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#### The affirmative advocates restricting the President’s war powers by ending Islamophobic indefinite detention policies.

#### Islamophobic values have seeped into our daily lives due to the War on Terror---we reject those practices that actively target marked bodies

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4. Standing with Muslims against the “War on Terror”¶ In this chapter, I have demonstrated that:¶ The overriding motive for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is to secure control over the Middle East and Central Asia for U.S. oil, military, and corporate interests.¶ Bush’s handlers have been planning imperial conquest of the world since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989.¶ From the evidence here and elsewhere, it is difficult to draw another conclusion than that Bush’s associates organized the 9-11 attacks to kick start popular support for this war. They have continued to justify the ‘‘war on terror’’ by claiming that Muslim terrorists pose an immanent danger to Americans.¶ In fact, however, terrorism actually poses minimal risk to Americans.¶ The ‘‘war on terror’’ is a concept modeled on Israel’s assaults on Palestinians to provide a cover for campaigns of territorial conquest.¶ Far from being ‘‘under attack,’’ America has pre-emptively attacked and conquered two sovereign states, and is threatening military domination of the entire world.¶ In other words, Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is a massive con job, perpetrated by a few oil and military elites, at the expense of Muslims particularly, but threatening the security and well-being of virtually everyone on the planet.¶ An immensely wealthy and powerful republic has been hijacked by a small cabal of individuals...The American people have...been deliberately lied to, their interests cynically misrepresented and misreported, the real aims and intentons of this private war of Bush the son and his junta concealed with complete arrogance." (Said, 2003)¶ Thomas Donnelly, author of the RAD blueprint for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ recently reaffirmed the neo-conservative commitment, not to protect Americans from ‘‘terrorism,’’ but to conquer the world.¶ This war, properly understood, is a struggle to build a [new] ... order throughout the ‘‘greater Middle East,’’ that giant swath of the planet that extends from West Africa to Southeast Asia. ...Operation Iraqi Freedom represented the first step in a generational commitment to Iraq, but also the commitment of many generations to transforming the greater Middle East....The vision of the Bush Doctrine is hugely ambitious; in embracing this great vision, the United States must obligate the resources and create the institutions necessary to realize it." (Donnelly, 2004, pp. ix, 111)¶ 4.1. ‘‘Either you are with us, or you are with the Terrorists’’¶ Fear and hatred of a scapegoated ‘‘enemy’’ are powerful tools by which despots confuse people into believing that their oppressors are their salvation. Just as anti-Semitism served to divide and silence progressive German movements in the early Nazi era, Islamophobia is dividing and silencing us now. No one wants to associate with “terrorists”, much less be labelled and persecuted as one. Many progressive Western people fear and despise “fundmentalist” Muslims, and thereby fall into the trap of allying themselves with, or at least not opposing, Islamophobic laws and practices in the name of opposing “terrorism”. They thereby collude in undercutting the fabric of rights, due process, and equality on which they too depend.¶ The Bush Doctrine rhetoric has succeeded in convincing most white Americans that “terrorists” pose a serious threat to their personal safety, and that the “war on terror” is necessary to protect them. Islamophobic language and values have seeped into the fiber of our daily lives. Bookstores now have “terrorism” sections, displaying some of the 5,036 mostly new books on the topic.15 Several U.S. colleges and universities now offer degrees in “homeland security.” Media images of “Arab extremists” have become routine.¶ Most Americans now believe that “terrorism” is such a big problem, that they should pay with their taxes, their freedoms, their decimated public services, and their children’s lives. In the summer of 2005, polls found that 79 percent of Americans believed that “the threat of terrorism against the U.S.” has increased or stayed about the same (Polling Report.com, 2005). Seventy-six percent thought “Osama bin Laden himself is currently planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States,” and 64 percent supported the Patriot Act. Sixty-four percent would be “willing to give up some of [their] personal freedom in order to reduce the threat of terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005). Almost half of all Americans “believe the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim-Americans” (Dean, 2005). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and shocking revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison, however, popular support for the “war on terror” plummetted. In November, 2005, 55 percent of Americans disapproved of the way Bush is “dealing with the war on terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005).¶ 4.2. Which Side are you on?¶ Before 9-11, the anti-globalization movement had been rapidly gaining influence and unity worldwide. Opposition to U.S.-dominated institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the G-8, NATO and APEC, had succeeded in disrupting and exposing several of their gatherings. And in their place, the World Social Forum and other progressive people’s movements were demonstrating that indeed there are excellent alternatives to globalization and corporate rule.¶ The 9-11 “attacks” and the “war on terror” derailed these hopeful movements and imposed crippling constraints on dissent, democracy, and national sovereignty. Under cover of Islamophobic targeting of Muslims, the U.S. is waging war on all movements for social justice both domestically and internationally, using its new post 9-11 legislative powers and bloated military and policing budgets. Domestically, the Bush administration is attacking democracy, abortion rights, the judiciary, environmental protections, social security, public education, women’s rights, union rights, and civil rights (Dorhrn, 2003). Internationally, it pressures other nations to enact similar “anti-terror” laws and policies, as well as demanding that they open their economies to full U.S. corporate rule.¶ As Bernadette Dorhn points out: “The result is a chilling effect. That is to say, people around the targets back away, get silent, don’t stand up when they see the cost of simply expressing your opinion or even making a joke, let alone publicly objecting to what’s going on” (2003).¶ Many progressive groups oppose Islamophobia and support Muslim victims of U.S. and Israeli assaults. These include civil liberties associations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, anti-Zionist Jewish and Christian groups, unions, peace groups, and student organizations like the Canadian Federation of Students. Secular, Jewish, and Christian groups have formed alliances with Palestinians and Iraqis in oppostion to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. In the U.S. the Center for Constitutional Rights works to end arbitrary detention of Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. In Canada, the Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada has mobilized broad support for Muslim detainees and their rights.¶ However, even these groups have not dared to challenge the Islamophobic base of the “anti-terror” legislation, for fear of being called pro-terrorist. They are thereby left arguing that the particular individuals for whom they advocate aren’t terrorists, while implicitly condoning the myth that “real” terrorists are lurking in the shadows. But under the Bush Doctrine, all Muslims are presumed to be either current or potential terrorists, and their civil liberties have been sacrificed in the name of “national security”.¶ To defeat the Bush plot for world control, we will need to challenge Islamophobic fear of “terrorists”, to assert clearly that there is little substantive terrorist threat. What terrorism there is could better be addressed through criminal justice systems and international law. More importantly we need to insist that the U.S. desist from both overt preemptive wars and covert state-financed terrorism. The actual security of both Americans and all other people will be best served by ending the occupations of the West Bank, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and recognizing the right of all nations to self-determination (including oil policies). We need to stand in solidarity with all Muslims, regardless of their religious beliefs. At this juncture, Islamophobia is the key barrier to effective mobilization against the Bush regime.

#### US detention policy is an act of Islamophobia informed by a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice

Theresa Koenigsknecht 12, Public History MA Candidate at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, October 4, “Perspectives on Post 9/11 Prejudices: Islamophobia”, http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/04/perspectives-on-post-911-prejudices-islamophobia/

Have the September 11th terrorist attacks changed how you view or treat others? For many, unfortunately, the answer is probably “yes.” The events of 9/11, the United States government’s response to them, and an increasing public misunderstanding of Islam have created a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice towards Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim). This “unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam” is popularly known as “Islamophobia.” Whether this attitude occurs intentionally or subconsciously, this mindset has resulted in intensifying stereotypes, hate crimes, discrimination and often condones the violation of civil rights of Muslim-Americans. The Muslim community’s response to the 9/11 attacks, both initially and today, remains remarkably patriotic and supports cooperation with government authorities. Yet immediately following 9/11, Muslim-Americans, as well as those perceived to be Muslims, often endured increased suspicion from other Americans and even experienced physical violence, supposedly in retaliation for the attacks. Over a decade later, Muslims are still subjected to hate crimes, workplace discrimination, unreasonable arrest and detention, passenger profiling, verbal (especially through hate mail and internet outlets) and physical harassment and abuse. Although racism and anti-Semitism are considered socially unacceptable, ethnic profiling against Muslim-Americans is often encouraged and accepted by government authorities and popular media. Fortunately, some people are actively working to counter the rise of Islamophobia and many communities have come together showing solidarity and interfaith cooperation with their Muslim neighbors. Anyone can take steps to defeat Islamophobia by encouraging empathy for others and participating in activities that promote discussion between people of different faiths and ethnicities. More information on countering Islamophobia can be found on The Muslim Public Affairs Council website which provides helpful resources, links and workshops. It is efforts such as these that can help create an atmosphere of trust and dialogue, as opposed to fear and misunderstanding. So what does Islamophobia have to do with Guantánamo? Muslims constitute almost all of those detained there since 9/11. For that reason, although Guantánamo may not figure largely in the minds of some Americans, Islamophobia strongly influences Western culture and plays a large part in what Americans do understand about Guantánamo and its detainees. To many Americans the prevalent misconception that Islam is equivalent with terrorism unfortunately justifies the violation of Muslim’s civil liberties in the United States as well as violations of detainees’ human rights at Guantánamo. Yet, the American Civil Liberties Union’s “A Call to Courage” report states that, “by allowing and in some cases actively encouraging the fear of terrorism to divide Americans by religion, race, and belief, our political leaders are fracturing this nation’s greatest strength: its ability to integrate diverse strands into a unified whole on the basis of shared, pluralistic, democratic values.” Remembering each person’s right to civil liberties and advocating for greater awareness and knowledge can persuade people to reconsider how they view or treat those around them and in time provide an antidote for Islamophobia.

#### These constructions create a broader state of violence against colored bodies---this manifests in xenophobic profiling

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To illustrate how race can be socially constructed, I will use myself as an example. In the United States, I am considered African American or Black American, with the defacto second class status that designation still implies. My parents and grandparents were all considered Black, even though some of them had very light skin. The most recent white person whom we can determine is an ancestor is my great-great grandfather, Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard.35 We even have members of the African American group who look white, yet are still considered part of the Black group. In South Africa, where I have taught many times, I was considered part of the historically mixed race group known as Coloured, due to my light skin, wavy hair and other characteristics. 7 During the apartheid era, this group had a buffer status between the de jure most privileged whites and the least privileged black Africans.3 " In Brazil, I learned that my same features would classify me as White, with all the defacto privileges that the designation still brings in that society.39 The pan-ethnicity term "Arab" and the religious signifier "Muslim" have been socially constructed as a synonymous "race" in the United States.4° While there are over 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide, only 15% are Arab.41 In the U.S., it is unclear, but there maybe between 4-8 million Muslims, of whom 22.4% are U.S. born and 23.8% are African American.42 There may be 3 million Arabs in the U.S., originating from 22 countries,43 and the Arab American Institute has revealed the little known fact that nearly three quarters of Arab Americans are Christians." In an important case, St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Arabs can be discriminated against on account of their race. Interestingly, those who merely look like Arabs or Muslims may be racially profiled on that basis as well. The double group can thus be considered larger than the number of actual members. According to one commentator, there may be, in this country, 7 million Arabs, 8 million Muslims, and 1.6 million South Asians, Latinos, and African Americans who could look "Arab," probably at least 10 million people,46 which I think even that is a vast underestimate of the numbers of the Blacks and Latinos in America who could pass as Arab. One African American radio personality stated that French citizen Zacharias Moussaoui, native of Morocco, who may have been the twentieth September 11 hijacker, looks like "a brother from around the way.' When my sons and I travel abroad, we are often mistaken for Arabs or Muslims. My partner James, who is a dark brown skinned Christian African American, often wears a kufi or skull cap to express his cultural affinity for Africa. He is always taken for a Muslim, although not an Arab. Sadly, I have told my NYU student son, who can phenotypically pass for Arab, that he has to be careful when flying so that he will not be mistaken for an Arab. Dressing in the popular ghetto styled baggy pants coupled with corn rowing his hair, and the use of an Ebonics dialect,48 helps ensure that he is not racially profiled as an Arab. Of course, when he lands in New York, his failure to be able to hail a cab indicates he is clearly seen as a Black - too risky to pick up.49 These two overlapping and socially constructed-as-synonymous groups, Arabs and Muslims, have come to be regarded in some of the negative ways that have historically characterized African Americans. While Arabs and Muslims are often stereotyped as dangerous, evil, sneaky, primitive, and untrustworthy, much as Blacks are, the criminality has a twist-they are considered potential or actual terrorists." They are forever "foreign, disloyal and imminently threatening,"'" whether they are citizens or not. Arabs and Muslims were racially profiled, victimized, and demonized as terrorists well before September 11 2 These activities have included: physical attacks by individuals and pro-Israel groups such as the Jewish Defense League; political attacks by pro-Israel lobby AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai Birth, as well as many other Democratic and Republican Party affiliated entities; blacklisting of prominent Arab American intellectuals such as Columbia professor Edward Said and Harvard professor Walid Khalidi; as well as vicious stereotypes in films and television that would not be tolerated if used to characterize other groups.53 For example, Jack Shaheen surveyed a number of movies and found the following characterizations of Arabs and Muslims: "assholes," "bastards," "camel-dicks," "pigs," "devil-worshipers," "jackels," "rats," "rag-heads," "towel-heads," "scum-buckets," "sons-of-dogs," "buzzards of the jungle," "sons-of-whores," "sons-of-unnamed goats," and "sons-of-she-camels." 4 It is difficult to imagine the movie industry applying those sorts of labels to Blacks or Jews today. Arab American campaign contributions have been returned as if Arab citizens have no right to participate in American politics 5 3 Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim activities have intensified during periods of high tensions in the Middle East, such as the 1980 Iran Hostage situation, 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, 1986 war against Libya, and the 1991 Gulf war.56 "The Supreme Court has upheld immigration laws discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race, national origin and political affiliation that would patently violate the constitution if the rights of citizens were at stake."57 The cases include Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," Nguyen v. US.,59 Reno v American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee,6 ' Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Incorporated,6 ' and The Chinese Exclusion cases.62 The plenary power doctrine has historically provided immunity from judicial scrutiny of immigration judgments, whether by Congress or the Executive branch. Many Americans assumed the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah federal building had to be done by Arabs or Muslims, rather than by white Christian militia member Timothy McVeigh.' After that incident, even though Arabs and Muslims were not involved, draconian immigration laws were passed in 1996 which singled out those groups. 65 Unfortunately, what happened to Arabs and Muslims under these 1996 laws was not unique. According to Kevin Johnson, these laws are part of a history of attempts to stiffle dissent that includes the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s and the Palmer Raids after World War 1.66 In that period after the war, the U.S. imprisoned people for years for speaking out against the war effort.67 During the cold war Red Scare, many people lost jobs and were subject to investigation, or were even imprisoned, because of rumored association with the Communist party.6 According to Jerry Kang, "wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of mistakes. Specifically we overestimate the threat posed by racial 'others,' in WWlI, Japanese Americans; today, Arab Americans, Muslims Middle Easterners, immigrants and anyone who looks like 'them . ,9, ? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)70 made it a crime to contribute to foreign groups deemed as terrorist, and created special deportation procedures, including the formation of special courts to evaluate secret evidence. 7 ' The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)72 supplemented AEDPA. That act prevents federal courts from reviewing a variety of immigration cases, with very limited exceptions. 3 These two laws "either explicitly-or according to INS interpretation, impliedly-authorize the use of classified evidence to exclude an 'alien terrorist' under special removal proceedings,74 to summarily remove an alien who is a 'national security' risk,7 and to deny bond to aliens in removal proceedings."76 Pursuant to these statutes, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deported or attempted to deport more than two dozen people on the basis of secret evidence-almost all were Muslim, mainly Arabs. 77 Ironically, in 2000, Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of racial profiling when it used secret evidence.78 After September 11 the situation affecting Arabs and Muslims dramatically worsened,79 and there have been profound effects on their civil rights.8 " Before that fateful date, 80% of Americans considered racial profiling wrong.8 After September 11, the polls reversed and 60% said profiling was fine, especially if directed against Arabs and Muslims. 82 U.S. Congressman John Cooksey of Louisiana likely expressed the sentiments of many when he stated on the radio, "If I see someone come in and he's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over and checked." 3 A survey done soon after September 11 said that nearly half would be in favor of having Arabs, including citizens, carry a special identification card.8 There were early reports that some Blacks and Latinos welcomed the law enforcement targeting of Arabs and Muslims.85 When I heard that comment, it reminded me that I preferred that my sons not be mistaken for Arabs when flying. On the other hand, I also realized that increased racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims has not meant that the long term racial profiling of African Americans has stopped. It merely means that my sons may be doubly profiled depending on the context. At the airport, they may be regarded as Arab terrorists, while at the taxi stand or ATM machine, they may be regarded as Black criminals.8 6 After September 11, Muslims and Arabs and people who look like them have been under siege." Over 1000 incidents of hate crimes were reported by February 2002.8 Even President Bush's Arab secret service agent was removed from an American Airlines plane. 9 Of five people who were killed, including a Sikh Indian, a Pakistani Muslim, an Egyptian Coptic Christian, and an Indian Hindu,9 none of them was a Muslim Arab, but all were socially constructed as such. The U.S. Justice Department opened up more than 380 investigations into violence or threats, which have taken the form of "telephone, internet, mail and face-to-face threats; minor assaults, assaults with dangerous weapons, and assaults resulting in serious injury or death; and vandalism, shootings, and bombings directed at homes, businesses, and places of worship."9 ' About 70 state and local criminal prosecutions were instigated against 80 defendants. 92 According to Bill Hing, Arabs and Muslims, whether citizens or not, are literally and figuratively being de-Americanized, which is "a twisted brand of xenophobia that is not simply hatred of foreigners, but also hatred of those who may not be foreigners but whom the vigilantes would prefer being removed from the country anyway."93 A member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has even said that in the event of another terrorist attack, the American government might consider interning Arab Americans,"4 reminiscent of the treatment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II.9 ' The legal position of Arabs and Muslims has especially declined since the exceptionally speedy passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act),96 which subjects noncitizens to guilt by association, ideological exclusion, unilateral executive detention, and racial profiling.97 Aliens are deportable for innocent association, without any proof that they supported terrorist activity.98 Noncitizens are now subject to the resurrection of ideological exclusion, that is that they will be denied a visa on the basis of pure speech if they are seen as endorsing or espousing terroristic activity or persuading others to support activity or a group.99 Aliens can be detained without any hearing or showing that they pose a threat to national security or are a flight risk. The defendant in a normal criminal proceeding can be held without bail only if he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. " Aliens can now be held not only during the proceeding which can take years, but also afterwards, indefinitely, even if the proceeding says they should not be removed from the country!!lo Rules that effect citizens and noncitizens alike include the authorization of secret searches and wiretaps without any probable cause as would normally be required by the Fourth Amendment. 0 2 Under the USA Patriot Act, over 1000 people were held for weeks or months with no charges in mass preventive detention. 03 They did not have access to lawyers and, in many cases, their families were not told where they were."° Some people were held as material witnesses, i.e. they might have information. Even they have been treated harshly.'0 5 Some have challenged that detention in court. While federal judges have found that the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for potential testimony before a grand jury is unlawful,'0 6 otherjudges have held the opposite. 1 7 According to Jerry Kang, [we] should not be surprised if courts determine that national security in the face of terrorism is-in the lingo of constitutional law- a 'compelling interest' and that rude forms of racial profiling, notwithstanding its over and under-inclusiveness, are 'narrowly tailored' to furthering that interest. It would be foolish to think that the courts will necessarily save us from the excesses of the more political branches, r' Little research has been done as to how all this has affected women in the Arab and Muslim communities, as many of the men detained were the sole or major breadwinners for their families as well as respected business owners, religious leaders, and community activists." These women are usually stereotyped as voiceless and passive, needing to be liberated from the all encompassing Afghanistan burqa or even the more modest varieties of head scarves many wear in the United States."' Some of them may not speak English, may not have been working, or even had a visa to work, if foreign born." In November 2001, the Bush Justice Department said it would interview some 5000 young men, solely based on age, date of arrival, and country of origin. Virtually all were Arabs or Muslims." 2 Some police departments refused to assist the federal government as they believed the policy constituted racial profiling."' They knew that law enforcement works best if it positively involves the community rather than terrorizes it."4 Needless to say, the affected groups have been outraged by the targeting."5 Some months later, the Justice Department announced it would interview 3000 additional men from countries with an Al Qaeda presence." 6 When the Justice Department announced the Absconder Apprehension Initiative in February 2002, they decided to prioritize the deportation of 6000 aliens out of the 300,000 foreigners who remained in the country after being ordered deported. Needless to say, these men were from Arab countries." 7 In April 2002, the Justice Department announced that it would put into effect a provision from IIRIRA, which gives the police the authority to enforce immigration laws."' This was controversial not only in immigrant communities, but with police concerned about racial profiling. "'We've spent decades establishing trust... with our very diverse communities,' says a San Diego spokesman. 'If there is an immigration emergency tied to criminal activity, of course we'll assist. But if it is simply an immigration violation.., we will not be involved.""" In June 2002, the Entry-Exit Registration System was established which now requires men from age 16 up, from 25 countries including nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, to register and be photographed, fingerprinted, interviewed, or else be deported.2 Over 1200 men have been detained under this program.' For example, in December 2002, 400 men from Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Syria were detained in Los Angeles under this program, and Amnesty International reported their harsh treatment included being shackled, hosed down with cold water, forced to sleep standing up, and kept from contacting family or legal counsel.'22 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has called for a dismantling of this registration system since it is "discriminatory in nature, ineffective and inefficient as a law enforcement strategy, and creates widespread ill-will in Arab American and Muslim communities across the country."'2 Of course, the inadequacy of all such profiling is shown by the fact that the airplane "shoe bomber" Richard Reid is a citizen of Great Britain;24 the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh is a Muslim convert, white upper middle class native of Main County, California; ' 25 potential "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla is a Puerto Rican, former Chicago gangbanger; 12 6 and alleged twentieth hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui, who was captured before September 11, is a citizen of France.' 7 None of them would have been identified through profiling on the basis of nationality. It is interesting to look at the disparate legal treatment of these men. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, got a public trial, whereas hundreds of foreign born Arabs and Muslims, also captured there, are being held in incommunicado detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'28 The President issued a military order that Al Qaeda members and other noncitizens could be tried in military tribunals or commissions without appeal to civilian courts, an action which has been heavily criticized by various scholars,'29 as well as our allies.130 At least two federal courts have denied habeas petitions filed by lawyers representing some of the detainees, refusing to assert jurisdiction over the cases. 13 1 There may be approximately 650 suspects from 43 countries in Cuba, and officials are preparing accommodations for up to 2000 inmates.13 1 Some scholars and government officials have suggested that detention and prosecution of captured suspects should not even be governed by international law. 1 3 Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz and others have argued that such persons could be tortured without violating any laws binding the U.S. 34 Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, is a former Chicago Latin Kings gang member who converted to Islam.' He was picked up by authorities as he returned from Pakistan and was allegedly planning to set off a dirty bomb containing radioactive materials. 36 He is now being held in incommunicado detention in a U.S. military prison as an "enemy combatant," without access to counsel or any court-military or civilian, and may never be tried. 1 37 In December 2002, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York judge Michael Mukasey issued a 102 page opinion affirming Padilla's right to consult counsel, but the government continues to resist the court's order. 38 Another U.S. citizen, Yaser Hamdi, born in Louisiana of Saudi descent, who was captured by Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, is also being held as an enemy combatant, after being discovered among the Guantanamo prisoners. 139 The U.S. government in both the Padilla and Hamdi cases is resisting petitions for habeas corpus and saying that courts should just accept the President's determinations as to their status.140 Ironically, putting U.S. citizens under military jurisdiction without access to legal counsel places them in a legal limbo where they have less rights than foreigners Reid or Moussaoui 14 1 In October 2002, Reid ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge William G. Young of the U.S. District Court in Boston. 142 In Seattle last August, an African American thirty-six year old, Earnest James Thompson, now known as James Uj aama, was accused of lending assistance to Al Qaeda by founding a training camp in Bly, Oregon in 1999.43 He was also alleged to have run a militant Islamic web site in Great Britain, and was allegedly linked to Abou Hamza Masri, a London Muslim and alleged recruiter for Bin Laden.'" Investigators hope to "squeeze some information out of him, "and he is being tried in a civilian court.145 In March 2003, the INS was dissolved and folded into the new Department of Homeland Security along with 21 other federal agencies. The implications are ominous, as one commentator has stated. "Placing all of the INS's functions into a department focused primarily on national security suggests that the United States no longer views immigrants as welcome contributors, but as potential threats viewed through a terrorist lens."'146 At the time of this writing, it is alleged that the U.S. government has drafted in secret Patriot II, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003.147 The proposed law would authorize secret arrests, overturning the federal court decision requiring the government to release the names of all those detained since September 11. 148 Additionally, the law would permit the U.S. to extradite even American citizens for trial to countries with which we do not have extradition treaties, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya, which are well known for torture. 149 International and current U.S. law prohibit sending a person to a country where there is likelihood of torture. 50 Constituting a new level of invasion of privacy, a proposed Terrorist Identification database would authorize the collection of DNA of any suspect and of all noncitizens suspected of having an association with a "terrorist organization."'' The most extraordinary proposal would possibly strip Americans of citizenship as a form of punishment for giving material support to terrorist groups.15 2

#### Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy---notions of western superiority are a critical tool that drum up support for broader militarism

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KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.

#### This dehumanization of foreign populations establishes continuous cycles of violence---the way we discuss this issue matters

John Collins 2, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

#### Islamophobic detention policies create constant dehumanization---marking individuals as “dangerous” creates a free license that establishes detention sites as a space of perpetual warfare

Judith Butler 6, Professor at UC Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” Ch. 3: Indefinite Detention, p. 50

If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of deciding whether criminal acts occurred. Indeed, "deeming" someone dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to preempt determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of thousands of Arab residents or Arab- American citizens, sometimes on the basis of last names alone; the harassment of any number of US and non-US citizens at the immi- gration borders because some official "perceives" a potential difficulty; the attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern descent on US streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. When Rumsfeld has sent the US into periodic panics or "alerts," he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark-skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani- Americans. Although "deeming" someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, has become targeted by this government mandate to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the US becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain "indefinite containment" takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag in the months following September Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless ruled public culture-and business interests\_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be proven to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo released by the Department of Defense. The DOD did not hide these photos, but published them openly. My speculation is that they published these photographs to make known that a certain vanquishing had taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication. These were not photographs leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international response was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European human rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge, cruelty, and a nationalist and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several countries asked that their citizens be returned home for trial. But there is something more in this degradation that calls to be read. There is a reduction of these human beings to animal status, where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of total restraint. It is important to remember that the bestialization of the human in this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined. Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these people have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with murderers under both criminal and international law. The language with which they are described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are exceptional, that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these. The treatment of these prisoners is considered as an extension of war itself, not as a postwar question of appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their detention stops the killing. If they were not detained, and forcibly so when any movement is required, they would appar- ently start killing on the spot; they are beings who are in a permanent and perpetual war. It may be that al-Qaeda representatives speak this way-some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those detained are centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative team in Guantanamo, suggest that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention the prison uprisings in Afghanistan in which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison. In this sense, the war is not, and cannot be, over; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and there is a warrant for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the continuing site of war. It would seem that the rules that govern combat are in place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners separated from the war itself. When General Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the street, even if you don't charge them?" he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my emphasis). | 1 If the war is against terrorism, and the definition of terrorism expands to include every questionable instance of global difficulty, how can the war end? Is it, by definition, a war without end, given the lability of the terms "terrorism" and "war"? Although the pictures were published as a sign of US triumph, and so apparently indicating a conclusion to the war effort, it was clear at the time that bombing and armed confiict were continuing in Afghanistan, the war was not over, and even the photographs, the degradation, and the indefinite detention were continuing acts of war. Indeed, war seems to have established a more or less permanent condition of national emergency, and the sovereign right to self-protection outfianks any and all recourse to law.

#### These politics depend on expansive claims of executive authority---appeal to visions of an apocalyptic future will be used to justify the creation of spaces like Guantanamo---reigning in the executive solves

Jess Whyte 5, PHD candidate in Monash University’s Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, September 20, online: http://www.ephemeraweb.org/conference/accepted-abstracts.pdf

Russia, Siberia, China: these names evoke thoughts of internment, of gulags, of camps filled with dissidents. To think such camps is to think the relationship between juridical and economic forms. We are invited freely to think the gulags, for instance, in terms of labour control, insofar as control over labour is conceived not as a technical question, but as a political problem, and a political struggle. In conceptualizing today's camps—those that have materialized during the 'war on terror' such connections are made less freely. What is the relationship between the exceptional juridical status of a space like Guantanamo Bay, and the needs of Post-Fordist capital? How can we understand the contemporary transformations in the nature and exercise of state power? These transformations, I believe, are given an indicative form in the extra-judicial status of Guantanamo Bay, which epitomizes the shift from a judicial regime to a regime of exception, weighted to calculations of risk and 'security.' These contemporary juridical transformations can be seen as the "flexibilization" of the state", and can perhaps be better understood when viewed in the context of the shift from a Fordist model of capitalist accumulation to post-Fordism or as David Harvey calls it, "flexible accumulation". Today the exception, as epitomized in Guantanamo Bay, is steadily imbuing most aspects of the juridical realm, in the form of a shift away from the rule of law and the separation of powers towards a regime of unchecked executive power. As Agamben argues, we are faced today with the indistinction of norm and exception. Today's exception no longer aims at the reestablishment of legal norms, but becomes confused with the norm itself. To understand this shift, we should analyse the justification for the establishment of Guantanamo Bay, as outlined in a series of leaked memos between, then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales and Colin Powell. While Powell argues for the application of the Geneva Convention Guantanamo, Gonzales's argument for affording Camp X-Ray an extra-legal status focuses on three things: unpredictability, flexibility and risk. Central to Gonzales's argument is the depiction of the war on terror as "a new kind of war" which "renders quaint", in his words, the established laws of war. The key characteristic of this new kind of war is its unpredictability, in contrast with the relative stability engendered by the well-known enemies of the cold war. As Gonzales puts it: "it is difficult to predict the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on terror," In Gonzales' increasingly unpredictable world, the US faces unimaginable and potentially catastrophic risks. Stemming from this, for Gonzales, is a shift from a concern for legal certainty and stability to the valorization of the flexible state, which can respond quickly to new threats, unconstrained by the norms developed in a past that is no longer seen as an adequate guide to the future. Hence Gonzales defends a form of flexibility that would remove Guantanamo Bay from any legal jurisdiction, leaving its inhabitants utterly exposed to the decisionist power of the sovereign: in this case, the President of the United States. What this means in practice has been made disturbingly clear as allegations of torture, fatal beatings and sexual humiliation leak out from behind the razor wire. In Guantanamo Bay flexibility is revealed as a euphemism. Behind it lies the reality that "anything is possible", a principle Hannah Arendt defined as fundamental to totalitarianism, and which found its true meaning in the concentration camp. This valorization of flexibility is not confined to spaces like Guantanamo Bay, but is a key feature of contemporary capital. Post-Fordism—or flexible accumulation—is similarly conceived as a revolution aimed at overcoming the 'rigidities' of Fordism. While Fordism saw the equation of security with stability, post-Fordism is defined by 'flexibility' (or precarity), and a willingness to inaugurate a new and risky model of accumulation. In short, the Fordist model of stability and social insurance has been replaced by a speculative model, which seeks not to insure against risk, but to profit from it. In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech to a military college, in which he argued the military must encourage its people to "behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists." Central to this transformation, he argued, is the need for a temporal shift, whereby the military, or the state, begins to anticipate and act against threats that have not yet emerged. In this model the state must seek to "play the volatility" by intervening into, and preempting the emergence of the future. The military, Rumsfeld argues, must be prepared to "deter and defeat enemies that have not yet emerged." Inside Guantanamo Bay, this doctrine of preemption is extended to individuals. Guantanamo's model is not the judicial system, with its 'rigid' categorizations of guilt or innocence, but the flexible framework of risk management, enabled by the absolute sovereign authority of the state of exception. In Guantanamo, people are interned "until they are no longer a threat anymore." People therefore remain in Camp X-Ray not on the basis of what they have done, but on the basis of speculation as to what they may do in the future. This notion of risk cannot be codified in norms but only decided. Hence the shift from a model of guilt to a model of risk necessarily emboldens executive power. The future, and the catastrophic risk it presents is always, according to the logic of preemption, an exception. And when the temporal horizons of decision are disrupted so that the exception is no longer confined to a present emergency, but concerns also the emergent threat existing only in a projected future, then the bounds of decisionist power become unlimited. In the process, the boundary between norm and exception is eradicated, and the exception itself is normalized.

#### Our advocacy is important in this space---interrogating Islamophobia in educational settings establishes a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects

Shirin Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Jan. 4, works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions behind Islamophobia creates a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

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As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. ¶ Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

#### The aff challenge to indefinite detention creates an ideal intersectional space to build coalitions against racial violence---PARTICULAR projects are key

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Because of the various problems with coalition building, several scholars do not endorse it. For example, Delgado advocates laboring within your own group for the social justice goals you support. "For some projects, justice turns out to be a solitary though heroic quest, and the road to justice is one that must be traveled alone, or with our deepest, most trusted companions."' 4 Haunani-Kay Trask states that real organizing of native Hawaiians takes place outside of coalitions.205 She supports Malcolm X's claims that whites need to tackle racism within their own communities, rather than in coalition." "Work in conjunction with us-each working among our own kind."207 Despite the frictions and problems between various traditional and nontraditional groups, coalition building can be a useful tool of critical race praxis in the current period. African Americans have been used to being the dominant minority in the United States, able to keep their concerns at the center of the civil rights movement. Latinos are now surpassing Blacks numerically,208 and are the majority in California already.2 They will be 25% of the U.S. population by 2050.210 Blacks will have to learn to work in coalition with Latinos to ensure that Black concerns are not lost in a new dispensation of "favored minority." While the Latinos are becoming the majority minority, they are not as politically organized as the Blacks yet, with many being recent immigrants or noncitizens, who may not speak English.21 ' Thus in some instances, Latinos will need to learn from African Americans, and with them, to achieve various goals. Coalition is good for Asians because although they score higher on standardized tests and have a higher income level than the other minority groups, history has already shown that they remain regarded as perpetual foreigners,1 2 once subject to internment. 3 Native Americans constitute only two million people," 4 and can benefit from linking with the larger groups, some of whom may resent those tribes, who now profit from gambling casino wealth." 5 Arabs and Muslims need to join in coalition with the other groups because they are too small and too recent as immigrants in comparison to the other groups to go it alone. As the current personification of evil of the moment, they need to draw upon the resources of other groups for support. Coalition building does not happen in a vacuum. It must coalesce around particular projects where there is commonality of interest. For instance, Frank Valdes has noted that Latinos and Asians share a common interest in legal issues that involve "immigration, family, citizenship, nationhood, language, expression, culture, and global economic restructuring."216 Racial profiling is a potential issue for cooperation as it affects all the major minority groups. I will use it for illustrative purposes in the remainder of this section, even though it is only one of various issues that could be the basis for coalition building. Asian scholars have noted how both the recent mistreatment of Chinese American scientist Dr. Wen Ho Lee 2 17 and the interning of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II could both be regarded as cases of racial profiling.218 Kevin Johnson has called for Asians and Latinos to form political coalitions to challenge arbitrary INS conduct . 21 He also wants Blacks and Latinos to form coalitions to work on issues of racial profiling, as well.22° In the war against terrorism, racial profiling is particularly affecting Blacks, Latinos and South Asians who look Arab, creating an ideal intersectional issue for coalition building.22 ' Coalescing around profiling in these times will not be easy. In his timely book, Justice at War: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in a Time of Crisis, Richard Delgado, a founder of CRT, queries, "Will the establishment insist on Americanism and toeing the line in the war on terrorism, and demand that minorities demonstrate loyalty, in return for a symbolic concession or two?.. .Will it choose one minority group for favored treatment, in hope of keeping the others in line."2'22 There are several foreseeable scenarios in this regard. For example, the Bush administration could reconfigure rather than terminate various federal affirmative action programs after an expected hostile Supreme Court decision in the upcoming Michigan cases,223 to attempt to ensure Black support for the war efforts. The administration's rejection of the pro-affirmative action position of the University of Michigan may have attracted some Asian support.224 The perpetuation of the forty year old blockade against Cuba despite U.S. business opposition ensures Cuban American loyalty,225 and the rumored appointment of a Hispanic for the next U.S. Supreme Court vacancy may attract other Latinos.22 ' Delgado wonders whether people of color will "be able to work together toward mutual goals--or [will] the current factionalism and distrust continue into the future, with various minority groups competing for crumbs while majoritarian rule continue[s] unabated? 22

# 2AC

### AT: Islamophobia Word Bad

#### Breaking Islamophobia down into Islam and phobia is a counterproductive semantic move which reifies Ableism

Sayyid 8, Reader in Postcolonial and Racism Studies at the University of Leeds, and Director of the Centre of Ethnicity and Racism Studies. THINKING THRU’ ISLAMOPHOBIA Symposium Papers, ARE UNICORNS MUSLIM? Centre for Ethnicity & Racism Studies, May, p.1-2

Those who see Islamophobia not as a polemical but as an analytical term are confronted with the paucity of its current formulation. Neither consitently defined, deployed, or understood, Islamophobia comes off as a nebulous and perpetually contested category. This has allowed it to circulate widely, but ineffectively: useful, for some, to vent grievances; used, by others, to pontificate; conveniently toothless platitudes and sound bites for canvassing politicians and opinion makers unable or unwilling to see its value as a tool for justice. Questions about what Islamophobia is, often (and not unreasonably in the practical domain of public policy and everyday life) slip into questions about who exactly is and is not Islamophobic. This type of question in turn slides into others that inquire whether Islamophobia actually exists, which in turn impinges upon what, if any, relationship is there between Islamophobia and racism, or Islamophobia and Orientalism. What, in short, do we gain, and lose, by talking about Islamophobia rather than racism or Orientalism? Confronted with the whirlpool of polemics and emotions around the concept, there is a strong temptation to clear the decks, mistaking essential contestion for semantic ambiguity and thus to offer rigorous and nuanced definition by way of solution. The most common such approach, which further mistakes the etymology of the concept for conceptual definition, is to try and understand Islamophobia by breaking it down into its constituent parts: we know what Islam is, and we know what phobia means, thus we can understand Islamophobia as fear of Islam (and its cognates). While not devoid of heuristic value this approach does not help us to account for the range of phenomena marshalled by and mobilisations around references to Islamophobia.

## T

### 2AC T

#### limits on discursive form aren’t natural rules of the game, but rather a monocultural attempt to eliminate alternative approaches to the resolution --- their violation upholds islamophobia

Baker 8—U Rochester (Michael, Eurocentrism and the Modern/Colonial Curriculum:Towards a Post-Eurocentric Math & Science Education – A Critical Interpretive Review, http://www.academia.edu/1517810/Towards\_a\_Post-Eurocentric\_Math\_and\_Science\_Education\_--\_A\_Critical\_Interpretive\_Review)

This essay reviews literature in science and mathematics education that assumes the possibilities for knowing the realities of the world through the official curriculum are reductively maintained within a Eurocentric cultural complex (Carnoy, 1974; Swartz, 1992;Willinsky, 1998). Eurocentrism will be described as the epistemic framework of colonial modernity, a framework through which western knowledge enabled and legitimated the global imposition of one particular conception of the world over all others. Eurocentrism is an ethnocentric projection onto the world that expresses the ways the west and thewesternized have learned to conceive and perceive the world. At the center of this ethnocentric projection are the control of knowledge and the maintenance of the conditions of epistemic dependency (Mignolo, 2000a).¶ Every conception of the “world” involves epistemological and ontological presuppositions interrelated with particular (historical and cultural) ways of knowing and being. All forms of knowledge uphold practices and constitute subjects (Santos, 2007a).What counts as knowledge and what it means to be human are profoundly interrelated(Santos, 2006). The knowledge that counts in the modern school curriculum, fromkindergarten to graduate school, is largely constructed and contained within an epistemic framework that is constitutive of the monocultural worldview and ideological project of western modernity (Meyer, Kamens & Benavot, 1992; Wallerstein, 1997, 2006; Lander,2002; Kanu, 2006; Kincheloe, 2008; Battiste, 2008). The monocultural worldview andethos of western civilization are based in part upon structures of knowledge and an epistemic framework elaborated and maintained within a structure of power/knowledge relations involved in five hundred years of European imperial/colonial domination(Quijano, 1999, p. 47). If our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is also to become more and not less democratic, schools and teachers must learn to incorporate theworldwide diversity of knowledges and ways of being (multiple epistemologies and ontologies) occluded by the hegemony of Eurocentrism. Academic knowledge andunderstanding should be complemented with learning from those who are living in andthinking from colonial and postcolonial legacies (Mignolo, 2000, p. 5).¶ Too many children and adults today (particularly those from non-dominant groups)continue to be alienated and marginalized within modern classrooms where knowledge and learning are unconsciously permeated by this imperial/colonial conception of the world.The reproduction of personal and cultural inferiority inherent in the modern educational project of monocultural assimilation is interrelated with the hegemony of western knowledge structures that are largely taken for granted within Eurocentric education (Dei,2008). Thus, in the field of education, “we need to learn again how five centuries of studying, classifying, and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide up and to educate the world” (Willinsky,1998, pp. 2-3). The epistemic and conceptual apparatus through which the modern worldwas divided up and modern education was institutionalized is located in the culturalcomplex called “Eurocentrism”.¶ Western education institutions and the modern curriculum, from the sixteenthcentury into the present, were designed to reproduce this Eurocentric imaginary under thesign of “civilization” (Grafton & Jardine, 1986; Butts, 1967, 1973). Eurocentric knowledge lies at the center of an imperial and colonial model of civilization that now threatens to destroy the conditions that make life possible (Lander, 2002, p. 245). From a post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon (described below), the present conditions of knowledge are embedded within a hegemonic knowledge apparatus that emerged withEuropean colonialism and imperialism in the sixteenth century (Philopose, 2007;Kincheloe, 2008).¶ Based upon hierarchical competition for power, control, and supremacy among the“civilized” nation-states, imperialism is an original and inherent characteristic of themodern western interstate system that emerged with the formation of sovereign Europeanterritorial states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Wallerstein, 1973; Gong, 1984 ;Hindness, 2005; Agnew, 2003; Taylor & Flint, 2000). Closely interrelated withimperialism, colonialism involves a civilizing project within an ideological formation established to construct the way the world is known and understood, particularly through the production, representation, and organization of knowledge (Mignolo, 2000a; Kanu,2006). Colonialism reduces reality to the single dimension of the colonizer. Colonialism and imperialism impose on the world one discourse, one form of conscience, one science, one way of being in the world. “Post-colonial analysis leads to a simple realization: that theeffect of the colonizing process over individuals, over culture and society throughoutEurope’s domain was vast, and produced consequences as complex as they are profound”(Ashcroft, 2001a, p. 24).¶ In yet to be acknowledged ways, the Eurocentric curriculum, and western schoolingin general, are profoundly interrelated with both modern imperialism and colonialism.The persistence and continuity of Eurocentrism rather leads one to see it asa part of a habitus of imperial subjectivity that manifests itself in a particular kind of attitude”: the European attitude – a subset of a more encompassing “imperial attitude.” The Eurocentric attitude combines the search for theoria with the mythical fixation with roots and the assertion of imperial subjectivity. It produces and defends what Enrique Dussel hasreferred to as “the myth of modernity” (Maldonado-Torres, 2005b, p. 43). ¶ Western schooling reproduces this “Eurocentric attitude” in complicity with a globalizedsystem of power/knowledge relations, tacitly based upon white heterosexual malesupremacy (Kincheloe, 1998; Allen, 2001; Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2006; Twine & Gallagher,2008; Akom, 2008a, 2008b). Eurocentrism is a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that relies on confusion between abstract universality and concrete world hegemony (Escobar, 2007; Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 1999, 2000). Worldwide imperialexpansion and European colonialism led to the late nineteenth century worldwidehegemony of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2005, p. 56). Eurocentrism, in other words, refers to the hegemony of a (universalized) Euro-Anglo-American epistemological framework that governs both the production and meanings of knowledges and subjectivities throughout the world (Schott, 2001; Kincheloe, 2008).¶ Eurocentrism is an epistemological model that organizes the state, the economy,gender and sexuality, subjectivity, and knowledge (Quijano, 2000). The production of Eurocentrism is maintained in specific political, economic, social and cultural institutions and institutionalized practices that began to emerge with the colonization of the Americasin the sixteenth century. The nation-state, the bourgeois family, the capitalist corporation, Eurocentric rationality, and western educational institutions are all examples of worldwideinstitutions and institutionalized practices that contribute to the production of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2008, pp. 193-194).¶ Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon is not to be understood withoutreference to the structures of power that EuroAmerica produced over thelast five centuries, which in turn produced Eurocentrism, globalized itseffects, and universalized its historical claims. Those structures of power include the economic (capitalism, capitalist property relations, markets andmodes of production, imperialism, etc.) the political (a system of nation-states, and the nation-form, most importantly, new organizations to handle problems presented by such a reordering of the world, new legal forms,etc.), the social (production of classes, genders, races, ethnicities, religiousforms as well as the push toward individual-based social forms), andcultural (including new conceptions of space and time, new ideas of thegood life, and a new developmentalist conception of the life-world) (Dirlik,1999, p. 8).¶ Eurocentric thinking is embedded in the concepts and categories through which the modernworld has been constructed. “The West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behavior; law, tradition and community; reason, mathematics and science; what is real and what it means to be human. The non-Western civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence” (Sardar, 1999, p. 44).¶ The mostly taken-for-granted definitions and conceptual boundaries of the academic disciplines and school subjects such as “philosophy”, “math”, “science”,“history”, “literature”, “literacy”, “humanities”, “education” are all Eurocentric constructions.If Eurocentrism is intrinsic in the way we think and conceptualize, it is alsoinherent in the way we organize knowledge. Virtually all the disciplines of social sciences, from economics to anthropology, emerged when Europewas formulating its worldview, and virtually all are geared to serving theneed and requirements of Western society and promoting its outlook. Eurocentrism is entrenched in the way these disciplines are structured, the concepts and categories they use for analysis, and the way progress is defined with the disciplines (Joseph et al. 1990) (Sardar, 1999, p. 49).¶ This hegemonic knowledge formation envelops the modern school curriculum within an imperial/colonial paradigm legitimated by the rhetoric of modernity (i.e., equal opportunity, mobility, achievement gap, meritocracy, progress, development, civilization,globalization). Western education (colonial and metropolitan) reproduces imperial/colonial, monocultural, and deluded conceptions of and ways of being in the world (Mignolo, 2000a; Kincheloe, 2008). “The effect of Eurocentrism is not merely that it excludes knowledges and experiences outside of Europe, but that it obscures the very nature and history of Europe itself” (Dussel, 1993). Understanding Eurocentrism thus involves recognizing and denaturalizing the implicitly assumed conceptual apparatus and definitional powers of the west (Sardar, 1999, p. 44; Coronil, 1996). Individually,understanding Eurocentrism may also involve the experience of disillusionment and cultureshock as one begins to demythologize the dense mirage of modernity.¶ Yet, today, in the academic field of education, “Eurocentrism” is commonlyunderstood as a cultural perspective among political conservatives who ascribe to thesuperiority of western contributions (e.g., scientific, cultural and artistic) to world ivilization that in turn justify the continued exclusion of non-European cultures andknowledges in the curriculum (Collins & O’Brien, 2003). Understanding Eurocentrism as a conservative perspective on western culture and education ignores the historical claim that Eurocentrism is the framework for the production and control of knowledge – thatEurocentrism is the way the “modern” world has been constructed as a cultural projection.For many of us educated in the western tradition – within this still dominantepistemological framework -- a Eurocentric worldview may be all we know. We may not recognize that our enlightened, liberal versus conservative, university educated ways of thinking, knowing, and being are a reflection of a particular historical-cultural-epistemological world-view, different from and similar to a variety of other equally valid and valuable ways of knowing and being (Santos, 2007; Battiste, 2008). In other words, if we are “well educated”, we conceive, perceive, interpret, know, learn about, and (re)produce knowledge of the “world” through an ethnocentric cultural projection knownas “Eurocentrism” (Ankomah, 2005).¶ This review begins therefore by situating Eurocentrism within the historical contextof its emergence – colonial modernity – and proceeds to define Eurocentrism as theepistemic framework of colonial modernity. From this decolonial (or post-Eurocentric)historical horizon and framing of Eurocentrism, the second part will frame and reviewliterature on the critique of Eurocentrism within mathematics and science education thatrepresent alternatives to the hegemony of western knowledge in the classroom. This literature was searched for and selected because it provides critiques of Eurocentrism that include specific proposals for de-centering and pluralizing the school curriculum. Thereview concludes by summarizing, situating, and appropriating these two school subject proposals within a vision for a post-Eurocentric curriculum. In framing, selecting, andreviewing literature that challenges and reconceptualizes the underlying Eurocentricassumptions of the modern school curriculum, this literature review adopts from critical philosophical (Haggerson, 1991), interpretive (Eisenhardt, 1998), and creative processapproaches (Montuori, 2005). The rationale for this two-part organization, as well as thetype of review this rationale calls for deserve further clarification, before analyzing thehistorical context of Eurocentrism.¶ Methodological and Theoretical Rationale¶ Conventional literature reviews seek to synthesize ideas as overviews of knowledgeto date in order to prefigure further research (Murray & Raths, 1994; Boote & Beile, 2005).Eisenhardt (1998) however, describes another purpose of literature reviews as interpretivetools to “capture insight ….suggesting how and why various contexts and circumstancesinform particular meanings and reveal alternative ways of making sense (p. 397).Following Eisenhardt’s description, this unconventional literature review is intended tosituate and review an emergent literature on a post-Eurocentric curriculum within anhistorical analysis of Eurocentrism. A post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon is describedthat provides an alternative way of making sense of the curriculum literature. Eurocentricmodernity is the historical context within which the modern curriculum is conceived. Mostuses of term Eurocentrism within the curriculum literature have yet to include analyses of the origins and meaning of Eurocentrism within the history and project of modernity. Thislack of recognition and analysis of the historical context of Eurocentrism contributes to both incoherence and impotency in the use of this critical concept (for examples seeMahalingam, 2000; Gutierrez, 2000; Aikenhead & Lewis, 2001).¶ The concepts Eurocentrism and post-Eurocentrism offer contrasting paradigmsthrough which the curriculum can be evaluated in relation to whether teaching and learningreproduces or decolonizes the dominant modern/colonial system of power/knowledgerelations. The successful development and implementation of a post-Eurocentriccurriculum is dependent upon an adequate historical-philosophical interpretation of Eurocentrism. As such, this literature review adopts elements from the critical philosophical, interpretive, and creative process approaches (Haggerson, 1991; Eisenhardt,1999; Livingston, 1999; Meacham, 1998; Schwandt, 1998; Montuori, 2005). Eisenhardtdescribes interpretive reviews as presenting information that “disrupts conventional thinking” and seeks to “reveal alternative ways of making sense”

## Blackness K

### 2AC Consequences

#### Their desire to ignore the consequences of their advocacy causes alt failure ---must evaluate consequences of proposals

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328#n281) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

### AT: Sexton

#### Sexton is wrong---Anti-blackness as the root of all oppression is self-referential and requires ignoring mass evidence to the contrary---critique’s of multiculturalism are a reason to be weary of it’s dangers, not a reason to focus on blackness to the exclusion of other forms of violence

Paul Spickard 9, University of California, Santa Barbara, Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism (review) American Studies - Volume 50, Number 1/2, Spring/Summer 2009, pp. 125-127

One of the major developments in ethnic studies over the past two decades has been the idea (and sometimes the advocacy) of multiraciality. From a theoretical perspective, this has stemmed from a post-structuralist attempt to deconstruct the categories created by the European Enlightenment and its colonial enterprise around the world. From a personal perspective, it has been driven by the life experiences in the last half-century of a growing number of people who have and acknowledge mixed parentage. The leading figures in this scholarly movement are probably Maria Root and G. Reginald Daniel, but the writers are many and include figures as eminent as Gary Nash and Randall Kennedy. A small but dedicated group of writers has resisted this trend: chiefly Rainier Spencer, Jon Michael Spencer, and Lewis Gordon. They have raised no controversy, perhaps [End Page 125] because their books are not well written, and perhaps because their arguments do not make a great deal of sense. It is not that there is nothing wrong with the literature and the people movement surrounding multiraciality. Some writers and social activists do tend to wax rhapsodic about the glories of intermarriage and multiracial identity as social panacea. A couple of not-very-thoughtful activists (Charles Byrd and Susan Graham) have been coopted by the Gingrichian right (to be fair, one must point out that most multiracialists are on the left). And, most importantly, there is a tension between some Black intellectuals and the multiracial idea over the lingering fear that, for some people, adopting a multiracial identity is a dodge to avoid being Black. If so, that might tend to sap the strength of a monoracially-defined movement for Black community empowerment. With Amalgamation Schemes, Jared Sexton is trying to stir up some controversy. He presents a facile, sophisticated, and theoretically informed intelligence, and he picks a fight from the start. His title suggests that the study of multiraciality is some kind of plot, or at the very least an illegitimate enterprise. His tone is angry and accusatory on every page. It is difficult to get to the grounds of his argument, because the cloud of invective is so thick, and because his writing is abstract, referential, and at key points vague. For Sexton (as for the Spencers and Gordon) race is about Blackness, in the United States and around the world. That is silly, for there are other racialized relationships. In the U.S., native peoples were racialized by European intruders in all the ways that Africans were, and more: they were nearly extinguished. To take just one example from many around the world, Han Chinese have racialized Tibetans historically in all the ways (including slavery) that Whites have racialized Blacks and Indians in the United States. So there is a problem with Sexton's concept of race as Blackness. There is also a problem with his insistence on monoraciality. For Sexton and the others, one cannot be mixed or multiple; one must choose ever and only to be Black. I don't have a problem with that as a political choice, but to insist that it is the only possibility flies in the face of a great deal of human experience, and it ignores the history of how modern racial ideas emerged. Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment. The main problem is that Sexton argues from conclusion to evidence, rather than the other way around. That is, he begins with the conclusion that the multiracial idea is bad, retrograde, and must be resisted. And then he cherry-picks his evidence to fit his conclusion. He spends much of his time on weaker writers such as Gregory Stephens and Stephen Talty who have been tangential to the multiracial literature. When he addresses stronger figures like Daniel, Root, Nash, and Kennedy, he carefully selects his quotes to fit his argument, and misrepresents their positions by doing so. Sexton also makes some pretty outrageous claims. He takes the fact that people who study multiracial identities are often studying aspects of family life (such as the shaping of a child's identity), and twists that to charge them with homophobia and nuclear family-ism. That is simply not accurate for any of the main writers in the field. The same is true for his argument by innuendo that scholars of multiraciality somehow advocate mail-order bride services. And sometimes Sexton simply resorts to ad hominem attacks on the motives and personal lives of the writers themselves. It is a pretty tawdry exercise. That is unfortunate, because Sexton appears bright and might have written a much better book detailing his hesitations about some tendencies in the multiracial movement. He might even have opened up a new direction for productive study of racial commitment amid complexity. Sexton does make several observations that are worth thinking about, [End Page 126] and surely this intellectual movement, like any other, needs to think critically about itself. Sadly, this is not that book.

#### Their indicts of multiculturalism get coopted by the right to justify Islamophobia and Western racism

Dr. Amir Saeed 8, Ph.D. professor of media and cultural studies at University of Sunderland, May 2008, "Islamophobia and Capitalism," Thinking Thru Islamophobia, Symposium Papers, Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, www.academia.edu/2657806/On\_conceptualising\_Islamophobia\_anti-Muslim\_sentiment\_and\_cultural\_racism

Simultaneously cultural racism is evident with politicians questioning the success of a multicultural society. The moral panic surrounding the events of 9/11, and 7/7 have led to a right-wing led debate under the guise of community cohesion that have suggested a return to ―core national values/culture‖ (note that the debates suggest the lack of precise meanings for these terms; national and culture) alongside stricter immigration and policing controls. Recently a new dominant neo-right wing discourse has been formulated that questions the whole concept of multiculturalism. What makes this different from previous right wing criticism of multiculturalism is that much of this criticism is coming from previously centre left commentators. Much of this language has taken even the more sinister view of questioning the need of immigration, questioning minority communities and questioning the actual benefits of a multicultural society. Furthermore much of the ‗blame‘ for the failure of multiculturalism has been attached to Muslims ‘ incompatibility to live within the ‗democratic‘ principles of the West.

### AT: Abolition

#### Non-reformist reforms fail

Angela Davis 4, Interview with Dylan Rodriguez, Davis: The Challenges of Prison Abolition, illinoisprisonwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/davis-challenges-of-prison-abolition.html

Angela: The seemingly unbreakable link between prison reform and prison development -- referred to by Foucault in his analysis of prison history -- has created a situation in which progress in prison reform has tended to render the prison more impermeable to change and has resulted in bigger, and what are considered "better," prisons.¶ The most difficult question for advocates of prison abolition is how to establish a balance between reforms that are clearly necessary to safeguard the lives of prisoners and those strategies designed to promote the eventual abolition of prisons as the dominant mode of punishment. In other words, I do not think that there is a strict dividing line between reform and abolition.¶ For example, it would be utterly absurd for a radical prison activist to refuse to support the demand for better health care inside Valley State, California's largest women's prison, under the pretext that such reforms would make the prison a more viable institution. Demands for improved health care, including protection from sexual abuse and challenges to the myriad ways in which prisons violate prisoners' human rights, can be integrated into an abolitionist context that elaborates specific decarceration strategies and helps to develop a popular discourse on the need to shift resources from punishment to education, housing, health care, and other public resources and services.

#### Radical negativity is wrong --- positive reforms are possible

Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory

We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.

### Distancing DA

#### Their K doesn’t come to grips with the interaction between suffering in places like Guantanamo now and our relationship to that—their K mirrors acts of distancing that say we should only focus on what’s in our purview—indefinite detention has maintained its legitimacy precisely because we view it as out there and not affecting us—we must bring the voices of those who can’t speak for themselves here

James Park 10, “EFFECTUATING PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION: HISTORICAL REPETITION AND THE CASE OF THE UYGHURS”, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 785

George Orwell once wrote in The Road to Wigan Pier regarding empire and the complicity of a nation that enjoys its fruits: For in the last resort, the only important question is, Do you want the British Empire to hold together or do you want it to disintegrate?... For, apart from any other consideration, the high standard of life we enjoy in England depends upon our keeping a tight hold on the Empire, particularly the tropical portions of it such as India and Africa. Under the capitalist system, in order that England may live in comparative comfort, a hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation. 128 How the old British Empire relates to the detention of Haitians and Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay involves the very question of conscious awareness and the difficulties in piercing the veil of physical and metaphysical detachment. 129 Descriptions of events transcribed through the filter of media form a buffer to action due to its intangible nature-there is an unreality to the medium of television where elements of reality that play across the screen can take on the discursive properties of the imaginary. 130 As a result, there can be quiet and passive acquiescence when terms, such as, "exceptional," "unprecedented," and "the normal rules do not apply" are heard and used to form the exigencies and justifications for "intensive interrogation methods" and indefinite detention without charge. 131 Spatial separation and isolation also create impediments to rectifying injustice. In the case of the Haitian refugees, service organizations had to go through the judiciary and spend years in litigation to gain access to the refugees at Guantanamo Bay. 13 In the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees caught up in the "War on Terror," there were explicated policies against denying access. 133 For instance, "[a] confidential 2003 manual for operating the Guantanamo detention center shows that military officials had a policy of denying detainees access to independent monitors" from the Red Cross. 134 In other words, those who had done no wrong were denied access and, as a result, justice. The indefinite detention of the Haitians and Uyghurs and the years they have spent and are spending in extra-territorial detention can, similarly, be examined through the prism of "punishment" as there have been alterations to the order and methodology of punishment and incarceration over time. 135 Punishment has changed from something that was acutely visible to something that has become cloaked and secreted away. 136 At one time, the public spectacle of punishment took center stage as a gory spectacle of physical pain. 137 These dramatic displays of "justice" provided all concerned with a specific role: The criminal to be punished acted as the star, the innocent public witnesses supplied the captivated audience, and the government authority directed this macabre melodrama. 138 These displays were therefore meant to educate both the individual criminals living (or in some cases dying), as well as the watching public as to the concepts of justice and punishment. 139 These theatrics later gave way to a less sensational mode of education which focused less on physical torment in pursuit of justice and sought to internalize a sense of a moral code in all individuals. 140 Thus, what was once a passive group of mere voyeurs has been disbanded to become a cluster of individual productions-each person now internalizes and imagines the process of punishment through the censored lens of courtroom dramas and the scripted cinema of the prison yard in popular culture, rather than bear witness to the realities of society's retribution.

This more sanitary, internal approach to punishment is particularly pronounced when examined in the context of the "War on Terror." In this instance, the institutions of punishment are not only removed from the public eye, but from the very soil of our nation. 141 In point of fact, Guantanamo Bay is based in a country where United States citizens cannot visit without obtaining a license through the United States government due to a long-existing trade embargo which has only recently been revisited. 142 Guantanamo Bay has been argued to be territory that is outside the bounds of United States' sovereignty, thereby, prohibiting detainees from invoking habeas corpus to challenge their detention. 143 Proponents of this argument used the United States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided in 1950, which held that those detained in territories beyond the borders of United States sovereignty are unable to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. 144 Thus, Guantanamo Bay was argued to be the sovereign territory of the nation of Cuba as a convenient fiction despite the years of isolation between the two nations. 145 This argument was shattered when the United States Supreme Court held that habeas corpus for "War on Terror" detainees was due in Boumediene v. Bush, decided in 2008. 146 Even further tucked away from the public eye are the secret prisons-socalled "black sites"-instituted by the Bush Administration, operating extra-judicially and containing the faceless "ghost detainee," subject to "intensive interrogation methods."' 147 As the form of punishment and detention shifts further afield, it takes on a profound dimension of separation. George Orwell, in the excerpt above, was alluding to the natural tendency to accept the conditions with which people are presented. The automatic supposition that what may be taking placing is unjust and perhaps beyond the constitutional limits can be seemingly driven from conscious awareness by the public's separation from events and the lack of information. As a consequence, justice has proceeded at a slow, aggravated plod in rectifying wrong where, oftentimes, individuals are simply "released" quietly after years of imprisonment without the subject of their innocence ever being addressed.

### 2AC Perm---General

#### Uniting different coalitions is necessary to overcome white supremacy---Hooks votes aff

Bell Hooks 3, social critic extraordinaire, “Beyond Black Only: Bonding Beyond Race”, http://prince.org/msg/105/50299?pr

African Americans have been at the forefront of the struggle to end racism and white supremacy in the United States since individual free black immigrants and the larger body of enslaved blacks first landed here. Even though much of that struggle has been directly concerned with the plight of black people, all gains received from civil rights work have had tremendous positive impact on the social status of all non-white groups in this country. Bonding between enslaved Africans, free Africans, and Native Americans is well documented. Freedom fighters from all groups (and certainly there were many traitors in all three groups who were co-opted by rewards given by the white power structure) understood the importance of solidarity-of struggling against the common enemy, white supremacy. The enemy was not white people. It was white supremacy. ¶ Organic freedom fighters, both Native and African Americans, had no difficulty building coalitions with those white folks who wanted to work for the freedom of everyone. Those early models of coalition building in the interest of dismantling white supremacy are often forgotten. Much has happened to obscure that history. The construction of reservations (many of which were and are located in areas where there are not large populations of black people) isolated communities of Native Americans from black liberation struggle. And as time passed both groups began to view one another through Eurocentric stereotypes, internalizing white racist assumptions about the other. Those early coalitions were not maintained. Indeed the bonds between African Americans struggling to resist racist domination, and all other people of color in this society who suffer from the same system, continue to be fragile, even as we all remain untied by ties, however frayed and weakened, forged in shared anti-racist struggle. ¶ Collectively, within the United States people of color strengthen our capacity to resist white supremacy when we build coalitions. Since white supremacy emerged here within the context of colonization, the conquering and conquest of Native Americans, early on it was obvious that Native and African Americans could best preserve their cultures by resisting from a standpoint of political solidarity. The concrete practice of solidarity between the two groups has been eroded by the divide-and-conquer tactics of racist white power and by the complicity of both groups. Native American artist and activist of the Cherokee people Jimmie Durham, in his collection of essays A Certain Lack of Coherence, talks about the 1960’s as a time when folks tried to regenerate that spirit of coalition: “In the 1960’s and ‘70’s American Indian, African American and Puerto Rican activists said, as loudly as they could, “This country is founded on the genocide of one people and the enslavement of another.” This statement, hardly arguable, was not much taken up by white activists.” As time passed, it was rarely taken up by anyone. Instead the fear that one’s specific group might receive more attention has led to greater nationalism, the showing of concern for one’s racial or ethnic plight without linking that concern to the plight of other non-white groups and their struggles for liberation. ¶ Bonds of solidarity between people of color are continuously ruptured by our complicity with white racism. Similarly, white immigrants to the United States, both past and present, establish their right to citizenship within white supremacist society by asserting it in daily life through acts of discrimination and assault that register their contempt for and disregard of black people and darker-skinned immigrants mimic this racist behavior in their interactions with black folks. In her editorial “On the Backs of Blacks” published in a recent special issue of TIME magazine Toni Morrison discusses the way white supremacy is reinscribed again and again as immigrants seek assimilation: ¶ All immigrants fight for jobs and space, and who is there to fight but those who have both? As in the fishing ground struggle between Texas and Vietnamese shrimpers, they displace what and whom they can…In race talk the move into mainstream America always means buying into the notion of American blacks as the real aliens. Whatever the ethnicity or nationality of the immigrant, his nemesis is understood to be African American…So addictive is this ploy that the fact of blackness has been abandoned for the theory of blackness. It doesn’t matter anymore what shade the newcomer’s skin is. A hostile posture toward resident blacks must be struck at the Americanizing door. ¶ Often people of color, both those who are citizens and those who are recent immigrants, hold black people responsible for the hostility they encounter from whites. It is as though they see blacks as acting in a manner that makes things harder for everybody else. This type of scapegoating is the mark of the colonized sensibility which always blames those victimized rather than targeting structures of domination. ¶ Just as many white Americans deny both the prevalence of racism in the United States and the role they play in perpetuating and maintaining white supremacy, non-white, non-black groups, Native, Asian, Hispanic Americans, all deny their investment in anti-black sentiment even as they consistently seek to distance themselves from blackness so that they will not be seen as residing at the bottom of this society’s totem pole, in the category reserved for the most despised group. Such jockeying for white approval and reward obscures the way allegiance to the existing social structure undermines the social welfare of all people of color. White supremacist power is always weakened when people of color bond across differences of culture, ethnicity, and race. It is always strengthened when we act as though there is no continuity and overlap in the patterns of exploitation and oppression that affect all of our lives. ¶ To ensure that political bonding to challenge and change white supremacy will not be cultivated among diverse groups of people of color, white ruling groups pit us against one another in a no-win game of “who will get the prize for model minority today.” They compare and contrast, affix labels like “model minority,” define boundaries, and we fall into line. Those rewards coupled with internalized racist assumptions lead non-black people of color to deny the way racism victimizes them as they actively work to disassociate themselves from black people. This will to disassociate is a gesture of racism. ¶ Even though progressive people of color consistently critique these standpoints, we have yet to build a contemporary mass movement to challenge white supremacy that would draw us together. Without an organized collective struggle that consistently reminds us of our common concerns, people of color forget. Sadly forgetting common concerns sets the stage for competing concerns. Working within the system of white supremacy, non-black people of color often feel as though they must compete with black folks to receive white attention. Some are even angry at what they wrongly perceive as a greater concern on the part of white of the dominant culture for the pain of black people. Rather than seeing the attention black people receive as linked to the gravity of our situation and the intensity of our resistance, they want to make it a sign of white generosity and concern. Such thinking is absurd. If white folks were genuinely concerned about black pain, they would challenge racism, not turn the spotlight on our collective pain in ways that further suggest that we are inferior. Andrew Hacker makes it clear in Two Nations that the vast majority of white Americans believe that “members of the black race represent an inferior strain of the human species.” He adds: “In this view Africans-and Americans who trace their origins to that continent-are seen as languishing at a lower evolutionary level than members of other races.” Non-black people of color often do not approach white attention to black issues by critically interrogating how those issues are presented and whose interests the representations ultimately serve. Rather than engaging in a competition that sees blacks as winning more goodies from the white system than other groups, non-black people of color who identify with black resistance struggle recognize the danger of such thinking and repudiate it. They are politically astute enough to challenge a rhetoric of resistance that is based on competition rather than a capacity on the part of non-black groups to identify with whatever progress blacks make as being a positive sign for everyone. Until non-black people of color define their citizenship via commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice rather than investing in the dehumanization and oppression of black people, they will always act as mediators, keeping black people in check for the ruling white majority. Until racist anti-black sentiments are let go by other people of color, especially immigrants, and complain that these groups are receiving too much attention, they undermine freedom struggle. When this happens people of color war all acting in complicity with existing exploitative and oppressive structures. ¶ As more people of color raise our consciousness and refuse to be pitted against one another, the forces of neo-colonial white supremacist domination must work harder to divide and conquer. The most recent effort to undermine progressive bonding between people of color is the institutionalization of “multiculturalism”. Positively, multiculturalism is presented as a corrective to a Eurocentric vision of model citizenship wherein white middle-class ideals are presented as the norm. Yet this positive intervention is undermined by visions of multiculturalism that suggest everyone should live with and identify with their own self contained group. If white supremacist capitalist patriarchy is unchanged then multiculturalism within that context can only become a breeding ground for narrow nationalism, fundamentalism, identity politics, and cultural, racial, and ethnic separatism. Each separate group will then feel that it must protect its own interests by keeping outsiders at bay, for the group will always appear vulnerable, its power and identity sustained by exclusivity. When people of color think this way, white supremacy remains intact. For even though demographics in the United States would suggest that in the future the nation will be more populated by people of color, and whites will no longer be the majority group, numerical presence will in no way alter white supremacy if there is no collective organizing, no efforts to build coalitions that cross boundaries. Already, the white Christian Right is targeting large populations of people of color to ensure that the fundamentalist values they want this nation to uphold and represent will determine the attitudes and values of these groups. The role Eurocentric Christianity has played in teaching non-white folks Western metaphysical dualism, the ideology that under girds binary notion of superior/inferior, good/bad, white/black, cannot be ignored. While progressive organizations are having difficulty reaching wider audiences, the white-dominated Christian Right organizes outreach programs that acknowledge diversity and have considerable influence. Just as the white-dominated Christian church in the U.S. once relied on biblical references to justify racist domination and discrimination, it now deploys a rhetoric of multiculturalism to invite non-white people to believe that racism can be overcome through a shared fundamentalist encounter. Every contemporary fundamentalist white male-dominated religious cult in the U.S. has a diverse congregation. People of color have flocked to these organizations because they have felt them to be places where racism does not exist, where they are not judged on the basis of skin color. While the white-dominated mass media focus critical attention on black religious fundamentalist groups like the Nation of Islam, and in particular Louis Farrakhan, little critique is made of white Christian fundamentalist outreach to black people and other people of color. Black Islamic fundamentalism shares with the white Christian Right support for coercive hierarchy, fascism, and a belief that some groups are inferior and others superior, along with a host of other similarities. Irrespective of the standpoint, religious fundamentalism brainwashes individuals not to think critically or see radical politicization as a means of transforming their lives. When people of color immerse themselves in religious fundamentalism, no meaningful challenge and critique of white supremacy can surface. Participation in a radical multiculturalism in any form is discouraged by religious fundamentalism. ¶ Progressive multiculturalism that encourages and promotes coalition building between people of color threatens to disrupt white supremacist organization of us all into competing camps. However, this vision of multiculturalism is continually undermined by greed, one group wanting rewards for itself even at the expense of other groups. It is this perversion of solidarity the authors of Night Vision address when they assert: “While there are different nationalities, races and genders in the U.S., the supposedly different cultures in multiculturalism don’t like to admit what they have in common, the glue of it all-parasitism. Right now, there’s both anger among the oppressed and a milling around, edging up to the next step but uncertain what it is fully about, what is means. The key is the common need to break with parasitism.” A based identity politics of solidarity that embraces both a broad based identity politics which acknowledges specific cultural and ethnic legacies, histories, etc. as it simultaneously promotes a recognition of overlapping cultural traditions and values as well as an inclusive understanding of what is gained when people of color unite to resist white supremacy is the only way to ensure that multicultural democracy will become a reality.

### Anti-Blackness Not Root of Islamophobia

#### Anti-blackness as the root cause of Islamophobia is ahistorical---it’s the other way around

Timothy Charoenying 8, Citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Professor at Cal-Berkeley, "Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach", Fall, crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach

The year 1492 marked a major turning point in the trajectory of Western Civilization. Elementary age children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalus–a Moorish province on the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlier–and more importantly, the last major Muslim stronghold on the European continent. Critical race scholars have argued that these two events would not only shift the geopolitical balance of power from the Orient to the Occident, but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and racial identity.¶ According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley, the expulsion of the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age of imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of European colonial expansion throughout the known world. The “discovery” of “godless” natives in the Americas would also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in 1550 on the nature of the human soul. Such a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religous—and ultimately racial—differences.¶ Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks, but rather, is an amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the Iberian peninsula, and to the notion of souless beings embodied in popular conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas.¶ These beliefs would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

### AT: Wilderson – General

#### Wilderson is overly reductive---he has no way to explain historical resistance to anti-blackness because his theory pigeon holes all oppression into the non-falsifiable register of psychoanalysis

Saër Maty Bâ 11, prof of film at Portsmouth University, The US Decentred, http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/view/2304/2474

As we shall see below, blacks in the US cannot and do not have ontology, or so Wilderson argues, denying with the same breath the workability of analogy as a method, because analogy can only be a ruse. Thus, what he calls ‘the ruse of analogy’ grants those who fall for it, for example, ‘Black film theorists’ or Black academics, an opportunity to reflect on (black) cinema only after some form of structural alteration. (38) Analogy does seem tricky if one follows Wilderson’s line of thought, that is, the Holocaust/Jews and slavery/Africans. Jews entered and came out of Auschwitz as Jews whereas Africans emerged from the slave ships as Blacks.2 Two types of holocaust: the first ‘Human’, the second ‘Human and metaphysical’, something which leads to Wilderson saying that ‘the Jews have the Dead ... among them; the Dead have the Black among them’. (38) It bears reiterating that for Wilderson, blacks are socially and ontologically dead in the sense that the black body has been violently turned into flesh, ‘ripped apart literally and imaginatively’, that it is a body vulnerably open, ‘an object made available (fungible) for any subject’ and ‘not in the world’ or civil society the way white bodies are. (38)¶ Furthermore, Wilderson argues that differences between black and white ethical dilemmas separate them dialectically into incompatible zones. As illustration Wilderson reflects on black women suffering in US prisons in the 1970s and then juxtaposes the suffering with white women’s concurrent public preoccupations in civil society. For example, the violence and neglect underwent by Safya Bukhari‐ Alston3 in solitary confinement at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women is linked to the similar plight of another black woman, Dorothy, in Haile Gerima’s Bush Mama (1977) before Wilderson questions what both situations mean in relation to images of ‘[w]hite women burning bras in Harvard Square ... marching in ... Manhattan campaigning for equal rights’. (135) Wilderson’s answer is that the images of female black pain and white activism are irreconcilable precisely because they cannot be read against one another without such an exercise appearing intellectually sloppy. However, he does not develop this point, preferring instead to examine suffering through ‘a libidinal economy’ (131) leading, predictably, to the conclusion that white radicalism, white political cinema and white supremacy are one and the same thing. Most unfortunate though inevitable is the reason Wilderson gives to justify this: a so‐called ‘anti‐Blackness’ that, ¶ [wilderson quote begins]¶ as opposed to white apathy, is necessary to White political radicalism and to White political cinema because it sutures affective, emotional, and even ethical solidarity between the ideological polar extremes of Whiteness. This necessary anti‐Blackness erects a structural prohibition that one sees in White political discourse and in White political cinema. (131) [wilderson quote ends]¶ undamentally, the first three chapters of Red, White and Black are concerned with what it takes to think blackness and agency together ethically, or to permit ourselves intellectual mindful reflections upon the homicidal ontology of chattel slavery. Wilderson posits ways through which ‘the dead’ (blacks) reflect on how the living can be put ‘out of the picture’. (143) There seems to be no let off or way out for blacks (‘The Slave’) in Wilderson’s logic, an energetic and rigorous, if unforgiving and sustained, treadmill of damning analysis to which ‘Indians’ (‘The “Savage”’/‘The Red’) will also be subjected, first through ‘“Savage” film’ analysis.¶ <cont>¶ And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act(STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film.¶ Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes ¶ [wilderson quote begins]¶ The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7¶ [wilderson quote ends] ¶ Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279)¶ Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

### AT: Wilderson – Policy Key

#### Policy focus key to combat racism---anti-blackness is not ontological

Jamelle Bouie 13, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a **creation of explicit policy choices—**the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to **dismantle this prejudice using public policy**. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That **there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that has defined American history**. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade **without the emergence of an anti-black racism**. It took particular choices made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would **make white supremacy the ideology of America**. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) **wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it**. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

### AT: Wilderson – Anti-Blackness Wrong

#### Anti-blackness is not an ontological antagonism---conflict is inevitable in politics, but does not have to be demarcated around whiteness and blackness---the alt’s ontological fatalism recreates colonial violence

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Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-“white” – modes of struggle are not (just) “psychic” 6 but involve the “reactivation” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant “object” that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity.

### AT Wilderson

#### Wilderson’s scholarship isn’t intended to preclude goal-oriented political change

Frank b. Wilderson 10 III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, "Panel on Literary Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10

Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say my writing is self consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented.

For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presetting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.

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#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

### Yancy = Aff

George Yancy 5, Duquesne University, Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19.4 (2005) 215-241

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:

Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.

(1998, 6)

To theorize the Black body one must "turn to the [Black] body as the radix for interpreting racial experience" (Johnson [1993, 600]).1 It is important to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body's subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body."2 These instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value" (Snead 1994, 4).

How I understand and theorize the body relates to the fact that the body—in this case, the Black body—is capable of undergoing a sociohistorical process of "phenomenological return" vis-à-vis white embodiment. The body's meaning—whether phenotypically white or black—its ontology, its modalities of aesthetic performance, its comportment, its "raciated" reproduction, is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is understood, how it is "seen," its "truth," is partly the result of a profound historical, ideological construction. "The body" is positioned by historical practices and discourses. The body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted, and constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and serve various ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden social processes. The historical plasticity of the body, the fact that it is a site of contested meanings, speaks to the historicity of its "being" as lived and meant within the interstices of social semiotics. Hence: a) the body is less of a thing/being than a shifting/changing historical meaning that is subject to cultural configuration/reconfiguration. The point here is to interrogate the "Black body" as a "fixed and material truth" that preexists "its relations with the world and with others"3 ; b) the body's meaning is fundamentally symbolic (McDowell 2001, 301), and its meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration that emits certain signs and presupposes certain norms; and, c) the body is a battlefield, one that is fought over again and again across particular historical moments and within particular social spaces. "In other words, the concept of the body provides only the illusion of self-evidence, facticity, 'thereness' for something [End Page 216] fundamentally ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of particular social groups" (301). On this score, it is not only the "Black body" that defies the ontic fixity projected upon it through the white gaze, and, hence, through the episteme of whiteness, but the white body is also fundamentally symbolic, requiring demystification of its status as norm, the paragon of beauty, order, innocence, purity, restraint, and nobility. In other words, given the three suppositions above, both the "Black body" and the "white body" lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture and to strategies of interrogating and removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity.

### AT: Prison First

#### The starting point of military detention allows an interrogation of us notions of punishment

Michelle Brown 5, “"Setting the Conditions" for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad”, American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 973-997, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v057/57.3brown.html>

As a site of unseemly conjunctures between various kinds of competing law, Abu Ghraib is an unusually complex instance of American imprisonment. Its gates mark encounters with United States, Islamic, military, criminal, and international human rights law. Its walls mark not simply the contours of sovereignty and the boundaries of the nation/state but, more significantly, their violation as an immense superpower engages in a preemptive strike, invasion, occupation, and torture. Within this configuration of power, transnational exportations of punishment materialize in a variety of manifestations: (1) in the sociopolitical contexts that define the lives of the primary actors caught up in the prison/military-industrial complex and its increasingly global economies; (2) through the international implementation of U.S. penal technologies with unprecedented exclusionary capabilities, epitomized in President Bush's desire to raze Abu Ghraib and build a "state of the art" supermax prison in its place; and (3) in the unregulated use of force outside of the boundaries of law, a violence juxtaposed and conflated with the memory and backdrop of penal horror under the regime of Saddam Hussein. Abu Ghraib, then, is the kind of place always caught in a double gesture. Regimes and governments attempt to deny and erase the prison's existence. Yet we are simultaneously unable to turn away from its grotesqueness, a site that demands investigation and thus constitutes, as ordered by military judicial ruling, "the scene of the crime."6 Prisons have long served as liminal spaces both inside and outside the boundaries of constitutional law, belonging to (in fact, invented by) but not of the United States. The birth of the penitentiary, a form of punishment defined [End Page 974] entirely upon the denial of freedom, is culturally grounded in democratic values. As historian David Rothman points out, incarceration emerged "at the very moment when Americans began to pride themselves on the openness of their society, when the boundless frontier became the symbol of opportunity and equality . . . as principles of freedom became more celebrated in the outside society."7 Sociolegal scholar David Garland depicts the penitentiary as a regime constructed upon notably American value systems, including "the targeting of 'liberty' as the object of punishment" and the "intensive focusing upon the individual in prison cells."8 However, as an institution fundamentally constructed through the inverse of these values, the American penitentiary rests upon a crucial cultural contradiction, the removal of liberty in a nation that would seek to preserve it, the use of violence to counter violence. As Michael Ignatieff writes: "Outside was a scrambling and competitive egalitarianism; inside, an unprecedented carceral totalitarianism."9 The prison is built upon an interior secret, a union of antithetical ideas and values. Its invocation always risks disclosing the weakness not simply of the sovereign state but of American democracy, founded in distinctly penal terms, including genocide and slavery. Prisons, then, are strategic research sites, from which we may always uncover the contradictions of American power. For these reasons, special attention must be given to how recent assertions of sovereignty by the United States, coded in penal terms, set the conditions for what Judith Butler refers to as the "new war prison," where "the current configuration of state power, in relation both to the management of populations (the hallmark of governmentality) and the exercise of sovereignty in the acts that suspend and limit the jurisdiction of law itself, are reconfigured," a context rife with possibilities for the violation of human rights.10 This corruptibility is, in part, an intrinsic property of punishment. To borrow Ignatieff's terminology, prisons are inherently "lesser evil" institutions. Even as democratic defense, such institutions always risk, in any invocation, the violation of foundational commitments to democracy. Even when applied in the context of legislative deliberation, judicial review, and adversarial constraint, they remain necessarily tragic and ultimately evil.11 However, events at Abu Ghraib and other contemporary domestic and war prisons prove most disconcerting not simply because of the absence of open, adversarial justification, but because of the larger absence of any perceived need for justification. As evidence emerges that Abu Ghraib was simply one site of detainee abuse among many in the war against terror,12 we realize the fear, as expressed by Amy Kaplan in her 2003 presidential address to the American Studies Association, that Guantánamo would become a story of our future, a world where "this floating [End Page 975] colony will become the norm rather than an anomaly, that homeland security will increasingly depend on proliferating these mobile, ambiguous spaces between the domestic and foreign."13 Abu Ghraib is, consequently, the kind of "unanticipated event," dramatic, poignant, and ugly all at once, in which the "normality of the abnormal is shown for what it is"—terror as usual. For these reasons, it also marks a critical site from which to consider how what it means to do American studies is irrevocably bound up with the practice and conjugation of U.S. punishment, not simply at home but abroad, and especially in those "mobile, ambiguous spaces" lost somewhere in between in a time of empire.

### Not Root

#### All types of racism existed independent of and before contact w/ whiteness

Radha Jhappan 96, Associate Professo, Dept of pol sci, Carleton University. Post-Modern Race and Gender Essentialism or a Post-Mortem of Scholarship, http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/viewFile/6876/3857

*Whites are responsible for racism* Race essentialist positions almost always set up a white/non-white dichotomy. There is a tendency to simplify the sources of oppression, to take the position, "whites did it to us," as if whites invented racism, imperialism and slavery. They did not. They have just been more successful over the last few centuries, and they have managed to impress an ideology of white supremacy on the world, thanks in part to their dedication to improving the technologies of travel, communications, and warfare. But to speak as if whites invented racism, imperialism, and slav- ery is to ignore five to ten thousand years of human history featuring various empires, inter-racial/ethnic/religious wars, and slavery in many areas of the world. It is also to aggregate and romanticize all non-white (indigenous, Asian, African, Australian, and South American) societies prior to contact with Europeans as if they existed in some happy past free of war, imperialism, patriarchy, racism, social stratification, exploitation, and oppression.

The race essentialist position appears to homogenize all whites as "our oppressors," without acknowledging the pos- sibility that "we" may do our own oppressing based on cul- tural systems and the economic and power interests of certain classes. I am not referring here only to the historical facts that it was African slavers who sold their peoples into slavery to the Europeans, or that the European imperial powers in non-settler colonies such as India depended upon local elites, who were only too happy to support the British rulers who were helping them to maintain their castel ethnic privileges and oppress others. As elsewhere, so complete was their dependence on the collaboration of Indian elites that the British contemplated creating "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.t'J> Yum yum yum, said the little aliens as they lined up for implantation. However, as Mohanty notes, "all forms of ruling operate by constructing and consolidat- ing, as well as transforming, already existing social inequali- ties." As well as constructing "hegemonic masculinities as a form of state rule, the colonial state also transformed ex- isting patriarchies and caste/class hierarchies.t'-v It seems that they did not need to implant very many aliens; they were already present.

In arguing that people of colour do our own oppressing, sometimes quite independently of whites, I am also referring to a number of racially xenophobic, patriarchal, and deeply- ingrained caste/class structures which pre-date European global dominance, and which are transplanted from continent to continent with the mass migrations that have characterized the last century. My knowledge and direct experience of South Asian culture tells me that, although altered somewhat by European imperialism, that culture was never and is not now characterized by gender, racial, or class equality.

Fur- ther, Friedman notes that there were forty-eight ethnic wars/conflicts being fought in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East during 1993.37 Many of these conflicts were/are based on ethnic animosities wherein each party has racialized an ethnic "other." In many cases such "othering" pre-dated or has survived (in modified forms) European imperialism (for example, the long-standing Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India, manifested today in various insurgencies including the Kashmiri independence move- ment; the Buddhist Tamil struggle against the Hindu Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; clan warfare in Somalia; and tribal warfare in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire). Indeed, many racisms in dif- ferent parts of the world (such as Japanese racism against Koreans) seemingly have nothing to do with Europeans at all, while others (such as the generalized racism throughout Asia against the many thousands of exported Filipina domestic workers and nurses, and male Filipino labourers exported for the construction and shipping trades) are indirectly caused by European imperialism by virtue of its stunting of economic development in various regions.

Finally, it is important to remember the ongoing complic- ity of the elites of third world countries and cultures in buttressing European/American economic imperialism and white supremacy because it serves their immediate interests. The specificities of their geopolitical positions, the machi- nations of international capitalism, and the legacies of co- lonialism may well explain the behaviour of "comprador" elites, but they are not thereby absolved of responsibility for oppressing certain ethnic/cultural/religious groups, classes, or women within their populations. Race essentialist positions that hold only whites accountable for racial oppres- sion are overly simplistic, miss the complexity of the issues involved, and encourage a focus on only one set of villains.

To be sure, European racism must be distinguished from earlier more localized forms by virtue of the facts that it is global in scope, hegemonic in power, structured in specific ways, and still with us as the fundamental organizing prin- ciple of North and South, West and East. Nevertheless, my point is that it has not entirely displaced all of the earlier forms which pre-dated it. In addition, by virtue of imperi- alism's forced exposure of various cultures to others (for example, through the creation of artificial "nation-states" amalgamating diverse cultures, or through mass global "mi- grations" such as that of West Africans and Indians to the West Indies as slaves and indentured labourers), new racisms have followed in the wake of European empires. It is not enough to analyze the origins of or modifications to these racisms in Euro-colonialism without recognizing that they must be dealt with now on their own terms.