown, alienation, helplessness and reactions to these states of mind will always win the day.

### AT: Automation

#### Automation won’t cause extinction

Nick Stevenson 2 is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield, Understanding Media Cultures: Social Theory and Mass Communication – page 209

Finally, missing from Virilio’s argument is an account of the way in which new media may become linked into the contestation of cultural identity. Virilio’s analysis offers a picture of human subjectivity increasingly limited and crippled by the impact of technology. Here there is a strong family resemblance between Virilio and a host of cultural critics who argue that humanistic sensibilities are currently under attack by a technologically determined present (Roszak, 1986).Such perspectives offer speciﬁc narratives of decline, where more ‘authentic’ cultures are gradually replaced by technologically induced sensibilities. The development of what Postman (1993) calls a technopoly is ushered into place when common cultures are progressively shaped by the requirements of technology. A technopoly displaces questions of cultural value and quality by championing efficiency, objective measurement and quantity. Virilio’s radicalness comes in taking these arguments further by suggesting such is technology’s dominance over culture that it is actually pushing global societies ever closer to their own destruction. Without wishing to dismiss these perspectives out of hand, such viewpoints have a con-servative bent and often underestimate the extent to which popular cultures are capable of sustaining a diverse range of tastes and sensibilities. Indeed, if we follow these critical points we might ask what is the social basis for technophobia? Andrew Ross (1994) argues that technophobia amongst intellectuals and experts can be connected to a fear that the development of technology will erode their traditional status and store of cultural capital. This fear (which is not without basis) is that the knowledge economy requires the creation of an obedient, instrumental and efﬁcient knowledge class. While these are important considerations, Virilio does not demonstrate sufﬁcient reﬂexivity in attempting to position his analysis within a wider social ﬁeld. Put differently, we might argue that because Virilio fails to consider how his concerns can be linked to a traditional knowledge class, he thereby neglects to analyse different identity formations to his own.

**Distancing is good---battlefield pressure makes soldiers more likely to commit unethical actions and demonize the enemy---removal from the field of battle causes ethical decisionmaking and restraint**

Stephen **Holmes 13**, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, July 2013, “What’s in it for Obama?,” The London Review of Books, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/stephen-holmes/whats-in-it-for-obama>

But Obama can make an even subtler case for drones. Well-meaning but imperfectly informed critics sometimes claim that the absence of risk to US forces explains the recklessness with which American drone operators kill combatants and noncombatants alike. Mazzetti quotes, in this context, Richard Clarke’s comment on the routinisation of asymmetry in drone warfare: ‘if the Predator gets shot down, the pilot goes home and fucks his wife. It’s OK. There’s no POW issue here.’ That noncombatants are regularly killed by pilots of unmanned aircraft sticking to their routines is widely acknowledged. But does it make sense to argue that such documented overkill results from the absence of risk to the pilots’ own lives and limbs? Obama and his supporters, **rightly** in my view, **dismiss this** line of attack as **theoretically confused and empirically unproven**. For one thing, the stress, panic and fear experienced on combat missions can **easily increase rather than decrease** the number of mistaken hair-trigger strikes on noncombatants. Reckless endangering of civilians results **more often from heat-of-battle fear** than from above-the-battle serenity. The drone operator is freed from the pressures of kill or be killed that can easily distort interpretations of what one sees, or thinks one sees, on the battlefield. The faux cockpits from which drones are remotely piloted are unlikely to be commandeered by berserkers.¶ An even more powerful, if still flawed, argument in favour of Obama’s campaign is the way heavy losses in any war can subconsciously put pressure on civilian politicians to **inflate irrationally the aims of the conflict** in order to align them with the sacrifices being made. War aims are not fixed ex ante but are constantly evolving for the simple reason that war is essentially opportunistic. Initial objectives that prove unrealistic are discarded as new opportunities emerge. **Far from inducing greater caution in the use of force**, heavy losses of one’s own troops may **exacerbate a tendency to demonise the enemy and to hype the goals of the struggle**.¶ Formulated more abstractly, the way we fight has a marked impact on when and why we fight. This is true despite what experts in the laws of war tell us about a theoretically watertight separation between jus in bello and jus ad bellum. Fighting in a way that limits the risk to one’s own troops **makes it possible to fight limited-aims wars** that **don’t spiral into all-out wars for national survival**. This, I think, is Obama’s best case for drone warfare. Land wars are ‘dumb’ because they almost inevitably involve mission creep as well as postwar responsibilities that US forces are poorly equipped to assume. Drone warfare is smart because, while helping dismantle terrorist organisations and disrupt terrorist plots, it involves less commitment on the American side, and is therefore **much less likely to escalate out of control**.

### Speed Good

#### Their rejection of speed is isolationist, collapses global integration and democratization

Smith 4, Professor of Film – University of Sydney 2004, Theory and Criticism 7:3

11. In Neuropolitics contemporary life is distinguished by its speed. Life, Connolly explains, is now "fast-paced", "distance is compressed", concentric relations of self and politics are constantly being criss-crossed by eccentric relations of capital, information, and culture. These eccentric relations are not new but their attraction, value and efficacy have recently become culturally, economically and politically overarching. The eccentric world and the concentric world have been reordered are their relation is now characterised by disjunction. That is, the concentric institutional spaces of industrial modernity, the family, school, factory, and nation are confronted with eccentric flows of network postmodernity, consumers, information and the free-market. This disjunction has presented political theory with some interesting dilemmas. Is democratic deliberation disappearing? Should the nation be defended as the primary and, or most effective form of democratic life? Can the new economies of speed serve democratic life? For Connolly, political theory has not adequately explored the democratic possibilities of speed: ¶ 12. My wager is that it is more possible to negotiate a democratic ethos congruent with the accelerated tempo of modern life than it is either to slow the world down or to insulate the majority of people from the effects of speed. It is important to reach a judgment on this issue, for the downside of pace without negotiation of a generous ethos is as bleak as its upside is enchanting. And the attempt to slow the world down under contemporary conditions of life is almost certain to devolve into a search for scapegoats held responsible for the effects of a rapid pace of life that cannot itself be derailed (Neuropolitics 162-63).¶ Clearly, the danger of despotism in different forms looms over attempts to "slow things down". Isolationism and insularity threaten democratic ways. It is also clear though that speed carries its own dangers. These dangers are no more apparent than in Paul Virilio's military paradigm of speed wherein the crucial gap between deliberation and action is greatly reduced if not annihilated. The danger inherent in the military machine is not in doubt -- speed is "profoundly ambiguous" (Neuropolitics. 179). Connolly's wager rests not on a dispute about Virilian speed but rather with the model of politics bound up with it: ¶ 13. Virilio remains transfixed by a model of politics insufficiently attuned to the positive role of speed in intrastate democracy and cross-state cosmopolitanism. He underplays the positive role speed can play in ventilating dogmatic identities in the domains of religion, sensuality, ethnicity, gender, and nationality (Neuropolitics. 178).

#### Causes economic collapse

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To be clear at the outset, I refer to the hypermodern as a short hand for “hypermodernity” or the present historical and social era, primarily in the advanced information and consumer-driven societies of Europe, North America, Australasia and Japan (Mattelart, 2003; Lipovetsky, 2005). The exact dating of this era is not a particular issue of debate. Borgmann (1992, pp. 78-109), Kroker and Cook (1986) and Kroker et al. (1990, pp. 443-459) all locate its beginnings in the 1980s. But, unlike Kroker and Cook, for instance, I do not consider the current transition purely as a radical rupture with modernity. Instead, I regard hypermodernity as a heightened level of modern intensification, as a tremendous force whereby acceleration above all is used as a factor of production proportionately more than ever before. To accelerate, of course, means to go, to happen, or cause something to travel or occur more rapidly than previously. It is to speed up or bring about something sooner than expected or to increase the velocity of the territorial, the human, and the social body together with their reactions. Virilio (1986), for example, has spoken of the contemporary significance of approaching the history of the world not merely from the perspective of the political economy of wealth, of money and capital, but also from the standpoint of the political economy of speed. For today as economic globalization unfolds it appears that what we are witnessing is an escalation in the velocity of new information and communications technologies, in the social divisions between those who have access to speed and those who do not, and, most of all, in the elimination of real space by real time, a condition wherein new information and communications technologies put the speed of light to work over great distances and without delay. As Virilio (in Virilio and Armitage, 2001a, p. 185: original italics) puts it: “the speed of light does not merely transform the world. It becomes the world. Globalization is the speed of light. And it is nothing else!”. In other words, a phenomenon such as economic globalization is simply unthinkable without the exploitation of the speed of light, or, to put it another way, without the complete spatial and temporal transformation of our world. Hence, to appreciate the prefix “hyper-” it is important to approach it literally, namely, in terms of above, over, or in excess, as in indicating an abnormality or as indicative of a social condition having a greater than usual quantity of a given constituent, for instance, the excesses of the political economy of speed. Nevertheless, in broad terms, hypermodernity signifies the multiple transformations that have taken global capitalism to a new stage that is both radically different from yet continuous with the preceding regimes of national and international capitalism. Phil Graham and I (Armitage and Graham, 2001, p. 114) have described this contemporary “dromoeconomic” order of the political economy of speed as “hypercapitalism” – as a form of accelerated capitalism founded on processes of circulation and self-valorisation and on increasingly ephemeral or symbolic commodities associated with new information and communications technologies. McKenna (2004, p. 17) has usefully and more recently defined hypercapitalism as:

[…] the operationalization and inculcation of knowledges as social practices. Another characteristic is that surplus value is increasingly being built on “self-valorizing things”, or phenomenological capital, what Bauman (1998, p. 44) refers to as “the illusion of wealth”. Other important features of hypercapitalism are its technocratic hegemony … and its operation as a knowledge economy (hypermediated compilation, storage and application of data; increasingly technologized modalities of social interaction; the dominance of the culture industry, with its attendant simulacra over traditional industries).

### AT: Virilio – Democracy

#### Virilio’s basic assumption is flawed. Speed of tech doesn’t ruin the political—opposite is true

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Chapter 1: A Schmittian Century?: From Nuclear Leviathan to Nuclear-Sovereign-Assemblage – March 17, 2008 – http://becomingwar.blogspot.com/2008/03/chapter-1-schmittian-century-from.html

Initially nuclear weapons seemed to solidify even complete the decisionistic model of sovereignty once and for all. In Virilio’s reading of Schmitt’s the state of emergency became permanent and democracy ended once it became possible for a single individual to decide to got to war and to finish that war in 30 minutes. At first glance Virilio’s apocalyptic diagnosis seems accurate. Nuclear weapons at their current numbers could destroy the entire planet and given the structure of the United States nuclear command any Congressional or popular attempt to stop the war would be in vain. This is the backbone of Virilio’s argument. Politics and a democratic balance of power require time. Time to react, time to respond, time to debate, time to strategize, time to implement and ICBMS nullify time. But Virilio is wrong. The threat of the extreme case has obscured the actual or present case that presents new opportunities for intervention. Politics, whether micro or macro, does not begin and end with the sovereign decision; the sovereign decision (both expressively and in its enactment) emerges from a relay of forces, connections, and other previous decisions, resonances, forces, and actants that are presupposed in each subsequent iteration of the sovereign decision, and layered in multiple streams of time. Even an increasingly automated nuclear arsenal requires the participation of literally millions of people and countless networks, objects, tectonic stability, stable solar flare activity and on and on. The decision only *appears* singular when Virilio truncates time to the moment the president ‘pushes the button.’ We are not as of yet in that moment so other temporal rhythms abound and each part of the nuclear assemblage follows a different temporal course. Certainly the sovereign decision is a powerful, expressive, performative act of individuation for the sovereign and highly affective in mobilizing populations, but it is not self-constituted or self-causal. The process of individuation and mobilization necessitates a field of relations and resonances from which the sovereign decision emerges. The decision is also not decisive. Instead it territorializes the relations *from which it emerges* through its resonant modulation. The enunciation of a sovereign decision (a distinct inquiry from the ‘making of a decision. Certainly no less emeshed but nonetheless ought to remain analytically different) is something like a refrain, the sovereign—in so far as it is constituted by the enunciation of decisions—is a condensation point for national ethos, affect, and institutional identity making. Each decision is constitutive not of the ‘sovereign’ as is the case in Schmitt’s analysis but of a sovereign point of identification or reified, dogmatic consistency which can be recognized but need not remain static or immobile. Again however such a node is only possible because of its attachments whether physical or resonant (both material) to the complex system of tradition, culture, wires, telephones, satellites, nuclear silos, television cameras, previous sovereign decisions, personal affective characteristics, character, etc. This list is not exhaustive by any measure however it gestures in the direction of what I am trying to get at. The sovereign is not an individual, at best it is an iterative series of moments of performative or expressive individuation resulting from a complex interface with machines, networks, affective fields.

 The assemblage has a life of its own that cannot and should not be reduced to a single point simply because that is most consistent with our common sensibilities. In some sense the sovereign is a prosthesis or interface to be worn by whoever is elected to office. (President as first-person-shooter?) This does in part explain why there is so little transition time between each sovereign and so little variation in war powers. It is reference point or index for a history of actions and events made more complex by the function it is meant or believed to serve. It is the titular focal point of an assemblage that if recognized as such would undermine its own function. An assemblage that function because it can inspire belief in it is unity not its dispersed and multivalent organization. The irony is that the development of miles of fiberoptic networks, new technological interfaces and mobility was supposed to save the centralized and hierarchical sovereign form from its obvious strategic liability—that of being an easy target. However in increasing its ‘survivability’ it has also opened innumerable points of access to the supposed center. Each access point whether it be technological, affective, or economic that can recenter, or reterritorialize the sovereign assemblage. I do not want to make this sound ‘easy’ or ‘painless’ however as this ‘dispersed’ or redundant network system has become ‘everyday’ increasingly the President has been unaware of exactly who is in control or even at how many levels the Nuclear-sovereign-assemblage can be engaged or reterritorialized.

# Block

## ADV CP

Solves the case

**Kellner, ‘8** [Douglas Kellner, professor of philosophy at UCLA; "Preface The Ideology of HIgh-Tech/Postmodern War vs. the Reality of Messy Wars;" http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/2008\_Kellner\_MessyWarPreface\_ver29052008FINAL.pdf]

Hence, phenomenal new military technologies are being produced in the Third Millennium, described as the instruments of an emergent postmodern warfare, and envisaged earlier by Philip K. Dick and other SF writers. These military technologies, described in Messy Wars, are changing the nature of warfare and are part of a turbulent technological revolution with wide-ranging effects. They are helping to engender **a novel type of highly intense "hyperwar," cyberwar, or technowar, where technical systems make military decisions and humans are put out of the loop,** or **are forced to make instant judgments based on technical data. As computer programs displace military planners and computer simulations supplant charts and maps of the territory, technology supersedes humans in terms of planning, decision making and execution.** On the level of the battlefield itself, human power is replaced by machines, reducing the soldier to a cog in a servomechanism. **These developments** are alarming and **led** French theorist Paul **Virilio** (1989, 84) **to comment** in War and Cinema: **The disintegration of the warrior's personality is at a very advanced stage. Looking up, he sees the digital display** (optoelectronic or holographic) of the windscreen collimator; **looking down**, the radar screen, **the** onboard **computer**, the radio and the video screen, which enables him to follow the terrain with its four or five simultaneous targets; and to monitor his self navigating Sidewinder missiles fitted with a camera of infra-red guidance system. **The autonomization of warfare and ongoing displacement of humans by technology creates the specter of technology taking over and the possibility of military accidents, leading to**, Virilio warns us, **the specter of global catastrophe.** There is a fierce argument raging in military circles between those who want to delegate more power and fighting to the new "brilliant" weapons opposed to those who want to keep human operators in charge of technical systems. **Critics of cyberwar worry that as technology supplants human beings, taking humans out of decision-making loops, the possibility of accidental firing of arms at inappropriate targets and even nuclear war increases.** Since the 1980s, Virilio criticized **the accelerating speed of modern technology** and indicated how it **was producing developments that were spinning out of control, and** that, in the case of military technology, **could lead to the end of the human race** (see Virilio and Lotringer’s Pure War 1983). For Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current era unfolds such that "the new war machine combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the disappearance of places in vehicular extermination" (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased pace of destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and computer-governed networks constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer geostrategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, creating "a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe" (Virilio 1986: 135). **Thus**, "strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day," with **microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing the way for what Virilio calls "pure war," a situation where military technologies and an accompanying technocratic system come to dominate every aspect of life.** In Virilio's view, **the war machine is the demiurge of technological growth and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing "a state of emergency" where nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species.** This consists of a shift from a "geo-politics" to a "chrono-politics," from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever commands the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant sociopolitical force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific form of accident and a nuclear accident would be catastrophic. Hence, **in the contemporary era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency with hightech networks that enables military state to impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life,** as shown in Messy Wars’ chapter 3 about war environment.

## Non adv cp

#### Resistance as a political strategy inevitably fails --- it’s reliant upon that which it critques

Mann in 1996

(Paul, Professor of English @ Pomona College, “The Nine Grounds of Intellectual Warfare”, PMC 6.2, pMUSE-rkc)

Without exception, all positions are oriented toward the institutional apparatus. Marginality here is only relative and temporary: the moment black studies or women's studies or queer theory conceives of itself as a discipline, its primary orientation is towardthe institution. The fact that the institution might treat it badly hardly constitutes an ethical privilege. Any intellectual who holds a position is a function of this apparatus; his or her marginality is, for the most part, only an operational device. It is a critical commonplace that the state is not a monolithic hegemony but rather a constellation of disorganized and fragmentary agencies of production. This is often taken as a validation for the political potential of marginal critical movements: inside-outside relations can be facilely deconstructed and critics can still congratulate themselves on their "resistance." But the contrary is clearly the case. The most profitable intellectual production does not take place at the center (e.g., Romance Philology), where mostly obsolete weapons are produced; the real growth industries are located precisely on the self-proclaimed margins. It will be argued that resistance is still possible; nothing I propose here argues against such a possibility. I wish only to insist that effective resistance will never be located in the position, however oppositional it imagines itself to be. Resistance is first of all a function of the apparatus itself. What would seem to be the transgressive potential of such institutional agencies as certain orders of gender criticism might demonstrate the entropy of the institution, but it does nothing to prove the counterpolitical claims of the position. Fantasies of resistance often serve as alibis for collusion. Any position is a state agency, and its relative marginality is a mode of orientation, not an exception. Effective resistance must be located in other tactical forms.

## DA

### Moore

#### Broad empirical analysis demonstrates our argument---heg is necessary to solve peace and its absence causes war

Wohlforth 8 William, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, October, World Politics, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” www.­polisci.­wisc.­edu/­Uploads/­Documents/­IRC/­Wohlforth (2009)­.­pdf)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

#### They - > SFP --- deterrence good

**The aff locks in the war system—infinite number of possible ‘root causes’ means that only incentives theory solves**

**Moore 4—**chaired law prof, UVA. Frm first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State (John, Beyond the Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis,)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, **there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors**, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. 158 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. **No one**, however, **has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war** that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may **doom us to war for generations** to come. [\*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State and War, 159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high-risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that major international war is critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an absence of [\*395] democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. 160 III. Testing the Hypothesis Hypotheses, or paradigms, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war;" there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars. That is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence? 161 And although it, by itself, does not prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in non-war settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy. That is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

**You should discard non-empirical theories of war**

**Moore 4** – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia (7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page xxii-xxvi

The "cause" of the "democratic peace" is likely not any single factor. Rather it is a combination of factors inherent in differences between the culture of democracy and the culture of Hegelian "statism." These factors probably include: differential incentive structures for regime elites, and particularly the greater ability of such elites in statist systems to externalize costs on others while internalizing the benefits of their actions; differences in leaders assuming power through public appeal versus violence; differences between ideologies of human freedom versus statist ideologies, including pervasive differences concerning the rule of law, modalities for resolution of disputes, and deification of those in power; individual empowerment versus the collective, and many other important differences in subjectivities; higher levels of external trade and international interaction between democracies; greater internal checks and balances on the decision for war; resulting greater democratic nation wealth, which may predispose to greater caution in efforts at risky expansion of values; and many other pervasive differences in culture. Of these, "incentive theory" would suggest that one particularly important factor is likely to be the first on the list; that is, the differential effect on incentives for decision elites from all of these factors together; • Contrary to entrenched conventional wisdom within the social science community, democracies are considerably less likely to initiate aggressive war than nondemocracies. Further, the differences in total casualties between democratic and nondemocratic initiated aggression is overwhelming—on the order of one to a hundred; • Nondemocracies are frequently getting into major war through aggression. A principal path to war for democracies, and an additional path to war for nondemocracies, is an absence of effective deterrence; • An absence of effective deterrence, that is, of effective incentives from the international system, is a crucial factor in major war; • For this latter reason, deterrence, rather than simply levels of power, is a more important variable than power in the origin of major war. A common absence of effective deterrence results from a failure to communicate an intent to deter, whatever the specific reason for this failure; • The democracy/deterrence syndrome is an important recurrent feature in major war; • Because of the importance of deterrence in war avoidance, theory will benefit from a more objective scoring system for measuring levels of deterrence, as we now enjoy with several systems for the scoring of democracy. This book uses an initial effort at such a scoring system developed within the author's War & Peace Seminar; • The practice of deterrence should incorporate behavioral insights from cognitive psychology, particularly including "prospect theory." Other such behavioral insights should be incorporated into broader theory as relevance is demonstrated; • Incentive theory suggests a focus of deterrence on regime decision makers (that is, reducing their incentives for war), and this feature of incentive theory is already making its way into practice; • Original studies are referenced showing correlations between form of government and terrorism, state involvement in the drug trade, refugee flows, and corruption. These supplement important studies by others showing the correlation between democracy and war, democide, economic development, famine, infant mortality, and environmental protection; • Incentive theory likely is useful in analyzing civil war, terrorism, and minor coercion, as well as major war. Specific key variables and resulting incentives, however, may be different in these settings. For example, civil war does not lend itself readily to an analysis as to which party is an aggressor under international law; • Incentive theory suggests that a crucial role in strengthening collective security is to begin to think about enhancing the role of the United Nations and other collective security mechanisms in deterrence terms; that is, thinking about mechanisms to provide advance deterrence against aggression and democide rather than leaving such action to possible collective action after the event; • Stable trade not only serves to enhance economic development, it also serves to create incentives militating against major war. The effort to remove trade barriers should continue while retaining our sensitivity to labor and the environment; • Effective foreign policy should seek both a long-run strategy of democracy enlargement and a strategy of providing effective deterrence against rogue regimes as needed to deter war, democide, and terrorism; • Democratic nations should work together to strengthen pro- democracy initiatives, such as the "Community of Democracies"; • The United States might want to create a new position of Special Representative of the President for Democracy Assistance; and • The United States might want to add a more focused "warning-response" mechanism to the National Security Council charged with the specific responsibility of formulating and presenting to the President proposals for war avoidance in war crisis settings when alerted to such crises from the intelligence community. It should be clearly understood that the demonstration of correlation does not necessarily prove causation. As such, while this book seeks to integrate the best of the empirical work with the best of the theoretical work, it presents, and can only present, an hypothesis. We should, however, certainly discard theories that are not consistent with the available empirical evidence about war. Similarly, even if "incentive theory" proves a more useful focus in seeking to predict and control war, it does not offer a slot-machine for simple answers. The decision for war is affected by a complex aggregate of incentives. Even rejecting poorer modes of focus will not provide instant answers in specific cases any more than understanding that night air does not cause plague will by itself lead to a discovery of penicillin. Until we set aside pervasive myths about war and focus our attention on the critical variables, we will have little chance to control this age-old scourge of mankind. It is hoped that this book may make an at least modest contribution to its goal.

### AT Heg Collapse Now

#### US expansion of globalization and hegemony over the last 20 years has entrenched American dominance

Beckley 11 Michael Beckley, Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, September 2011, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” http://michaelbeckleydotcom.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/beckley\_writing-sample6.pdf

Is unipolarity sustainable? The dominant perspective among international relations scholars is that the U.S. is in decline relative to China, and that much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the U.S. bears to sustain globalization. This study refutes this conventional wisdom with theoretical and empirical analyses. In Chapter 1 I develop an alternative theory that explains why globalization and hegemony reinforce unipolarity. In Chapter 2, I conduct a first-­‐cut test of my theory by comparing the U.S. and China across a large set of power indicators over the last twenty years. During this time period, globalization and U.S. hegemony expanded significantly, yet I find that the U.S. is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. In Chapter 3, I conduct time-­‐series and regression analyses to estimate the costs and benefits of key aspects of American hegemony and find that U.S. hegemony is, on balance, profitable. In Chapter 4 (not included in this writing sample) I use regression analyses and case studies to investigate the effects of globalization on U.S. and Chinese high-­‐ technology industries. I find that American firms increasingly conduct activities in which profits and proprietary knowledge are highest (R&D, branding, marketing) while Chinese firms remain stuck in low-­‐value manufacturing activities. Taken together, these results suggest that American dominance is not a temporary aberration, but rather a deeply embedded condition with the potential to persist well into this century.

#### this doesn’t take out our impact --- transition to multipolarity might be inev---it’s about the US maintaining its absolute military power to smooth the transition

Walton 7 Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in Reading, England, 07 [Dale C, “geopolitics and the great powers in the twenty-first century”, http://books.google.com/books?id=AQLTD1R-47AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Although international political conditions will differ enormously in the coming decades from those of the middle 1940’s, it would be grossly irresponsible for the United States to shrug off its burdens of great power status and return to the slumber that it once enjoyed. Almost certainly, if the United States had refused to take an active role in European politics in the middle of the twentieth century, a world would have emerged in which American values would not have flourished and even their survival on the North American continent would have been profoundly threatened. America’s refusal to play a substantial role in the great power struggles of this century would have similarly deleterious effects. Importantly, if the United States withdraws to its hemisphere a third world war is far more likely. In a meta region full of young rising powers the presence of a strategically mature superpower can be expected to have a stabilizing effect; the enormous military resources possessed by America compels would be aggressors to consider carefully before launching a strategic adventure. Even more chillingly, as noted above, it is possible that the multipolar system could become sufficiently unbalanced that it would collapse, with a power such as China building a coalition that would allow it ultimately to emerge as the master of eastern Eurasia and the greatest power in the world. nited States is the “court of last resort” protecting against such an eventuality. The latter possibility does not contradict the above argument that us unipolarity is unsustainable - as an extra Eurasian power lacking the ruthlessness to destroy potential great power competitors preventatively, Washington simply cannot sustain unipolarity indefinitely. Nonetheless, while **the** emerging **multipolar** **system** appears robust it **should receive “care and feeding**” – otherwise it is vulnerable to grossly unbalanced events such as the creation of a very aggressive coalition dedicated to achieving Eurasian hegemony and willing if necessary to fight a third world war t o achieve it. Most likely such a coalition would not be able to simply bully its way to hegemony; it probably would have to fight, the results being a war enormously costly in blood, perhaps even one that would **dwarf World War II** in its price. If the aggressive coalition won, in turn, the multipolar system would be destroyed and the United States would face a competitor far more powerful than itself , and in all likelihood a world in which **democracy and personal liberty would be in eclipse**. In any case it is a geopolitical imperative for the United States that no power or coalition attains hegemony in Eastern Eurasia, much less that an explicitly hostile state or coalition succeeds in doing so. If the United States is to guard its national interests in this century, **it is vital that it ensures** the **transition** from unipolarity **to multipolarity occurs in a**s **gentle** a **manner** as possible. In this capacity, it is important to understand that the United States is in long term relative decline, but, at the same time to acknowledge that it has very great military, financial and diplomatic resources at its disposal. If Washington deploys these resources wisely it can maximize its security over the long term and **minimize the probability of a great power war.**

### Aff no Solve/AT IR Constructed

#### Regardless, congratulations, you have successfully pointed out that states are actually artificially created boundaries and that international relations are constructed—realism is still inevitable

Sørensen 98 – British International Studies Association (Georg, IR Theory after the cold war, 87-88)

What, then, are the more general problems with the extreme versions of the postpositivist position? The first problem is that they tend to overlook, or downplay, the actual insights produced by non-post-positivists, such as, for example, neorealism. It is entirely true that anarchy is no given, ahistorical, natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific, socially constructed product of human practice **does not make it less real**. In a world of sovereign states, anarchy is in fact **out there in the real world in some form**. In other words, it is not the acceptance of the real existence of social phenomena which produces objectivist reification. Reification is produced by the transformation of historically specific social phenomena into given, ahistorical, natural conditions.21 Despite their shortcomings, neorealism and other positivist theories have produced valuable insights about anarchy, including the factors in play in balance-of-power dynamics and in patterns of cooperation and conflict. Such insights are downplayed and even sometimes dismissed in adopting the notion of 'regimes of truth'. It is, of course, possible to appreciate the shortcomings of neorealism while also recognizing that it has merits. One way of doing so is set forth by Robert Cox. He considers neorealism to be a 'problem-solving theory' which 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships . . . as the given framework for action . . . The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination'.22 At the same time, this 'assumption of fixity' is 'also an ideological bias . . . Problem-solving theories (serve) . . . particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order'.23 In sum, objectivist theory such as neorealism contains a bias, **but that does not mean that it is without merit** in analysing particular aspects of international relations from a particular point of view. The second problem with post-positivism is the danger of extreme relativism which it contains. If there are no neutral grounds for deciding about truth claims so that each theory will define what counts as the facts, then the door is, at least in principle, **open to anything goes.** Steve Smith has confronted this problem in an exchange with Øyvind Østerud. Smith notes that he has never 'met a postmodernist who would accept that "the earth is flat if you say so". Nor has any postmodernist I have read argued or implied that "any narrative is as good as any other"'.24 But the problem remains that if we cannot find a minimum of common standards for deciding about truth claims a post-modernist position appears unable to come up with a metatheoretically substantiated critique of the claim that the earth is flat. In the absence of at least some common standards it appears difficult to reject that any narrative is as good as any other.25 The final problem with extreme post-positivism I wish to address here concerns change. We noted the post-modern critique of neorealism's difficulties with embracing change; their emphasis is on 'continuity and repetition'. But extreme post-positivists have their own problem with change, which follows from their metatheoretical position. In short, how can post-positivist ideas and projects of change be distinguished from pure utopianism and wishful thinking? Post-positivist radical subjectivism leaves no common ground for choosing between different change projects. A brief comparison with a classical Marxist idea of change will demonstrate the point I am trying to make. In Marxism, social change ( e.g. revolution) is, of course, possible. But that possibility is tied in with the historically specific social structures (material and non-material) of the world. Revolution is possible under certain social conditions but not under any conditions. Humans can change the world, but they are **enabled and constrained** by the social structures in which they live. There is a dialectic between social structure and human behaviour.26 The understanding of 'change' in the Marxist tradition is thus closely related to an appreciation of the historically specific social conditions under which people live; any change project is not possible at any time. Robert Cox makes a similar point in writing about critical theory: 'Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world . . . Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order'.27 That constraint appears to be absent in post-positivist thinking about change, because radical post-positivism is **epistemologically and ontologically cut off from evaluating the relative merit** of different change projects. Anything goes, or so it seems. That view is hard to distinguish from utopianism and wishful thinking. If neorealism denies change in its overemphasis on continuity and repetition, then radical post-positivism is metatheoretically compelled to embrace any conceivable change project.28

## FW

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### Clash KT Advocacy/Turns Case

#### Clash and in-depth deliberation create more effective decision making and advocacy skills---ensures that the aff’s advocacy is improved and more effectively carried out

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

 In addition to the basic equity norm, dismissing the idea that debaters defend the affirmative side of the topic encourages advocates to falsely value affirmative speech acts in the absence of a negative response. There may be several detrimental consequences that go unrealized in a debate where the affirmative case and plan are not topical. Without ground, debaters may fall prey to a siren’s call, a belief that certain critical ideals and concepts are axiological, existing beyond doubt without scrutiny. Bakhtin contends that in dialogical exchanges “the greater the number and weight” of counter-words, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be (Bakhtin, 1990). The matching of the word to the counter-word should be embraced by proponents of critical activism in the activity, because these dialogical exchanges allow for improvements and modifications in critical arguments. Muir argues that “debate puts students into greater contact with the real world by forcing them to read a great deal of information” (1993, p. 285). He continues, “[t]he constant consumption of material…is significantly constitutive. The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process shapes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena” (p. 285). Through the process of compreh

ensive understanding, debate serves both as a laboratory and a constitutive arena. Ideas find and lose adherents. Ideas that were once considered beneficial are modified, changed, researched again, and sometimes discarded altogether. A central argument for open deliberation is that it encourages a superior consensus to situations where one side is silenced. Christopher Peters contends, “The theory holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the process of decision making…creates decisions that are better for having been subjected to this trial by fire” (1997, p. 336). The combination of a competitive format and the necessity to take points of view that one does not already agree with combines to create a unique educational experience for all participants. Those that eschew the value of such experience by an axiological position short-circuit the benefits of the educational exchange for themselves, their opponents, as well as the judges and observers of such debates.

### Their ev

Aff recreates this

**James, ‘7** [Ian James, professor of philosophy and French at Cambridge, Ph.D. from Warwick University; “Paul Virilio: (Routledge Critical Thinkers);” published 2007; page 86.]

**The implications of war conceived of as ‘total electronic war’ are at once**¶ **military and political. The most important consequence** that Virilio himself¶ deduces from the dominance of the fourth front **relates to the experience of time in both the military and the political spheres.** He argues that the¶ temporality of instantaneous data transmission, be it the transmission of¶ weapons control or that of spectacular images of destruction, is such that¶ **the temporal delays which allow careful decision making and strategic thinking come to be eroded.** This is felt first and foremost in the experience¶ of command and control of combat situations themselves, where the control¶ screen takes on a primary role: The screen becomes, therefore, the telescopic sight for a war where the¶ attention of each is mobilized, whether he likes it or not. The horizon of the control monitor supplants both the military communiqué and the press, that mainstream press still necessary for analysis and reflection. (Virilio 2005e: 21)¶ **The temporality of instantaneous transmission of data is such that the instant of the reflex reaction necessarily dominates the period of time in which considered analysis and reflection might occur** (and this recalls, of¶ course, the temporality of exposure discussed in previous chapters). **This may have an impact, not just on the carrying out of military strategy and decision making, but on the nature of broader political consciousness: ‘In this epoch military industrial and scientific logistics will prevail over strategic doctrines and truly political arguments. . . . The era opens as weapons of instantaneous communication come to dominate, thanks to globalized information networks and telesurveillance’** (Virilio 2005e: 7). Just as the total war of¶ 1940–45 and the total peace which followed it transformed the nature of¶ geopolitical space by rendering obsolete the fortification of frontiers, so,¶ according to Virilio, **total electronic war transforms the nature of political time by eclipsing the temporality of delay and duration which**, he argues, **makes the reflection and developed argumentation of any true politics worthy of the name possible.**

### USFG

#### The USfg is the three central branches

USAgov No Date http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government: The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.

## Util/Things Improving

### UQ – Improvements Now

#### No impact uniqueness – world getting better now heg is peaceful

Busby 12 Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, **a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity** (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war **but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. **But, if my read of other** [**reports**](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) **based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly** (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

#### The status quo is structurally improving

Dash 2/4 Co-Founder and Managing Director at Activate, a new kind of strategy consultancy that advises companies about the opportunities at the intersection of technology and media co-founder and CEO of ThinkUp, which shows you how to be better at using your social networks, publisher, editor and owner of Dashes.com, my personal blog where I've been publishing continuously since 1999, entrepreneur, writer and geek living in New York City (Anil Dash, 4 February 2013, “THE WORLD IS GETTING BETTER. QUICKLY.,” http://dashes.com/anil/2013/02/the-world-is-getting-better-quickly.html)

The world is getting better, faster, than we could ever have imagined. For those of us who are fortunate enough to live in wealthy communities or countries, we have a common set of reference points we use to describe the world's most intractable, upsetting, unimaginable injustices. Often, we only mention these horrible realities in minimizing our own woes: "Well, that's annoying, but it's hardly as bad as children starving in Africa." Or "Yeah, this is important, but it's not like it's the cure for AIDS." Or the omnipresent description of any issue as a "First World Problem". But let's, for once, look at **the** actual **data** around developing world problems. Not our condescending, world-away displays of **emotion**, or our slacktivist tendencies to see a retweet as meaningful action, but the actual numbers and metrics about how progress is happening for the world's poorest people. Though metrics and measurements are always fraught and flawed, Gates' single biggest emphasis was the idea that measurable progress and metrics are necessary for any meaningful improvements to happen in the lives of the world's poor. So how are we doing? THE WORLD HAS CHANGED The results are astounding. Even if we caveat that every measurement is imprecise, that billionaire philanthropists are going to favor data that strengthens their points, and that some of the most significant problems are difficult to attach metrics to, it's inarguable that the past two decades have seen the greatest leap forward in the lives of the global poor in the history of humanity. Some highlights: Children are 1/3 less likely to die before age five than they were in 1990. The global childhood mortality rate for kids under 5 has dropped from 88 in 1000 in 1990 to 57 in 1000 in 2010. The global infant mortality rate for kids dying before age one has plunged from 61 in 1000 to 40 in 1000. Now, any child dying is of course one child too many, but this is astounding progress to have made in just twenty years. In the past 30 years, the percentage of children who receive key immunizations such as the DTP vaccine has quadrupled. The percentage of people in the world living on less than $1.25 per day has been cut in half since 1990, ahead of the schedule of the Millennium Development Goals which hoped to reach this target by 2015. The number of deaths to tuberculosis has been cut 40% in the past twenty years. The consumption of ozone-depleting substances has been cut 85% globally in the last thirty years. The percentage of urban dwellers living in slums globally has been cut from 46.2% to 32.7% in the last twenty years. And there's more progress in hunger and contraception, in sustainability and education, against AIDS and illiteracy. After reading the Gates annual letter and following up by reviewing the UN's ugly-but-data-rich Millennium Development Goals statistics site, I was surprised by how much progress has been made in the years since I've been an adult, and just how little I've heard about the big picture despite the fact that I'd like to keep informed about such things. I'm not a pollyanna — there's a lot of work to be done. But I can personally attest to the profound effect that basic improvements like clean drinking water can have in people's lives. Today, we often use the world's biggest problems as metaphors for impossibility. But the evidence shows that, actually, we're really good at solving even the most intimidating challenges in the world. What we're lacking is the ability to communicate effectively about how we make progress, so that we can galvanize even more investment of resources, time and effort to tackling the problems we have left.

### AT: Their Impacts

#### The impact is the exception not the rule

**Abrahamsen 5** (Rita, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear, Alternatives 30:1)

The war on Iraq can be seen to demonstrate the willingness of the British government to engage in illiberal acts to defend the liberal values of the "international community," but it is important to note that the process of securitization does not automatically dictate such spectacular responses. As argued above, the process of securitization is gradual and incremental, and an issue can move along a continuum of risk/fear without ever reaching the stage of "existential threat" where it merits "emergency action" (as with Iraq). Instead, **most** security politics is concerned with the more mundane everyday management and containment of risk, and the securitization of Africa is thus entirely compatible with the feeble response to the brutal and prolonged conflict in the DRC or the Sudan. Rather than spectacular emergency politics or military action, securitization is **more likely** to give rise to policies of containment or policing.

## Virilio Wrong

### 1NR---Grove

#### Extend our Grove ev WHICH WAS CONCEDED – finishing it here

The assemblage has a life of its own that cannot and should not be reduced to a single point simply because that is most consistent with our common sensibilities. In some sense the sovereign is a prosthesis or interface to be worn by whoever is elected to office. (President as first-person-shooter?) This does in part explain why there is so little transition time between each sovereign and so little variation in war powers. It is reference point or index for a history of actions and events made more complex by the function it is meant or believed to serve. It is the titular focal point of an assemblage that if recognized as such would undermine its own function. An assemblage that function because it can inspire belief in it is unity not its dispersed and multivalent organization. The irony is that the development of miles of fiberoptic networks, new technological interfaces and mobility was supposed to save the centralized and hierarchical sovereign form from its obvious strategic liability—that of being an easy target. However in increasing its ‘survivability’ it has also opened innumerable points of access to the supposed center. Each access point whether it be technological, affective, or economic that can recenter, or reterritorialize the sovereign assemblage. I do not want to make this sound ‘easy’ or ‘painless’ however as this ‘dispersed’ or redundant network system has become ‘everyday’ increasingly the President has been unaware of exactly who is in control or even at how many levels the Nuclear-sovereign-assemblage can be engaged or reterritorialized.

#### Here’s more ev that you should reject their premise:

Douglas Kellner 99, George F. Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education, UCLA – “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections," Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 16(5-6), 1999: 103-125, http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm)

Yet I want to argue in this study that Virilio has a flawed conception of technology that is excessively one-sided and that misses the emancipatory and democratizing aspects of new computer and media technologies. My argument is that his vision of technology is overdetermined by his intense focus on war and military technology and that this optic drives him to predominantly negative and technophobic perspectives on technology per se. However, precisely the one-sidedness and extremely critical discourse on war and military technology, as well as his reflections on war, cinema, technologies of representation and vision machines, constitute some of the most valuable aspects of his work. Consequently, in the following pages I will follow Virilio in pursuing what he calls the "riddle of technology" and interrogate his attempts to elucidate this conundrum. Nowhere, however, does Virilio directly theorize technology in any systematic or sustained way, although reflections on it permeate his analyses. Thus, I want to probe Virilio's perspectives on technology to determine the extent of his insight and use-value, and to indicate what I see as the limitations of his perspectives. In this reading, Virilio emerges as one of the major critics of war, technology, and vision machines in our time, albeit with excessively negative and even technophobic proclivities.

#### Second – they have the politics K backward. Speed doesn’t ruin politics, it saves us from fascism. Here’s more ev:

Nick Stevenson 2 is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield, Understanding Media Cultures: Social Theory and Mass Communication – page 214-15

The development of the media of mass communications has gradually seen the decline of print as the dominant form of communication and the rise of an audio-visual domain. Virilio links the visualisation of the media into narratives of decline where our perceptions of reality are progressively undermined by a speed culture. As I have indicated, Virilio tends to see progressive political possibilities in reversing this process, with human populations better able to make contact with others through face-to-face communication and print cultures. While there is much that could be said on the superficiality of much visual culture and its progressive underming of literate cultures, such an analysis is too sweeping. The popularisation of the media, which has accompanied the rise of television and its increasingly visual nature of media cultures, has also made public cultures and associated debates open to a greater number of people. While the visualisation of media cultures can indeed be linked into narratives of control and surveillance in the way that Virilio suggests, it can equally be connected into a progressive democra-tisation of everyday life. The visual bias of much media and communication provides social movements with considerable opportunities to interrupt the ﬂow of dominant media messages, by staging dramatic media events and engaging in image manipu-lation. We can make a similar argument in respect of the development of the Net. As Dahlgren (2001) has argued the partial displacement of hierarchical forms of information that the Net makes available confuses the boundaries between who is and who is not a journalist. While these arguments have been carried too far by some Net enthusiasts the possibilities that ‘ordinary’ people have for constructing their own sites of images, information and discourse is greatly enhanced by the arrival of new media. Seemingly these and other democratic possibilities are missed by a critique which offers an overly one-sided view of new media technologies.

#### Speed K hurts progressive politics – makes fascism more likely, turning all their args.

Nick Stevenson 2 is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield, Understanding Media Cultures: Social Theory and Mass Communication – page 214-15

The arrival of new technologies of communication has offered new possibilities for the social theory of mass communication. We have witnessed the development of a number of provocative perspectives in this regard seeking to articulate the links between technological change, globalisation and the new social movements such as cyberfeminism. In this respect, Castells and Harraway have sought to outline the ambivalent possibilities and limitations of the new media age most coherently. Despite their limitations, Castells’s and Haraway’s analyses of the network society neither lapse into technological optimism nor pessimism. Yet, not surprisingly, other theorists *such as* Schiller and Virilio have chosen to concentrate upon some of the less progressive features of the new communications revolution. That is they continue to offer powerful correctives to much ‘cyberdrool’ which has accompanied the development of the Net within the academy. Such perspectives will continue to find a home in a world where the main driving force behind communications’ development remains the requirements of the military and the market. However, while commentators concentrate on either positive or negative poles of analysis, critical debate is likely to be deﬁned through the discourse of the other. Perhaps the main limitation here is the inability to link the arrival of new media into many of the possibilities (and of course limitations) suggested by social movements who seek to develop a political response to our rapidly changing world. The development of a new politics for a new age, which resists the temptation of fundamentalism and is adequate to the challenges of the modern world, is more likely to develop through an engagement with technological change, globalisation and gender politics than their mutual negation. For progressive and generative political forces this chapter has argued that there is no return to the certitudes of either an exclusively class politics or a less technologically complex society.

### AT: Virilio – Self Correction Solves

#### Self-Correction prevents their impacts:

#### A. Their authors ignore mainstream policy work that has integrated an understanding of speed

John Armitage, Division of Media & Communication, School of Arts & Social Sciences, Northumbria University, critical perspectives on international business Volume: 2 Number: 4 2006

Hence, on the face of it, Virilio's writings are cultural critique articulated at the highest level of theoretical abstraction. Certainly, his work develops a left-Heideggerian yet ultimately transdisciplinary conception of power that encourages a reflexive and critical consideration of questions of subjectivity and the importance of numerous architectural and dromological, political, military and technological forces relevant to contemporary society. Furthermore, Virilio's writings oppose positivist perspectives on representation and the management of power, solely based on his own biographical, religious, and intellectual experiences. At the same time, Virilio routinely challenges configurations of control, the state and the political from a standpoint that appears ignorant of, or, worse, indifferent to, other either mainstream or critical cultural, let alone managerial, theorists. He is, for instance, apparently oblivious of the many and varied cultural challenges to political and organizational orthodoxy in train today, such as the spectacular rise and power of oppositional politics and organized internet activism (Kahn and Kellner, 2005, pp. 75-100). Nor are those of his philosophically inclined and radically discursive writings which do touch on the nature and dialectic of globalization and international business (e.g. Virilio, 1997, pp. 69-86) particularly academically rigorous or based on careful empirical study. More to the point, to incorporate Virilio's work into one's own is difficult as it is only recently that it has come to be recognized by other cultural theorists as unique and also because it repeatedly challenges its own prior suppositions. Virilio's writings, which he labels “the archeology of the future”, are, then, almost without exception, highly speculative interventions, as opposed to writings that are academically exact or engaged with the countless and increasingly public voices of those involved in formulating a critique of international business around the globe such as Naomi Klein (2001).

B. Solves the global order --- if acceleration causes conflict, humanity will learn to cooperate --- only the alt’s sudden crisis causes problems--- globalization and US hegemony are learned adaptations that shouldn’t be cast aside

Modelski 2 and Thompson, Professors of Political Science, Washington and Indiana 2002

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Anyone setting out to predict international change in the twenty-first century ought to be able to explicate the theory and the methodology on the basis of which such a claim is staked out. The basis of the following analysis is an evolu- tionary perspective. That approach is an attempt to answer the question: How do we describe and explain structural change in global politics? The premise of that approach is the assertion that world politics are subject to evolutionary processes. That is, global political structures undergo change that can be charac- terized as evolutionary. The fact of change is obvious to anyone who undertakes the thought experiment of comparing the provision of world order of one millen- nium ago with those currently in place. Approaching the year 2000, such structures are significantly more elaborate, well entrenched, and less primitive and less anarchic than they were 1000 years earlier,3 and the question cannot be avoided: What accounts for that change? The simplest and most comprehensive answer is that afforded by an evolutionary perspective.

3 How do we measure and compare the output of world order at two such different points of time? Today’s world politics serves as a framework of order for a population some twenty times greater, experiencing living standards, life expectancy, and security that are higher due to increased self-knowledge and mobility, than they were a millennium ago. The risks of major disasters might be similar (think of the Mongol devastation of Central Asia, and of North China in the thirteenth century, and the Great Plagues of the fourteenth century), but the means of anticipating, and coping with, them are better today.

An evolutionary perspective is applicable here because global politics involves social evolution at the level of the macro-organization of the human species. Next to cosmological, biological, and cultural evolution, there is social evolution. The product of social evolution is an established pattern of social121

behavior or strategy (e.g., a social institution) in a space of possible social patterns. Social evolution—that is, the selective retention of some social patterns over others—occurs in conditions of high evolutionary potential: those that privilege policy or strategic innovation, afford opportunities (via parties or alliances) for creating new patterns for association and cooperation, and those that maintain social selection mechanisms (such as elections or markets), and reinforce, and diffuse the patterns thus selected (by example and emulation). Democracy is a set of conditions that optimizes the potential for social evolution.

Global political institutions are those behavioral and policy patterns that give organization and a degree of stability to international relations. In the past half-millennium, world politics have been shaped by such arrangements as world powers exercising global leadership, as well as by nation-states, wars, and coali- tions; earlier on, that role was played by incipient imperial structures with aspirations to worldwide extension. In the past century, public and private inter- national organizations have come to form an increasingly pervasive network; that is, the range of actors participating in global politics has risen steadily over the millennium. Global political structures are, roughly speaking, the world’s constitutional order, actual and potential. But, most important for this analysis, that order is neither fixed nor immutable; it changes at a rate that our work suggests (as observed in Table 2) is roughly proportional to time, responding to the beat of generations and, in a manner expected of a social evolutionary process, it also coevolves with other global processes.4 It does so via the opera- tion of the four universal evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, cooperation, and amplification (Modelski 1996a, 1996b, 1999). The agents of global political evolution are those that operate evolutionary mechanisms.

Modern evolutionary theory recognizes selection as a principal mechanism of evolution. Whereas in Darwinian biology the mechanism accounting for the origin of species is understood to be natural selection (i.e., selection by the forces of nature), in the social sciences, without altogether ignoring natural selection, the focus lies on mechanisms of social selection. Economic competition among firms in markets, and electoral competition among political parties or candidates in democratic systems, are examples of increasingly well-understood mecha- nisms of social selection. Competition for global leadership is yet another form of social selection, and has been a crucial, although by no means exclusively important, element of modern global politics. Variation as among policies competing for global attention by means of innovation is yet another. Social cooperation that in world politics takes the form of special relationships, coali- tions, and alliances must also be regarded as an evolutionary mechanism in as much as all social structural change calls for common action toward new goals. Finally, social evolutionary change, a composite of the four mechanisms, is a learning process that involves adoption, reinforcement, and diffusion of innova- tions. This foursome of evolutionary mechanisms operates at several nested levels of global political evolution, as is argued below. 121-3

### AT: Virilio – Wrong

#### Virilio’s theory isn’t grounded in reality or history; his negativity in his philosophy creates a future without humanity

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Shrilly technophobic and consistently hysterical, Virilio demonizes modern information and communication technologies, suggesting that they are do irreparable damage to the human being. Sometimes over-the-top rhetorical, as in the passage just cited, Virilio's 1990's comments on new information technology suggest that he is deploying the same model and methods to analyze the new technologies that he used for war technology. He speaks regularly of an "information bomb" that is set to explode (1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1997a, and 1997b), evoking the specter of "a choking of the senses, a loss of control of reason of sorts" in a flood of information and attendant disinformation. Deploying his earlier argument concerning technology and the accident, Virilio argues that the information superhighway is just waiting for a major accident to happen (1995a and 1995b; 1997a and 1997b), which will be a new kind of global accident, effecting the whole globe, "the accidents of accidents" (Epicurus): "The stock market collapse is merely a slight prefiguration of it. Nobody has seen this generalized accident yet. But then watch out as you hear talk about the 'financial bubble' in the economy: a very significant metaphor is used here, and it conjures up visions of some kind of cloud, reminding us of other clouds just as frightening as those of Chernobyl..." (1995b). In a 1995 interview with German media theorist Friedrich Kittler (1995c), titled "The information Bomb," Virilio draws an analogy between the nuclear bomb and the "information bomb," talking about the dangers of "fallout" and "radiation" from both. In contrast to the more dialectical Kittler, Virilio comes off as exceedingly technophobic in this exchange and illicitly, in my view, deploys an amalgam of military and religious metaphors to characterize the world of the new technologies. In one exchange, Virilio claims that "a caste of technology-monks is coming up in our times," and "there exist monasteries (of sorts whose goal it is to pave the way for a (kind of) 'civilization' that has nothing to do with civilization as we remember it." These monks are avatars of a "technological fundamentalism" and "information monotheism," a world-view that replaces previous humanist and religious worldviews, displacing man and god in favor of technology. [This world-view] comes into being in a totally independent manner from any controversy. It is the outcome of an intelligence without reflection or past. And with it goes what I think as the greatest danger (of all), the derailment, the sliding down into the utopian, into a future without humanity. And that is what worries me. I believe that violence, nay hyperviolence, springs out of this fundamentalism. Virilio goes on to claim that fallout from the "information bomb" will be as lethal for the socius as nuclear bombs, destroying social memory, relations, traditions, and community with an instantaneous overload of information. Thus, the technological "monks" who promote the information revolution are guilty of "sins in technical fundamentalism, of which we witness the consequences, the evil effects, today." One wonders, however, if the discourse of "sin," "evil," and "fundamentalism" is appropriate to characterize the effects and uses of new technologies which are, contrary to Virilio, hotly and widely debated, hardly monolithic, and, in my view, highly ambiguous, mixing what might be appraised as positive and negative features and effects.