### 1AC NDT

#### The affirmative advocates restricting the President’s war powers by ending Islamophobic indefinite detention policies.

#### Islamophobic values have seeped into our daily lives due to the War on Terror---we reject those practices that actively target marked bodies

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4. Standing with Muslims against the “War on Terror”¶ In this chapter, I have demonstrated that:¶ The overriding motive for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is to secure control over the Middle East and Central Asia for U.S. oil, military, and corporate interests.¶ Bush’s handlers have been planning imperial conquest of the world since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989.¶ From the evidence here and elsewhere, it is difficult to draw another conclusion than that Bush’s associates organized the 9-11 attacks to kick start popular support for this war. They have continued to justify the ‘‘war on terror’’ by claiming that Muslim terrorists pose an immanent danger to Americans.¶ In fact, however, terrorism actually poses minimal risk to Americans.¶ The ‘‘war on terror’’ is a concept modeled on Israel’s assaults on Palestinians to provide a cover for campaigns of territorial conquest.¶ Far from being ‘‘under attack,’’ America has pre-emptively attacked and conquered two sovereign states, and is threatening military domination of the entire world.¶ In other words, Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is a massive con job, perpetrated by a few oil and military elites, at the expense of Muslims particularly, but threatening the security and well-being of virtually everyone on the planet.¶ An immensely wealthy and powerful republic has been hijacked by a small cabal of individuals...The American people have...been deliberately lied to, their interests cynically misrepresented and misreported, the real aims and intentons of this private war of Bush the son and his junta concealed with complete arrogance." (Said, 2003)¶ Thomas Donnelly, author of the RAD blueprint for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ recently reaffirmed the neo-conservative commitment, not to protect Americans from ‘‘terrorism,’’ but to conquer the world.¶ This war, properly understood, is a struggle to build a [new] ... order throughout the ‘‘greater Middle East,’’ that giant swath of the planet that extends from West Africa to Southeast Asia. ...Operation Iraqi Freedom represented the first step in a generational commitment to Iraq, but also the commitment of many generations to transforming the greater Middle East....The vision of the Bush Doctrine is hugely ambitious; in embracing this great vision, the United States must obligate the resources and create the institutions necessary to realize it." (Donnelly, 2004, pp. ix, 111)¶ 4.1. ‘‘Either you are with us, or you are with the Terrorists’’¶ Fear and hatred of a scapegoated ‘‘enemy’’ are powerful tools by which despots confuse people into believing that their oppressors are their salvation. Just as anti-Semitism served to divide and silence progressive German movements in the early Nazi era, Islamophobia is dividing and silencing us now. No one wants to associate with “terrorists”, much less be labelled and persecuted as one. Many progressive Western people fear and despise “fundmentalist” Muslims, and thereby fall into the trap of allying themselves with, or at least not opposing, Islamophobic laws and practices in the name of opposing “terrorism”. They thereby collude in undercutting the fabric of rights, due process, and equality on which they too depend.¶ The Bush Doctrine rhetoric has succeeded in convincing most white Americans that “terrorists” pose a serious threat to their personal safety, and that the “war on terror” is necessary to protect them. Islamophobic language and values have seeped into the fiber of our daily lives. Bookstores now have “terrorism” sections, displaying some of the 5,036 mostly new books on the topic.15 Several U.S. colleges and universities now offer degrees in “homeland security.” Media images of “Arab extremists” have become routine.¶ Most Americans now believe that “terrorism” is such a big problem, that they should pay with their taxes, their freedoms, their decimated public services, and their children’s lives. In the summer of 2005, polls found that 79 percent of Americans believed that “the threat of terrorism against the U.S.” has increased or stayed about the same (Polling Report.com, 2005). Seventy-six percent thought “Osama bin Laden himself is currently planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States,” and 64 percent supported the Patriot Act. Sixty-four percent would be “willing to give up some of [their] personal freedom in order to reduce the threat of terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005). Almost half of all Americans “believe the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim-Americans” (Dean, 2005). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and shocking revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison, however, popular support for the “war on terror” plummetted. In November, 2005, 55 percent of Americans disapproved of the way Bush is “dealing with the war on terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005).¶ 4.2. Which Side are you on?¶ Before 9-11, the anti-globalization movement had been rapidly gaining influence and unity worldwide. Opposition to U.S.-dominated institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the G-8, NATO and APEC, had succeeded in disrupting and exposing several of their gatherings. And in their place, the World Social Forum and other progressive people’s movements were demonstrating that indeed there are excellent alternatives to globalization and corporate rule.¶ The 9-11 “attacks” and the “war on terror” derailed these hopeful movements and imposed crippling constraints on dissent, democracy, and national sovereignty. Under cover of Islamophobic targeting of Muslims, the U.S. is waging war on all movements for social justice both domestically and internationally, using its new post 9-11 legislative powers and bloated military and policing budgets. Domestically, the Bush administration is attacking democracy, abortion rights, the judiciary, environmental protections, social security, public education, women’s rights, union rights, and civil rights (Dorhrn, 2003). Internationally, it pressures other nations to enact similar “anti-terror” laws and policies, as well as demanding that they open their economies to full U.S. corporate rule.¶ As Bernadette Dorhn points out: “The result is a chilling effect. That is to say, people around the targets back away, get silent, don’t stand up when they see the cost of simply expressing your opinion or even making a joke, let alone publicly objecting to what’s going on” (2003).¶ Many progressive groups oppose Islamophobia and support Muslim victims of U.S. and Israeli assaults. These include civil liberties associations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, anti-Zionist Jewish and Christian groups, unions, peace groups, and student organizations like the Canadian Federation of Students. Secular, Jewish, and Christian groups have formed alliances with Palestinians and Iraqis in oppostion to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. In the U.S. the Center for Constitutional Rights works to end arbitrary detention of Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. In Canada, the Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada has mobilized broad support for Muslim detainees and their rights.¶ However, even these groups have not dared to challenge the Islamophobic base of the “anti-terror” legislation, for fear of being called pro-terrorist. They are thereby left arguing that the particular individuals for whom they advocate aren’t terrorists, while implicitly condoning the myth that “real” terrorists are lurking in the shadows. But under the Bush Doctrine, all Muslims are presumed to be either current or potential terrorists, and their civil liberties have been sacrificed in the name of “national security”.¶ To defeat the Bush plot for world control, we will need to challenge Islamophobic fear of “terrorists”, to assert clearly that there is little substantive terrorist threat. What terrorism there is could better be addressed through criminal justice systems and international law. More importantly we need to insist that the U.S. desist from both overt preemptive wars and covert state-financed terrorism. The actual security of both Americans and all other people will be best served by ending the occupations of the West Bank, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and recognizing the right of all nations to self-determination (including oil policies). We need to stand in solidarity with all Muslims, regardless of their religious beliefs. At this juncture, Islamophobia is the key barrier to effective mobilization against the Bush regime.

#### US detention policy is an act of Islamophobia informed by a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice

Theresa Koenigsknecht 12, Public History MA Candidate at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, October 4, “Perspectives on Post 9/11 Prejudices: Islamophobia”, http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/04/perspectives-on-post-911-prejudices-islamophobia/

Have the September 11th terrorist attacks changed how you view or treat others? For many, unfortunately, the answer is probably “yes.” The events of 9/11, the United States government’s response to them, and an increasing public misunderstanding of Islam have created a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice towards Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim). This “unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam” is popularly known as “Islamophobia.” Whether this attitude occurs intentionally or subconsciously, this mindset has resulted in intensifying stereotypes, hate crimes, discrimination and often condones the violation of civil rights of Muslim-Americans. The Muslim community’s response to the 9/11 attacks, both initially and today, remains remarkably patriotic and supports cooperation with government authorities. Yet immediately following 9/11, Muslim-Americans, as well as those perceived to be Muslims, often endured increased suspicion from other Americans and even experienced physical violence, supposedly in retaliation for the attacks. Over a decade later, Muslims are still subjected to hate crimes, workplace discrimination, unreasonable arrest and detention, passenger profiling, verbal (especially through hate mail and internet outlets) and physical harassment and abuse. Although racism and anti-Semitism are considered socially unacceptable, ethnic profiling against Muslim-Americans is often encouraged and accepted by government authorities and popular media. Fortunately, some people are actively working to counter the rise of Islamophobia and many communities have come together showing solidarity and interfaith cooperation with their Muslim neighbors. Anyone can take steps to defeat Islamophobia by encouraging empathy for others and participating in activities that promote discussion between people of different faiths and ethnicities. More information on countering Islamophobia can be found on The Muslim Public Affairs Council website which provides helpful resources, links and workshops. It is efforts such as these that can help create an atmosphere of trust and dialogue, as opposed to fear and misunderstanding. So what does Islamophobia have to do with Guantánamo? Muslims constitute almost all of those detained there since 9/11. For that reason, although Guantánamo may not figure largely in the minds of some Americans, Islamophobia strongly influences Western culture and plays a large part in what Americans do understand about Guantánamo and its detainees. To many Americans the prevalent misconception that Islam is equivalent with terrorism unfortunately justifies the violation of Muslim’s civil liberties in the United States as well as violations of detainees’ human rights at Guantánamo. Yet, the American Civil Liberties Union’s “A Call to Courage” report states that, “by allowing and in some cases actively encouraging the fear of terrorism to divide Americans by religion, race, and belief, our political leaders are fracturing this nation’s greatest strength: its ability to integrate diverse strands into a unified whole on the basis of shared, pluralistic, democratic values.” Remembering each person’s right to civil liberties and advocating for greater awareness and knowledge can persuade people to reconsider how they view or treat those around them and in time provide an antidote for Islamophobia.

#### These constructions create a broader state of violence against colored bodies---this manifests in xenophobic profiling

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To illustrate how race can be socially constructed, I will use myself as an example. In the United States, I am considered African American or Black American, with the defacto second class status that designation still implies. My parents and grandparents were all considered Black, even though some of them had very light skin. The most recent white person whom we can determine is an ancestor is my great-great grandfather, Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard.35 We even have members of the African American group who look white, yet are still considered part of the Black group. In South Africa, where I have taught many times, I was considered part of the historically mixed race group known as Coloured, due to my light skin, wavy hair and other characteristics. 7 During the apartheid era, this group had a buffer status between the de jure most privileged whites and the least privileged black Africans.3 " In Brazil, I learned that my same features would classify me as White, with all the defacto privileges that the designation still brings in that society.39 The pan-ethnicity term "Arab" and the religious signifier "Muslim" have been socially constructed as a synonymous "race" in the United States.4° While there are over 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide, only 15% are Arab.41 In the U.S., it is unclear, but there maybe between 4-8 million Muslims, of whom 22.4% are U.S. born and 23.8% are African American.42 There may be 3 million Arabs in the U.S., originating from 22 countries,43 and the Arab American Institute has revealed the little known fact that nearly three quarters of Arab Americans are Christians." In an important case, St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Arabs can be discriminated against on account of their race. Interestingly, those who merely look like Arabs or Muslims may be racially profiled on that basis as well. The double group can thus be considered larger than the number of actual members. According to one commentator, there may be, in this country, 7 million Arabs, 8 million Muslims, and 1.6 million South Asians, Latinos, and African Americans who could look "Arab," probably at least 10 million people,46 which I think even that is a vast underestimate of the numbers of the Blacks and Latinos in America who could pass as Arab. One African American radio personality stated that French citizen Zacharias Moussaoui, native of Morocco, who may have been the twentieth September 11 hijacker, looks like "a brother from around the way.' When my sons and I travel abroad, we are often mistaken for Arabs or Muslims. My partner James, who is a dark brown skinned Christian African American, often wears a kufi or skull cap to express his cultural affinity for Africa. He is always taken for a Muslim, although not an Arab. Sadly, I have told my NYU student son, who can phenotypically pass for Arab, that he has to be careful when flying so that he will not be mistaken for an Arab. Dressing in the popular ghetto styled baggy pants coupled with corn rowing his hair, and the use of an Ebonics dialect,48 helps ensure that he is not racially profiled as an Arab. Of course, when he lands in New York, his failure to be able to hail a cab indicates he is clearly seen as a Black - too risky to pick up.49 These two overlapping and socially constructed-as-synonymous groups, Arabs and Muslims, have come to be regarded in some of the negative ways that have historically characterized African Americans. While Arabs and Muslims are often stereotyped as dangerous, evil, sneaky, primitive, and untrustworthy, much as Blacks are, the criminality has a twist-they are considered potential or actual terrorists." They are forever "foreign, disloyal and imminently threatening,"'" whether they are citizens or not. Arabs and Muslims were racially profiled, victimized, and demonized as terrorists well before September 11 2 These activities have included: physical attacks by individuals and pro-Israel groups such as the Jewish Defense League; political attacks by pro-Israel lobby AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai Birth, as well as many other Democratic and Republican Party affiliated entities; blacklisting of prominent Arab American intellectuals such as Columbia professor Edward Said and Harvard professor Walid Khalidi; as well as vicious stereotypes in films and television that would not be tolerated if used to characterize other groups.53 For example, Jack Shaheen surveyed a number of movies and found the following characterizations of Arabs and Muslims: "assholes," "bastards," "camel-dicks," "pigs," "devil-worshipers," "jackels," "rats," "rag-heads," "towel-heads," "scum-buckets," "sons-of-dogs," "buzzards of the jungle," "sons-of-whores," "sons-of-unnamed goats," and "sons-of-she-camels." 4 It is difficult to imagine the movie industry applying those sorts of labels to Blacks or Jews today. Arab American campaign contributions have been returned as if Arab citizens have no right to participate in American politics 5 3 Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim activities have intensified during periods of high tensions in the Middle East, such as the 1980 Iran Hostage situation, 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, 1986 war against Libya, and the 1991 Gulf war.56 "The Supreme Court has upheld immigration laws discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race, national origin and political affiliation that would patently violate the constitution if the rights of citizens were at stake."57 The cases include Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," Nguyen v. US.,59 Reno v American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee,6 ' Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Incorporated,6 ' and The Chinese Exclusion cases.62 The plenary power doctrine has historically provided immunity from judicial scrutiny of immigration judgments, whether by Congress or the Executive branch. Many Americans assumed the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah federal building had to be done by Arabs or Muslims, rather than by white Christian militia member Timothy McVeigh.' After that incident, even though Arabs and Muslims were not involved, draconian immigration laws were passed in 1996 which singled out those groups. 65 Unfortunately, what happened to Arabs and Muslims under these 1996 laws was not unique. According to Kevin Johnson, these laws are part of a history of attempts to stiffle dissent that includes the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s and the Palmer Raids after World War 1.66 In that period after the war, the U.S. imprisoned people for years for speaking out against the war effort.67 During the cold war Red Scare, many people lost jobs and were subject to investigation, or were even imprisoned, because of rumored association with the Communist party.6 According to Jerry Kang, "wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of mistakes. Specifically we overestimate the threat posed by racial 'others,' in WWlI, Japanese Americans; today, Arab Americans, Muslims Middle Easterners, immigrants and anyone who looks like 'them . ,9, ? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)70 made it a crime to contribute to foreign groups deemed as terrorist, and created special deportation procedures, including the formation of special courts to evaluate secret evidence. 7 ' The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)72 supplemented AEDPA. That act prevents federal courts from reviewing a variety of immigration cases, with very limited exceptions. 3 These two laws "either explicitly-or according to INS interpretation, impliedly-authorize the use of classified evidence to exclude an 'alien terrorist' under special removal proceedings,74 to summarily remove an alien who is a 'national security' risk,7 and to deny bond to aliens in removal proceedings."76 Pursuant to these statutes, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deported or attempted to deport more than two dozen people on the basis of secret evidence-almost all were Muslim, mainly Arabs. 77 Ironically, in 2000, Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of racial profiling when it used secret evidence.78 After September 11 the situation affecting Arabs and Muslims dramatically worsened,79 and there have been profound effects on their civil rights.8 " Before that fateful date, 80% of Americans considered racial profiling wrong.8 After September 11, the polls reversed and 60% said profiling was fine, especially if directed against Arabs and Muslims. 82 U.S. Congressman John Cooksey of Louisiana likely expressed the sentiments of many when he stated on the radio, "If I see someone come in and he's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over and checked." 3 A survey done soon after September 11 said that nearly half would be in favor of having Arabs, including citizens, carry a special identification card.8 There were early reports that some Blacks and Latinos welcomed the law enforcement targeting of Arabs and Muslims.85 When I heard that comment, it reminded me that I preferred that my sons not be mistaken for Arabs when flying. On the other hand, I also realized that increased racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims has not meant that the long term racial profiling of African Americans has stopped. It merely means that my sons may be doubly profiled depending on the context. At the airport, they may be regarded as Arab terrorists, while at the taxi stand or ATM machine, they may be regarded as Black criminals.8 6 After September 11, Muslims and Arabs and people who look like them have been under siege." Over 1000 incidents of hate crimes were reported by February 2002.8 Even President Bush's Arab secret service agent was removed from an American Airlines plane. 9 Of five people who were killed, including a Sikh Indian, a Pakistani Muslim, an Egyptian Coptic Christian, and an Indian Hindu,9 none of them was a Muslim Arab, but all were socially constructed as such. The U.S. Justice Department opened up more than 380 investigations into violence or threats, which have taken the form of "telephone, internet, mail and face-to-face threats; minor assaults, assaults with dangerous weapons, and assaults resulting in serious injury or death; and vandalism, shootings, and bombings directed at homes, businesses, and places of worship."9 ' About 70 state and local criminal prosecutions were instigated against 80 defendants. 92 According to Bill Hing, Arabs and Muslims, whether citizens or not, are literally and figuratively being de-Americanized, which is "a twisted brand of xenophobia that is not simply hatred of foreigners, but also hatred of those who may not be foreigners but whom the vigilantes would prefer being removed from the country anyway."93 A member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has even said that in the event of another terrorist attack, the American government might consider interning Arab Americans,"4 reminiscent of the treatment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II.9 ' The legal position of Arabs and Muslims has especially declined since the exceptionally speedy passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act),96 which subjects noncitizens to guilt by association, ideological exclusion, unilateral executive detention, and racial profiling.97 Aliens are deportable for innocent association, without any proof that they supported terrorist activity.98 Noncitizens are now subject to the resurrection of ideological exclusion, that is that they will be denied a visa on the basis of pure speech if they are seen as endorsing or espousing terroristic activity or persuading others to support activity or a group.99 Aliens can be detained without any hearing or showing that they pose a threat to national security or are a flight risk. The defendant in a normal criminal proceeding can be held without bail only if he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. " Aliens can now be held not only during the proceeding which can take years, but also afterwards, indefinitely, even if the proceeding says they should not be removed from the country!!lo Rules that effect citizens and noncitizens alike include the authorization of secret searches and wiretaps without any probable cause as would normally be required by the Fourth Amendment. 0 2 Under the USA Patriot Act, over 1000 people were held for weeks or months with no charges in mass preventive detention. 03 They did not have access to lawyers and, in many cases, their families were not told where they were."° Some people were held as material witnesses, i.e. they might have information. Even they have been treated harshly.'0 5 Some have challenged that detention in court. While federal judges have found that the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for potential testimony before a grand jury is unlawful,'0 6 otherjudges have held the opposite. 1 7 According to Jerry Kang, [we] should not be surprised if courts determine that national security in the face of terrorism is-in the lingo of constitutional law- a 'compelling interest' and that rude forms of racial profiling, notwithstanding its over and under-inclusiveness, are 'narrowly tailored' to furthering that interest. It would be foolish to think that the courts will necessarily save us from the excesses of the more political branches, r' Little research has been done as to how all this has affected women in the Arab and Muslim communities, as many of the men detained were the sole or major breadwinners for their families as well as respected business owners, religious leaders, and community activists." These women are usually stereotyped as voiceless and passive, needing to be liberated from the all encompassing Afghanistan burqa or even the more modest varieties of head scarves many wear in the United States."' Some of them may not speak English, may not have been working, or even had a visa to work, if foreign born." In November 2001, the Bush Justice Department said it would interview some 5000 young men, solely based on age, date of arrival, and country of origin. Virtually all were Arabs or Muslims." 2 Some police departments refused to assist the federal government as they believed the policy constituted racial profiling."' They knew that law enforcement works best if it positively involves the community rather than terrorizes it."4 Needless to say, the affected groups have been outraged by the targeting."5 Some months later, the Justice Department announced it would interview 3000 additional men from countries with an Al Qaeda presence." 6 When the Justice Department announced the Absconder Apprehension Initiative in February 2002, they decided to prioritize the deportation of 6000 aliens out of the 300,000 foreigners who remained in the country after being ordered deported. Needless to say, these men were from Arab countries." 7 In April 2002, the Justice Department announced that it would put into effect a provision from IIRIRA, which gives the police the authority to enforce immigration laws."' This was controversial not only in immigrant communities, but with police concerned about racial profiling. "'We've spent decades establishing trust... with our very diverse communities,' says a San Diego spokesman. 'If there is an immigration emergency tied to criminal activity, of course we'll assist. But if it is simply an immigration violation.., we will not be involved.""" In June 2002, the Entry-Exit Registration System was established which now requires men from age 16 up, from 25 countries including nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, to register and be photographed, fingerprinted, interviewed, or else be deported.2 Over 1200 men have been detained under this program.' For example, in December 2002, 400 men from Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Syria were detained in Los Angeles under this program, and Amnesty International reported their harsh treatment included being shackled, hosed down with cold water, forced to sleep standing up, and kept from contacting family or legal counsel.'22 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has called for a dismantling of this registration system since it is "discriminatory in nature, ineffective and inefficient as a law enforcement strategy, and creates widespread ill-will in Arab American and Muslim communities across the country."'2 Of course, the inadequacy of all such profiling is shown by the fact that the airplane "shoe bomber" Richard Reid is a citizen of Great Britain;24 the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh is a Muslim convert, white upper middle class native of Main County, California; ' 25 potential "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla is a Puerto Rican, former Chicago gangbanger; 12 6 and alleged twentieth hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui, who was captured before September 11, is a citizen of France.' 7 None of them would have been identified through profiling on the basis of nationality. It is interesting to look at the disparate legal treatment of these men. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, got a public trial, whereas hundreds of foreign born Arabs and Muslims, also captured there, are being held in incommunicado detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'28 The President issued a military order that Al Qaeda members and other noncitizens could be tried in military tribunals or commissions without appeal to civilian courts, an action which has been heavily criticized by various scholars,'29 as well as our allies.130 At least two federal courts have denied habeas petitions filed by lawyers representing some of the detainees, refusing to assert jurisdiction over the cases. 13 1 There may be approximately 650 suspects from 43 countries in Cuba, and officials are preparing accommodations for up to 2000 inmates.13 1 Some scholars and government officials have suggested that detention and prosecution of captured suspects should not even be governed by international law. 1 3 Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz and others have argued that such persons could be tortured without violating any laws binding the U.S. 34 Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, is a former Chicago Latin Kings gang member who converted to Islam.' He was picked up by authorities as he returned from Pakistan and was allegedly planning to set off a dirty bomb containing radioactive materials. 36 He is now being held in incommunicado detention in a U.S. military prison as an "enemy combatant," without access to counsel or any court-military or civilian, and may never be tried. 1 37 In December 2002, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York judge Michael Mukasey issued a 102 page opinion affirming Padilla's right to consult counsel, but the government continues to resist the court's order. 38 Another U.S. citizen, Yaser Hamdi, born in Louisiana of Saudi descent, who was captured by Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, is also being held as an enemy combatant, after being discovered among the Guantanamo prisoners. 139 The U.S. government in both the Padilla and Hamdi cases is resisting petitions for habeas corpus and saying that courts should just accept the President's determinations as to their status.140 Ironically, putting U.S. citizens under military jurisdiction without access to legal counsel places them in a legal limbo where they have less rights than foreigners Reid or Moussaoui 14 1 In October 2002, Reid ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge William G. Young of the U.S. District Court in Boston. 142 In Seattle last August, an African American thirty-six year old, Earnest James Thompson, now known as James Uj aama, was accused of lending assistance to Al Qaeda by founding a training camp in Bly, Oregon in 1999.43 He was also alleged to have run a militant Islamic web site in Great Britain, and was allegedly linked to Abou Hamza Masri, a London Muslim and alleged recruiter for Bin Laden.'" Investigators hope to "squeeze some information out of him, "and he is being tried in a civilian court.145 In March 2003, the INS was dissolved and folded into the new Department of Homeland Security along with 21 other federal agencies. The implications are ominous, as one commentator has stated. "Placing all of the INS's functions into a department focused primarily on national security suggests that the United States no longer views immigrants as welcome contributors, but as potential threats viewed through a terrorist lens."'146 At the time of this writing, it is alleged that the U.S. government has drafted in secret Patriot II, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003.147 The proposed law would authorize secret arrests, overturning the federal court decision requiring the government to release the names of all those detained since September 11. 148 Additionally, the law would permit the U.S. to extradite even American citizens for trial to countries with which we do not have extradition treaties, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya, which are well known for torture. 149 International and current U.S. law prohibit sending a person to a country where there is likelihood of torture. 50 Constituting a new level of invasion of privacy, a proposed Terrorist Identification database would authorize the collection of DNA of any suspect and of all noncitizens suspected of having an association with a "terrorist organization."'' The most extraordinary proposal would possibly strip Americans of citizenship as a form of punishment for giving material support to terrorist groups.15 2

#### Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy---notions of western superiority are a critical tool that drum up support for broader militarism

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KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.

#### This dehumanization of foreign populations establishes continuous cycles of violence---the way we discuss this issue matters

John Collins 2, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

#### Islamophobic detention policies create constant dehumanization---marking individuals as “dangerous” creates a free license that establishes detention sites as a space of perpetual warfare

Judith Butler 6, Professor at UC Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” Ch. 3: Indefinite Detention, p. 50

If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of deciding whether criminal acts occurred. Indeed, "deeming" someone dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to preempt determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of thousands of Arab residents or Arab- American citizens, sometimes on the basis of last names alone; the harassment of any number of US and non-US citizens at the immi- gration borders because some official "perceives" a potential difficulty; the attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern descent on US streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. When Rumsfeld has sent the US into periodic panics or "alerts," he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark-skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani- Americans. Although "deeming" someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, has become targeted by this government mandate to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the US becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain "indefinite containment" takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag in the months following September Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless ruled public culture-and business interests\_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be proven to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo released by the Department of Defense. The DOD did not hide these photos, but published them openly. My speculation is that they published these photographs to make known that a certain vanquishing had taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication. These were not photographs leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international response was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European human rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge, cruelty, and a nationalist and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several countries asked that their citizens be returned home for trial. But there is something more in this degradation that calls to be read. There is a reduction of these human beings to animal status, where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of total restraint. It is important to remember that the bestialization of the human in this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined. Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these people have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with murderers under both criminal and international law. The language with which they are described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are exceptional, that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these. The treatment of these prisoners is considered as an extension of war itself, not as a postwar question of appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their detention stops the killing. If they were not detained, and forcibly so when any movement is required, they would appar- ently start killing on the spot; they are beings who are in a permanent and perpetual war. It may be that al-Qaeda representatives speak this way-some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those detained are centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative team in Guantanamo, suggest that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention the prison uprisings in Afghanistan in which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison. In this sense, the war is not, and cannot be, over; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and there is a warrant for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the continuing site of war. It would seem that the rules that govern combat are in place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners separated from the war itself. When General Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the street, even if you don't charge them?" he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my emphasis). | 1 If the war is against terrorism, and the definition of terrorism expands to include every questionable instance of global difficulty, how can the war end? Is it, by definition, a war without end, given the lability of the terms "terrorism" and "war"? Although the pictures were published as a sign of US triumph, and so apparently indicating a conclusion to the war effort, it was clear at the time that bombing and armed confiict were continuing in Afghanistan, the war was not over, and even the photographs, the degradation, and the indefinite detention were continuing acts of war. Indeed, war seems to have established a more or less permanent condition of national emergency, and the sovereign right to self-protection outfianks any and all recourse to law.

#### These politics depend on expansive claims of executive authority---appeal to visions of an apocalyptic future will be used to justify the creation of spaces like Guantanamo---reigning in the executive solves

Jess Whyte 5, PHD candidate in Monash University’s Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, September 20, online: http://www.ephemeraweb.org/conference/accepted-abstracts.pdf

Russia, Siberia, China: these names evoke thoughts of internment, of gulags, of camps filled with dissidents. To think such camps is to think the relationship between juridical and economic forms. We are invited freely to think the gulags, for instance, in terms of labour control, insofar as control over labour is conceived not as a technical question, but as a political problem, and a political struggle. In conceptualizing today's camps—those that have materialized during the 'war on terror' such connections are made less freely. What is the relationship between the exceptional juridical status of a space like Guantanamo Bay, and the needs of Post-Fordist capital? How can we understand the contemporary transformations in the nature and exercise of state power? These transformations, I believe, are given an indicative form in the extra-judicial status of Guantanamo Bay, which epitomizes the shift from a judicial regime to a regime of exception, weighted to calculations of risk and 'security.' These contemporary juridical transformations can be seen as the "flexibilization" of the state", and can perhaps be better understood when viewed in the context of the shift from a Fordist model of capitalist accumulation to post-Fordism or as David Harvey calls it, "flexible accumulation". Today the exception, as epitomized in Guantanamo Bay, is steadily imbuing most aspects of the juridical realm, in the form of a shift away from the rule of law and the separation of powers towards a regime of unchecked executive power. As Agamben argues, we are faced today with the indistinction of norm and exception. Today's exception no longer aims at the reestablishment of legal norms, but becomes confused with the norm itself. To understand this shift, we should analyse the justification for the establishment of Guantanamo Bay, as outlined in a series of leaked memos between, then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales and Colin Powell. While Powell argues for the application of the Geneva Convention Guantanamo, Gonzales's argument for affording Camp X-Ray an extra-legal status focuses on three things: unpredictability, flexibility and risk. Central to Gonzales's argument is the depiction of the war on terror as "a new kind of war" which "renders quaint", in his words, the established laws of war. The key characteristic of this new kind of war is its unpredictability, in contrast with the relative stability engendered by the well-known enemies of the cold war. As Gonzales puts it: "it is difficult to predict the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on terror," In Gonzales' increasingly unpredictable world, the US faces unimaginable and potentially catastrophic risks. Stemming from this, for Gonzales, is a shift from a concern for legal certainty and stability to the valorization of the flexible state, which can respond quickly to new threats, unconstrained by the norms developed in a past that is no longer seen as an adequate guide to the future. Hence Gonzales defends a form of flexibility that would remove Guantanamo Bay from any legal jurisdiction, leaving its inhabitants utterly exposed to the decisionist power of the sovereign: in this case, the President of the United States. What this means in practice has been made disturbingly clear as allegations of torture, fatal beatings and sexual humiliation leak out from behind the razor wire. In Guantanamo Bay flexibility is revealed as a euphemism. Behind it lies the reality that "anything is possible", a principle Hannah Arendt defined as fundamental to totalitarianism, and which found its true meaning in the concentration camp. This valorization of flexibility is not confined to spaces like Guantanamo Bay, but is a key feature of contemporary capital. Post-Fordism—or flexible accumulation—is similarly conceived as a revolution aimed at overcoming the 'rigidities' of Fordism. While Fordism saw the equation of security with stability, post-Fordism is defined by 'flexibility' (or precarity), and a willingness to inaugurate a new and risky model of accumulation. In short, the Fordist model of stability and social insurance has been replaced by a speculative model, which seeks not to insure against risk, but to profit from it. In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech to a military college, in which he argued the military must encourage its people to "behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists." Central to this transformation, he argued, is the need for a temporal shift, whereby the military, or the state, begins to anticipate and act against threats that have not yet emerged. In this model the state must seek to "play the volatility" by intervening into, and preempting the emergence of the future. The military, Rumsfeld argues, must be prepared to "deter and defeat enemies that have not yet emerged." Inside Guantanamo Bay, this doctrine of preemption is extended to individuals. Guantanamo's model is not the judicial system, with its 'rigid' categorizations of guilt or innocence, but the flexible framework of risk management, enabled by the absolute sovereign authority of the state of exception. In Guantanamo, people are interned "until they are no longer a threat anymore." People therefore remain in Camp X-Ray not on the basis of what they have done, but on the basis of speculation as to what they may do in the future. This notion of risk cannot be codified in norms but only decided. Hence the shift from a model of guilt to a model of risk necessarily emboldens executive power. The future, and the catastrophic risk it presents is always, according to the logic of preemption, an exception. And when the temporal horizons of decision are disrupted so that the exception is no longer confined to a present emergency, but concerns also the emergent threat existing only in a projected future, then the bounds of decisionist power become unlimited. In the process, the boundary between norm and exception is eradicated, and the exception itself is normalized.

#### Our advocacy is important in this space---interrogating Islamophobia in educational settings establishes a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects

Shirin Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Jan. 4, works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions behind Islamophobia creates a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

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As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. ¶ Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.