# 1AC – Wake Rd 6

### 1AC – Advocacy Statement

#### The ongoing legacy of the Internment Cases should be repudiated and ended.

### 1AC – Korematsu

#### The internment cases are flawed, racist, classist and sexist institutional stances on indefinite detention---Korematsu ruled the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II constitutional

Erwin Chemerinsky 11, Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law, April 1st, 2011, "Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be Repeated," Pepperdine Law Review, pepperdinelawreview.com/wp-content/plugins/bag-thumb/bag\_thumb885\_07\_chemerinsky\_camera\_ready.pdf

III. WHY KOREMATSU WAS ONE OF THE WORST DECISIONS IN HISTORY¶ Applying the criteria described above, there is no doubt that Korematsu belongs on the list of the worst Supreme Court rulings. First, in terms of the social and human impact, 110,000 Japanese-Americans, aliens, and citizens—and 70,000 were citizens—were uprooted from their life-long homes and placed in what President Franklin Roosevelt called “concentration camps.” 18 For many, if not most of them, their property was seized and taken without due process or compensation. They were incarcerated. The only determinate that was used in this process was race. William Manchester, in a stunning history of the twentieth century, The Glory and the Dream, gives this description:¶ Under Executive Order 9066, as interpreted by General De Witt, voluntary migration ended on March 27. People of Japanese descent were given forty-eight hours to dispose of their homes, businesses, and furniture; during their period of resettlement they would be permitted to carry only personal belongings, in hand luggage. All razors and liquor would be confiscated. Investments and bank accounts were forfeited. Denied the right to appeal, or even protest, the Issei thus lost seventy million dollars in farm acreage and equipment, thirty-five million in fruits and vegetables, nearly a half-billion in annual income, and savings, stocks, and bonds beyond reckoning.19¶ Manchester describes what occurred:¶ Beginning at dawn on Monday, March 30, copies of General De Witt’s Civilian Exclusion Order No. 20 affecting persons “of Japanese ancestry” were nailed to doors, like quarantine notices. It was a brisk Army operation; toddlers too young to speak were issued tags, like luggage, and presently truck convoys drew up. From the sidewalks soldiers shouted, “Out Japs!”—an order chillingly like [what] Anne Frank was hearing from German soldiers on Dutch pavements. The trucks took the internees to fifteen assembly areas, among them a Yakima, Washington, brewery, Pasadena’s Rose Bowl, and racetracks in Santa Anita and Tanforan. The tracks were the worst; there, families were housed in horse stalls.¶ . . . .¶ The President never visited these bleak garrisons, but he once referred to them as “concentration camps.” That is precisely what they were. The average family of six or seven members was allowed an “apartment” measuring twenty by twenty-five feet. None had a stove or running water. Each block of barracks shared a community laundry, mess hall, latrines, and open shower stalls, where women had to bathe in full view of the sentries. 20¶ The human impact of the actions of the United States government towards Japanese-Americans during World War II cannot be overstated. It is almost beyond comprehension that our government could imprison 110,000 people solely because of their race.¶ In terms of the judicial reasoning, Korematsu was also a terrible decision. Interestingly, Korematsu is the first case where the Supreme Court used the language of “suspect” classifications. 21 The Court did not use the phrasing of “strict scrutiny,” which came later, but the Court certainly was implying that racial classifications warrant what later came to be referred to as strict scrutiny. 22 Strict scrutiny, of course, means that a government action will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.

#### Korematsu was litigated in the context of Jim Crow laws---the aff disrupts racial compartmentalization by recognizing the connections between different policies and how racism affects multiple minority groups

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Conclusion¶ My argument has been that American identity and American citizenship do not necessarily go hand in hand, that racial naturalization constitutes both, and that racial naturalization ought to be understood as a process or experience through which people enter the imagined American community as cognizable racial subjects. Explicit in this claim is a conception of racism itself as a technology of naturalization. Indeed, it is precisely through racism that our American racial identities come into being. Put differently, **racism plays a significant role in socially situating and defining us as Americans.** Our sense of ourselves as Americans, of others as Americans, and of the nation itself, is inextricably linked to racism.¶ I do not mean to suggest that we are overdetermined by racism—that, as a result of racism, we have no agency. My point is simply that racism helps to determine who we are as Americans and how we fit into the social fabric of American life. Racism, in other words, is always already a part of America's social script, a script within which there are specific racial roles or identities for all of us. None of us exists outside of or is unshaped by the American culture racism helps to create and sustain.¶ To some extent, my conception of racial naturalization is linked to a claim Toni Morrison advances in "On the Backs of Blacks." Morrison's point of departure is a critique of Elia Kazan's critically acclaimed America, America. She writes: [End Page 651]¶ Fresh from Ellis Island, Stavros gets a job shining shoes at Grand Central Terminal. It is the last scene of Elia Kazan's film America, America, the story of a young Greek's fierce determination to immigrate to America. Quickly, but as casually as an afterthought, a young black man, also a shoe shiner, enters and tries to solicit a customer. He is run off the screen—"Get out of here! We're doing business here!"–and silently disappears.¶ This interloper into Stavros's workplace is crucial in the mix of signs that make up the movie's happy-ending immigrant story: a job, a straw hat, an infectious smile—and a scorned black. It is the act of racial contempt that transforms this charming Greek into an entitled white. Without it, Stavros's future as an American is not at all assured.60¶ Morrison powerfully reveals the nature of Stavros's racialized journey into American identity. Indeed, the scene depicts Stavros's social rebirthing as an American—which is to say, his racial naturalization. Through the deployment of a recognizable American social practice—antiblack racism—Stavros is born again. He becomes a (white) American out of the racial body of northern racism.¶ Significantly, this transition in Stavros's identity does not require the acquisition of formal citizenship status. Stavros becomes a white American by social practice, not by law.61 While formal naturalization and citizenship might never be available to Stavros, he can (and does) become racially naturalized by simply shoring up his whiteness, and positioning himself against black subalternity.¶ Morrison's analysis might lead one to conclude that the episode she describes figures Stavros's, but not the shoe shiner's, Americanization. My own view, however, is that the encounter naturalizes the shoe shiner as well. More than merely reflect the shoe shiner's black American identity, the encounter actually produces it. When it is kept in mind that Kazan's America, America takes place in the early 1900s, a period during which African American racial subordination was utterly and completely normative, it becomes clear that Stavros's displacement of the shoe shiner rehearses an American script that is both inclusive and familiar. The shoe shiner's part in this script is to experience racial subordination. Stavros's is to practice it. Both are included in the drama, and both are Americanized by it.¶ In this sense, Kazan's representation of the black shoe shiner reflects more than a problem of racial exclusion. It reveals what I have been calling an inclusive exclusion. Stavros's "Get out of here" includes the black shoe shiner into a recognizable American social position—that of the American Negro. This social position is in turn subordinated to Stavros's newly acquired status as a white American. In other words, Stavros's attainment of white American identity depends upon an exclusion of the black shoe shiner ("Get out of here"), and that exclusion is precisely what renders the shoe shiner intelligible as an [End Page 652] American. Indeed, it is through Stavros's exclusion that the shoe shiner reexperiences his American belonging.¶ What I am suggesting, in short, is that the scene around which Morrison frames her argument naturalizes Stavros and the black shoe shiner. The event assimilates both, drawing them into an American reality that both precedes and is enacted by the racial roles they perform. Morrison is only half right, then, when she asserts that "becoming [white] American is based on . . . an exclusion of me." The concept of racial naturalization disarticulates racism from exclusion. It conceives of racism as a social process that includes everyone, naturalizing us into different but recognizable American racial positions, both as citizens and noncitizens. None of us is excluded from this process. None of us is outside of it. None of us is left behind.¶ Conceiving of racial naturalization in this way has at least two benefits. First, **it provides another theoretical vehicle to make the point that racism is endemic to American society, that, historically, racism has been formative of, and not simply oppositional to, American democracy**.62 Second, the concept helps to disrupt our tendency to engage in racial compartmentalism. By racial compartmentalism I mean the application of particular racial paradigms (such as immigration) to understand the racial experiences of particular racial groups (such as Latinas/os). **As a result of racial compartmentalism, blacks disappear in the context of discussions about immigration law and policy, and Asian Americans disappear in the context of discussions about racial profiling.**63 Racial compartmentalism makes it possible to study Korematsu v. United States and never engage, or even reference, the fact that the constitutionality of Japanese American internment was litigated in the context of Jim Crow.64 And because of racial compartmentalism, it is acceptable to study the racial failures of Reconstruction and never engage, or even acknowledge, the fact that these failures occur in the context of Chinese exclusion.65 If, like Nikhil Pal Singh, we understand the color line as "an internal border"66 —or, to pluralize his conception, a series of borders—**it becomes more difficult for us to ignore or elide the multiracial social dynamics of inclusion and exclusion**.67¶ Conceptualizing the color line as an internal border (or a series of borders) provides a way of highlighting the fact that racial identification is a form of documentation. How we cross the borders of the color line and where socially we end up are functions of the racial identification we carry. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, historically, racial identification (like other forms of identification) has raised evidentiary questions about falsification, standards of proof, and methods of authentication—in short, questions about the "real" and the "copy." [End Page 653]¶ **To the extent that we understand race as a form of identification, it becomes apparent that problems of migration (social movement across marked boundaries), documentation ("papers"/identifications), and national membership (noncitizen, citizen, American identity) do not end at the physical borders of America.** These problems are a part of the broader social landscape of America. Consider this point with respect to Latinas/os. The racial identification of this group as both "illegal" and "alien" is a problem within, and not simply a problem at the physical borders of, the nation-state.68 Thus we have the phenomenon of factory surveys, or raids of workplaces with significant representation of Latina/o employees by U.S. immigration officials. These raids, within the nation's interior, suggest that the color line operates both as a fixed checkpoint (at the physical borders of the United States) and as a roving patrol (within the interior).69¶ Problematizing the color line in terms of documentation has implications for black experiences as well. Specifically, this framing brings into sharp relief the ways in which documentation has served as an important technology for policing physical and social boundary-crossings by blacks. Dred Scott is a useful starting place for elaborating this point.

#### This was the culmination of racism against Asian Americans in the United States---the aff helps expose the history of racism and slavery the state has been founded upon

Natsu Taylor Saito 1, professor at Georgia State University College of Law, 2001, "Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the 'Racing' of Arab Americans as 'Terrorists,'" Asian Law Journal, 8 Asian L. J. 1, 2001, hein online

Thus far, it has the makings of a feel-good story: a terrible thing happened, but the nation recognized its wrong and stepped forward to provide some redress. The story confirms what so many want to believe, that despite occasional aberrations this is a nation committed to democracy and the equality of peoples. Most people I encounter are open to this story. Like many Japanese Americans, I am invited to tell it at high schools and churches, even military bases. However, if we really care about achieving democracy and equality, we need to look beyond this level of the narrative.¶ Im. FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE NARRATIVE¶ There are at least two major flaws with the internment narrative. First, it accepts the notion that the internment was an aberration rather than a logical extension of the treatment of Asians in America. Second, it implies that the wrong has actually been righted.¶ A. The Internment Was Not an Aberration in the Context of Asian American History¶ Implicit in the terms of the apology, which attributed the problem to wartime hysteria and racial prejudice, is the notion that the internment was an aberration, an instance in which our nation temporarily strayed from its basic commitment to due process and equal protection.¶ But the internment was not an aberration. One need only look at the social, political, economic, and legal history of Asian Americans in the United States, from the enforcement of the 1790 Naturalization Act's limitation of citizenship to "free white persons,"3 to the exploitation of Chinese labor in the mines and building of the railroads,39 to lynchings and Jim Crow laws,40 to Chinese exclusion in the 1880s and the exclusion of the Japanese in the early 1900S,41 to the alien land laws,42 and to the National Origins Act of 1924,43 to see that the military orders to exclude and then imprison "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien"4 were really a logical extension of all that had come before.¶ Between the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 188245 and the National Origins Act of 1924,"' immigration laws were modified to prevent nearly all Asian migration to the United States. The 1790 Naturalization Act limited citizenship to "free white persons" and Asians were held in a series of cases to be non-white.7 Thus, as Asians were incorporated into the U.S. racial hierarchy, "foreignness" became part of their racialized identity.' Some forms of discrimination, such as segregation and lynchings, were blatantly race-based, but much of it was structured, legally and socially, on the presumption that Asian Americans were not or could not become citizens. State and local laws were enacted which levied special taxes on Asian Americans; others prevented those aliens "ineligible to citizenship" from obtaining employment, possessing various kinds of licenses, or owning land.49¶ Legalized discrimination was compounded by the perpetual "enemy" status afforded Asians in popular American culture. Starting with depictions of the "yellow peril" hordes waiting to take over the country in the 1880s, Asians were routinely portrayed as sneaky, inscrutable, fanatical, unassimilable and, on top of that, fungible." They were foreign, disloyal and therefore an enemy, just as portrayed in the rhetoric of the internment. In this context, the anti-Japanese sentiment and actions taken in the 1940s were unusual only in scope, not in nature.¶ Thus, as we look briefly at the history of Asians in America, we see the internment emerging as a somewhat extreme, but not aberrant, manifestation of a well-entrenched pattern of discrimination rooted in a racialized identification of Asian Americans as perpetually "foreign.'¶ B. Flaw #2: The Real Wrong Has Not Been Righted¶ The second major problem with the standard internment narrative is that it implies that the wrong has been recognized and corrected, or at least that it could not happen again. One of the stated purposes of the Civil Liberties Act was to "discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future."52 To understand whether the wrong has been corrected, we must first see if it has been correctly identified. The way the story is usually told, the wrong is one of racial prejudice playing out against a group of people in ways we now recognize to have been excessive.¶ The history of racial discrimination against Asian Americans certainly did not end with the internment. The Chinese, who were "our friends" in World War II,53 rapidly became the enemy as China "went communist." The wars in Korea and Vietnam reinforced this image, despite the fact that Asians were allies as often as they were enemies.54 The refusal to distinguish among individuals and ethnic groups has persisted from General DeWitt's famous pronouncement that "a Jap's a Jap"s through the beating death of Vincent Chin, a fifth generation Chinese American killed by unemployed auto workers in Detroit who were angry at the Japanese automobile industry,56 to the stories of hate crimes against "gooks" and "chinks" still recorded every month.57¶ It was this history that made Asian Americans so suspicious of the allegations against and treatment of Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear physicist accused but never actually charged with espionage.58 According to Neil Gotanda, "The federal government, after years of investigation, has been unable to produce any evidence of espionage. The spy charges have been maintained, not by evidence, but by constant allegations linking Wen Ho Lee to China.59 He continues:¶ The assignment to Wen Ho Lee of a presumption of disloyalty is a well- established marker of foreignness. And foreignness is a crucial dimension of the American racialization of persons of Asian ancestry. It is at the heart of the racial profile of Chinese and other Asian Americans.61 But while racism is inextricable from the story of the internment, the primary "wrong" that should be addressed by reparations is more complex. In what is still probably the best analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in the internment cases, Yale Law School professor Eugene Rostow, in 1945, summarized the wrong as follows:¶ The Japanese exclusion program thus rests on five propositions of the utmost potential menace: (1) protective custody, extending over three or four years, is a permitted form of imprisonment in the United States; (2) political opinions, not criminal acts, may contain enough clear and present danger to justify such imprisonment; (3) men, women and children of a given ethnic group, both Americans and resident aliens can be presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas which require their imprisonment; (4) in time of war or emergency the military, perhaps without even the concurrence of the legislature, can decide what political opinions require imprisonment, and which ethnic groups are infected with them; and (5) the decision of the military can be carried out without indictment, trial, examination, jury, the confrontation of witnesses, counsel for the defense, the privilege against self-incrimination, or any of the other safeguards of 61 the Bill of Rights.¶ Rostow's summary describes a wrong much larger than the "relocation" of 120,000 people on the basis of their race or national origin for three or four years. It goes beyond the denial of Japanese Americans' civil rights and liberties to a dismantling of protections that are supposed to extend to everyone within this system.¶ Have these problems been corrected? The 1943 and 1944 Supreme Court opinions in the Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases have never been overturned. The coram nobis cases decided in the 1980s vacated the convictions but, as Fred Yen says, "Unfortunately, proclamations of Korematsu's permanent discrediting are premature. The Supreme Court has never overruled the case. It stands as valid precedent, an authoritative interpretation of our Constitution and the 'supreme Law of the Land.'"2 Could it happen again? Would it? Given the publicity and the reparations, it is unlikely that it will happen again to Japanese Americans, but that does not mean it could not happen to other groups. The following section explores parallels I have observed between the Asian American experience described above and the contemporary social, political, and legal treatment of Arab Americans and Muslims in the United States.¶ IV. HISTORY REPEATS AS WE WATCH: THE TREATMENT OF ARAB AMERICANS TODAY¶ A. The "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists" One way to examine whether the wrong done to Japanese Americans during World War II has been righted is to look at how the media and our political and judicial systems are responding to discrimination against Arab Americans and Muslims3 in the United States today. The possibility **that** Arab Americans could be interned just as Japanese Americans were lies just below the surface of popular consciousness, occasionally emerging as it did in the movie The Seige.6 We have no more legal protections against such a scenario than we did in 1942. However, we need not postulate the wholesale internment of Arab Americans to see how many of the issues faced today by Arab Americans parallel those Asian Americans have encountered.5¶ Just as Asian Americans have been "raced" as foreign, and from there as presumptively disloyal6 Arab Americans and Muslims have been "raced" as "terrorists": foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening. Although Arabs trace their roots to the Middle East and claim many different religious backgrounds, and Muslims come from all over the world and adhere to Islam, these distinctions are blurred and negative images about either Arabs or Muslims are often attributed to both. As Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on American-Islamic Relations notes, "The common stereotypes are that we're all Arabs, we're all violent and we're all conducting a holy war."67

#### Korematsu mirrors the Dred Scott decision in its flawed and racist judicial reasoning---both decisions found racial discrimination constitutionally legitimate

G. Edward White 11, Distinguished Professor of Law and University Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, December 2011, "Symposium: Supreme Mistakes: Determining Notoriety in Supreme Court Decisions," Pepperdine Law Review, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 197, lexis nexis

II. Examples of Notorious Mistakes: A First Look¶ ¶ In the long history of Supreme Court jurisprudence, a small number of cases have been consistently identified as notorious mistakes by commentators. Those cases need to be distinguished from a much larger group of cases that were severely criticized at the time they were decided but over the years have secured a degree of acceptance. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, n4 McCulloch v. Maryland, n5 Brown v. Board of Education, n6 and Miranda v. Arizona n7 are in the larger group of cases. The smaller group seems to include only a few cases, which appear to be distinguished by the fact that successive generations of commentators have continued to regard them as notorious. What gives those cases their notoriety? Perhaps a comparison of two cases regularly placed on the list of notorious mistakes will aid us in that inquiry.¶ [\*199] Dred Scott v. Sandford n8 and Korematsu v. United States n9 are likely to appear on nearly everyone's list of notorious mistakes. n10 Some sense of why can be gleaned from a characterization of Dred Scott by David Currie in 1985, and of Korematsu in a 1982 Congressional report on that case. Currie described Dred Scott as "bad policy and bad judicial politics ... [and] also bad law." n11 The Congressional report stated that Korematsu had been "overruled in the court of history." n12 Taken together, those characterizations of Dred Scott and Korematsu suggest that four characteristics have been attributed to notorious decisions: misguided outcomes, a flawed institutional stance on the part of the Court, deficient analytical reasoning, and being "on the wrong side" of history with respect to their cultural resonance.¶ The Dred Scott decision concluded that African-American slaves and their descendants were not "citizens of the United States" and hence ineligible to sue in the federal courts. n13 The decision further concluded that Congress could not outlaw slavery in federal territories because to do so would constitute an interference with the Fifth Amendment property rights of slaveholders. n14 The Korematsu decision allowed the federal government to evacuate American citizens of Japanese origin from the West Coast, where they were detained in internment centers during the course of World War II, even though the sole basis of their evacuation and detention was their national origin, and even though Americans of German or Italian extraction were not comparably treated**.** n15 Thus, Dred Scott committed the Court to the propositions that the Constitution protected the "rights" of humans to own other humans as property, and that African-Americans descended from slaves were a "degraded race" not worthy of United States citizenship, whereas Korematsu committed the Court to the proposition that American citizens of a particular ethnic origin could be summarily incarcerated by the government simply because of their ethnicity. Those [\*200] propositions, as policy statements, seem blatantly at odds with the foundational principles of American civilization that all persons are created equal and may not be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty by the state.¶ The outcomes reached in Dred Scott and Korematsu appear to suggest that the Court found the policies of slavery and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity to be constitutionally legitimate. The decisions could also be seen as reflecting an inappropriate institutional stance by the Court with respect to its role of determining the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government.¶ In Dred Scott the Court was asked to decide whether an African-American slave who had been taken by his owner into a federal territory where slavery was not permitted, and then "voluntarily" returned to a slave state, could sue for his freedom in federal court. n16 A majority of the Court found that African-American slaves were ineligible to sue in federal court. n17 That finding made any inquiry into the constitutional status of slavery in the federal territories irrelevant to the decision, but Chief Justice Roger Taney's opinion, which was characterized as the "opinion of the court," went on to conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which according to Taney protected the property rights of slave owners, prevented Congress from abolishing slavery in the territories. n18¶ The interaction of slavery and westward expansion has been recognized as one of the most deeply contested political issues of the antebellum period. The power of Congress to decide the status of slavery in federal territories had been acknowledged by supporters and opponents of slavery ever 1789, when Congress divided land acquired from Virginia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut into "northwest" and "southwest" portions, with the Ohio River serving as a boundary, and outlawed slavery in the northwest section while remaining silent on it in the southwest section. n19¶ As slavery became a polarizing national issue in the early nineteenth century, it was generally conceded that although the federal government had no power to abolish slavery in states, it appeared to retain that power in federal territories. n20 All of the political compromises related to the westward expansion of slavery that were fashioned by Congress between 1820 and 1850 proceeded on that assumption. Moreover, as the United States acquired a vast amount of new territory between 1803 and 1853, the attitude [\*201] of Congress toward slavery in portions of that territory was thought to foreshadow the attitude of residents of those portions when states formed from them sought to enter the Union. The process by which Congress gave permission to new states to enter the Union was heavily influenced by expectations about whether the states would be free or slave, and those expectations were influenced by Congress's treatment of slavery in the portions of territory from which prospective states were carved out. n21¶

#### Its ongoing legal legacy must be ended because the Court established a flawed precedent, just like it did in Dred Scott

G. Edward White 11, Distinguished Professor of Law and University Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, December 2011, "Symposium: Supreme Mistakes: Determining Notoriety in Supreme Court Decisions," Pepperdine Law Review, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 197, lexis nexis

By reaching out to decide the constitutional status of slavery in the federal territories in Dred Scott, the Taney Court treated the delicate balancing of free and slave territories, and free and slave states, as if it had been based on an erroneous assumption. Suddenly, Congress had no power to outlaw slavery in any federal territory. n22 That conclusion represented a dramatic intervention by the Court in an extremely sensitive political issue that Congress had sought to keep in equipoise. Moreover, the intervention was not necessary to the decision in Dred Scott.¶ Taney's conclusion that Congress had no power to outlaw slavery in the federal territories rested on two propositions. First, he announced that Congress's constitutional power to make rules and regulations for federal territories n23 extended only to territory within the United States in 1789. n24 Second, he maintained that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protected property in slaves. n25 Both propositions were novel. Taney's reading of the Territories Clause of the Constitution would have prevented Congress from exercising any of its enumerated powers outside the original thirteen states, n26 and Taney's interpretation of the Due Process Clause could not easily be squared with federal or state bans on the international or interstate slave trade, both of which were in place at the time of Dred Scott. n27¶ In short, Dred Scott can be seen as reaching a pernicious result, representing a categorical judicial resolution of an issue long regarded as deeply contested in the political branches of government, and resting on some dubious legal arguments. In addition, it was described as a mistake by [\*202] contemporaries, n28 the Republican Party adopted a platform in the 1860 election pledging to continue to outlaw slavery in federal territories in defiance of the decision, n29 and it was explicitly overruled by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. n30¶ One could construct a similar analysis of the Korematsu decision. It gave constitutional legitimacy to the incarceration of large numbers of American residents of Japanese descent simply on the basis of their ethnicity. The internment program made no effort to distinguish aliens from citizens or Japanese loyal to the United States from those loyal to Japan. n31 Internments were of indefinite duration. They were often accompanied by the confiscation of property owned by Japanese residents. Detainees could not challenge their detentions through writs of habeas corpus. And even though Justice Hugo Black's opinion for the Court asserted that Japanese residents of the West Coast were "not [interned] because of [their] race" but "because we are at war with the Japanese Empire," n32 the United States was also at war with Germany and Italy at the time, and few residents of German or Italian descent were interned during the course of that war.¶ Whereas the Court's posture with respect to other branches of government in Dred Scott might be described as awkwardly interventionist, its institutional posture in Korematsu might be described as awkwardly supine. The Court in Korematsu merely posited that military authorities had determined that allowing Japanese to remain on the West Coast posed threats of espionage and sabotage because Japan might invade the West Coast, and that relocating all Japanese to internment centers was necessary because there was no easy way to distinguish "loyal" from "disloyal" members of the Japanese population. n33 Although the Korematsu majority maintained that "legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect," and courts "must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny," n34 it arguably did not subject the restrictions on Japanese residents of the West Coast to any scrutiny at all. It simply noted that exclusion of "the whole group [of Japanese]" n35 from the West Coast was justified because of military authorities' concerns about espionage and sabotage by the Japanese on the West Coast, and their inability to "bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal." n36 The [\*203] Korematsu majority made no effort to determine whether military authorities had attempted to ascertain the loyalty of particular Japanese, or whether they had attempted to detain Germans or Italians anywhere in the United States. Instead, it concluded that the military authorities who ordered Japanese residents on the West Coast to leave their homes and report to "Assembly Centers," the first stage in their internment, were **justified in doing so because they "considered that the need for action was great, and time was short."** n37¶ The legal arguments mounted by Black for the Korematsu majority were no more statured than those employed by Taney in Dred Scott. Although Black rhetorically endorsed strict scrutiny for acts restricting the civil rights of racial minorities, he failed to subject the internment policy to searching review while denying that the internment policy was racially motivated. Justice Robert Jackson pointed out in dissent that the standard of review implemented by Black's opinion - whether the military reasonably believed that one of its policies was justified by a grave, imminent danger to public safety - could not realistically be applied by courts. n38 Moreover, the Korematsu Court had not heard any evidence on what the military believed or whether they could distinguish loyal from disloyal Japanese. It would subsequently be revealed that most of the basis for the internment order rested on stereotyped assumptions about the "unassimilated" status of Japanese communities in America rather than on military necessity, and government officials concealed this evidence from the Court. n39¶ Part of the reason that Korematsu would be "overruled in the court of history" resulted from the Court's subsequent implementation of the strict scrutiny standard for racial classifications proposed by Black in a series of cases reviewing classifications of African-Americans on the basis of their race. n40 Once the Court began to put some teeth into its review of policies affecting the civil rights of racial minorities, its rhetorical posture in Korematsu appeared disingenuous. In addition, the factors that led to the internment policy being formulated and upheld (uninformed stereotyping of a racial minority by military and civilian officials and reflexive deference on the part of the Court to the decisions of military officials in times of war) suggested that unless the Court actually followed through on its promise to subject racial discrimination to exacting scrutiny, the Korematsu precedent [\*204] might become, as Jackson put it, "a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." n41¶ III. Characteristics of "Mistaken" Decisions: A Further Analysis¶ ¶ Dred Scott and Korematsu thus share pernicious outcomes, a questionable institutional stance on the part of the Court, flawed legal reasoning, and, over time, a location on the wrong side of history. At first glance those criteria might appear to be useful baselines for identifying notorious Supreme Court decisions, but a closer look at the criteria suggests that three of them seem heavily dependent on the fourth.¶ Suppose one were to make some assumptions about the Dred Scott and Korematsu decisions that numerous contemporaries of those decisions made. Suppose, with respect to Dred Scott, one believed that slavery was a creation of positive law, so that if states chose to permit it, they created "property rights" in slaveholders. Suppose further that it was understood that slave status was a matter for states to decide, and other states and the federal government needed to respect those decisions. Both those assumptions were in place at the time of the Dred Scott decision n42 and were part of the reason why Congress and a series of antebellum presidents attempted to maintain a precise equilibrium between slave states and free states as new public lands states entered the Union. In this setting, the idea that Congress could outlaw slavery in all of the territory acquired by the United States between 1803 and 1853 - an area that more than doubled the size of the nation - was threatening to states with sizable slave populations. For example, in 1846, when President James K. Polk requested a congressional appropriation for funds to purchase lands from Mexico as part of a settlement to the Mexican War, David Wilmot, a Congressman from Pennsylvania, sought to attach a proviso to the appropriation that slavery would not be permitted in any of the territory acquired. n43¶ Thus, contemporaries of the Dred Scott decision might well have thought that granting power to Congress to abolish slavery in federal territories would result in much of the newly acquired territory being "free," and thus, over time, the balance between slave states and free states in Congress being disrupted. n44 Many residents of slave states believed that it was a small step from that situation to an antislavery majority in Congress seeking to abolish slavery in the states. n45 When the 1860 presidential platform of the Republican Party defied Dred Scott's conclusion that slavery [\*205] could not constitutionally be banned in federal territories, and Lincoln and a Republican congressional majority prevailed in the 1860 election, the Southern states who seceded from the Union stated that they were doing so because they believed that Congress would eventually seek to force them to abolish slavery. n46¶ In addition, antebellum constitutional jurisprudence had a strong tradition of protection for "vested" rights of property. Once one assumed that humans could legitimately be "owned" by other humans, the idea that Congress or a state legislature could take away the property rights of slaveholders seemed no different, conceptually, than other legislative appropriations of property that were inconsistent with the vested rights principle. It was one thing for citizens of a state to decide, collectively, that they did not want to hold slaves as property. It was another for slaveholders to have their ownership rights in slaves dissolved merely because they had become residents of a federal territory. n47¶ Finally, by the time Dred Scott was heard by the Court, Congress had demonstrated that it was no longer capable of containing the sectional tension that had resulted from the interaction of slavery with westward expansion. In the place of the Compromise of 1850's retention of the calibrated balance between slave and free states in the Union, Congress had substituted, in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the idea that "popular sovereignty" would govern the treatment of slavery in federal territories aspiring to become states. n48 The results were the appearance of competing pro-and anti-slavery legislatures and constitutions in Kansas, subsequent violence in that state, and the prospect that the entire mass of western federal territory might be subjected to similar treatment. In this atmosphere a definitive constitutional treatment of the status of slavery in federal territories may have seemed a welcome solution to many contemporaries of the Dred Scott case. n49 Justice James Wayne advanced this argument in a memorandum to the Taney Court urging the Justices to take the occasion of Dred Scott to rule on the constitutionality of slavery in the federal territories. n50¶ [\*206] If one emphasizes those antebellum assumptions about slavery and its political and constitutional status, the Court's intervention in Dred Scott becomes more explicable and more consistent with American constitutional jurisprudence at the time. One should recall that the Constitution interpreted in Dred Scott had all its "proslavery" provisions intact and that no major political candidate, including Lincoln, was advocating for the abolition of slavery in states where it had become established. n51 With this in mind, it is possible to see Dred Scott as a case not about the constitutional legitimacy of slavery itself, but about the constitutional legitimacy of extending slavery into federal territories. Were persons such as Dr. John Emerson, the owner of Dred Scott, and his wife to be at risk of losing their property every time they took up residence in a federal territory? If slavery was to prove economically viable in the territory acquired by the United States after the Mexican War, could Congress prevent it from taking root there? Faced with those possibly dire uncertainties, the Court in Dred Scott sought to settle the matter. n52¶ The decision in Dred Scott thus can be deemed pernicious only if one concludes that a number of the decision's contemporary observers were radically wrong about the legitimacy of humans owning other humans as property, so that all the antebellum common law decisions, statutes, and constitutional provisions treating slavery as legitimate were entitled to no legal weight. That is what successive generations of Americans after Dred Scott have concluded. But that fact only shows that Dred Scott was on the wrong side of history. It does not provide support for the other criteria associated with notorious Supreme Court decisions.¶ To be sure, one could criticize the Court's aggressively interventionist stance in Dred Scott, and some of Taney's arguments in the opinion, as analytically flawed. n53 But many Supreme Court opinions have been criticized for undue activism or for inept reasoning. Dred Scott's notoriety rests on something different: it upheld the constitutional legitimacy of slavery and suggested that African-Americans were an inferior class of beings. Once one restores a sufficient amount of historical context to show that both of those attitudes were part of the discourse of antebellum constitutional jurisprudence, the notoriety of Dred Scott initially seems to rest on its being on the wrong side of history.¶ A similar analysis is possible for Korematsu. For many years Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had been one of the architects of the internment [\*207] policy during his years as Attorney General and Governor of California, and Justices Black and Douglas, who had joined the majority in Korematsu, were unrepentant in their defense of the decision despite its apparent inconsistency with their willingness to protect the civil rights of minorities as members of the Warren Court. n54 In their defense of Korematsu, those Justices suggested that their critics needed to recall the decision's context. The United States Navy had been attacked by Japan at Pearl Harbor, and for two years after that attack, the Japanese navy appeared to be in control of the Pacific. Japanese submarines had been observed off the West Coast. Unlike German and Italian residents of America, Japanese residents were thought to be disinclined to assimilate into the general population, living in closely-knit communities and retaining Japanese as their first language. n55 Many first-generation Japanese citizens had close relatives in Japan, and some traveled back and forth between Japan and the United States. n56¶ Warren, Black, and Douglas maintained that in this setting it was difficult for civilian authorities on the West Coast, most of whom did not speak Japanese, to determine the loyalty of the resident Japanese population. Warren recalled that numerous Japanese were engaged in the commercial fishing industry, resulting in fishing boats operated by Japanese regularly venturing into Pacific waters. n57 Warren was engaged with civil defense issues as Attorney General and Governor, and he and his staff worried that fishing boats manned by Japanese residents of America could be employed to flash signals to Japanese submarines, or possibly portions of the Japanese fleet, stationed off of the coast. n58 It seemed at the time, Warren recalled, that [\*208] potential sabotage or espionage could be forestalled by moving the resident Japanese population away from where they might have access to Japanese forces in the Pacific. n59¶ In defending their role in implementing and sustaining the internment of Japanese residents of the West Coast, none of the Justices openly suggested that German or Italian residents were perceived of as less of a security threat than those of Japanese extraction, despite the fact that there were German submarines stationed off the Atlantic Coast. But both those populations had been in America far longer than Japanese residents, who had only come to the United States in substantial numbers in the early twentieth century and who were mainly located on the West Coast. n60 Americans had far greater linguistic familiarity with German and Italian than with Japanese. At the time the United States entered World War II, few Americans had encountered Japanese students in public schools or colleges. There were reasons for contemporaries of the Korematsu decision to believe the stereotype of "unassimilable" Japanese communities in America.¶ Further, there was considerable revulsion against Japan in the United States for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the event as a "date which will live in infamy." n61 Numerous Americans regarded it as outside the unwritten rules of wartime engagement since the United States was not a belligerent at the time the naval base at Pearl Harbor was attacked. Among the negative stereotypes applied to the nation of Japan after Pearl Harbor were tendencies to dissemble and to exhibit a ruthless disregard for human life. Sabotage operations among "unassimilable" Japanese communities on the West Coast were consistent with those stereotypes.¶ As for the Court's toothless standard of review in Korematsu, it was actually more searching, at least rhetorically, than the standard the Court had employed in Hirabayashi v. United States, decided a year earlier. Although technically the Hirabayashi case only involved a curfew order, not evacuation, a unanimous Court concluded that its standard of review of the order should be whether there was a rational basis for concluding that the curfew was necessary to protect against espionage and sabotage which might accompany an invasion. Even though there had been no evidence of sabotage, and even though officials had not advanced any reasons for why [\*209] Japanese residents should be singled out among those groups of residents that had "ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy," n62 the Court concluded that it could not say that the officials were mistaken in thinking that requiring Japanese-Americans to remain in their homes from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. was necessary to the war effort. n63¶ Thus Black's opinion in Korematsu at least recognized that the supine form of review adopted in Hirabayashi gave officials license to selectively restrict the activities of racial minorities without having to say why. Of course then after asserting that nothing but the gravest national emergency could justify classifications disadvantaging racial minorities, Black blithely accepted the same supposed justifications for interning Japanese residents on the West Coast that the Hirabayashi opinion had accepted in sustaining the curfew order. But given the fact that the United States and Japan were still at war in 1944, when Korematsu was handed down, and that American naval supremacy in the Pacific was far from assured at the time, how likely was the Supreme Court of the United States to engage in a searching investigation of a civil defense strategy designed to protect the West Coast from a Japanese invasion?¶ Black argued in Korematsu that "to cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue." n64 Korematsu, Black claimed, "was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese empire." n65 There was no way at the time for civilian or military authorities to gauge the threat of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast and little way of predicting the response of Japanese residents in America to that prospect. One could argue that Korematsu is one of those decisions that looks far worse in retrospect than it did at the time because some contingencies that were part of the basis of the decision - an invasion, Japanese-directed sabotage or espionage on the West Coast - did not actually occur. In light of that nonoccurrence, and the heightened sensitivity of late twentieth century and twenty-first century Americans toward racial classifications, Korematsu has ended up on the wrong side of history.¶ The question raised by the above analyses of Dred Scott and Korematsu boils down to this: should one conclude that the ranking of previous [\*210] decisions by the Court is essentially determined by whether a decision is perceived as being on the right or wrong side of history?¶ That conclusion seems oversimplified. Most decisions of the Court have a limited doctrinal shelf life. None of the Marshall Court's decisions interpreting the scope of the Commerce Clause n66 or the reach of the Contracts Clause n67 would be considered authoritative today. Nor would the efforts by late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Courts to "prick out the boundary," in police power and due process cases, between permissible and impermissible exercises of the police powers of the states be considered authoritative today. n68 Nor would the early and mid-twentieth century Court's treatment of obscenity, n69 commercial speech, n70 or subversive advocacy n71 be considered authoritative today. Does doctrinal obsolescence in a decision of the Court render it notorious? The answer would seem to be, on the whole, no.¶ A recent treatment of the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York can serve as an illustration. That opinion was a candidate for notoriety for several years in the middle and late twentieth century, primarily on the ground that it employed the discredited judicial doctrine of "liberty of contract" to invalidate maximum hours legislation initiated as a health measure. But the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York has been "rehabilitated" on the ground that in an era in which Justices were expected to engage in pricking the boundary between the police power and private rights in due process cases, it rested on the widely held assumption that legislative efforts to fix hours in the baking industry were unwarranted, paternalistic interferences with the freedom of employees to contract for their services. Furthermore, judicial efforts to attach substantive meaning to [\*211] terms such as liberty in the Due Process Clause were then regarded as consistent with the judiciary's role as a guardian of private rights under the Constitution. n72¶ In short, the Lochner majority's being on the wrong side of history for later commentators was not in itself a reason for treating the opinion as notorious if it was on the right side of history for contemporaries. Lochner was handed down by a divided Court, with Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissenting opinion also engaging in "boundary pricking," but concluding that the statute establishing maximum hours of work in the baking industry could be justified as reasonable exercise of the power to the states to protect the health of their citizens. n73 Only Holmes's dissenting opinion suggested that "liberty of contract" was an unwarranted judicial gloss, and no commentator would endorse that position for another four years. n74 It was not until 1937 that a majority of the Court would back away from the doctrine. n75¶ In contrast, the Korematsu decision was criticized, as early as six months after it was decided, as "hasty, unnecessary and mistaken," "in no way required or justified by the circumstances of the war," and "calculated to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social maladjustments of a cumulative and sinister kind." n76 As for Dred Scott, we have seen that criticism of that decision was immediate and widespread, and the election of 1860 suggested that its holding as to the status of slavery in the federal territories would not be enforced by either the Lincoln Administration or Congress.¶ Thus perceptions about the wrongheadedness of a result can affect evaluations of the reasoning accompanying that result and of the institutional stance adopted by the Court in the decision, but, taken alone, neither the doctrinal obsolescence of an opinion nor the subsequent estrangement of commentators from an outcome are enough to ensure notoriety. It seems to [\*212] be implicitly acknowledged that the popularity of outcomes reached by the Court in its decisions will change over time, and that the shelf life of the Court's constitutional doctrines will be comparatively short. What seems necessary for notoriety is a combination of foundational wrongheadedness and transparently defective reasoning, both of which are identified by contemporaries of the decision. On that ground both Dred Scott and Korematsu qualify. Taney's interpretation of the Territory Clause and his conclusion about the "degraded" status of African-Americans at the founding were attacked by Justice Benjamin Curtis in his Dred Scott dissent n77 and numerous commentators in the press at the time. n78 Black's rationale for upholding the evacuation order in Korematsu and the general treatment of Japanese-Americans by the United States government was savaged shortly after the decision was handed down by Yale law professor Eugene Rostow.

#### The precedent makes future internment likely---it massively expands executive authority and offers unlimited deference

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B. THE INTERNMENT CASES¶ The greatest move towards containing the threat of sabotage occurred on February 19, 1942, when President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which authorized the Secretary of War, or the military commander whom he might designate, "to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he ... may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded.44 Congress gave force to the Order by passing Public Law 503, which made it a misdemeanor to violate the orders of a military commander in a designated military area.45 Immediately, General DeWitt issued a number of proclamations setting up military zones, curfews, and travel regulations.46 These proclamations were followed up with civilian exclusion orders, which removed persons of Japanese ancestry from various areas along the West Coast, gathered them in assembly areas and • 47 transported to relocation camps. In all, the government removed 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from their homes.48¶ The Internment Cases both occurred under violations of the military proclamations. Gordon Hirabayashi, in an act of civil defiance, turned himself into the FBI with the specific purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the civilian exclusion and curfew orders.49 Conversely, Fred Korematsu violated the exclusion order in trying to pose as a non- Japanese.50 In both cases, the petitioners challenged the military orders (Hirabayashi addressed the curfew order, Korematsu addressed the exclusion order) for violating their rights to equal protection under the law.¶ Condemning any legal classifications based on race, it appeared that the Supreme Court would lean in the petitioners' favor.51 Despite its rigid scrutiny of the racial classifications involving the curfew and exclusion orders, however, the Court upheld both orders to prevent acts of espionage and sabotage by the potentially disloyal members of the Japanese American population.2 The Supreme Court's ruling that such blatant racial classifications were constitutional in light of the government's national security interests indicates that the Internment Cases provide the current government with broad authority to curb the terrorist threat.¶ C. ARE THE INTERNMENT CASES GOOD LAW TODAY?¶ Before determining Internment Cases' present legal effect, one must realize that the Court used a more amorphous form of equal protection analysis to uphold the exclusion orders. Although both cases were decided before the Court "reverse incorporated" the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause into the 5th Amendment (thus making it applicable to federal government actions), it conducted the analysis anyway.5 The fact that the Internment Cases relied on an embryonic form of scrutiny affects the way in which courts today can interpret their precedential scope. For example, a modern court may have trouble narrowly interpreting the two cases as precedents permitting the government to intern American citizens on the basis of race. Although matter-of-factly that was what occurred, as a legal matter, it is questionable whether the Internment would survive the modern form of strict scrutiny, which requires the government to achieve its ends with the least restrictive means, no matter how compelling those ends might be.54 As such, a court may have a better chance at analogizing to more general themes within the Internment Cases, or to particular statements of law, which remain unchanged to this day.¶ In 1938, the Supreme Court had established the notion of differing levels of judicial scrutiny to be utilized when examining government actions that violated the Bill of Rights in the now-famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co. ("Carolene Products").55 The Court held that any government action facially classifying individuals on the basis of race, under this equal protection analysis, would require a "more searching inquiry," since "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.56 Justice Harlan Stone, who authored the footnote, did not offer it as a settled theorem of judicial review, but as a starting point for debate among attorneys, academics, and judges that would eventually yield a well thought-out comprehensive doctrine.57 Equal protection and free speech challenges arose, however, before his proposal had time to percolate within the legal community.58 As a result, the Internment Cases' Court had little precedent or scholarly analysis with which to guide their understanding of ''a more searching inquiry."¶ Although the Internment Cases do not cite to the footnote in their analysis, they both recognized that classifications based on ancestry are "by their nature odious to a free people,"59 and therefore "immediately suspect'60 and subject to "the most rigid scrutiny.,61 Though Hirabayashi did not specifically use the terms "most rigid scrutiny," it implied such heightened inquiry, noting that because of the "odious[ness]" of "legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone," "for that reason" such legislation has often constituted a denial of equal protection.62 Furthermore, Chief Justice Stone authored the Hirabayashi opinion, which would lead to the assumption that he would abide by the reasoning he set forth in the Carolene Products footnote.63 Both decisions, however, added one caveat to the Carolene Products footnote, stating that the Bill of Rights does not represent an impenetrable guarantee of individual liberty and may be supplanted when the government proffers a legally sufficient justification.64¶ The greatest distinction between the Internment Cases' scrutiny and the modern notion of heightened scrutiny is the former's underdeveloped sense of what burden the government must meet in order to offer a sufficiently legal justification. Modern equal protection analysis states that the government can classify on the basis of race only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling interest.65¶ The Internment Cases' Court failed to address the "necessity" aspect of heightened scrutiny. The Courts' analyses granted the government with far more "wiggle room" than any modern court would dare provide. The term "necessary" entails a close-fit between the government's means to achieving its compelling end; it cannot be substantially over or under- inclusive.66 For example, even if preventing terrorism represents a worthwhile pursuit, the government cannot exclude Arabs from large buildings as such a policy would be both substantially over-inclusive (because all Arabs are not terrorists) and under-inclusive (because all terrorists are not Arabs). Hirabayashi literally did not address the potential burdens and overbreadth of the military imposed curfew for Japanese Americans.67 On the other hand, Korematsu did briefly ponder the higher burden of being excluded from one's home versus being subject to a curfew.68 Despite mentioning these hardships, the Court seems to have merged the "means-ends fit" analysis with the "compelling interest" portion of heightened scrutiny as it completely dismisses the burdens as a necessary wartime hardship and part of maintaining national security.69 It did not independently address whether the hardships incurred by the Japanese Americans were so "overreaching" or "burdensome" that there had to exist a less restrictive alternative to bolster national security. If anything, the Korematsu majority's terse mention of the hardships appears almost perfunctory as shown in Justice Owen Robert's dissent.7° The Court's language in the Internment Cases also indicates a somewhat ambiguous definition of what exactly constitutes a "compelling government interest." Admittedly, judicial scrutiny represents a value judgment based on the totality of the circumstances, such that determining the level of deference owed to the government in scrutinizing its actions becomes a daunting task for the Court. Justice Stone, however, deployed his "newly forged" invention of heightened scrutiny before the legal community could explore its intricacies. As such, heightened scrutiny appeared before scholars characterized it as "strict in theory and fatal in fact.",71¶ Korematsu states that while "a pressing public necessity" may sometimes justify classification, "racial antagonism never can.72 Taken as they are, the words "pressing public necessity" imply absolutely anything the government finds to be gnawing at its heel. The only limitation the Court places on a "pressing public necessity" is the absence of any openly racist justifications. Within the context of the Court's analysis, one can find some rigidity to the "pressing public necessity" requirement as it explained the special circumstances of war and the dangers of an unascertainable number of enemy saboteurs among the Japanese American population.73 Then again, any justification can appear "necessary" with competent lawyering. The Court offered little on the basis of comparison to give teeth to the standard of review, basing most of its analysis on the equally ambiguous Hirabayashi case.74¶ Justice Stone's language in Hirabayashi seems to imply that the court's conception of "rigid scrutiny" is not necessarily rigid when compared to modern formulations of judicial scrutiny for facially racial classifications. The Court stated that it was "enough" that circumstances within the knowledge of the military afforded a "rational basis for the decision which they made.75 Modern "rational basis review" is extremely deferential to the government interest - so much so that any conceivable constitutional purpose, even if it is not the government's actual purpose, will justify upholding the law.76¶ Contextually, however, Justice Stone probably meant for this rational basis formulation to possess less government deference than the rubberstamp interpretation it holds today. Within the decision, he prefaced his application of the standard by generally condemning government racial classifications.77 **It would not make sense logically to condemn a practice and then excuse it without any compelling justification.** Furthermore, it is clear that the standard by which Justice Stone conducted his equal protection analysis followed his Carolene Products footnote, as it fell in stride with a series of post-Carolene dissents in which he appealed for greater minority protection.78¶ Although Stone offered precedents to further explicate the components of heightened scrutiny for racial classifications in Hirabayashi, the cases do little to elaborate on his original query posed in Carolene Products. Setting up the standard for heightened scrutiny, he listed Yick Wo v. Hopkins ("Yick Wo"), 79 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad ("Yu Cong Eng"), 80 and Hill v. Texas ("Hill") 81 as examples of racial classifications failing to meet the standard.82 However, he conceded that these precedents would be controlling, "were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war ... calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas."83 Stone's language, "were it not for," seems to distinguish the use of heightened scrutiny altogether in the face of military necessity, and the decision itself fails to debate the validity of the government's justification or the means with which to achieve it.¶ Even the cases themselves shed little light on the intricacies of heightened scrutiny.84 Although the Court generally deplored the discriminatory results and application of the laws considered in those cases, its lengthy discussions on the merits of the government's purposes were unnecessary since, in all three cases, they were clearly discriminatory.85 Therefore, in Hirabayashi, Stone did not compare the government purpose of military necessity to any cases involving government purposes that were outright irrational. Consequently, the majority simply "shot from the hip" in making its value judgment.¶ Despite the circumstances under which they were decided, the Internment Cases have not been overruled and represent good law today. Some may argue that even without the formality of a Supreme Court ruling, lower courts have overturned the convictions of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu, placing the original decisions in jeopardy.86 In fact, a recent article in the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal commented that Korematsu is dead law in light of the 2001 Supreme Court decision, Zadvydas v. Davis.87 These criticisms, however, fail to actually phase out the Internment Cases' core legal analysis.¶ Lower courts overturned Hirabayashi and Korematsu's convictions on the basis of a factual error, but they did not overrule the legal analysis relied upon in the original Internment Cases. Hirabayashi and Korematsu challenged their convictions in the mid-1980s after the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians ("CWRIC") unearthed a drove of information suggesting that the government knowingly suppressed and altered evidence during the original trial.88 Their cause of action, however, limited them to only challenging the factual errors leading to their convictions and not the law itself. Hirabayashi and Korematsu each petitioned the court under a writ of coram nobis, which allows petitioners to challenge a federal criminal conviction obtained by constitutional or fundamental error that renders a proceeding irregular and invalid.89 Although Korematsu argued that under current constitutional standards his conviction would not survive strict scrutiny, the Court dismissed his argument, noting that "the writ of coram nobis [is] used to correct errors of fact," and "[is] not used to correct legal errors and this court has no power, nor does it attempt, to correct any such errors."90 The court hearing Hirabayashi's coram nobis petition simply ignored the issue entirely.9' Although the Georgetown article interprets Zadvydas' reasoning to overrule the Internment Cases, the actual holding of the case is limited to modifying a post-removal-period detention statute, and, even if applied broadly, does not rule out the possibility of infinitely detaining "specially dangerous individuals."92 Zadvydas concerned a statute which allows the government to detain a deportable alien if it has not been able to secure the alien's removal during a 90-day statutory "removal period.93 The Court held that the statute implies a limit on the post-removal detention period, which the article interprets as an all-out ban on indefinite detentions of immigrants or citizens without due process.94 Factually, **the Zadvydas statute applies to a procedurally narrower class of people than the Internment Orders** (aliens adjudged to be deported versus aliens suspected of espionage) and appears to serve a less "urgent" purpose in "ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings" and "[p]reventing danger to the community.,95 Therefore, it may be argued that the two cases are not factually analogous. Even if they are, Zadvydas' holding itself does not preclude the possibility of indefinitely detaining particularly dangerous individuals without due process.96 The Court set aside this particular exception to the general rule, stating that such detainment is constitutionally suspect.97 The Zadvydas statute did not target dangerous individuals, such as terrorists; therefore, it did not fit within the exception because it broadly applied to even the most innocuous tourist visa violators.98 In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court upheld the orders because the government, despite falsifying the evidence, convinced the Court that Japanese Americans and immigrants presented an acute danger to national security. Lastly, Zadvydas did not contain any references to either Internment Case, so it is probably safe to assume that the Court did not intend to overrule them in the process.¶ The greatest evidence, however, that the Internment Cases are still live precedents is that current cases still cite to them. Ninth Circuit decision Johnson v. State of California 99 cited to Hirabayashi on February 25, 2003, and American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO) v. United States referred to Korematsu on March 29, 2002.0° Both cases used Hirabayashi and Korematsu as authority for strictly scrutinizing government racial classifications. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court cited the Internment Cases as authority on the relationship between strict scrutiny and race.'0' In fact, many cases have referred to the Internment Cases for this purpose, as they represent the Supreme Court's first formulation of heightened scrutiny. The scope of the Internment Cases' precedent, however, extends beyond simply establishing strict scrutiny for racial classifications, and includes the Supreme Court's commentary on the circumstances in which such "odious'1T2 measures are justifiable. The recalcitrant position that this justification occupies in Supreme Court case history poses the greatest threat to present-day civil liberties.¶ With respect to the current cases challenging the executive orders invoked in the wake of the September l1th attacks, Korematsu and Hirabayashi may offer virtually unlimited deference **to the government in its efforts to maintain national security in times of war.** Hirabayashi (upon which Korematsu based its analysis) characterized the war power of the federal government as the "power to wage war successfully" that "extends to every matter so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct, and embraces every phase of the national defense[.]"'103 By approving the wholesale detainment of an entire ethnic group in order to prevent potential sabotage, the Court provided the government a very wide berth in determining the neccesary actions in waging a successful war. Such a precedent ostensibly allows the government to use a "declaration of war" as a proxy for any action it sees fit. "War" then releases the government from any obligations to equal protection and other Constitutional rights. Thus, Padilla's characterization of the current terrorist scenario as one in which the President's war powers are invoked'04 renders Hirabayashi and Korematsu applicable.¶ The government has already crept toward the direction predicted by the Internment Cases. Prior to Hamdi and Padilla, Congress passed a joint resolution empowering the President to take all "necessary and appropriate" measures to prevent any future acts of terrorism against the United States.105 Hamdi itself implicitly acknowledged the Internment Cases' precedent in its explanation of the President's war power, by referencing the Supreme Court's tendency to defer to the political branches when "called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs."' Coincidentally, both Hamdi and Hirabayashi cite to Ex parte Quirin ("Quirin"), a case involving the due process rights of German saboteurs caught on American soil, to derive the broad authority given to the President during times of war.'07 Although Hamdi paid lip service to the idea that executive wartime authority is not unlimited,108 it also stated, "the Constitution does not specifically contemplate any role for courts in the conduct of war, or in foreign policy generally."'109¶ Even if the President's war power is invoked, one might argue that in 1971 the legislature statutorily curtailed the President's discretionary power to detain citizens by first requiring an "Act of Congress."10 Although argued in the government's brief in the Korematsu coram nobis case as a pre-existing legislative barrier to future mass-internments, the statute does little to limit the Internment Cases' authority.' The legislature did, in fact, approve the executive order under which Korematsu was convicted.' 2 The government may have characterized this approval as an isolated incident that was repealed in 1976,13 but Hamdi and Padilla subsequently refuted any notion that occurences of congressional approval are few and far between. Both cases exempted President Bush's detainment executive order stating that the prior joint resolution granting the President "necessary and appropriate" authority constituted an "Act of Congress."' 14 Although in theory the 1971 statute makes it more difficult for the President to detain citizens by requiring congressional approval, the joint resolution that quickly followed the terrorist attacks demonstrates that Congress is not reluctant to give its authorization.¶ **The** broad presidential war authority precedent **established in the Internment Cases appears to act as an all-purpose compelling government interest, which may** allow the government to openly target ethnic and religious groups **associated with terrorism**. The current executive orders tiptoe around equal protection issues given that they do not specifically call for the detention of Arabs or Muslims. Even if the government detains a disproportionate number of people who are members of these groups, the government's actions are unchallengeable on these grounds without proof of a discriminatory purpose. Now, with Hirabayashi and Korematsu as accessible precedents, the government may openly profile suspect groups by entirely quashing the equal protection issue. Even if the government bases its correlations off of unreliable research tainted with racial prejudice, as long as the Court is unaware of these transgressions, the government can argue in the vein of Hirabayashi that such classifications are logically related to preserving national security. Though neither Hamdi nor Padilla involved an equal protection issue, their deference to government war authority foreshadows a Hirabayashi extension of that authority to facially racial classifications.¶ One factor hindering the use of the Internment Cases is that they were decided in a very different time and under a dated legal standard. The fact that the Internment Cases emerged under a less-developed form of strict scrutiny makes it less tenable that something as extreme as a full-scale exclusion and internment of an ethnic group will occur again. Moreover, it is always possible that the Hirabayashi and Korematsu Courts' ambiguity in defining a compelling interest may even limit the clout "national security" carries as an end-all government purpose.¶ Even with these historical and contextual roadblocks, cases decided after the Internment Cases effectively touched up their anachronistic blemishes. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena referred to Korematsu and Hirabayashi in delineating its standard of heightened scrutiny, confirming that the two previous cases did, in fact, employ some version of strict scrutiny at the time.1"5 Furthermore, Adarand explicitly rejected the long- held notion that "strict scrutiny is strict in theory, and fatal in fact," which although more of an academic characterization, highlights the surmountability of heightened scrutiny. Still, it is almost impossible for the government to intern an entire ethnic group because it is not narrowly tailored to, nor the least restrictive alternative for, the government's interest in protecting national security. This construction of strict scrutiny, however, does not rule out inconveniences slightly less than Internment and leaves open the possibility of, for example, mandatory baggage searches for all Arab-American airplane passengers. Furthermore, **there is always the possibility of a Court resorting to Korematsu's "balancing out" of the narrow tailoring requirement for "hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships."**'17 Moreover, even if the Internment Cases' outdated methodology of judicial review precludes them from being applied in a modern equal protection analysis, it still does not affect the broad authority given the President to "wage war successfully." Indeed, no precedent explicitly bars uses of the Internment Cases**, and** in the crises- minded state of our present times, these relics of the past are factually analogous and legally applicable.

#### Ending the precedent is binding and prevents circumvention

Stephen I. Vladeck 9, associate professor at American University Washington College of Law, 2009, "The Long War, The Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox," 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. ahttps://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc2289/LT/Vladeck.Short.pdf

B. The Limits of Jackson’s Dissent—and of Wittes’s Argument¶ As much as Jackson’s dissent has been celebrated for its attack on the substance of Black’s majority decision, its argument against judicial involvement has been roundly criticized. In what became the authoritative critique of Korematsu, Eugene Rostow denounced Jackson’s opinion as “a fascinating and fantastic essay in nihilism.” 135 Even Professor Hutchinson, among Jackson’s more sympathetic commentators, noted two obvious flaws: “some emergencies may not be resolved quickly or clearly, and judicial abstention may popularly and even formally be understood as tacit approval.”¶ 136¶ These concerns are even more poignant as applied to Wittes’s work. Almost twice as much time has passed since Congress enacted the AUMF as that which elapsed between Pearl Harbor and V-E Day. Moreover, the war on terrorism has the potential to drag on for generations, which would turn temporary exercises of military necessity into permanent policy, a prospect Jackson himself railed against in a 1948 concurrence.¶ 137¶ But I also think the risk runs even deeper , for even if one takes Jackson’s logic at face value, it holds not just that the underlying military conduct is unreviewable, but that the assertion of military necessity (as justifying the decision not to review the underlying conduct) is itself unreviewable. Just like recent debates over whether procedurally valid suspensions of habeas corpus are substantively reviewable by the courts, 138 the underlying idea is that once the government makes a threshold procedural showing, there is nothing for the courts to do.¶ Even if one believes that suspensions are unreviewable, there is a critical difference between the Suspension Clause and the issue here: At least with regard to the former, there is a colorable claim that the Constitution itself ousts the courts from reviewing whether there is a “case[s] of Rebellion or Invasion where the public Safety requires” suspension. 139 In contrast, Jackson’s argument sounds purely in pragmatism—that the reason not to review whether military necessity exists is because such review will lead either to the courts affirming an unlawful policy, or to the potential that the political branches will simply ignore a judicial decision invalidating such a policy. Like Jackson before him, Wittes seems to believe that the threat to liberty posed by judicial deference in that situation pales in comparison to the threat posed by judicial review.¶ The problem is that such a belief is based on a series of assumptions that Wittes does not attempt to prove. First, he assumes that the Executive Branch would ignore a judicial decision invalidating action that might be justified by military necessity. While Jackson may arguably have had credible reason to fear such conduct (given his experience with both the Gold Clause Cases 140 and the “switch in time”), 141 a lot has changed in the past six-and-a-half decades, to the point where I, at least, cannot imagine a contemporary President possessing the political capital to expressly refuse to enforce a Supreme Court decision. But perhaps I’m naïve.¶ 142¶ Second, Wittes assumes that a judicial decision invalidating action that might be justified by military necessity will therefore preclude the relevant government official from taking such action. Of course , it will not; it will merely require that official to make the “moral” choice—between doing what is legal and doing what he or she believes is “right.” Just as legality does not follow from necessity, so too does illegality not compel the conclusion that the particular conduct is unnecessary. I don’t mean to devolve into metaphysics; I mean only to point out that this is a relevant consideration that Wittes’s critique overlooks. There may in fact be something to gain from requiring government officials to break the law in such extreme circumstances.¶ Finally, at a more basic level, there is history, to which we—unlike Justice Jackson—are privy. The government affirmatively misled the Court in Korematsu, just as it apparently did in Hirabayashi, claiming military necessity where none truly existed. 143 Given this history—and any number of additional episodes—we cannot afford to have faith that the government would only choose to invoke Jackson’s “military necessity” exception to judicial review in cases of urgent need, especially when the invocation itself is unreviewable. In the end, I think Wittes (like Jackson before him) is right to focus our attention on the potential dilemma that courts face in these cases. But their solution would be significantly worse than the disease.¶ CONCLUSION¶ Dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 144 the Supreme Court’s famous 1928 decision sustaining against Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges a criminal conviction based upon evidence obtained through a warrantless wiretap, Justice Brandeis rejected the argument that the wire tap could be justified as an exercise of law enforcement powers justified by necessity. In his words,¶ Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well- meaning but without understanding.¶ 145¶ As the story usually goes, Brandeis’s view of the constitutionality of such warrantless wiretapping—or lack thereof—was subsequently vindicated, with the Warren Court overruling Olmstead in Berger v. New York 146 and Katz v. United States . 147 Such conventional wisdom, though, may well have been another casualty of September 11, given the Bush Administration’s own admission that it engaged in a systematic program of warrantless wiretapping, 148 a program that, even if constitutional, seems difficult to reconcile with the exclusivity provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 149 —at least prior to the 2008 amendments thereto.¶ 150¶ Putting the substance of Brandeis’s dissent aside (at least for the moment), the above-quoted passage may be the perfect epigraph to describe the Bush Administration’s conduct of the war on terrorism, policies that have been pursued by “men [and women] of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” Jane Mayer certainly thought so—her important recent book, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Values, 151 places Brandeis’s sentiment right on the back cover, just above President Bush’s assertion in his 2003 State of the Union address that “[o]ne by one, the terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice.” 152¶ Mayer’s book is significant here in another respect, as well, for it is the most thorough account yet available of the government’s mistreatment of detainees—and the role that senior governmental official s played in promulgating policies directly leading to that mistreatment. As Mayer’ s account makes clear, even with the jousting over definitional semantics, there can no longer be any question that the U.S. government has tortured detainees in its custody during the war on terrorism. 153 And as I suggested above, I suspect that it is the specter of courts reviewing torture claims that prompts the judicial review paradox of which Wittes is so concerned.¶ One could argue, as Alice Ristroph (among others) has, that torture is a singularly bad example of a situation where courts should defer on whether torture is “necessary” in favor of those with “expertise.” After all, as Ristroph notes, the real “experts” all seem to agree that torture is counterproductive. 15¶ But even if torture actually worked, and even if one accepted that the completely fantastical ticking-bomb hypothetic al could actually happen someday, 155 there would still be government officials claiming the need to use such extreme authority when it was not strictly necessary. That is Brandeis’ s point: even the most well-intentioned of officers will cloak in the guise of “necessity” actions that are neither necessary nor appropriate, which is exactly why judicial review is so essential.¶ 156¶ The great irony in all of this is Jackson. Profoundly affected by his experience as lead American prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, where he witnessed first-hand the chaos and calamity that could ensue when courts stopped serving as a check on the tyranny of the majority, 157 he became more circumspect later in his career about whether the courts should ever defer to executive claims of need, even while still worrying about whet her they would. As he concluded his celebrated concurrence in Youngstown.¶ With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up. 158

#### We have a moral obligation to advocate for effective remedies to injustices like Korematsu---the aff is not the ONLY starting point, but is ONE effective starting point to challenge executive abuses of power

Natsu Taylor Saito 10, Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law, “ARTICLE: INTERNMENTS, THEN AND NOW: CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-9/11 AMERICA”, Spring, 2 Duke Forum for L. & Soc. Change 71, Lexis

The dangers illustrated by the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II appear to be alive and well in post-9/11 America. If we wish to transform that reality, we cannot limit ourselves to resisting each new iteration of this pattern in a piecemeal fashion. Appealing to Congress, the executive, or even the courts to curb particular "excesses" or to enforce specific constitutional guarantees in a more effective manner still leaves Justice Jackson's "loaded weapon" available to those who would utilize it in the future. This brings us to what I believe may be the most dangerous legacy of the Japanese American internment--the failure of all branches of government to acknowledge what actually happened, to take effective remedial measures, or to hold to account those responsible for acknowledged injustices.¶ As Jerry Kang has documented, the Supreme Court did a remarkable job in the internment cases of "[letting] the military do what it will, keep[ing] its own hands clean, and forg[ing] plausible deniability for others." n182 Although the cases were self-evidently about the constitutionality of the detentions, the Court limited its holding in the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases to the legality of the [\*98] curfew, n183 and in Korematsu it bypassed the question of internment, approving the exclusion order as an extension of the curfew upheld in Hirabayashi. n184 "This segmentation technique allowed the Court to obscure its own agency and thereby minimize responsibility for its choice." n185¶ In ex parte Endo, n186 decided at the same time as Korematsu, the issue of internment could no longer be avoided, for the only question was whether the government could continue to detain a U.S. citizen whom it conceded was "loyal." The Court, which waited to issue its decision until President Franklin Roosevelt had been safely re-elected, n187 found Mitsuye Endo's continued detention unlawful, but managed to absolve both Congress and the president by claiming that the War Relocation Authority ("WRA") had not been authorized to detain Endo. n188 In turn, the lower federal court decisions vacating the convictions of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu held that the Supreme Court would have ruled differently in the 1940s, had the justices been aware that they were being misled by the government's lawyers. n189¶ More than forty years after the fact, the Civil Liberties Act attributed the internment to a combination of wartime hysteria, racial prejudice, and a failure of political leadership. This legislation also provided an apology and $ 20,000 in compensation to each surviving internee. n190 Despite the historic significance of this Act, and the enormous importance of the redress process to individual survivors and to the Japanese American community as a whole, n191 the fact that the legislative debate and the apology it produced were couched in terms of the wholesale loyalty of Japanese Americans is problematic. n192 Chris Iijima observed that, "[w]hile there was general agreement, at least rhetorically, on the injustice of the internment . . . [t]hose who, at the time of internment, saw it for the injustice and outrage that it was and chose to dissent continue to be silenced and unheralded even during the process of acknowledging their prescience." n193 As I [\*99] have argued elsewhere, the larger message that Congress seemingly intended to convey was that Japanese Americans should be rewarded for cooperating in our own incarceration, not that a wrong which should have been more widely resisted had occurred. n194¶ This Article began with Eugene Rostow's question: "What are we to think of our own part in a program which violates every democratic social value, yet has been approved by the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court?" n195 Answering this question requires us to look not only at whether the institutions of government fulfilled their responsibilities under the Constitution, but whether the individual actors involved have been held accountable.¶ In the case of the Japanese American internment, it seems quite clear that those most responsible were well-rewarded. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, who falsely claimed that evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was necessary despite the fact that the War Department had determined that there was "no threat of imminent attack," and whose Final Report stated plainly that time was not an issue in assessing the loyalty of Japanese Americans, n196 was subsequently appointed Commandant of the Army and Navy Staff College and, after his retirement, promoted to full general by a special act of Congress. n197 Karl Bendetsen, the primary architect of the internment and author of DeWitt's Final Report, was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army in 1950 and Undersecretary in 1952, before leaving government to become a corporate executive. n198¶ Attorney General Francis Biddle, who was well aware of the problems with DeWitt's report, went on to represent the United States at the Nuremberg Tribunal and later became a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. n199 Because DeWitt's arguments contradicted the government's position that evacuation was necessary as there was insufficient time to conduct loyalty hearings, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy ensured that the version of the Final Report made available to the Supreme Court was revised to eliminate the problematic language. n200 He went on to become the founding president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("The [\*100] World Bank") and, later, a senior advisor to President Reagan. n201 The Justice Department's liaison to the WRA, Tom C. Clark, was first appointed Attorney General and eventually became a justice on the Supreme Court. n202¶ Part of the government's legal strategy was to avoid disputes about the accuracy of the military's assessments by having the courts take judicial notice of "facts" that were based upon unfounded presumptions about race and culture. n203 In turn, many of these "facts" had been generated by the media, most notably the press controlled by William Randolph Hearst, n204 and groups such as the Native Sons of the Golden West, an organization dedicated to preserving California "as it has always been and as God himself intended it shall always be--the White Man's Paradise." n205 In 1942, Earl Warren, then-Attorney General of California and a member of the Native Sons, coached the California Joint Immigration Committee--formerly known as the Asiatic Exclusion League--on how "to persuade the federal government that all ethnic Japanese should be excluded from the West Coast." n206 According to the CWRIC, "In DeWitt's Final Report, much of Warren's presentation to the [congressional committee preparing legislation to criminalize non-compliance with the military orders] was repeated virtually verbatim, without attribution. Warren's arguments, presented after the signing of the Executive Order, became the central justifications presented by DeWitt for the evacuation." n207 Subsequently Warren was elected Governor of California in November 1942, twice reelected, and appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1953. n208¶ Even government attorneys who opposed the internment acquiesced in its implementation and participated in its defense. Edward Ennis, Director of the Alien Enemy Unit of the Justice Department, and Assistant Attorney General James R. Rowe Jr. both recognized the factual inaccuracies and constitutional problems inherent to the government's arguments of "military necessity." Nonetheless, as Rowe later stated, he managed to "convince Ennis that it was not important enough to make him quit his job." n209¶ [\*101] With this sort of record, why would any public official, military leader, or government employee be deterred from engaging in comparable behavior? It remains unclear whether any officials will be held responsible for the detentions, abuse, and torture associated with the War on Terror that has been waged by the United States since 2001, but the signs are not propitious.¶ The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee called for the removal of Civil Rights Commissioner Kirsanow following his defense of internment in 2002. n210 He was not removed, although apparently he did apologize, insisting that his remarks had been taken out of context. n211 In January 2006, while Congress was in recess, President Bush appointed Kirsanow to the National Labor Relations Board. n212 Congressman Coble expressed his "regret" that "many Japanese and Arab Americans found my choice of words offensive," but ignored calls for his resignation as chair of the subcommittee on terrorism. n213¶ CIA Director "Leon Panetta announced at his confirmation hearing that CIA agents that engaged in torture, including waterboarding, in the early phases of the war against terrorism, would not be criminally prosecuted." n214 In fact, attorneys in the Obama administration have continued to rely "on the state secret doctrine and thus seem prepared to confer de facto immunity on the CIA for constitutional wrongs as gross as those entailed in extraordinary rendition." n215 According to Attorney General Eric Holder, "It would be unfair to prosecute dedicated men and women working to protect America for conduct that was sanctioned in advance by the Justice Department." n216¶ It appears unlikely that those who sanctioned the illegal or unconstitutional programs will be prosecuted. As Jordon Paust observed in 2007, the administration of George W. Bush had "furthered a general policy of impunity by refusing to prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes Act or alternative legislation, the torture statute, genocide legislation, and legislation permitting prosecution of certain civilians employed by or accompanying U.S. military forces abroad." n217 Shortly after Jay Bybee issued his torture memorandum in August 2002, President Bush appointed him to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and he was confirmed in March 2003. n218 John Yoo, who [\*102] drafted the torture memos, has returned to his law professorship at Boalt Hall. n219 The Obama Justice Department has rejected recommendations of ethics investigators concerning violations of professional standards by Bybee and Yoo. n220 Although President Obama's January 22 Executive Order "prohibits reliance on any Department of Justice or other legal advice concerning interrogation that was issued between September 11, 2001 and January 20, 2009," n221 when questioned about possible prosecutions for torture, he has only emphasized the importance of looking forward, not backward. n222 As things stand, then, there is no reasonable prospect of legal remedies for any of the wrongs associated with the so-called War on Terror.¶ I believe we, as lawyers and legal scholars, have responsibilities distinct from those of documentary historians or moral theorists. It is a central tenet of the rule of law that legal rights without remedies are meaningless. n223 If the legal system has permitted or facilitated legal wrongs, we have an obligation to ensure that effective remedies are implemented. In other words, it is necessary to address the question of accountability for injustice and, where there are consistent patterns replicating injustices, we must acknowledge that the remedies thus far employed have been inadequate. Otherwise, we are engaging not in legal analysis but alchemy.¶ The injustices of the Japanese American internment were belatedly acknowledged and partial redress provided to some of its victims, but even these measures were couched in terms which exonerated the institutional and individual actors responsible for the wrongs at issue. This left the door open for the dangers posed by the internment to be replicated in the current War on Terror, and our failure to hold those accountable for contemporaneous wrongs will ensure that they, too, will be repeated in the future.

#### Avoiding the original case silences dissent---an investigation against government racism by external individuals like us is key to prevent the same wrongs from happening again

Natsu Taylor Saito 1, professor at Georgia State University College of Law, 2001, "Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the 'Racing' of Arab Americans as 'Terrorists,'" Asian Law Journal, 8 Asian L. J. 1, 2001, hein online

V. CONCLUSION: CONTESTING THE SYMBOLISM OF REDRESS¶ After a thoughtful study of the legislative intent underlying the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, University of Hawai'i law professor Chris Iijima cautions us that the ultimate effect of Japanese American redress may not be to repair the harm caused by the internment. Instead, he warns that it may become "a return to original humiliation" if we allow it to reinforce the "ideology of acquiescence"' 52 rather than resistance to injustice. Reparations for the Japanese American internment accomplished much that was important to the individuals involved, to the community, and to a broadening of "official history." And yet, as we have seen in the discussion above, it has not thus far created institutional change that will prevent such abuses from happening again. The redress received was clearly symbolic. No governmental proclamation fifty years after the fact or token payment of money can compensate for the families torn apart, property confiscated, communities scattered, psyches scarred, lives lost. But just what does it symbolize? This is what we are in the process of contesting and as we contest it we become, in Man Matsuda's words, the "authors" of the internment."'¶ Iijima makes a convincing case that it was Congress' intent in passing the Civil Liberties Act to reward the "superpatriotism" of the Japanese Americans, illustrated by their co-operation with the internment and the extraordinary accomplishments of the all-nisei combat units. He quotes as typical the statement of Congressman Yates who noted the difficulties of the internment and concluded that:¶ [T]his should have been enough to kill the spirit of a less responsible group of people. But the reply from the Japanese parents was to [send] their children out from behind the wire fences... to fight the Nazis and the armed forces of their ancient homeland.'54¶ From this perspective, redress was "deserved" because Japanese Americans were both heroic and stoic, because they went along with the program and proved their loyalty. In other words, we have been rewarded for accommodating the wrong. If this is not what Congress was doing, why haven't those who recognized the wrong at the time, who spoke the truth and stood up for it at great personal cost, been honored? The resisters, and there were many,'55 still have not been properly recognized. Iijima notes, There is a particular irony about the debate on the redress bill. While there was general agreement, at least rhetorically, on the injustice of the internment,... [t]hose who, at the time of internment, saw it for the injustice and outrage that it was and chose to dissent continue to be silenced and unheralded even during the process of acknowledging their prescience."'¶ This interpretation of Japanese American reparations - the rewarding of acquiescence rather than the righting of wrongs - seems to accurately capture not only Congress' intent in passing the Civil Liberties Act, but also the reason why the mainstream narrative is so readily accepted. Rather than alarming people about the dangers lurking in our political and judicial structures, it comforts them with the notion that oppressed minorities can accommodate injustice.¶ If this is the symbolism that ultimately attaches to Japanese American redress, it will serve to divide Japanese Americans (and by extension other Asian Americans) from other communities of color, reinforcing the "model minority" myth that says to African Americans and Latinos, "look, they made it against all odds and were even polite in the process; why can't you?" It will also mask the on-going abuses of power perpetrated by the government against racially identified groups in the name of "national security."If we allow virtually the same wrong to be committed with impunity against Arab Americans today, we will have lost the Japanese American reparations battle altogether. A check and a letter fifty years after the fact mean nothing if they are not symbolic of changes in the system which created the wrong in the first place.¶ We began with the commonly held belief that redress for the internment of Japanese Americans has almost been completed. We see, instead, that much remains to be done. First, we must take it upon ourselves to learn what is really happening, even if it appears to be happening to "someone else." We must name the wrongs we see by their proper and truthful names; we must insist on meaningful redress. Those of us who grew up hearing about the internment remember stories of the white neighbor families who stood by, many sympathetic, even sad, watching silently as our families were herded onto trucks by soldiers with bayonets. We must not become those silent observers.

#### Korematsu survives silently as a precedent for future violence---only public debate can prevent history from repeating itself

Dean Masaru Hashimoto 96, Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College, “ARTICLE: THE LEGACY OF KOREMATSU V. UNITED STATES: A DANGEROUS NARRATIVE RETOLD”, Fall 1996, 4 UCLA Asian Pac. AM. Law Journal 72, Lexis

During times of war, citizens must bear tremendous costs and burdens; indeed, sometimes they even surrender their lives. So was the nation's treatment of Japanese Americans so intolerable in view of wartime exigency? Part I examines the constitutional analysis considering this question in Korematsu v. United States. n35 Declaring that "hardships are part of war," n36 the Court upheld a military order that excluded persons of Japanese ancestry from designated coastal areas. The Court began, however, by noting that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." n37 But it ultimately relied on the precedent set by United States v. Hirabayashi, n38 which upheld a similar curfew. The Court's analysis turned on whether the military order was within the war powers of the President and Congress.¶ [\*77] However, the Court's opinion in Korematsu has been aptly called "a muddled hodge-podge of conflicting and barely articulate doctrine." n39 Its mixed messages later were misinterpreted by the Court itself. The popular wisdom is that Korematsu has been, in fact, overruled as evidenced by the criticism it has received. n40 Nevertheless, the Court continues to cite and rely on Korematsu in modern cases. Most recently, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, n41 for example, the Court explicitly claimed that it relied on Korematsu in overruling more recent precedent that had applied intermediate scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs. The Court offered two conflicting interpretations of Korematsu and described its result as "inexplicable." n42 In its first interpretation, the Court concluded that although it had set forth the "most rigid scrutiny" standard in Korematsu, it "then inexplicably relied on 'the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case,'" n43 which held that the "Fifth Amendment 'restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process.'" n44 In this interpretation, the Court indicated that it had not applied a strict scrutiny test in Korematsu. Later, in the same opinion, however, the Court offered yet a different interpretation of Korematsu. The Court noted that Korematsu has been repeatedly cited for the proposition that racial classifications made by the federal government must be subject to strict scrutiny n45 and concluded that Korematsu teaches that "even 'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification." n46 The Court's second interpretation of Korematsu assumes that it had applied strict scrutiny. Part I explores these two contradictory views.¶ Part I also considers the role of Korematsu as legal precedent. n47 Since the 1980s, various individuals, groups, and courts have pronounced Korematsu insignificant. [\*78] Yet, despite declarations that Korematsu is of little precedential significance in the modern day, the Court has not explicitly overruled it. Instead, the Court gives Korematsu meaning in several different ways. Part I describes and criticizes the logic of those who claim that Korematsu is no longer influential as precedent. Part I also shows how Korematsu has been perpetuated as precedent. The Court has abandoned its reliance on traditional stare decisis in interpreting Korematsu. Instead, it has relied on interpretive methods that either exaggerate the amount of judicial scrutiny imposed or perpetuate the legal principles of Korematsu without citation to the case. The Court also uses Korematsu based on its historical meaning. The Court's modern interpretation of Korematsu places more emphasis on the persuasive quality of the case as precedent instead of confronting its logic. This rhetorical orientation allows the legal principle contained in Korematsu to survive and flourish silently.¶ The modern Court's difficulty in understanding Korematsu and its distortion as precedent had its genesis in the Korematsu Court's failure to provide a logical explanation for reaching its result and choosing instead to rely on persuasive rhetoric. To describe and explain the opinion's lack of an integrated analysis, I take a narrative-based approach to interpreting Korematsu. n48 This technique is sensitive to the intertwined roles of rhetoric and logic as well as to social influences involved in the creation of narratives and their subsequent transformations. Part II traces the origins of the narratives incorporated into the Court's written opinion and considers other available narratives ignored by the Court, particularly those of the parties most intimately involved: Korematsu and DeWitt. Part II also describes how the Court integrated and attributed meanings to the narratives contained within Korematsu. The section next offers and analyzes a two-tiered decisionmaking model for how narratives [\*79] may have been selected for integration into the Court's opinion. Then, I develop the idea that the Court's emphasis on choosing narratives and assigning them meaning based on persuasive appeal, rather than on their logical relevance resulted in the disjointed quality of the written opinion. This practice led to the failure to establish what I term the "interpretive-narrative link" -- a meaningful connection between the narrative and the Court's rule of law. The failure to establish this link caused the disharmony among messages within the opinion about the standard of review imposed.¶ Part III explains why the Court should privilege adjudication based on the narrative-interpretive link. This is not a call for less rhetoric; it would be naive to deprecate its importance. Instead, this is a plea for more explicit logical connections. The Court has excessively favored persuasive appeal over logical analysis in its use of Korematsu as precedent. The Court should confront Korematsu when it is logically relevant to a case. The Justices ought to provide explanation about how Korematsu is interpreted, despite rhetorical cost. Emphasis on the importance of the interpretive-narrative link in doctrinal interpretation would mean explicitly acknowledging Korematsu's legal presence through the traditional method of stare decisis as well as through historical interpretation. I call, however, for an abandonment of interpretive methods that rely on exaggeration based on the rhetoric contained within Korematsu and also for discarding those that permit reliance sub silentio. Only through continuing public conversations about the modern-day meaning of Korematsu can its potentially dangerous principles and rhetoric be limited effectively.

#### Public deliberation about detention policy promotes agency and decision-making---reciprocity and public debate facilitates mutual respect that lays the groundwork for cooperation on other issues

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WHAT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY MEANS¶ To go to war is the most consequential decision a nation can make. Yet most nations, even most democracies, have ceded much of the power to make that decision to their chief executives--to their presidents and prime ministers. Legislators are rarely asked or permitted to issue declarations of war. The decision to go to war, it would seem, is unfriendly territory for pursuing the kind of reasoned argument that characterizes political deliberation.¶ Yet when President George W. Bush announced that the United States would soon take military action against Saddam Hussein, he and his advisors recognized the need to justify the decision not only to the American people but also to the world community. Beginning in October 2002, the administration found itself engaged in argument with the U.S. Congress and, later, with the United Nations. During the months of preparation for the war, Bush and his colleagues, in many different forums and at many different times, sought to make the case for a preventive war against Iraq.1 Saddam Hussein, they said, was a threat to the United States because he had or could soon have weapons of mass destruction, and had supported terrorists who might have struck again against the United States. Further, he had tyrannized his own people and destabilized the Middle East.¶ In Congress and in the United Nations, critics responded, concurring with the judgment that Hussein was a terrible tyrant but challenging the administration on all its arguments in favor of going to war before exhausting the nonmilitary actions that might have controlled the threat. As the debate proceeded, it became clear that almost no one disagreed with the view that the world would be better off if Saddam Hussein no longer ruled in Iraq, but many doubted that he posed an imminent threat, and many questioned whether he actually supported the terrorists who had attacked or were likely to attack the United States.¶ This debate did not represent the kind of discussion that deliberative democrats hope for, and the deliberation was cut short once U.S. troops began their invasion in March 2003. Defenders and critics of the war seriously questioned one another's motives and deeply suspected that the reasons offered were really rationalizations for partisan politics. The administration, for its part, declined to wait until nonmilitary options had been exhausted, when a greater moral consensus might have been reached. But the remarkable fact is that even under the circumstances of war, and in the face of an alleged imminent threat, the government persisted in attempting to justify its decision, and opponents persevered in responding with reasoned critiques of a preventive war.¶ The critics are probably right that no amount of deliberation would have prevented the war, and the supporters are probably right that some critics would never have defended going to war even if other nonmilitary sanctions had ultimately failed. Yet the deliberation that did occur laid the foundation for a more sustained and more informative debate after the U.S. military victory than would otherwise have taken place**. Because the administration had given reasons** (such as the threat of the weapons of mass destruction) for taking action, **critics had more basis to continue to dispute the original decision, and to challenge the administration's judgment. The imperfect deliberation that preceded the war** prepared the ground for the less imperfect deliberation that followed.¶ Thus even in a less than friendly environment, deliberative democracy makes an appearance, and with some effect. Both the advocates and the foes of the war acted as if they recognized an obligation to justify their views to their fellow citizens. (**That their motives were political or partisan is less important than that their actions were responsive to this obligation.**) This problematic episode can help us discern the defining characteristics of deliberative democracy if we attend to both the presence and the absence of those characteristics in the debate about the war.¶ What Is Deliberative Democracy?¶ Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another. In a democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and respond to the reasons that citizens give in return. But not all issues, all the time, require deliberation. Deliberative democracy makes room for many other forms of decision-making (including bargaining among groups, and secret operations ordered by executives), as long as the use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a deliberative process. Its first and most important characteristic, then, is its reason-giving requirement.¶ The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their representatives to give should appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject. The reasons are neither merely procedural ("because the majority favors the war") nor purely substantive ("because the war promotes the national interest or world peace"). They are reasons that should be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.¶ The moral basis for this reason-giving process is common to many conceptions of democracy**. Persons should be treated not merely as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as** autonomous agents **who take part in the governance of their own society, directly or through their representatives.** In deliberative democracy an important way these agents take part is by presenting and responding to reasons, or by demanding that their representatives do so, with the aim of justifying the laws under which they must live together. The reasons are meant both to produce a justifiable decision and to express the value of mutual respect. It is not enough that citizens assert their power through interest-group bargaining, or by voting in elections. No one seriously suggested that the decision to go to war should be determined by logrolling, or that it should be subject to a referendum. Assertions of power and expressions of will, though obviously a key part of democratic politics, still need to be justified by reason. When a primary reason offered by the government for going to war turns out to be false, or worse still deceptive, then not only is the government's justification for the war called into question, so also is its respect for citizens.¶ A second characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the reasons given in this process should be accessible to all the citizens to whom they are addressed. To justify imposing their will on you, your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you. If you seek to impose your will on them, you owe them no less. This form of reciprocity means that the reasons must be public in two senses. First, the deliberation itself must take place in public**, not merely in the privacy of one's mind.** In this respect deliberative democracy stands in contrast to Rousseau's conception of democracy, in which individuals reflect on their own on what is right for the society as a whole, and then come to the assembly and vote in accordance with the general will.2¶ The other sense in which the reasons must be public concerns their content. A deliberative justification does not even get started if those to whom it is addressed cannot understand its essential content. It would not be acceptable, for example, to appeal only to the authority of revelation, whether divine or secular in nature. Most of the arguments for going to war against Iraq appealed to evidence and beliefs that almost anyone could assess. Although President Bush implied that he thought God was on his side, he did not rest his argument on any special instructions from his heavenly ally (who may or may not have joined the coalition of the willing).¶ **Admittedly, some of the evidence on both sides of the debate was technical** (for example, the reports of the U.N. inspectors). But this is a common occurrence in modern government. Citizens often have to rely on experts. This does not mean that the reasons**, or the bases of the reasons,** are inaccessible. Citizens are justified in relying on experts if they describe the basis for their conclusions in ways that citizens can understand; and if the citizens have some independent basis for believing the experts to be trustworthy (such as a past record of reliable judgments, or a **decision-making structure that contains checks and balances by experts who have reason to exercise critical scrutiny over one another**).¶ To be sure, the Bush administration relied to some extent on secret intelligence to defend its decision. Citizens were not able at the time to assess the validity of this intelligence, and therefore its role in the administration's justification for the decision. In principle, using this kind of evidence does not necessarily violate the requirement of accessibility if good reasons can be given for the secrecy, and if opportunities for challenging the evidence later are provided. As it turned out in this case, the reasons were indeed challenged later, and found to be wanting. Deliberative democracy would of course have been better served if the reasons could have been challenged earlier.¶ **The third characteristic of deliberative democracy is that its process** aims at producing a decision that is binding **for some period of time**. **In this respect the deliberative process is not like a talk show or an academic seminar. The participants do not argue for argument's sake; they do not argue even for truth's own sake** (although the truthfulness of their arguments is a deliberative virtue because it is a necessary aim in justifying their decision). They intend their discussion to influence a decision the government will make, or a process that will affect how future decisions are made. At some point, the deliberation temporarily ceases, and the leaders make a decision. The president orders troops into battle, the legislature passes the law, or citizens vote for their representatives. Deliberation about the decision to go to war in Iraq went on for a long period of time, longer than most preparations for war. Some believed that it should have gone on longer (to give the U.N. inspectors time to complete their task). But at some point the president had to decide whether to proceed or not. Once he decided, deliberation about the question of whether to go to war ceased.¶ Yet deliberation about a seemingly similar but significantly different question continued: was the original decision justified? Those who challenged the justification for the war of course did not think they could undo the original decision. They were trying to cast doubt on the competence or judgment of the current administration. They were also trying to influence future decisions--to press for involving the United Nations and other nations in the reconstruction effort, or simply to weaken Bush's prospects for reelection.¶ This continuation of debate illustrates the fourth characteristic of deliberative democracy--its process is dynamic. Although deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today will suffice for the indefinite future. **It keeps open the** possibility of a continuing dialogue**, one in which citizens can criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the basis of that criticism**. Although a decision must stand for some period of time, it is provisional in the sense that it must be open to challenge at some point in the future. This characteristic of deliberative democracy is neglected even by most of its proponents. (We discuss it further below in examining the concept of provisionality.)¶ Deliberative democrats care as much about what happens after a decision is made as about what happens before. Keeping the decision-making process open in this way--recognizing that its results are provisional--is important for two reasons. First, **in politics as in much of practical life, decision-making processes and the human understanding upon which they depend are imperfect.** We therefore cannot be sure that the decisions we make today will be correct tomorrow, and even the decisions that appear most sound at the time may appear less justifiable in light of later evidence. Even in the case of those that are irreversible, like the decision to attack Iraq, reappraisals can lead to different choices later than were planned initially. Second, **in politics most decisions are not consensual. Those citizens and representatives who disagreed with the original decision are more likely to accept it if they believe they have a chance to reverse or modify it in the future. And they are more likely to be able to do so if they have a chance to keep making arguments**.¶ One important implication of this dynamic feature of deliberative democracy is that the continuing debate it requires should observe what we call the principle of the economy of moral disagreement**. In giving reasons for their decisions, citizens and their representatives should try to find justifications that** minimize their differences with their opponents. Deliberative democrats do not expect deliberation always or even usually to yield agreement. How citizens deal with the disagreement that is endemic in political life should therefore be a central question in any democracy. Practicing the economy of moral disagreement promotes the value of mutual respect (which is at the core of deliberative democracy). By economizing on their disagreements, citizens and their representatives can continue to work together to find common ground, if not on the policies that produced the disagreement, then on related policies about which they stand a greater chance of finding agreement. Cooperation on the reconstruction of Iraq does not require that the parties at home and abroad agree about the correctness of the original decision to go to war. Questioning the patriotism of critics of the war, or opposing the defense expenditures that are necessary to support the troops, does not promote an economy of moral disagreement.¶ Combining these four characteristics, we can define deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.3 This definition obviously leaves open a number of questions. We can further refine its meaning and defend its claims by considering to what extent deliberative democracy is democratic; what purposes it serves; why it is better than the alternatives; what kinds of deliberative democracy are justifiable; and how its critics can be answered.

# 2AC

## AT: White Supremacy

### AT: Whiteness/Privilege – Niemonen

#### Mono-causal theories like whiteness in their Yancy ev shut down communication by making our self-defense automatically biased—this reifies racism and leads to endless squabbling about authenticity

Jack Niemonen 10, American Sociologist, 41(1), 48-81, “Public Sociology or Partisan Sociology? The Curious Case of Whiteness Studies”, Online

Despite recognition that racial classification systems are not constant, proponents of whiteness studies treat whites as if they were an immutable, bounded, and cohesive category (Bonnett 2003; Eichstedt 2001; Gabriel 2000; Giroux 1997; Hartigan 1997; Keating 1995; Kincheloe 1999; Kolchin 2002; Levine-Rasky 2000; McCarthy 2003; Pugliese 2002; Sidorkin 1999; Yans 2006). They posit a generic white subject, both privileged and unaware of the extent of that privilege. However, even if whites coalesce at certain historical junctures, we cannot conclude that the category “white” is an entity that will continue indefinitely in the absence of antiracist initiatives (McDermott and Sampson 2005; Yans 2006; cf. Niemonen 2007). Reification has the unintended consequence of neglecting how the construction of racial identities is a negotiated, indeed manipulative, process (Bonnett 1998; Rockquemore 2002). In doing so, proponents of whiteness studies understate the contradictions, inconsistencies, and ambivalences within white and nonwhite identities. They assume before the fact that whites regard whiteness rather than nationality, ethnicity, religion, or class as the main factor that separates the civilized from the uncivilized. And, they oversimplify the challenges that nonwhites face by implying that their problems are largely race-related and hence attributable to racism (Croteau et al. 2002; Hartigan 2002; Kolchin 2002; Mansfield and Kehoe 1994; Warren and Twine 1997). Emphasizing the unifying interest in, and reproduction of, dominance minimizes how the boundaries of racial categories are negotiated, reinforced, or challenged in daily life (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Perera 1999). Largely ignored are the complicated interactions between race, class, and sex, and the struggles of many whites to acquire privileges in a class-stratified society, especially economic security and some degree of self-autonomy (Bonnett 1997; Eichstedt 2001; Hartigan 1997, 2000b; Hubbard 2005; Kolchin 2002; Lee 1999; Winders 2003). Reifying the concept of race fails to capture the processes through which it acquires meaning, confers status, or exerts a “structuring effect” (Bash 2006; Lewis 2004). By suppressing intra-group divisions and contradictions, whiteness studies ignore how multiple statuses work together in people’s lives (cf. Brekhus 1998; Merton 1972) and perpetuate an “us-them” view of difference—the binary perspective that is at the core of racist discourses. The reification of racial categories endows them with causal potential and predictive ability, implying that all persons classified as white will exhibit the undesirable traits associated with whiteness, since being white is a condition with distinct, identifiable, but largely negative attributes that are in need of corrective attention (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Hartigan 2000b; Keating 1995; Santas 2000; Scott 2000). In a reversal of the historical equation, “white” has become reprehensible whereas “nonwhite” has become virtuous (Gillborn 1996; Keating 1995). Whiteness studies posit racism as a mono-causal explanation for almost everything. All other forces, including the class struggle, are relegated to the margins. William Julius Wilson’s work is dismissed out-of-hand as a defense of the culture of poverty thesis (e.g., Harrison 1998; Ladson-Billings 1996; Welcome 2004). Racism is the problem. Therefore, whites either actively resist its reproduction or they perpetuate existing inequalities (Hartigan 2000b; Kolchin 2002; Moon and Flores 2000; Troyna 1994). This premise allows for the subsequent argument that whiteness is the source of oppression. If it is eradicated, then social justice will emerge (Moon and Flores 2000; Trainor 2002). Once whiteness is demonized, whites have no choice but to view their selves—ironically—in the context of a deficit model that identifies their failings, after which they may redeem themselves by becoming race traitors. Whites are required to renounce their whiteness but at the same time celebrate the alternatives. Such arguments inevitably result in anger and bafflement (Gillborn 1996; Kolchin 2002). The concept of racism suffers from conceptual inflation; it is used to mark any racially suspect attitude, behavior, policy, or practice (Blum 2002). It is defined as a property of whites who act against nonwhites (Gabriel 2000; Mansfield and Kehoe 1994; Pearce 2003). Whiteness studies proponents dodge the questions of whether or not whites can be victims of racism, and whether or not nonwhites’ atrocities against other nonwhites should be regarded as racist. They generally conclude that nonwhites cannot be racist, for the latter are not beneficiaries of a white-privileged world. Nonwhites lack the power to institutionalize the means that would disadvantage whites and advantage themselves (Eichstedt 2001; Gillborn 1996; Johnson et al. 2000; Ladson-Billings 1996; Tehranian 2000). Being cast as nonwhite means that one cannot escape thinking about race; it means being wounded, hurt, and hampered (Johnson et al. 2000; Leonardo 2004). Thus, in serving as a term of moral reproach, racism has joined vices such as dishonesty, cruelty, cowardice, and hypocrisy (Blum 2002). As opposed to recognizing that rationality, objectivity, and truth are themselves contested concepts that have been the subject of centuries of philosophical debate, whiteness studies conflate this history into a reductive, indeed monolithic, Eurocentrism. Painting Eurocentrism as the enemy creates the impression that it is static over time. It is caricatured as the claim thatWestern epistemology is omnipresent and wielded as a weapon of indoctrination against nonwhites. The struggle against Eurocentrism is transformed into an epistemological project in which the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for overcoming privilege is to disclose the truth about it (Kruks 2005). However, standpoint epistemologies may not constitute a satisfactory alternative (Aya 2004; Hammersley 1993). For example, on what grounds can the claim be made that one or more groups have privileged insight into reality? It cannot be declared before the fact; otherwise, all groups may make the same claim with no possibility of adjudication (Hammersley 1993). Although distinctive insights are possible—for example, as demonstrated in the work of Patricia Hill Collins—the claim that nonwhites have privileged access to the world whereas whites do not is Am Soc (2010) 41:48–81 65 implausible at best (Hammersley 1993; Srivastava 1996). Such an argument begs the question of how a correct perception of the world is achieved. In other words, the argument that personal experience occupies the same epistemological ground as social science is rife with logical and empirical problems. By grounding their framework on the epistemology of provenance (that only the oppressed can claim epistemic authority by virtue of their experiences), proponents of whiteness studies have blurred the distinction between scientific justification and folk beliefs. Personal experiences may be atypical or distorted by self-interest. Yet, to suggest so devolves into debates about the speaker’s authenticity and his or her right to speak. If an objective understanding of the world is impossible, then sociological concepts such as “concentration effects” may be more sophisticated, but no more valid, than the accounts offered by anybody else. If so-called higher values are little more than the hegemonic tactics of whites, and if the epistemology of provenance decides truth and falsehood, or right and wrong, then knowledge is local convention, and any outsider who disputes that claim is a racist (Aya 2004). Sociological research may not escape from normative concerns. However, this body of work is much more sophisticated than the proponents of witnesses studies claim (cf. Alba 1999; Bash 1979; Lee 1999; Lubienski 2003; Mckee 1993; Niemonen 2002). Even if the worth of this work should be evaluated by its public relevance, the claim on the part of whiteness studies proponents that its validity should be evaluated in the same way is questionable. Proponents of whiteness studies imply that true understanding is impossible across bounded groups because the latter construct discourses that—by virtue of the postulates of standpoint epistemology—cannot be communicated across boundaries without violating their authenticity (Sidorkin 1999). This premise creates a dilemma: How is it possible to appeal to social justice, while at the same time disavowing the possibility of authentic communication (Sidorkin 1999)? In fact, the boundaries between discourses are drawn too rigidly as a result of a conception of the social that is fixed, static, and homogenous (Merton 1972). In this context, whiteness is an arbitrary designation that underpins a political project that could not succeed in the absence of reification.

### AT: Whiteness = Root Cause

#### Their argument elevates white supremacy to an all-pervasive force that explains all oppression – that re-inscribes its inevitability---specific analysis of racism is crucial

Margaret L. Andersen 3, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28

Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the reification of whiteness as a concept, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to conceptual obfuscation but also impedes the possibility for empirical analysis. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about everything associated with racial domination. As such, whiteness becomes a slippery and elusive concept. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did mainly because they were white, then there's little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an omnipresent and all-powerful historical force. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, for the impoverishment of humanity. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b:153).¶ Despite noting that there is differentiation among whites and warning against using whiteness as a monolithic category, most of the literature still proceeds to do so, revealing a reductionist tendency. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history (Gallagher 2000). Hence while trying to "deconstruct” whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness, the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it (Stowe 1996:77).¶ For example, Michael Eric Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). Empirical investigation requires being able to identify and measure a concept— or at the very least to have a clear definition—but since whiteness has come to mean just about everything, it ends up meaning hardly anything.

#### White supremacy isn’t a monolithic root cause---they shut off productive debate over solutions – means the alt fails

Tommie Shelby 7, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.¶ There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on open public debate—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.¶ These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

## AT: Their Links

### AT: Ahistorical

#### The aff applies the lessons of the past to the problems of the present

James Axtell 93, Kenan Professor of Humanities at the College of William and Mary, chaired the American Historical Association's Columbus Quincentenary Committee, Historian, Autumn, Vol. 56, Issue 1 1993

We judge the past for at least three important reasons. The first is to appraise action, an intrinsic part of historical thinking. Not to make such judgments is to abandon the past to itself, rendering it unintelligible and untranslatable to the present. The second reason is to do justice to it, although making judgment is not the same as passing sentence. As historians, we are too involved in both the prosecution and the defense since the words and reputations of the dead on all sides are in our hands. History's goal is not to punish or rehabilitate historical malefactors, who are morally incorrigible in any event, but to set the record straight for future appeals to precedent. The third reason for judging the past is to advance our own moral education, to learn from and, in effect, to be judged by the past. Since we think and speak historically for our own generation, we can have judgmental effect only on ourselves. Consequently, history becomes, in Lord Bolingbroke's famous phrase, "philosophy teaching by example," a "preceptor of prudence, not of principles." After bearing witness to the past with all the disinterestedness and human empathy we can muster, we should let ourselves be judged by the past as much as, or more than, we judge it The past is filled with the lives and struggles of countless "others," from whom we may learn to extend the possibilities of our own limited humanity. As we learn about what it is like to be other than ourselves, we are better able to do justice to the past.[14]¶ The relationship between the past and the present is always troubled and troubling. Historians cannot help but draw on the past for materials, methods, and models. Our self-images and sodal foundations are fabricated from historical elements, all inherited but reshaped by our current needs and biases, and then rewoven by our flawed and fluid memories. We need the past to give us bearings, but we often construct pasts that are merely useful and undemanding, more wishful than true. This leads to serious problems for historians because we cannot cure inherited social ills or make moral amends for past wrongs unless we know how the past actually was. It is perhaps the profession's most important task to ensure that our image of the past is as nearly full, complex, and true as the past itself was, lest we lose our bearings in fantasy and waste our resources and moral energies on false trails.

### AT: View from Nowhere

#### Our alternative is situated impartial knowledge. It’s not a view from nowhere OR privileged insight to reality—it’s the claim to look at claims on face for their merits, irrespective of the power relations we diagnose

Lisa J. Disch 93, Professor of Political Theory – University of Minnesota, “More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 21:4, November

What Hannah Arendt called “my old fashioned storytelling”7 is at once the most elusive and the most provocative aspect of her political philosophy. The apologies she sometimes made for it are well known, but few scholars have attempted to discern from these “scattered remarks” as statement of epistemology or method.8 Though Arendt alluded to its importance throughout her writings in comments like the one that prefaces this essay, this offhandedness left an important question about storytelling unanswered: how can thought that is “bound” to experience as its only “guidepost” possibly be critical? I discern an answer to this question in Arendt’s conception of storytelling, which implicitly redefines conventional understandings of objectivity and impartiality. Arendt failed to explain what she herself termed a “rather unusual approach”9 to political theory because she considered methodological discussions to be self-indulgent and irrelevant to real political problems.10 This reticence did her a disservice because by failing to explain how storytelling creates a vantage point that is both critical and experiential she left herself open to charges of subjectivism.11 As Richard Bernstein has argued, however, what makes Hannah Arendt distinctive is that she is neither a subjectivist nor a foundationalist but, rather, attempts to move “beyond objectivism and relativism.”12 I argue that Arendt’s apologies for her storytelling were disingenuous; she regarded it not as an anachronistic or nostalgic way of thinking but as an innovative approach to critical understanding. Arendt’s storytelling proposes an alternative to the model of impartiality defined as detached reasoning. In Arendt’s terms, impartiality involves telling oneself the story of an event or situation form the plurality of perspectives that constitute it as a public phenomenon. This critical vantage point, not from outside but from within a plurality of contesting standpoints, is what I term “situated impartiality.” Situated impartial knowledge is neither objective disinterested nor explicitly identified with a single particularistic interest. Consequently, its validity does not turn on what Donna Haraway calls the “god trick,” the claim to an omnipotent, disembodied vision that is capable of “seeing everything from nowhere.”13 But neither does it turn on a claim to insight premised on the experience of subjugation, which purportedly gives oppressed peoples a privileged understanding of structures of domination and exonerates them of using power to oppress. The two versions of standpoint claims – the privileged claim to disembodied vision and the embodied claim to “antiprivilege” from oppression – are equally suspect because they are simply antithetical. Both define knowledge positionally, in terms of proximity to power; they differ only in that they assign the privilege of “objective” understanding to opposite poles of the knowledge/power axis. Haraway argues that standpoint claims are insufficient as critical theory because they ignore the complex of social relations that mediate the connection between knowledge and power. She counters that any claim to knowledge, whether advanced by the oppressed or their oppressors, is partial. No one can justifiably lay claim to abstract truth, Haraway argues, but only to “embodied objectivity,” which she argues “means quite simply situated knowledges.”14 There is a connection between Arendt’s defense of storytelling and Haraway’s project, in that both define theory as a critical enterprise whose purpose is not to defend abstract principles or objective facts but to tell provocative stories that invite contestation form rival perspectives.15

## Perm

### 2AC – Perm Solves

**Advocating towards justice through normative statements is necessary to political change**

**Bhambra 10**—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

**Political mobilisation** around suffering **engenders solidarities** between those who are suffering and those who afford recognition of (and then action around) that suffering. Those who suffergenerally claim their common humanity with others in asking forpeople to look beyond the speciﬁc circumstances of their suffer-ing, and in doing so, the request is to address those speciﬁc circumstances on the basis of a humanity not bound to the circumstances. **The mistake of some forms of identity politics, then, is to associate identity with suffering**. While a recognition of historical (and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect of the political process of seeking redress for the conditions of suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly. ¶ “Wounded attachments”, we would argue, do not representthe general condition of politicised identities, but rather, are prob-lematic constructions of identities which fail to recognise (oraccept) the processes of change associated with movements. The accumulation of different sorts of challenges around similar issues generally leads to the gradual amelioration of the condi-tions which generated the identity (and the associated move-ment) in the ﬁrst instance. If the emphasis in the movement is on identity then successful reform (**even partial reform**) **reduces the injury and thus diminishes the power of the identity claim based upon that injury**. This is because reform is necessarily uneven in terms of the impact it has. This then poses a problem for those within the movement who would **wish the reforms to go further** and who see in the reforms a weakening of the identity that they believe is a necessary prerequisite for political action. **As they can no longer mobilise the injured identity – and the associated suffering – as common to all** (and thus requiring address becauseof its generalised effect), **there is often, then, a perceived need to privilege that suffering as particular and to institute a politics of guilt with regard to addressing it – truly the politics of ressentiment**. ¶ The problems arise by insisting on the necessity of political action being constituted through pre-existing identities and soli-darities (for example, those of being a woman). If, instead, it was recognised that equality for women is not separable from (or achievable separated from) wider issues of justice and equality within society then **reforms could be seen as steps towards equality.** A movement concerned with issues of social justice (of whichgender justice is an integral aspect) **would allow for provisional reforms to prevailing conditions of injustice without calling into question the basis for the movement** – **for there would always be more to be achieved .** 8 Each achievement would itself necessitate further revision of what equality would look like. And it would also necessitate revision of the particular aims that constitute the “identity” afforded by participating in that movement. In this way, identity becomes more appropriately understood as being, in part at least, about **participating in a series of dialogues about what is desired for the future in terms of understandings of social justice**. ¶ **Focusing on the future, on how we would like things to be tomorrow**, based on an understanding of where we are today**, would allow for partial reforms to be seen as gains and not threats**. **It is only if one believes that political action can only occur in the context of identiﬁcation of past injustices as opposed to future justice that one has a problem with (partial) reforms** in the present. **Political identity which exists only through an enunciation of its injury and does not seek to dissolve itself as an identity can lead to the ossiﬁcation of injured relations**. **The “wounded attachment” occurs when the politicised identity can see no future without the injury also constituting an aspect of that future**. Developing on the work of Brown, we would argue that not only does a “reformed” identity politics need to be based upon desire for the future, but that that desire should actually be a desire for the dissolution (in the future) of the identity claim. The complete success of the femi-nist movement, for instance, would mean that feminists no longerexisted, as the conditions that caused people to become feministhad been addressed. Similarly, with the dalit movement, its success would be measured by the dissolution of the identity of “dalit” as asalient political category. There would be no loss here, only a gain.¶ As we have argued, following Mohanty ([1993] 2000) andNelson (1993), it is participation in the processing of one’s ownand other’s experiences into knowledge about the world, in thecontext of communities that negotiate epistemological premises, which confers a notion of politicised identity. Since it is an under-standing of “tomorrow” (what that would be, and how it is to beachieved) that establishes one as, for example, a feminist, such an identity claim does not exclude others from participation**, and it does not solicit the reiﬁcation of identity around the fact of historical or contemporary suffering**. By removing these obstacles to progress, the “tomorrow” that is the goal, is more readily achievable. **Identity politics**, then, “**needs a tomorrow**” in this sense: that the raison d’être of any politicised identity is the bringing about of a tomorrow in which the social injustices of the present have been overcome. **But identity politics also needs that tomorrow – today – in the sense that politicised identities need to inscribe that tomorrow into their self-deﬁnition in the present, in order to avoid consolidating activity around the maintenance of the identity rather than the overcoming of the conditions that generated it.** **That the tomorrow to be inscribed – today – in the self-deﬁnition of one’s political identity, is one in which that identity will no longer be required, is not a situation to be regretted, since it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice.**

#### The perm’s effective---no cooption as “their cause” can become “our cause”

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, andthat these are offered by the work of two theorists, SatyaMohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000)post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excessesof the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as aproposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993]2000), identities must be understood as theoretical constructions that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explana-tions of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaningand signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), whosimilarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning ork nowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the“death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology,Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are theagents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possiblefor an individual to know something that another individualcould not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to makesense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworksand practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator andrepository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity astheoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on episte-mological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individu-als in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the expe-rience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one afeminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts tounderstand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make theidentiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given factof a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, beingdesignated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achieve-ment” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First,that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is some-thing that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is some-thing politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, orthen on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity poli-tics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experi-ence of others has led to an assumption on the part of some whitefeminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the soleresponsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998).Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experi-ences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful forall subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular,overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this orthat is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“rac-ism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is whathe chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that,as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological com-munity requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and thatare social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recog-nised by particular communities as valid in order to be success-ful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the commu-nities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/orpostcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities,dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its asso-ciated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities indi- viduals participate in rather than the characteristics they aredeemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood asthe complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.

### Coalitions – Bell Hooks

#### Uniting different coalitions is necessary to overcome white supremacy---them trying to create competition with their K is white “divide and conquer” tactics

Bell Hooks 3, social critic extraordinaire, “Beyond Black Only: Bonding Beyond Race”, http://prince.org/msg/105/50299?pr

African Americans have been at the forefront of the struggle to end racism and white supremacy in the United States since individual free black immigrants and the larger body of enslaved blacks first landed here. Even though much of that struggle has been directly concerned with the plight of black people, all gains received from civil rights work have had tremendous positive impact on the social status of all non-white groups in this country. Bonding between enslaved Africans, free Africans, and Native Americans is well documented. Freedom fighters from all groups (and certainly there were many traitors in all three groups who were co-opted by rewards given by the white power structure) understood the importance of solidarity-of struggling against the common enemy, white supremacy. The enemy was not white people. It was white supremacy. ¶ Organic freedom fighters, both Native and African Americans, had no difficulty building coalitions with those white folks who wanted to work for the freedom of everyone. Those early models of coalition building in the interest of dismantling white supremacy are often forgotten. Much has happened to obscure that history. The construction of reservations (many of which were and are located in areas where there are not large populations of black people) isolated communities of Native Americans from black liberation struggle. And as time passed both groups began to view one another through Eurocentric stereotypes, internalizing white racist assumptions about the other. Those early coalitions were not maintained. Indeed the bonds between African Americans struggling to resist racist domination, and all other people of color in this society who suffer from the same system, continue to be fragile, even as we all remain untied by ties, however frayed and weakened, forged in shared anti-racist struggle. ¶ Collectively, within the United States people of color strengthen our capacity to resist white supremacy when we build coalitions. Since white supremacy emerged here within the context of colonization, the conquering and conquest of Native Americans, early on it was obvious that Native and African Americans could best preserve their cultures by resisting from a standpoint of political solidarity. The concrete practice of solidarity between the two groups has been eroded by the divide-and-conquer tactics of racist white power and by the complicity of both groups. Native American artist and activist of the Cherokee people Jimmie Durham, in his collection of essays A Certain Lack of Coherence, talks about the 1960’s as a time when folks tried to regenerate that spirit of coalition: “In the 1960’s and ‘70’s American Indian, African American and Puerto Rican activists said, as loudly as they could, “This country is founded on the genocide of one people and the enslavement of another.” This statement, hardly arguable, was not much taken up by white activists.” As time passed, it was rarely taken up by anyone. Instead the fear that one’s specific group might receive more attention has led to greater nationalism, the showing of concern for one’s racial or ethnic plight without linking that concern to the plight of other non-white groups and their struggles for liberation. ¶ Bonds of solidarity between people of color are continuously ruptured by our complicity with white racism. Similarly, white immigrants to the United States, both past and present, establish their right to citizenship within white supremacist society by asserting it in daily life through acts of discrimination and assault that register their contempt for and disregard of black people and darker-skinned immigrants mimic this racist behavior in their interactions with black folks. In her editorial “On the Backs of Blacks” published in a recent special issue of TIME magazine Toni Morrison discusses the way white supremacy is reinscribed again and again as immigrants seek assimilation: ¶ All immigrants fight for jobs and space, and who is there to fight but those who have both? As in the fishing ground struggle between Texas and Vietnamese shrimpers, they displace what and whom they can…In race talk the move into mainstream America always means buying into the notion of American blacks as the real aliens. Whatever the ethnicity or nationality of the immigrant, his nemesis is understood to be African American…So addictive is this ploy that the fact of blackness has been abandoned for the theory of blackness. It doesn’t matter anymore what shade the newcomer’s skin is. A hostile posture toward resident blacks must be struck at the Americanizing door. ¶ Often people of color, both those who are citizens and those who are recent immigrants, hold black people responsible for the hostility they encounter from whites. It is as though they see blacks as acting in a manner that makes things harder for everybody else. This type of scapegoating is the mark of the colonized sensibility which always blames those victimized rather than targeting structures of domination. ¶ Just as many white Americans deny both the prevalence of racism in the United States and the role they play in perpetuating and maintaining white supremacy, non-white, non-black groups, Native, Asian, Hispanic Americans, all deny their investment in anti-black sentiment even as they consistently seek to distance themselves from blackness so that they will not be seen as residing at the bottom of this society’s totem pole, in the category reserved for the most despised group. Such jockeying for white approval and reward obscures the way allegiance to the existing social structure undermines the social welfare of all people of color. White supremacist power is always weakened when people of color bond across differences of culture, ethnicity, and race. It is always strengthened when we act as though there is no continuity and overlap in the patterns of exploitation and oppression that affect all of our lives. ¶ To ensure that political bonding to challenge and change white supremacy will not be cultivated among diverse groups of people of color, white ruling groups pit us against one another in a no-win game of “who will get the prize for model minority today.” They compare and contrast, affix labels like “model minority,” define boundaries, and we fall into line. Those rewards coupled with internalized racist assumptions lead non-black people of color to deny the way racism victimizes them as they actively work to disassociate themselves from black people. This will to disassociate is a gesture of racism. ¶ Even though progressive people of color consistently critique these standpoints, we have yet to build a contemporary mass movement to challenge white supremacy that would draw us together. Without an organized collective struggle that consistently reminds us of our common concerns, people of color forget. Sadly forgetting common concerns sets the stage for competing concerns. Working within the system of white supremacy, non-black people of color often feel as though they must compete with black folks to receive white attention. Some are even angry at what they wrongly perceive as a greater concern on the part of white of the dominant culture for the pain of black people. Rather than seeing the attention black people receive as linked to the gravity of our situation and the intensity of our resistance, they want to make it a sign of white generosity and concern. Such thinking is absurd. If white folks were genuinely concerned about black pain, they would challenge racism, not turn the spotlight on our collective pain in ways that further suggest that we are inferior. Andrew Hacker makes it clear in Two Nations that the vast majority of white Americans believe that “members of the black race represent an inferior strain of the human species.” He adds: “In this view Africans-and Americans who trace their origins to that continent-are seen as languishing at a lower evolutionary level than members of other races.” Non-black people of color often do not approach white attention to black issues by critically interrogating how those issues are presented and whose interests the representations ultimately serve. Rather than engaging in a competition that sees blacks as winning more goodies from the white system than other groups, non-black people of color who identify with black resistance struggle recognize the danger of such thinking and repudiate it. They are politically astute enough to challenge a rhetoric of resistance that is based on competition rather than a capacity on the part of non-black groups to identify with whatever progress blacks make as being a positive sign for everyone. Until non-black people of color define their citizenship via commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice rather than investing in the dehumanization and oppression of black people, they will always act as mediators, keeping black people in check for the ruling white majority. Until racist anti-black sentiments are let go by other people of color, especially immigrants, and complain that these groups are receiving too much attention, they undermine freedom struggle. When this happens people of color war all acting in complicity with existing exploitative and oppressive structures. ¶ As more people of color raise our consciousness and refuse to be pitted against one another, the forces of neo-colonial white supremacist domination must work harder to divide and conquer. The most recent effort to undermine progressive bonding between people of color is the institutionalization of “multiculturalism”. Positively, multiculturalism is presented as a corrective to a Eurocentric vision of model citizenship wherein white middle-class ideals are presented as the norm. Yet this positive intervention is undermined by visions of multiculturalism that suggest everyone should live with and identify with their own self contained group. If white supremacist capitalist patriarchy is unchanged then multiculturalism within that context can only become a breeding ground for narrow nationalism, fundamentalism, identity politics, and cultural, racial, and ethnic separatism. Each separate group will then feel that it must protect its own interests by keeping outsiders at bay, for the group will always appear vulnerable, its power and identity sustained by exclusivity. When people of color think this way, white supremacy remains intact. For even though demographics in the United States would suggest that in the future the nation will be more populated by people of color, and whites will no longer be the majority group, numerical presence will in no way alter white supremacy if there is no collective organizing, no efforts to build coalitions that cross boundaries. Already, the white Christian Right is targeting large populations of people of color to ensure that the fundamentalist values they want this nation to uphold and represent will determine the attitudes and values of these groups. The role Eurocentric Christianity has played in teaching non-white folks Western metaphysical dualism, the ideology that under girds binary notion of superior/inferior, good/bad, white/black, cannot be ignored. While progressive organizations are having difficulty reaching wider audiences, the white-dominated Christian Right organizes outreach programs that acknowledge diversity and have considerable influence. Just as the white-dominated Christian church in the U.S. once relied on biblical references to justify racist domination and discrimination, it now deploys a rhetoric of multiculturalism to invite non-white people to believe that racism can be overcome through a shared fundamentalist encounter. Every contemporary fundamentalist white male-dominated religious cult in the U.S. has a diverse congregation. People of color have flocked to these organizations because they have felt them to be places where racism does not exist, where they are not judged on the basis of skin color. While the white-dominated mass media focus critical attention on black religious fundamentalist groups like the Nation of Islam, and in particular Louis Farrakhan, little critique is made of white Christian fundamentalist outreach to black people and other people of color. Black Islamic fundamentalism shares with the white Christian Right support for coercive hierarchy, fascism, and a belief that some groups are inferior and others superior, along with a host of other similarities. Irrespective of the standpoint, religious fundamentalism brainwashes individuals not to think critically or see radical politicization as a means of transforming their lives. When people of color immerse themselves in religious fundamentalism, no meaningful challenge and critique of white supremacy can surface. Participation in a radical multiculturalism in any form is discouraged by religious fundamentalism. ¶ Progressive multiculturalism that encourages and promotes coalition building between people of color threatens to disrupt white supremacist organization of us all into competing camps. However, this vision of multiculturalism is continually undermined by greed, one group wanting rewards for itself even at the expense of other groups. It is this perversion of solidarity the authors of Night Vision address when they assert: “While there are different nationalities, races and genders in the U.S., the supposedly different cultures in multiculturalism don’t like to admit what they have in common, the glue of it all-parasitism. Right now, there’s both anger among the oppressed and a milling around, edging up to the next step but uncertain what it is fully about, what is means. The key is the common need to break with parasitism.” A based identity politics of solidarity that embraces both a broad based identity politics which acknowledges specific cultural and ethnic legacies, histories, etc. as it simultaneously promotes a recognition of overlapping cultural traditions and values as well as an inclusive understanding of what is gained when people of color unite to resist white supremacy is the only way to ensure that multicultural democracy will become a reality.

## Alt

### Performance Bad

#### Their performance and narrative is not an effective mode of resistance---it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations

Peggy Phelan 96, chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, Unmarked: the politics of performance, 146-9

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivityproposed here, becomes itself through disappearance.

The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to thelaws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.

The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the

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representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The factthat these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—onlylends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art objectand the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistantto the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if thereproduction is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memoryforget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personalmeanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptiverecovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it ratherhelps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. Thedescriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generatesrecovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers.The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; itrehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered.

For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing.

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I Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4

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Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animalwith whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. Themimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing aboutperformance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls inbehind the drive of the document/ary. Performance’s challenge to writingis to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.

# 1AR

### Not Black Consumption

#### Not vampiristic consumption

Rosi Braidotti 6, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 76

I beg to differ from Spivak's assessment. The charge of vampiristic or consumerist consumption of others is an ill-informed way of approaching the issue, in that it ignores the rigorous anti-humanistic, cartographic and materialistic roots of poststructuralism. It specifically rests on a misreading of what is involved in the poststructuralist critique of representation and on what is at stake in the task of redefining alternative subject positions. Spivak attempts to rescue Derrida, whom she credits with far more self-reflexivity and political integrity than she is prepared to grant to Foucault and Deleuze. The grounds for this preferential treatment are highly debatable. Nomadic thinking challenges the semiotic approach that is crucial to the 'linguistic turn' and also to deconstruction. Both Deleuze and Foucault engage in a critical dialogue with it and work towards an alternative model of political and ethical practice. It seems paradoxical that thinkers who are committed to an analytics of contemporary subject-positions get accused of actually having caused the events which they account for; as if they were single-handedly responsible for, or even profiting from, the accounts they offer as cartographies. Naming the networks of power-relations in late postmodernity, however, is not as simple as metaphorizing and therefore consuming them. In my view there is no vampiristic approach towards 'otherness' on the part of the poststructuralists. Moreover, I find that approach compatible with the emerging subjectivities of the former 'others' of Western reason. Late postmodernity has seen the proliferation of many and potentially contradictory discourses and practices of difference, which have dislocated the classical axis of distinction between Self or Same/Other or Different. The point of coalition between different critical voices and the poststructuralists is the process of elaborating the spaces in-between self and other, which means the practice of the Relation.

 They stress the need to elaborate forms of social and political implementation of non-pejorative and nondualistic notions of 'others'.

### Conway

#### They presume the purity of their experience in place of facts---we must examine multiple perspectives

Conway 97—philosophy, Penn State (Daniel, Nietzsche and the political, 135-6)

This preference is clearly political in nature, and Haraway makes no pretense of aspiring to epistemic purity or foundational innocence. For Haraway, any epistemic privilege necessarily implies a political (i.e., situated) preference. Her postmodern orientation elides the boundaries traditionally drawn between politics and epistemology, and thus renders otiose the ideal of epistemic purity. All perspectives are partial, all standpoints situated—including those of feminist theorists. It is absolutely crucial to Haraway's postmodern feminist project that we acknowledge her claims about situated knowledge as themselves situated within the political agenda she sets for postmodern feminism; feminist theorists must therefore accept and accommodate **the self-referential implications of their own epistemic claims**. ¶ The political agenda of postmodern feminism thus assigns to (some) subjugated standpoints a political preference or priority. Haraway, for example, believes that some subjugated standpoints may be more immediately revealing, especially since they have been discounted and excluded for so long. They may prove especially useful in coming to understand the political and psychological mechanisms whereby the patriarchy discounts the radically situated knowledges of others while claiming for its own (situated) knowledge an illicit epistemic privilege: ¶ The standpoints of the subjugated ... are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts— ways of being nowhere while claiming to sec comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its dazzling—and, therefore, blinding—illuminations.34 ¶ But these subjugated standpoints do not afford feminist theorists an epistemically privileged view of the world, independent of the political agendas they have established. Reprising elements of Nietzsche's psychological profile of the "slave" type, Haraway warns against the ¶ serious danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their positions. To see from below is neither easily learned nor unproblematic, even if "we" "naturally" inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated knowledges. The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical re-examination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical enquiry. **The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions**.35 ¶ **A subjugated standpoint may shed new light on the ways of an oppressor, but it in no way renders superfluous** or redundant **the standpoint of the oppressor.** Because neither standpoint fully comprises the other, the aggregation of the two would move both parties (or a third party) closer to a more objective understanding of the world. If some feminists have political reasons for disavowing this project of aggregation, or for adopting it selectively, then they must pursue their political agenda at the expense of the greater objectivity that they might otherwise have gained.