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#### The legal education they create is utterly ineffectual and reinvests fidelity in the Law – only a prior rejection of that faith can resolve their impacts

Jack Balkin 98, Lafeyette S. Foster Professor @ Yale Law “Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith – Part II,” http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/agrhell2.htm/

I emphasize this point because we might think that one answer to the problem of constitutional evil is to take constitutional idealism seriously: By discussing and arguing about the Constitution among ourselves, legal academics can contribute to the constitutional tradition and change its trajectory. We can be the masters of our own constitutional destiny.(51) This solution to the problem of constitutional evil is appealing because it envisions legal academics as having a significant effect on the Constitution. By writing about the importance of justice in constitutional interpretation, by engaging in an ongoing conversation with others about the meaning of the Constitution, they can actually make the Constitution more just. Yet this is a fool's errand for most of the law professors who write and think daily about the Constitution. It is a confusion of their role with the role of the Supreme Court Justice.(52) Even if participating in arguments about the Constitution is a possible solution to the problem of constitutional faith for Justice Story, it is not a possible solution for the vast majority of American law professors, or, indeed, the vast majority of American citizens. The articulation of constitutional ideals by different parties may look grammatically identical but its social meaning and social effect is quite different.(53) The construction of constitutional systems by the average law professor at the average American law school has only a minuscule effect on the direction of the Constitution's meaning. For them, as for most Americans, constructing a Shadow Constitution is shadow boxing. It does not avoid the real problems of constitutional faith. Justice Story's faith in the Constitution is importantly different precisely because he is able to turn the Constitution to the path of what he regards as just. Of course, the very fact that Story was presented with a case like Prigg shows that even Supreme Court Justices have limited control over events that affect the Constitution's meaning. And in any case, he does not act alone - he must convince four of his other colleagues. But these limitations on Justice Story simply support the larger point I wish to make: To have faith in the Constitution is to have faith in an ongoing set of institutions whose meaning the individual will not be able to control. Most of us participate only in the great mass of public opinion that eventually affects the meaning and direction of the Constitution; our views are like a drop of water in a great ocean. We cannot mold the object of our faith to our will; its eventual trajectory is largely out of our hands. And what, then, if our constitutional faith is shaken? What if we come to believe that fidelity to the Constitution will not eventually achieve social justice, but that it will, on the contrary, preserve and even expand pervasive social injustices? It would be like discovering that the God we worshiped was not in fact good but was indifferent or even evil; that He did not care about us or about our well being and might be actively hostile to us. Should we have faith in such a God at that point? Should we even come to doubt His existence? It is no accident that one of the most difficult arguments put forward by atheists against the existence of God is the Argument from Evil. Explaining the existence of evil, and constructing theodicies, has been a constant task for generations of theologians.(54) Of course, there is no question of not believing in the existence of the Constitution. But we might well doubt whether our Constitution deserves our fidelity, just as we might come to wonder whether the god we thought we were worshipping was actually a demon.

#### Reliance on the law exonerates the individual of responsibility and evacuates value to life by making all guilty

Diego Rozo 4 (, MA in philosophy and Cultural Analysis, “Forgiving the Unforgivable: *On Violence, Power, and the Possibility of Justice”* p 19-21

Within the legal order the relations between individuals will resemble this logic where suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering, because these relations are no longer regulated by the “culture of the heart” [*Kultur des Herzens*]. (CV 245) As Benjamin describes it, the “legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power.” (CV 238) The individual is not to take law in his own hands; no conflict should be susceptible of being solved without the direct intervention of law, lest its authority will be undermined. Law has to present itself as *indispensable* for any kind of conflict to be solved. The consequence of this infiltration of law throughout the whole of human life is paradoxical: the more inescapable the rule of law is, the less *responsible* the individual becomes. Legal and judicial institutions act as avengers in the name of the individual. Even the possibility of forgiveness is monopolized by the state under the ‘right of mercy’. Hence the responsibility of the person toward the others is now delegated on the authority and justness of the law. The legal institutions, the very agents of (legal) vengeance exonerate me from my essential responsibility towards the others, breaking the moral proximity that makes every ethics possible.20 Thus I am no longer obliged to an other that by his/her very presence would demand me to be worthy of the occasion (of every occasion), because law, by seeking to regulate affairs between individuals, makes this other *anonymous, virtual:* his otherness is equaled to that of every possible other. The Other becomes faceless, making it all too easy for me to ignore his demands of justice, and even to exert on him violence just for the sake of legality. The logic of evil, then, becomes not a means but an end in itself:21 state violence for the sake of the state’s survival. Hence, the ever-present possibility of the worst takes the form of my unconditional responsibility towards the other being delegated on the ideological and totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray in the (its) logic of self- preserving vengeance. The undecidability of the origin of law, and its consequent meddling all across human affairs makes it possible that the worst could be exerted in the name of law. Even the very notion of crimes against humanity, which seeks to protect the life of the population, can be overlooked by the state if it feels threatened by other states or by its own population.22 From now on, my responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence being constantly threatened by the imminent and fatal possibility of being signaled as guilty of an (for me) indeterminate offence. In this picture, the modern state protects my existence while bringing on the terror of state violence – the law infiltrates into and seeks to rule our most private conflicts

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#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Restrictions on authority have to limit the President’s discretion to wage war

Jules Lobel 8, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh  Law School, President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, represented members of Congress challenging assertions of Executive power to unilaterally initiate warfare, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power  over the Conduct of War,” Ohio State Law Journal, Vol 69, p 391, 2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel\_.pdf

So too, the congressional power to declare or authorize war has been long held to permit Congress to authorize and wage a limited war—“limited in place, in objects, and in time.” 63 When Congress places such restrictions on the President’s authority to wage war, it limits the President’s discretion to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it confined the President’s authority to the use of U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64

#### “In the area” means all of the activities

UN 13, United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm

PART I¶ INTRODUCTION¶ Article 1

Use of terms and scope¶ 1. For the purposes of this Convention: (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority; (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;

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The United States federal judiciary should permanently enjoin enforcement of sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2014 which allow for indefinitely detaining anyone who has “substantially supported” parties relevant to the 2001 AUMF.

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#### The United States Congress should repeal section 1021(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2012 on the grounds that it is facially overbroad.

The Court’s pursuing an incremental strategy in regards to War Powers now---the plan causes massive backlash and executive non-acquiescence

Neavl Devins 10, Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William & Mary., Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 491

Congress, the President, and the Court. Throughout the enemy combatant litigation, Congress signaled to the Court that it would go along with whatever ruling the Court made in these cases. In other words, contrary to the portrayal by academics and the news media of the Supreme Court's willingness to stand up to Congress and the executive branch, lawmakers repeatedly stood behind Court rulings limiting elected branch power. At the same time, as I will detail in the next Part, the Court pursued an incremental strategy - declining to test the boundaries of lawmaker acquiescence and, instead, issuing decisions that it knew would be acceptable to lawmakers. n85¶ The 2004 rulings in Hamdi and Rasul triggered anything but a backlash. In the days following the decisions, no lawmaker spoke on the House or Senate floor about the decision, and only a handful issued [\*508] press releases about the cases. n86 And while eight members of Congress signed onto amicus briefs backing administration policy, n87 Congress did not seriously pursue legislative reform on this issue until the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the Hamdan case. n88¶ When Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) in December 2005, "lawmakers made clear that they did not see the DTA as an attack on either the Court or an independent judiciary." n89 Most significant, even though the DTA placed limits on federal court consideration of enemy combatant habeas petitions, lawmakers nevertheless anticipated that the Supreme Court would decide the fate of the President's military tribunal initiative. Lawmakers deleted language in the original bill precluding federal court review of Hamdan and other pending cases. n90 Lawmakers, moreover, depicted themselves as working collegially with the Court; several Senators, for example, contended that the "Supreme Court has been shouting to us in Congress: Get involved," n91 and thereby depicted Rasul as a challenge [\*509] to Congress, n92 "asking the Senate and the House, do you intend for ... enemy combatants ... to challenge their detention [in federal courts] as if they were American citizens?" n93 Lawmakers also spoke of detainee habeas petitions as an "abuse[]" n94 of the federal courts, and warned that such petitions might unduly clog the courts, n95 thus "swamping the system" n96 with frivolous complaints. n97 Under this view, the DTA's cabining of federal court jurisdiction "respects" the Court's independence and its role in the detainee process. n98¶ Following Hamdan, lawmakers likewise did not challenge the Court's conclusions that the DTA did not retrospectively bar the Hamdan litigation and that the President could not unilaterally pursue his military tribunal policy. n99 Even though the Military Commissions Act (MCA) eliminates federal court jurisdiction over enemy combatant habeas petitions, lawmakers depicted themselves as working in tandem with the Court. Representative Duncan Hunter (R. Cal.), who introduced the legislation on the House floor, said during the debates that the bill was a response to the "mandate of the Supreme Court that Congress involve itself in producing this new structure to prosecute terrorists." n100 And DTA sponsor Lindsey Graham stated: "The Supreme Court has set the rules of the road and the [\*510] Congress and the president can drive to the destination together." n101 Even lawmakers who expressed disappointment in the Court's ruling did not criticize the Court. Senator Sessions (R. Ala.), for example, blamed Hamdan's lawyers for misleading the Court about the legislative history of the DTA. n102¶ Debates over the MCA habeas provision, moreover, reveal that lawmakers thought that the Supreme Court was responsible for assessing the reach of habeas protections. Fifty-one Senators (fifty Republicans and one Democrat) voted against a proposed amendment to provide habeas protections to Guantanamo detainees. Arguing that enemy combatants possessed no constitutional habeas rights, n103 these lawmakers contended that they could eliminate habeas claims without undermining judicial authority. One of the principal architects of the MCA, Senator Lindsey Graham, put it this way: Enemy combatants have "a statutory right of habeas ... . And if [the Supreme Court finds] there is a constitutional right of habeas corpus given to enemy combatants, that is ... totally different ... and it would change in many ways what I have said." n104 Forty-eight Senators (forty-three Democrats, four Republicans, and one Independent) argued that the habeas-stripping provision was unconstitutional, that the courts would "clean it up," n105 and that Congress therefore should fulfill its responsibility to protect "that great writ." n106¶ When the Supreme Court agreed to rule on the constitutionality of the MCA, the Congress no longer supported the MCA's habeas-stripping provisions. Democrats had gained control of both Houses of Congress. Not surprisingly, there was next-to-no lawmaker criticism of Boumediene. In the week following the decision, no member [\*511] of the House, and only two Senators, made critical comments about the decision on the House or the Senate floor. n107¶ \* \* \* Supreme Court enemy combatant decisions were not out-of-step with prevailing social and political forces. Academics (including prominent conservatives), the media (again including conservative newspapers), former judges, and bar groups had all lined up against the administration. Interest groups too opposed the administration (including some conservative groups). Over the course of the enemy combatant litigation, the American people increasingly opposed the Bush administration. This opposition, in part, was tied to policy missteps (some of which implicated enemy combatant policy-making). These missteps were highly visible and contributed to widespread opposition to the Bush administration. For its part, Congress did not question the Court's role in policing the administration's enemy combatant initiative. By the time the Court decided Boumediene, voter disapproval of the President had translated into widespread opposition to the administration's enemy combatant initiative; a Democratic Congress supported habeas protections for enemy combatants and presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama called for the closing of Guantanamo Bay.¶ In the next part of this Essay, I will discuss the incremental nature of the Court's decision making. This discussion will provide additional support for the claims made in this section. Specifically, I will show that each of the Court's decisions was in sync with changing attitudes towards the Bush administration. More than that, Part II will belie the myth that Court enemy combatant decisions were especially consequential. Unlike newspaper and academic commentary about these cases, Court decision making had only a modest impact. Correspondingly, the Court never issued a decision that risked its institutional capital; the Court knew that its decisions would be followed by elected officials and that its decisions would not ask elected officials to take actions that posed some national security risk. [\*512] ¶ II. Judicial Modesty or Judicial Hubris: Making Sense of the Enemy Combatant Cases ¶ From 1952 (when the Supreme Court slapped down President Truman's war-time seizure of the steel mills) n108 until 2004 (when the Court reasserted itself in the first wave of enemy combatant cases), the judiciary largely steered clear of war powers disputes. n109 In part, the Court deferred to presidential desires and expertise. The President sees the "rights of governance in the foreign affairs and war powers areas" as core executive powers. n110 Correspondingly, the President has strong incentives to expand his war-making prerogatives. n111 For its part, the Court has limited expertise in this area, and, as such, is extremely reluctant to stake out positions that may pose significant national security risks. n112 The Court, moreover, is extremely reluctant to risk elected branch opprobrium. Lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Court cannot ignore the risks of elected branch non-acquiescence. n113¶ Against this backdrop, the Court's repudiation of the Bush administration's enemy combatant initiative appears a dramatic break from past practice. Academic and newspaper commentary back up this claim - with these decisions being labeled "stunning" (Harold [\*513] Koh), n114 "unprecedented" (John Yoo), n115 "breathtaking" (Charles Krauthammer), n116 "astounding" (Neal Katyal), n117 "sweeping and categorical" (New York Times), n118 and "historic" (Washington Post and Wall Street Journal). n119 Upon closer inspection, however, the Court's decisions are anything but a dramatic break from past practice. Part I detailed how Court rulings tracked larger social and political forces. In this Part, I will show how the Court risked neither the nation's security nor elected branch non-acquiescence. n120 The Court's initial rulings placed few meaningful checks on the executive; over time, the Court - reflecting increasing public disapproval of the President - imposed additional constraints but never issued a ruling that was out-of-sync with elected government preferences. Separate and apart from reflecting growing public and elected government disapproval of Bush administration policies, the Court had strong incentives to intervene in these cases. The Bush administration had challenged the Court's authority to play any role in national security matters. n121 This frontal assault on judicial power prompted the Court to stand up for its authority to "say what the law is." In Part III, I will talk about the Court's interest in protecting its turf - especially in cases implicating individual rights.¶ [\*514] Small Steps: Hamdi and Rasul. These decisions were a minimalist opening volley in Court efforts to place judicial limits on the Bush administration. While rejecting claims of executive branch unilateralism in national security matters, the Court said next-to-nothing about how it would police the President's enemy combatant initiative. Rasul simply held that Guantanamo Bay was a "territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control," and, consequently, that the President's enemy combatant initiative is subject to existing habeas corpus legislation. n122 This ruling "avoided any constitutional judgment" and offered no guidance on "what further proceedings may become necessary" after enemy combatants filed habeas corpus petitions. n123 Hamdi, although ruling that United States citizens have a constitutional right to challenge their detention as an enemy combatant, placed few meaningful limits on executive branch detentions. Noting that "enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive," the Court ruled both that hearsay evidence was admissible, and that "the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence." n124¶ The Bush administration, as John Yoo put it, saw the limited reach of Hamdi and Rasul as creating an "opportunity" for the administration to regain control over its detention policy. n125 In particular, the administration asked Congress to enact legislation that would limit federal court review of enemy combatant claims. The administration also launched Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) as a more formal substitute for unilateral executive determinations of a detainee's enemy combatant status. n126 Capitalizing on Rasul's failure to consider the constitutional dimensions of enemy combatant claims, CSRTs largely operated as a rubber stamp of administration determinations. In 2006, ninety-nine out of 102 detainees brought before CSRTs were designated as enemy combatants. n127 The Justice Department reconvened CSRTs to reconsider the remaining three cases [\*515] and, ultimately, the remaining three were determined to be enemy combatants. n128¶ Hamdi and Rasul were both "narrow, incompletely theorized [minimalist] decisions." n129 And while newspapers and academics focused their attention on the Court's open-ended declaration that "a state of war is not a blank check for the President," n130 the decisions did not meaningfully limit the executive. Well aware that Congress and the American people supported the President's military commission initiative, n131 the Court understood that a sweeping denunciation of administration policies might trigger a fierce backlash. n132 Moreover, by ruling that Congress had authorized the President's power to detain enemy combatants (through its post-9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution), and by suggesting that the Court would make use of pro-government presumptions when reviewing military commission decision making, the Court formally took national security interests into account. n133 Actions taken by the executive in response to these rulings underscore that the Court's de minimis demands neither risked national security nor executive branch non-acquiescence.¶ None of this is to say that the 2004 decisions were without impact. Following Rasul, for example, the administration understood that it needed to make use of some type of military court review - a requirement that may have impacted the military's handling of enemy combatants. At the same time, the Court did not issue a potentially debilitating blow to the Bush administration by decisively and resoundingly rejecting key elements of the administration's legal policy. n134 Instead, the Court simply carved out space for itself to review administration policy-making - without setting meaningful boundaries on what the administration could or could not do.

#### Court involvement in national security causes massive blowback that crushes judicial legitimacy

Robert M. Chesney 9, Professor, University of Texas School of Law, NATIONAL SECURITY FACT DEFERENCE, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1361

Judicial involvement in national security litigation, as noted at the outset, poses unusual risks for the judiciary as an institution. Such cases are more likely than most to involve claims of special, or even exclusive, executive branch authority. They are more likely than most to involve a perception - on the part of the public, the government, or judges themselves - of unusually high stakes. They are more likely than most to be in the media spotlight and hence in view of the public in a meaningful sense. These cases are, as a result of all this, especially salient as a political matter. And therein lies the danger for the courts. Because of these elements, an inappropriate judicial intervention in national security litigation is unusually likely to generate a response from the other branches or the public at large that might harm the institutional interests of the judiciary, either by undermining its prestige and authority or perhaps even by triggering some form of concrete political response.

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#### Judges will get pay raises now, but Congress still has the ability to wreck salaries – key to judicial independence

Lyle Denniston, SCOTUSblog badass, covered the court for 54 years, National Constitution Center’s Adviser on Constitutional Literacy, 10-8-2012, “Major gain for judges’ independence,” Constitution Daily, http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2012/10/major-gain-for-judges%E2%80%99-independence/

That has been, from the beginning, one of the ways the Founders guaranteed the independence of the federal judiciary (another was a promise of life tenure “during good behavior”). But for the past 34 years, federal judges have been pursuing a series of lawsuits, claiming that Congress has frequently acted in ways that – in real-dollar terms – reduced their pay, in violation of the Compensation Clause. The theory was that, if a federal judges’ pay remains constant, it will be eroded over time by the effects of inflation in money’s value. Last Friday, that legal struggle finally resulted in a historic constitutional victory for the judges – a victory that is likely to be tested in the Supreme Court before it could take final effect. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit – a specialized court that decides claims for money from the federal government – ruled by a 10-2 vote that Congress has several times violated a promise made in 1989 to give federal judges an annual cost-of-living increase in their pay level. The decision does not mean that Congress has lost the power to set federal judges’ salary levels, or that it has a constitutional duty to give them a period, inflation-countering raise. But it does mean that Congress cannot promise a raise, and then break that promise, and that the lawmakers cannot take steps that reduce the value of a sitting judge’s salary scale. The judges’ fight has been a long-running labor for them and their lawyers, and the issue raises such fundamental constitutional questions that it has gone to the Supreme Court, in one form or another, three times. It almost certainly will return there again, because the Justice Department does not believe the judges have a valid claim that the Compensation Clause has been violated, and the Department has the authority to seek Supreme Court review. The Federal Circuit Court’s ruling in the judges’ favor (in the case of Beer v. U.S.) is a strong statement of support for judicial independence, and for the role that a secure salary plays in helping to protect that independence. In the Declaration of Independence, the court recalled, America’s revolutionary generation protested that the King of England had made judges depend upon his grace for their tenure and for their pay. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist Papers: “Next to permanence in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.”

#### Congress will backlash against the plan and cut judicial pay

Philip A. Talmadge, Justice, Washington State Supreme Court, Winter 1999, Seattle University Law Review, 22 Seattle Univ. L. R. 695, p. 701-704

The doctrine of judicial restraint has been encrusted in recent years with considerable ideological cant of both the left and the right. 17 The ideological discussion highlights particular political issues of the day. Many conservatives decry judicial activism with respect to the courts' role in racial desegregation in America or [\*702] reproductive rights issues. 18 Liberals complain today of judicial activism in property and economic issues. 19 But this doctrine need not be the captive of the left or the right. The doctrine itself has become "political" largely because it is not susceptible to rigorous and predictable definition. That the courts are not entirely trusted by the partisan branches of government to announce constitutional principles is illustrated by recent Washington legislation. In 1997, a bill was introduced in the Washington State House of Representatives with thirty-three sponsors. The bill challenged the doctrine of judicial review: "The doctrine of judicial review that the courts have the sole and final say in interpreting the Constitution on behalf of all three branches of government has been subject to serious analysis and criticism by scholars, jurists, and others for almost two hundred years." 20 The legislation's apparent intent was to undercut the finality and authority of judicial review of constitutional questions by permitting the legislature to disagree with a judicial interpretation of the Washington Constitution and to submit the issue to the voters in a statewide referendum. 21 [\*703] The sense that the courts are too powerful sometimes conflicts with direction to judges from the partisan branches to state their views more publicly. In 1997, twenty-two sponsors introduced in the Washington State House of Representatives a measure urging the Supreme Court to amend Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to afford judges and judicial candidates the right to "speak freely and without fear of governmental retaliation, on issues that are not then before the court." 22 The United States Congress has also raised serious questions about judicial performance through a different methodology. The United States Senate's recent glacial pace in confirming nominees to judicial vacancies increases judicial workloads and instills trepidation in the minds of the nominees. 23 In recent legislation, 24 Congress [\*704] sought to restrain "judicial activism" by denying judges cost-of-living salary adjustments and limiting federal court jurisdiction. Various versions of the legislation would deny federal courts the power to release federal prisoners because of bad prison conditions and establish special procedures to hear challenges to state initiative measures. In summary, these issues illustrate the need for the courts continually to revisit and review the core constitutional functions of the judiciary. 25 Within the constitutional sphere, however, the courts should be active and the other branches of government constrained not to act unconstitutionally. The judiciary cannot "restrain" itself from declaring the enactments of legislative bodies violative of constitutional norms. The courts must vigorously protect individuals, particularly minorities, from majoritarian tyranny. But this protective role does not allow the courts to "constitutionalize" every controversy. Judicial self-restraint lends support to the legitimacy of judicial independence. In our system of separation of powers, achievement of the necessary balance between a judiciary vigorous within its constitutional sphere and independent of the partisan branches of government, and a judiciary restrained in its inclination to right every wrong, is no easy task. That necessary balance is, however, the essence of ordered liberty in the American constitutional system. Likewise, the other branches of government must regard the authority and independence of the judiciary by respecting judicial review, properly funding the courts, and avoiding the imposition of nonjudicial duties or ever-escalating caseloads. The fulfillment of separation of powers is found in the principles of restraint employed in the federal and state court systems.

#### Adequate funding for the judiciary is key to the rule of law – it’s watched internationally

Testimony of Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Judicial Security and Independence February 14, 2007 http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2526&wit\_id=6070

The provision of judicial resources by Congress over the years is admirable in most respects. Your expeditious consideration of the pending court-security bill is just one example of your understanding of our needs. Our facilities have been, and are, the envy of the judiciaries of the several States and, indeed, of judges throughout the world. Our staff, our libraries, our electronic data systems, and our courthouses are excellent. These resources have been the special concern of Congress. Your interest, your oversight, and your understanding of our needs set a standard for our own States and for nations around the world. Just one example is the Federal Judicial Center. When visitors come to Washington, we recommend they observe it to learn how a successful judicial-education center functions. Those visitors are awed by what they see. As you know, the Center produces an elaborate series of programs for judicial education, under a small budget emphasizing turn-key projects. Around the world, the allocation of scarce resources to judiciaries is, to be candid, a tough sell. There are urgent demands for funds for defense; for roads and schools; for hospitals, doctors, and health care; and for basic utilities and necessities such as clean water. Even rich countries like our own find it hard to marshal the necessary resources for all these endeavors. What, then, is the reception an elected representative receives when he or she tells constituents the legislature has increased funding for judicial resources? The report, to be frank, is not likely to generate much excitement. Perhaps this is an educational failure on our part, for there is a proper response to this predictable public reaction. It is this: An efficient, highly qualified judiciary is part of the infrastructure necessary in any society that seeks to safeguard its freedom. A judiciary committed to excellence secures the Rule of Law; and the Rule of Law is a building block no less important to the advance of freedom and prosperity than infrastructure systems such as roads and utilities. Without a functioning, highly qualified, efficient judiciary, no nation can hope to guarantee its prosperity and secure the liberties of its people. The Committee knows that judges throughout the United States are increasingly concerned about the persisting low salary levels Congress authorizes for judicial service. Members of the federal judiciary consider the problem so acute that it has become a threat to judicial independence. This subject is a most delicate one and, indeed, is difficult for me to address. It is, however, an urgent matter requiring frank and open exchange of views. Please permit me to make some remarks on the subject.

#### That causes nuclear war [gender paraphrased].

Charles S. Rhyne, Founder and Senior Partner of Rhyne & Rhyne law firm. “Law Day Speech for Voice of America.” May 1, 1958. American Bar Association. http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html

In these days of soul-searching and re-evaluation and inventorying of basic concepts and principles brought on by the expansion of man’s vision to the new frontiers and horizons of outer space, we want the people of the world to know that we in America have an unshakable belief in the most essential ingredient of our way of life—the rule of law. The law we honor is the basis and foundation of our nation’s freedom and the freedom for the individual which exists here. And to Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives. The rule of law has been the bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities, the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about “justice” under our rule of law, the absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about “freedom” for the individual, Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when we talk about peace under law—peace without the bloodbath of war—we are appealing to the foremost desire of all peoples everywhere. The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that [hu]mankind’s best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man’s relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teachers that the rule of law has enabled [hu]mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations. The lawyer is the technician in man’s relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear war overtake our people.

### Off

#### We overwhelmingly control uniqueness---all federal courts are either siding with the executive’s terror policies through narrow rulings or declining to even hear the cases---past rulings are being distinguished

Jonathan L. Entin 12, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs (School of Law), David L. Brennan Professor of Law, and Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. War Powers, Foreign Affairs, and the Courts: Some Institutional Considerations, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 443

Although these procedural and jurisdictional barriers to judicial review can be overcome, those who seek to limit what they regard as executive excess in military and foreign affairs should not count on the judiciary to serve as a consistent ally. The Supreme Court has shown substantial deference to the president in national security cases. Even when the Court has rejected the executive's position, it generally has done so on relatively narrow grounds.¶ Consider the Espionage Act cases that arose during World War I. Schenck v. United States, n63 which is best known for Justice Holmes's [\*452] announcement of the clear and present danger test, upheld a conviction for obstructing military recruitment based on the defendant's having mailed a leaflet criticizing the military draft although there was no evidence that anyone had refused to submit to induction as a result. Justice Holmes almost offhandedly observed that "the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out." n64 The circumstances in which the speech took place affected the scope of First Amendment protection: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." n65 A week later, without mentioning the clear and present danger test, the Court upheld the conviction of the publisher of a German-language newspaper for undermining the war effort n66 and of Eugene Debs for a speech denouncing the war. n67 Early in the following term, Justice Holmes refined his thinking about clear and present danger while introducing the marketplace theory of the First Amendment in Abrams v. United States, n68 but only Justice Brandeis agreed with his position. n69 The majority, however, summarily rejected the First Amendment defense on the basis of Holmes's opinions for the Court in the earlier cases. n70¶ Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to the government's war programs during World War II. For example, the Court rebuffed a challenge to the use of military commissions to try German saboteurs. n71 Congress had authorized the use of military tribunals in such cases, and the president had relied on that authorization in directing that the defendants be kept out of civilian courts. n72 In addition, the Court upheld the validity of the Japanese internment program. n73 Of course, the Court did limit the scope of the [\*453] program by holding that it did not apply to "concededly loyal" citizens. n74 But it took four decades for the judiciary to conclude that some of the convictions that the Supreme Court had upheld during wartime should be vacated. n75 Congress eventually passed legislation apologizing for the treatment of Japanese Americans and authorizing belated compensation to internees. n76¶ The Court never directly addressed the legality of the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers case, for example, did not address how the nation became militarily involved in Southeast Asia, only whether the government could prevent the publication of a Defense Department study of U.S. engagement in that region. n77 The lawfulness of orders to train military personnel bound for Vietnam gave rise to Parker v. Levy, n78 but the central issue in that case was the constitutionality of the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that were the basis of the court-martial of the Army physician who refused to train medics who would be sent to the war zone. n79 The few lower courts that addressed the merits of challenges to the legality of the Vietnam War consistently rejected those challenges. n80¶ The picture in the post-2001 era is less clear. In three different cases the Supreme Court has rejected the executive branch's position, but all of those rulings were narrow in scope. For example, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld n81 held that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given a meaningful opportunity to have a neutral decision-maker determine the factual basis for his detention. There was no majority opinion, however, so the implications of the ruling were ambiguous to say the least. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion for four members of the Court concluded that Congress had authorized the president to detain enemy combatants by passing the Authorization for Use of Military Force n82 and that the AUMF satisfied the statutory requirement of congressional authorization for the detention of U.S. [\*454] citizens. n83 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, thought that the AUMF had not in fact authorized the detention of American citizens as required by the statute, n84 which suggested that Hamdi should be released. But the Court would have been deadlocked as to the remedy had he adhered to his view of how to proceed. This was because Justices Scalia and Stevens also believed that Hamdi's detention was unlawful and that he should be released on habeas corpus, n85 whereas Justice Thomas thought that the executive branch had acted within its authority and therefore would have denied relief. n86 This alignment left four justices in favor of a remand for more formal proceedings, four other justices in favor of releasing Hamdi, and one justice supporting the government's detention of Hamdi with no need for a more elaborate hearing. To avoid a deadlock, therefore, Justice Souter reluctantly joined the plurality's remand order. n87¶ Hamdi was atypical because that case involved a U.S. citizen who was detained. The vast majority of detainees have been foreign nationals. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, n88 the Supreme Court ruled that the military commissions that the executive branch had established in the wake of the September 11 attacks had not been authorized by Congress and therefore could not be used to try detainees. n89 A concurring opinion made clear that the president could seek authorization from Congress to use the type of military commissions that had been established unilaterally in this case. n90¶ Congress responded to that suggestion by enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, n91 which sought to endorse the executive's detainee policies and to restrict judicial review of detainee cases. In Boumediene v. Bush, n92 the Supreme Court again rejected the government's position. First, the statute did not suspend the writ of [\*455] habeas corpus. n93 Second, the statutory procedures for hearing cases involving detainees were constitutionally inadequate. n94 At the same time, the Court emphasized that the judiciary should afford some deference to the executive branch in dealing with the dangers of terrorism n95 and should respect the congressional decision to consolidate judicial review of detainee cases in the District of Columbia Circuit. n96¶ Detainees who have litigated in the lower federal courts in the District of Columbia have not found a sympathetic forum. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has not upheld a single district court ruling that granted any sort of relief to detainees, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in every post-Boumediene detainee case in which review was sought. n97 In only one case involving a detainee has the D.C. Circuit granted relief, and that case came up from a military commission following procedural changes adopted in the wake of Boumediene. n98 About a month after this symposium took place, in Hamdan v. United States n99 the court overturned a conviction for providing material support for terrorism. The defendant was the same person who successfully challenged the original military commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. n100 This very recent ruling emphasized that the statute under which he was prosecuted did not apply to offenses committed before its enactment. n101 It remains to be seen how broadly the decision will apply. [\*456] ¶ Meanwhile, other challenges to post-2001 terrorism policies also have failed, and the Supreme Court has declined to review those rulings as well. For example, the lower courts have rebuffed claims asserted by foreign nationals who were subject to extraordinary rendition. In Arar v. Ashcroft, n102 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of constitutional and statutory challenges brought by a plaintiff holding dual citizenship in Canada and the United States. n103 And in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., n104 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the state-secrets privilege barred a separate challenge to extraordinary rendition brought by citizens of Egypt, Morocco, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Yemen. n105 Unlike Arar, in which the defendants were federal officials, n106 this case was filed against a private corporation that allegedly assisted in transporting the plaintiffs to overseas locations where they were subjected to torture. n107 Although at least four judges on the en banc courts dissented from both rulings, n108 the Supreme Court declined to review either case. n109

#### Court interference in war powers collapses effective military policy and exec flex

Stephen F. Knott 13, professor of National Security Affairs at the United States Naval War College, 8/22/13, War by Lawyer, www.libertylawsite.org/2013/08/22/war-by-lawyer/

Terrorist attacks directed from abroad are acts of war against the United States, requiring a response by the nation’s armed forces under the direction of the commander-in-chief. Unity in the executive is critical to the conduct of war, as Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist, and war by committee, especially a committee of lawyers, brings to armed conflict the very qualities that are the antithesis of Publius’s “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The American military, with the assistance of the American intelligence community, fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense. The nation’s defense establishment is not the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Health and Human Services; if one dislikes the social welfare policies of the Obama administration or disagrees with President Obama for whatever reason, that is all well and good, but true conservatives should reject the principle that judicial review is applicable to the conduct of national defense. The founders understood that the decision to use force, the most important decision any government can make, were non-judicial in nature and were to be made by the elected representatives of the people.

Nonetheless, for those weaned during an era when “privacy” was elevated to the be-all and end-all of the American experiment, the war power and related national security powers granted by the Constitution to the elected branches are trumped by modern notions of a limitless “right to privacy.” The civil liberties violations of the War on Terror are considered so egregious as to require the intervention of an appointed judiciary lacking any Constitutional mandate, and lacking the wherewithal, including information and staff, to handle sensitive national security matters. This is judicial activism at its worst and further evidence that the “political questions doctrine,” the idea of deferring to the elected branches of government on matters falling under their constitutional purview, is, for all practical purposes, dead (See the case of Totten vs. U.S., 1875, for an example of judicial deference to the elected branches on intelligence matters. This deference persisted until the late 20th century). Simply put, according to the Constitution and to almost 220 years of tradition, Congress and the President are constitutionally empowered, among other things, to set the rules regarding the measures deemed necessary to gather intelligence and conduct a war.

One of the latest demands from advocates of increased judicial oversight is for a “targeted killing court.” In a similar vein, Senator Marco Rubio has called for the creation of a “Red Team” review of any executive targeting of American citizens, which would include a 15 day review process – “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” be damned. A 15 day review process of targeting decisions would horrify Alexander Hamilton and all the framers of the Constitution. No doubt our 16th President would be horrified as well – imagine Abraham Lincoln applying for targeting permits on American citizens suspected of assisting the Confederacy. (“Today, we begin a 15 day review of case #633,721, that of Beauregard Birdwell of Paducah, Kentucky.”) War by lawyer might in the not too distant future include these types of targeting decisions, followed by endless appeals to unelected judges. All of this is a prescription for defeat.

We are, sadly, almost at this point, for a new conception about war and national security has taken root in our increasingly legalistic society. We saw this during the Bush years when the Supreme Court for the first time in its history instructed the executive and legislative branches on the appropriate manner of treating captured enemy combatants. The Courts are now micromanaging the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, to the point of reviewing standards for groin searches of captured Al Qaeda members. True conservatives understand the pitfalls of this legalism, especially of the ill-defined international variety. Conservatives should be especially alert to the dangers arising from elevating international law over the national interest as the standard by which to measure American conduct.

The legalistic approach to the war on terror now being endorsed by prominent conservatives would cede presidential authority to executive branch lawyers and to their brethren in the judiciary who are playing a role they were never intended to play. Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA’s unit charged with tracking down Osama bin Laden, observed that “at the end of the day, the U.S. intelligence community is palsied by lawyers, and everything still depends on whether the lawyers approve it or not.” This is as far removed from conducting war, as Hamilton described it, with decision and dispatch, and with the “exercise of power by a single hand,” as one can get. War conducted by the courts is not only unconstitutional, it is, to borrow a phrase from author Philip K. Howard, part of the ongoing drift toward the death of common sense.

#### That decks effective executive responses to prolif, terror, and the rise of hostile powers---link threshold is low

Robert Blomquist 10, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIPRUDENCE, 44 Val. U.L. Rev. 881

Supreme Court Justices--along with legal advocates--need to conceptualize and prioritize big theoretical matters of institutional design and form and function in the American national security tripartite constitutional system. By way of an excellent introduction to these vital issues of legal theory, the Justices should pull down from the library shelf of the sumptuous Supreme Court Library in Washington, D.C. (or more likely have a clerk do this chore) the old chestnut, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by the late Harvard University law professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks. n7 Among the rich insights on institutional design coupled with form and function in the American legal system that are germane to the Court's interpretation of national security law-making and decision-making by the President are several pertinent points. First, "Hart and Sacks' intellectual starting point was the interconnectedness of human beings, and the usefulness of law in helping us coexist peacefully together." n8 By implication, therefore, the Court should be mindful of the unique [\*883] constitutional role played by the POTUS in preserving peace and should prevent imprudent judicial actions that would undermine American national security. Second, Hart and Sacks, continuing their broad insights of social theory, noted that legal communities establish "institutionalized[] procedures for the settlement of questions of group concern" n9 and regularize "different procedures and personnel of different qualifications . . . appropriate for deciding different kinds of questions" n10 because "every modern society differentiates among social questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other modes for others-e.g., courts for 'judicial' decisions and legislatures for 'legislative' decisions" n11 and, extending their conceptualization, an executive for "executive" decisions. n12 Third, Professors Hart and Sacks made seminal theoretical distinctions between rules, standards, principles, and policies. n13 While all four are part of "legal arrangements [\*884] in an organized society," n14 and all four of these arrangements are potentially relevant in judicial review of presidential national security decisions, principles and policies n15 are of special concern because of the sprawling, inchoate, and rapidly changing nature of national security threats and the imperative of hyper-energy in the Executive branch in responding to these threats. n16

The Justices should also consult Professor Robert S. Summers's masterful elaboration and amplification of the Hart and Sacks project on enhancing a flourishing legal system: the 2006 opus, Form and Function in a Legal System: A General Study. n17 The most important points that [\*885] Summers makes that are relevant to judicial review of American national security presiprudence are three key considerations. First, a "conception of the overall form of the whole of a functional [legal] unit is needed to serve the founding purpose of defining, specifying, and organizing the makeup of such a unit so that it can be brought into being and can fulfill its own distinctive role" n18 in synergy with other legal units to serve overarching sovereign purposes for a polity. The American constitutional system of national security law and policy should be appreciated for its genius in making the POTUS the national security sentinel with vast, but not unlimited, powers to protect the Nation from hostile, potentially catastrophic, threats. Second, "a conception of the overall form of the whole is needed for the purpose of organizing the internal unity of relations between various formal features of a functional [legal] unit and between each formal feature and the complementary components of the whole unit." n19 Thus, Supreme Court Justices should have a thick understanding of the form of national security decision-making conceived by the Founders to center in the POTUS; the ways the POTUS and Congress historically organized the processing of national security through institutions like the National Security Council and the House and Senate intelligence committees; and the ways the POTUS has structured national security process through such specific legal forms as Presidential Directives, National Security Decision Directives, National Security Presidential Decision Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, and National Security Policy Directives in classified, secret documents along with typically public Executive Orders. n20 Third, according to Summers, "a conception of the overall form of the whole functional [legal] unit is needed to organize further the mode of operation and the instrumental capacity of the [legal] unit." n21 So, the Supreme Court should be aware that tinkering with national security decisions of the POTUS--unless clearly necessary to counterbalance an indubitable violation of the text of the Constitution--may lead to unforeseen negative second-order consequences in the ability of the POTUS (with or without the help of Congress) to preserve, protect, and defend the Nation. n22

 [\*886] B. Geopolitical Strategic Considerations Bearing on Judicial Interpretation

Before the United States Supreme Court Justices form an opinion on the legality of national security decisions by the POTUS, they should immerse themselves in judicially-noticeable facts concerning what national security expert, Bruce Berkowitz, in the subtitle of his recent book, calls the "challengers, competitors, and threats to America's future." n23 Not that the Justices need to become experts in national security affairs, n24 but every Supreme Court Justice should be aware of the following five basic national security facts and conceptions before sitting in judgment on presiprudential national security determinations.

(1) "National security policy . . . is harder today because the issues that are involved are more numerous and varied. The problem of the day can change at a moment's notice." n25 While "[y]esterday, it might have been proliferation; today, terrorism; tomorrow, hostile regional powers" n26, the twenty-first century reality is that "[t]hreats are also more likely to be intertwined--proliferators use the same networks as narco-traffickers, narco-traffickers support terrorists, and terrorists align themselves with regional powers." n27

(2) "Yet, as worrisome as these immediate concerns may be, the long-term challenges are even harder to deal with, and the stakes are higher. Whereas the main Cold War threat--the Soviet Union--was brittle, most of the potential adversaries and challengers America now faces are resilient." n28

(3) "The most important task for U.S. national security today is simply to retain the strategic advantage. This term, from the world of military doctrine, refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events." n29 Importantly, "[w]hen you hold [\*887] the strategic advantage, situations unfold in your favor, and each round ends so that you are in an advantageous position for the next. When you do not hold the strategic advantage, they do not." n30

(4) While "keeping the strategic advantage may not have the idealistic ring of making the world safe for democracy and does not sound as decisively macho as maintaining American hegemony," n31 maintaining the American "strategic advantage is critical, because it is essential for just about everything else America hopes to achieve--promoting freedom, protecting the homeland, defending its values, preserving peace, and so on." n32

(5) The United States requires national security "agility." n33 It not only needs "to refocus its resources repeatedly; it needs to do this faster than an adversary can focus its own resources." n34

 [\*888] As further serious preparation for engaging in the jurisprudence of American national security presiprudence in hotly contested cases and controversies that may end up on their docket, our Supreme Court Justices should understand that, as Walter Russell Mead pointed out in an important essay a few years ago, n35 the average American can be understood as a Jacksonian pragmatist on national security issues. n36 "Americans are determined to keep the world at a distance, while not isolating ourselves from it completely. If we need to take action abroad, we want to do it on our terms." n37 Thus, recent social science survey data paints "a picture of a country whose practical people take a practical approach to knowledge about national security. Americans do not bother with the details most of the time because, for most Americans, the details do not matter most the time." n38 Indeed, since the American people "do know the outlines of the big picture and what we need to worry about [in national security affairs] so we know when we need to pay greater attention and what is at stake. This is the kind of knowledge suited to a Jacksonian." n39

Turning to how the Supreme Court should view and interpret American presidential measures to oversee national security law and policy, our Justices should consider a number of important points. First, given the robust text, tradition, intellectual history, and evolution of the institution of the POTUS as the American national security sentinel, n40 and the unprecedented dangers to the United States national security after 9/11, n41 national security presiprudence should be accorded wide latitude by the Court in the adjustment (and tradeoffs) of trading liberty and security. n42 Second, Justices should be aware that different presidents [\*889] institute changes in national security presiprudence given their unique perspective and knowledge of threats to the Nation. n43 Third, Justices should be restrained in second-guessing the POTUS and his subordinate national security experts concerning both the existence and duration of national security emergencies and necessary measures to rectify them. "During emergencies, the institutional advantages of the executive are enhanced", n44 moreover, "[b]ecause of the importance of secrecy, speed, and flexibility, courts, which are slow, open, and rigid, have less to contribute to the formulation of national policy than they do during normal times." n45 Fourth, Supreme Court Justices, of course, should not give the POTUS a blank check--even during times of claimed national emergency; but, how much deference to be accorded by the Court is "always a hard question" and should be a function of "the scale and type of the emergency." n46 Fifth, the Court should be extraordinarily deferential to the POTUS and his executive subordinates regarding questions of executive determinations of the international laws of war and military tactics. As cogently explained by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, n47 "the United States should comply with the laws of war in its battle against Al Qaeda"--and I would argue, other lawless terrorist groups like the Taliban--"only to the extent these laws are beneficial to the United States, taking into account the likely response of [\*890] other states and of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations," n48 as determined by the POTUS and his national security executive subordinates.

## Case

### Util

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil

**Issac 2**—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

# Block

## NDAA CP

### We’re right

#### It passed

Natasha Lennard 12/27, 2013, "Obama signs NDAA 2014, indefinite detention remains", www.salon.com/2013/12/27/obama\_signs\_ndaa\_2014\_indefinite\_detention\_remains/

On Thursday President Obama signed into law the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a sweeping defense policy bill, which includes some improvements in terms of civil liberties and human rights on its previous two iterations. However, a number of provisions — as in the 2012 and 2013 NDAAs — should keep civil libertarians concerned.

## Case

### Cummiskey

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

## DA

### 2NC Link / UQ

#### The SQ is goldilocks---it carves out enough room for judicial review of War Powers to solve Court influence, but doesn’t impose any meaningful checks on the Executive so it allows for flexibility---the plan sends a signal of judicial over-reach that causes political blowback

Neavl Devins 10, Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William & Mary., Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 491

In Part III of this Essay, I will argue that the Court's actions in the first year of the Obama administration are cut from the same cloth as its decision to intervene in Bush-era disputes. As this section has suggested, the Court has never risked national security or executive branch non-acquiescence in its enemy combatant decision making. Moreover, as I argued in Part I, Court decision making in this area has largely tracked social and political forces. For reasons I will now detail, the Court's decisions both to steer clear of this issue in the spring and summer of 2009 and its fall 2009 decision to hear the Uighur petition match past Court practices. Throughout the enemy combatant dispute, the Court has found ways to expand its authority without risking an institutionally costly backlash.¶ III. Conclusion: The Past Is Prologue¶ Supreme Court interventions in the enemy combatant disputes never pushed the limits of what was acceptable to the political [\*523] branches of government. The Court, instead, maximized its authority by moving incrementally and expanding judicial power in ways generally acceptable to the political branches. This was true of Bush-era decision making and there is no reason to think that the Court will depart from past practices during the Obama administration.¶ Consider, for example, the Court's March 2009 decision to back away from a case involving Bush administration efforts to detain a legal resident without charges. After agreeing - in December 2008 - to hear a challenge to the Bush administration's detention of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri at a South Carolina Navy brig, the Court sided with the Obama administration and removed the case from its docket. n170 The administration had claimed the case was moot because - in February 2009 - it formally filed federal criminal charges against al-Marri (so that he would be tried in federal court and not held indefinitely at a military base). n171 Mr. Marri's lawyers objected, arguing (unsuccessfully) that the administration could subsequently relocate him to a military base and, consequently, the Court should still resolve his legal challenge. n172¶ The Court's decisions to hear and then moot al-Marri are readily understandable. The Fourth Circuit had upheld the Bush administration in al-Marri and - when agreeing to hear the case - the Justices had good reason to slap down the Bush administration for their continuing efforts to sidestep federal court review over enemy combatant policy-making. Not only had the Court taken a strong stand in favor of judicial review in Boumediene and other decisions, but the November 2008 election of Barack Obama and the Democratic Congress further solidified the Court's position with elected officials and the American people. And, with none of the eighteen amicus briefs in the case supporting the Bush administration, n173 a Court ruling against [\*524] Bush administration actions would have further buoyed the Court's status with academics and other interest groups. By March 2009, however, there was no good reason to ask the new administration to sort out its views on the al-Marri detention. Candidate Obama had campaigned against the Bush administration efforts to fence out federal courts from war-on-terror litigation. Indeed, when asking the Court to moot the case, the Obama administration told the Justices that it was willing to have the Fourth Circuit ruling vacated (showing "that the government is not attempting to preserve its victory while evading review"). n174 Against this backdrop, there was simply no reason for the Justices to force the Obama administration to formally disavow or embrace Bush administration legal arguments. An Obama administration decision disavowing Bush administration arguments would not strengthen the Court's position vis-a-vis the executive (as the Obama Justice Department had already conceded the Court's authority to vacate the lower court ruling); an administration decision supporting Bush administration arguments would set the stage for a costly battle between the Court and the new administration. A decision on the merits, moreover, would have opened the Court up to charges of judicial over-reaching. In its brief seeking to moot al-Marri, the government argued that keeping the case alive "would lead only to an advisory opinion with no real-world impact on any individual" and that the Court should not reach out to decide "in a hypothetical posture" "complex constitutional questions" about the line where "national security policy and the Constitution intersect." n175¶ The Court's participation in Kiyemba likewise displays the Court's sensitivity to its status vis-a-vis the other branches and to the risks of unnecessarily interjecting itself in national security policy. This was true of both the June 2009 decision to hold over the appeal of the Uighur petitioners and the October 2009 decision to hear the case (but to schedule oral arguments so as to delay any decision until the summer of 2010). n176¶ June 2009 was too early for the Court to enter this dispute. Even though petitioners cast the case as an opportunity for the Court to defend its turf (suggesting that Boumediene had become an empty shell and it was up to the Court to give meaning to the decision), n177 [\*525] the Court well understood the costs of entering this dispute. At that time, the Obama administration and Democratic Congress were sorting out their policy priorities on Guantanamo, Bagram detainees, and much more. Correspondingly, the Court had reason to think that a ruling demanding the relocation of Uighur detainees to the United States would not sit well with either the administration or Congress. Not only did the Obama administration oppose the relocation of the Uighurs to the United States, n178 Congress enacted legislation in June 2009 that severely limited the President's power to move Guantanamo detainees to the United States or resettle them in another country. n179¶ By holding the issue over, however, the Court gave the Obama administration time both to sort out its policy priorities and to relocate the Uighur detainees (and, in so doing, to try to moot the case). n180 In its brief opposing certiorari, the Obama administration made clear that it was trying both to close Guantanamo and to relocate the Uighur petitioners and asked the Court to respect the "efforts of the political Branches to resolve issues relating to petitioners and other individuals located at Guantanamo Bay." n181 Furthermore, the decision to hold the case over bought the Court time to see how the enemy combatant issue would play out among politicians, interest groups, the media, and the American people. As Part I reveals, Court enemy combatant decisions track social and political forces. As Part II reveals, the Court has moved incrementally - advancing its authority to say "what the law is" without risking backlash or national security.¶ The Court's October 2009 decision to hear Kiyemba does not break from this pattern. By scheduling oral arguments for spring 2009, the Court both provided elected government with additional time to settle this issue and provided itself with an opportunity to calibrate its decision making against the backdrop of elected government action and other subsequent developments. n182 More than that, [\*526] since Boumediene only decided the threshold issue that enemy combatants were entitled to habeas corpus relief, Kiyemba is a good vehicle for the Court to provide some details on how habeas proceedings should be conducted. In particular, there is little prospect that the decision will impact the rights on many Guantanamo detainees. By the summer of 2010, Guantanamo may be closed; if not, most detainees who prevail in habeas proceedings are likely to have been relocated to another country. Moreover, Kiyemba raises a quite narrow issue, namely, whether federal courts can mandate that Guantanamo detainees be relocated to the United States if no foreign nation will take them. n183 In other words, there is next to no prospect that Kiyemba will result in the type of scrutinizing judicial review that might raise national security risks (assuming, of course, that the Court will rule against the administration). Instead, Kiyemba seems likely to further tighten judicial control over the executive - but only in a very modest way.¶ Throughout the course of its enemy combatant decision making, the Court has moved incrementally. In so doing, the Court has expanded its authority vis-a-vis the President. Obama administration efforts to moot al-Marri and to relocate Uighur detainees (thereby mooting that litigation) speak to the administration's desire to avoid Supreme Court rulings that might limit the scope of presidential power. Unlike the Bush administration (whose politically tone deaf arguments paved the way for anti-administration rulings), n184 the Obama administration understands that the Court has become a player in the enemy combatant issue.¶ What is striking here, is that the Court never took more than it could get - it carved out space for itself without risking the nation's security or political backlash. Its 2004 and 2006 rulings provided ample opportunity for the President to pursue his enemy combatant initiative. Its 2008 ruling in Boumediene, while clearly constraining the political branches, reflected the views of the new Democratic majority in Congress and (to a lesser extent) the views of presidential candidates Obama and McCain. n185 Its decision to steer clear of early Obama-era [\*527] disputes likewise avoids the risks of a costly backlash while creating incentives for the Obama administration to take judicial authority into account (by settling these cases outside of court). n186 Put another way, by taking prevailing social and political forces into account, the Court was able to flex its muscles without meaningfully undermining the policy preferences of the President and Congress.¶ I, of course, recognize that the Court's willingness to engage the executive and, in so doing, to nullify a signature campaign of the Bush administration, is a significant break from the judiciary's recent practice of steering clear of disputes tied to unilateral presidential war making. n187 At the same time, I see the Court's willingness to challenge, and not defer, as not at all surprising. The Bush administration made arguments that backed the Court into a corner. The Court could either bow at the altar of presidential power, or it could find a way to slap the President down. It is to be expected that the Court chose to find a way to preserve its authority to "say what the law is." n188 The Justices, after all, have incentives to preserve the Court's role in our system of checks and balances - especially when their decisions enhance their reputations with media and academic elites. n189 This is true of the Supreme Court in general, and arguably more true of the current Court - given its penchant to claim judicial supremacy and given the importance of these institutional concerns to the Court's so-called swing Justices. n190 It is also noteworthy that the enemy combatant cases were at the very core of the judicial function. At oral arguments in Hamdan, Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of habeas corpus relief, n191 suggesting that limitations on habeas relief would "threaten[] the status of the judiciary as a co-equal partner of the legislature and the executive." n192¶ [\*528] One final comment on the nature of the dialogue that took and is taking place between the three branches on the enemy combatant issue: Throughout the Bush-era, these cases were anything but a constitutional dialogue. The executive persisted in making the same argument, and, as its political fortunes diminished, the Court carved over more and more issue space for itself. For its part, the Bush-era Congress played no meaningful role - it simultaneously backed the executive while signaling to the Court that it would support judicial invalidation of executive initiatives. With a new administration in place, there is reason to think that the inter-branch dynamic will change. The Obama administration has advanced its policies while pursuing a less confrontational course; avoiding absolutist arguments and trying to steer clear of an adverse Supreme Court ruling. In so doing, the administration has yet to launch the type of broadsides that challenge the foundations of judicial authority. Up until now, the Court has responded in kind, leaving the administration breathing room to pursue its policies without a Supreme Court pronouncement on the scope of presidential power. It is a matter of pure speculation whether this pattern will continue. At the same time, there is good reason to think that the Court will follow the path it has laid down in Bush-era cases, taking social and political forces into account so as to protect its turf without risking national security or elected government backlash.

#### The Court’s only pursuing minimalist War on Terror Rulings now that are in line with the dominant political consensus---only the plan forces a change in executive policy that risks tangible backlash

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What a difference a year makes. In the summer of 2008, the Bush administration campaign to defend its enemy combatant policies lay in shreds. The Supreme Court had ruled against the administration's initiative in 2004, 2006, and 2008 - decisions that had been characterized as "the most important decisions on presidential power and the rule of law ever," n1 (Walter Dellinger), "a disaster for the war effort," n2 (Robert H. Bork and David B. Rivkin, Jr.), and "a historic rebuke to the Bush administration," n3 (The Washington Post). The 2004 and 2006 rulings declared that Guantanamo Bay detentions were subject to federal court review and that the administration could not unilaterally pursue its enemy combatant policies. In 2008, the Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that neither Congress nor the President could strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo habeas petitions. n4 Making matters worse, with presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain both agreeing that Guantanamo should be closed, the Bush administration's initiative seemed a political as well as a legal casualty. n5¶ [\*492] One year later, the landmark billing of these rulings seems suspect. Next-to-no detainees had been released from Guantanamo. Even though thirty detainees have prevailed in habeas proceedings, n6 the Obama administration argued that these individuals do not have a "constitutional right to enter the United States." n7 Instead, these individuals were to remain in Guantanamo "in a non-enemy combatant status" until they or the administration could locate a country for them to return to. n8 Further ensuring that Guantanamo detainees would remain at Guantanamo, the Democratic Congress enacted spending legislation blocking the closing of the facility. n9 And, in a related development, the Obama administration backed Bush administration efforts to end-run Boumediene by bringing captured detainees to Bagram, Afghanistan - claiming that, unlike combatants held at the United States base on Guantanamo Bay, "military detainees [held] in Afghanistan have no legal right to challenge their imprisonment there." n10¶ Responding to these developments, lawyers for Guantanamo detainees went back to the well - returning to the Supreme Court to challenge both Obama administration practices and the federal spending law. n11 Having prevailed both before the Supreme Court in [\*493] Boumediene and in subsequent habeas hearings, these litigants declared: "Something has gone awry... ." n12 "The Judicial Branch may hold hearings; it may even issue vague and unenforceable exhortations to diplomacy. But that is all. It has become the hortatory branch." n13 Initially, the Court did not bite. Notwithstanding the urgency of petitioners' request, the Court held the case over for its 2009-2010 term.¶ In October 2009, the Court granted certiorari in the case Kiyemba v. Obama. n14 By this time, however, the Court's action received comparatively little attention - both in the mainstream press and in legal blogs. n15 Unlike Bush-era cases (where the Court was seen as invalidating critically important presidential initiatives), Kiyemba was depicted as a low stakes gambit by the Court. In part, no one thought the case would meaningfully alter administration policies. The Obama administration remains committed to closing Guantanamo n16 and, in September 2009, the administration reversed court on Bagram detainees - allowing detainees to see evidence, call witnesses, and much more. n17 Furthermore, as several news stories noted, the case would [\*494] directly impact few, if any, detainees. n18 By waiting until October to grant certiorari in the case, the Court deferred oral arguments (and a decision) until the end of its 2009-2010 term. By that time, the administration may seek to moot the case by either shutting down Guantanamo or relocating all petitioners. n19¶ Without question, there are very real differences between the factual contexts of Kiyemba and Bush-era cases. These differences, however, do not account for the striking gap between accounts of Kiyemba as likely inconsequential and Bush-era cases as "the most important decisions" on presidential power "ever." n20 In the pages that follow, I will argue that Kiyemba is cut from the same cloth as Bush-era enemy combatant decision making. Just as Kiyemba will be of limited reach (at most signaling the Court's willingness to impose further limits on the government without forcing the government to meaningfully adjust its policymaking), Bush-era enemy combatant cases were modest incremental rulings. Notwithstanding claims by academics, opinion leaders, and the media, Supreme Court enemy combatant decision making did not impose significant rule of law limits on the President and Congress. Bush-era cases were certainly consequential, but they never occupied the blockbuster status that so many (on both the left and the right) attributed to them. Throughout the course of the enemy combatant dispute, the Court has never risked its institutional capital either by issuing a decision that the political branches would ignore, or by compelling the executive branch to pursue policies that created meaningful risks to national security. The Court, instead, took limited risks to protect its turf and assert its power to "say what the law is." That was the Court's practice during the Bush years, and it is the Court's practice today.¶ [\*495] My argument will proceed in three parts. First, I will argue that Bush-era enemy combatant decisions were anything but counter-majoritarian. These decisions tracked larger social and political forces. These decisions, moreover, were hugely popular with newspapers, academics, and other elite audiences (audiences that matter a great deal to centrist Justices). Second, contrary to media and academic portrayals of these cases as bold, decisive, and consequential, Bush-era decisions were truly incremental. The 2004 and 2006 decisions placed few meaningful demands on the administration; Boumediene was decided at a moment in time when the Court had good reason to think that the political process was well on its way to closing Guantanamo (so that constitutionally mandated habeas hearings would be symbolically consequential but of little practical import). Third, I will extend my analysis of Bush-era cases to the Obama era. In particular, I will explain why today's Court has no institutional incentive to place meaningful limits on Obama administration policymaking. Even though the Court may rule against the government in Kiyemba, there is no reason to think that it will check the President in ways that will severely constrain elected branch priorities (priorities, incidentally, that include the closing of Guantanamo and the imposition of some rule of law norms in detainee cases). n21 In making this point, I will draw a fairly obvious connection between Bush administration missteps in advancing an overly aggressive view of inherent presidential war-making power and the Court's efforts to expand power by speaking loudly but, ultimately, asking for very little.

#### SQ rulings haven’t clarified the legal debate---the plan does

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To be sure, the Supreme Court has decided some well-known national security cases. Among them are the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer; n2 the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States; n3 the Iranian hostage case, Dames & Moore v. Regan; n4 and some notable First Amendment cases arising out of World War I, such as Schenck v. United States n5 and Abrams v. United States. n6 Then there are the Japanese internment decisions during World War II, notably Korematsu v. United States, n7 as well as Ex parte Quirin, n8 which upheld the use of military commissions to try German agents who landed in the United States as part of a sabotage mission. Most recently, the Supreme Court has addressed questions arising from the government's response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, in such cases as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, n9 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, n10 and Boumediene v. Bush. n11 These cases do matter, but they have not clearly resolved the constitutional and other legal issues that pervade the debate about presidential power and foreign affairs.

Beyond the limitations of the Supreme Court rulings, the judiciary probably will not contribute very much to the debate. Various procedural and jurisdictional obstacles make it difficult for courts to address the merits of disputes about war powers and foreign affairs. Even if those obstacles can be surmounted, those who decry what they view as presidential excess should note that the judiciary typically has taken a deferential role in reviewing challenges to executive action.

#### Only the plan settles authority questions which the court is explicitly avoiding now

Bruce K. Miller 11, Western New England University School of Law, No Virtue in Passivity: The Supreme Court and Ali Al-Marri, http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1203&context=facschol

The many other important questions about the scope and limits of the President’s military detention power remain largely unad­ dressed by the Court’s decisions.244 Perhaps the most important of these are (a) whether, and to what extent, there are geographical or temporal restraints on the lawful exercise of this power; (b) whether there is a definition that limits the categories of persons who might be subject to military detention; (c) what constitutionally mandated procedures, if any, constrain the President’s power to de­ tain persons on the basis of their alleged activities outside the tradi­ tionally defined field of battle in Afghanistan; (d) whether persons residing lawfully in the United States, including both citizens and non-citizens, are subject to military detention; and (e) whether, and in what ways, the President may lawfully interrogate persons held in military custody. On these, and perhaps other questions, both the President and the lawyers and organizations who represent de­ tainees, can still plausibly assert just about any position.

In order to resolve the questions presented by Al-Marri’s peti­ tion for certiorari, which the Court had agreed to hear, the Justices would almost certainly have been required to shed significant light on some, or maybe all, of these issues. Because Al-Marri’s deten­ tion was based, in significant part, on his alleged conduct outside Afghanistan prior to September 11,245 his petition necessarily ad­dressed the limits imposed by time, location, and due process on the President’s war power in a situation significantly different from that presented by Hamdi.246 Al-Marri was also a non-citizen residing lawfully in the United States when he was apprehended, had never been a member of the armed forces of an enemy government, and was subjected to military detention, at least in significant part, in order to subject him to interrogation.247 Determining the lawful­ ness of his detention under these circumstances would likely have required the Court also to address the standards for determining who may be subjected to military detention, the permissible goals of such detention, and the extent to which power of military deten­ tion can be applied to persons arrested on American soil.

Eight years after September 11, light from the Supreme Court on these issues would have been welcome. It goes without saying that the power of the executive branch to apply force and violence against anyone it chooses is enormous. To date, both Presidential Administrations that have held power since the events of Septem­ ber 11 have, perhaps understandably, sought to maximize their abil­ ity to use that power against those they perceive to be the nation’s enemies. To the extent that American law imposes restraints on the President’s authority to detain persons he deems to be enemy com­ batants without trial, it is past time for the judicial branch, which has the power and duty “to say what the law is,”248 to announce what these restraints are. For this reason, unless somehow required by the Court’s precedents, including those precedents standing for the passive virtues of judicial restraint, the Court’s decision to dis­ miss the Al-Marri petition as moot was deeply unfortunate.

### 2NC Link Wall

#### Congress perceives plan as activist, that means they’ll cut pay, the impact is judicial independence and terrorism

HARLINGTON WOOD Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. New York University Annual Survey of American Law 2001

Since the federal judges are protected from unjustified removal, is it nevertheless possible to discipline judges by cutting their salary, even if for only a short period? No, it is not. The Constitution provides that a federal judge's salary may not be reduced during the judge's tenure. 12 Congress can, however, increase the salaries of federal judges to keep up with the general level of legal compensation in the marketplace. Congress can also grant a cost of living increase to keep up with inflation. Most federal employees receive cost of living increases, but some in Congress for their own, reasons including political, have in the past voted "no" on extending this increase to federal judges. Some of us have thought Congress misunderstood and believed the Constitution prohibited not only a reduction in judicial salaries, but also a fair salary increase. [\*264] Often citing the low salaries of federal judges as a reason, sixty Article III judges retired or resigned from the bench between 1991 and 2002, marking it as the largest number of departures in federal judiciary history for any ten-year period. 13 Indeed, judges often see their law clerks recruited to leading private firms at starting salaries comparable to those of judges. 14 Not only is a reasonable judicial salary fair treatment of judges for their work, but it is also an important factor in judicial independence. A well-paid judge is less susceptible to deserting the bench for the more lucrative private practice or, in the very rarest of circumstances, succumbing to the temptation to do judicial favors for a fee. Judges who have accepted bribes may not only be subject to impeachment as judges, but also find themselves as defendants in front of the bench of another judge and possibly on their way to the penitentiary. 15 Reasonable judicial salaries also serve another very important purpose because fair compensation helps attract the most qualified lawyers to the bench. If serving as a judge were to mean a financial sacrifice impacting prospective judges and their families, only the rich would become federal judges. That should not be. In 2001, Congress did not forget the Third Branch entirely and gave the judges a cost-of-living increase, not a pay raise, for which the judges are grateful. However, since 1993, the judges have received only four of nine annual cost-of-living adjustments. 16 Judges have always been at some personal risk from disgruntled litigants and anti-government groups. 17 For example, an ordinary-looking [\*265] letter was delivered to me one February at the office, but its contents were not ordinary. It was a very mean and vicious threat about what would soon happen to me. The sender from the Chicago area got so enthusiastic about sending me his "valentine" that he forgot and conveniently put his name and return address on the envelope. Since we are now in a war with terrorists, the risks are much greater for everyone. Congress has the responsibility to look after the welfare of the judiciary because the judiciary cannot financially care for itself. The judicial structure must be kept healthy and safe, especially in times of national crises, or the terrorists will have achieved some part of their goal.

#### Best studies prove congress will cut pay and the judiciary will respond by not adhering to your precedent

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There is empirical evidence that Congress pays attention to Supreme Court decisions and punishes undesirable decisions with budget cuts, and that the Justices respond with decisions more amenable to congressional policy goals. Eugenia Toma hypothesized that the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court was a contractual one in which budgetary favors are linked to politically acceptable decisions. 205 She empirically analyzed the Court's budget and its decisions. The greater the ideological distance between a term's decisions and the congressional average of the relevant House and Senate committees, the less money was appropriated for the Court's budget. 206 She also found that the Court responded to these signals and modified its decisions accordingly. 207 The effect was not an enormous one and not entirely consistent over the years, 208 but it was clearly [\*1469] present, enough to meet rigorous standards of statistical significance. 209 Congress may achieve indirectly through appropriations what it cannot do directly. 210

#### Pay cuts and budget stripping results from congressionally unpopular rulings

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Distinct from, but analogous to, jurisdiction stripping is the creation of non-Article III court systems. This action removes certain topics from the life-tenured federal judiciary's power and places it with "statutory judges." Such courts are not protected by the tenure or salary or other independence guarantees of the Constitution, granting Congress even more control over judicial outcomes. 179 Non-Article III courts may be created precisely for the additional "political control they permit." 180 The creation of such courts removes power from the Article III judiciary and transfers it into a structurally more pliable Article I judiciary. 181 c. Resource Punishment. - Perhaps the most salient constraint on courts involves congressional control over their resources. Judicial salaries are generally protected from being cut by Congress, but a displeased Congress may withhold salary increases or other resources. 182 There are few, if any, constraints on congressional control of funding for judicial support [\*1466] staff, courthouses, and other necessary resources of the Third Branch. Congress does not automatically defer to the Court's budget requests, nor does it automatically grant the Court some increase in resources to account for inflation or growing caseloads. Between 1946 and 1988, the real budget for the Court increased at an average of 3.2% per year, but annual changes in the budget have varied from a negative 9.8% to a positive 13.7%. 183 Plainly, Congress has both the power and inclination to manipulate appropriations to the courts. 184

## Congress CP

### Court Stripping

#### Court stripping destroys judicial legitimacy and separation of powers---even unsuccessful backlash can put the entire edifice of judicial review in question

Andrew D. Martin 1, Prof of Political Science at Washington University 2001. Statuatory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the Supreme Court

But the large policy payoff in the constitutional cases. What does the ability of the President and Congress to attack through overrides or other means constitutional court decisions imply in terms of the cost of the justices bear? If an attack succeeds and the court does not back down, it effectively removes the court from the policy game and may seriously or, even irrevocably harm its reputation, credibility, and legitimacy. Indeed, such an attack would effectively remove the court from policy making, thus incurring an infinite cost. With no constitutional prescription for judicial review, this power is vulnerable, and would be severely damaged if congress and the president were effective in attack on the Court. But even if the attack is unsuccessful, the integrity of the court may be damaged, for the assault may compromise its ability to make future constitutional decisions and, thus, more long-lasting policy. One does not have to peer as far back as scott v. sandford to find examples; Bush v. Gore (2000, U.S.) may provide one. To be sure, the new President and Congress did not attack the decision, but other members of government did of course, unsuccessfully at least in terms of the ruling’s impact. Yet, there seems little doubt that the critics (not to mention the decision itself) caused some major damage to the reputation of the court, the effects of which the justices may feel in the not-so-distant future.

## T

### AT: We Meet

#### They don’t meet – don’t categorically prohibit detention authority – allows for too many affs – that’s our definition

#### “In” means “throughout”

Words and Phrases 8 (Permanent Edition, vol. 20a, p. 207)

Colo. 1887. In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

### Restrictions = Prohibition

#### Defining "restrictions on authority" is key to predictability

J.A.D. Haneman 59, justice of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. “Russell S. Bertrand et al. v. Donald T. Jones et al.,” 58 NJ Super. 273; 156 A.2d 161; 1959 N.J. Super, Lexis

 HN4 In ascertaining the meaning of the word "restrictions" as here employed, it must be considered in context with the entire clause in which it appears. It is to be noted that the exception concerns restrictions "which have been complied with." Plainly, this connotes a representation of compliance by the vendor with any restrictions upon the permitted uses of the subject property. The conclusion that "restrictions" refer solely to a limitation of the manner in which the vendor may [\*\*\*14] use his own lands is strengthened by the further provision found in said clause that the conveyance is "subject to the effect, [\*\*167] if any, of municipal zoning laws." Municipal zoning laws affect the use of property.¶ HN5 A familiar maxim to aid in the construction of contracts is noscitur a sociis. Simply stated, this means that a word is known from its associates. Words of general and specific import take color from each other when associated together, and thus the word of general significance is modified by its associates of restricted sense. 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 552, p. 110; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, 5 N.J. 494 (1950). The [\*284] word "restrictions," therefore, should be construed as being used in the same limited fashion as "zoning."

#### And, substantial requires an objective, absolute measurement--- there's no way to quantify the impact oversight has on War Powers which means that their interpretation has no coherent way to account for an entire word in the topic

Words & Phrases 64, 40 W&P 759

The words "outward, open, actual, risible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not bidden; exposed to view; free from concealment dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 111. App. 308, 31R

#### They conflate management and restrictions

BEREC 12, Guidelines for quality of service in the scope of net neutrality, Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications

The concept of “traffic management” is sometimes used as a synonym of “restrictions”, but in these guidelines BEREC seeks to avoid misunderstanding by using the term “restrictions” to refer to all limitations, including those which are contractually binding and/or technically implemented limitations.