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#### a. Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### “Should” requires defending federal action

Judge Henry Nieto 9, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange

Steinberg and Freeley 13, \* David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And \*\* Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, *Argumentation and Debate***,** *Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, 121-4

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### b. Vote neg

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### 2. substantive regulations that demarcate limits are necessary for dialogue---refusal to tailor their identity claims to normative, public stances shuts down the possibility for discussion and democratic respect

John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful.

Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states:

To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248)

Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70).

Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.

#### Tailoring identity claims to common topics for deliberation is possible and desirable---the 1ac’s failure to affirm topical action impedes the culture of democratic debate that’s key to effective decisionmaking in a pluralistic society

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.

One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.)

The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument.

Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.

More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process of intellectual exchange outweighs the content of the aff and doesn’t link to any of their offense

Amanda Anderson 6, prof of English at Johns Hopkins The Way We Argue Now, 25-8

25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.

#### Avoiding engaging the topic because the state is irredeemably racist over-essentializes modern black-life---switching sides on Afro-Pessimism crucial

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The answer common in such departments is that the principal mission is to teach students about the eternal power of racism past and present. Certainly it should be part of a liberal arts education to learn that racism is more than face-to-face abuse, and that social inequality is endemic to American society. However, too often the curriculum of African-American Studies departments gives the impression that racism and disadvantage are the most important things to note and study about being black.

The question is whether this, for all of its moral urgency in the local sense, qualifies as education under any serious definition.

Typical is the curriculum of one African-American Studies department in a solid, selective state school west of the Mississippi. In this department, racism is, essentially, everything.

One course teaches that "Housing discrimination systematically skews opportunities and life chances," another that "racism, sexism, and heterosexism shape black life chances in a 21st century context," while yet another zeroes in on "the effects of institutional racism on social policy, desegregation, integration, and affirmative action programs."

Then there is "Blacks in the Media" - or, rather, one slice of that subject: "Studying literature, comic books, comic strips, cartoons, music, theater, cinema, broadcasting, and television, students will analyze the mythical imageries which have created stereotypes." This is a common trope in writings on black performance, in which any performer can be jammed into a category such as "Mammy" or "Tragic Mulatto," sidestepping the nevertheless brilliant performances of people like Ethel Waters and Fredi Washington in the old days, or Queen Latifah and Halle Berry today.

Following from this glum desperation is a fetishization of radical politics as blacks' only constructive allegiance. One would never know the marginal import of radicalism to most black lives from its centrality to so many African-American Studies department syllabi. One course analyzes "the tradition of radical thought and the relevance of this thought to the needs and interests of the black community" - but what does the "relevance" consist of except intellectually? Yet the same department also offers a course on, more specifically, black Marxism.

According to this curriculum, being black has been so horrific that we are even challenged by the mere physicality of existence. One courses teaches that black women's bodies have to be "important spaces of resistance," while another is based on the idea that black people have been done in by various permutations of "urban spatial relations."

Because racism and inequality will always exist in some forms, this all qualifies as a bone-deep, almost willful pessimism about black potential. One would expect the thinking class of a troubled race to at least pay more lip service to looking forward. The set-jawed obsession with tabulating obstacles becomes almost peculiar, as if based on an assumption that in some way, black Americans are uniquely exempt from treating challenges as surmountable. There is even a course on black psychology whose description would get a white-run department picketed out of existence in a week, examining "manifestations of various psychological characteristics of people of African decent [sic], their cultual [sic] and behavioral norms, including the way that issues of race, class, gender and sexuality affect their cognitive, social, and emotional development."

One senses that the people teaching in African-American Studies departments feel that blackness is indeed something very different, likely because African slaves were unwilling immigrants. However, Ralph Ellison once asked "Can a people live and develop for over three hundred years simply by reacting?"

To those who would consider themselves representing black people by answering in the affirmative, there are legions of black people of all walks who would heartily disagree. There is no self-standing metric of unassailable truth that justifies intellectuals treating that disagreement - that is, the life-spirit of a people millions strong making the best of the worst for four hundred years -- as unworthy of serious address.

As to the possible objection that course descriptions do not engage these departments closely enough, a look at a few actual course syllabi is useful.

At the University of Pennsylvania, the syllabus for "Racial and Sexual Conflict" openly states that "The term paper for this course should be concerned with the structure, causes, and policies that attempt to alleviate or perpetuate racial and/or sexual discrimination in the United States." Technically, this stipulation could allow an exploration of what people have done to get past obstacles rather than merely describe them. However, the material covered in this course gives precious little support to such an endeavor.

One week, the discussion concerns the questions as to "What role does educational opportunity play in economic opportunity? How has government policy affected educational opportunity by race?" However, the readings include none of the academic literature by scholars such as Joleen Kirschenman, Kathryn Neckerman, Jomills Braddock, James McPartland and Alford Young on how attitudinal factors affect the hireability of many uneducated black men, none of the literature on solid job opportunities for people without college degrees, and nothing on organizations nationwide assisting people in taking advantage of such opportunities. In a course purporting to teach America's brightest and most ambitious students about urgent realities, how are sources such as these irrelevant?

At the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, one course exemplifies the focus on radicalism. "Race, Radicalism and African American Culture" seeks to "track the genealogy of the movement that came to be called 'Black Power,' and to situate black radical artists and intellectuals in the broader history of twentieth-century American thought, culture, and politics."

And the course covers a noble procession of figures: Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, Richard Wright, Paul Robeson, the Black Panthers, Amiri Baraka, Cornel West, Bell Hooks. Not to mention James Baldwin. And Malcolm X. And Stokely Carmichael. Upon which the simple question is: despite their resonance, what effect did any of these people have upon the fact that there are today more middle-class black people than poor ones? Which was more central to making whites comfortable enough with blackness to elect a black President, the legacy of Malcolm X or the legacy of Dr. King?

As to King, the course does address Bayard Rustin, who was central to organizing the March on Washington. But he was at loggerheads with black radicals as the sixties wore on. The main legacy of black radicalism has been mood and fashion. Is its centrality to so many African-American Studies departments' curricula a matter of comprehensive engagement with black political development? Or is it what happens to be a common political orientation among modern academics in the humanities, including black ones?

To the extent that the answer is the latter, students are being underserved. At Columbia, in one African-American Studies course Manning Marable assigns an article by Robin Kelley called "Beyond the 'Real' World, or Why Black Radicals Need to Wake Up and Start Dreaming." But which black radical dreams have borne fruit in a way that would elicit a salute from ordinary black people in 2009? Dr. King had a dream indeed -- but he didn't mean us to stop there.

The issue is not the quality of these courses in themselves. I will gladly assume that these professors are all excellent lecturers, assiduous researchers and dedicated mentors. Yet attention must be paid to their ideological bias nevertheless. An African-American Studies curriculum whose main message is that black Americans' most interesting experience has always been racism, still is, and that this requires radicalism as a politics of choice is not education. It is indoctrination. It proposes a single minority view as sense incarnate. This is not what education is supposed to be.

To the extent that these courses and syllabi are typical, then, there is a problem. And anyone familiar with African-American Studies departments knows that these courses and syllabi are, indeed, typical.

African-American Studies departments have a place in a liberal arts education. However, to deserve that inclusion in anything beyond a symbolic sense, they should revise their curricula in exactly two ways, simple but crucial.

First, there should be full acknowledgment in all courses that the role of racism in black people's lives and fates is receding, and to such a degree that the race's challenges today are vastly different than they were forty years ago.

The aim should not be to downplay the reality of racism, but to present precisely what education consists of: the ambiguities and challenges of real life and how one thinks about it.

Defeatism should be discouraged. Any sense that defeatism is the empirically proper position on black American history in the same way as it would have been for Pompeiians in the face of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius fails -- for the simple reason that progress for black Americans continues on so many fronts.

Most of the people in question would resist being characterized as defeatist, or as not acknowledging change. However, there is acknowledgment and there is genuflection. Plus, a claim that black radicalism is our only real future is, in itself, defeatism. Four centuries of black history give no indication that these politics will significantly affect how most black people thrive.

For example, a course like Yale's on "African-American Politics" should include not only mention of the Bradley Effect (under which whites voters have claimed in polls that they would vote for black candidates but do not at the voting booth) but also that it has been proven to be on the wane repeatedly for twenty years, including in the election of Barack Obama. Otherwise, Yale's teachings will lag behind what even Wikipedia tells us about the reality on the Bradley Effect, as opposed to its recruitment as a strategy of indoctrination.

The course I mentioned on blacks' problems with urban space flags environmental racism - but would ideally mention the important work of Christopher Foreman of the Brookings Institution (black, for the record) showing that claims along these lines have been overblown.

It must also fall out of this that there will be no such thing as a course shoehorning the careers of hundreds of hard-working and excellent black artists and performers as lessons in stereotyping, or as most interesting for how they were hemmed in by racism than for what they accomplished regardless. Just as it is impossible to imagine Jewish Americans submitting themselves to so dispiriting and reductive a historiography of performance as this one, black scholars should step away from this kind of thinking as giving in to, rather than coping with, the ills of our history.

In the same vein, black popular music (including hip hop) should not be treated as most interesting in how it happened to intersect with (leftist and radical) political ideology - anymore than klezmer music, Chinese opera, or Tchaikovsky is. What about how our music is just good?

Second, an African-American Studies department should be considered larval without a course on black conservative thought - upon which courses on black radicalism would then be acceptable as alternative arguments.

Crucially, token assignment of writings of ancient three-named figures like Booker T. Washington, who wrote amidst post-Civil War conditions now ancient history, are a mere beginning. Most departments already slip in Washington, for example - although they should now regularly engage Robert Norrell's new biography that rescues the man from a century of calumny.

However, equally central to honest engagement with "black thought" are modern figures often considered controversial by the campus set, such as Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, Walter Williams, Debra Dickerson, and Stanley Crouch. (I will refrain from putting myself on this list, but will mention that my work is not uncommonly assigned to college students and seems not to leave them deaf to America's sociological imperfections.) Also useful, given that African-American Studies syllabi typically include some white writers, would be Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom, Lawrence Mead, Dan Subotnik and Peter Wood.

There is an argument hardly unfamiliar in the halls of ivy that black writers of this ilk are irrelevant to serious discussion because they are traitors to the race. Those charges must be permitted as free speech - but have no place in any brand of academic inquiry. All of the writers I have listed are careful thinkers deeply concerned with the fate of black America. It will not do to tar them as "not scholarly" because they do not all write in academic format or publish in obscure scholarly journals. Writings typically assigned by James Baldwin, Cornel West or even most of the others in this school are not written in this format either.

Thomas Sowell is read by millions in a nationally syndicated column, and this is in part because he is an economics and history scholar of long standing, whose books are often festooned with footnotes and references to academic work. Shelby Steele won the National Book Award, because of rhetorical skill surely the equal of writers like Patricia Williams and Michael Eric Dyson. Stanley Crouch is a polymath whose salty, "down" essence challenges anyone's claim that not being with the black radical program means not being "culturally black."

To be sure, many professors in African-American Studies departments think of themselves as doing their jobs in what they term "contesting" assorted topics. An example is Marable's "Critical Approaches to African-American Studies" at Columbia in which the contesting is the likes of "Remapping the black experience," "Redefining whiteness," and "Race-ing justice." However, this is a rearranging of furniture, very en famille. The confrontational, leftwardly politicized assumptions remain steadfast - while millions of blacks have overcome having never heard of politics of this kind.

These views, nevertheless, have value and should be heard. Yet they are not, on their own, truth. They verge into excess and anti-empiricism as readily as views from the right. There exist as many intelligent "contestings" of these leftist views as there exist "contestings" of the writings of Shelby Steele or myself. In a university department worth the status, contesting from all sides must be heard.

### Case

#### No social death – history proves

Brown 9 Vincent, Prof. of History and African and African-American Studies @ Harvard Univ., December, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," American Historical Review, p. 1231-1249

THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSON’S MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with “survivals” or “retentions” of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park’s view of “the Negro” predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits ex- amined “Africanisms”—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park’s, who empha- sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovits’s line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. 35¶ Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by “slave crime.”36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writ- ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of “the slave” with what they were learning about the en- slaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson’s definition of slavery. “If slaves were in fact ‘generally dishonored,’ ” Craton asked, “how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of ‘reputation’ and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?” How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been “natally alienated” by definition? Finally, and per- haps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to “permanent violent domination,” they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the “varied manifestations of their resistance” that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes “fatally.”38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson’s description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their “tropical temperament.”¶ The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow- erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re- sistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker’s analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul- tural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom “the rupture was the story” of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the “perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles.”39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City’s 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a “shared cultural heritage” that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the “various steps Africans made in the process of becoming ‘African American’ in culture, orientation, and identity.”40

#### Reforms are possible and desirable---tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption and is still a better strategy than their merely symbolic stance

Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.

#### Disenfranchisement narrative is overly pessimistic and ignores massive progress since Civil Rights, Voting Rights, etc---they essentialize race-relations

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As a writer, philosopher, artist, and black American, I've devoted more than 40 years of my life to trying to understand and express intellectually and artistically different aspects of the black American narrative. At times during my life, especially when I was young, it was a story that engaged me emotionally and consumed my imagination. I've produced novels, short stories, essays, critical articles, drawings, and PBS dramas based on what we call the black American story. To a certain degree, teaching the literature of black America has been my bread and butter as a college professor. It is a very old narrative, one we all know quite well, and it is a tool we use, consciously or unconsciously, to interpret or to make sense of everything that has happened to black people in this country since the arrival of the first 20 Africans at the Jamestown colony in 1619. A good story always has a meaning (and sometimes layers of meaning); it also has an epistemological mission: namely, to show us something. It is an effort to make the best sense we can of the human experience, and I believe that we base our lives, actions, and judgments as often on the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves (even when they are less than empirically sound or verifiable) as we do on the severe rigor of reason. This unique black American narrative, which emphasizes the experience of victimization, is quietly in file background of every conversation we have about black people, even when it is not fully articulated or expressed, It is our starting point, our agreed-upon premise, our most important presupposition for dialogues about black America. We teach it in our classes, and it is the foundation for both our scholarship and our popular entertainment as they relate to black Americans. Frequently it is the way we approach each other as individuals.

As a writer and a teacher of writing, I have to ask myself over and over again, just what is a story. How do we shape one? How many different forms can it take? What do stories tell us about our world? What details are necessary, and which ones are unimportant for telling it well? I constantly ask my creative writing students two questions: Does the story work, technically? And, if so, then, what does it say? I tell them that, like a work of philosophy (which is the sister discipline to storytelling among the interpretive arts), a narrative vision must have the qualities of coherence, consistency, and completeness. The plot of a modern story must be streamlined and efficient if it is to be easily understood. And, like Edgar Allan Poe in his 1842 essay "On the Aim and the Technique of the Short Story," I argue that a dramatic narrative should leave the listener with "a certain unique or single effect" that has emotional power. For the last 32 years, I've stressed to my students that a story must have a conflict that is clearly presented, one that we care about, a dilemma or disequilibrium for the protagonist that we, as readers, emotionally identify with. The black American story, as we tell it to ourselves, beautifully embodies all these narrative virtues.

The story begins with violence in the 17th-century slave forts sprinkled along the west coast of Africa, where debtors, thieves, war prisoners, and those who would not convert to Islam were separated from their families, branded, and sold to Europeans who packed them into the pestilential ships that cargoed 20 million human beings (a conservative estimate) to the New World. Only 20 percent of those slaves survived the harrowing voyage at sea (and only 20 percent of the sailors, too), and if they were among the lucky few to set foot on American soil, new horrors and heartbreak awaited them.

As has been documented time and again, the life of a slave--our not-so-distant ancestors--was one of thinghood. Former languages, religions, and cultures were erased, replaced by the Peculiar Institution, in which the person of African descent was property, and systematically--legally, physically, and culturally--denied all sense of self worth. A slave owns nothing, least of all himself He desires and dreams at the risk of his life, which is best described as relative to (white) others, a reaction to their deeds, judgements, and definitions of the world. And these definitions, applied in blacks, were not kind. For 244 years (from 1619 to 1863), America was a slave state with a guilty conscience: two and a half centuries scarred by slave revolts, heroic black (and abolitionist) resistance to oppression, and, more than anything else, physical, spiritual, and psychological suffering so staggering it silences the mind when we study the classic slave narratives of Equiano or Frederick Douglass. Legal bondage, the peculiar antebellum world, ended during the Civil War, but the Emancipation Proclamation did not bring liberation.

Legal freedom instead gradually brought segregation, America's version of apartheid. But "separate" clearly was not "equal." Black Americans were not simply segregated; they were methodically disenfranchised, stripped of their rights as citizens. From the 1890s through the 1950s, the law of black life was experienced as second-class citizenship. In the century after the Emancipation Proclamation, members of each generation of black Americans saw their lives disrupted by race riots, lynchings, and the destruction of towns and communities, such as the Greenwood district of black homes, businesses, and churches in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on May 31, 1921. The challenge for black America and the conflict for its story, then, was how to force a nation that excluded black people from its promise of "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" "after the Revolutionary War, and failed to redress this grievance after Reconstruction, to honor these principles enshrined in its most sacred documents.

What I have described defines the general shape of the black American group narrative before the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement, the most important and transformative domestic event in American history after the War Between the States. The conflict of this story is first slavery, then segregation and legal disenfranchisement. The meaning of the story is group victimization, and every black person is the story's protagonist. This specific story was not about ending racism, which would be a wonderful thing; but ending racism entirely is probably as impossible for human beings as ending crime, or as quixotic as President Bush's "war on terror." No, the black American story was not as vague as that. It had a clearly defined conflict. And our ancestors fought daily for generations, with courage and dignity, to change this narrative. That was the point of their lives, their sacrifices, each and every day they were on this earth. We cannot praise enough the miracle they achieved, the lifelong efforts of our leaders and the anonymous men and women who kept the faith, demonstrated, went to jail, registered black people to vote in the Deep South, changed unjust laws, and died in order that Americans of all backgrounds might be free. I have always seen their fight for us as noble.

Among those I pay special tribute to is W. E. B. Du Bois, one of the founders of the NAACP, who deeply understood the logic and structure of this narrative as it unfolded from Reconstruction through the 1950s. It was a sign of his prescience that he also could see beyond this ancient story while still in the midst of it and fighting mightily to change it.

In 1926, Du Bois delivered an address titled, "Criteria of Negro Art" at the Chicago Conference for the NAACP. His lecture, which was later published in The Crisis, the official publication of the NAACP, which Du Bois himself edited, took place during the most entrenched period of segregation, when the opportunities for black people were so painfully circumscribed. "What do we want?" he asked his audience. "What is the thing we are after?"

Listen to Du Bois 82 years ago:

[Du Bois quote begins]

What do we want? What is the thing we are after? As it was phrased last night it had a certain truth: We want to be Americans, full-fledged Americans, with all the rights of American citizens. But is that all? Do we want simply to be Americans? Once in a while through all of us there flashes some clairvoyance, some clear idea, of what America really is. We who are dark can see America in a way that white Americans cannot. And seeing our country thus, are we satisfied with its present goals and ideals?…

If you tonight suddenly should become full-fledged Americans; if your color faded, or the color line here in Chicago was miraculously forgotten; suppose, too, you became at the same time rich and powerful;--what is it that you would want? What would you immediately seek? Would you buy the most powerful of motor cars and outrace Cook County? Would you buy the most elaborate estate on the North Shore? Would you be a Rotarian or a Lion or a What-not of the very last degree? Would you wear the most striking clothes, give the richest dinners, and buy the longest press notices?

Even as you visualize such ideals you know in your heart that these are not the things you really want. You realize this sooner than the average white American because, pushed aside as we have been in America, there has come to us not only a certain distaste for the tawdry and flamboyant but a vision of what the world could be if it were really a beautiful world; if we had the true spirit; if we had the Seeing Eye, the Cunning Hand, the Feeling Heart; if we had, to be sure, not perfect happiness, but plenty of good hard work, the inevitable suffering that comes with life; sacrifice and waiting, all that--but, nevertheless, lived in a world where men know, where men create, where they realize themselves and where they enjoy life. It is that sort of world we want to create for ourselves and for all America.

[Du Bois Quote ends]

This provocative passage is, in part, the foundation for my questioning the truth and usefulness of the traditional black American narrative of victimization. When compared with black lives at the dawn of the 21st century, and 40 years after the watershed events of the Civil Rights Movement, many of Du Bois' remarks now sound ironic, for all the impossible things he spoke of in 1926 are realities today. We are "full-fledged Americans, with the rights of American citizens." We do have "plenty of good hard work" and live in a society where "men create, where they realize themselves mid where they enjoy life." Even more ironic is the fact that some of our famous rappers and athletes who like "living large," as they say, seem obsessed with what Du Bois derisively called "the tawdry and flamboyant" (they call it "bling"). Furthermore, some of us do use the freedom paid for with the blood of our ancestors to pursue conspicuous consumption in the form of "powerful motor cars," "elaborate estates," "striking clothes," and "the richest dinners."

To put this another way, we can say that 40 years after the epic battles for specific civil rights in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma, after two monumental and historic legislative triumphs--the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965---and after three decades of affirmative action that led to the creation of a true black middle class (and not the false one E. Franklin Frazier described in his classic 1957 study, Black Bourgeoisie), a people oppressed for so long have finally become, as writer Reginald McKnight once put it, "as polymorphous as the dance of Shiva." Black Americans have been CEOs at AOL Time Warner, American Express, and Merrill Lynch; we have served as secretary of state and White House national security adviser. Well over 10,000 black Americans have been elected to offices around the country, and at this moment Senator Barack Obama holds us in suspense with the possibility that he may be selected as the Democratic Party's first biracial, black American candidate for president. We have been mayors, police chiefs, best-selling authors, MacArthur fellows, Nobel laureates, Ivy League professors, billionaires, scientists, stockbrokers, engineers, theoretical physicists, toy makers, inventors, astronauts, chess grandmasters, dot-com millionaires, actors, Hollywood film directors, and talk show hosts (the most prominent among them being Oprah Winfrey, who recently signed a deal to acquire her own network); we are Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists (as I am). And we are not culturally homogeneous. When I last looked, West Indians constituted 48 percent of the "black" population in Miami. In America's major cities, 15 percent of the black American population is foreign born--Haitian, Jamaican, Senegalese, Nigerian, Cape Verdean, Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Somalian--a rich tapestry of brown-skinned people as culturally complex in their differences, backgrounds, and outlooks as those people lumped together under the all too convenient labels of "Asian" or "European." Many of them are doing better--in school and business--than native-born black Americans, I think often of something said by Mary Andom, an Eritrean student at Western Washington University, and quoted in an article published in 2003 in The Seattle Times: "I don't know about 'chidings' or 'grits.' I don't listen to soul music artists such as Marvin Gaye or Aretha Franklin.… I grew up eating injera and listening to Tigrinya music.… After school, I cook the traditional coffee, called boun, by hand for my mother. It is a tradition shared amongst mother and daughter."

No matter which angle we use to view black people in America today, we find them to be a complex and multifaceted people who defy easy categorization. We challenge, culturally and politically, an old group narrative that fails at the beginning of this new century to capture even a fraction of our rich diversity and heterogeneity. My point is not that black Americans don't have social and cultural problems in 2008. We have several nagging problems, among them poor schools and far too many black men in prison and too few in college. But these are problems based more on the inequities of class, and they appear in other groups as well. It simply is no longer the case that the essence of black American De is racial victimization and disenfranchisement, a curse and a condemnation, a destiny based on color in which the meaning of one's life is thinghood, created even before one is born. This is not something we can assume. The specific conflict of this narrative reached its dramatic climax in 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama, and at the breathtaking March on Washington; its resolution arrived in 1965, the year before I graduated from high school, with the Voting Rights Act. Everything since then has been a coda for almost haft a century. We call this long-extended and still ongoing anticlimax the post-civil-rights period. If the NAACP is straggling these days to recent members of the younger generation and to redefine its mission in the 21st century--and it is struggling to do that--I think it is a good sign that the organization Du Bois led for so long is now a casualty of its own successes in the 1960s.

## 2NC

### T Version

#### Especially true in the you of this topic---plans can be a negative action---the law can be transformed and used as a crucial tool for political change

Orly Lobel 7, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

V. RESTORING CRITICAL OPTIMISM IN THE LEGAL FIELD

“La critique est aisée; l’art difficile.”

A critique of cooptation often takes an uneasy path. Critique has always been and remains not simply an intellectual exercise but a political and moral act. The question we must constantly pose is how critical accounts of social reform models contribute to our ability to produce scholarship and action that will be constructive. To critique the ability of law to produce social change is inevitably to raise the question of alternatives. In and of itself, the exploration of the limits of law and the search for new possibilities is an insightful field of inquiry. However, the contemporary message that emerges from critical legal consciousness analysis has often resulted in the distortion of the critical arguments themselves. This distortion denies the potential of legal change in order to illuminate what has yet to be achieved or even imagined. Most importantly, cooptation analysis is not unique to legal reform but can be extended to any process of social action and engagement. When claims of legal cooptation are compared to possible alternative forms of activism, the false necessity embedded in the contemporary story emerges — a story that privileges informal extralegal forms as transformative while assuming that a conservative tilt exists in formal legal paths. In the triangular conundrum of “law and social change,” law is regularly the first to be questioned, deconstructed, and then critically dismissed. The other two components of the equation — social and change — are often presumed to be immutable and unambiguous. Understanding the limits of legal change reveals the dangers of absolute reliance on one system and the need, in any effort for social reform, to contextualize the discourse, to avoid evasive, open-ended slogans, and to develop greater sensitivity to indirect effects and multiple courses of action. Despite its weaknesses, however, law is an optimistic discipline. It operates both in the present and in the future. Order without law is often the privilege of the strong. Marginalized groups have used legal reform precisely because they lacked power. Despite limitations, these groups have often successfully secured their interests through legislative and judicial victories. Rather than experiencing a disabling disenchantment with the legal system, we can learn from both the successes and failures of past models, with the aim of constantly redefining the boundaries of legal reform and making visible law’s broad reach.

#### Policy focus key to combat racism---anti-blackness is not ontological

Jamelle Bouie 13, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a **creation of explicit policy choices—**the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to **dismantle this prejudice using public policy**. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That **there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that has defined American history**. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade **without the emergence of an anti-black racism**. It took particular choices made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would **make white supremacy the ideology of America**. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) **wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it**. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

### AT: Language of Resolution Excludes

#### Their refusal to combine narrative with policy knowledge reinforces a dichotomy that makes the affs impacts inevitable by foreclosing meaningful debate on a common basis

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

A key proposition that undergirds these radical claims is the notion that storytelling liberates outsiders to author a more authentic account of their experiences than traditional legal discourse permits. Outsider storytellers concede that traditional legal discourse depends heavily on the narration of real events, but they argue that the meaning a legal narrative may produce is constrained by epistemological premises and normative objectives that are antithetical to the outsiders' perspectives. For example, legal discourse purports to endorse objective truth-finding methods. That commitment is a ruse, however, and not only because doctrinal requirements predominantly determine which facts are reported and which are not. Building on insights developed by philosophers and literary and cultural critics, n21 radical scholars maintain that there is no objective position from which to describe pertinent events because knowledge claims always are conditioned by the historical, cultural, and discursive situation of the person making the claim. n22 Accordingly, the most that law, or any other discipline, may assert on behalf of one speaker's account is that the account "genuinely" records that speaker's experience, n23 and perhaps the experience of others who occupy an historical and cultural [\*1239] location similar to that of the speaker. n24 Legal discourse may claim more on behalf of its narratives, but that claim obfuscates an implicit decision to privilege one point of view above others, which outsiders suspect is the point of view of the affluent white men who construct and administer law. n25¶ Having discovered institutionalized preferences for white male perspectives, the narrative scholars also dispute the claim that legal discourse reflects universal truths about the nature of the human self and its experiences. n26 In this context, the outsiders compare traditional accounts of their lived experiences to the reports provided by outsiders themselves. This exercise is damningly revealing: law consistently adopts accounts that best serve the political and economic interests of white men, even though those accounts often conflict (radically) with the outsiders' perspectives. n27 Therefore, to the extent that legal discourse rejects the out [\*1240] siders' accounts on the ground that they do not correspond to universal human experience, that discourse conceals its own selfish interests and its profound antagonism to the political interests of marginalized groups. This invocation of the universal in traditional legal scholarship has had a significant practical effect on the store of knowledge about outsider experiences because it denies the truth of outsider perspectives that are inconsistent with the cultural stock of racist and sexist stereotypes. n28¶ For purposes of my inquiry, it is important to pause here and connect the outsiders' condemnation of law's "stock narratives" about human experience to their critique of liberal political theory. n29 While outsiders do not identify all of the aspects of liberalism that they find objectionable, nor agree upon an alternative [\*1241] political philosophy, n30 they have expressed hostility towards the normative definition of human nature constructed by a liberal individualist ideology. Thus, it is fair to say that the authors object to those strands of liberalism that describe the human actor as an autonomous character who is able to overcome, through the rational use of his personal resources, material obstacles to social and economic success. n31 The liberal image of individual experience is unfaithful to outsiders' lives, yet law holds it fast and rejects as untrue outsider experiences that do not support its premises.¶ Through an understanding of human nature firmly grounded in insider values, legal discourse obscures the source of outsiders' suffering and imposes on them individually, rather than on the community, the obligation to remedy the effects of past discrimination. n32 For example, now that law has largely removed superficial sexist and racist barriers, liberal ideology holds that women and people of color are as well-equipped as white men to compete for available resources. When they fall short, as overwhelming numbers of them must, law pronounces that they "have chosen, and therefore deserve, to be poor." n33 The implications for [\*1242] outsiders are grim: n34 not only are outsiders constrained by a normative vision of human nature that they did not create and that refuses to relieve their social, economic, and intellectual subjugation, they also are taught by that vision to aspire to a way of life that their material circumstances ensure they will be denied. This critique of liberalism suggests a task that I find compelling: the construction of a self and its connection to the social that avoids the liberal individual. n35¶ In the course of pursuing normative and methodological strategies that will convince law to recognize and remedy their individual suffering, n36 a number of outsider scholars have made an important discovery: storytelling is the special domain of outsiders. n37 Women [\*1243] and people of color (and, possibly, other outsiders) n38 are said to employ stories about personal experiences as a distinctive method for generating and supporting political arguments. n39 Outsiders eschew the objective, abstract, neutral, and ahistorical analyses that they associate with white men n40 in favor of stories that are personal, concrete, emotionally evocative, and contextualized. n41¶ This assertion gives rise to the double attack embodied in the so-called "different voice" thesis. First, outsider scholars maintain that the experiences outsiders bring to law are qualitatively different from those of white men. Second, these scholars argue that outsiders represent these experiences in a distinctive rhetoric that privileges the voice and its variable arrangements, registers, and nuances as a palpable extension of the suffering self. n42 As a result, [\*1244] outsiders possess a "different voice" that distinguishes their autobiographical writings from insider texts. It is important to note that the outsider scholarship does not clearly identify the unique cognitive claims that outsiders have on the storytelling method, nor does it clearly articulate the motivations that propel women and people of color to resort more often to storytelling than white men do. n43 All we are told is that outsiders "just do rely on narrative, anecdote and story more than" insiders do. n44¶ An unexplored implication of the different voice thesis might suggest that not only law, but the very language(s) law employs, could never contribute to a program for social change. The dilemma, according to the premises of the different voice thesis, is not simply that traditional legal narratives are incapable of registering the experiences of the socially marginalized, but that insiders and outsiders are deaf to each other's stories. In essence, each group tells its own stories to its own atomized group of willing listeners [\*1245] , in its own personalized and idiomatic tongue. The dilemma that the different voice thesis exposes, but also reinforces, is that we seem to lack, and may even may feel obliged to denigrate, a shared language for debate. If the edifice of legal narrative appears monologically limited in terms of class, race, and gender, the different voice thesis would seem to establish the incorrigibility of this condition. No matter what voice, register or language law ultimately were to adopt, faith in the logical extension of the different voice thesis would prevent outsiders and insiders from having a meaningful dialogue about precisely those experiences for which outsiders seek social and legal redress. n45

## 1NR

### AT Internal Exclusion

#### Establishing constraints on the topics for discussion in debate does not cause internal exclusion and breaking down those constraints doesn’t solve it because the absence of clash and the refusal of the burden of rejoinder only flips external exclusion---the way to resolve internal exclusion is to broaden the scope of what counts as a persuasive argument within a given topic---for example, our model of debate would welcome the use of narrative and personal experience on behalf of a topical argument---this middle ground most effectively resolves their exclusion arguments

Gert Biesta et al 9, professor of Education and Director of Research at the School of Education, University of Stirling, Susan Verducci , Assistant Professor at the Humanities Department at San José State University, and Michael S. Katz, professor of philosophy and education at San Jose State, Education, Democracy and the Moral Life, 2009, p. 105-107

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political communication. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included - although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is "that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics" (Dryzek, 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: external exclusion, which is about "how people arc [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making", and internal exclusion where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, "that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young, 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people "lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making" (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on "dispassionate, unsituatcd, neutral reason" (ibid. p.63).

To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy "exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices" but also to promote "respect and trust" and to make possible "understanding across structural and cultural difference" (ibid. p.57). The first of these is greeting or public acknowledgement. This is about "communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . .. recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location" (ibid., p.61; emphasis in original). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It "precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons" (ibid., p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is rhetoric and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid., p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments "in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation' (ibid., p.67; emphasis in original). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it "for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone" (ibid., p.79). Young's third mode of political communication is narrative or storytelling. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential "to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important" (ibid., p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. "Inclusive democratic communication", so she argues, "assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together" and also assumes "that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or sterco-types" (ibid., p.77).

It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to replace argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails "that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them" (ibid., p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of rational argumentation (e.g. Bcnhabib, 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzck, after a discussion of Young's ideas,1 concludes that argument always has to be "central to deliberative democracy" (Dryzek, 2000, p.7l). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different "because they do not have to be present" (ibid., emphasis added). For Dryzek, at the end of the day, all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid., p.168).

### Anderson Must Read AT Psychic Violence/FW Turns Case

#### Only we access offense---arguments like framework don’t injure people, but policies do---avoiding democratic engagement means the aff can never actually transform the institutions that produce exclusion in the first place---rejecting institutional engagement turns debate into a palliative where they escaped lived realities instead of producing political habits necessary to actualize democratic politics

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Probyns piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: precisely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the books content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas.

When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply not able to accommodate the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the center of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is not that identity is not relevant, but simply that it should not be used to trump or stifle argument.

In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

### Case Stuff

#### They make the perfect the enemy of the good---they’ll reject all productive engagement because it isn’t a PERECT explanation of certain experiences---but The real test of our politics should be the ability to advocate for change on behalf of people who aren’t like us and whose experience we don’t share---the 1AC forfeited an opportunity to engage in policy deliberation on broader issues of concern to people who might be unlike ourselves

Fred Clark 3-21, ethicist, journalist, former managing editor of Prism Magazine, 3/21/13, “For Sen. Portman, Sen. Kirk and the rest of us: The next big step is the important one,” <http://www.patheos.com/blogs/slacktivist/2013/03/21/for-sen-portman-sen-kirk-and-the-rest-of-us-the-next-big-step-is-the-important-one/>

Earlier this year, Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., returned to Washington after a long, arduous recovery from the stroke he suffered in early 2012. In an interview with Natasha Korecki of the Chicago Sun-Times, Kirk said he:

[Plans] to take a closer look at funding of the Illinois Medicaid program for those with have no income who suffer a stroke, he said. In general, a person on Medicaid in Illinois would be allowed 11 rehab visits, he said.

“Had I been limited to that, I would have had no chance to recover like I did,” Kirk said. “So unlike before suffering the stroke, I’m much more focused on Medicaid and what my fellow citizens face.”

Kirk has the same federal health-care coverage available to other federal employees. He has incurred major out-of-pocket expenses, which have affected his savings and retirement, sources familiar with Kirk’s situation said.

Harold Pollack commended Kirk for those “wise words, sadly earned,” writing: “Such a profound physical ordeal – and one’s accompanying sense of profound privilege in securing more help than so many other people routinely receive — this changes a person.”

Steve Benen was also impressed with Kirk’s hard-won change of heart, but noted:

I do wish, however, that we might see similarly changed perspectives without the need for direct personal relevance. Many policymakers are skeptical about federal disaster relief until it’s their community that sees devastation. They have no interest in gay rights until they learn someone close to them is gay. And they’re unsure of the value of Medicaid until they see its worth up close.

Which brings us to this week, and the news that conservative Republican Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio now supports marriage equality for same-sex couples. The Cleveland Plain-Dealer’s headline for Sabrina Eaton’s report tells the story, “Sen. Rob Portman comes out in favor of gay marriage after son comes out as gay“:

Republican U.S. Sen. Rob Portman on Thursday announced he has reversed his longtime opposition to same-sex marriage after reconsidering the issue because his 21-year-old son, Will, is gay.

Portman said his son, a junior at Yale University, told him and his wife, Jane, that he’s gay and “it was not a choice, it was who he is and that he had been that way since he could remember.”

“It allowed me to think of this issue from a new perspective, and that’s of a Dad who loves his son a lot and wants him to have the same opportunities that his brother and sister would have — to have a relationship like Jane and I have had for over 26 years,” Portman told reporters in an interview at his office.

The conversation the Portmans had with their son two years ago led to him to evolve on the issue after he consulted clergy members, friends — including former Vice President Dick Cheney, whose daughter is gay — and the Bible.

This is a big deal. Portman is the first Republican senator to endorse marriage equality. And he wasn’t previously someone who seemed on the fence — he was adamantly, religiously opposed before.

So the first thing I want to say is congratulations, kudos, and thank you to Portman. I heartily second the commendations and praise he’s receiving from groups like the Human Rights Campaign, Freedom to Marry Ohio, and PFLAG.

For Portman, as for Kirk, an unbidden circumstance expanded his perspective of the world. That new, larger appreciation in turn expanded his understanding of what justice requires — of what justice requires for people who aren’t necessarily just like him.

This is one way we all learn — one way we all become bigger, better people. It is, for almost all of us, a necessary first step toward a more expansive empathy and a more inclusive understanding of justice. Even if it is only a first step, it is an unavoidable one, and we should celebrate the epiphany that challenging circumstance has allowed these senators.

What Steve Benen said about Kirk is still true for Portman. It is good to see his perspective change due to “direct personal relevance,” but it would be better if he could learn to expand his perspective even without it. That’s the next necessary step, the next epiphany awaiting these senators.

Kirk’s long recovery provided his “Aha!” moment when it comes to other people who are also recovering from a stroke. And Portman’s coming to grips with his son’s identity provided him with an “Aha!” moment when it comes to other LGBT people and their families. But it’s not yet clear that either senator has yet taken the next logical step — the next “Aha!” moment. The next step is the big one. It’s the realization that because I didn’t understand others’ situation or others’ perspective until I myself faced the same thing, I should then strive to listen and to learn and to see the world through others’ eyes so that I can better understand the world without having to experience every situation, every injustice, every ordeal personally.

This next step is necessary for justice, which can only come “When those who are not injured feel as indignant as those who are.”

That next step may seem obvious, but epiphanies always seem obvious in retrospect.

Until that next step occurs, though, the slightly expanded empathy of people like Kirk and Portman seems self-serving, like the “cowardice and hypocrisy” of the privileged, as Morf Morford describes it. They still seem to cling to a cramped, self-centered understanding of justice — one that can only grow when their own, personal interests require it to do so. It still lacks the ability to be “indignant” except when one is personally among the “injured.”

“Moral and political positions aren’t supposed to be something you only take when they’ll benefit you,” Mark Evanier wrote. Empathy becomes suspect when it coincides so closely with personal benefit. It begins to look like what Mark Schmitt calls “Miss America compassion“:

Their compassion seems so narrowly and literally focused on the specific misfortune that their family encountered. Having a child who suffers from mental illness would indeed make one particularly passionate about funding for mental health, sure. But shouldn’t it also lead to a deeper understanding that there are a lot of families, in all kinds of situations beyond their control, who need help from government? Shouldn’t having a son whose illness leads to suicide open your eyes to something more than a belief that we need more money for suicide help-lines? Shouldn’t it call into question the entire winners-win/losers-lose ideology of the current Republican Party?

If we take the first step without ever taking the next step — changing our perspective only when “direct personal relevance” demands it and not otherwise — we can fall into what Matthew Yglesias describes as “The Politics of Narcissism“:

Remember when Sarah Palin was running for vice president on a platform of tax cuts and reduced spending? But there was one form of domestic social spending she liked to champion? Spending on disabled children? Because she had a disabled child personally? Yet somehow her personal experience with disability didn’t lead her to any conclusions about the millions of mothers simply struggling to raise children in conditions of general poorness. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son with a pre-existing medical condition who’s locked out of the health insurance market. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son engaged in peasant agriculture whose livelihood is likely to be wiped out by climate change. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son who’ll be malnourished if SNAP benefits are cut. So Rob Portman doesn’t care.

… But if Portman can turn around on one issue once he realizes how it touches his family personally, shouldn’t he take some time to think about how he might feel about other issues that don’t happen to touch him personally? Obviously the answers to complicated public policy questions don’t just directly fall out of the emotion of compassion. But what Portman is telling us here is that on this one issue, his previous position was driven by a lack of compassion and empathy. Once he looked at the issue through his son’s eyes, he realized he was wrong. Shouldn’t that lead to some broader soul-searching? Is it just a coincidence that his son is gay, and also gay rights is the one issue on which a lack of empathy was leading him astray? That, it seems to me, would be a pretty remarkable coincidence. The great challenge for a senator isn’t to go to Washington and represent the problems of his own family. It’s to try to obtain the intellectual and moral perspective necessary to represent the problems of the people who don’t have direct access to the corridors of power.

Senators basically never have poor kids. That’s something members of Congress should think about.

Will Femia notes that this widely shared observation prompted an insightful — and darkly funny — meme about “hypothetical Republican empathy.”

“If empathy only extends to your flesh and blood, we gotta start shoving people into those families,” Rachel Maddow said.

“Now all we need is 59 more gay Republican kids,” Dave Lartigue wrote.

“Perhaps if we could get the Republican caucus to adopt gay, black Hispanic illegal-immigrant children, who will grow up to be denied insurance due to pre-existing conditions, we’d make some more social progress,” mistermix wrote.

“Eventually one of these Republican congressmen is going to find out his daughter is a woman, and then we’re all set,” Anil Dash tweeted.

And Andy Borowitz chimed in with “Portman Inspires Other Republicans to Stop Speaking to Their Children.”

Endless variations of that joke circulated this week because that joke offers limitless possibilities — as limitless as the stunted “hypothetical empathy” of “Miss America compassion” is limited.

That joke and Yglesias’ argument are correct. An empathy that never moves beyond that first step and that first epiphany is morally indistinct from selfishness. To take that first step without the next one is only to move from “me first” to “me and mine first.” (David Badash and Jonathan Chait also have insightful posts making this argument.)

But no one can take that next big step until they take the first one. So I’m less interested in criticizing Portman or Kirk or anyone else in their position than I am in figuring out how we can urge and encourage them to take that next big step. How can we facilitate the next epiphany?

That’s the bigger issue, the more important challenge. Ari Kohen tackles this challenge in a bookish post building on Richard Rorty’s thoughts. Kohen is interested most of all in how “to accomplish this progress of sentiments, this expanding of our sense of solidarity”:

The best way to convince the powerful that their way of thinking about others needs to evolve is to show them the ways in which individuals they consider to be “Other” are, in fact, much more closely akin to them than they ever realized. It is, in short, to create a greater solidarity between the powerful and the weak based on personal identification.

Rob Portman’s change of heart is a good example of the way in which we ultimately achieve a progress of sentiments that leads to the equal treatment of more and more people. Viewed in this way, it’s really not something people on the Left ought to be criticizing; it’s something we should be working to encourage for those without the sort of immediate personal connection that Portman fortunately had.

(Note that we are, yet again, confronted with the idea of ethics as a trajectory.)

The vital question, then, is how? How can we encourage “a progress of sentiments” along a trajectory “that leads to the equal treatment of more and more people”?

Part of the answer, I think, is to remember how we ourselves were encouraged along — how we ourselves each came to take that next step, how we ourselves came to have that second epiphany.

That’s the approach that Grace at Are Women Human? takes in a firm-but-generous post titled “Changes of heart and our better selves.” Grace highlights Portman’s case as an example of “the tensions between celebrating progress and recognizing that there’s still work to be done.” She draws on her own story and history for humility and perspective, and as a guide to helping others see and take the next steps in their journey:

How easy it is to say Portman … should have done better and forget that I wasn’t so different, not so long ago.

The honest truth: it was getting to know and love queer people that, more than anything else, led me away from the bigotry I’d been taught as faith. … It’s important for me not to forget this, or that it took the thought that my not-yet-born child might be transgender for me to realize that I needed to educate myself about gender identity. It would be dangerous to indulge the fiction that I’ve always held the moral “high ground.” …

That history — her own and that of others who have come to a more inclusive, expansive understanding of justice — informs the advice, and the warning, that follows:

Portman isn’t an exception in having, and indulging, the luxury of ignoring the consequences of politics that don’t affect him personally.

This is a feature, not a bug, of our culture and political system. Power is concentrated in the hands of people who routinely make policy on matters they have little experience or real stakes in. You don’t need any conscious malice in this setup to produce policy that has devastating effects on the communities these issues touch most directly (though there’s plenty of malice, too). All you need is a system run by people who can afford not to care that much about policies that mostly impact other people’s lives.

Which, I suppose, is why civil rights activism often depends on cultivating these very moments of identification with the “other,” on spontaneous and planned appeals to emotion and basic decency. Systemic lack of incentive to care has to be confronted with stories that get politicians or the public to care.

Emmitt Till’s open casket. Rosa Parks’ carefully planned protest of bus segregation – as a more “respectable” face of black resistance than Claudette Colvin. Hydeia Broadbent and Ryan White as the faces of children with HIV. DREAMers taking over public spaces, stories about families torn apart by racist, classist, unjust immigration policies.

… Rob Portman is not an exception. He’s the rule. I don’t say this to suggest that we cut him slack for finally arriving at a basic (and still incomplete) recognition of the humanity of queer people. Nor am I arguing that we shouldn’t critique the circumstances around his change of heart.

What I hope is that we don’t forget ourselves in these calls to do better. That we don’t fall into the deceptive confidence that because we know or do better, we’ve arrived…or forget how many of us had to change and grow to get to where we are now. We’re all capable of fooling ourselves into thinking our standpoints are clearly “rational” or “moral” when it comes to issues that don’t affect us.

#### Turns communication---narrative focus deters people from sharing experiences because they might not be “good enough” or might not have been “hurt enough” to win a ballot---putting narratives in debate forces the judge to say one person’s experiences are more important than anothers

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar **himself or herself** hurts **and hurts badly**.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 **-** destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles**.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from** abstracting themselves **from their pain in order** to gain perspective **on their condition**. n77¶ [\*696] **Last, as we have seen,** it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this** conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicismin white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

#### Turns commodification---they flips the hierarchy of framework---subjectivity becomes an unquestionable dogma and personal experience gets instrumentalized as advocacy

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

In this paper, I will argue that autobiography is not simply a transparent medium through which the self may give voice to what [\*1232] it alone knows. Nor is autobiography an unconditioned mode of representation that opens up subjective spaces hitherto unexplored. For one thing, an autobiographical narrative makes the same ontological commitments to readers as legal discourse. Autobiography places limitations on the range of available meanings similar to those imposed by law. In addition, many literary critics and historians have suggested that autobiography and the experiences it constructs are shaped by the same cultural values reflected in law. Far from eluding the constraints of legal discourse and cultural bias, therefore, autobiography may lead outsiders to become the unwitting proponents of the very values they most want to resist.

Perhaps more crucially, the outsiders' intention to liberate discourse from dogmatic or culture-bound types of objectivity is threatened by the possibility that their works will merely achieve a simple reversal of academic orthodoxy. By celebrating individual perspectives, reliance on autobiography may establish authorial subjectivity as the new form of unassailable dogma, the new tale that wags our legal discourse.

Despite its potential complicity in a culture the outsiders decry, storytelling is an attractive enterprise because it is remunerative. Yet this feature of outsider storytelling raises additional questions about the role of these ostensibly resistant texts, particularly the meaning that context imposes on them. The scholars who tell the stories receive material rewards for publishing them. The authors are also lawyers or, at least, critics of the law, whose purpose in offering the stories is instrumental to some end. By recounting painful, personal experiences to an audience willing to pay for them, the authors use themselves and their suffering as a market commodity. Similarly, because the storytellers want lawmakers to recognize and remedy their suffering, they must make their stories intelligible (and in some sense marketable) to the audience whose understanding and intervention they seek, even as they rebuke it. Thus, the storyteller is never free from the constraints imposed by her audience's expectations. While autobiographies may possess a transformative power, one must wonder what they transform. Will the practice of telling one's own stories transform legal culture, as the outsiders claim? Or will that practice more likely transform the self who tells the story? [\*1233]

#### Voting affirmative is a placebo that is too seductive to risk getting addicted to --- the ballot is a temporary victory that is erased by the time the next debate starts

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In this sense, the identity of the novel, if we can see the novel as having an identity, revolves around a simple plot. The situation had been normal, it became abnormal, and by the end of the novel, the normality, or some variant on it, was restored. We can put this simplistic paradigm into the language that Wendy Brown (1995) uses and say that the identity of the novel is therefore a "wounded identity." Like Philoctetes, the novel must have a wound. And like that of Philoctetes, the wound is necessary because without it, the novel would not be able to perform its function. Yet, also like that of the mythical character, the wound must be healed or cured.

I return to the notion of identity because I want to tie the novel, disability, and identity politics together around the issue of cure. The novel as a form relies on cure as a narrative technique. Protagonists must "change," we are told, for their character to be believable. Interestingly, this aspect of believability flies in the face of probability since most "real" people do not change easily, if at all. When characters change, they undergo a kind of moral or perceptual transformation that cures them of their problem. So, Emma is cured of her self-centeredness or Darcy is cured of his pride. Likewise, the plot is cured of its abnormal initiating events. The narrative, at its end, is no longer disabled by its lack of conformity to imagined social norms. The process of narrative, then, serves to wound identity—whether individual, bourgeois, national, gendered, racialized, or cultural. Readers read so that they can experience this wound vicariously, so they can imagine the dissolution of the norms under which they are expected to labor. As a temporarily wounded person, the reader can see the way that society oppresses various categories of being. At the same time, the reader can rejoice in the inevitable return to the comfort of bourgeois norms, despite the onus that these norms place on its beneficiaries as well as those excluded from the benefits of bourgeois identity. 14

Yet the desire for a cure is also the desire for a quick fix. The alterity presented by disability is shocking to the liberal, ableist sensibility, and so narratives involving disability always yearn toward the cure, the neutralizing of the disability. This desire to neutralize is ironic because in a dialectic sense, the fantasy of normality needs the abjection of disability to maintain a homeostatic system of binaries. However, since this desire is premised on the denigration of disability, it will of course be invisible to the normate15 readers who prefer the kindly notion of cure to the more dramatic notion of eradication. Likewise, the quick fix presented by issues concerning race, class, and gender is equally characteristic of the bourgeois imagination. The conflict between classes can be nicely reconciled in novels, so that in North and South, a kind of utopian factory emerges that bypasses labor unions and is achieved by rerouting surplus value through the benevolence of a female captain of industry in the form of Margaret Hale, or, in Hard Times, the working class struggle is seen as a "muddle" only soluble by Christian charity toward the poor who "will always be with you."

All of these cures are placebos for the basic problem presented to capitalism and its ideological productions in the form of modern subjectivity, which dons the form of the normal, average, citizen protagonist—that bell curve–generated fantastic being who reconciles the promise of equal rights with the reality of unequal distribution of wealth. However, the quick fix, the cure, has to be repeated endlessly, like a patent medicine, because it cures nothing. Novels have to tell the story over and over again, as do films and television, because the patient never stays cured, and the disabled, cured individually, refuse to stop reappearing as a group. Indeed, modern subjectivity is a wounded identity that cannot cure itself without recourse to cure narratives, which means that it cannot cure itself at all since the disability of modern subjectivity is inherent in the environment, not in the subject.

The problem with the notion of wounded identities, as Brown (1995) postulates, is that the ontology of their coming into being is best characterized by Nietzsche's notion of resentment as an "effect of domination [that] reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for selfaffirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection" (Brown 1995:69). Thus, identity is dependent for its motivation and existence on remembering and reinvoking the pain caused by oppression. Politicized identity "installs its pain . . . in the very foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity . . . by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics" (Brown 1995:74). Like the novel, identity is rooted in its wounds, and plot is a form of pain control. Thus, its solution must be to heal the wound and end the pain. However, like the novel that offers a cure to the oppressions of modernity, the cure offered to wounded identity spells the end of identity because identity is created by the initializing wound, just as the cure offered in novels spells closure for that novel. The answer to novels is more novels, not a cure offered to the actual ills of society. Likewise, the proliferation of politicized identities is symptomatic of the problem, and the addition of more identities will no more solve the problem of oppression than the proliferation of novels will solve the same problem. I want to add that we have needed the idea of identity to help combat racism, sexism, ageism, and so on. However, the limits of this kind of politics are now becoming increasingly evident. The solution is not to do without identity or to denigrate the identities involved. Rather, a reconsideration of oppression based around other parameters that can, at this point, create solidarity while maintaining difference is essential.

I have tried to make the case briefly that disability, as an identity, can legitimately be seen as the foundational model on which to argue the origin and theory of the novel. As a foundational origin, I can then say that all other identities—class, race, gender, sexual preference—should be subsumed under the hegemonic identity category of disability. In other words, I contend that the novel belongs to a history of ableist domination (while it has also tried to resist that domination). If I do that, I place myself in a line of critics who have argued for the centrality of their identity as foundational for the creation of modern subjectivity. By doing so, I can now make two observations. First, I clearly have not solved the problem of identity politics. Second, by adding my identity to the roster and even by claiming the greater adequacy of my identity (which can be seen as including and therefore superceding other identities), I have only rearranged the chessboard without creating a strategy for winning the battle. Neither will scholarship, like this chapter, propel disability into the forefront of identity politics for the simple reason that the other identity groups will not cede their place of priority. The reason for this reluctance is also relatively simple—to acknowledge truly that the existence of another identity dilutes the general category of identity, as well as to create a priority of identities, places some identities further down the line as significant. As an amplification of this point, disability will have difficulty being seen as having a primary place in identity politics because most academics are deeply implicated in ableism without, of course, realizing it. Disability is still routinely ignored, marginalized, or patronized by the very people most active in identity politics.

The answer is not to keep creating newer and newer categories of identity or to claim that cultural institutions are uniquely created by the oppression of one or other identity. The advantage that disability studies gives us in this regard is that it is an identity that interrogates and can help transform the very idea of identity. Disability, by the unstable nature of its category, asks us to redefine the very nature of identity and of "belonging" to an identity group. Only when identity is stripped of its exclusive nature and becomes part of the larger reformation of oppression can we all safely feel that we have truly regained our identity.

#### Their radical politics go too far --- it’s insular, ignores the progress of Black Americans, and enshrines a defeatist agenda that makes resisting racism impossible

McWhorter 9—Associate Professor in the English and Comparative Literature, Columbia (John, What African-American Studies Could Be, www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2009/09/by\_john\_mcwhorter\_while\_this.html)

The answer common in such departments is that the principal mission is to teach students about the eternal power of racism past and present. Certainly it should be part of a liberal arts education to learn that racism is more than face-to-face abuse, and that social inequality is endemic to American society. However, too often the curriculum of African-American Studies departments gives the impression that racism and disadvantage are the most important things to note and study about being black.

The question is whether this, for all of its moral urgency in the local sense, qualifies as education under any serious definition.

Typical is the curriculum of one African-American Studies department in a solid, selective state school west of the Mississippi. In this department, racism is, essentially, everything.

One course teaches that "Housing discrimination systematically skews opportunities and life chances," another that "racism, sexism, and heterosexism shape black life chances in a 21st century context," while yet another zeroes in on "the effects of institutional racism on social policy, desegregation, integration, and affirmative action programs."

Then there is "Blacks in the Media" - or, rather, one slice of that subject: "Studying literature, comic books, comic strips, cartoons, music, theater, cinema, broadcasting, and television, students will analyze the mythical imageries which have created stereotypes." This is a common trope in writings on black performance, in which any performer can be jammed into a category such as "Mammy" or "Tragic Mulatto," sidestepping the nevertheless brilliant performances of people like Ethel Waters and Fredi Washington in the old days, or Queen Latifah and Halle Berry today.

Following from this glum desperation is a fetishization of radical politics as blacks' only constructive allegiance. One would never know the marginal import of radicalism to most black lives from its centrality to so many African-American Studies department syllabi. One course analyzes "the tradition of radical thought and the relevance of this thought to the needs and interests of the black community" - but what does the "relevance" consist of except intellectually? Yet the same department also offers a course on, more specifically, black Marxism.

According to this curriculum, being black has been so horrific that we are even challenged by the mere physicality of existence. One courses teaches that black women's bodies have to be "important spaces of resistance," while another is based on the idea that black people have been done in by various permutations of "urban spatial relations."

Because racism and inequality will always exist in some forms, this all qualifies as a bone-deep, almost willful pessimism about black potential. One would expect the thinking class of a troubled race to at least pay more lip service to looking forward. The set-jawed obsession with tabulating obstacles becomes almost peculiar, as if based on an assumption that in some way, black Americans are uniquely exempt from treating challenges as surmountable. There is even a course on black psychology whose description would get a white-run department picketed out of existence in a week, examining "manifestations of various psychological characteristics of people of African decent [sic], their cultual [sic] and behavioral norms, including the way that issues of race, class, gender and sexuality affect their cognitive, social, and emotional development."

One senses that the people teaching in African-American Studies departments feel that blackness is indeed something very different, likely because African slaves were unwilling immigrants. However, Ralph Ellison once asked "Can a people live and develop for over three hundred years simply by reacting?"

To those who would consider themselves representing black people by answering in the affirmative, there are legions of black people of all walks who would heartily disagree. There is no self-standing metric of unassailable truth that justifies intellectuals treating that disagreement - that is, the life-spirit of a people millions strong making the best of the worst for four hundred years -- as unworthy of serious address.

As to the possible objection that course descriptions do not engage these departments closely enough, a look at a few actual course syllabi is useful.

At the University of Pennsylvania, the syllabus for "Racial and Sexual Conflict" openly states that "The term paper for this course should be concerned with the structure, causes, and policies that attempt to alleviate or perpetuate racial and/or sexual discrimination in the United States." Technically, this stipulation could allow an exploration of what people have done to get past obstacles rather than merely describe them. However, the material covered in this course gives precious little support to such an endeavor.

One week, the discussion concerns the questions as to "What role does educational opportunity play in economic opportunity? How has government policy affected educational opportunity by race?" However, the readings include none of the academic literature by scholars such as Joleen Kirschenman, Kathryn Neckerman, Jomills Braddock, James McPartland and Alford Young on how attitudinal factors affect the hireability of many uneducated black men, none of the literature on solid job opportunities for people without college degrees, and nothing on organizations nationwide assisting people in taking advantage of such opportunities. In a course purporting to teach America's brightest and most ambitious students about urgent realities, how are sources such as these irrelevant?

At the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, one course exemplifies the focus on radicalism. "Race, Radicalism and African American Culture" seeks to "track the genealogy of the movement that came to be called 'Black Power,' and to situate black radical artists and intellectuals in the broader history of twentieth-century American thought, culture, and politics."

And the course covers a noble procession of figures: Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, Richard Wright, Paul Robeson, the Black Panthers, Amiri Baraka, Cornel West, Bell Hooks. Not to mention James Baldwin. And Malcolm X. And Stokely Carmichael. Upon which the simple question is: despite their resonance, what effect did any of these people have upon the fact that there are today more middle-class black people than poor ones? Which was more central to making whites comfortable enough with blackness to elect a black President, the legacy of Malcolm X or the legacy of Dr. King?

As to King, the course does address Bayard Rustin, who was central to organizing the March on Washington. But he was at loggerheads with black radicals as the sixties wore on. The main legacy of black radicalism has been mood and fashion. Is its centrality to so many African-American Studies departments' curricula a matter of comprehensive engagement with black political development? Or is it what happens to be a common political orientation among modern academics in the humanities, including black ones?

To the extent that the answer is the latter, students are being underserved. At Columbia, in one African-American Studies course Manning Marable assigns an article by Robin Kelley called "Beyond the 'Real' World, or Why Black Radicals Need to Wake Up and Start Dreaming." But which black radical dreams have borne fruit in a way that would elicit a salute from ordinary black people in 2009? Dr. King had a dream indeed -- but he didn't mean us to stop there.

The issue is not the quality of these courses in themselves. I will gladly assume that these professors are all excellent lecturers, assiduous researchers and dedicated mentors. Yet attention must be paid to their ideological bias nevertheless. An African-American Studies curriculum whose main message is that black Americans' most interesting experience has always been racism, still is, and that this requires radicalism as a politics of choice is not education. It is indoctrination. It proposes a single minority view as sense incarnate. This is not what education is supposed to be.

To the extent that these courses and syllabi are typical, then, there is a problem. And anyone familiar with African-American Studies departments knows that these courses and syllabi are, indeed, typical.

African-American Studies departments have a place in a liberal arts education. However, to deserve that inclusion in anything beyond a symbolic sense, they should revise their curricula in exactly two ways, simple but crucial.

First, there should be full acknowledgment in all courses that the role of racism in black people's lives and fates is receding, and to such a degree that the race's challenges today are vastly different than they were forty years ago.

The aim should not be to downplay the reality of racism, but to present precisely what education consists of: the ambiguities and challenges of real life and how one thinks about it.

Defeatism should be discouraged. Any sense that defeatism is the empirically proper position on black American history in the same way as it would have been for Pompeiians in the face of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius fails -- for the simple reason that progress for black Americans continues on so many fronts.

Most of the people in question would resist being characterized as defeatist, or as not acknowledging change. However, there is acknowledgment and there is genuflection. Plus, a claim that black radicalism is our only real future is, in itself, defeatism. Four centuries of black history give no indication that these politics will significantly affect how most black people thrive.

For example, a course like Yale's on "African-American Politics" should include not only mention of the Bradley Effect (under which whites voters have claimed in polls that they would vote for black candidates but do not at the voting booth) but also that it has been proven to be on the wane repeatedly for twenty years, including in the election of Barack Obama. Otherwise, Yale's teachings will lag behind what even Wikipedia tells us about the reality on the Bradley Effect, as opposed to its recruitment as a strategy of indoctrination.

The course I mentioned on blacks' problems with urban space flags environmental racism - but would ideally mention the important work of Christopher Foreman of the Brookings Institution (black, for the record) showing that claims along these lines have been overblown.

It must also fall out of this that there will be no such thing as a course shoehorning the careers of hundreds of hard-working and excellent black artists and performers as lessons in stereotyping, or as most interesting for how they were hemmed in by racism than for what they accomplished regardless. Just as it is impossible to imagine Jewish Americans submitting themselves to so dispiriting and reductive a historiography of performance as this one, black scholars should step away from this kind of thinking as giving in to, rather than coping with, the ills of our history.

In the same vein, black popular music (including hip hop) should not be treated as most interesting in how it happened to intersect with (leftist and radical) political ideology - anymore than klezmer music, Chinese opera, or Tchaikovsky is. What about how our music is just good?

Second, an African-American Studies department should be considered larval without a course on black conservative thought - upon which courses on black radicalism would then be acceptable as alternative arguments.

Crucially, token assignment of writings of ancient three-named figures like Booker T. Washington, who wrote amidst post-Civil War conditions now ancient history, are a mere beginning. Most departments already slip in Washington, for example - although they should now regularly engage Robert Norrell's new biography that rescues the man from a century of calumny.

However, equally central to honest engagement with "black thought" are modern figures often considered controversial by the campus set, such as Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, Walter Williams, Debra Dickerson, and Stanley Crouch. (I will refrain from putting myself on this list, but will mention that my work is not uncommonly assigned to college students and seems not to leave them deaf to America's sociological imperfections.) Also useful, given that African-American Studies syllabi typically include some white writers, would be Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom, Lawrence Mead, Dan Subotnik and Peter Wood.

There is an argument hardly unfamiliar in the halls of ivy that black writers of this ilk are irrelevant to serious discussion because they are traitors to the race. Those charges must be permitted as free speech - but have no place in any brand of academic inquiry. All of the writers I have listed are careful thinkers deeply concerned with the fate of black America. It will not do to tar them as "not scholarly" because they do not all write in academic format or publish in obscure scholarly journals. Writings typically assigned by James Baldwin, Cornel West or even most of the others in this school are not written in this format either.

Thomas Sowell is read by millions in a nationally syndicated column, and this is in part because he is an economics and history scholar of long standing, whose books are often festooned with footnotes and references to academic work. Shelby Steele won the National Book Award, because of rhetorical skill surely the equal of writers like Patricia Williams and Michael Eric Dyson. Stanley Crouch is a polymath whose salty, "down" essence challenges anyone's claim that not being with the black radical program means not being "culturally black."

To be sure, many professors in African-American Studies departments think of themselves as doing their jobs in what they term "contesting" assorted topics. An example is Marable's "Critical Approaches to African-American Studies" at Columbia in which the contesting is the likes of "Remapping the black experience," "Redefining whiteness," and "Race-ing justice." However, this is a rearranging of furniture, very en famille. The confrontational, leftwardly politicized assumptions remain steadfast - while millions of blacks have overcome having never heard of politics of this kind.

These views, nevertheless, have value and should be heard. Yet they are not, on their own, truth. They verge into excess and anti-empiricism as readily as views from the right. There exist as many intelligent "contestings" of these leftist views as there exist "contestings" of the writings of Shelby Steele or myself. In a university department worth the status, contesting from all sides must be heard.

#### Optimism and solidarity are our only hope---their strategy of negativity accepts the foundational premises of racism as its starting point for politics

bell hooks 96, Killing Rage: Ending Racism, Google Books, 269-272

269More than ever before in our history, black Americans are succumbing to and internalizing the racist assumption that there can be no meaningful bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people trapped in the worst situation of racial oppres sion—enslavement—had the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not repudiate racism. Con temporary black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization of white supremacist assumptions. Organized white supremacists have always taught that there can never be trust and intimacy between the superior white race and the inferior black race. When black people internalize these sentiments, no resistance to white supremacy is taking place; rather we become complicit in spreading racist notions. It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that 270white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character flaw.

Of course many white people are comfortable with a rhetoric of race that suggests racism cannot be changed, that all white people are “inherently racist” simply because they are born and raised in this society. Such misguided thinking socializes white people both to remain ignorant of the way in which white supremacist attitudes are learned and to assume a posture of learned helplessness as though they have no agency—no capacity to resist this thinking. Luckily we have many autobiographies by white folks committed to anti-racist struggle that provide documentary testimony that many of these individuals repudiated racism when they were children. Far from passively accepting It as inherent, they instinctively felt it was wrong. Many of them witnessed bizarre acts of white racist aggression towards black folks in everyday life and responded to the injustice of the situation. Sadly, in our times so many white folks are easily convinced by racist whites and bLack folks who have internalized racism that they can never be really free of racism.

These feelings aíso then obsc]re the reality of white privi lege. As long as white folks are taught to accept racism as ‘natura]” then they do not have to see themselves as con sciously creating a racist society by their actions, by their political choices. This means as well that they do not have to face the way in which acting in a racist manner ensures the maintenance of white privilege. Indeed, denying their agency allows them to believe white privilege does not exist even as they daily exercise it. If the young white woman who had been raped had chosen to hold all black males account able for what happened, she would have been exercising white privilege and reinforcing the structure of racist thought which teaches that all black people are alike. Unfortunately,

271so many white people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something ¡fit is perceived as immutable. To accept racism as a system of domination that can be changed would demand that everyone who sees him- or herself as embracing a vision of radai social equality would be required to assert anti-racist habits of being. We know from histories both present and past that white people (and everyone else) who commit themselves to living in anti-racist ways need to make sacrifices, to courageously endure the uncomfortable to challenge and change.

Whites, people of color, and black folks are reluctant to commit themselves fully and deeply to an anti-racist struggle that is ongoing because there is such a pervasive feeling of hopelessness—a conviction that nothing will ever change. How any of us can continue to hold those feelings when we study the history of racism in this society and see how much has changed makes no logical sense. Clearly we have not gone far enough. In the late sixties, Martin Luther King posed the question “Where do we go from here.” To live in anti-racist society we must collectively renew our commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice and equality. Pursuing that vision we create a culture where beloved community flourishes and is sustained. Those of us who know the joy of being with folks from all walks of life, all races, who are fundamentalls’ anti-racist in their habits of being. need to give public testimony. Ve need to share not only what we have experienced but the conditions of change that make such an experience possible. The interracial circle of love that I know can happen because each individual present in it has made his or her own commitment to living an anti- racist life and to furthering the struggle to end white supremacy 272 will become a reality for everyone only if those of us who have created these communities share how they emerge in our lives and the strategies we use to sustain them. Our devout commitment to building diverse communities is cen tral. These commitments to anti-racist living are just one expression of who we are and what we share with one an other but they form the foundation of that sharing. Like all beloved communities we affirm our differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings, especially those that have to do with race and racism. In a beloved community solidarity and trust are grounded in profound commitment to a shared vision. Those of us who are always anti-racist long for a world in which evezyone can form a beloved community where borders can be crossed and cultural hybridity celebrated. Anyone can begin to make such a community by truly seeking to live in an anti-racist world. If that longing guides our vision and our actions, the new culture will be born and anti-racist communities of resis tance will emerge everywhere. That is where we must go from here.

#### Only our framework teaches debaters how to speak in the language of experts---that solves cession of science and politics to ideological elites who dominate the argumentative frame

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ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy.

There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making.

For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge.

Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics.

Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251).

National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts.

In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences.

The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality.

Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray.

For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

#### Anti-blackness dooms any possibility of social change---accusatory politics create a self-fulfilling prophecy that cracks coalitions necessary for progress

Clark 95—Professor of Law, Catholic University Law School. (Leroy, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)

A Final Word Despite Professor Bell's prophecy of doom, I believe he would like to have his analysis proven wrong. However, he desperately leans on a tactic from the past--laying out the disabilities of the black condition and accusing whites of not having the moral strength to act fairly. That is the ultimate theme in both of his books and in much of his law review writing. That tactic not only lacks full force against today's complex society, it also becomes, for many whites, an exaggerated claim that racism is the sole cause of black misfortunes. n146 Many whites may feel about the black condition what many of us may have felt about the homeless: dismayed, but having no clear answer as to how the problem is to be solved, and feeling individually powerless if the resolution calls for massive resources that we, personally, lack. Professor Bell's two books may confirm this sense of powerlessness in whites with a limited background in this subject, because Professor Bell does not offer a single programmatic approach toward changing the circumstance of blacks. He presents only startling, unanalyzed prophecies of doom, which will easily garner attention from a controversy-hungry media. n147 It is much harder to exercise imagination to create viable strategies for change. n148 Professor Bell sensed the despair that the average--especially average black--reader would experience, so he put forth rhetoric urging an "unremitting struggle that leaves no room for giving up." n149 His contention is ultimately hollow, given the total sweep of his work. At some point it becomes dysfunctional to refuse giving any credit to the very positive abatements of racism that occurred with white support, and on occasion, white leadership. Racism thrives in an atmosphere of insecurity, apprehension about the future, and inter-group resentments. Unrelenting, unqualified accusations only add to that negative atmosphere. Empathetic and more generous responses are possible in an atmosphere of support, security, and a sense that advancement is possible; the greatest progress of blacks occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s when the economy was expanding. Professor Bell's "analysis" is really only accusation and "harassing white folks," and is undermining and destructive. There is no love--except for his own group--and there is a constricted reach for an understanding of whites. There is only rage and perplexity. No bridges are built--only righteousness is being sold. A people, black or white, are capable only to the extent they believe they are. Neither I, nor Professor Bell, have a crystal ball, but I do know that creativity and a drive for change are very much linked to a belief that they are needed, and to a belief that they can make a difference. The future will be shaped by past conditions and the actions of those over whom we have no control. Yet it is not fixed; it will also be shaped by the attitudes and energy with which we face the future. Writing about race is to engage in a power struggle. It is a non-neutral political act, and one must take responsibility for its consequences. Telling whites that they are irremediably racist is not mere "information"; it is a force that helps create the future it predicts. If whites believe the message, feelings of futility could overwhelm any further efforts to seek change. I am encouraged, however, that the motto of the most articulate black spokesperson alive today, Jesse Jackson, is, "Keep hope alive!" and that much of the strength of Martin Luther King, Jr. was his capacity to "dream" us toward a better place.

#### Turns commodification

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The pedagogy of appearance focuses on cultural representation and the role of representation in constructing the represented. By centering teaching in the machinery of "representation," it **obliterates the objective**. Reducing pedagogy to lessons in cultural semiotics, it makes "experience" of the pleasures of "depth less" surfaces the measure of reality and thus **obscures the social relations of production that are the material conditions of that experience.** However, "This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a pure 'reality,' but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real" (Althusser 223). The ideological value of the concept of "experience" in de-conceptualizing pedagogy will perhaps become more clear in examining the way bourgeois radical pedagogues, such as Giroux, **deploy experience** as an instance of spontaneity to **eviscerate class** as an explanatory concept by which the social relations of property are critiqued. In his Impure Actsa book devoted to marginalizing explanatory concepts and popularizing "hybrids" and that, in effect, justifies political opportunism in pedagogy-Giroux repeats the claims of such other cultural phenomenologists as Stuart Hall, Judith Butler, and Robin Kelley that "class" is "lived through race" (28). Class, in other words, is an affect. He represents this affective view of class as epistemological resistance against class which, he claims, is a universal category that takes the "difference" of race out of class. As I have already argued, epistemology is used in mainstream pedagogy as a cover for a reactionary class politics that does several things, as Giroux demonstrates. First, **it segregates the "black" proletariat from the "white" proletariat and isolates both: from other "racial" proletariats**. In doing so, Giroux's pedagogy **carries out the political agenda of capital**-to pit one segment of the proletariat against the other and to turn the unity of the working class into contesting (race) "differences." Second, it rewrites the system of wage labor itself into a hybrid. Giroux's experience-ism obscures the **systematicity of wage labor** and argues that there is no capitalism operating with a single logic of exploitation. Instead, there are many, aleatory, ad hoc, local arrangements between employees and employers depending on the color of the worker not the laws of motion of capital. Third, it converts capitalism from an economic system based on the "exploitation" of humans by humans (wage labor) through the ownership of the means of production-into an institution of cultural "oppression" based on "power." Fourth, since class is lived through race, it is not an objective fact (the relation of the worker to ownership ofthe means of production) but a subjective experience. The experience of ("living") class through race, like all experiences, is contingent, aleatory, and indeterminate. Class (lived through the experience of race) is thus reconstituted as contingent-an accident not a necessity of wage labor. Fifth, since capitalism is not a system but a series of ad hoc arrangements of exchange with various workers of diverse colors, it does not produce an objective binary class system but only cultural differences. One cannot, therefore, obtain objective knowledge of capitalism. There are, in short, no laws of motion of capital; there are only "experiences" of work influenced by one's color. Consequently, to say-as I have said-that capitalism is a regime of exploitation is simply a totalitarian closure. We cannot know what capitalism is because, according to Giroux's logic, it is fraught with differences (of race) not the singularity of "surplus labor." In Giroux's pedagogy, there is no capitalism ("totality"), only cultural effects of capitals without capitalism ("differences"). Giroux represents his gutting of class as a radical and groundbreaking notion that will lead to liberation of the oppressed. However, he never completes the logic of his argument because in the end it will deground his position and turn it into epistemological nonsense and **political pantomime.** If class is a universal category that obliterates the difference of race, there is (on the basis of such a claim) no reason not to say that race is also a universal category because it obliterates the difference of sexuality (and other differences), which is, by the same logic, itself a universal category since it obliterates the difference of age (and other differences), which is itself a universal category because it obliterates the difference of (dis )ability (and other differences), which is itself a universal category because it obliterates the difference of class (and other differences). In short, the social, in Giroux's pedagogy is a circle of oppressions, **none of whose components can explain any structural relations**; each simply absorbs the other ("class is actually lived through race," paraphrasing Giroux) and thus points back to itself as a local knowledge of the affective, difference, and contingency. Class explains race; it does not absorb it as an experience (see Butler, "Merely"), nor does it reduce it to the contingencies of ethnicities (Hall, "New") or urban performativities (Kelley, Yo '). To put it differently**, since in this pluralism of oppressions each element cancels out the explanatory capacity of all others, the existing social relations are reaffirmed in a pragmatic balancing of differences.** Nothing changes, everything is resignified. The classroom of experience reduces all concepts (which it marks as "grand narratives") to affects ("little stories") and, instead of **explaining the social in order to change it,** only "interprets" it as a profusion of differences. Teaching becomes an affirmation of the singular-as-is; its lessons "save the honor of the name" (see Lyotard, Postmodern 82). Giroux's program is a mimesis of the logic of the ruling ideology: as in all pedagogies of affect, it redescribes the relation of the subject of knowledge with the world but **leaves the world itself intact by reifying the signs of "difference**" (see Rorty, Contingency 53, 73). The subject, as I will discuss later in my analysis of Cary Nelson's radical pedagogy, feels differently about itself in a world that remains what it was Giroux is putting forth a class-cleansing pedagogy: he erases class from teaching in the name of epistemology ("totalization"). But as I have already argued, epistemology is not an issue for Giroux; it **is an alibi for hollowing out from class its economic explanatory power.** Epistemology in bourgeois pedagogy is class politics represented as "theory"-whose aim is to turn class into a cultural aleatory experience. In Giroux's phenomenological experientialism, **lived experience is an excuse for advancing the cause of capital in a populist logic** (respect for the ineluctable "experience" of the student) so that the student, the future worker, is trained as one who understands the world only through the sense-able-his own "unique" experience as black, white, or brown; man or woman; gay or straight-but never as a proletariat: a person who, regardless of race, sexuality, gender, age, or (dis )ability has to sell his or her labor power to capital in order to obtain subsistence wages in exchange. Experience, in Giroux's pedagogy, becomes a self-protecting "inside" that resists world-historical knowledge as an intrusion from "outside"; it thus valorizes ignorance as a mark of the authenticity and sovereignty of the subject-as independence and free choice.