# 1AC

Same as Round 1

# 2AC

# Case

### AT: Cuomo

#### Nuke war outweighs positive peace

Folk 78 – Peace Studies Professor, Bethany College (Jerry, Peace Education-Peace Studies Programs, Peace Change 5.1)

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

#### Structural violence isn’t first—rejecting flashpoint focus causes war

Friedberg 2k – Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton (Aaron, Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?, Survival 42.3)

But there are reasons too to be wary of placing too much faith in the collective human capacity for learning, still less common sense. At the turn of this century, many sensible Europeans believed that war was idiotic, outmoded, even obsolete, and they were optimistic about the enormous benefits to be gained from permanent peace. Their good sense and sound judgment on this question was not enough to stamp out the anxieties, jealousies and hatreds that resulted eventually in the tragedy of World War I. Twenty-five years later, with the evidence of war's folly still fresh before them, the European powers were unable to prevent another catastrophe. Indeed, looking back, it seems clear that it was the very eagerness of the liberal democratic powers to learn the lessons and to avoid the mistakes of the past that caused them to stumble again into war. Had they been more attentive to the realities of power, more alert to the dangers of aggression by ambitious states, and less convinced of the pacifying effects of trade, institutions and conciliatory diplomacy, they might have done better at securing their interests and preserving the peace.

#### Nuke war threat is real and o/w structural and invisible violence---their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive omnipresence makes preventing war impossible

Ken Boulding 78 is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peace.

### AT: Disease K

#### Disease securitization mobilizes political action to solve disease

Dr. Christian Enemark 5, is a Visiting Fellow of the John Curtin School of Medical Research at ANU where he serves as Deputy Director of the National Centre for Biosecurity.'INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY', The Nonproliferation Review, 12:1, 107 â€“ 125. March 1st â€“ via Taylor & Francis, which is usually obtainable through google scholar

In pursuing international cooperation, a threshold issue is how to win political acceptance for the idea that some infectious diseases pose a threat to security as well as to health. To securitize infectious diseases is to seek some of the overriding political interest and superior financial resources associated with more traditional (military) concepts of security. Labeling something a security issue lends it a sense of urgency, attracts greater public attention, and implicitly demands resources.1 There is a strong humanitarian imperative to mitigate the huge potential and actual loss of life resulting from infectious disease, but humanitarian motivations alone are not sufficient to address this problem. In appealing to national governments\*/still the principal players in the international arena\*/infectious diseases need to be portrayed in such a way as to stimulate concerns about national interests. Historically, governments have shown greater enthusiasm toward their own security than they have toward humanitarian causes.A good introduction to the way in which infectious diseases impact security is to examine their relevance to military operations throughout history. The historian Livy described an outbreak of plague in the Carthaginian and Roman armies during the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC. The Carthaginians, less accustomed than the Romans to the city's moist climate, suffered greater casualties from the disease and were defeated shortly afterward.2 In the thirteenth century, the Mongol invasions helped spread various epidemics of plague between East Asia and Eastern Europe. The sixteenth century demise of the Aztec empire came about mostly because the Spanish conquerors brought smallpox and measles with them to the New World. During World War I, an outbreak of typhus in Serbia in 1915 was so severe that the fighting on both sides stopped for six months.And disease was relevant in April 2003 when Canada's health minister suggested that medical staff from the Canadian Forces could help relieve pressure on Toronto hospital staff treating patients with SARS. The military replied that it was already critically short of physicians to look after its troops. At the time, Canada was preparing for a major deployment to Afghanistan. Had the SARS outbreak in Toronto become so bad as to require medical personnel from Canadian military units to assist, those units would not have been able to deploy overseas.3

In one sense, infectious diseases are already an ''established'' security threat in the form of biological warfare. Weapons for deliberately disseminating pathogenic microÂ­organisms potentially pose direct security threats to many countries. BW is not a new threat like emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, and it fits more easily within traditional conceptions of security. For these reasons, attempts to link disease and security via the problem of BW tend to resonate more strongly with the public and policymakers**.** But biological weapons are just one part of a spectrum of risks associated with the biological sciences. The spectrum encompasses natural disease outbreaks, accidents arising from otherwise benign activities such as medical research with pathogens, and the use of disease as a weapon of war or terror.5Transparency, Cooperation, and Security

Global networks assisted in the defeat of SARS by providing for the free exchange of information on surveillance, diagnosis, and treatment. Openness and transparency are also vital for maintaining confidence in cooperative efforts to confront disease-based security threats through formal institutions like the WHO and the BWC. The last section of this article discusses how excessive secrecy on the part of individual governments can undermine collective attempts to address infectious disease threats, whether of natural or deliberate origin. The experience of SARS in early 2003 demonstrated well the importance of government transparency in fostering cooperation against a common microbial threat. It was therefore unfortunate that the re-emergence of H5N1 avian influenza in 2004 was possibly the subject of attempted cover-ups by certain governments in Southeast Asia**.** In the short term, the disease known as ''bird flu'' is a security issue for countries in that region in the way it has brought economic devastation to the poultry industry, thus threatening the livelihoods of millions of people. However, the recent damage is negligible in comparison to that which might occur if H5N1 is not brought under control. The virus already meets two of the three criteria for causing a global pandemic of catastrophic proportions: the ability to replicate in humans and the absence of viral antibodies in the human population. The third criterion is that the virus be able to spread rapidly among people.4 7 If H5N1 were to adapt itself to spread from person to person as easily as regular human flu, its ability to kill would far exceed that of SARS.

### AT: Nuclear K Link

#### Fear of nukes exerts a restraining impulse --- even aggressive leaders are forced to moderate

Robert **Jervis 9**, the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, “Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying”, The National Interest, November/December, 10.27.2009, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22356

Mueller may also be too quick to dismiss the possibility that in a world absent nuclear weapons, the Soviets would have seen limited conventional wars as safe. As University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer showed, conventional deterrence can falter when the attacker believes that a quick victory is possible.4 **In the prenuclear era, states used limited force to change the status quo even when they would have shied away from a worldwide conflagration** (think of the wars that led to the unification of Germany and Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century, for example). **Without nuclear weapons, the American threat to wage an all-out war might have seemed neither credible nor efficacious. And in a world without them, aggression by the Soviets would have increased in probability.**¶Indeed, **the influence of nuclear weapons may have extended even more broadly. The Cold War saw multiple crises** and several wars in which the United States and the USSR were involved either directly or indirectly. So a story goes: back in the 1980s, an American said how significant it was that **none of these involved nuclear weapons**. More perceptive, a Soviet analyst replied, “actually, they were all nuclear wars.” It is notable that **these crises greatly diminished after the onset of mutual second-strike capability** in the mid-1960s. Of course**, the chronology does not prove cause and effect, and even scholars less ingenious than Mueller have been able to come up with alternative explanations like the effects of learning or the mellowing of the Soviet system.** But sometimes the obvious one is correct.¶ One can go further still and note that **all international politics in this period was conducted** under the shadow of nuclear weapons. **The knowledge that any confrontation**, not to speak of war, **could** lead to overwhelming destruction **was likely never far from anyone’s mind**. **The effects of this fear** saturated our consciousness and ways of thinking about politics**, and may well have** influenced the selection of leaders **on both sides. Even** Richard **Nixon, who talked about his “madman theory,” was rash only in his private statements.**¶Maybe nuclear weapons only had a modest impact, as Mueller insists. Maybe history would have been pretty much the same without them. But **the very pervasiveness of our nuclear fear—and the weapons’ very influence—was so widespread that trying to trace out the likely course of a nonnuclear world simply does not make much sense.**

#### IR nuclear war gaming key to good predictions and effective policy-making

Dong-ho Han 10, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 26, 2010, “Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished\_manuscript&file\_index=1&pop\_up=true&no\_click

\_key=true&attachment\_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f

Another example of the use of scenario analysis by defense planners can be found in a series of papers by the Rand Corporation that deal with ongoing national security issues and develop national security policies for the United States government. A recent article by Brian Jackson and David Frelinger entitled “Emerging Threats and Security Planning,” one of a series, deals with issues such as the security threats the U.S. government faces now and suggests how to discern “true” threats from “false” threats.57 Coping with a variety of emerging threats means not just focusing on traditional and conventional ways of thinking but also concentrating on unconventional and unusual modes of reasoning, often based on fanciful thinking that scenario planning most seeks to inspire.¶ Again, a series of papers at the Rand Corporation have dealt with diverse national security issues and tried to devise various national security policies for the U.S. government on the basis of scenario thinking and analysis. One of the early efforts in this domain could be found in a work on how nuclear war might start from the perspective of the early twenty-first century.58 In these papers various scenarios have been unfolded ranging from the possibility of nuclear warfare to emerging threats and new technological innovations in the military and industrial domains. The diverse usages of scenarios in government think tanks like Rand suggest that scenarios could have potential to be used for not only articulating alternative possibilities in a certain issue area but also applying various thoughts of different outcomes into a real world of policy making. In a word, scenario-based planning could make a difference in such diverse areas as business, military, economics, and politics.¶ Common and effective usage of scenario planning in other fields such as business, military, and even education strategic planning, strengthened by scenario-oriented methodological approaches, has considerable implications for the development of the field of IR in terms of the possible connection of theory and policy. If IR scholars could derive more practical insights from these fields of studies, their research could be more fruitful in the arena of real world policy making. This is why we need a discussion of the necessity of introducing scenario analysis in our field, the topic of the following section.¶ 4. Why the Study of International Politics Needs Scenario Analysis¶ Is the rationale for using scenarios in other disciplines still relevant for the study of international politics? Or do we have to find some other reasons for using the scenario methodology in our field?59 The potential relevance of the scenario method to the field of IR can be found in various efforts of IR scholars to use a variety of theoretical insights in order to think about an unknown future.¶ As the previous section suggested, the scenario methodology has been primarily developed in the areas of military planning and strategic management. In the field of IR a few scholars have reevaluated the importance of scenario analysis as a social science methodology.60 These scholars contend that the scenario-building method could make a unique contribution to IR research because of the alternatives to a “scientific” approach it offers to mainstream IR theorizing.

### AT: Heg K Link

#### Strong US key to norms and coop

Robert O. Keohane 12, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University, July/August 2012, “Hegemony and After,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, p. 114-118

Apart from questions of originality and the specifics of the declinist debate, the central problem with books of present- oriented foreign policy commentary such as these lies in their failure to distinguish between what is known and what is unknowable. By conflating the two, they end up misleading readers rather than educating them. It might be useful, therefore, to indicate half a dozen things relevant to the future of the U.S. global role that can now be said with confidence.¶ First, we know that in the absence of leadership, world politics suffers from collective action problems, as each state tries to shift the burdens of adjustment to change onto others. Without alliances or other institutions helping provide reassurance, uncertainty generates security dilemmas, with states eyeing one another suspiciously. So leadership is indeed essential in order to promote cooperation, which is in turn necessary to solve global problems ranging from war to climate change.¶ Second, we know that leadership is exercised most effectively by creating multilateral institutions that enable states to share responsibilities and burdens. Such institutions may not always succeed in their objectives or eliminate disagreements among their members, but they make cooperation easier and reduce the leader's burdens--which is why policymakers in Washington and many other capitals have invested so much effort for so many decades in creating and maintaining them.¶ Third, we know that leadership is costly and states other than the leader have incentives to shirk their responsibilities. This means that the burdens borne by the leader are likely to increase over time and that without efforts to encourage sharing of the load, leadership may not be sustainable.¶ Fourth, we know that in a democracy such as the United States, most people pay relatively little attention to details of policy in general and foreign policy in particular. Pressures for benefits for voters at home-- in the form of welfare benefits and tax cuts--compete with demands for military spending and especially nonmilitary foreign affairs spending. This means that in the absence of immediate threats, the public's willingness to invest in international leadership will tend to decline. (A corollary of this point is that advocates of international involvement have incentives to exaggerate threats in order to secure attention and resources.)¶ Fifth, we know that autocracies are fundamentally less stable than democracies. Lacking the rule of law and accepted procedures for leadership transitions, the former are subject to repeated internal political crises, even though these might play out beneath a unified and stable façade. China's leadership crisis during the spring of 2012, marked by the detention of the politician Bo Xilai and his wife, illustrated this point.¶ And sixth, we know that among democracies in the world today, only the United States has the material capacity and political unity to exercise consistent global leadership. It has shown a repeated ability to rebound from economic and political difficulties. The size, youth, and diversity of its population; the stability and openness of its political institutions; and the incentives that its economic system creates for innovation mean that it remains the most creative society in the world. Yet it also has major problems-- along with intense domestic partisan conflict that prevents those problems from being resolved and that constitutes a major threat

**Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support our advantage, prefer our advantage because it is interdisciplinary**

**Wohlforth 9** William, professor of government at Dartmouth College, “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

**Heg is key to decease excess American interventionalism**

**Kagan and Kristol, 2k** (Robert and William, “Present Dangers”, Kagan is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kristol is the editor of The Weekly Standard, and a political analyst and commentator, page 13-14 )

http://www2.uhv.edu/fairlambh/asian/present\_dangers.htm

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas interventions than under the "vital interest" standard. (13). The question, then, is not whether the US should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is whether the US should generally lean forward, as it were, or sit back. A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should embrace the former stance, being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably **before they erupt.** This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own advantage. By contrast, the vital interest standard is that of a "normal" power that awaits a dramatic challenge before it rouses itself into action.

## T

### 2AC T – WPA

#### The plan restricts armed conflict authority, which the AUMF is a subset of—we are a specific statute that applies to the AUMF—Gallagher votes aff

Jack Goldsmith 13, Harvard Law School, 9/1, A Quick Primer on AUMFs, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/a-quick-primer-on-aumfs/

Via Ilya Somin at Volokh, I see that the administration has proffered its proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) for Syria. Now it is Congress’s turn to decide what proposal(s) it wants to debate and possibly approve. And it appears that the scope of the authorization will be an issue in Congress. For example, Senators Graham and McCain have announced that they will not support a narrow AUMF supporting only isolated strikes, and some members of Congress surely will not support one that is that broad.¶ An article that I wrote with Curt Bradley, which examined AUMFs throughout American history, provides a framework for understanding AUMFs. (And the Lawfare Wiki collects many historical AUMFs and declarations of war, here.) AUMFs can (as Bradley and I argued on pp. 2072 ff.) be broken down into five analytical components:¶ (1) the authorized military resources;¶ (2) the authorized methods of force;¶ (3) the authorized targets;¶ (4) the purpose of the use of force; and¶ (5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force¶ Most AUMFs in U.S. History – for example, AUMFs for the Quasi-War with France in the 1790s, for repelling Indian tribes, for occupying Florida, for using force against slave traders and pirates, and many others – narrowly empower the President to use particular armed forces (such as the Navy) in a specified way for limited ends. At the other extreme, AUMFs embedded within declarations of war (here is the one against Germany in World War II) typically authorize the President to employ the entire U.S. armed forces without restriction except for the named enemy. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for Vietnam was also famously broad, as was the 2002 AUMF for Iraq, although the latter did require the President to make certain diplomatic and related determinations, and to report to Congress. Narrower AUMFs in the post-World War II era include the one in 1955 for Taiwan (narrow purpose and timing limitations) and the 1991 Iraq AUMF (narrow purpose and many procedural restrictions). Narrower yet were AUMFs for Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, both of which had a very narrow and restrictive purpose, and which contained time limits on the use of force. And of course there is the relatively broad AUMF that everyone knows, from September 18, 2001.¶ Bradley and I summarized historical AUMFs as follows:¶ This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has authorized the President to use force in many different situations, with varying resources, an array of goals, and a number of different restrictions. All of the authorizations restrict targets, either expressly (as in the Quasi-War statutes’ restrictions relating to the seizure of certain naval vessels), implicitly (based on the identified enemy and stated purposes of the authorization), or both. Such restrictions may be constitutionally compelled. Congress’s power to authorize the President to use force, whatever its scope, arguably could not be exercised without specifying (at least implicitly) an enemy or a purpose.¶ The primary differences between limited and broad authorizations are as follows: In limited authorizations, Congress restricts the resources and methods of force that the President can employ, sometimes expressly restricts targets, identifies relatively narrow purposes for the use of force, and sometimes imposes time limits or procedural restrictions. In broad authorizations, Congress imposes few if any limits on resources or methods, does not restrict targets other than to identify an enemy, invokes relatively broad purposes, and generally imposes few if any timing or procedural restrictions.

#### Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

## Gender K

### FW

#### Policy relevant debate about war powers is critical to hold the government accountable --- must engage specific proposals to solve

Ewan E. Mellor 13, European University Institute, Political and Social Sciences, Graduate Student, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, <http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why_policy_relevance_is_a_moral_necessity_Just_war_theory_impact_and_UAVs>

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37¶ Kelsay argues that:¶ [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38¶ He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms.¶ Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to¶ demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis.¶ Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51

### AT: Prior Questions – Cochrane

#### Prior questions will never be fully settled---action’s prior

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### Isaac

#### Consequentialism key

**Isaac 2**—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness **undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that **politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions**; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### AT: Method First

#### Method questions fail and stymie politics

Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Prioritizing method causes self-marginalization

Fred Halliday 96, Prof of IR at the London School of Economics, “The future of international relations: fears and hopes,” Chapter 16 in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, p. 323, google books

For its part, feminism has already shown how a range of issues seen as gender-neutral do in fact have a gendered character: security, national interest, human rights, war, nationalism. As such it suggests a general reconceptualization of much of IR, linked to the development of other, critical, approaches. But equally feminist engagement with the international suggests a range of issues on which the feminist perspective, hitherto focused on individual and social dimensions, may itself be affected by such a context – the international constitution of economies, gender images, social practices, legal possibilities. At the same time, the encounter of feminism with the international as much as that of sociology, poses questions to both bodies of thought – the very complexities, analytic and ethical, of international issues force clarification and development of feminist approaches. Feminism too has not been immune to the distortions of post-modernism: its impact on the discipline has been reduced by this divisionary association. The conceit, prevalent throughout much of post-modernism, that it alone provides a means of examining structures of domination, and giving a voice to the oppressed, is reproduced in analysis of gender relations. As feminist critics of post-modernism has shown, the risk is one of self-marginalisations, often disguised as principle: too often methodological introversion prevails at the expense of ethical critique or substantive analysis.

### No Patriarchy from Speech Act

#### One speech act doesn’t cause their impacts

Irina Ghughunishvili 10, “Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies”, Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

### AT: Feminism

#### Perm solves---integrating gender into IR is better than pure rejectoin

Hudson et al 10 [Valerie M. Hudson, Prof of Poli Sci at Texas A&M University, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof of Poli Sci at the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program at the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” from The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark]

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay.¶ In our view, seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies as a discipline, the literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212).¶ Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline. Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of empirical scholarship on gender, whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that make a meaningful contribution to security studies.

**Their patriarchy impacts are contrived, reductionist, essentialist, and fracture resistance**

**Crenshaw 2** [Carrie Crenshaw PhD, Former President of CEDA, “Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate” 2002 p. 119-126]

Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for “commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive “claims of immediacy” (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions “to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists” (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of “good reasons” to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, “[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical motivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists 'Mo feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. Debaters practice the ¶ convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leadsthe judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" (hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14).

#### Using technical discourse strategically is key to solve the K

Mary Caprioli 4, Dept. of Political Science @ the University of Tennessee, PhD from the University of Connecticut, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jun., 2004), pp. 253-269

We should learn from the research of feminist scholars to engage in a dialogue that can be understood. Carol Cohn (1987), for example, found that one could not be understood or taken seriously within the national security arena without using a masculine-gendered language. In other words, a common language is necessary to understand and be understood. This insight could be applied to feminist research within international relations. Why not, as Charlotte Hooper (2001:10) suggests, make "strategic use of [expert jargon] to gain credibility for feminist arguments (or otherwise subvert it for feminist ends)." Little justification exists for abandoning the liberal empiricists who reason that "the problem of developing better knowledge lies not with the scientific method itself but with the biases in the ways in which our theories have been focused and developed" (Tickner 2001:13).

### Reps Don’t Cause War

#### Reps don’t cause war

Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, **most skeptical view of preemptive war**, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

### AT: Gusterson

#### We don’t link to Gusterson or their nuclear weapons link – those are inevitable

#### Their criticism of the nuclear fetish is wrong---it ignores the material reality of IR that threats are real and states will exploit perceived breakdowns in U.S. deterrence. Nuclear scientists are right to work on making our deterrent effective

Gusterson 98 – Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at George Mason University, 1998, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War, p. 11-12

The psychological critique of the arms race is important. It reminds us that nuclear weapons are dangerous and potentially genocidal. It warns us that people can become numb in response to the overwhelming destructive force and apparent immovability of such weapons. And it tells us that we must pay attention to emotions and the unconscious mind as well as the rational calculations of the conscious mind when we discuss nuclear policy. In this context, however, I want to concentrate on gaps and problems in the psychologists' arguments.21¶ To begin with, they often fail to take seriously what is important in the realist view of the world, namely, that, as Stanley Hoffmann (1986: 9) puts it, "enemies are not mere projections of negative identities; they are often quite real." Given the way the world is currently organized, states do indeed have enemies and are sometimes attacked by them if they are weak. The psychologists are often so eager to find the pathology in the arms race that they do not take seriously enough nuclear professionals' own rationales for their positions. For example, in his book Minds at War, Steven Kull, one of the more influential antinuclear psychologists, criticizes strategists' scenarios for winnable nuclear wars as unrealistic and maladaptive— and therefore hunts down unconscious motives for them—without seriously addressing their rationale: they know nuclear wars should not be fought but must still somehow communicate to potential enemies the credibility and resolve that, they believe, deter aggression. Whether or not one agrees with the strategists' solution, it is important to take account of the problem the strategists see themselves as trying to solve.22

### AT: Alt – Wright

#### The alt’s all-or-nothing choice fails --- small reforms like the plan are key to institutional change and getting others to sign on to the alt

Erik Olin Wright 7, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf

5. Waystations¶ The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the **viability of institutional alternatives** that embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often **depends upon the existence of smaller steps**, intermediate institutional innovations **that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values.** Institutional proposals which have an **all-or-nothing quality** to them are both **less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems** if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem.¶ Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level¶ earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone.¶ What we ideally want, therefore, are **intermediate reforms** that have two main properties: first, they concretely **demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable;** and second, they **enhance the capacity for action of people**, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and **bring people together in problem-solving deliberations** for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that are **possible within existing institutions** and that **pragmatically solve real problems** while at the same time **empowering people in ways which** **enlarge their scope of action in the future.**

# 1AR

### SQ Improving

#### SQ improving for gender

Bjorn Lomborg 10/16, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, "A Better World Is Here", 2013, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-the-declining-costs-of-global-problems-by-bj-rn-lomborg

COPENHAGEN – For centuries, optimists and pessimists have argued over the state of the world. Pessimists see a world where more people means less food, where rising demand for resources means depletion and war, and, in recent decades, where boosting production capacity means more pollution and global warming. One of the current generation of pessimists’ sacred texts, The Limits to Growth, influences the environmental movement to this day.¶ The optimists, by contrast, cheerfully claim that everything – human health, living standards, environmental quality, and so on – is getting better. Their opponents think of them as “cornucopian” economists, placing their faith in the market to fix any and all problems.¶ But, rather than picking facts and stories to fit some grand narrative of decline or progress, we should try to compare across all areas of human existence to see if the world really is doing better or worse. Together with 21 of the world’s top economists, I have tried to do just that, developing a scorecard spanning 150 years. Across ten areas – including health, education, war, gender, air pollution, climate change, and biodiversity – the economists all answered the same question: What was the relative cost of this problem in every year since 1900, all the way to 2013, with predictions to 2050.¶ Using classic economic valuations of everything from lost lives, bad health, and illiteracy to wetlands destruction and increased hurricane damage from global warming, the economists show how much each problem costs. To estimate the magnitude of the problem, it is compared to the total resources available to fix it. This gives us the problem’s size as a share of GDP. And the trends since 1900 are sometimes surprising.¶ Consider gender inequality. Essentially, we were excluding almost half the world’s population from production. In 1900, only 15% of the global workforce was female. What is the loss from lower female workforce participation? Even taking into account that someone has to do unpaid housework and the increased costs of female education, the loss was at least 17% of global GDP in 1900. Today, with higher female participation and lower wage differentials, the loss is 7% – and projected to fall to 4% by 2050.¶ It will probably come as a big surprise that climate change from 1900 to 2025 has mostly been a net benefit, increasing welfare by about 1.5% of GDP per year. This is because global warming has mixed effects; for moderate warming, the benefits prevail.¶ On one hand, because CO2 works as a fertilizer, higher levels have been a boon for agriculture, which comprises the biggest positive impact, at 0.8% of GDP. Likewise, moderate warming prevents more cold deaths than the number of extra heat deaths that it causes. It also reduces demand for heating more than it increases the costs of cooling, implying a gain of about 0.4% of GDP. On the other hand, warming increases water stress, costing about 0.2% of GDP, and negatively affects ecosystems like wetlands, at a cost of about 0.1%.¶ As temperatures rise, however, the costs will rise and the benefits will decline, leading to a dramatic reduction in net benefits. After the year 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the decades to come.¶ Yet, to put matters in perspective, the scorecard also shows us that the world’s biggest environmental problem by far is indoor air pollution. Today, indoor pollution from cooking and heating with bad fuels kills more than three million people annually, or the equivalent of a loss of 3% of global GDP. But in 1900, the cost was 19% of GDP, and it is expected to drop to 1% of GDP by 2050.¶ Health indicators worldwide have shown some of the largest improvements. Human life expectancy barely changed before the late eighteenth century. Yet it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the gain since 1900: in that year, life expectancy worldwide was 32 years, compared to 69 now (and a projection of 76 years in 2050).¶ The biggest factor was the fall in infant mortality. For example, even as late as 1970, only around 5% of infants were vaccinated against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. By 2000, it was 85%, saving about three million lives annually – more, each year, than world peace would have saved in the twentieth century.¶ This success has many parents. The Gates Foundation and the GAVI Alliance have spent more than $2.5 billion and promised another $10 billion for vaccines. Efforts by the Rotary Club, the World Health Organization, and many others have reduced polio by 99% worldwide since 1979.¶ In economic terms, the cost of poor health at the outset of the twentieth century was an astounding 32% of global GDP. Today, it is down to about 11%, and by 2050 it will be half that.¶ While the optimists are not entirely right (loss of biodiversity in the twentieth century probably cost about 1% of GDP per year, with some places losing much more), the overall picture is clear. Most of the topics in the scorecard show improvements of 5-20% of GDP. And the overall trend is even clearer. Global problems have declined dramatically relative to the resources available to tackle them.¶ Of course, this does not mean that there are no more problems. Although much smaller, problems in health, education, malnutrition, air pollution, gender inequality, and trade remain large.¶ But realists should now embrace the view that the world is doing much better. Moreover, the scorecard shows us where the substantial challenges remain for a better 2050. We should guide our future attention not on the basis of the scariest stories or loudest pressure groups, but on objective assessments of where we can do the most good.

### Confession/Privilege Focus Bad

#### Starting politics with a focus on confession calcifies white-masculinist-subjectivity---it presumes a self-reflexive subject which ultimately is a defense-mechanism against otherness---politics in their model becomes an endless ritual of temporarily cathartic expressions of privilege or oppression

Andrea Smith 13, intellectual, feminist, and anti-violence activist, The Problem with “Privilege,” http://anarchalibrary.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-problem-with-privilege-2013.html

In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: “I am so and so, and I have x privilege.” It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions became the political project themselves. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the “most oppressed.” Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. “I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together.” Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity.

These rituals around self-reflexivity in the academy and in activist circles are not without merit. They are informed by key insights into how the logics of domination that structure the world also constitute who we are as subjects. Political projects of transformation necessarily involve a fundamental reconstitution of ourselves as well. However, for this process to work, individual transformation must occur concurrently with social and political transformation. That is, the undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. However, the response to structural racism became an individual one – individual confession at the expense of collective action. Thus the question becomes, how would one collectivize individual transformation? Many organizing projects attempt and have attempted to do precisely this, such Sisters in Action for Power, Sista II Sista, Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, and Communities Against Rape and Abuse, among many others. Rather than focus simply on one’s individual privilege, they address privilege on an organizational level. For instance, they might assess – is everyone who is invited to speak a college graduate? Are certain peoples always in the limelight? Based on this assessment, they develop structures to address how privilege is exercised collectively. For instance, anytime a person with a college degree is invited to speak, they bring with them a co-speaker who does not have that education level. They might develop mentoring and skills-sharing programs within the group. To quote one of my activist mentors, Judy Vaughn, “You don’t think your way into a different way of acting; you act your way into a different way of thinking.” Essentially, the current social structure conditions us to exercise what privileges we may have. If we want to undermine those privileges, we must change the structures within which we live so that we become different peoples in the process.

This essay will explore the structuring logics of the politics of privilege. In particular, the logics of privilege rest on an individualized self that relies on the raw material of other beings to constitute itself. Although the confessing of privilege is understood to be an anti-racist practice, it is ultimately a project premised on white supremacy. Thus, organizing and intellectual projects that are questioning these politics of privilege are shifting the question from what privileges does a particular subject have to what is the nature of the subject that claims to have privilege in the first place.

### \*\*AT: K Prior

#### Conventional IR can accommodate the K

Mary Caprioli 4, Dept. of Political Science @ the University of Tennessee, PhD from the University of Connecticut, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jun., 2004), pp. 253-269

Conventional feminist IR scholars misrepresent the field of international relations in arguing that IR scholarship as popularly accepted excludes alternative explanations of state behavior, including feminist inquiry, that go beyond structural, state-focused models. Feminist IR theorists, among others, critique the IR field for its state-centric approach and argue that "a world of states situated in an anarchical international system leaves little room for analyses of social relations, including gender relations" (Tickner 2001:146). As a result, they appear to set up a straw man by refusing to recognize the variety within "conventional" IR research. Indeed, as Jack Levy (2000) has observed, a significant shift to societal-level variables has occurred, partly in response to the decline in the systemic imperatives of the bipolar era. Certainly the democratic peace literature, particularly its normative explana- tion (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), among other lines of inquiry, recognizes the role of social relations in explaining state behavior. ¶ The normative explanation for the democratic peace thesis emphasizes the soci- etal level values of human rights, support for the rule of law, and peaceful conflict resolution in explaining the likelihood of interstate conflict. Furthermore, dyadic tests of the democratic peace thesis rely "on an emerging theoretical framework that may prove capable of incorporating the strengths of the currently predom- inant realist or neorealist research program, and moving beyond it" (Ray 2000:311). In addition, theorizing and research in the field of ethnonationalism has highlighted connections that domestic ethnic discrimination and violence have with state behavior at the international level (Gurr and Harff 1994; Van Evera 1997; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003a, 2003b). ¶ Contrary to the argument that conventional IR theory excludes feminist inquiry, space exists within the field of international relations for feminist inquiry even allowing for a state-centric focus, just as room exists for scholars interested in exploring the democratic peace and ethnonationalism. International relations feminists make the same mistake that they accuse IR scholars of making: narrowing the space for various worldviews, thereby creating competition and a sense of exclusion among the so-called others. If the role of "feminist theory is to explain women's subordination, or the unjustified asymmetry between women's and men's social and economic positions, and to seek prescriptions for ending it" (Tickner 2001:11), then feminist IR scholarship ought to allow for an explanation of how women's subordination or inequality has an impact on state behavior, assuming a state- centric focus, while at the same time challenging the predetermination of a struc- tural analysis. If domestic inequality does affect state behavior, or even perpetuates the existence of states, then policy prescriptions should be sought. ¶ Feminists most consistently argue that improving the condition of women, chal- lenging gender-neutral assumptions that are really male-centric, highlighting the pernicious effects of gender hierarchy, and committing to social justice are critical and necessary components of feminist international relations (see Peterson 2002). At the most basic level, feminist international relations challenges the assumption that theories are gender neutral (Pettman 2002); Christine Sylvester (2002a) has argued that feminists generally begin with gender but that not all such scholars are feminists first. Indeed, "some prefer starting with a recognizable IR topic and bringing to it new gender-highlighting questions" (Sylvester 2002b: 181). The role of feminist IR scholarship has also been identified as showing "how gender rela- tions of inequality act to exclude women from the business of foreign policymak- ing" (Tickner 1999:48). At issue is the question: might feminist IR scholarship benefit from moving beyond a focus on the exclusion of women toward a focus on the impact of that exclusion on state behavior? Feminist and gendered scholarship, regardless of methodology, can further feminist goals by focusing on the role that the norms of inequality and dominance play in constructing the international po- litical world, including that of state behavior, rather than only on the bias inherent in male-centered inquiry and the unequal impact of state violence on women.

### \*\*AT: Add and Stir

#### Add and stir misunderstands the perm – incorporating gender into mainstream IR solves best

Mary Caprioli 4, Dept. of Political Science @ the University of Tennessee, PhD from the University of Connecticut, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jun., 2004), pp. 253-269

A Response to the "Add Gender and Stir" Criticism ¶ The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment of both feminist and other types of IR scholarship. As Jan Jindy Pettman (2002) has argued, however, no single feminist position exists in international relations. One of the most common feminist critiques of feminist quantitative research is that scholars cannot simply "add gender and stir" (Peterson 2002; Steans 2003), for gender is not just one of many variables. Yet, gender is one of many variables when we are discussing international issues, from human rights to war. As Fred Halliday (1988) has observed, gender is not the core of international relations or the key to understanding it. Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not the only one. ¶ Such a critique only serves to undermine the feminist argument against a sci- entific methodology for the social sciences by questioning the scholarship of those who employ quantitative methodologies. One does not pull variables "out of the air" to put into a model, thereby "adding and stirring." Variables are added to models if a theoretical justification for doing so exists: ¶ the basic method of social science remains the same: make a conjecture about causality; formulate that conjecture as an hypothesis, consistent with established theory (and perhaps deduced from it, at least in part); specify the observable implications of the hypothesis; test for whether those implications obtain in the real world; and overall, ensure that one's procedures are publicly known and replicable. Relevant evidence has to be brought to bear on hypotheses generated by theory for the theory to be meaningful. (Keohane 1998:196) ¶ Peterson (2002:158) postulates that "as long as IR understands gender only as an empirical category (for example, how do women in the military affect the conduct of war?), feminisms appear largely irrelevant to the discipline's primary questions and inquiry." Yet, little evidence actually supports this contention--unless one is arguing that gender is the only important category of analysis. ¶ If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gender- centric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. ¶ Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) ar- gue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individ- uals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world. Sylvester (2002a) has wondered aloud whether feminist research should be focused primarily on critique, warning that feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

### \*\*Perm Solves

#### Feminism is compatible with our epistemology

Lind 5 [Michael Lind, executive editor of The National Interest, “Of Arms and the Woman,” http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt]

Rejecting the feminist approach to international relations does not mean rejecting the subjects or the political values of feminist scholars. Differing notions of masculinity and femininity in different societies, the treatment of women and homosexuals of both sexes in the armed forces, the exploitation of prostitutes by American soldiers deployed abroad, the sexual division of labor both in advanced and developing countries: all of these are important topics that deserve the attention that Enloe awards them. She shows journalistic flair as well as scholarly insight in detailing what abstractions like the Caribbean Basin Initiative mean in the lives of women in particular Third World countries. Still, such case studies, however interesting, do not support the claim of feminist international relations theorists that theirs is a new and superior approach.¶ One thing should be clear: commitment to a feminist political agenda need not entail commitment to a radical epistemological agenda. Ideas do not have genders, just as they do not have races or classes. In a century in which physics has been denounced as "Jewish" and biology denounced as "bourgeois," it should be embarrassing to denounce the study of international relations as "masculinist." Such a denunciation, of course, will not have serious consequences in politics, but it does violence to the life of the mind. The feminist enemies of empiricism would be well-advised to heed their own counsel and study war no more.