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#### The aff is not topical --- introducing armed forces only refers to human troops, not weapons systems such as nuclear weapons

Lorber 13 – Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. January 2013, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Contsitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis

As is **evident from a** textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and **the broad** policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that **only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR.** Though not dispositive, **the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.** n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that **expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (**such as non-members **constituting armed forces)**. n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ **An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces**. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that **Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.**¶ **The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities**. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). **Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the** W**ar** P**owers** R**esolution likely does not cover such activities**. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, **individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.** Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits --- nuclear weapons is a whole topic on its own --- requires research into a whole separate literature base --- undermines preparedness for all debates.

## K

### 1NC — Critique

#### The aff uses expertism to mask their politically constructed scenarios as objective — this privileges insulated decision-making authority — causes deference to the executive — turns case and results in endless militarism — the alternative is to reject this epistemological assumption from the 1AC

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, “NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417

Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310¶ [\*1486] ¶ Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs.¶

Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well.¶

Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [\*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy.¶ In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [\*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states.¶ The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling.¶ It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [\*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge.

If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

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Current nuclear engagement with China is reciprocal reassurance---requiring China to commit to reassurances about its rise in exchange for potential U.S. accommodation

Pessin 9 – Al Pessin, writer for GlobalSecurity.org, September 24, 2009, “US Calls on China for 'Strategic Reassurance',” online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/09/mil-090924-voa08.htm

Just days before the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, a senior State Department official has called on the Beijing government to reassure the United States and other countries of its peaceful and constructive intentions as its military continues to grow and it plays a greater role in world affairs.

Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg says the United States is eager to continue to work with China to address a variety of global and regional issues, including those where the two countries disagree. But he told a conference sponsored by the Center for a New American Security that China's "size and importance" create a "risk of competition and rivalry that can thwart" such cooperation.

Steinberg says what is needed is what he calls "strategic reassurance."

"Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's arrival as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others. Bolstering that bargain must be a priority in the U.S.-China relationship," Steinberg said.

He notes that the United States and China have recently raised the level of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue process. He said other aspects of reassurance involve greater transparency about China's military spending and intentions, and actions on both sides to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate. He said that would include making military exchanges permanent, and not subject to interruption by incidents at sea or U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

He also said China's relationships with rogue regimes and disregard for human rights at home and abroad make other countries concerned about China's intentions. The deputy secretary of state said transparency and cooperation are particularly important in three areas.

"The risks of mistrust are especially acute in the arena of strategic nuclear weapons, space, and increasingly in the cyber realm. Achieving mutual reassurance in these areas is challenging, but, as we learned during the Cold War, essential to avoiding potentially catastrophic rivalry and misunderstanding. Both sides need to devote creating thinking into how we might address these thorny challenges," said Steinberg.

He also noted the potential for competition between the United States and China for natural resources. He criticized China for trying to monopolize resources in some areas, and called on its leaders to work within the world market system.

He said the United States is open to China's rise, but China must provide the world with clear reassurance about its intentions.

Unilateral NFU to China destroys the reciprocal strategic reassurance framework---causes backsliding

Guo 9 – Guo Yanyuan, November 12, 2009, “Strategic assurance and international security,” online: http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2009-11/12/content\_18876902.htm

On September 24, 2009, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg put forward an idea of "strategic reassurance" with China, hinting the U.S. and its allies are prepared to welcome China's "arrival" as a prosperous and successful power. China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others. It seems that the U.S. will "reset" its relationship with China, just as it did with Russia, so as to maintain the regional and international security the U.S. projected.

Strategic assurance is an important instrument to keep international actors together. Various actors in the international system are closely intertwined with each other. They cannot go alone but abide by some international norms in the anarchic international community. Strategic assurance is a kind of strategic commitment which international actors make to each other so that an international norm can be built. Strategic assurance can often be used to transform anarchy into an orderly society.

Strategic assurance is very important to help build and promote security confidence and mutual trust among international actors to lessen security uncertainties. Although security dilemmas exist between nation states that seek optimal national interests, security cooperation with the guide of strategic assurance is pragmatically conducive to stability and peace of the international community. Thus, various types of collective security cooperation regimes have been constructed, such as bilateral and multilateral alliances or regional security communities. The United Nations is the largest and most comprehensive international regime that plays an authoritative role in maintaining international security.

Strategic assurance is the most popular means for nation states to show their willingness to increase trust with other countries. Collective security means all the members in the regime can enjoy benefits from its strategic assurance; no member can violate the norms of the regime or hurt the national interests of other members without punishment. Strategic assurance is always used to safeguard the interests of others. For example, a nuclear no first-use policy should be the natural strategic assurance of nuclear states, even though they have first-strike capabilities.

Strategic assurance can not be abused or misused, but managed properly and prudently. NATO is a political and security product of the Cold War, a military instrument to contain a possible attack from former Soviet Union. Its strategic objectives are unclear and diversified because Russia cannot be identified as its primary enemy, only as a potential security competitor. Thus, NATO seems much less important for European countries, which are building a regional community themselves. However, although the EU emerged from security issues, it has achieved little in formulating common security policies to tackle regional and international security threats that may hurt common or individual national interests. Many EU states are still reluctant to undertake strategic assurance to keep regional unification wholeheartedly.

All relevant members should be treated equally when strategic assurance is issued. Sovereignty, independence and equality by international law are often undermined by the de facto inequality of capability and power between countries. Therefore, the small countries are usually inferior in developing relations with big countries, although big countries might provide more strategic public goods. Small countries may be dependent on big countries later in future. Thus, strategic assurance must be carried out fairly and transparently to ensure all the countries are willing to make their commitments in the regime.

Strategic assurance must be implemented interactively to promote mutual benefit. Mutual assured destruction, which is used to safeguard its own survival in nuclear confrontation, is absolutely contrary to strategic assurance, which eulogizes against mutual damage. However, if only some countries can benefit from strategic assurance, then not all countries are burdened to honor their commitments and the strategic assurance will eventually be abandoned. No country will bind itself to a non-profitable obligation. For example, although the Japan-US alliance is asymmetric for both sides, it still exists because either Japan or the US can benefit from this reciprocal relationship. This is also the very reason why some traditional alliances are still alive today.

Unilateral strategic reassurance causes Chinese miscalc and overreach---they’ll actively undermine U.S. interests

WP 10 – Washington Post, January 3, 2010, “U.S.-China relations to face strains, experts say,” online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/02/AR2010010201751.html

Still, U.S. officials and analysts have noticed a new assertiveness -- what one senior U.S. official called a "sense of triumphalism" -- on the part of officials and the public in China. This stems from a sense in Beijing that the global economic crisis proves the superiority of China's controlled economy and its authoritarian political system -- and that the West, and in particular the United States, is in decline.

This triumphalism was on display during the recently concluded climate talks in Copenhagen. China only sent a deputy foreign minister to meetings set for the level of heads of state; its representatives publicly clashed with their American counterparts. And during the climax of the conference, China's security team tried to block Obama and the rest of his entourage from entering a meeting chaired by China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao.

That type of swagger is new for China and it could make for a stronger reaction from Beijing.

"If they really believe the United States is in decline and that China will soon emerge as a superpower, they may seek to take on the U.S. in ways that will cause real problems," said Bonnie S. Glaser, an expert on China with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Complicating this picture is the view of some American analysts that the Obama administration -- with its intensive outreach to Beijing -- tried too hard in its first year to cultivate ties with China. Playing hard to get might have helped smooth out China's swagger, they suggest.

"Somehow the administration signaled to the Chinese that we need them more than they need us," Lampton said. "We're in the role of the supplicant."

Destroys U.S. leadership in Asia

Lam 9 – Willy Lam, professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and adjunct professor of history at Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 6, 2009, “Reassurance or Appeasement?,” Far Eastern Economic Review, online: http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/november51/reassurance-or-appeasement

Beijing is not planning to do much in return for Mr. Obama's myriad concessions. Even worse is the probability that the Hu leadership has interpreted Washington's friendly overtures as a sign of weakness. This has prompted Beijing to take more measures to bolster its international standing at the expense of America.

Beijing's enhanced wooing of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, one of whose purposes is to keep the U.S. out of China's perceived sphere of influence. At the Asean summit last month, Beijing played "dollar diplomacy" by offering Southeast Asian countries a credit line of $15 billion for industrial and infrastructure projects. Premier Wen also secured a consensus pledge that the "Asean plus three" structure—Southeast Asia plus China, Japan and South Korea—would become the "main vehicle toward the long-term goal of building an East Asian Community." Not only the U.S. but such American allies as Australia and India have been excluded from what could be a prototype for an EU-style Asian bloc.

Nuclear war

Walton 7 – C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

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#### The US has nuclear primacy now --- capability to execute a disarming nuclear first strike is vital to prevent inevitable conventional wars against nuclear-armed adversaries from escalating --- specifically Iran, North Korea, and China

Lieber and Press 13, Keir Lieber, Associate Professor in the Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown, and Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government @ Dartmouth, “The new era of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and conflict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7.1, Spring, p.3, Gale

The Counterforce Revolution and US Nuclear Primacy¶ The first set of arguments is about an important, yet virtually unnoticed, consequence of changes in military technology and the balance of power. In a nutshell, the same revolution in accuracy that has transformed conventional warfare has had equally momentous consequences for nuclear weapons and deterrence. (2) Very accurate delivery systems, new reconnaissance technologies, and the downsizing of arsenals from Cold War levels have made both conventional and nuclear counterforce strikes against nuclear arsenals much more feasible than ever before. Perhaps most surprising, pairing highly accurate delivery systems with nuclear weapons permits target strategies that would create virtually no radioactive fallout, hence, vastly reduced fatalities.¶ For nuclear analysts weaned on two seeming truths of the Cold War era--that nuclear arsenals reliably deter attacks via the threat of retaliation, and that nuclear weapons use is tantamount to mass slaughter--the implications of the counterforce revolution should be jarring.¶ The conventional view linking nuclear weapons to stalemate and slaughter was correct during the latter decades of the Cold War. By the mid 1960s, a truly effective nuclear counterforce strike by either side--that is, a disarming blow by one superpower against the nuclear arsenal of the other--had become impossible. (3) Each of the superpowers wielded an enormous arsenal, which was deployed on a diverse set of delivery systems. The sheer number of targets that would have to be destroyed, combined with the limitations of contemporary guidance systems, virtually guaranteed that any disarming attack would fail, leaving the enemy with a large number of surviving weapons with which to retaliate. Furthermore, any significant counterforce strike would have produced enormous quantities of lethal radioactive fallout and hence caused millions of civilian casualties. (4) Most Cold War strategists--many of whom are still active in the nuclear analytical community today--came to instinctively associate nuclear weapons with stalemate and nuclear use with Armageddon.¶ But nuclear weapons--like virtually all other weapons--have changed dramatically over the past four decades. Modern guidance systems permit nuclear planners to achieve "probabilities of damage" against hardened nuclear targets that were unheard of during the Cold War. And heightened accuracy also permits nontraditional targeting strategies that would further increase the effectiveness of counterforce strikes and greatly reduce casualties. (5) The revolution in accuracy and sensors, and the relatively small contemporary arsenals, mean that nuclear balances around the world--for example, between the United States and China, the United States and North Korea, and perhaps in the future between Iran and Israel--bear little resemblance to the Cold War superpower standoff.¶ To illustrate the revolution in accuracy, in 2006 we modeled the hardest case for our claim: a hypothetical US first strike on the next largest nuclear arsenal in the world, that of Russia. The same models that were used during the Cold War to demonstrate the inescapability of stalemate--the condition of "mutual assured destruction," or MAD--now suggested that even the large Russian arsenal could be destroyed in a disarming strike. (6) Furthermore, the dramatic leap in accuracy--which is the foundation for effective counterforce--is based on widely available technologies within reach of other nuclear-armed states, including Russia, China, Pakistan, and others. Our overriding message is not about the US-Russian nuclear balance per se. Rather, our point is that key beliefs about nuclear weapons have been overturned; scholars and analysts need to reexamine their underlying assumptions about nuclear stalemate and deterrence.¶ Since 2006, we have discussed these issues with many nuclear analysts, US government officials, and military officers involved with the nuclear mission. Almost everything we learned reinforced our views about the counterforce revolution and suggests our earlier work understated the leap in US counterforce capabilities--with one exception. We previously argued that US "nuclear primacy"--the ability to use nuclear weapons to destroy the strategic forces of any other country--appeared to be an intentional goal of US policymakers. We noted that even as the United States greatly reduced its nuclear arsenal, it retained, and in some cases improved, those nuclear forces that were ideally suited to the counterforce mission. Based on what we have subsequently learned, we would recast and sharpen this part of our argument to contend that the United States is intentionally pursuing "strategic primacy"--meaning that Washington seeks the ability to defeat enemy nuclear forces (as well as other WMD)--but that US nuclear weapons are but one dimension of that effort. In fact, the effort to neutralize adversary strategic forces--that is, achieve strategic primacy--spans nearly every realm of warfare: for example, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance systems, offensive cyber warfare, conventional precision strike, and long-range precision strike, in addition to nuclear strike capabilities.¶ In sum, two fundamental "truths" about nuclear weapons--they reliably produce stalemate and their use would necessarily create mass casualties--have been quietly overturned by changes in technology and dramatic force reductions. Unfortunately, many contemporary analyses of nuclear politics seem to rest on the assumption that nuclear deterrence still functions as it did in the 1970s. The stipulation of mass slaughter under MAD conditions may be true for some nuclear relationships in the world but not for others. And new conditions generate new questions: for example, how is deterrence likely to work when nuclear use does not automatically imply suicide and mass slaughter? In particular, what are the implications for US nuclear policy?¶ The Problem of Coercive Escalation and US Nuclear Modernization¶ A second set of arguments stems from the problem of nuclear escalation and the future of the US nuclear arsenal. Our main claim is that deterring nuclear conflict will be much more difficult in the coming decades than many analysts realize. As nuclear weapons proliferate, it becomes increasingly likely that the United States will find itself in conventional conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Those adversaries understand the consequences of losing a war to the United States--prison or death typically awaits enemy leaders. (7) Coercive nuclear escalation as a means of creating stalemate and remaining in power is one of the only trump cards available to countries fighting the United States.¶ Some analysts might scoff at the notion that a rational leader would use nuclear weapons against a superpower like the United States. But that retort conflates the logic of peacetime deterrence with the logic of war, and it ignores history. During peacetime, almost any course of action is better than starting a nuclear war against a superpower. But during war--when that superpower's planes are bombing command and leadership sites, and when its tanks are seizing territory--the greatest danger may be to refrain from escalation and let the war run its course. Leaders of weaker states--those unlikely to prevail on the conventional battlefield--face life-and-death pressures to compel a stalemate. And nuclear weapons provide a better means of coercive escalation than virtually any other.¶ The notion of countries escalating conflict to avoid conventional defeat may sound far-fetched, but it is well grounded in history. When nuclear-armed states face overwhelming conventional threats--or worry about the possibility of catastrophic conventional defeat--they often adopt coercive escalatory doctrines to deter war or stalemate a conflict that erupts. Pakistan openly intends to use nuclear weapons to counter an overwhelming conventional Indian invasion. Russia claims it needs theater nuclear weapons to counter NATO's conventional advantages. Israel expects to win its conventional wars but retains the capability for nuclear escalation to prevent conquest in case its conventional forces suffer a catastrophic defeat.¶ The discussion of coercive nuclear escalation should sound familiar to Western analysts, as it was NATO's strategy for three decades. From the mid 1960s until the end of the Cold War, NATO planned to deter war, and stalemate it if necessary, through coercive nuclear escalation. NATO understood that--by the mid 1960s--it could no longer win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, but it still based its national security strategy on coercive escalation because it believed Warsaw Pact conventional forces were overwhelming.¶ In short, the escalatory dynamics that existed during the Cold War exist today--and they are just as powerful. States still face the same critical national security problem they faced during the Cold War and throughout history: namely, how to prevent stronger countries from conquering them. The high-stakes poker game of international politics has not ended; the players and the cards dealt have merely changed. Those who were weak during the Cold War are now strong, and another set of militarily "weak" countries--such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and even China and Russia--now clutch or seek nuclear weapons to defend themselves from overwhelming military might, just as NATO once did.¶ What can the United States do to mitigate the problem of escalation? Ideally, it should avoid wars against nuclear-armed enemies. But that option may not be possible given current US foreign policy and alliances. War may erupt on the Korean Peninsula, ensnaring the United States in a battle against a desperate nuclear-armed foe. In the future, Washington may fight a nuclear-armed Iran over sea lanes in the Persian Gulf. And the United States could someday be dragged into war by a clash between Chinese and Japanese naval forces near disputed islands.¶ Alternatively, the United States could seek to develop conventional war plans designed to wage limited war without triggering enemy escalation. Development of alternative plans is sensible, but history shows that wars are difficult to contain, and modern conventional warfare is inherently escalatory.¶ A third option to mitigate these dangers is to retain, and improve, US nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities. Fielding powerful counterforce weapons may help deter adversary escalation during war--by convincing enemy leaders to choose a "golden parachute" rather than escalation--and would give US leaders better response options if deterrence failed. In particular, the United States should retain and develop nuclear weapons that bring together three key characteristics of counterforce: high accuracy, flexible yield, and prompt delivery.¶ To be clear, sharpening US counterforce capabilities is not a "solution" to the problem of adversary nuclear weapons. Although, ceteris paribus, it would be better to have excellent counterforce capabilities than to lack them, given enough time and motivation, many countries could greatly increase the survivability of their forces. But given the plausible prospect that the United States will find itself waging war against nuclear-armed states, and given the powerful incentives of US adversaries to brandish or use nuclear weapons, it would be reckless to proceed without a full suite of modern nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities.

#### Self-denial of nuclear superiority destroys deterrence---signals weakness and invites aggression

-AT: START/Cuts thumper

Payne et al. 10 – Keith Payne, President and Co-Founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Department at Missouri State University; Kathleen Bailey, Senior Associate at the National Institute for Public Policy, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Kurt Guthe, Director of Strategic Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, former senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Robert Joseph, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, Stephanie Koeshall, research associate at the NIPP; Thomas Scheber, Vice President of the NIPP, former Director of Strike Policy and Integration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst at the NIPP; Andrei Shoumikhin, Visiting Professor at the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State; Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2010, “Planning the Future U.S. Nuclear Force,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 29, No. 1&2, p. 1-216

The principle that the United States must avoid apparent nuclear inferiority (Continuity 6) clearly has implications for force sizing. Denying opponents nuclear superiority appears to matter, even if many believe the catastrophic nature of nuclear war argues otherwise. Political leaders and the public may accept not being ahead, but are loath to fall manifestly behind. While administrations have used a variety of quantitative and qualitative formulations to define the nuclear position required for the United States (including “superiority,” “parity,” “equivalence,” and “second to none”), all past presidents have called for at least parity with the nearest nuclear rival. They have taken the view that the United States must either have a nuclear advantage itself or deny such an advantage to its competitors. The aversion to inferiority reflects at least three concerns: apprehension by presidents and their advisers that an unfavorable nuclear imbalance could encourage aggression by an opponent, even if the limits of superiority were apparent to U.S. officials; unease that allies might be unsettled by such an imbalance and rendered less sure of U.S. leadership; and worry that ceding an advantage to an adversary could have adverse repercussions not only in foreign capitals, but also in the domestic political realm (recall the controversies over the “bomber gap,” “missile gap,” and “window of vulnerability”). The July 2009 Joint Understanding that requires the United States and Russia to reduce strategic nuclear weapons to a common level of 1,500-1,675 warheads under a post-START treaty is consistent with the principle of preserving parity and avoiding inferiority.3

#### Perception of declining U.S. deterrence causes fast, global, great power nuclear war

Caves 10, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University 10 – John P. Caves Jr., Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, January 2010, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” Strategic Forum, No. 252

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particularly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear-armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. ¶ A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante.¶ The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position.¶ Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assurances. They could compensate by accommodating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, which in most cases could be accomplished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years.¶ Important U.S. interests could be compromised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terrorists alone could inflict.

## CP

### CP---1NC

#### The United States Executive branch should offer to negotiate with the government of China a bilateral agreement that obligates the United States to refrain from first-use of nuclear weapons absent Congressional approval against China, and obligates China to refrain from nuclear first-use absent legislative approval against the United States, so long as the agreement remains in effect. The Executive should pledge to submit the agreement for Congressional ratification upon signature by China.

#### The United States Congress should limit first use of nuclear weapons without Congressional approval in instances not covered by the agreement.

#### Competes--- the plan and perm remove the executive’s leverage in negotiating the agreement with China.

Solves the case---China says yes

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 27, 2004, “Fact Sheet:China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of,” online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/prc\_nuclear-disarmement-factsheet\_27apr2004.htm

I. Since the very first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. China has also undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones. China firmly opposes the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons. We call upon all nuclear-weapon states to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has never taken part in any nuclear arms race or deployed a single piece of nuclear weapon outside of the Chinese territory.

In January 1994, China formally presented a draft "Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France and proposed that the five nuclear-weapon states begin consultations on this matter as soon as possible.

China seeks to reach arrangements on a bilateral basis with other nuclear-weapon states for mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons. In September 1994, Chinese and Russian leaders declared their commitment to mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-targeting of such weapons at each other.

The CP solves and avoids the Strategic Reassurance disad---reciprocal reassurance is key

Lam 9 – Willy Lam, professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and adjunct professor of history at Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 6, 2009, “Reassurance or Appeasement?,” Far Eastern Economic Review, online: http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/november51/reassurance-or-appeasement

Despite his lack of expertise on China, Mr. Obama began his tenure by extending an olive branch in the form of the "doctrine of strategic reassurance" toward the country that has become America's largest creditor. In the words of Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, the U.S. and its allies "are prepared to welcome China's ‘arrival' ... as a prosperous and successful power." All that Mr. Steinberg asked for in return was "a shared commitment to building an international system based on mutual trust." "China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others," he said.

Mr. Obama thus seemed ready from day one to give the P.R.C. ample benefit of the doubt. This approach is different from the initial phases of the tenures of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, which were marked by muscle flexing and, in the case of the "spy plane incident" in early 2001, ugly confrontation. The Obama team has already made a number of concessions in the expectation that the Chinese Communist Party would reciprocate by becoming more of what former deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick called a "responsible stakeholder" in the global community.

An assessment of the U.S. president's maiden tour of the Middle Kingdom should begin by examining to what extent the Chinese have reciprocated Washington's goodwill gestures. First, the Obama administration seems to have mothballed two related strategies that Washington has employed since the 1950s: "peaceful evolution" and the "human rights card." This refers to efforts to promote Communist China's gradual transformation into a democratic, capitalist country through playing up—and impressing upon younger generations of Chinese—global values such as democracy and civil liberties.

However, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton steered clear of human rights during her China sojourn early this year. Washington kept mum regarding Beijing's escalation of slash-and-burn tactics in Xinjiang after a series of bloody skirmishes between the majority Han Chinese and Uighurs, whose culture and ethnic identity are being systematically marginalized. Last month, Mr. Obama caught flak from both the American left and right—as well as human rights activists in China—by refusing to see the Dalai Lama during the Nobel laureate's visit to the American capital.

There are signs that in pursuit of the "strategic reassurance" doctrine, Mr. Obama may be amenable to shelving an even more powerful lever that Washington has used against the P.R.C.: the threat of containment. This is a codeword for efforts by the U.S., in conjunction with allies and semi-allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia, to "encircle" China by maintaining a web of alliances in the Asia-Pacific.

As Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou complained recently, Washington has continued to stall on Taipei's requests for F-16 jetfighters, despite the transformational growth of the People's Liberation Army's capacity in the past decade. A major objective of the just-completed American tour of the vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, General Xu Caihou, was Washington's total cessation of arms sales to Taiwan. While Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Gen. Xu's host, didn't say anything on this issue, Washington has been less than vociferous in demanding that the PLA remove the 1,000-odd missiles that it has deployed in bases just opposite Taiwan.

Given that the Chinese hold some $800 billion worth of U.S. government bonds, in addition to another $550 billion or so of American securities, it is not surprising that Washington has been making nice with Beijing in the finance and trade arenas. The Treasury Department last month chose not to name China as a country that manipulates its currency, despite the fact that the yuan has returned to a de facto peg to the dollar in the past year. The Obama administration did slap punitive tariffs on Chinese tires in September, but given the small volume of such imports this was more a symbolic gesture to placate the Democratic Party's labor constituency.

Moreover, at the recent trade talks in the coastal city of Hangzhou, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke and his Chinese counterpart Chen Deming agreed on a theoretical moratorium on protectionist policies. On the eve of the Obama visit, Beijing was abuzz with speculation that Washington would liberalize procedures for Chinese purchases of American high technology, and that the U.S. might even accord China "full market economy status."

In return for its olive branches, the Obama administration hopes Beijing will do more in these areas: reining in the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran; making firmer commitments to cut fossil-fuel gas emissions; continuing to buy American bonds; boosting imports of American goods and services; and improving the transparency of its defense forces. So far, Beijing has done little on these fronts, a tendency that is unlikely to be changed by the upcoming Obama-Hu tête-à-tête. A key reason is that President Hu and his advisers consider Mr. Obama's favors as things the U.S. should have done all along—and not "concessions" for which the CCP authorities need to reciprocate.

Only the CP reassures allies

Blumenthal 9 – Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, October 8, 2009, “An Illiberal Approach to China,” Center for Defense Studies, online: http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=654

Finally, the “responsible stakeholder” formulation that Osnos disparages is an invitation by all the established powers for China to fully integrate into the international system in accordance with the norms of the reigning democratic powers. It is popular amongst our allies in Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and our friends in Europe. All of these countries hope for a successful Chinese integration. Yet none of these countries are betting their futures on that outcome. All of our allies want to hold China accountable for its many internal and external misdeeds. Tossing out the responsible stakeholder formulation would be an act of American recklessness and unilateralism. That would reassure no one.

And preserves extended deterrence

Craig 7 – Susan Craig, China Specialist for PACOM J1, formerly intelligence analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office for the U.S. Army, July 2007, “Defining the U.S.-China Relationship: Beyond the Cold War and Status Quo Rise Constructs,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8

Explore the possibility of a strategic assurance between China and the U.S. Chinese delegates repeatedly expressed concern about the U.S.’ proclivity toward “first use” of nuclear weapons and a desire to understand how China was categorized in U.S. nuclear doctrine. Is China a nuclear adversary similar to the Soviet Union or is it a rogue third world state upon which nuclear weapons could be used pre-emptively? A principled agreement between the U.S. and China not to use nuclear weapons against one another (with stipulations for each side in the event of extreme threat, etc.) could quell these concerns without seriously degrading the deterrent value of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Credible extended deterrence is key to prevent global war and prolif

Payne et al. 10 – Keith Payne, President and Co-Founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Department at Missouri State University; Kathleen Bailey, Senior Associate at the National Institute for Public Policy, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Kurt Guthe, Director of Strategic Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, former senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Robert Joseph, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, Stephanie Koeshall, research associate at the NIPP; Thomas Scheber, Vice President of the NIPP, former Director of Strike Policy and Integration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst at the NIPP; Andrei Shoumikhin, Visiting Professor at the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State; Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2010, “Planning the Future U.S. Nuclear Force,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 29, No. 1&2, p. 1-216

The consequences of failing to maintain extended deterrence and the related assurance of allies should not be underestimated. If allies have less faith in, and adversaries less fear of, U.S. nuclear guarantees, not only could the risk of coercion and conflict increase, but the danger of nuclear proliferation could grow. Allies that no longer look to the United States for nuclear protection may seek their own nuclear alternatives instead. Conversely, there is considerable evidence that U.S. nuclear guarantees have kept a number of countries from acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. The list includes Germany, Norway, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.20 “The extension of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent to allies and friends has been an important nonproliferation tool,” Walter Slocombe, a senior defense official in the Carter and Clinton administrations, has concluded. “Indeed, our strong security relationships probably have played as great a role in nonproliferation over the past 40 years as the NPT or any other single factor.”21

## Prolif

### 1NC---First Use Threat --/--> Prolif

#### U.S. first-use threats don’t cause prolif---rogues seek nuclear weapons for regional security concerns and to deter U.S. conventional superiority

Payne 5 – Keith B. Payne, President of The National Institute for Public Policy, Summer 2005, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,” The Washington Quarterly , Vol. 28, No. 3

This linkage of a potential U.S. nuclear initiative to the motivation of others to acquire nuclear weapons derives from the old action-reaction dynamic thought to drive the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms competition during the Cold War. It was believed that the Soviet Union paced its nuclear forces after the U.S. lead. If Washington pursued a nuclear capability, Moscow would feel compelled to follow suit; if Washington refrained, so too would Moscow. 39 U.S. action would lead to the inevitable Soviet reaction. Contending now that U.S. nuclear efforts will motivate rogue states to seek nuclear capabilities simply recasts and applies the action-reaction thesis to contemporary opponents and proliferation.

Yet, this arms race theory was inadequate to explain U.S. or Soviet motives during the Cold War,40 and today it mistakenly attributes the same motivation and dynamic to rogue states. Rogue states seek nuclear capabilities for their own purposes, such as the ability to intimidate or attack their regional neighbors and to deter with nuclear threats an overwhelmingly strong U.S. conventional response to such actions. These nuclear aspirations do not require rogues to mimic U.S. nuclear programs qualitatively or quantitatively, nor do they need U.S. signals to appreciate the value of nuclear weapons for their own particular purposes. North Korea and Iran, for example, see considerable value in nuclear weapons. For these states, the signal sent by Washington, were it to refrain from the potential to hold hardened and deeply buried targets at risk, would have no dampening effect on the high value they already place on nuclear weapons. In fact, it could have the opposite effect by encouraging them to believe that tunneling deep underground can effectively put them beyond the reach of the U.S. deterrent.

### 1NC---NFU =/= Credible

#### Can’t solve prolif --- NFU isn’t credible and conventional threats outweigh

Tertrais 9 – Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and Contributing Editor to Survival, October-November 2009, “The Trouble with No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, p. 23

My first argument is that the benefits of no-first-use postures are overrated. Can one believe that Tehran or Pyongyang would feel reassured by Western no-first-use statements? During the Cold War, we did not take Soviet no-first-use statements seriously. I doubt that governments that see the United States and its allies as adversaries would believe our own. And does the nuclear-proliferation risk today stem mostly from Western nuclear policies? There are good reasons to think that conventional superiority matters more.

More importantly for the purpose of non-proliferation, why would Non- Aligned Movement countries consider that nuclear-weapon states would feel bound by no-first-use commitments if and when push came to shove? Some would, but others would not, and given the amount of misperception and sometimes paranoia regarding Western military policies in general, they would be many. The non-proliferation value of a no-first-use commitment would be limited.

### 1NC---A/C---Naval Nuclear

#### Alt cause --- naval nuclear reactors deck the NPT --- makes is functionally unenforceable

Greg Thielmann 7/24/13, senior fellow @ the Arms Control Association and former top intelligence official @ the US State Department, and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “The Naval Nuclear Reactor Threat to the NPT,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/files/TAB\_Naval\_Nuclear\_Reactor\_Threat\_to\_the\_NPT\_2013.pdf

•Because acquiring fissile material is the biggest technical obstacle to building nuclear weapons, discouraging uranium enrichment above levels used in civilian power reactors is an important barrier to proliferation. • But the NPT allows states to use uranium enriched to higher levels to fuel naval propulsion reactors, free from the IAEA safeguards that would otherwise apply. • This exclusion confers legitimacy on enriching uranium beyond the level needed for civilian power reactors and could potentially be exploited by aspiring nuclear-weapon states to provide a shield for diversion of that material for use in a nuclear weapons program. • Brazil, poised to become the first NPT non-nuclear-weapon state with nuclear-powered submarines, could create a dangerous precedent for states seeking to enrich uranium to weapons-grade or near-weapons-grade levels. • Iran is a case in point. With six world powers trying to negotiate limits on the size and enrichment level of Iranian uranium hexafluoride stockpiles, senior Iranian naval officers say they are considering their own nuclear submarines, using fuel enriched to “45-56 percent.” • Meanwhile, as Russia and France dramatically reduce the enrichment levels required by their newer submarine reactors, the United States and United Kingdom are still designing reactors for the next half-century that require weapons-grade uranium. • The U.S. Defense and Energy Departments should urgently consider options for building future U.S. submarine reactors fueled by uranium that is not highly enriched. • The IAEA should seek enhancements to safeguards agreements that tighten monitoring measures for uranium designated for naval nuclear reactors.

## China

### 1NC---Threat Perception I/E

#### Chinese modernization and threat perception are inevitable---they’re driven by U.S. conventional superiority and pursuit of unipolarity

Wortzel 7 – Larry M. Wortzel, Retired Director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, former Vice President for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, served two tours of duty as a military attaché at the American Embassy in China, May 2007, “China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, And Campaign Planning,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=776

Major General Wang Baocun of the PLA Academy of Military Science summarized the view of the United States this way:

The new military transformation has led to the rise of a United States possessed of overwhelmingly dominant military might. The United States is also an arrogant country with strong ambitions for hegemonism. The United States will take advantage of its absolute superiority in supreme military might in order to pursue power politics and hegemonism, seek to maintain its position as the world’s only superpower, and slow down the process of mulitpolarization for the world’s strategic structure.7

Such a view is fueling the PLA’s efforts to build a modern, information-based, digitized military force. PLA thinkers believe that the missiles in the Second Artillery Corps (Strategic Rocket Forces) are a “trump card” that, when combined with information warfare, will help the PLA to win a war against a more advanced military.8 Indeed, even if the PLA did not envision seeking a direct confrontation with the United States, the awareness that the two countries could clash in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is enough to drive PLA modernization.

### 1NC---NFU Not Key to Relations

China does not fear U.S. first-use---current U.S. nuclear transparency is more reassuring than NFU---tension over NFU doesn’t spillover to broader mistrust

Namkung 7 – Sun Namkung, research assistant at Pacific Forum CSIS and a co-editor of Comparative Connections, July 2007, “Overcoming Divergences,” in Next Generation Thinking on Divergences and Trust in the U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship, Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8, ed. Brad Glosserman, p. 21-22

The divergences in Chinese and U.S. views on strategic nuclear policy over “no first use” and military transparency were highlighted in the second annual meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue “Reducing Misperception and Increasing Mutual Trust in Sino-American Strategic Affairs” held Nov. 6-7 in Honolulu. The divergences are not in themselves a negative – they merely reflect national interests. But it did mean no consensus could be reached at this meeting on the issues of military transparency and a no first use policy. Then again the importance of the meeting was to have a dialogue on the differences and to clear away misperceptions. Shared China and U.S. programs and activities should be created and pursued to prevent accidental and intentional use of their respective nuclear arsenals.¶ No first use vs. transparency¶ At this moment, the U.S. prefers to have military transparency over a declared no first use policy, while China prefers a no first use nuclear policy over military transparency. (See Table 1) Each country’s preferred policy has the same effect: it announces to other nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states that it will not use nuclear weapons as a first-line arsenal.¶ It is incorrect to assume that having no “no first use” policy means that the U.S. will use its nuclear arsenal first. U.S. ambiguity over first use does not necessarily mean that nuclear weapons are offensive in nature. Even at the height of the Cold War, nuclear weapons were seen as defensive weapons. Nuclear weapons were seen as a deterrent and the U.S. public accepted these weapons as such. Had the Soviets launched intercontinental warheads at U.S. targets, the U.S. would have responded with its own. Alternatively, having a “no first use” policy does not mean that China will not use nuclear weapons to defend its interests if warranted. It is simply not known what the Chinese would do if its national interests were threatened.¶ The U.S. seeks a stable, global environment, including a protected homeland. If ambiguity keeps enemy states from attacking U.S. interests then ambiguity has done its job. There are several reasons that “no first use” is not the U.S. nuclear policy. As the North Korea nuclear crisis shows, Kim Jong-il doesn’t fear a nuclear attack from the U.S. He is more worried about conventional U.S. firepower as used in the two Iraq wars. It’s been understood and reinforced by the U.S. that should U.S. interests be attacked with a weapon of mass destruction that could be chemical or biological, the U.S. could use nuclear weapons as a means of retaliation.¶ The U.S. nuclear strategy is transparent, from the strategic review to the budgeting process. The 2002 revision of the Nuclear Posture Review called for new nuclear weapons that could penetrate buried facilities. Congress has halted development of these new weapons. The U.S. public did not want new usable nuclear weapons. There are sufficient political and bureaucratic processes that expose and reveal the thinking of lawmakers and the public.¶ This transparency does not exist in China. The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is secretive about its forces and its force strength. Its opacity creates concern. China may feel that since it is a “rising” state that it needs to keep its numbers ambiguous. This need for secrecy has caused many in the U.S. and in the region to call for a reexamination of its modernization and the increased military budget. Having a no first use policy does not mean much when the rest of China’s military establishment is cloaked in secrecy. The Chinese insistence on opacity is one of the reasons that East Asian nations hedge against China and why the Europeans continue their arms embargo. Declaratory policies have less value than a transparent system. In the end, China will need to become more transparent to prevent incorrect guestimates of their forces and armament capabilities by U.S. and their East Asian neighbors.¶ The U.S. needs to lead by example and continue to be transparent. U.S. Pacific Command Commander Adm. William Fallon was correct in pushing for military-to-military relations. The interaction between high-level and working-level officers is critical in dispelling misperceptions that Chinese forces have about the U.S. and vice versa. The divergences of U.S. and Chinese views on no first use and transparency will matter less as more visits and exercises take place comfort levels and trust is built between the two sides. As China modernizes its military, it will need to be transparent to assuage the concerns of its immediate neighbors like South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. The increased numbers of China and U.S. bilateral and multilateral exercises show that China sees some utility in these contacts.

#### Strategic nuclear relations are irrelevant to broader U.S.-China relations---economic ties are strong and deepening despite tension over nuclear doctrine

Bin 7 – Li Bin, Professor in the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, 2007, “Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles,” Science & Global Security, 15:1-30

Relations between China and the United States are complicated. On one hand, the two countries are developing tremendous trade, cultural and educational exchanges and are cooperating on important global affairs. However, there are disputes and suspicions over several issues including Taiwan and complex relations persist in many fields, including security. China and the United States cooperate on nuclear nonproliferation and antiterrorism but their interests conflict on space weaponization, missile defense, mobile missile and antimobile missile developments.¶ China is developing strategic mobile missiles whereas the United States is simultaneously developing the capability to target mobile missiles. These efforts are counterproductive and may destabilize security relations between the two countries unless efforts are made to clarify the motivations and objectives for these actions. This article evaluates the potential capabilities of Chinese strategic mobile missiles and U.S. antimobile technology. The article examines the security implications of the mobility and antimobility game and makes policy recommendations to increase stability between China and the United States.¶ Unlike Soviet–U.S. relations during the Cold War, issues surrounding strategic weapons have played a marginal role in longstanding and deeply rooted Sino–U.S. relations. However, this does not suggest that strategic weapons should be ignored. The significance of nuclear weapons could increase during a crisis. The Taiwan problem is widely believed to be a fuse that could lead to serious military confrontation, even military conflict, between China and the United States.1 It is strategically important to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait to avoid military confrontation between China and the United States. Recently there has been effort and progress toward this end. However, the risk of military confrontation between China and the United States cannot be completely ruled out. Consideration should be given to reducing the destabilizing role of strategic weapons should a confrontation arise.

# 2NC

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### 1NC

#### The aff is not topical --- introducing armed forces only refers to human troops, not weapons systems such as nuclear weapons

Lorber 13 – Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. January 2013, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Contsitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis

As is **evident from a** textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and **the broad** policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that **only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR.** Though not dispositive, **the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.** n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that **expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (**such as non-members **constituting armed forces)**. n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ **An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces**. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that **Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.**¶ **The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities**. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). **Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the** W**ar** P**owers** R**esolution likely does not cover such activities**. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, **individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.** Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits --- nuclear weapons is a whole topic on its own --- requires research into a whole separate literature base --- undermines preparedness for all debates.

### 2NC Overview

#### “Introducing US Armed Forces into Hostilities” only refers to US troops and excludes nuclear weapons

#### 2 reasons to prefer our interpretation

#### Limits --- they make this topic impossible for the negative by creating a Frankenstein combination of the nukes topic plus the entire war powers debate --- it’s already difficult to be neg because we have to research war powers in 4 different areas --- including nukes opens the floodgates to an entirely separate, dense literature base --- gut check --- every aff that was read on the nukes topic becomes T under their interpretation

#### Limits are key to education--- it’s the only way to have in depth and substantive debates--- clash is the foundation of all constructive argumentation and only a limited and predictable interpretation preserves the best form of debate and generates the exportable skills that make debate valuable – i.e. defending your position against a well prepared opponent

#### Interpretation predictability --- “introducing USAF into hostilities” is a term of art that refers exclusively to ground troops --- Lorber says that “textual analysis, legislative history, and intent of the WPR” all support this. Unpredictable interpretations should be rejected on-face because they are arbitrary and self-serving.

#### They have zero offense --- the college community has already debated nuclear weapons policy --- no reason learning about it against is necessary --- only a risk they ruin our ability to learn about war powers because of our Limits DA.

### 2NC Nukes Not Hostilities

#### Hostilities implies units of US armed forces engaged in an active exchange of fire with opposing units --- weapons systems don’t count

David W. Opderbeck 13, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, 8/2/13, “Drone Courts,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2305315

The WPR does not indicate that Congress has any authority to oversee or control the President’s deployment of armed forces in circumstances other than those involving actual or immanent “hostilities.” Recently the Obama administration has interpreted what “hostilities” means in this context very narrowly in connection with U.S. military involvement in the revolution that overthrew Libyan leader Mohammar Quadaffi.176 As Harold Koh, Legal Advisor to the Department of State, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2011, “as virtually every lawyer recognizes, the operative term, ‘hostilities,’ is an ambiguous standard, which is nowhere defined in the statute.”177 Koh further noted that “[a]pplication of these provisions often generates difficult issues of interpretation that must be addressed in light of a long history of military actions abroad, without guidance from the courts, involving a Resolution passed by a Congress that could not have envisioned many of the operations in which the United States has since become engaged.”178

In light of these ambiguities, Koh testified, the Executive branch, in league with Congress, has engaged in casuistic efforts to determine when a particular situation does or does not involve “hostilities.”179 Koh noted that a particularly influential effort to frame principles for application was developed in 1975 by his predecessor Monroe Leigh and Defense Department General Counsel Martin Hoffmann, in a letter that has become canonical in this context.180 The Leigh-Hoffmann letter states that “hostilities” implies “a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.”181 As Koh interpreted the Leigh-Hoffman letter, if the mission, exposure of U.S. forces, and risk of elevation are each limited, the military forces are not engaged in “hostilities.”182 Koh therefore argued that the involvement of U.S. forces in airstrikes against Quaddafi’s forces did not constitute “hostilities.”

If the practice of previous administrations supplies guiding precedent, Koh’s argument was sound. As Koh noted, the WPR’s requirements for “hostilities” were not invoked for military operations in Grenada, Lebanon, El Salvador, Iraq (Operation Desert Storm), Kosovo, or Somalia.183 It seems that the use of combat drones for targeted strikes also would not ordinarily constitute “hostilities,” since there is usually no “exchange of fire” under such circumstances.

### AT W/M USAF

#### USAF = regular components of DOD

Farlex 13 The Free Dictionary By Farlex, “United States Armed Forces,” Accessed 7-23, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States+Armed+Forces

Used to denote collectively only the regular components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. See also Armed Forces of the United States.

### AT W/M Airforce

#### US Code excludes weapons from the airforce

US Code No Date – "10 USC § 8062 - Policy; composition; aircraft authorization" www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/8062

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Air Force that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—¶ (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;¶ (2) supporting the national policies;¶ (3) implementing the national objectives; and¶ (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.¶ (b) There is a United States Air Force within the Department of the Air Force.¶ (c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.¶ (d) The Air Force consists of—¶ (1) **the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Air Force Reserve;**¶ (2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Air Force without component; and¶ (3) all Air Force units and other Air Force organizations, with their installations and supporting and auxiliary combat, training, administrative, and logistic elements; and all members of the Air Force, including those not assigned to units; necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a national emergency.¶ (e) Subject to subsection (f) of this section, chapter 831 of this title, and the strength authorized by law pursuant to section 115 of this title, the authorized strength of the Air Force is 70 Regular Air Force groups and such separate Regular Air Force squadrons, reserve groups, and supporting and auxiliary regular and reserve units as required.¶ (f) There are authorized for the Air Force 24,000 serviceable aircraft or 225,000 airframe tons of serviceable aircraft, whichever the Secretary of the Air Force considers appropriate to carry out this section. **This subsection does not apply to guided missiles.**¶ (g)¶ (1) Effective October 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total aircraft inventory of strategic airlift aircraft of not less than 301 aircraft. Effective on the date that is 45 days after the date on which the report under section 141(c)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 is submitted to the congressional defense committees, the Secretary shall maintain a total aircraft inventory of strategic airlift aircraft of not less than 275 aircraft.¶ (2) In this subsection:¶ (A) The term “strategic airlift aircraft” means an aircraft—¶ (i) that has a cargo capacity of at least 150,000 pounds; and¶ (ii) that is capable of transporting outsized cargo an unrefueled range of at least 2,400 nautical miles.¶ (B) The term “outsized cargo” means any single item of equipment that exceeds 1,090 inches in length, 117 inches in width, or 105 inches in height.¶ (h)¶ (1) Beginning October 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire more than six B–1 aircraft.¶ (2) The Secretary shall maintain in a common capability configuration not less than 36 B–1 aircraft as combat-coded aircraft.¶ (3) In this subsection, the term “combat-coded aircraft” means aircraft assigned to meet the primary.

### AT: We Meet --- Armed Force Launches Nuke

#### The soldier who presses the button to launch the nuke isn’t in hostilities --- NDAA proves

Healey & Wilson 13 – Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. AND\*\*\* A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the

Atlantic Council, 2013, “Cyber Conflict and the War Powers

Resolution: Congressional Oversight

of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain,” jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11\_Dycus.pdf‎

War Powers and Offensive Cyber Operations¶ In a report submitted to Congress in November 2011, pursuant to a mandate in section 934 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011, the Pentagon, quoting the WPR’s operative language, stated that:8 **Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces personnel into the area of hostilities.** Cyber operations may, however, be a component of larger operations that could trigger notification and reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution. The Department will continue to assess each of its actions in cyberspace to determine when the requirements of the War Powers Resolution may apply to those actions. With the focus on “personnel,” this passage makes clear that the WPR will typically not apply to exclusively cyber conflicts. With cyber warriors executing such operations from centers inside the United States, such as the CYBERCOM facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, at a significant distance from the systems they are attacking and well out of harm’s way. Thus, there is no relevant “introduction” of armed forces. Without such an “introduction,” even the reporting requirements are not triggered. ¶ The view that there can be no introduction of forces into cyberspace **follows naturally from the administration’s argument that the purpose of the WPR is simply to keep US service personnel out of harm’s way** unless authorized by Congress. If devastating unmanned missions do not fall under the scope of the resolution, it is reasonable to argue that a conflict conducted in cyberspace does not either.¶ Arguing the point, an administration lawyer might ask, rhetorically, what exactly do cyber operations “introduce”? On a literal, physical level, electrical currents are redirected; but nothing is physically added to—nor, for that matter, taken away from—the hostile system. To detect any “introduction” at all, we must descend into metaphor; and even there, all that is really introduced is lines of code, packets of data: in other words, information. At most, this information constitutes the cyber equivalent of a weapon. “Armed forces,” by contrast, consist traditionally of weapons plus the flesh and blood personnel who wield them. And that brings us back to our cyber-soldier who, without leaving leafy Maryland, can choreograph electrons in Chongqing. Finally, even if armed forces are being introduced, there are no relevant “hostilities” for the same reason: no boots on the ground, no active exchanges of fire, and no body bags.

### “Into” is Direct

#### Into means entry

Meriam Webster 13, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/into

Full Definition of INTO

1—used as a function word to indicate entry, introduction, insertion, superposition, or inclusion <came into the house> <enter into an alliance>

### AT: Reasonability

Competing interps create a race to the top — find most defensible definitions.

Our standards prove they’re unreasonable.

It’s arbitrary—reasonability is subjective — makes 2NR choice impossible.

## K

## CP

### AT: Theory

No link to theory — counterplan is functionally/textually different — it’s not a PIC — its an advantage CP — proves their interp links to all counterplans

Key to Nuclear education — core debate within lit — solvency advocate checks their offense

Competition proves aff ground — means there is functional differences they can derive offence from

### AT: Perm---2NC

The perm has to include the plan’s unilateral elimination of first-strikes against China---otherwise it’s severance---that destroys the point of a bilateral agreement---the CP establishes a reciprocal obligation where both parties know that if they break it, the other side can too. The plan locks the U.S. into NFU against China which makes a bargain impossible---China will know that whatever they do, the U.S. can’t renege on its NFU---that destroys the reciprocal strategic reassurance framework and causes Chinese backsliding---that’s Guo.

The CP alone is key to leverage:

a) The perm can’t create any---China sees unilateral concessions as a sign of weakness---only starting from an offer of mutual exchange prevents aggressive Chinese expansionism and rollback of their NFU

Chang 9 – Gordon Chang, author of books on China and North Korea, columnist for Forbes, advisor to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 23, 2009, “Barack in Beijing; How the Chinese regime hopes to make use of him,” The Weekly Standard, p. lexis

Chinese leaders know that the stability of the modern Chinese state depends on prosperity and that prosperity largely rests on continued access to American technology and especially markets. Last year, all but $27.5 billion of China's $295.5 billion trade surplus related to sales to the United States. Fortunately for the party, Washington has continued to accept large trade deficits with China, and this unbalanced relationship gives Obama extraordinary leverage in his dealings with Beijing--but only if he uses it.

So far, he has mostly chosen not to do so. To his credit, Obama imposed Section 421 surge tariffs on Chinese tires in September, the Commerce Department levied anti-subsidy duties on steel products in late October, and his administration filed a World Trade Organization case against China in June, but he has failed to take concerted action in a period of Beijing's increasingly mercantilist behavior.

Obama's predecessor also failed to use America's enormous economic leverage on the Chinese, but George W. Bush did apply geopolitical pressure. First, changing course from the Clinton administration, he shored up relations with Tokyo. Obama, by contrast, has weakened ties with America's core ally in Asia.

Second, in what could turn out to be his most lasting legacy, Bush reached out to India and established strong working ties in vital areas, especially nuclear energy. His successor, unfortunately, has undermined these relationships. A partnership between the world's most populous democracy and its most powerful one--even if it remained informal--would be a setback of immense proportions for Beijing. To prevent such a threatening tie-up--and to avoid the formation of an "arc of freedom and prosperity" from India to Japan, as Tokyo once proposed--the Chinese would do almost anything, even accede to Washington's initiatives.

Obama's failure to consolidate relations with Japan and India, the countries China fears most, is a critical mistake. As a result, he has little to bargain with. Beijing's foreign policy is, above all, ruthlessly pragmatic. The Chinese generally do not reciprocate friendly gestures; they interpret them as weakness. Obama, who comes from the rough and tumble of Chicago's politics, should instantly recognize the way Chinese policymakers think. Inexplicably, he doesn't.

As a result of misunderstanding the Chinese, America is losing friends in Asia fast. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who ended the decades-long reign of the Liberal Democratic party in September, has signaled he wants to reorient Japan's foreign policy toward China. And some policy-makers in New Delhi, noticing Obama's unusually soft approach, are pushing their country away from America as they feel India too now needs to placate the Chinese. Washington, in a real sense, is undermining its own role in Asia. Obama is not the only American president to get China wrong. Bill Clinton gave the Chinese an extraordinarily favorable World Trade Organization deal, and George W. Bush sought to enlist them in grand geopolitical projects at a time when they were not ready to help. At least Obama's predecessor told China that it had to play a constructive role in the international system, pushing Beijing to be a "responsible stakeholder." That language was dropped in late September for a less demanding formulation. "We are ready to accept a growing role for China on the international stage," said Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. The price for American acceptance would be "strategic reassurance"--in other words, "a shared commitment to building an international system based on mutual trust."

At one time, it might have been possible to think that Beijing would actually share strategic visions with the United States. Jiang Zemin, China's leader from 1993 to 2003, desired recognition for his country's growing status, but he saw himself working cooperatively with the United States and its partners in a Congress of Vienna-like atmosphere.

Hu Jintao, the current supremo, has shifted policy in a new direction. Like Jiang, he believes Beijing should assert itself. Unlike his predecessor, Hu thinks China should actively work to restructure the international system more to its liking. This change in outlook has had consequences as China, to give just a few examples, has recently increased its support for nuclear rogues Iran and North Korea, used aggressive tactics at sea to push the U.S. Navy from Asian waters, stepped up its efforts to remove America from Central Asia, and formed a loose coalition of developing nations to undermine the dollar. Unlike Jiang, Hu is ideologically anti-American.

Yet we cannot place all the blame on Hu. Washington's generous policies have encouraged China to move in wrong directions. Even before the end of the Cold War, we sought to ease the Chinese into the international system. In so doing, we made their economic "miracle" possible by opening our market to their goods and accepted the severe limitations they place on access to theirs. This economic policy has been accompanied by a generous policy of "engagement." Yet by engaging China we have inadvertently created perverse incentives. In the past, when the Chinese acted aggressively, we indulgently rewarded them. So they continued unfriendly conduct. We rewarded them still more. In these circumstances, why would they ever improve?

Since Deng Xiaoping abandoned most of Mao's economic ideology, the primary basis of the regime's legitimacy has been the continuous delivery of prosperity. Should the economy stall in this global downturn--a distinct possibility when Beijing's economic stimulus measures wear off--the only thing the Communist party can rely on is nationalism. Nationalist themes already dominate state media.

So why did Hu Jintao invite Barack Obama to his capital at a time like this? There is little likelihood that the Chinese ruler has any intention of coming to terms with him. The two men have met and talked many times, and they know each other's positions well. The purpose of this week's summit is to show the laobaixing that the leader of the world's democracies feels he must come to Beijing to ask for help on the great issues of the day. Obama's visit, unfortunately, makes America appear needy, and this convinces China's officials that they can call the tune.

Now, we are seeing the worst possible combination in Beijing--a deeply insecure regime that has become arrogant over its recent economic success. The world--not just America--is bound to suffer as a result.

b) Signaling---The perm signals that we won’t employ leverage with China even when it’s available---that signal uniquely causes an aggressive Chinese rise

Currie 9 – Kelley Currie, Nonresident Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, October 22, 2009, “The Doctrine of 'Strategic Reassurance',” The Wall Street Journal, online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704224004574488292885761628.html

If "strategic reassurance" was developed primarily with China's third priority of a positive environment for its continued rise in mind it would still be a mistake. U.S. policy makers have frequently misidentified China's real priorities and, as a result, developed mismatched policy responses that failed to take full advantage of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The six-party talks on North Korea are a good example: The U.S. side has operated under a misguided belief that the Chinese cared more about helping achieve American goals than they do, and even worked to allay China's concerns about the North Korean regime's stability instead of using these to push China to act more forcefully.

There is a chance that the U.S. is starting a quiet but important strategic shift away from a policy that incorporates an understood, if often inchoate, desire to see China become a more liberal and democratic society, toward an acceptance of China as a permanent authoritarian state that the U.S. and other Western countries are encouraging to become a global superpower. This would be an important development, but it is hardly reassuring.

Perm doesn’t solve any of our args about U.S. perceptions of China---only strategic reassurance based on simultaneous symmetrical actions creates assurance on both sides

Wei 9 – Da Wei, Deputy Director with the Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, November 17, 2009, “Strategic reassurance starts with small steps,” Global Times, online: http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2009-11/485591.html

Strategic reassurance is ordinarily a process; it comes from an accumulation of confidence over time through step-by-step, often symmetrical, signals and actions.

There are already many channels for interchange between China and the US, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

Steinberg's call for strategic reassurance, and Obama's visit to China, can help give those mechanisms a common theme and focus: to foster the assurance both sides seek.

They can be venues for the two sides to articulate and identify explicitly the reassuring measures each side has taken and the reciprocal response it expects from the other side. Besides official channels, scholars in the two countries can set up a joint task force to identify, articulate and evaluate reassurance measures from each side.

Doesn’t solve any net-benefit---political conditions will inevitably force backsliding on unilateral NFUs

---only the CP makes it durable

Berry 9 – Ken Berry, Research Coordinator for the International Campaign for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, June 2009, “Draft Treaty on Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.icnnd.org/research/Berry\_No\_First\_Use\_Treaty.pdf

Adoption of such a policy could be done in a number of ways. The most obvious and immediate ones would include unilateral or joint declarations by the nuclear armed states. The value of public declarations should not be undervalued. As one recent writer has put it in relation to the United States:

Nuclear declaratory policy is meant to enhance deterrence of potential adversaries by providing a signal of the intentions, options and proclivities of the US government in different crisis and war-time scenarios. Such signals are similarly meant to enhance reassurance of allies. Declaratory policy can indirectly influence the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by dissuading governments or individuals from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist organisations and by making terrorist use of a nuclear weapon appear immoral and illegitimate to some individuals who might otherwise support the terrorists’ goals. Finally, statements about doctrine can influence both the likelihood and consequences of nuclear proliferation by helping shape global norms about reasonable and legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. These norms can in turn influence internal debates in new and potential nuclear-weapons states about their own nuclear doctrines or potential nuclearweapons acquisition.3

However, declarations such as these are also mutable, and can be changed as political and other conditions evolve. Embodying a no first use policy in treaty form may provide greater certainly. This too was the view explicitly expressed by the German ‘Four Horsemen’ in their January 2009 statement, when they described a no first use treaty as “an urgently needed step in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation”.4 A further option would be for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear armed states, or all states without exception. A variant of this5 would ban use of nuclear weapons altogether against non-nuclear armed states—or only those which are Party to the NPT. The Resolution could even go on to declare such an action a crime against humanity. There is considerable merit in this idea, and it has the singular advantage of not requiring a determination of who is or is not a nuclear weapon state. While it is also a way of providing negative security assurances to nonnuclear armed states (discussed below), it would also—given the binding nature of Security Council decisions under Chapter VII—establish a new international legal norm.

However, there has been considerable criticism in recent years of the Security Council, with its limited membership, arrogating to itself legislative powers which many believe are ultra vires the UN Charter. Again, therefore, a no first use treaty suggests itself as a more acceptable option which would both establish the legal norm against first use, and also make a wider range of states feel they have a stake in it.

### Avoids Strategic Reassurance---2NC

The details of Obama’s strategic reassurance doctrine are up for grabs---China’s foreign policy is based on zero-sum power competition with the U.S.---the plan’s unilateral accommodation causes aggressive Chinese expansion---while the CP’s a

Kagan and Blumenthal 9 – Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, November 10, 2009, “'Strategic reassurance' that isn't,” The Washington Post, online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110902793.html

The Obama administration's worldview is still emerging, but its policies toward Russia and China are already revealing. Its Russia policy consists of trying to accommodate Moscow's sense of global entitlement. So far that has meant ignoring the continued presence of Russian forces on Georgian territory, negotiating arms-control agreements that Moscow needs more than Washington does and acquiescing to Russian objections to new NATO installations -- such as missile interceptors -- in former Warsaw Pact countries. An aggrieved Russia demands that the West respect a sphere of influence in its old imperial domain. The Obama administration rhetorically rejects the legitimacy of any such sphere, but its actions raise doubts for those who live in Russia's shadow.

The administration has announced a similar accommodating approach to China. Dubbed "strategic reassurance," the policy aims to convince the Chinese that the United States has no intention of containing their rising power. Details remain to be seen, but as with the Russia "reset," it is bound to make American allies nervous.

Administration officials seem to believe that the era of great-power competition is over. The pursuit of power, President Obama declared during a July speech about China, "must no longer be seen as a zero-sum game."

Unfortunately, that is not the reality in Asia. Contrary to optimistic predictions just a decade ago, China is behaving exactly as one would expect a great power to behave. As it has grown richer, China has used its wealth to build a stronger and more capable military. As its military power has grown, so have its ambitions.

This is especially true of its naval ambitions. Not so long ago, our China experts believed it was absurd for China to aspire to a "blue-water" navy capable of operating far from its shores.

Yet the new head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Robert Willard, noted last month that "in the past decade or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability. . . . They've grown at an unprecedented rate." Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently warned that China's military modernization program could undermine U.S. military power in the Pacific.

It is hardly surprising that China wants to supplant U.S. power in the region. To the Chinese, the reign of "the middle kingdom" is the natural state of affairs and the past 200 years of Western dominance an aberration. Nor is it surprising that China wants to reshape international security arrangements that the United States established after World War II, when China was too weak to have a say.

What is surprising is the Obama administration's apparent willingness to accommodate these ambitions. This worries U.S. allies from New Delhi to Seoul.

Those nations are under no illusion about great-power competition. India is engaged in strategic competition with China, especially in the Indian Ocean, which both see as their sphere of influence. Japan's government wants to improve relations with Beijing, but many in Japan fear an increasingly hegemonic China. The nations of Southeast Asia do business with China but look to the United States for strategic support against their giant neighbor.

For decades, U.S. strategy toward China has had two complementary elements. The first was to bring China into the "family of nations" through engagement. The second was to make sure China did not become too dominant, through balancing. The Clinton administration pushed for China's accession to the World Trade Organization and normalized trade but also strengthened the U.S. military alliance with Japan. The Bush administration fostered close economic ties and improved strategic cooperation with China. But the United States also forged a strategic partnership with India and enhanced its relations with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam. The strategy has been to give China a greater stake in peace, while maintaining a balance of power in the region favorable to democratic allies and American interests.

"Strategic reassurance" seems to chart a different course. Senior officials liken the policy to the British accommodation of a rising United States at the end of the 19th century, which entailed ceding the Western Hemisphere to American hegemony. Lingering behind this concept is an assumption of America's inevitable decline.

Yet nothing would do more to hasten decline than to follow this path. The British accommodation of America's rise was based on close ideological kinship. British leaders recognized the United States as a strategic ally in a dangerous world -- as proved true throughout the 20th century. No serious person would imagine a similar grand alliance and "special relationship" between an autocratic China and a democratic United States. For the Chinese -- true realists -- the competition with the United States in East Asia is very much a zero-sum game.

For that reason, "strategic reassurance" is likely to fail. The Obama administration cannot back out of the region any time soon; Obama's trip this week, in fact, seems designed to demonstrate American staying power. Nor is China likely to end or slow its efforts to militarily and economically dominate the region. So it will quickly become obvious that no one on either side feels reassured.

Unfortunately, the only result will be to make American allies nervous. For an administration that has announced "we are back" after years of alleged Bush administration neglect in Asia, this is not an auspicious beginning.

### China Says Yes---2NC

The CP solves the case if China says yes---they lack a say-no card assuming the CP’s specific offer---China wants bilateral NFU treaties with the U.S. and other nuclear powers for years---our ev. from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs--- is a direct quote about what China would do in response to the CP, [better than all their ev which is speculation by external observers]

China thinks the CP’s necessary to foreclose potential U.S. backsliding in the future---only a mutual agreement signed with China solves their threat perceptions

Glaser 8 - Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the CSIS, October 15, 2008, “Conference on “U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics”: Introduction and Key Findings,” online: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081015\_intro\_and\_key\_findings.pdf

China’s expert community clearly views the source of instability in the strategic nuclear relationship as U.S. military policymaking. On one level, Chinese strategists remain deeply uncomfortable with U.S. military predominance in global affairs and the perceived U.S. penchant to use military force to coerce other states to advance U.S. objectives. Many in China fear that U.S. military power, in the future, could be directed at coercing China. On a second level, on nuclear affairs the Chinese concern is that the United States seeks to develop the strategic military tool-kit, as envisioned in the 2001 NPR, with the hope of escaping relationships of mutual vulnerability with other nuclear powers, including especially China, so that it can be free to exercise military power at will. The concepts and policies in the NPR, many Chinese argue, undermine U.S.-China strategic stability because they lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons and countenance the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan. Most specifically, the Chinese are concerned about U.S. missile defense, ISR, and long-range conventional strike capabilities – all of which undermine their ability to possess a secure second-strike capability. These factors are having a significant impact on the “objective circumstances” for which China’s leaders must account in developing the PLA.

China’s expert community argues further that China’s responses to these U.S. policies are consistent with the traditions of China’s nuclear policy and with the requirements of strategic stability. They see mutual vulnerability as stabilizing, by dampening U.S. temptations to do something rash (or to incite others, as for example Taiwanese leaders, to do something rash). They defend the modernization of China’s strategic forces as the minimum necessary to maintain a credible retaliatory capability. They reject the possibility of any arms race and deny a desire to seek nuclear parity with the United States, under any circumstances. China’s force is designed to “absorb the first blow” and counter-attack, and this requires far fewer numbers than a force designed for preemption or sustained nuclear war-fighting. To promote greater strategic stability, the Chinese urge the U.S. to adopt a no-first-use posture or agree to a bilateral no-first-use accord with China and refrain from identifying China as a target country of U.S. nuclear weapons in the 2009 NPR.

Mechanism of the CP’s widely supported by the Chinese arms control community

Lora Saalman, 2009, Research Assistant Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2009, (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, How Chinese Analysts View Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War, Occasional Paper No. 15)

According to Chinese strategists, the United States has yet to effectively reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in its deterrence calculus, even in non-nuclear arenas. As evidence, General Qian Shaojun cites U.S. and British threats during the Iraq War that the nuclear option would remain on the table, even against a NNWS, if chemical weapons were used.135 Th is policy contravened China’s vision of the centrality of NFU and negative security assurances to eff ective arms control.

A number of Chinese analysts recommend that China must use its diplomatic resources to cultivate a stand that is flexible and meets some of the demands of the United States, but at the same time gains U.S. concessions.136 They emphasize the necessity of establishing a unified voice among its arms control and disarmament experts. In these accounts, nuclear weapons are generally not treated as a hindrance to good relations, but rather as a guarantee against undue military or political interference from the United States.

Only the CP is credible---they want a U.S. pledge against first-strikes codified in a treaty

Garrett and Glaser 95 – Banning N. Garrett, Director of Asia Programs at The Atlantic Council of the United States, and Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the CSIS, Winter 1995, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1

Chinese officials and analysts maintain that among the five nuclear states, China has greater need for an NFU treaty than the other nuclear powers and that Beijing is primarily concerned about an NFU commitment by the United States. Chinese arms control experts contend that China's requirement for reassurances from the United States is rooted in its historical experience with the United States. "China was threatened with nuclear weapons by the United States in the 1950s three times--the Korean War, Dien Bien Phu and Quemoy-Matsu," and "for this reason it developed nuclear weapons" sooner than it would have otherwise, declared one university professor. As a consequence, he said, China wants moral assurance that it "won't become a victim." A senior Foreign Ministry official placed the need for an NFU pledge from the United States in the context of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, which he said had fundamentally changed the nuclear calculus. The official portrayed China as in a vulnerable, isolated position because the United States, France, and Britain are militarily allied, and the United States and Russia are now partners that would not use nuclear weapons against each other. "So it is four against one," he said. The official insisted that although the United States and China "don't see each other as security threats," United States participation in a five-power NFU treaty would nevertheless "have a strong psychological impact" on China.

Mutual, bilateral NFU solves Chinese threat perceptions and relations

Garrett and Glaser 95 – Banning N. Garrett, Director of Asia Programs at The Atlantic Council of the United States, and Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the CSIS, Winter 1995, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1

Chinese arms control experts say that a U.S. NFU pledge--bilateral or multilateral--would enable Beijing to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament. Some researchers suggest that an NFU commitment from the United States would make it easier for China to accept a freeze in the development of its nuclear arsenal relative to the arsenals of the United States and Russia. One military analyst asserted that a U.S. NFU pledge to China would facilitate Beijing's participation in five-power nuclear arms reductions talks by reducing the nuclear threat to China.(35)

Some Chinese arms control specialists appreciate that U.S. security commitments will make it difficult for the United States to change its policy and sign an NFU treaty or make a bilateral NFU pledge to China. A COSTIND arms controller noted, for example, that "adopting NFU would require the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence." Other Chinese analysts contend that the United States no longer needs nuclear weapons to assure its security and should revise its nuclear strategy. A PLA expert maintained that "it is a very different international environment than the Cold War when the Soviet Union had stronger conventional forces in Europe," and the United States needed nuclear weapons for deterrence. "Now there is no conventional threat to the United States," he said, "so it is a good time for the United States to make a no-first-use pledge."

The Chinese have more to gain from NFU pledges by the nuclear powers than does the United States. A bilateral U.S.-Chinese NFU pledge or a five-power NFU agreement would enhance Chinese security as well as advance Beijing's political interests. China is unlikely to be in a position in which first use of nuclear weapons would be advantageous, except perhaps on its own territory. Beijing has no security commitments requiring extended deterrence, while the other nuclear powers that it could potentially face, the United States and Russia, have far stronger nuclear forces that they could be inhibited from using or threatening to use by an NFU pledge. Thus, China's NFU commitment requires it to give up very little, while an NFU pledge by the United States could put at risk the credibility of U.S. security commitments to other powers as well as potential leverage in a crisis. A bilateral NFU pledge to China would benefit the United States, however, by easing Chinese suspicions of U.S. intentions and fostering forward movement in nuclear arms control, including eventual five-power nuclear arms reductions.

#### The CP is the exact mechanism China wants to codify NFU---they’ve called for it

Pan 2 – Pan Zhenqiang is Vice-President of China Foundation for International Studies and Academic Changes, November 17, 2002, “On China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” online: http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/zhenqiang.htm

Nor is China expected to reduce its interest in the participation in the international multilateral efforts for nuclear arms control and disarmament. In fact, Beijing continues to push forward the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons. In January 1994, China formally submitted a draft treaty on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons to U.S. Russia, France and Britain and suggested a consultation between the five nuclear weapon states at an early date. It has also been actively seeking support of the other nuclear weapon states to undertake no-first-use commitment on bilateral basis. On September 4, 1994, China and Russia agreed to undertake not to be the first t use nuclear weapons against each other or target their nuclear weapons at each other. The U.S. still refused to consider any obligation of no-first-use either on the multilateral or bilateral basis, but Washington did agree to conclude an agreement with China on the non-targeting of each other under Clinton administration.

Future prospect of turning no-first-use into an international treaty

The idea of developing thermo-nuclear weapons was first raised during the second world war by a group of natural scientists in order to deny the Nazi Germany any opportunity of acquiring this horrible capability and bring to the world the unimaginable catastrophe. They successfully manufactured the weapons thanks to the support of the U.S. government before the Germans did; the bombs were actually used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, demonstrating such huge destructive power that the effect immediately shocked the world. Among those who were particularly alarmed by the ensuing nuclear armed race between the two superpowers and the increasing risk of a nuclear exchange are those very scientists engaged in the development of the nuclear weapons themselves. “The men who know most are the most gloomy”.

So at the very outset in the Cold War, the scientists with great consciousness to humanity were pioneers for alerting the world of the danger of nuclear weapons and the calling for their abolition. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto issued by eleven such eminent scientists in July 1955 was just one example. With a sense of great urgency, they pointed out that “a war with H-Bombs might quite possibly put an end to the human race.”, and asked the question, “stark and dreadful, and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war”. The Manifesto particularly called for an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments.15 Following the release of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, efforts were begun to convene an international conference of scientists for a more in-depth exchange of views on ways to avert a nuclear catastrophe. The first Pugwash conference was thus held from 7-10 July 1957, ending up with a report on nuclear radiation hazards, control of nuclear weapons, and the social responsibilities of scientists. From this first meeting the Pugwash Conferences have evolved into an international organization with national groups in more than 50 countries, which by the summer of 2001 had organized 265 meetings, involving more than 3,500 individual scientists, academics and policy specialists. In recognition of its efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat, Pugwash and its then President, Joseph Rotblat, were jointly awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize.16 Today, anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations like Pugwash Conference are over several thousands all over the world. They have been playing a unique role in arousing the international awareness of the nuclear risks and mobilizing the world efforts for nuclear disarmament, including the no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

But of course these international efforts were not only confined to the peace movement. In the United States and the Western world, there has been growing criticism from government officials or research institutions about the role of nuclear weapons. As early as in 1982, four Americans who had held high office in the US government proposed reconsideration of the NATO understanding and of an agreement not to use nuclear weapons first.17 The proposal contained in the article in Foreign Affairs immediately gave rise to a heated debate on the NATO nuclear strategy for many ensuing years. In 1991, right on the eve of the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which comprised a number of well-known scientists, former high-ranking officials and generals, released a report on “the Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear relationship”, highlighting a conclusion in its findings that “the principal objective of U.S. nuclear policy should be to strengthen the emerging political consensus that nuclear weapons should serve no purpose beyond the deterrence of and possible response to, nuclear attack by others”.18 After the Cold War was over, the European allies have also been uneasy about the nuclear deterrence policy which seemed so outdated for the changed situation. One illustrating example is that the German government raised the issue of a nuclear no-first-use policy at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on December 8, 1999, defying outspoken U.S. opposition. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer explicitly stressed the support of renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons and lowering the alert status, arguing that “the nuclear powers’ failure to take steps toward disarmament or reducing the role of nuclear weapons will reduce the incentive for non-nuclear weapon states to forgo the nuclear option”.19 Although the German initiative was unable to shake the U.S. dominant nuclear concept within the alliance, it was reported that there was wide support by other non-nuclear members of NATO of the opposition against the indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons. In November the same year, Germany and 11 further NATO member states decided no to vote against resolution A/C.1/53/L48 “Toward a nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda” in the UN First Committee. This was indeed a courageous step towards a right direction for a nuclear-free world.20

Facing the new reality, it is increasingly essential, as the Statement of Pugwash Council stressed after its 52nd annual conference on August 10-14 August 2002, that all the nuclear weapon states should “recognize the illegality and immorality of nuclear weapons and move expeditiously to eliminate such weapons in the near future”.21 In order to achieve this aim, it is perhaps of greater significance to call the establishment of a common understanding of the value of no-first-use policy of all the nuclear weapon states. No-first-use is first of all the greatest confidence building measures politically among the nuclear weapons states, which seems so absent now in there mutual relations. It also provides the way for genuine nuclear disarmament by these states. If all the nuclear weapon states are committed to no-first-use, requirements for the modernization of major nuclear systems will become far more modest than has been assumed, thus making the real, irreversible deep cuts of the nuclear weapons possible and feasible. Finally, this meaningful obligation by the nuclear weapon states will have great positive impact on the strengthening of nonproliferation regime in the world since the role of nuclear weapons is fundamentally reduced and restrained.

### Mutual NFU Key---2NC

The mechanism of a mutual pledge is key to solve the case:

-- Signing a mutual agreement solves the whole case without the perception of squandering leverage---it allows dialogue to clarify China’s concerns and successfully creates mutual strategic trust

Wang 7 – Liang Wang, MIS Candidate and Research Assistant at the Elliot School of International Affairs, July 2007, “Clearing the Ambiguities: Overcoming Misperceptions in the China-U.S. Strategic Relationship,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8

Equally important, the U.S. also needs to clear its ambiguities with regard to China’s concerns. First, it needs to clarify whether the U.S. plans to keep nuclear weapons as an option in a preemptive attack. If yes, it must specify under what conditions the U.S. will use nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike. If no, it has to convince China that nuclear weapons will remain a strategic instead of tactical weapon. In the leaked NPR, one of the three conditions that would prompt nuclear retaliation – “surprising military developments” – deserves further clarification.

The second ambiguity – China’s position in its nuclear strategy – requires more efforts from the U.S. Due to the leaked NPR and the continued “China Threat” message transmitted through Pentagon reports,26 a general belief has been formed among Chinese strategists and military officials that the U.S. regards China as a target for a nuclear strike. It is likely that the United States would use nuclear weapons in a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait.27 This is highly risky. It would deepen China’s mistrust and may invite competitive or even irrational behavior from China to develop its own nuclear program – a scenario not in line with the U.S. interest. For the United States, listing the Taiwan scenario as one that might include nuclear weapons also undermines its own strategic ambiguity toward the defense of Taiwan.

Therefore, if the U.S. does not intend to target China with nuclear weapons, it should make its stance explicit and reassure China with concrete actions including, but not limited to, signing a mutual NFU agreement. Given that the U.S. enjoys pre-eminence in conventional weapons, signing an NFU agreement with China would not undermine its military leverage, but would bring about tremendous political gains.

-- Only the CP creates durable strategic relations---the U.S. is concerned about ambiguities in China’s NFU---mutual agreement’s key to clarity from both sides

Hastings 7 – Justin Hastings, visiting research associate at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, July 2007, “Ambiguity and Clarity in the U.S.-China Relationship,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8

Second, countries that emphasize sweeping statements of principle as the basis for their foreign policy (or military strategy) appear not to think in terms of probabilities, at least publicly. In the conference, U.S. participants argued that the lack of a “No First Use” policy did not mean that the chances that the U.S. would be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict were more than close to nil. Nevertheless, the Chinese participants still interpreted the absence of “No First Use” to mean “First Use.” Third, U.S. military and conventional capabilities are so much greater than those of any other country that capabilities have essentially been dropped in determining whether the U.S. poses a threat. The U.S. could pose a threat to any country in the world; the question is whether it will choose to. As a result, intentions become all-important, and U.S. ambiguity about this becomes a liability.

Conclusion

So what is to be done? We can continue to host exchange programs and take confidence-building measures, but the underlying problem will remain as long as we fail to realize that Americans and Chinese are not talking about the same thing when they discuss “transparency.” Both the U.S. and China have to move out of the conceptual impasse.

The U.S. should give China what it wants, and announce a new policy of “No First Use,” but only with regard to China (and other states that the U.S. considers “responsible” nuclear weapons states). At the same time, it should keep in mind that the policy will have as much applicability in an actual war as China’s – which is to say not much. It’s true that violating the policy in wartime (such as by threatening nuclear weapon use) could expose the U.S. to charges of hypocrisy, but being the U.S., it will be criticized no matter what it does by dictatorships and democracies trying to appease them. It may as well derive some diplomatic benefit from making largely meaningless gestures.

A “No First Use” policy directed only at China will also have the indirect, but beneficial, effect of increasing the credibility of U.S. threats against rogue states such as Iran or North Korea, since they will have pointedly been left off the “No First Use” list. In turn, China should realize that its “No First Use” policy simply does not hold much currency with the U.S., and accelerate the transparency of details about its nuclear weapons program and doctrine for use (above and beyond “No First Use”). There is not much that it can do about suspicions arising from its increasing economic and military capabilities (aside from curtailing them, which no sane leader in China would do), but it can make clear that it backs up its strategic declarations with concrete steps at the tactical level. Such steps by both China and the U.S. will help ameliorate misperceptions they might have in the future.

-- Reassurance from China is key to the U.S. military’s willingness to engage---otherwise they’ll assume China’s NFU is worthless propaganda and hedge against China

Bishop 7 – Justin Bishop, Research Intern at Pacific Forum CSIS, July 2007, “Considerations on Sources of Divergence,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8

In addition, to releasing its own doctrine, China needs to do a better job of clarifying its “no-first use” (NFU) policy. The NFU raises questions. Can anyone truly expect China, when faced with a gigantic conventional threat large enough to cause unimaginable damage, will only use nuclear weapons as a response to a nuclear attack? Will China abandon its NFU policy if the threat is big enough? Is the prevailing view of many U.S. military experts that China will use its nuclear weapons to respond to specific threats accurate? Clarification on these and other issues is critical to advancing understanding between the United States and China on the strategic nuclear level. In addition track-2, and track-1 dialogues, as well as effective and open exchange programs between various levels of the political and military establishments of both countries, will lead to a better understanding of both sides’ nuclear doctrines.

Every attempt at an aff solvency warrant is actually neg---the only way to make NFU meaningful is to codify it in a treaty

Every aff warrant is more true of the CP than the plan---treaty’s the only way to make NFU meaningful

Goldblat 97 – Jozef Goldblat, Senior Lecturer and Research Fellow, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1997, Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses, Volume 256, p. 163

Only a formal assurance of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, given to all countries, whatever their status — nuclear or non-nuclear, aligned or non-aligned — would have significance. Such a new rule of the law of armed conflict could even have arms control implications : it might require changes in the composition and deployment of nuclear forces and, in the first place, the elimination of those nuclear weapon systems that have first-strike characteristics. The role of the remaining nuclear weapons would be reduced to deterring the use of the same weapons by adversaries. The fire-break separating conventional and nuclear warfare would be reinforced, and the risk of nuclear war minimized. A no-first-use commitment valid erga omnes would better serve the cause of international security than would assurances accorded selectively to any given category of States.

To carry real weight, the proposed obligation must be included in a multilateral treaty. Such a treaty should be signed not only by the nuclear powers, but by all nations; it would then be applicable also to the nuclear-threshold States which have not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have not given up the nuclear-weapon option220. The treaty would have to specify that the first use of nuclear weapons in response to, or in anticipation of, an attack with non-nuclear weapons (whether conventional, chemical or biological) would gravely violate international law. Once the first use of nuclear weapons has been prohibited, the very threat of such use will become unlawful. Consequently, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, in so far as it consists in threatening a nuclear attack in response to any armed aggression, would have to be declared invalid.

### 2NC

#### Counter-interpretation—one conditional CP/one conditional critique.

Standards—

Argument Innovation—debaters are risk-averse—a fallback strategy encourages introduction of new positions—solves research skills.

Neg Flex—in-round testing is critical to balance aff prep.

Nuanced Advocacy—contradictory positions force aff defense of the political middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—prevents ideological extremism.

Strategic Thinking—causes introduction of the best arguments—necessitates intelligent coverage decisions—key to info processing and argument evaluation.

[If Dispo] Logic—a decision maker can always chose the status quo.

Substance crowd-out—re-appropriating time spent on condo solves fairness offense.

High Threshold—the 2AR is reactive and persuasive—theory has a 1-to-5 time trade-off—unless we make debate impossible, vote neg.

Defense—

Fairness impossible—resource and coaching differentials—no terminal impact—no one quits b/c of the process CP.

Skew inevitable—DAs and T

Contradictions inevitable—Security K and Deterrence DA

2NR collapse solves depth.

Cheating strategies lose to theory & competition args.

Judge is a referee—potential abuse isn’t a voter—blaming us for other teams behavior is unfair—voting down abuse solves their offence.

# 1NR

## CP

Mechanism of the CP’s widely supported by the Chinese arms control community

Lora Saalman, 2009, Research Assistant Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2009, (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, How Chinese Analysts View Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War, Occasional Paper No. 15)

According to Chinese strategists, the United States has yet to effectively reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in its deterrence calculus, even in non-nuclear arenas. As evidence, General Qian Shaojun cites U.S. and British threats during the Iraq War that the nuclear option would remain on the table, even against a NNWS, if chemical weapons were used.135 Th is policy contravened China’s vision of the centrality of NFU and negative security assurances to eff ective arms control.

A number of Chinese analysts recommend that China must use its diplomatic resources to cultivate a stand that is flexible and meets some of the demands of the United States, but at the same time gains U.S. concessions.136 They emphasize the necessity of establishing a unified voice among its arms control and disarmament experts. In these accounts, nuclear weapons are generally not treated as a hindrance to good relations, but rather as a guarantee against undue military or political interference from the United States.

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## DA 2

### Impact---2NC

Chinese perception of U.S. unilateral concessions causes them to aggressively expand their sphere of influence in Asia---the plan sends a hands-off signal that we won’t oppose any Chinese aims---means they’ll miscalculate and explicitly form countervailing coalitions against the U.S. throughout the region---that’s Lam.

The impact’s global nuclear war---a Chinese-led axis against the U.S. in Asia causes conflicts across the region---that draws the U.S. back in---causes a massive nuclear great power war---that’s Walton.

Turns the case---outright U.S.-China conflict flips every aff advantage:

The plan’s signal of unilateral restraint causes China to ramp up modernization---leads to crisis instability and miscalc

Pfaltzgraff 9 – Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University, April 7, 2009, “China–U.S. Strategic Stability,” online: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2009npc\_prepared\_pfaltzgraff.pdf

This, then, leads me to the conclusion that to the extent that the United States perpetuates its vulnerabilities, it provides an open invitation to Chinese efforts to exploit such vulnerabilities. Let me be more specific. There is considerable discussion to the effect that the United States should maintain or develop with China a strategic relationship based on mutual vulnerability and that increased emphasis, notably, on missile defense on our part will lead China to increase its own programs to order to counter such U.S. systems. Aside from the shaky empirical basis for such an assertion, the Chinese emphasis on exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities argues logically for efforts on our part to cut off such U.S. vulnerabilities wherever possible in the forces that will shape the China-U.S. strategic relationship in the years ahead. In fact, I could even argue that the conscious perpetuation of U.S. vulnerability in the mistaken belief that the result will be strategic stability makes no sense. It may even encourage China to attempt to exploit U.S. vulnerability at a time of crisis and lead to undesired escalation based on miscalculation.

It turns the case---unreciprocated concessions to China cause a U.S. backlash---we’ll stop engaging China altogether---that causes destabilizing geopolitical competition

Lam 9 – Willy Lam, professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and adjunct professor of history at Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 6, 2009, “Reassurance or Appeasement?,” Far Eastern Economic Review, online: http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/november51/reassurance-or-appeasement

In the event that Mr. Obama fails to bring any substantial agreements back from Beijing, it is likely that the two giants will switch to a more complex relationship marked by both cooperation and contention. Indeed, the Obama visit could spell the end to the honeymoon in bilateral ties made possible by the "strategic reassurance" mantra. Naïve as the Obama foreign-policy team may seem to its critics, it will soon stop unilaterally dispensing goodies.

While still dependent on Chinese capital to fund America's deficits, Washington has been buoyed by the 3.5% GDP surge in the third quarter. To ensure the longevity of the American recovery, the Obama administration has little choice but to press the Chinese to narrow their still-gaping trade surplus by buying more U.S. products—and by speeding up the full convertibility of the yuan.

Over the long haul, the two titans will remain what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice presciently characterized in 2000 as "strategic competitors." Mr. Obama as a presidential candidate said as much when he said China is "neither our enemy nor our friend. They are competitors." First, the U.S. will more jealously guard the basis of its claim to superpower status: high-tech superiority in the business and military fields. Tougher scrutiny will be placed on efforts by Chinese sovereign funds and state-controlled firms to purchase American companies with sophisticated know-how. U.S. law-enforcement officials will more zealously combat the industrial-espionage network that the P.R.C. set up in the late 1990s.

The contest between the U.S. and China will intensify over geopolitics, particularly winning hearts and minds in regions including Asia, Africa and Latin America. Secretary Clinton fired the first salvo when she took part in the Asean Regional Forum in July. After signing the long-delayed Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with the bloc, Clinton delivered Washington's message: "The U.S. is back." At a time when China is pulling out the stops to buttress its influence in world bodies ranging from the United Nations to the International Monetary Fund, the battle to win over Africa, which boasts more than 50 U.N. votes, will heat up.

Most critically, Sino-American competition will play out over whether Washington still has what it takes to reclaim the moral high ground in the community of nations. The devastating depletion of American soft power in the wake of the global financial crisis—when much of the world has been forced to suffer the consequences of the unchecked greed of American investment bankers—has given China an opening that it is frenetically exploiting.

The plan forfeits U.S. leverage---signals a broad strategic shift away from involvement in the region---causes China to aggressively seek superpower status

Currie 9 – Kelley Currie, Nonresident Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, October 22, 2009, “The Doctrine of 'Strategic Reassurance',” The Wall Street Journal, online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704224004574488292885761628.html

If "strategic reassurance" was developed primarily with China's third priority of a positive environment for its continued rise in mind it would still be a mistake. U.S. policy makers have frequently misidentified China's real priorities and, as a result, developed mismatched policy responses that failed to take full advantage of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The six-party talks on North Korea are a good example: The U.S. side has operated under a misguided belief that the Chinese cared more about helping achieve American goals than they do, and even worked to allay China's concerns about the North Korean regime's stability instead of using these to push China to act more forcefully.

There is a chance that the U.S. is starting a quiet but important strategic shift away from a policy that incorporates an understood, if often inchoate, desire to see China become a more liberal and democratic society, toward an acceptance of China as a permanent authoritarian state that the U.S. and other Western countries are encouraging to become a global superpower. This would be an important development, but it is hardly reassuring.

China sees the plan as unilaterally giving up leverage---it’s a sign of weakness that makes them think they can aggressively expand without consequences---kills U.S. power in Asia

Chang 9 – Gordon Chang, author of books on China and North Korea, columnist for Forbes, advisor to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 23, 2009, “Barack in Beijing; How the Chinese regime hopes to make use of him,” The Weekly Standard, p. lexis

Chinese leaders know that the stability of the modern Chinese state depends on prosperity and that prosperity largely rests on continued access to American technology and especially markets. Last year, all but $27.5 billion of China's $295.5 billion trade surplus related to sales to the United States. Fortunately for the party, Washington has continued to accept large trade deficits with China, and this unbalanced relationship gives Obama extraordinary leverage in his dealings with Beijing--but only if he uses it.

So far, he has mostly chosen not to do so. To his credit, Obama imposed Section 421 surge tariffs on Chinese tires in September, the Commerce Department levied anti-subsidy duties on steel products in late October, and his administration filed a World Trade Organization case against China in June, but he has failed to take concerted action in a period of Beijing's increasingly mercantilist behavior.

Obama's predecessor also failed to use America's enormous economic leverage on the Chinese, but George W. Bush did apply geopolitical pressure. First, changing course from the Clinton administration, he shored up relations with Tokyo. Obama, by contrast, has weakened ties with America's core ally in Asia.

Second, in what could turn out to be his most lasting legacy, Bush reached out to India and established strong working ties in vital areas, especially nuclear energy. His successor, unfortunately, has undermined these relationships. A partnership between the world's most populous democracy and its most powerful one--even if it remained informal--would be a setback of immense proportions for Beijing. To prevent such a threatening tie-up--and to avoid the formation of an "arc of freedom and prosperity" from India to Japan, as Tokyo once proposed--the Chinese would do almost anything, even accede to Washington's initiatives.

Obama's failure to consolidate relations with Japan and India, the countries China fears most, is a critical mistake. As a result, he has little to bargain with. Beijing's foreign policy is, above all, ruthlessly pragmatic. The Chinese generally do not reciprocate friendly gestures; they interpret them as weakness. Obama, who comes from the rough and tumble of Chicago's politics, should instantly recognize the way Chinese policymakers think. Inexplicably, he doesn't.

As a result of misunderstanding the Chinese, America is losing friends in Asia fast. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who ended the decades-long reign of the Liberal Democratic party in September, has signaled he wants to reorient Japan's foreign policy toward China. And some policy-makers in New Delhi, noticing Obama's unusually soft approach, are pushing their country away from America as they feel India too now needs to placate the Chinese. Washington, in a real sense, is undermining its own role in Asia. Obama is not the only American president to get China wrong. Bill Clinton gave the Chinese an extraordinarily favorable World Trade Organization deal, and George W. Bush sought to enlist them in grand geopolitical projects at a time when they were not ready to help. At least Obama's predecessor told China that it had to play a constructive role in the international system, pushing Beijing to be a "responsible stakeholder." That language was dropped in late September for a less demanding formulation. "We are ready to accept a growing role for China on the international stage," said Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. The price for American acceptance would be "strategic reassurance"--in other words, "a shared commitment to building an international system based on mutual trust."

At one time, it might have been possible to think that Beijing would actually share strategic visions with the United States. Jiang Zemin, China's leader from 1993 to 2003, desired recognition for his country's growing status, but he saw himself working cooperatively with the United States and its partners in a Congress of Vienna-like atmosphere.

Hu Jintao, the current supremo, has shifted policy in a new direction. Like Jiang, he believes Beijing should assert itself. Unlike his predecessor, Hu thinks China should actively work to restructure the international system more to its liking. This change in outlook has had consequences as China, to give just a few examples, has recently increased its support for nuclear rogues Iran and North Korea, used aggressive tactics at sea to push the U.S. Navy from Asian waters, stepped up its efforts to remove America from Central Asia, and formed a loose coalition of developing nations to undermine the dollar. Unlike Jiang, Hu is ideologically anti-American.

Yet we cannot place all the blame on Hu. Washington's generous policies have encouraged China to move in wrong directions. Even before the end of the Cold War, we sought to ease the Chinese into the international system. In so doing, we made their economic "miracle" possible by opening our market to their goods and accepted the severe limitations they place on access to theirs. This economic policy has been accompanied by a generous policy of "engagement." Yet by engaging China we have inadvertently created perverse incentives. In the past, when the Chinese acted aggressively, we indulgently rewarded them. So they continued unfriendly conduct. We rewarded them still more. In these circumstances, why would they ever improve?

Since Deng Xiaoping abandoned most of Mao's economic ideology, the primary basis of the regime's legitimacy has been the continuous delivery of prosperity. Should the economy stall in this global downturn--a distinct possibility when Beijing's economic stimulus measures wear off--the only thing the Communist party can rely on is nationalism. Nationalist themes already dominate state media.

So why did Hu Jintao invite Barack Obama to his capital at a time like this? There is little likelihood that the Chinese ruler has any intention of coming to terms with him. The two men have met and talked many times, and they know each other's positions well. The purpose of this week's summit is to show the laobaixing that the leader of the world's democracies feels he must come to Beijing to ask for help on the great issues of the day. Obama's visit, unfortunately, makes America appear needy, and this convinces China's officials that they can call the tune.

Now, we are seeing the worst possible combination in Beijing--a deeply insecure regime that has become arrogant over its recent economic success. The world--not just America--is bound to suffer as a result.

### Link---2NC

Unilateral NFU to China destroys the current framework of reciprocal strategic reassurance---it signals and sets expectations that they can get something for nothing---kills the incentive for China to commit to a reciprocal framework of engagement and collective security---and once the U.S. is locked in to a unilateral NFU, China’s likely to overplay their hand and backslide to exploit unilateral U.S. restraint---that’s Guo.

The U.S. has to carefully balance the signals it sends to China---unilateral concessions signal that we need them more than they need us---that causes China to overestimate their leverage and miscalculate. The financial crisis has made Chinese foreign policy uniquely assertive---they’re convinced the West is in decline---the plan confirms that the U.S. thinks we’re in decline too---that causes China to aggressively assert themselves internationally---that’s Washington Post.

Unequivocal unilateral NFU destroys the stable deterrent balance in Asia---causes China to expand aggressively---status quo cuts don’t link

Miller and Shearer 9 – Franklin C. Miller, senior counselor at the Cohen Group, a Washington-based consultancy, worked at the Pentagon and National Security Council from 1979 to 2005, and Andrew Shearer, director of studies and a senior research fellow at Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy, “U.S. Disarmament Is Dangerous for Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704398304574598791384178648.html#articleTabs%3Darticle

But other suggestions would be dangerous. Capping U.S. and Russian arsenals at 500 warheads is unrealistic given today's world. An unequivocal "no first use" declaration would weaken American deterrence. And the recommendation that the Proliferation Security Initiative, currently a coalition of the willing to interdict nuclear shipments, be folded into the United Nations is a surefire way to neuter a successful tool.

The basic problem is that such efforts ignore the fact that the world is an unfriendly place. And no part of it looks more Hobbesian than Asia, riven with unresolved Cold War tensions, rapid advances in military capabilities and growing competition among rising powers. Some of those governments maintain and deploy nuclear weapons. Others want nuclear weapons, break their treaty commitments not to acquire them and will want them whether the U.S. has nuclear weapons or not. Look no further than North Korea.

This is why a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent is so important. This is partly a matter of self interest: Washington must prevent a major power from attacking America or seeking to coerce it with a nuclear threat. But it also needs to be mindful of the effects of U.S. nuclear policies on its Asian allies who face real threats—North Korea among the most pressing. The U.S. nuclear arsenal protects allies including Australia, Japan and South Korea, with whom America has treaty commitments. Not only does the U.S. nuclear deterrent shape the behavior of rogue nations such as North Korea toward these allies; the U.S. umbrella also removes the need for countries like Japan to seek nuclear weapons of their own.

Maintaining an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent will become even more important in Asia as China works hard to close the conventional military gap. This should be one of the top priorities of the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and should guide any response to Tuesday's high-profile report. Deterrence is about holding at risk what potentially hostile governments value. So the U.S. and its allies also must make every effort to understand the leadership of adversaries or potential enemies—a challenge particularly with respect to secretive authoritarian regimes.

The nuclear deterrent is not the only element of America's commitment to the region, of course. Forward-deployed U.S. forces—in South Korea, Okinawa and Guam—also contribute to security in Asia. So do combined exercises and missile defense systems. But the role of nuclear weapons is unique.

A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent means having an operational force, with capabilities for real operations and an operational plan. Washington also must retain forward-based systems in places where its allies view their presence as vital to their security—even if U.S. defense planners believe central strategic systems can do the job. Washington needs to maintain at least parity in strategic forces with Russia and must never allow those levels to fall to a point where allies believe the Russian or Chinese short-range nuclear arsenals will affect U.S. decision-making in a crisis.

The sages who crafted Tuesday's report paid too little attention to all these realities in the name of a nuclear "peace in our time." In his Nobel Peace Prize speech, President Obama proclaimed—rightly—that the U.S. has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades. He acknowledged that global stability rested on more than international treaties and declarations. The critical contribution of U.S. nuclear deterrence was left unspoken.

Additional reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are possible and indeed desirable. But this disarmament game is dangerous. Potential enemies will be deterred, and allies assured, only if America is visibly confident in its nuclear posture. Asia's future stability and prosperity will depend far more on this than on airy dreams of disarmament.

### AT 3

Current U.S. engagement with China’s based on mutual, reciprocal reassurance---China’s expected to provide reassurances of its peaceful rise in return for any potential U.S. accommodation---that includes strategic nuclear issues---that’s Pessin.

 ‘Strategic reassurance’ is being framed as a reciprocal process with obligations for both sides---key to durable relations

Liu 9 – Liu FeiTao, Professor, China Institute of International Studies Department of American Studies, November 12, 2009, “Issues Involved in Obama’s Trip to Asia Seeking ‘Strategic Reassurance,’” online: http://watchingamerica.com/News/37947/issues-involved-in-obamas-trip-to-asia-seeking-strategic-reassurance/

In terms of the relationship with China, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg emphasized “strategic reassurance” as the focal point of the U.S.-China relationship in his keynote address, “The Current Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship,” given on September 24 at the Washington-based think tank, the Center for New American Security. Pointing out that the U.S. and other allies need to clearly welcome the arrival of China as a large nation with a booming economy, China must at the same time pledge to the rest of the world that its development and growing impact on the global community should not come at the cost of other nations’ securities or well-being.

Steinberg’s “strategic reassurance” theory is widely seen as a new label for the Obama government’s China policies. He said, “During Obama’s visit to China, leaders from both sides will discuss a wide range of topics. Currently, [we] cannot respond to many issues without China’s cooperation, such as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the question of North Korean and Iranian nuclear, climate change and global warming, rebuilding the sustainability of the global economy and the basis of balanced development, and the state of affairs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. With China as one of this century’s biggest up-and-coming countries, a stable and lasting relationship does not occur overnight. It requires us to work hard in investing time, money and energy, and for both sides to be mutually adaptable. Establishing mutual trust does not come through fantasizing, but through effort and action in order to realize.”

Clearly, no matter what level of cooperation is established, the sincere goal of U.S. relations with China is still for China to side with the U.S. in providing “strategic reassurance;” in essence, to establish China’s peaceful development without crossing any lines.

Status quo reciprocal engagement is goldilocks---the plan swings too far towards unilateral accommodation---the sudden 180 destroys the plan’s credibility---it seems opportunistic and inauthentic

Li 9 – Cheng Li, Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center, November 9, 2009, “Can President Obama Pull a Cairo-Speech Moment in China?,” online: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1109\_obama\_china\_li.aspx

Such condescension has fueled the growth of a hypernationalistic segment of China's younger generation, the so-called "angry youth," and caused broad swaths of the Chinese public to think that the United States has a conspiracy to "keep China down." It is therefore productive that Obama has changed the relationship's tone, and even erstwhile China critics, such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have somewhat adjusted their tone in the new era.

This shift in U.S. approach is partly the result of Obama's "unclenched fist" worldview, but it is also a prudent reaction to China's increasing geopolitical importance.

Now the imperative for the United States is to avoid swinging too far in the opposite direction – that is, seeming too deferential to China on hot-button political issues. Such a sudden change of heart would appear baldly opportunistic to the Chinese. There is already a nascent perception in Beijing that the United States is only interested in the country's continued financial support and expanding consumer market. A failure to represent American ideals honestly and engage the Chinese on areas of disagreement would risk cementing this impression.

To a certain extent, the Obama administration is already on the record in support of such an approach. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg recently introduced the catchphrase "strategic reassurance," a new policy framework meant to supplant the Bush-era call for China to become a "responsible stakeholder." According to Steinberg, strategic reassurance requires that both sides "find ways to highlight and reinforce the areas of common interest, while addressing the sources of mistrust directly, whether they be political, military, or economic."

Concrete steps have already been taken to address military and economic mistrust, but the political dimension of "strategic reassurance" remains largely undefined. In part, this haziness is a reflection of how discombobulated the world's leading liberal democracy feels vis-à-vis the increasingly powerful but still authoritarian China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies expected successive waves of democratization to extend democratic capitalism to the farthest reaches of the globe. Instead, China's model of state capitalism appears to have weathered a series of financial storms better than democratic capitalism, and the United States now struggles with the question of how to engage this hybrid authoritarian-capitalist state in the post-Cold War world.

### Case

All their defense presumes strategic reassurance, where China’s rise is being managed effectively---undermining the mutual framework removes checks on conflict

Yuan 9 – Jing-dong Yuan, Director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, associate professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, December 24, 2009, “Beijing in a high-level balancing act,” Asia Times, online: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KL24Ad02.html

While Beijing and Washington have agreed to build a bilateral relationship for the 21st century that is positive, cooperative, and comprehensive, China's continued rise to great-power status raises serious questions on how power transition can be managed and, if and when such transition takes place, whether it would be peaceful rather than create the conflict history shows to be the norm rather than the exception.

China's ascendancy gives Beijing greater confidence and influence than ever before, while at the same time stoking apprehension, not only in the United States but also in Asia. With impressive growth amid global recession and financial meltdown, foreign exchange reserves exceeding $2.3 trillion, and poised to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy, there is no question China's voice will likely carry more weight, just as its ambitions may also expand.

Dispelling the concerns of its neighbors, and managing the perceived threat and challenge it poses to the US, remains a major task for the Chinese leadership. Beijing's good-neighbor policy since the 1990s and the willingness it has demonstrated to embrace multilateralism and dialogue as principles for regional security has reassured states on its periphery and helped resolve boundary issues with erstwhile enemies. But convincing Washington that China's rise will remain peaceful and that Beijing harbors no ambitions to usurp the US ranking as a superpower will require diplomatic skill, resolve and, most of all, Washington to accept Beijing's pledges at face value.

And this leads to the concept of “strategic reassurance” as proposed by US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. Simply put, Washington would welcome China as a prosperous power but would expect assurances that its developments and actions would not come at a cost to other powers, including the US. Compared to past notions of "congagement", hedging, and being a strategic stakeholder, the Obama administration's newest China policy emphasizes dialogue, accommodation, and areas of common interests, while addressing a range of important sources of mistrust.

China's military modernization and its power projection draw increasing attention from Washington. Recent encounters between the two countries in the South China Sea, including the incident over the US navy survey ship Impeccable, raises US alarm over Chinese assertiveness over its exclusive economic zones and the issue of freedom of navigation. Future incidents could lead to major escalation and maritime conflicts. Perceived Chinese anti-access capabilities and programs beyond the Taiwan Strait would heighten US suspicions.

Impact’s highly likely:

Motives---China’s not a status quo power---carefully managing their rise is key

Pyon 7 – Junbeom Pyon, Vasey Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, MA in Government from Johns Hopkins, July 2007, “Understanding China’s Intentions and Finding a Solution to a Potential Nuclear Crisis,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8

At our meeting, a Chinese participant claimed that “China wants to remain as a status quo power.” But the Chinese notion of “status quo power” is perplexing, if not entirely wrong. While the participant argued that China does not seek to challenge the U.S. role in the Washington-led world, the participant also argued that China will continue its military modernization, expansion, and seek to solve territorial disputes, though peacefully, with its neighbors. The participant elaborated that China has always been a big power, politically and militarily, since 1971 and thus the notion of a China threat stemming from the ‘Rising China’ concept does not explain Beijing’s intentions.

What the Chinese misunderstand is the notion of “status quo.” Status quo means the existing condition or state of affairs. Expanding and modernizing China’s military to a level that exceeds what is necessary to deter Taiwan’s independence movement or what it considers a threat means it is not a status quo power but seeks to change the current state of affairs. Nor can China be a status quo power when it seeks to ‘solve’ territorial disputes with its neighbors by building military sites in disputed regions or when it conducts anti-satellite missile tests.

The status quo argument also contradicts China’s long argued ‘peaceful rise’ concept. China’s rise, although peaceful, suggests that China seeks a change in the current state of affairs in the region. Instead of arguing that China does not seek a change, Hu has advocated a peaceful transition in the state of global affairs.

The contradictions found within the Chinese arguments alert China experts in the Untied States and force Washington to speculate about Chinese intentions. China’s national objectives are unclear to the outside world. Its official reports, such as its military budget, suggest an ambiguity in China’s intentions in the region. As a result, other countries, such as the United States, have no option but to speculate that China seeks to become a hegemonic power like other countries have in history. The U.S. must prepare for any unwelcome outcomes.1 This in return causes a concern in Beijing and forces the PLA to accelerate its military modernization process.

Diversionary theory---slow recovery from the financial crisis make China likely to get into conflicts

Newmyer 9 – Jacqueline Newmyer, President and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group, works for the DOD, Office of Net Assessment on projects related to East Asia, April 8, 2009, “Economic Crisis: Impact on China’s Military Modernization,” online: http://www.cnponline.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/12503

And now we’re seeing – there is evidence within China, abundant evidence, of the slowdown. There’s higher unemployment, there are abandoned factories, so there’s no hiding the fact that within China, that the growth has slowed down. And again, there are questions or there’s debate about how much. But I think it is on the minds of the Chinese leadership that incidents and unrest have been increasing. Maybe some of this has to do with the run-up to the Olympics, so it’s a little hard to disaggregate the bad effect from the downturn effects for the 2008 year.

But basically, the number of incidents of unrest soared according to indictments for the charge of endangering state security in China. In 2008, the number of those kinds of arrests and indictments doubled for the second time in three years. The number of incidents of unrest – and again, this is going on Chinese figures – increased five-fold from 2005 to 2006 which is the last data that I was able to get my hands on. So it does look as though, at least in terms of what’s being reported, the number of incidents of unrest and disturbance within the country is increasing and it’s likely that the period when economic growth is slowing down, the party leadership will be especially sensitive to signs of popular unrest, maybe for reasons having to do with historical experience as suggested by David Smith.

So on the one hand, internally I think there’s going to be increasing sensitivity or fear, and I also think, at these kinds of periods, it’s a natural impulse to look to external actors who may be blamed, or bear some blame, for internal unrest or at least in terms of inspiring internal actors, so, I think, here is where the U.S. comes in for blame because of our record on supporting democracy and human rights.

I think actors within China may, at least drive inspiration if not support from the U.S., and I think the Chinese Communist Party leadership would be inclined to be sensitive to the degree that Western forces are perceived as helping internal dissidents or protesters.

I also think if the Indians can be problematic from the view of Beijing because of their support for Tibet – and then the other thing that happens in difficult times, when all countries behave badly and turn more nationalistic, is there’s a tendency to kind of demonize the other. And I think here is where Japan comes in because there’s already a kind of basis among the Chinese, or a discourse within China and among the Chinese people that is anti-Japanese for reasons having to do with history, and shrine visits, and so on.

So I think either way, either because of the insecurity that is stoked by what’s happening inside China and perceptions about economic slowdown, and/or because of demonization issues and popular discourse, I think that there’s a real chance that the Chinese leadership could feel compelled, for reasons of state security, to take actions that appear more belligerent abroad. And that could have effects leading up to possibly even military conflict or the use of military force against outside actors in addition to whatever force is used inside China to maintain stability. So I think that would be a real, kind of operational test for the PLA, a modernized force now.

So, in conclusion, what struck me in thinking about and preparing for this presentation was there was less divergence between the sort of steady state and the more dramatic impact of the economic downturn scenarios than I expected.

Either way, I think there is a chance, or a likelihood, of increased friction between China and other external countries, particular countries, that would affected in the case of increased arm transfers, actors in the Middle East would be affected, possibly also the U.S., and in the case of more serious concern about internal unrest in China, I think China’s relations with the West, and with India, or with Japan would be implicated there. So I think contrary to our hopes which would be that the downturn would have the effect of causing China to turn inwards and reduce the chances for any kind of external problem, I think, in fact, there’s reason to think, and to worry, that the downturn would lead to a greater chance of conflict abroad for China.

### AT 4

Unilateral NFU signals the U.S. will let China rise to hegemony in Asia unchallenged---maintaining a reciprocal framework’s key to manage Chinese expectations of their freedom of action

Currie 9 – Kelley Currie, Nonresident Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, October 22, 2009, “The Doctrine of 'Strategic Reassurance',” The Wall Street Journal, online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704224004574488292885761628.html

Some have tried to portray "strategic reassurance" as a narrow formula for managing the increasing propensity for the U.S. and China to rub up against each other in security matters, such as U.S. naval operations that fall within what China claims is its exclusive economic zone, or as a mechanism for calming Chinese fears about the security of their large pile of dollar-denominated assets. But there is also a more damaging interpretation, given the administration's downplaying of human rights on the bilateral agenda, the decision not to meet with the Dalai Lama during his recent visit to Washington, and the endless chase for Chinese cooperation on a raft of other "important" issues from climate change to Iran. What if "strategic reassurance" is nothing more than a fancy way of saying "appeasement"?

Lurking under this discussion is the question of whether "strategic reassurance" dovetails with or challenges China's own policy priorities. The Obama administration urgently needs to clarify this. The Chinese have lately been calling on international partners and interlocutors to undertake relations based on respect for China's "core interests." Beijing identifies these as being, in order of priority: the stability and preservation of the current authoritarian regime; respect for the territorial integrity of China; and the preservation of a positive environment for China's continued economic and political rise.

If Washington's "strategic reassurance" means reassuring China that the U.S. will not challenge these priorities, it would mark a major change in U.S. policy, particularly with respect to Beijing's top priority of preserving the current regime. China scholar Aaron Friedberg has noted that political liberalization has long been an important underlying policy objective of U.S. dealings with China. This is as it should be, given that many of the fundamental tensions in the U.S.-China relationship arise from or are amplified by the differences in the two countries' domestic political systems. Abandonment of this policy objective would be a serious strategic error.