**Disad outweighs and turns case – Harris and Burrows cite military economic stimuli, weakening multilateral institutions, and middle east proliferation – reverses the norms that have made the squo peaceful**

**Deudney and Ikenberry 09** [Daniel, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Myth of the Autocratic Revival :Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb]

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities -- of pushes and pulls -- that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while **creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving**. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become **largely obsolete.** Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people -- particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites -- have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The **declining utility** **of war**, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.

Downturn causes war in Asia – draws in China – destroys civilization

**SEP 11** [9/1, Socialist Equality Party, conference, “The breakdown of capitalism and the tasks of the working class”]

9. The working class must base itself on a scientific assessment of the global political and economic situation. Nothing less than a systemic breakdown in the entire structure of world capitalism is underway, like that which began with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The global profit system was only restabilised after World War II on the basis of the strength of American capitalism. Now, after a protracted economic decline, the US, the world’s chief debtor nation, is the principal source of economic instability and militarism. 10. Geopolitical tensions, and the use of military force to gain economic advantage, as in Libya, the Middle East, and Central Asia, will only intensify as the global crisis deepens. The Obama administration has ominously declared that the United States will now “refocus on Asia” to block the growing influence of China, posing the danger of open conflict and a catastrophic war between nuclear-armed states….15. Oppose militarism and war A third world war between nuclear-armed states would spell the end of human civilisation.

# 1NC

### 1

#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action --- the aff is oversight

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Vote neg — Limits — incentivizes a race to tiny oversight affs.

### 2

#### Debt ceiling will be raised now but it’s not certain --- Obama’s ironclad political capital is forcing the GOP to give in

Brian Beutler 10/3/13, “Republicans finally confronting reality: They’re trapped!,” Salon <http://www.salon.com/2013/10/03/republicans_finally_confronting_reality_theyre_trapped/>

After struggling for weeks and weeks in stages one through four, Republicans are finally entering the final stage of grief over the death of their belief that President Obama would begin offering concessions in exchange for an increase in the debt limit.¶ The catalyzing event appears to have been an hour-plus-long meeting between Obama and congressional leaders at the White House on Wednesday. Senior administration officials say that if the meeting accomplished only one thing it was to convey to Republican leaders the extent of Obama’s determination not to negotiate with them over the budget until after they fund the government and increase the debt limit. These officials say his will here is stronger than at any time since he decided to press ahead with healthcare reform after Scott Brown ended the Democrats’ Senate supermajority in 2010.¶ There’s evidence that it sunk in.¶ First, there’s this hot mic moment in which Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell tells Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., that the president’s position is ironclad.¶ Then we learn that House Speaker John Boehner has told at least one House Republican privately what he and McConnell have hinted at publicly for months, which is that they won’t execute their debt limit hostage. Boehner specifically said, according to a New York Times report, and obliquely confirmed by a House GOP aide, that he would increase the debt limit before defaulting even if he lost more than half his conference on a vote.¶ None of this is to say that Republicans have “folded” exactly, but they’ve pulled the curtain back before the stage has been fully set for the final act, and revealed who’s being fitted with the red dye packet.

#### Obama’s political capital is key --- it’s his sole focus now

Jonathan Allen 9/19, Politico, 9/19/13, GOP battles boost President Obama, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened. And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning. The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made. The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

#### Targeted killing restrictions sap political capital – spills over to other issues

Vladeck 13 (Steve – professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, “Drones, Domestic Detention, and the Costs of Libertarian Hijacking”, 3/14, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/drones-domestic-detention-and-the-costs-of-libertarian-hijacking/)

The same thing appears to be happening with targeted killings. Whether or not Attorney General Holder’s second letter to Senator Paul actually answered the relevant question, it certainly appeared to mollify the junior Senator from Kentucky, who declared victory and withdrew his opposition to the Brennan nomination immediately upon receiving it. Thus, as with the Feinstein Amendment 15 months ago, the second Holder letter appears to have taken wind out of most of the libertarian critics’ sails, many of whom (including the Twitterverse) have now returned to their regularly scheduled programming. It seems to me that both of these episodes represent examples of what might be called “libertarian hijacking”–wherein libertarians form a short-term coalition with progressive Democrats on national security issues, only to pack up and basically go home once they have extracted concessions that don’t actually resolve the real issues. Even worse, in both cases, such efforts appeared to consume most (if not all) of the available oxygen and political capital, obfuscating, if not downright suppressing, the far more problematic elements of the relevant national security policy. Thus, even where progressives sought to continue the debate and/or pursue further legislation on the relevant questions (for an example from the detention context, consider Senator Feinstein’s Due Process Guarantee Act), the putative satisfaction of the libertarian objections necessarily arrested any remaining political inertia (as Wells cogently explained in this post on Senator Paul and the DPGA from November).

#### Debt ceiling collapses the global economy --- fast timeframe and no resiliency

Adam Davidson 9/10/13, economy columnist for The New York Times, co-founder of Planet Money, NPR’s team of economics reporters, “Our Debt to Society,” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.¶ Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

### 3

#### Courts have refused to review targeted killing because of the political question doctrine---breaking the doctrine on targeted killings triggers a slippery slope

Christopher Ehrfurth 11, 10/10/11, “The Extrajudicial Killing of Anwar al-Awlaki,” http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/10/10/the-extrajudicial-killing-of-anwar-al-awlaki/

The legality of the extrajudicial assassination of al-Awlaki was the subject of a civil suit in 2010. After learning that his son had been placed on a CIA/Joint Special Operations Command “kill list”, al-Awlaki’s father brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against President Obama, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and CIA Director Leon Panetta. In an attempt to enjoin the executive branch from killing his son, al-Awlaki introduced several claims based in both constitutional and tort law. The court’s lengthy opinion begins with a compelling recitation of the questions presented: ¶ How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death? Can a U.S. citizen –himself or through another — use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law enforcement authorities, calling for “jihad against the West,” and engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States? Can the Executive order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a terrorist organization? How can the courts, as plaintiff proposes, make real-time assessments of the nature and severity of alleged threats to national security, determine the imminence of those threats, weigh the benefits and costs of possible diplomatic and military responses, and ultimately decide whether, and under what circumstances, the use of military force against such threats is justified? When would it ever make sense for the United States to disclose in advance to the “target” of contemplated military action the precise standards under which it will take that military action? And how does the evolving AQAP relate to core al Qaeda for purposes of assessing the legality of targeting AQAP (or its principals) under the September 18, 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force? ¶ Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2010). ¶ Before contemplating the more compelling issues, the court first decided the issue of standing. Al-Awlaki’s father lacked “next-friend” standing because he failed to provide an adequate reason justifying why Anwar could not appear in court on his own behalf. His father claimed that if Anwar presented himself to authorities he would be exposed to attack. The court disagreed, citing public government statements indicating that if al-Awlaki surrendered peacefully he could not be executed without due process. ¶ The court also denied third party standing, holding that Anwar’s father could not show that a parent suffers an injury in fact if his adult child is threatened with a future extrajudicial killing. Anwar’s status as an adult was of particular importance because a parent does not have a constitutionally (or common law) protected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his adult child free from government influence. ¶ Prudential standing was denied because, among other reasons, the court refused to “unnecessarily adjudicate rights” that it believed al-Awlaki did not wish to assert himself. The court noted that al-Awlaki made numerous public statements professing his contempt for the U.S. legal system. Al-Awlaki did not believe that he was bound by U.S. laws because, in his view, they are contrary to the teachings of Allah. I personally find it difficult to believe that a person would not want to contest his own assassination, but it also seems unlikely that al-Awlaki would wish to assert legal rights in a court system that he did not recognize as authoritative, especially in a country that he openly despised. ¶ Ultimately, the most compelling issues were not addressed because the court found that judicial review was inappropriate. The court held that separation of powers and the political question doctrine prohibited interfering with the executive branch’s orders with respect to military action abroad. Meaningful review was deemed impossible, because it would require an unmanageable assessment of the quality of the President’s interpretation of military intelligence and his resulting decision (based upon that intelligence) to use military force against terrorist targets overseas: ¶ [T]his Court does not hold that the Executive possesses “unreviewable authority to order the assassination of any American whom he labels an enemy of the state.” (citation omitted), the Court only concludes that it lacks the capacity to determine whether a specific individual in hiding overseas, whom the Director of National Intelligence has stated is an “operational” member of AQAP, (citation omitted), presents such a threat to national security that the United States may authorize the use of lethal force against him. This Court readily acknowledges that it is a “drastic measure” for the United States to employ lethal force against one of its own citizens abroad, even if that citizen is currently playing an operational role in a “terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Saudi, Korean, Yemeni, and U.S. targets since January 2009,”(citation omitted) But as the D.C. Circuit explained in Schneider, a determination as to whether “drastic measures should be taken in matters of foreign policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication, but of policymaking.” (citation omitted) Because decision-making in the realm of military and foreign affairs is textually committed to the political branches, and because courts are functionally ill-equipped to make the types of complex policy judgments that would be required to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds that the political question doctrine bars judicial resolution of this case. ¶ Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 52-53. ¶ It is unfortunate that the Aulaqi case never made it beyond the issue of standing, but perhaps that was the proper outcome. Although Awlaki was a U.S. citizen (and a citizen of Yemen), he was also clearly a member of al-Qaeda. Shortly after 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). The AUMF provides that: ¶ [T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001…in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States…¶ Everyone (except for the guy who leaves “9/11 was inside job” comments beneath every news article on the internet) knows that al-Qaeda is the organization that planned and committed the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11. Al-Awlaki was indisputably a member of al-Qaeda. The Executive’s killing of al-Awlaki was certainly aimed at preventing future acts of international terrorism against the United States. If the AUMF can be read as authorizing al-Awlaki’s killing, then it would appear that the President assassinated him with congressional approval. In that scenario, Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown would indicate that the President was acting at the highest ebb of his authority. ¶ Still, many columnists and politicians like Ron Paul believe that Obama’s decision was illegal on due process grounds. Might Ron Paul be engaging in political grandstanding? I do seem to remember hearing something about an upcoming election. On the other hand, the AUMF only authorizes necessary and appropriate force. In his suit against the Executive, al-Aulaqi suggested that imminence is the key factor in determining whether lethal force is justified. It would have been interesting to find out what legal standard the court would apply to the use of lethal force on foreign soil against a member of al-Qaeda holding U.S. citizenship, but that issue was never addressed. ¶ Was the force used against al-Awlaki necessary and appropriate? It seems difficult to determine without a meaningful presentation of evidence against al-Awlaki. Personally, I don’t think I’ll hold my breath waiting for the day that the general public is offered an explanation as to why al-Awlaki couldn’t be captured and tried in a U.S. courtroom. It is troubling to know that the President can order the extrajudicial execution of a U.S. citizen based upon secret evidence. On the other hand, it has been said that the Constitution is not a suicide pact, and it’s comforting to know that the President is tracking and killing those who are actively trying to kill Americans. ¶ After reading the al-Aulaqi opinion, I was left feeling unsatisfied with the court’s decision to defer to the other branches of government, but I understood why it did so. In many ways, the moral issue of al-Awlaki’s murder leaves me feeling the same way. I think it’s unfortunate that al-Awlaki was not indicted, captured, and tried in Federal court. I also understand that applying traditional due process to a terrorist abroad might create a logistical nightmare and place many innocent lives in danger. Is this a slippery slope? If so, wouldn’t requiring the judicial approval of military strategy abroad be just as slippery? Either way, I respect those who speak out in favor of due process. I also wonder how many of those people, if faced with the same choice as the President, would choose differently.

#### Setting a precedent against the PQD spills over to climate change cases---litigants are turning to the Courts now and asking them to abrogate the PQD

Laurence H. Tribe 10, the Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; Joshua D. Branson, J.D., Harvard Law School and NDT Champion, Northwestern University; and Tristan L. Duncan, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., January 2010, “TOOHOTFORCOURTSTO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE,” <http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf>

Two sets of problems, one manifested at a microcosmic level and the other about as macrocosmic as imaginable, powerfully illustrate these propositions. Not coincidentally, both stem from concerns about temperature and its chemical and climactic effects, concerns playing an increasingly central role in the American policy process. As those concerns have come to the fore, courts have correspondingly warmed to the idea of judicial intervention, drawn by the siren song of making the world a better place and fueled by the incentives for lawyers to convert public concern into private profit. In both the fuel temperature and global warming cases, litigants, at times justifying their circumvention of representative democracy by pointing to the slow pace of policy reform, have turned to the courts. By donning the cloak of adjudication, they have found judges for whom the common law doctrines of unjust enrichment, consumer fraud, and nuisance appear to furnish constitutionally acceptable and pragmatically useful tools with which to manage temperature’s effects. Like the proverbial carpenter armed with a hammer to whom everything looks like a nail, those judges are wrong. For both retail gasoline and global climate, the judicial application of common law principles provides a constitutionally deficient—and structurally unsound—mechanism for remedying temperature’s unwanted effects.

It has been axiomatic throughout our constitutional history that there exist some questions beyond the proper reach of the judiciary. In fact, the political question doctrine originates in no less august a case than Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[q]uestions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”1 Well over a century after that landmark ruling, the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr, famously announced six identifying characteristics of such nonjusticiable political questions, which, primarily as a “function of the separation of powers,” courts may not adjudicate.2 Of these six characteristics, the Court recently made clear that two are particularly important: (1) the presence of “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;” and (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”3

The spectrum of nonjusticiable political questions in a sense spans the poles formed by these two principles. At one pole, the Constitution’s specific textual commitments shield issues expressly reserved to the political branches from judicial interference. At the other pole lie matters not necessarily reserved in so many words to one of the political branches but nonetheless institutionally incapable of coherent and principled resolution by courts acting in a truly judicial capacity; such matters are protected from judicial meddling by the requirement that “judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule” and by the correlative axiom that “law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”4

At a deeper level, however, the two poles collapse into one. The reason emerges if one considers issues that courts are asked to address involving novel problems the Constitution’s framers, farsighted though they were, could not have anticipated with sufficient specificity to entrust their resolution to Congress or to the Executive in haec verba. A perfect exemplar of such problems is the nest of puzzles posed by humaninduced climate change. When matters of that character are taken to court for resolution by judges, what marks them as “political” for purposes of the “political question doctrine” is not some problem-specific language but, rather, the demonstrable intractability of those matters to principled resolution through lawsuits. And one way to understand that intractability is to view it as itself marking the Constitution’s textual, albeit broadly couched, commitment of the questions presented to the processes we denominate “legislative” or “executive”—that is, to the pluralistic processes of legislation and treaty-making rather than to the principle-bound process of judicially resolving what Article III denominates “cases” and “controversies.” In other words, the judicial unmanageability of an issue serves as powerful evidence that the Constitution’s text reserves that issue, even if broadly and implicitly, to the political branches.5

It has become commonplace that confusion and controversy have long distinguished the doctrine that determines, as a basic matter of the Constitution’s separation of powers, which questions are “political” in the specific sense of falling outside the constitutional competence of courts and which are properly justiciable despite the “political” issues they may touch. But that the principles in play have yet to be reduced to any generally accepted and readily applied formula cannot mean that courts are simply free to toss the separation of powers to the winds and plunge ahead in blissful disregard of the profoundly important principles that the political question doctrine embodies. Unfortunately, that appears to be just what some courts have done in the two temperature-related cases—one involving hot fuels, the other a hot earth— that inspired this publication. In the first, a court allowed a claim about measuring fuels to proceed despite a constitutional provision specifically reserving the issue to Congress. In the second—a case in which the specific issue could not have been anticipated, much less expressly reserved, but in which the only imaginable solutions clearly lie beyond judicial competence—a court, rather than dismissing the case as it ought to have done, instead summarily dismissed the intractable obstacles to judicial management presented by climate change merely because it was familiar with the underlying cause of action. As this pair of bookend cases demonstrates, the political question doctrine is feeling heat from both directions.

#### That crushes global coordination necessary to solve climate change

Laurence H. Tribe 10, the Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; Joshua D. Branson, J.D., Harvard Law School and NDT Champion, Northwestern University; and Tristan L. Duncan, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., January 2010, “TOOHOTFORCOURTSTO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE,” <http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf>

But that being said, if the Second Circuit was implying that such claims are justiciable in part because they are relatively costless, it was wrong again. In the wake of the recent Copenhagen climate negotiations, America is at a crossroads regarding its energy policy. At Copenhagen, the world—for the first time including both the United States and China—took a tremulous first step towards a comprehensive and truly global solution to climate change.44 By securing a modicum of international consensus—albeit not yet with binding commitments—President Obama laid the foundation for what could eventually be a groundbreaking congressional overhaul of American energy policy, an effort that will undoubtedly be shaped by considerations as obviously political as our energy independence from hostile and unreliable foreign regimes and that will both influence and be influenced by the delicate state of international climate negotiations.45

Against this backdrop, courts would be wise to heed the conclusion of one report that what “makes climate change such a difficult policy problem is that decisions made today can have significant, uncertain, and difficult to reverse consequences extending many years into the future."46 This observation is even more salient given that America—and the world—stand at the precipice of major systemic climate reform, if not in the coming year then in the coming decade. It would be disastrous for climate policy if, as at least one commentator has predicted,47 courts were to “beat Congress to the punch” and begin to concoct common law “solutions” to climate change problems before the emergence of a legislative resolution. Not only does judicial action in this field require costly and irreversible technological change on the part of defendants, but the prior existence of an ad hoc mishmash of common law regimes will frustrate legislators’ attempts to design coherent and systematic marketbased solutions.48 Indeed, both emissions trading regimes and carbon taxes seek to harness the fungibility of GHG emissions by creating incentives for reductions to take place where they are most efficient. But if courts were to require reductions of randomly chosen defendants—with no regard for whether they are efficient reducers— they would inhibit the effective operation of legislatively-created, market-based regimes by prematurely and artificially constricting the size of the market. And as one analyst succinctly put it before Congress, “[a]n insufficient number of participants will doom an emissions trading market.”49

There is no doubt that the “Copenhagen Accord only begins the battle” against climate change, as diplomats, bureaucrats, and legislators all now begin the lengthy struggle to turn that Accord’s audacious vision into concrete reality.50 But whatever one’s position in the debate between emissions trading and carbon taxes, or even in the debate over the extent or indeed the reality of anthropogenic climate change, one thing is clear: legislators, armed with the best economic and scientific analysis, and with the capability of binding, or at least strongly incentivizing, all involved parties, are the only ones constitutionally entitled to fight that battle.

CONCLUSION

Some prognosticators opine that the political question doctrine has fallen into disrepute and that it no longer constitutes a viable basis upon which to combat unconstitutional judicial overreaching.51 No doubt the standing doctrine could theoretically suffice to prevent some of the most audacious judicial sallies into the political thicket, as it might in the climate change case, where plaintiffs assert only undifferentiated and generalized causal chains from their chosen defendants to their alleged injuries. But when courts lose sight of the important limitations that the political question doctrine independently imposes upon judicial power–even where standing problems are at low ebb, as with the Motor Fuel case–then constitutional governance, and in turn the protection of individual rights and preservation of legal boundaries, suffer. The specter of two leading circuit courts manifestly losing their way in the equally real thicket of political question doctrine underscores the urgency, perhaps through the intervention of the Supreme Court, of restoring the checks and balances of our constitutional system by reinforcing rather than eroding the doctrine’s bulwark against judicial meddling in disputes either expressly entrusted by the Constitution to the political branches or so plainly immune to coherent judicial management as to be implicitly entrusted to political processes. It is not only the climate of the globe that carries profound implications for our future; it is also the climate of the times and its implications for how we govern ourselves.

### 4

#### The Executive branch should publicly articulate its legal rationale for its targeted killing policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection. The United States Congress should enact a resolution and issue a white paper stating that, in the conduct of its oversight it has reviewed ongoing targeted killing operations and determined that the United States government is conducting such operations in full compliance with relevant laws, including but not limited to the Authorization to Use Military Force of 2001, covert action findings, and the President’s inherent powers under the Constitution.

#### The CP’s the best middle ground---preserves the vital counter-terror role of targeted killings while resolving all their downsides

Daniel Byman 13, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4

Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.

Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.

#### Solves---the combination of executive disclosure and Congressional support boosts accountability and legitimacy

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Perhaps the most obvious way to add accountability to the targeted killing process is for someone in government to describe the process the way this article has, and from there, defend the process. The task of describing the government’s policies in detail should not fall to anonymous sources, confidential interviews, and selective leaks. Government’s failure to defend policies is not a phenomenon that is unique to post 9/11 targeted killings. In fact, James Baker once noted

"In my experience, the United States does a better job at incorporating intelligence into its targeting decisions than it does in using intelligence to explain those decisions after the fact. This in part reflects the inherent difficulty in articulating a basis for targets derived from ongoing intelligence sources and methods. Moreover, it is hard to pause during ongoing operations to work through issues of disclosure…But articulation is an important part of the targeting process that must be incorporated into the decision cycle for that subset of targets raising the hardest issues…"519

Publicly defending the process is a natural fit for public accountability mechanisms. It provides information to voters and other external actors who can choose to exercise a degree of control over the process. However, a detailed public defense of the process also bolsters bureaucratic and professional accountability by demonstrating to those within government that they are involved in activities that their government is willing to publicly describe and defend (subject to the limits of necessary national security secrecy). However, the Executive branch, while wanting to reveal information to defend the process, similarly recognizes that by revealing too much information they may face legal accountability mechanisms that they may be unable to control, thus their caution is understandable (albeit self-serving).520

It’s not just the Executive branch that can benefit from a healthier defense of the process. Congress too can bolster the legitimacy of the program by specifying how they have conducted their oversight activities. The best mechanism by which they can do this is through a white paper. That paper could include:

A statement about why the committees believe the U.S. government's use of force is lawful. If the U.S. government is employing armed force it's likely that it is only doing so pursuant to the AUMF, a covert action finding, or relying on the President's inherent powers under the Constitution. Congress could clear up a substantial amount of ambiguity by specifying that in the conduct of its oversight it has reviewed past and ongoing targeted killing operations and is satisfied that in the conduct of its operations the U.S. government is acting consistent with those sources of law. Moreover, Congress could also specify certain legal red lines that if crossed would cause members to cease believing the program was lawful. For example, if members do not believe the President may engage in targeted killings acting only pursuant to his Article II powers, they could say so in this white paper, and also articulate what the consequences of crossing that red line might be. To bolster their credibility, Congress could specifically articulate their powers and how they would exercise them if they believed the program was being conducted in an unlawful manner. Perhaps stating: "The undersigned members affirm that if the President were to conduct operations not authorized by the AUMF or a covert action finding, we would consider that action to be unlawful and would publicly withdraw our support for the program, and terminate funding for it."

A statement detailing the breadth and depth of Congressional oversight activities. When Senator Feinstein released her statement regarding the nature and degree of Senate Intelligence Committee oversight of targeted killing operations it went a long way toward bolstering the argument that the program was being conducted in a responsible and lawful manner. An oversight white paper could add more details about the oversight being conducted by the intelligence and armed services committees, explaining in as much detail as possible the formal and informal activities that have been conducted by the relevant committees. How many briefings have members attended? Have members reviewed targeting criteria? Have members had an opportunity to question the robustness of the internal kill-list creation process and target vetting and validation processes? Have members been briefed on and had an opportunity to question how civilian casualties are counted and how battle damage assessments are conducted? Have members been informed of the internal disciplinary procedures for the DoD and CIA in the event a strike goes awry, and have they been informed of whether any individuals have been disciplined for improper targeting? Are the members satisfied that internal disciplinary procedures are adequate?

3) Congressional assessment of the foreign relations implications of the program. The Constitution divides some foreign policy powers between the President and Congress, and the oversight white paper should articulate whether members have assessed the diplomatic and foreign relations implications of the targeted killing program. While the white paper would likely not be able to address sensitive diplomatic matters such as whether Pakistan has privately consented to the use of force in their territory, the white paper could set forth the red lines that would cause Congress to withdraw support for the program. The white paper could specifically address whether the members have considered potential blow-back, whether the program has jeopardized alliances, whether it is creating more terrorists than it kills, etc. In specifying each of these and other factors, Congress could note the types of developments, that if witnessed would cause them to withdraw support for the program. For example, Congress could state "In the countries where strikes are conducted, we have not seen the types of formal objections to the activities that would normally be associated with a violation of state's sovereignty. Specifically, no nation has formally asked that the issue of strikes in their territory be added to the Security Council's agenda for resolution. No nation has shot down or threatened to shoot down our aircraft, severed diplomatic relations, expelled our personnel from their country, or refused foreign aid. If we were to witness such actions it would cause us to question the wisdom and perhaps even the legality of the program."

## Due Process

### Terrorism

#### Authority to target U.S. citizens is lawful, legitimate, and centrally important to counter-terrorism---internal executive processes provide more than enough due process

Benjamin Wittes 13, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, 2/27/13, “In Defense of the Administration on Targeted Killing of Americans,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/in-defense-of-the-administration-on-targeted-killing-of-americans/

The notions that an armed conflict exists, that it is not limited to Afghanistan but extends at least to those places from which the enemy strikes, and that it includes Al Qaeda’s co-belligerent forces are all contested by advocacy groups, international organizations, and prominent figures in the legal academy. Importantly, as Holder noted, however, they have not been contested either by the Congress or by the courts. The AUMF did not specify a legal geography of the conflict and thereby create zones of impunity to which this country’s military enemies might flee and from which they might then attack—and Congress has never sought to impose geographic limits on the conflict after the fact either. In fact, Congress in 2012 specifically reaffirmed—as least as regards detention authority—that the AUMF was still a vital document and reached members and supporters of enemy groups, including associated forces. It did so, once again, without reference to geography.[1] What’s more, the courts, in Guantánamo detention cases, have recognized both that the armed conflict extends beyond the hot battlefield of Afghanistan[2] and that the executive branch’s authority to use force extends beyond core Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and includes “associated forces.”[3] In other words, there is no dispute among the branches of government that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its co-belligerents, wherever they may be.

Second, in this armed conflict—as, indeed, in any armed conflict—the United States is lawfully entitled to target the enemy with lethal force. The existence of an ongoing armed conflict means that, legally speaking, the administration can strike, assuming the target is a lawful one, whenever it wants. As a matter of international law and domestic AUMF authority, it does not have to do a separate legal analysis of whether force can be used against each individual member of enemy forces or whether each individual member poses an imminent threat; a single conflict is, after all, already under way. Nor is there some general legal obligation to seek to capture a lawful target before attacking using lethal force where the target is not hors de combat. Similarly, there is no obligation to give warning or to offer surrender before launching an attack, though surrender must be accepted once completed. While the administration has made it clear that, as a policy matter, it does prefer to capture whenever possible—to reap the intelligence harvest of interrogations, to avoid unnecessary death, and to bring suspects to justice in the criminal justice system—this is generally not a legal requirement but a set of prudential, humanitarian, and tactical considerations.

Again, this point should engender no particular controversy—though it nonetheless does. The ability to target the enemy in an armed conflict with lethal force is a simple, and lawful, operational necessity in a world in which enemy organizations in countries and locations impossible to reach by law enforcement continue to threaten the United States. The fact of armed conflict—and the consequent availability of targeting—does not mean automatic recourse to hostilities, of course. There are many places in the world where the United States can and does pursue terrorists through law enforcement, interdiction of terrorist financing, and other non-hostilities-based tools of counterterrorism. But there are other places in the world that are weakly governed, ungoverned, or simply hostile to the United States, where terrorist groups responsible for September 11 have fled, or in which associated terrorist groups or cells have arisen and joined the conflict against the United States. The armed conflict framework, and the inherently-tied authority to target the enemy with lethal force, is essential to reaching these actors and denying them sanctuary from which to attack this country.

Third, there exists no general immunity from targeting for U.S. citizens who sign up to wage war against their own country. Americans have fought in foreign armies against their country in numerous armed conflicts in the past, and their citizenship has never relieved them of the risks of that belligerency—nor does it convey any need for judicial review of targeting decisions. U.S. nationals fought for Axis countries during World War II, for example. And it would have been impossible to prosecute the Civil War had some principle required the Union Army to refrain from targeting U.S. citizens—or required judicial review of targeting decisions directed against citizens. This principle is no different if a rebel leads Al Qaeda operations against the United States in Yemen than if he leads an army against U.S. forces in Virginia.

Fourth, whatever the Constitution’s guarantee of Due Process may require before targeting a U.S. citizen aligned with the enemy overseas—and the administration assumes it does impose some demands—these requirements are more than satisfied by a high-level, rigorous internal judgment that this person is a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or its affiliates who poses an imminent threat, whose capture is not feasible, and whose targeting would be consistent with the laws of war.

#### Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism---disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.

If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.

Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Targeting low-level militants is key to all aspects of counter-terror---in-depth network analysis means the people we target don’t seem important to observers, but they’re actually vital to the effectiveness of terror groups

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

This becomes obvious when one considers that national security bureaucrats will look beyond criticality and vulnerability, and also engage in network-based analysis. Network-based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another.143 Contrary to popular critiques of the targeting process that liken it to a “haphazardly prosecuted assassination program,” in reality modern targeting involves applying pressure to various nodes and links within networks to disrupt and degrade their functionality.144

To effectively pursue a network-based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves “connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life.” This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence,” it assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”145 While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram, and further analyzed.146 Through this process links and nodes in the enemy's network emerge.147 The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks,”148 identifying key decision-makers and those who support or influence them indirectly.149 This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests, and they will exploit human and signals intelligence combined with computerized knowledge integration that generates and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network.150 “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure . . . as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”151

Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how seemingly low-level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization.152 Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.”153 Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations.154 Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by a bureaucrat relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security.155 This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be strong ties within the network.156 Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.157

#### Constraining targeted killing’s role in the war on terror causes extinction

Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

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Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

### Human Rights

#### Detention policy wrecks US human rights cred

Roth 7—executive director of Human Rights Watch. JD from Yale. (Ken, Carnegie Council [for Ethics in Intl Policy], 3/7, cceia.org)

But we also recognize that we need that activity supplemented by friendly and influential governments. Traditionally, there was no one more important in that process than the U.S. government. Now, I say that fully aware of all the warts and imperfections of the U.S. government's own record both domestically and in its foreign policy. And I am also aware of—and, indeed, I have probably spoken here several times about—the double standards that Joanne mentions, about the selectivity. But that said, the United States is, of course, the most powerful government, but also I think it is safe to say it has paid more attention to promoting human rights than anyone else around. So I am not happy to report the reality that I think is also apparent to most of us, and that is that the United States has severely damaged its credibility when it comes to promoting human rights. Now, not on everything. You know, we should put a caveat there first. The United States doesn't engage in genocide, it's not running around killing massive numbers of people; so it can protest, say, in Darfur with credibility. The United States is not shutting down civil society, censoring newspapers, closing political parties; so it can advocate for the protection of those freedoms and institutions around the world. But the United States is using torture and inhumane treatment. It has—and, frankly, continues to—forcibly disappeared people into secret detention facilities. It is locking people up without trial for long periods in places like Guantánamo or in Iraq or at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. And these are not small matters, I don't need to remind you. These involve some of the most fundamental rights around. And so it has become effectively unthinkable for the United States to go to a government and protest its torture or to protest its locking up of the latest dissidents without trial. I remember meeting recently with the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and asking him, "Do you complain about Egypt's use of torture?" He, sort of sheepishly, had to admit, "No, I can't really." And I saw why, because I then went to meet with the Egyptian Prime Minister and mentioned the torture problem. He kind of looked at me and said, "Well, what do you want? That's what Bush does." Now, we all know that that's a cheap excuse, it doesn't excuse anything in reality, but it is a line that helps to deflect the pressure, and it makes pressure from the United States much less real, much less forceful. This has left, in my view, a tremendous void on the leadership front when it comes to enforcing human rights. It is not a void that I think is necessarily there forever. I don't believe that America's reputation is irredeemable. But it is a void that will be there certainly for the next two years, because it is almost impossible for me to imagine the Bush Administration taking the steps that would be required to begin to change America's reputation around the world. What will be required is not only an end to the practices—stopping the torture, stopping the detention without trial—but a real repudiation of those practices, and ideally some form of accountability—prosecution for the worst offenses, other forms of censure, or the like—to make clear that this is not what America stands for. That is not going to happen under the Bush Administration. So, at least for the next couple of years, and possibly for longer, we are going to face the problem of traditionally the world's foremost human rights governmental advocate effectively not being there for many of our most serious problems.

#### Authoritarian states don’t follow norms — their “US justifies others” arg is naive

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The second benefit to foreigners of distinctive U.S. legal norms is information. The costs and benefits of our norms will be visible for all to see. n268 Particularly in an era of increased empirical social science testing, over time we will be able to analyze and identify the effects of differences in norms between the United States and other nations. n269 Such diversity benefits foreigners as foreign nations can decide to adopt our good norms and avoid our bad ones.

The only noteworthy counterargument is the claim that U.S. norms will have more harmful effects than those of raw international law, yet other nations will still copy them. But both parts of this proposition seem doubtful. First, U.S. law emerges from a democratic process that creates a likelihood that it will cause less harm than rules that emerge from the nondemocratic processes [\*1235] that create international law. Second, other democratic nations can use their own political processes to screen out American norms that might cause harm if copied.

Of course, many nations remain authoritarian. n270 But our norms are not likely to have much influence on their choice of norms. Authoritarian states are likely to select norms that serve the interests of those in power, regardless of the norms we adopt. It is true that sometimes they might cite our norms as cover for their decisions. But the crucial word here is "cover." They would have adopted the same rules, anyway. The cover may bamboozle some and thus be counted a cost. But this would seem marginal compared to the harm of allowing raw international law to trump domestic law.

#### Human Rights Cred is irrelevant — public opinion, global norms, and NGO networks outweigh US policy

Andrew Moravcsik 5, PhD and a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, 2005, "The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy," American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/paradox.pdf

It is natural to ask: What are the consequences of U.S. "exemptionalism” and noncompliance? International lawyers and human rights activists regularly issue dire warnings about the ways in which the apparent hypocrisy of the United States encourages foreign governments to violate human rights, ignore international pressure, and undermine international human rights institutions. In Patricia Derian's oft-cited statement before the Senate in I979: "Ratification by the United States significantly will enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of these standards. It will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the treaties. And, in countries where human rights generally are not respected, it will aid citizens in raising human rights issues.""' One constantly hears this refrain. Yet there is little empirical reason to accept it. Human rights norms have in fact spread widely without much attention to U.S. domestic policy. In the wake of the "third wave" democratization in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, government after government moved ahead toward more active domestic and international human rights policies without attending to U.S. domestic or international practice." The human rights movement has firmly embedded itself in public opinion and NGO networks, in the United States as well as elsewhere, despite the dubious legal status of international norms in the United States. One reads occasional quotations from recalcitrant governments citing American noncompliance in their own defense-most recently Israel and Australia-but there is little evidence that this was more than a redundant justification for policies made on other grounds. Other governments adhere or do not adhere to global norms, comply or do not comply with judgments of tribunals, for reasons that seem to have little to do with U.S. multilateral policy.

### Warming

#### No climate multilateralism — nationalism ensures gridlock

David Held 13, Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

Gridlock exists across a range of different areas in global governance today, from security arrangements to trade and finance. This dynamic is, arguably, most evident in the realm of climate change. The diffusion of industrial production across the world—a process enabled by economic globalization—has created a situation in which the basic consumption of each individual directly affects the life chances of every other individual on the planet, as well as the life chances of future generations.¶ This is a powerful and entirely new form of global interdependence. Bluntly put, the future of our civilization depends on our ability to cooperate across borders. And yet, despite twenty years of multilateral negotiations under the UN, a global deal on climate change mitigation or adaptation remains elusive, with differences between developed countries, which have caused the problem, and developing countries, which will drive future emissions, forming the core barrier to progress. Unless we overcome gridlock in climate negotiations, as in other issue areas, we will be unable to continue to enjoy the peace and prosperity we have inherited from the postwar order.¶ There are, of course, several forces that might work against gridlock. These include the potential of social movements to uproot existing political constraints, catalysed by IT innovation and the use of associated technology for coordination across borders; the capacity of existing institutions to adapt and accommodate factors such as emerging multipolarity (the shift from the G-5/7 to the G-20 is one example); and efforts at institutional reform which seek to alter the organizational structure of global governance (for example, proposals to reform the Security Council or to establish a financial transaction tax). ¶ Whether there is the political will or leadership to move beyond gridlock remains a pressing question. Social movements find it difficult to convert protests into consolidated institutional change. At the same time, the political leadership of the great power blocs appears dogged by national concerns: Washington is sharply divided, Europe is preoccupied with the future of the Euro and China is absorbed by the challenge of sustaining economic growth as the prime vehicle of domestic legitimacy. Against this background, the further deepening of gridlock and the continuing failure to address global collective action problems appears likely.

### AT: Heg

#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### PRISM destroyed soft power / credibility

Migranyan 7/5 (Andranik is the director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York. He is also a professor at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, a former member of the Public Chamber and a former member of the Russian Presidential Council. “Scandals Harm U.S. Soft Power,” 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/scandals-harm-us-soft-power-8695)

For the past few months, the United States has been rocked by a series of scandals. It all started with the events in Benghazi, when Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists attacked the General Consulate there and murdered four diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya. Then there was the scandal exposed when it was revealed that the Justice Department was monitoring the calls of the Associated Press. The Internal Revenue Service seems to have targeted certain political groups. Finally, there was the vast National Security Agency apparatus for monitoring online activity revealed by Edward Snowden. Together, these events provoke a number of questions about the path taken by contemporary Western societies, and especially the one taken by America.¶ Large and powerful institutions, especially those in the security sphere, have become unaccountable to the public, even to representatives of the people themselves. Have George Orwell’s cautionary tales of total government control over society been realized?¶ At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, my fellow students and I read Orwell’s 1984 and other dystopian stories and believed them to portray fascist Germany or the Soviet Union—two totalitarian regimes—but today it has become increasingly apparent that Orwell, Huxley and other dystopian authors had seen in their own countries (Britain and the United States) certain trends, especially as technological capabilities grew, that would ultimately allow governments to exert total control over their societies. The potential for this type of all-knowing regime is what Edward Snowden revealed, confirming the worst fears that the dystopias are already being realized.¶ On a practical geopolitical level, the spying scandals have seriously tarnished the reputation of the United States. They have circumscribed its ability to exert soft power; the same influence that made the U.S. model very attractive to the rest of the world. This former lustre is now diminished. The blatant everyday intrusions into the private lives of Americans, and violations of individual rights and liberties by runaway, unaccountable U.S. government agencies, have deprived the United States of its authority to dictate how others must live and what others must do. Washington can no longer lecture others when its very foundational institutions and values are being discredited—or at a minimum, when all is not well “in the state of Denmark.”¶ Perhaps precisely because not all is well, many American politicians seem unable to adequately address the current situation. Instead of asking what isn’t working in the government and how to ensure accountability and transparency in their institutions, they try, in their annoyance, to blame the messenger—as they are doing in Snowden’s case. Some Senators hurried to blame Russia and Ecuador for anti-American behavior, and threatened to punish them should they offer asylum to Snowden.¶ These threats could only cause confusion in sober minds, as every sovereign country retains the right to issue or deny asylum to whomever it pleases. In addition, the United States itself has a tradition of always offering political asylum to deserters of the secret services of other countries, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union and other ex-socialist countries. In those situations, the United States never gave any consideration to how those other countries might react—it considered the deserters sources of valuable information. As long as deserters have not had a criminal and murderous past, they can receive political asylum in any country that considers itself sovereign and can stand up to any pressure and blackmail.¶ Meanwhile, the hysteria of some politicians, if the State Department or other institutions of the executive branch join it, can only accelerate the process of Snowden’s asylum. For any country he might ask will only be more willing to demonstrate its own sovereignty and dignity by standing up to a bully that tries to dictate conditions to it. In our particular case, political pressure on Russia and President Putin could turn out to be utterly counterproductive. I believe that Washington has enough levelheaded people to understand that fact, and correctly advise the White House. The administration will need sound advice, as many people in Congress fail to understand the consequences of their calls for punishment of sovereign countries or foreign political leaders that don’t dance to Washington’s tune.¶ Judging by the latest exchange between Moscow and Washington, it appears that the executive branches of both countries will find adequate solutions to the Snowden situation without attacks on each other’s dignity and self-esteem. Russia and the United States are both Security Council members, and much hinges on their decisions, including a slew of common problems that make cooperation necessary.¶ Yet the recent series of scandals has caused irreparable damage to the image and soft power of the United States. I do not know how soon this damage can be repaired. But gone are the days when Orwell was seen as a relic of the Cold War, as the all-powerful Leviathan of the security services has run away from all accountability to state and society. Today the world is looking at America—and its model for governance—with a more critical eye.

### 1NC — Capability OW/No Deterrence

#### Capability outweighs credibility — US actions appear irrational, so countries don’t interpret our signals

Steve Chapman 9/5/13, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, “War in Syria: The Endless Quest for Credibility,” http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/05/war-in-syria-the-endless-quest-for-credi

The United States boasts the most powerful military on Earth. We have 1.4 million active-duty personnel, thousands of tanks, ships and planes, and 5,000 nuclear warheads. We spend more on defense than the next 13 countries combined. Yet we are told we have to bomb Syria to preserve our credibility in world affairs.¶ Really? You'd think it would be every other country that would need to confirm its seriousness. Since 1991, notes University of Chicago security scholar John Mearsheimer, the U.S. has been at war in two out of every three years. If we haven't secured our reputation by now, it's hard to imagine we ever could.¶ On the surface, American credibility resembles a mammoth fortress, impervious to anything an enemy could inflict. But to crusading internationalists, both liberal and conservative, it's a house of cards: The tiniest wrong move, and it collapses.¶ In a sense, though, they're right. The U.S. government doesn't have to impress the rest of the world with its willingness to defend against actual attacks or direct threats. But it does have to continually persuade everyone that we will lavish blood and treasure for purposes that are irrelevant to our security.¶ Syria illustrates the problem. Most governments don't fight unless they are attacked or have dreams of conquest and expansion. War is often expensive and debilitating even for the winners, and it's usually catastrophic for losers. Most leaders do their best to avoid it.¶ So even though the Syrian government is a vicious, repressive dictatorship with a serious grudge against Israel, it has mostly steered clear of military conflict. Not since 1982 has it dared to challenge Israel on the battlefield. When Israeli warplanes vaporized a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007, Bashar al-Assad did nothing. The risks of responding were too dire.¶ But the U.S. never faces such sobering considerations. We are more secure than any country in the history of the world. What almost all of our recent military interventions have in common is that they involved countries that had not attacked us: Libya, Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, Grenada and North Vietnam.¶ With the notable exception of the Afghanistan invasion, we don't fight wars of necessity. We fight wars of choice.¶ That's why we have such an insatiable hunger for credibility. In our case, it connotes an undisputed commitment to go into harm's way even when -- especially when -- we have no compelling need to do so. But it's a sale we can never quite close.¶ Using force in Iraq or Libya provides no guarantee we'll do the same in Syria or Iran or Lower Slobbovia. Because we always have the option of staying out, there's no way to make everyone totally believe we'll jump into the next crisis.¶ The parallel claim of Washington hawks is that we have to punish Assad for using nerve gas, because otherwise Iran will conclude it can acquire nuclear weapons. Again, our credibility is at stake. But how could the Tehran regime draw any certain conclusions based on what happens in Syria?¶ Two American presidents let a troublesome Saddam Hussein stay in power, but a third one decided to take him out. George W. Bush tolerated Moammar Gadhafi, but Barack Obama didn't. Ronald Reagan let us be chased out of Lebanon, only to turn around and invade Grenada. If you've seen one U.S. intervention, you've seen one.¶ What should be plain to Iran is that Washington sees nuclear proliferation as a unique threat to its security, which Syria's chemical weapons are not. Just because we might let Assad get away with gassing his people doesn't mean we will let Iran acquire weapons of mass destruction that would be used only against other countries. Heck, we not only let Saddam get away with using chemical weapons against Iran -- we took his side.¶ Figuring out the U.S. government's future impulses is hard even for Americans. There's no real rhyme or reason. But because we're so powerful, other governments can ill afford to be wrong. What foreigners have to keep in the front of their minds is not our inclination to act but our capacity to act -- which remains unparalleled whatever we do in Syria.¶ Credibility is overrated. Sure, it's possible for hostile governments to watch us squabble over Syria and conclude that they can safely do things we regard as dangerous. But there are graveyards full of people who made that bet.

## Legal Crisis

#### Status quo target vetting is carefully calibrated to avoid every aff impact in balance with CT--- there’s only a risk that restrictions destroy it

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Target vetting is the process by which the government integrates the opinions of subject matter experts from throughout the intelligence community.180 The United States has developed a formal voting process which allows members of agencies from across the government to comment on the validity of the target intelligence and any concerns related to targeting an individual. At a minimum, the vetting considers the following factors: target identification, significance, collateral damage estimates, location issues, impact on the enemy, environmental concerns, and intelligence gain/loss concerns.181 An important part of the analysis also includes assessing the impact of not conducting operations against the target.182 Vetting occurs at multiple points in the kill-list creation process, as targets are progressively refined within particular agencies and at interagency meetings.

A validation step follows the vetting step. It is intended to ensure that all proposed targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in strategic guidance.183 The term strategic is a reference to national level objectives—the assessment is not just whether the strike will succeed tactically (i.e. will it eliminate the targeted individual) but also whether it advances broader national policy goals.184 Accordingly, at this stage there is also a reassessment of whether the killing will comport with domestic legal authorities such as the AUMF or a particular covert action finding.185 At this stage, participants will also resolve whether the agency that will be tasked with the strike has the authority to do so.186 Individuals participating at this stage analyze the mix of military, political, diplomatic, informational, and economic consequences that flow from killing an individual. Other questions addressed at this stage are whether killing an individual will comply with the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement (including theater specific rules of engagement). Further bolstering the evidence that these are the key questions that the U.S. government asks is the clearly articulated target validation considerations found in military doctrine (and there is little evidence to suggest they are not considered in current operations). Some of the questions asked are:

• Is attacking the target lawful? What are the law of war and rules of engagement considerations?

• Does the target contribute to the adversary's capability and will to wage war?

• Is the target (still) operational? Is it (still) a viable element of a target system? Where is the target located?

• Will striking the target arouse political or cultural “sensitivities”?

• How will striking the target affect public opinion? (Enemy, friendly, and neutral)?

• What is the relative potential for collateral damage or collateral effects, to include casualties?

• What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the adversary, friendly forces, or multinational partners?

• What would be the impact of not conducting operations against the target?187

As the preceding criteria highlight, many of the concerns that critics say should be weighed in the targeted killing process are considered prior to nominating a target for inclusion on a kill-list.188 For example, bureaucrats in the kill-list development process will weigh whether striking a particular individual will improve world standing and whether the strike is worth it in terms of weakening the adversary's power.189 They will analyze the possibility that a strike will adversely affect diplomatic relations, and they will consider whether there would be an intelligence loss that outweighs the value of the target.190 During this process, the intelligence community may also make an estimate regarding the likely success of achieving objectives (e.g. degraded enemy leadership, diminished capacity to conduct certain types of attacks, etc.) associated with the strike. Importantly, they will also consider the risk of blowback (e.g. creating more terrorists as a result of the killing).191

#### The US and Russia created a deal on Syria — here’s what it does

Washington Post 9/14 “US-Russia agreement to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons at a glance,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-russia-agreement-to-destroy-syrias-chemical-weapons-at-a-glance/2013/09/14/9803b82c-1d37-11e3-80ac-96205cacb45a\_story.html

—The U.S. and Russia agree to work together on a U.N. Security Council resolution that would ensure verification of the agreement to secure and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stocks and remove its capability to produce such weapons.¶ The resolution would come under Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter, which allows for military action. But U.S. officials acknowledge Russia would veto such a step and they do not contemplate seeking authorization for the use of force.¶ U.S. officials stress that President Barack Obama retains his right to conduct military strikes to defend American national security interests in the absence of U.N. authorization.¶ —The U.S. and Russia give Syria one week, until Sept. 21, to submit “a comprehensive listing, including names, types and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.”¶ —The U.S. and Russia agree that international inspectors should be on the ground in Syria by November and complete their initial work by the end of the month. They must be given “immediate and unfettered” access to inspect all sites. The destruction of chemical agent mixing and filling equipment must be completed by the end of November.¶ —The U.S. and Russia agree that all of Syria’s chemical weapons stocks, material and equipment must be destroyed by mid-2014.

#### Targeting citizens in narrow cases with strict criteria is certainly legal---particularly al-Awlaki

Jack Goldsmith 12, Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, 3/19/12, “Fire When Ready,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire\_when\_ready

This is the background against which to assess Attorney General Holder's claim that the Constitution "guarantees due process, not judicial process." Holder was referring to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on taking life without due process, a further legal limitation on the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. Critics belittled Holder for distinguishing due process from judicial process, but Holder is right. The Supreme Court has ruled in many contexts that due process does not always demand judicial scrutiny. It has also ruled that the type and extent of process due depends on the nature and circumstances of the deprivation, including a balance between the interests of the individual and the government.

A U.S. citizen's interest is obviously at its height when he is targeted with lethal force. The government's interest is at its height when it seeks to incapacitate a threatening enemy in a congressionally sanctioned war. Holder only defended the wartime authority to kill a U.S. citizen who presents "an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and for whom "capture is not feasible," and only when operations are "conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles." In these circumstances, he claimed, high-level executive deliberation, guided by judicial precedent and subject to congressional oversight, is all the process that is due.

Is Holder right? It is hard to say for sure because the due process clause has never before been thought relevant to wartime presidential targeting decisions. The system described above goes far beyond any process given to any target in any war in American history. Awlaki was not given a formal notice and opportunity to defend himself in court, but war does not permit such formal practices. One predicate for the killing was that Awlaki was in hiding -- beyond legal process or the reasonable possibility of capture -- and plotting and directing attacks on the United States. The U.S. government made clear that if Awlaki "were to surrender or otherwise present himself to the proper authorities in a peaceful and appropriate manner, legal principles with which the United States has traditionally and uniformly complied would prohibit using lethal force or other violence against him in such circumstances." And as Judge Bates noted, while Awlaki's placement on a targeting list was publicly disclosed in January 2010, Awlaki publicly disclaimed any intention of challenging his status or turning himself in.

It is hard to see how the executive branch could have taken its constitutional responsibilities more seriously while honoring its obligation to keep the nation safe. In light of Judge Bates's ruling and the analysis on which it rests, and until Congress thinks the president's approach to targeting requires change, the current system -- executive deliberation guided by judicial precedent and subject to congressional oversight -- almost certainly satisfies any constitutional requirement. In any event, it belies the claim that the president is not subject to checks and balances.

#### No Russia war---no motive or capability

Betts 13 Richard is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies @ Columbia. “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, Vol. 92, Issue 2, Online

These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse. First, the East-West balance of military capabilities, which at the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has become utterly lopsided. Russia is now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal. There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for aggression, except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's capabilities are now far greater.¶ Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their interests. During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal.

# 2NC

### Solvency---2NC

#### The counterplan establishes transparency over targeted killing policy from within the executive branch---it discloses the administration’s legal rationale for the policy and the criteria for target selection. It also mandates that targeted killings be narrowed to comply with domestic and international law---particularly three international legal principles:

#### 1) Necessity---whether the target an imminent threat, and whether a kill order is the only viable method to neutralize the threat

#### 2) Distinction---can the target be clearly identified as a combatant, as distinguished from a civilian

#### 3) Proportionality---does the strategic value of the attack justify the risk, if any, of collateral damage

#### This combination of legal justification and transparency solves the case---it prevents overreach in drone operations and builds legitimacy, which solves any international perception or precedent args, while preserving targeted killings as an effective counter-terrorism tool employed by an unconstrained executive---that’s Byman.

#### Disclosing target criteria builds diplomatic credibility, enacts domestic accountability, and doesn’t link to the terror disad

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Related to defending the process, and using performance data is the possibility that the U.S. government could publish the targeting criteria it follows. That criteria need not be comprehensive, but it could be sufficiently detailed as to give outside observers an idea about who the individuals singled out for killing are and what they are alleged to have done to merit their killing. As Bobby Chesney has noted, "Congress could specify a statutory standard which the executive branch could then bring to bear in light of the latest intelligence, with frequent reporting to Congress as to the results of its determinations."521 What might the published standards entail? First, Congress could clarify the meaning of associated forces, described in Part I and II. In the alternative, it could do away with the associated forces criteria altogether, and instead name each organization against which force is being authorized,522 such an approach would be similar to the one followed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control when it designates financial supporters of terrorism for sanctions.523¶ The challenge with such a reporting and designation strategy is that it doesn’t fit neatly into the network based targeting strategy and current practices outlined in Parts I-III. If the U.S. is seeking to disrupt networks, then how can there be reporting that explains the networked based targeting techniques without revealing all of the links and nodes that have been identified by analysts? Furthermore, for side payment targets, the diplomatic secrecy challenges identified in Part I remain --- there simply may be no way the U.S. can publicly reveal that it is targeting networks that are attacking allied governments. These problems are less apparent when identifying the broad networks the U.S. believes are directly attacking American interests, however publication of actual names of targets will be nearly impossible (at least ex ante) under current targeting practices.¶ As was discussed above, the U.S. government and outside observers may simply be using different benchmarks to measure success. Some observers are looking to short term gains from a killing while others look to the long term consequences of the targeted killing policy. Should all of these metrics and criteria be revealed? Hardly. However, the U.S. should articulate what strategic level goals it is hoping to achieve through its targeted killing program. Those goals certainly include disrupting specified networks. Articulating those goals, and the specific networks the U.S. is targeting may place the U.S. on better diplomatic footing, and would certainly engender mechanisms of domestic political accountability.

#### Strongly err neg---their authors don’t understand how thorough and effective inter-executive mechanisms are---adding transparency’s clearly sufficient

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

To date scholars have lacked a thorough understanding of the U.S. government’s targeted killing practices. As such, their commentary is oftentimes premised on easily describable issues, and fails to grapple with the multiple levels of intergovernmental accountability present in current practice. When dealing with the theoretical and normative issues associated with targeted killings, scholars have failed to specify what they mean when they aver that targeted killings are unaccountable. Both trends have impeded legal theory, and constrained scholarly discourse on a matter of public import.

This article is a necessary corrective to the public and scholarly debate. It has presented the complex web of bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political accountability mechanisms that exert influence over the targeted killing process. It has demonstrated that many of the critiques of targeted killings rest upon poorly conceived understandings of the process, unclear definitions, and unsubstantiated speculation. The article’s reform recommendations, grounded in a deep understanding of the actual process, reflect an assumption that transparency, performance criteria, and politically grounded independent review can enhance the already robust accountability mechanisms embedded in current practice.

#### Executive transparency and commitment that targeted killings will comply with international law solves the case while preserving the benefits of flexibility and drone strikes

Michael Aaronson 13, Professorial Research Fellow and Executive Director of cii – the Centre for International Intervention – at the University of Surrey, and Adrian Johnson, Director of Publications at RUSI, the book reviews editor for the RUSI Journal, and chair of the RUSI Editorial Board, “Conclusion,” in Hitting the Target?: How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention, ed. Aaronson & Johnson, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Hitting\_the\_Target.pdf

As Weizmann and other contributors to this report highlight, it is important to determine whether new capabilities can satisfy the essential criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The answer seems to be that unmanned systems, as they exist, can indeed do so. There is no inherent contradiction between armed drone capability and International Humanitarian Law – a finding echoed by the UN Human Rights Council and the British government.1¶ This is not to glibly dismiss the controversy they have aroused. Many of the critiques of drone warfare2 are reasonable. The US administration argues that its targeting policy is in line with the law of conflict, involving a three-part test that the individual targeted must pose an imminent threat; capture must be too difficult; and the strike must be conducted in line with proportionality and discrimination.3 Aside from innocent casualties, there are two other main lines of ethical objection to the actual conduct of this policy. First, that by so stretching the definition of ‘imminence’ – a justification to be acting in self-defence – the administration has essentially rendered it meaningless. ¶ Second, that ‘signature strikes’ depart too far from discriminatory targeting to adhere to the lawful conduct of war. In the words of one journalist, the operator of a CIA drone over Pakistan ‘almost certainly doesn’t know for sure what he’s shooting at.’4 The latter may be an extreme view, but when targeting is based merely on suspicious patterns of behaviour, it is not radical to argue that the principles of necessity and discrimination are not satisfied, and that the justification of ‘imminence’ is contorted further.¶ However, these are objections to a specific use, not to the nature, of drones. Targeted killing and signature strikes would raise precisely the same quandaries were they undertaken by cruise missiles, manned aerial sorties or special forces. An underlying problem with the CIA drone programme, which the US military seems to have avoided, is the secrecy in which it has been conducted. This has, perhaps unfairly, suggested a wanton disregard for legal constraints (although the drone programme has temporarily been exempted from the ‘Counterterrorism Playbook’, a set of limits for legal conduct5). ¶ A more transparent drone programme, recognising explicit legal limits and allowing independent consideration of compliance, is one possible solution.6 Another suggestion is to remove operations from the CIA – which, after all, is a civilian agency dedicated to secretive operations – and bring them under the control of the Department of Defense, which is accorded privileged combatant status under the Geneva Conventions.7 As this report was going to press, there were good indications that the operational control and oversight might indeed be shifted to the military, with the CIA’s role reduced. ¶ These are all, however, problems of policy – not technology. For drones permit unprecedented levels of persistence and observation in support of effective targeting decisions; and, as Franke points out in her chapter, by far the majority of military drones worldwide are unarmed and used for surveillance. Furthermore, effective engineering could help pilots and operators to make better decisions under stressful circumstances, as Leveringhaus and De Greef argue in their chapter. It is not unreasonable to assume that, on balance, unmanned systems may provide a more effective means of respecting International Humanitarian Law in interventions to come. ¶ There is nothing about drones that necessarily violates the laws and customs of war. Policy-makers should, however, remain alert to the possibility that while drones remain lawful, public opinion may one day turn against the use of unmanned systems precisely because of policy; as the chapter on lawfulness and legitimacy reminds us, these two concepts are linked, but distinct.

### Solves---Perception---Human Rights/Due Process

#### Publicizing target procedures is the most effective way to resolve the perception of targeted killing as violating human rights and due process

Cheri Kramer 11, J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 1/1/11, “The Legality of Targeted Drone Attacks as U.S. Policy,” Santa Clara Journal of International Law, http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=scujil

Some advocates in the field of human rights assert that targeted killing denies individuals due process. 134 However, due process does not require that each target be given the opportunity to defend him or herself before a legitimate judicial authority before being eliminated: "[A] state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force."135¶ Still, in non-international armed conflicts such as the situation in Afghanistan, a target is not lawful until it has qualified as such under either CCF or DPH.136 Without public disclosure of the procedures for enforcing compliance with applicable law, it is impossible to determine whether or not the government is adhering to the requirements of law. Making public the procedures for target selection may be the most effective means to confront the human right challenges to targeted killing. In particular, if the U.S. wants to keep the higher moral ground, it should afford the public the process of clear, systematic target selection procedures to minimize the risk of targeting an unlawful target (i.e., a civilian), and thereby invoking guilt for a war crime under the Rome Statute.13 7

### Solves---U.S. Citizens

#### Disclosing the criteria for placement on the kill list provides sufficient due process for U.S. citizens

Mike Dreyfuss 12, J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School, January, 2012, “NOTE: My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 249

An underlying element of all law is the principle of nullem crimen sine lege, or "no crime without law." One purpose of law is to make people aware of what conduct is permissible and what is not. U.S. citizens have a right to know what conduct will get them killed by their government. Currently, the United States does not publish the criteria it uses to decide who will be killed by targeted killing, beyond statements like that of then Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, who stated, "Individuals aren't targeted because they have bad ideas. Individuals aren't targeted because they inspire others to do things. Individuals are targeted because they are involved in operations targeting the United States and our homeland." n142 Nor, for that matter, does the United States publish the list of U.S. citizens who it intends to kill. n143 The result is that the United States can use secret criteria to secretly designate U.S. citizens, secretly kill them, and officially deny any involvement in the action. n144

These unpublished "kill lists" or other means of designating individuals for targeted killing should not be confused with the U.S. Treasury Department's published lists of Specially Designated Global [\*274] Terrorist ("SDGT") individuals, which are available to the public. n145 While Al-Aulaqi was on both an SDGT list n146 and a kill list, the two lists are not necessarily the same. It is not known, for example, whether Aqeel Abdulaziz al-Aqil or Chiheb Ben Mohamed Ben Moktar al-Ayari, the SDGT individuals listed immediately before and after Al-Aulaqi, are also subject to targeted killing. n147 Even after the United States killed Al-Aulaqi, it did not publicly acknowledge his presence on a kill list. n148

Military expedience and security arguments support the practice of nonpublication of the lists. If the targets know that they have been designated, then they will make it more difficult, more expensive, and more dangerous for our armed forces to kill them. Notifying the targets will also make continued intelligence gathering more difficult.

Fundamental justice arguments support publication. All people have rights to life and liberty unless their government deprives them of those rights through the due process of law. Because the U.S. government can freeze the assets of SDGT individuals, they already have serious financial incentives to challenge their designations or otherwise exercise their rights in U.S. courts. Many have opted not to do so. But regardless of whether any individuals on kill lists decide to exercise their rights in court, it is still important to provide notice because it is a fundamental principle of our justice system. n149

#### Disclosing the process for target selection provides sufficient due process

Mike Dreyfuss 12, J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School, January, 2012, “NOTE: My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 249

The U.S. government cannot simply kill an American citizen out of hand. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains within it a due process requirement that requires the government to follow adequate procedures before depriving a citizen of a weighty right. n196 That requirement is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. n197 The Fifth Amendment states that "no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." n198 The Due Process Clause extends outside of the boundaries of criminal trials. n199 Due process is required whenever an individual will be deprived of life, liberty, or property. n200 For targeted killing then, a targeted U.S. citizen must be afforded some process before the government kills him. This process is not spelled out in the text of the Constitution, but it does not necessarily include a trial before an Article III court. n201

The precedents from the War on Terror cases are instructive as to the kinds of process due to those targeted for killing. In Hamdi, the Court held that the Due Process Clause protects U.S. citizens [\*283] captured on the battlefield in open and violent opposition to the United States. n202 The swaying political opinions of the executive branch, and the foreign policy decisions of the commander-in-chief, cannot justly dictate whether a U.S. citizen will live or die. n203 Certain rights, such as the right to life, are set apart from other state processes and subject to infringement only after the state observes formal processes. n204 The U.S. government cannot infringe on a fundamental liberty interest at all "unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." n205

In the situation of a targeted killing, the government's infringement on the target's interest is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The government defines the target and takes action to protect the rest of the citizens of the United States from an attack by one particular citizen. The government still needs to disclose a process for determining who it will kill and why it can kill them that can survive strict scrutiny.

### Solves---Norms/Precedent/Drone Prolif

#### Executive-branch transparency and bringing U.S. practice in line with policy builds the international diplomatic capital to press for drone norms

Kristin Roberts 13, News Editor, National Journal, 3/22/13, “When the Whole World Has Drones,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>

But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing control regime, or creating a new control agreement (which is never easy to pull off absent a bad-state actor threatening attack), just the process of lining up U.S. policy with U.S. practice would go a long way toward establishing the kind of precedent on use of this technology that America—in five, 10, or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions.

A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, Dennis Blair among them, thinks norms play little to no role in global security. And they have evidence in support. The missile-technology regime, for example, might be credited with slowing some program development, but it certainly has not stopped non-signatories—North Korea and Iran—from buying, building, and selling missile systems. But norms established by technology-leading countries, even when not written into legal agreements among nations, have shown success in containing the use and spread of some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs.

Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the United States. “History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past,” Zenko argued. Despite the legal and policy complexity of this issue, it is something the American people have, if slowly, come to care about. Given the attention that Rand Paul’s filibuster garnered, it is not inconceivable that public pressure on drone operations could force the kind of unforeseen change to U.S. policy that it did most recently on “enhanced interrogation” of terrorists.

The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring American options while doing little good elsewhere—as if other countries aren’t closely watching this debate and taking notes for their own future policymaking. But the White House’s refusal to answer questions about its drone use with anything but “no comment” ensures that the rest of the world is free to fill in the blanks where and when it chooses. And the United States will have already surrendered the moment in which it could have provided not just a technical operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.

#### Legal transparency solves global drone prolif---allows the U.S. to successfully shape international norms

Daniel Byman 13, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4

The fact remains that by using drones so much, Washington risks setting a troublesome precedent with regard to extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings. Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International contends that "when the U.S. government violates international law, that sets a precedent and provides an excuse for the rest of the world to do the same." And it is alarming to think what leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has used deadly force against peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators he has deemed terrorists, would do with drones of their own. Similarly, Iran could mockingly cite the U.S. precedent to justify sending drones after rebels in Syria. Even Brennan has conceded that the administration is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow."

Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible; that horse left the barn years ago. Drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce, and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring and using them. Nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals, and China is producing several inexpensive models for export. Armed drones are more difficult to produce and deploy, but they, too, will likely spread rapidly. Beijing even recently announced (although later denied) that it had considered sending a drone to Myanmar (also called Burma) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there.

The spread of drones cannot be stopped, but the United States can still influence how they are used. The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists -- and stick to it. Fortunately, Obama has begun to discuss what constitutes a legitimate drone strike. But the definition remains murky, and this murkiness will undermine the president's ability to denounce other countries' behavior should they start using drones or other means to hunt down enemies. By keeping its policy secret, Washington also makes it easier for critics to claim that the United States is wantonly slaughtering innocents. More transparency would make it harder for countries such as Pakistan to make outlandish claims about what the United States is doing. Drones actually protect many Pakistanis, and Washington should emphasize this fact. By being more open, the administration could also show that it carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike.

Washington needs to be especially open about its use of signature strikes. According to the Obama administration, signature strikes have eliminated not only low-level al Qaeda and Taliban figures but also a surprising number of higher-level officials whose presence at the scenes of the strikes was unexpected. Signature strikes are in keeping with traditional military practice; for the most part, U.S. soldiers have been trained to strike enemies at large, such as German soldiers or Vietcong guerrillas, and not specific individuals. The rise of unconventional warfare, however, has made this usual strategy more difficult because the battlefield is no longer clearly defined and enemies no longer wear identifiable uniforms, making combatants harder to distinguish from civilians. In the case of drones, where there is little on-the-ground knowledge of who is who, signature strikes raise legitimate concerns, especially because the Obama administration has not made clear what its rules and procedures for such strikes are.

Washington should exercise particular care with regard to signature strikes because mistakes risk tarnishing the entire drone program. In the absence of other information, the argument that drones are wantonly killing innocents is gaining traction in the United States and abroad. More transparency could help calm these fears that Washington is acting recklessly.

#### Transparency solves allied perception, blowback, and drone norms while maintaining the counter-terror benefits of targeted killings

Michael Aaronson 13, Professorial Research Fellow and Executive Director of cii – the Centre for International Intervention – at the University of Surrey, and Adrian Johnson, Director of Publications at RUSI, the book reviews editor for the RUSI Journal, and chair of the RUSI Editorial Board, “Conclusion,” in Hitting the Target?: How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention, ed. Aaronson & Johnson, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Hitting\_the\_Target.pdf

The Obama administration faces some tough dilemmas, and analysts should be careful not to downplay the security challenges it faces. It must balance the principles of justice and accountability with a very real terrorist threat; and reconcile the need to demonstrate a credibly tough security policy with the ending of a long occupation of Afghanistan while Al-Qa’ida still remains active in the region. Nevertheless, more transparency would provide demonstrable oversight and accountability without sacrificing the necessary operational secrecy of counter-terrorism. It might also help assuage the concern of allies and their publics who worry about what use the intelligence they provide might be put to. A wise long-term vision can balance the short-term demands to disrupt and disable terrorist groups with a longer-term focus to resolve the grievances that give rise to radicalism, and also preclude inadvertently developing norms of drone use that sit uneasily with the civilised conduct of war. Drones are but one kinetic element of a solution to terrorism that is, ultimately, political.

#### Executive-driven transparency clearly solves all their precedent args---if it’s true that current practices by the executive set bad precedents, then reforming them has to resolve that precedent

Laura Twomey 13, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, 3/14/13, “Setting a Global Precedent: President Obama's Codification of Drone Warfare,” http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-blog/setting-a-global-precedent-president-obamas-codification-of-drone-warfare

Rules codified by this Administration, vesting authority in the Executive branch, will play an important part of any future administration's counterterrorism framework. Such rules also set a precedent for leaders in other States, to the effect that it is acceptable for the executive to enjoy unchecked control over their respective targeted killing programmes.

3. Absence of geographic limits in invoking the law of armed conflict (‘LOAC’)

The White Paper argues that the AUMF gives the President authority to target those outside of the area of active hostilities, holding that there is no legal precedent for the proposition that the application of the LOAC is limited in geographical scope. The Paper therefore posits that in the course of a non-international armed conflict, the LOAC follows the participants (members of al-Qaeda or 'associated forces'). This is so, even in instances where the criteria determining the threshold for armed conflict set out in Prosecutor v Tadic are not fulfilled in a territory, that is, where there is no paradigm of hostilities (evidence of protracted armed violence and the presence of organised armed groups). Therefore, the Paper grants authority to conduct targeted killing operations across a much wider geographic scope than previously existing under international humanitarian law.

The White Paper further invokes the 'unwilling or unable' justification to deploy a drone strike where there has not been express or tacit permission on the part of a State's Government to operate on its sovereign territory. This justification has the potential to become problematic in the future. For example, at the moment the US is operating in Pakistan within an understanding of 'implied consent', an approach that may not be acceptable to other States, who may view a drone strike on their territory by another State as an act of war.

4. The temporal scope of the armed conflict with al-Qaeda has not been addressed.

The Administration has not clarified how long this Executive authority to target individuals under the AUMF and Article 51, UN Charter, may last. Is it the case that the authority will expire when armed conflict in Afghanistan comes to an end? Former Attorney General to the Department of Defence, Jeh Johnson, alluded in a November 2012 speech to a 'tipping point' wherein law enforcement methods of apprehension may become the default mode of operation against al-Qaeda operatives, as opposed to the LOAC. However, this matter has not been addressed by the Administration. The codification of the programme's rules suggest this method of conducting perpetual covert warfare is becoming 'the new normal.' However, a long term covert mechanism for conducting war operations sets a similar covert precedent for other States to follow, which is not desirable.

5. An extremely broad interpretive ability is vested in the Executive as to who may be targeted.

The White Paper outlines that a "senior operational leader" of al-Qaeda may be targeted, even if they are an American citizen. The memo does not define how these criteria may be fulfilled. Capture must not be “feasible”, however this term is again not elaborated upon. A “high level official” may make the decision to target if an “imminent threat” has been determined. This imminent threat is later expounded as equivalent to the “continuous plotting of attacks”, a radical redefinition of the word “imminent.” Furthermore, what constitutes an "associated force" of al-Qaeda also remains undefined.

The adoption of similarly broad targeting criteria by other States would lead to an unprecedented reshaping of traditional LOAC enshrined in the Geneva Conventions and found in the relevant customary international law rules. If such broad targeting criteria were to be adopted, it would indicate a marked departure from current ICRC criteria on "direct participation."

Conclusion: The Drone 'Rule Book' and its significance for international law

It is clear that, as the first State to deploy remote targeting technology in a non international armed conflict, the legal framework forged by the US during President Obama's second term will set significant precedent for the future practice of the estimated 40 States developing their own drone technology.

On 7 March 2013, members of the European Parliament expressed deep concern about the “unwelcome precedent” the programme sets, citing its “destabilising effect on the international legal framework” that “destroys ... our common legal heritage.” This 'destabilising effect' arises from the classified and seemingly amorphous substantive legal basis for the programme and the apparent lack of procedural standards in place. It remains to be seen if the classified 'rulebook' will be released for public scrutiny, and allay these concerns.

Reliance on international law in world order is based on consent, consensus, good faith and, crucially in this instance, reciprocity. The US programme may harbour short term gains in the pursuit of al-Qaeda operatives, however, if the aforementioned substantive legal justifications continue to be invoked, it risks engendering long term disadvantages. Pursuing this policy encourages other States to adopt similar policies. Administration officials have cited particular concern about setting precedent for Russia, Iran and China, all of which are developing their own remote targeting technology.

It is therefore suggested that the Administration should take this opportunity to codify the rules, clarify terms where ambiguity may currently allow for broader interpretations, and to bring its regulations in line with the existing framework of international law. This legal framework should then be made available to the public, with covert operational necessities redacted. This could set a valuable legal precedent, of particular importance at this turning point wherein international law must adapt to the 21st century model of warfare, a model which lacks a clear enemy and a demarcated battlefield.

#### Only the CP solves the case---moving too fast to restrict targeted killing’s ineffective---starting with the CP’s legal transparency’s more effective

Afsheen John Radsan 12, Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 to 2004; and Richard Murphy, the AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, 2012, “The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Vol. 5, p. 439-463

A thorough review of the arguments against the CIA drone campaign, however, shows that most critics invoke laws that do not bind American officials or laws that are vague. In a zone of ambiguity, one expects those responsible for protecting the United States to interpret their authority broadly. The President and his advisers – notably Harold Koh, the Dean of Yale Law School, currently the State Department Legal Adviser and a human rights specialist of the first order – have argued and concluded that CIA drone strikes are legal.3 The rules of armed conflict and the laws of interstate force permit the United States reasonably to assert the right to use the CIA to fire missiles from unmanned drones to kill “fighting” members of al Qaeda and the Taliban located in countries that are unable (or perhaps unwilling) to control the threat these armed groups pose.

Although critics of the CIA drone program do not demonstrate that its strikes are clearly illegal, some raise important points on how the law, drifting into policy, should constrain drone strikes. As noted, the CIA drone campaign and any similar campaigns pose acute dangers of mistakes and abuses. The law, in response to this type of problem, seeks to ensure accuracy, fairness, and accountability by insisting on regular, responsible procedures. Yet the laws of war, generally speaking, merely require reasonable precautions before striking.4 A simple rule-of-reason seems inadequate for targeted killing that, by its terms, demands “intelligence-driven use of force.”5

To facilitate the evolution of a “due process” of targeted killing, in two earlier pieces, we have attempted to tease controls from the U.S. Constitution and from international humanitarian law’s insistence on reasonable precautions.6 Whether for us or for other commentators, creating fine-grained constraints will not be straightforward. If the constraints are to evolve at all, they are likely to come from a long dialogue among many interested parties. The United States could add to this conversation by publicly adopting standards for its use of drones that ensure accuracy and accountability. The CIA, accordingly, could acknowledge a general role in the drone program without mentioning the names of any participating countries. By giving up a thin veil of secrecy, the CIA would benefit from more informed public scrutiny and might receive more support from some American citizens and allies. But that increased transparency could carry costs, including offending those concerned about the level of collateral damage. Residents of foreign countries closest to the locations of CIA strikes are likely to be the most sensitive. Take Pakistan as one possible example.

We do not expect opponents of CIA drones to give up their rhetorical weapon claiming illegality. Their rhetoric, however, tends to obscure how the law should evolve to result in good policy. The relevant substantive law governing resort to deadly force by states is and necessarily will remain vague. In contrast, the specific procedures for CIA targeted killing cry out for scrutiny and improvement. At the level of specificity that matters to actual drone operators, good law blurs into good policy. At this level, all of the President’s national security team, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, are welcome to advise him on drones.

## Politics

### 2NC—Condo Good

#### Counter-interpretation—one conditional CP/one conditional critique.

Standards—

Argument Innovation—debaters are risk-averse—a fallback strategy encourages introduction of new positions—solves research skills.

Neg Flex—in-round testing is critical to balance aff prep.

Nuanced Advocacy—contradictory positions force aff defense of the political middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—prevents ideological extremism.

Strategic Thinking—causes introduction of the best arguments—necessitates intelligent coverage decisions—key to info processing and argument evaluation.

[If Dispo] Logic—a decision maker can always chose the status quo.

Substance crowd-out—re-appropriating time spent on condo solves fairness offense.

High Threshold—the 2AR is reactive and persuasive—theory has a 1-to-5 time trade-off—unless we make debate impossible, vote neg.

Defense—

Fairness impossible—resource and coaching differentials—no terminal impact—no one quits b/c of the process CP.

Skew inevitable—DAs and T

Contradictions inevitable—Security K and Deterrence DA

2NR collapse solves depth.

Cheating strategies lose to theory & competition args.

Judge is a referee—potential abuse isn’t a voter—blaming us for other teams behavior is unfair—voting down abuse solves their offence.

## PQD

### Turns the Case---Court Cred/Signal

#### Violating the PQD jacks the court’s cred---turns the case

Laurence H. Tribe 10, the Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; Joshua D. Branson, J.D., Harvard Law School and NDT Champion, Northwestern University; and Tristan L. Duncan, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., January 2010, “TOOHOTFORCOURTSTO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE,” <http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf>

We can stipulate that the Constitution’s framers were not driven by the relationships among chemistry, temperature, combustion engines, and global climate when they assigned to the judicial process the task of interpreting and applying rules of law, and to the political process the mission of making the basic policy choices underlying those rules. Yet the framework established by the Constitution they promulgated, refined over time but admirably constant in this fundamental respect, wisely embodied the recognition that enacting the ground rules for the conduct of commerce in all of its manifestations—including designing incentives for innovation and creative production (through regimes of intellectual property), establishing the metrics and units for commercial transactions (through regimes of weights and measures), and coping with the cross-boundary effects of economic activity (through the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce)—was a task quintessentially political rather than judicial in character.

Yet the litigious character of American society, observed early in the republic’s history by deTocqueville, has ineluctably drawn American courts, federal as well as state, into problems within these spheres more properly and productively addressed by the legislative and executive branches. This has occurred in part because political solutions to complex problems of policy choice inevitably leave some citizens and consumers dissatisfied and inclined to seek judicial redress for their woes, real or imagined. And it has occurred in part because the toughest political problems appear on the horizon long before solutions can be identified, much less agreed upon, leaving courts to fill the vacuum that social forces abhor no less than nature itself. One can believe strongly in access to courts for the protection of judicially enforceable rights and the preservation of legal boundaries—as the authors of this WORKING PAPER do— while still deploring the perversion of the judicial process to meddle in matters of policy formation far removed from those judicially manageable realms. Indeed, the two concerns are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory, for courts squander the social and cultural capital they need in order to do what may be politically unpopular in preserving rights and protecting boundaries when they yield to the temptation to treat lawsuits as ubiquitously useful devices for making the world a better place.

### UQ---Review Precluded by PQD Now

#### Judicial review of targeted killing is precluded now by the political question doctrine---the plan requires abrogating it

Benjamin McKelvey 11, J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School, November 2011, “NOTE: Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 44 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1353

In August 2010, Aulaqi's father, Nasser al-Aulaqi, filed suit against the federal government and requested an injunction against the targeted killing of his son. n7 The complaint alleged that a targeted killing would violate Anwar al-Aulaqi's Fifth Amendment right to due process of law before a deprivation of life. n8 In response, the DOJ argued that the decision to target Aulaqi for extrajudicial killing was purely within executive branch authority and that to litigate this matter would require judicial infringement on executive power. n9 Nasser al-Aulaqi asserted that the Executive Branch claimed the [\*1356] power to kill an American without producing any justification. n10 The government's response essentially suggested that, in fact, it had this power in the context of counterterrorism and that this power was not subject to judicial review. n11

In December 2010, the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected Nasser al-Aulaqi's claims and granted summary judgment to the government. n12 While acknowledging the profound and troubling nature of the issues at stake in the case, n13 the court deferred to the assertion of executive authority and declined to review the evidence against Aulaqi. n14 The court held that these issues were nonjusticiable and that Aulaqi's father did not have standing to bring this claim on behalf of his son. n15

### UQ---PQD Strong Now

#### Judicial deference is high – there’s strict adherence to the political question doctrine

Bradley 9-2 (Curtis A., William Van Alstyne Professor of Law – Duke Law School, “War Powers, Syria, and Non-Judicial Precedent,” Lawfare Blog, 2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/war-powers-syria-and-non-judicial-precedent/)

As an initial matter, we need to bracket the issue of whether Obama’s action will weaken his own power as a political matter. This is a complicated issue: on the one hand, it may signal weakness both to Congress and to other nations; on the other hand, if he obtains congressional authorization, he may be in an ultimately stronger political position, as Jack Goldsmith has pointed out. As I understand it, the claim being made by Spiro, Rothkopf, and others is that the power of the presidency more generally is being weakened. How might this happen? **Not through an influence on judicial doctrine**: Although courts sometimes take account of historic governmental practices when assessing the scope of presidential authority, they have consistently invoked limitations on standing and ripeness, as well as the political question doctrine, to avoid **addressing constitutional issues relating to war powers**. In the absence of judicial review, what is the causal mechanism by which the “precedent” of Obama seeking congressional authorization for the action in Syria could constrain future presidential action? When judicial review is unavailable, the most obvious way in which the President is constrained is through the political process—pressure from Congress, the public, his party, etc. In an extreme case, this pressure could take the form of impeachment proceedings, but it does not take such an extreme case for the pressure to have a significant effect on presidential decisionmaking. Indeed, it is easy to think of political considerations that might have motivated Obama to go to Congress with respect to Syria.

### Internal---Precedent/Spillover

#### Breaking the PQD on one issue spills over---signals that the Court should presume political questions to be justiciable

Miller 10 (Mathew Edwin, JD – University of Michigan Law School, Associate – Latham & Watkins LLP, “The Right Issue, the Wrong Branch: Arguments against Adjudicating Climate Change Nuisance Claims,” Michigan Law Review, November, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 257, Lexis)

However, to say that cases like American Electric Power are justiciable just because plaintiffs allege a public nuisance begs the question: Why should such claims **automatically be justiciable?** It contravenes the **purpose and articulation of the political question doctrine** to suggest that nuisances are categorically justiciable because political questions have historically excluded torts between private parties and have focused instead on governmental issues like gerrymandering, foreign policy, and federal employment. n70 Again, Baker demanded "discriminating" case-by-case inquiries, rejecting "resolution by any semantic cataloguing." n71 Similarly, the fact that other public nuisance claims have not presented political questions in the past should not preclude such a finding in the climate context. n72 Indeed, the argument for nonjusticiability rests on the notion that climate suits are unique and therefore defy classification among tort precedent. n73

 [\*271] Extending the political question doctrine to a public nuisance allegation would surpass precedent in terms of claim-category application. Yet with respect to the theory behind the doctrine, **such an extension is proper** because cases like American Electric Power would push existing nuisance law to embrace a complex, qualitatively unique phenomenon **that cannot be prudentially adjudicated**. n74 The Supreme Court has never held that torts cannot present political questions, so prudential constitutional principles should similarly apply to them. This Note simply argues that the facts, claims, parties, and relief demanded in this particular mode of litigation should fall under the nonjusticiability umbrella, wherever its limits may lie. n75 The following analysis of Baker invokes the American Electric Power situation specifically for the sake of convenience, but the arguments therein should be read to apply to injunctive climate nuisance claims generally.

[Continues to Footnore]

n75. This Note does not purport to suggest exactly where the line ought to be drawn in applying the political question doctrine to tort claims. A consideration of the potential doctrinal "slippery slope" - where courts might improperly refuse to adjudicate claims solely on the basis of complexity - is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

## Due Process

### Terrorism

#### Authority to target U.S. citizens is lawful, legitimate, and centrally important to counter-terrorism---internal executive processes provide more than enough due process

Benjamin Wittes 13, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, 2/27/13, “In Defense of the Administration on Targeted Killing of Americans,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/in-defense-of-the-administration-on-targeted-killing-of-americans/

The notions that an armed conflict exists, that it is not limited to Afghanistan but extends at least to those places from which the enemy strikes, and that it includes Al Qaeda’s co-belligerent forces are all contested by advocacy groups, international organizations, and prominent figures in the legal academy. Importantly, as Holder noted, however, they have not been contested either by the Congress or by the courts. The AUMF did not specify a legal geography of the conflict and thereby create zones of impunity to which this country’s military enemies might flee and from which they might then attack—and Congress has never sought to impose geographic limits on the conflict after the fact either. In fact, Congress in 2012 specifically reaffirmed—as least as regards detention authority—that the AUMF was still a vital document and reached members and supporters of enemy groups, including associated forces. It did so, once again, without reference to geography.[1] What’s more, the courts, in Guantánamo detention cases, have recognized both that the armed conflict extends beyond the hot battlefield of Afghanistan[2] and that the executive branch’s authority to use force extends beyond core Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and includes “associated forces.”[3] In other words, there is no dispute among the branches of government that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its co-belligerents, wherever they may be.

Second, in this armed conflict—as, indeed, in any armed conflict—the United States is lawfully entitled to target the enemy with lethal force. The existence of an ongoing armed conflict means that, legally speaking, the administration can strike, assuming the target is a lawful one, whenever it wants. As a matter of international law and domestic AUMF authority, it does not have to do a separate legal analysis of whether force can be used against each individual member of enemy forces or whether each individual member poses an imminent threat; a single conflict is, after all, already under way. Nor is there some general legal obligation to seek to capture a lawful target before attacking using lethal force where the target is not hors de combat. Similarly, there is no obligation to give warning or to offer surrender before launching an attack, though surrender must be accepted once completed. While the administration has made it clear that, as a policy matter, it does prefer to capture whenever possible—to reap the intelligence harvest of interrogations, to avoid unnecessary death, and to bring suspects to justice in the criminal justice system—this is generally not a legal requirement but a set of prudential, humanitarian, and tactical considerations.

Again, this point should engender no particular controversy—though it nonetheless does. The ability to target the enemy in an armed conflict with lethal force is a simple, and lawful, operational necessity in a world in which enemy organizations in countries and locations impossible to reach by law enforcement continue to threaten the United States. The fact of armed conflict—and the consequent availability of targeting—does not mean automatic recourse to hostilities, of course. There are many places in the world where the United States can and does pursue terrorists through law enforcement, interdiction of terrorist financing, and other non-hostilities-based tools of counterterrorism. But there are other places in the world that are weakly governed, ungoverned, or simply hostile to the United States, where terrorist groups responsible for September 11 have fled, or in which associated terrorist groups or cells have arisen and joined the conflict against the United States. The armed conflict framework, and the inherently-tied authority to target the enemy with lethal force, is essential to reaching these actors and denying them sanctuary from which to attack this country.

Third, there exists no general immunity from targeting for U.S. citizens who sign up to wage war against their own country. Americans have fought in foreign armies against their country in numerous armed conflicts in the past, and their citizenship has never relieved them of the risks of that belligerency—nor does it convey any need for judicial review of targeting decisions. U.S. nationals fought for Axis countries during World War II, for example. And it would have been impossible to prosecute the Civil War had some principle required the Union Army to refrain from targeting U.S. citizens—or required judicial review of targeting decisions directed against citizens. This principle is no different if a rebel leads Al Qaeda operations against the United States in Yemen than if he leads an army against U.S. forces in Virginia.

Fourth, whatever the Constitution’s guarantee of Due Process may require before targeting a U.S. citizen aligned with the enemy overseas—and the administration assumes it does impose some demands—these requirements are more than satisfied by a high-level, rigorous internal judgment that this person is a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or its affiliates who poses an imminent threat, whose capture is not feasible, and whose targeting would be consistent with the laws of war.

#### Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism---disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.

If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.

Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Targeting low-level militants is key to all aspects of counter-terror---in-depth network analysis means the people we target don’t seem important to observers, but they’re actually vital to the effectiveness of terror groups

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

This becomes obvious when one considers that national security bureaucrats will look beyond criticality and vulnerability, and also engage in network-based analysis. Network-based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another.143 Contrary to popular critiques of the targeting process that liken it to a “haphazardly prosecuted assassination program,” in reality modern targeting involves applying pressure to various nodes and links within networks to disrupt and degrade their functionality.144

To effectively pursue a network-based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves “connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life.” This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence,” it assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”145 While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram, and further analyzed.146 Through this process links and nodes in the enemy's network emerge.147 The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks,”148 identifying key decision-makers and those who support or influence them indirectly.149 This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests, and they will exploit human and signals intelligence combined with computerized knowledge integration that generates and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network.150 “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure . . . as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”151

Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how seemingly low-level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization.152 Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.”153 Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations.154 Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by a bureaucrat relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security.155 This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be strong ties within the network.156 Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.157

#### Constraining targeted killing’s role in the war on terror causes extinction

Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

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Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

### Human Rights

#### Detention policy wrecks US human rights cred

Roth 7—executive director of Human Rights Watch. JD from Yale. (Ken, Carnegie Council [for Ethics in Intl Policy], 3/7, cceia.org)

But we also recognize that we need that activity supplemented by friendly and influential governments. Traditionally, there was no one more important in that process than the U.S. government. Now, I say that fully aware of all the warts and imperfections of the U.S. government's own record both domestically and in its foreign policy. And I am also aware of—and, indeed, I have probably spoken here several times about—the double standards that Joanne mentions, about the selectivity. But that said, the United States is, of course, the most powerful government, but also I think it is safe to say it has paid more attention to promoting human rights than anyone else around. So I am not happy to report the reality that I think is also apparent to most of us, and that is that the United States has severely damaged its credibility when it comes to promoting human rights. Now, not on everything. You know, we should put a caveat there first. The United States doesn't engage in genocide, it's not running around killing massive numbers of people; so it can protest, say, in Darfur with credibility. The United States is not shutting down civil society, censoring newspapers, closing political parties; so it can advocate for the protection of those freedoms and institutions around the world. But the United States is using torture and inhumane treatment. It has—and, frankly, continues to—forcibly disappeared people into secret detention facilities. It is locking people up without trial for long periods in places like Guantánamo or in Iraq or at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. And these are not small matters, I don't need to remind you. These involve some of the most fundamental rights around. And so it has become effectively unthinkable for the United States to go to a government and protest its torture or to protest its locking up of the latest dissidents without trial. I remember meeting recently with the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and asking him, "Do you complain about Egypt's use of torture?" He, sort of sheepishly, had to admit, "No, I can't really." And I saw why, because I then went to meet with the Egyptian Prime Minister and mentioned the torture problem. He kind of looked at me and said, "Well, what do you want? That's what Bush does." Now, we all know that that's a cheap excuse, it doesn't excuse anything in reality, but it is a line that helps to deflect the pressure, and it makes pressure from the United States much less real, much less forceful. This has left, in my view, a tremendous void on the leadership front when it comes to enforcing human rights. It is not a void that I think is necessarily there forever. I don't believe that America's reputation is irredeemable. But it is a void that will be there certainly for the next two years, because it is almost impossible for me to imagine the Bush Administration taking the steps that would be required to begin to change America's reputation around the world. What will be required is not only an end to the practices—stopping the torture, stopping the detention without trial—but a real repudiation of those practices, and ideally some form of accountability—prosecution for the worst offenses, other forms of censure, or the like—to make clear that this is not what America stands for. That is not going to happen under the Bush Administration. So, at least for the next couple of years, and possibly for longer, we are going to face the problem of traditionally the world's foremost human rights governmental advocate effectively not being there for many of our most serious problems.

#### Authoritarian states don’t follow norms — their “US justifies others” arg is naive

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The second benefit to foreigners of distinctive U.S. legal norms is information. The costs and benefits of our norms will be visible for all to see. n268 Particularly in an era of increased empirical social science testing, over time we will be able to analyze and identify the effects of differences in norms between the United States and other nations. n269 Such diversity benefits foreigners as foreign nations can decide to adopt our good norms and avoid our bad ones.

The only noteworthy counterargument is the claim that U.S. norms will have more harmful effects than those of raw international law, yet other nations will still copy them. But both parts of this proposition seem doubtful. First, U.S. law emerges from a democratic process that creates a likelihood that it will cause less harm than rules that emerge from the nondemocratic processes [\*1235] that create international law. Second, other democratic nations can use their own political processes to screen out American norms that might cause harm if copied.

Of course, many nations remain authoritarian. n270 But our norms are not likely to have much influence on their choice of norms. Authoritarian states are likely to select norms that serve the interests of those in power, regardless of the norms we adopt. It is true that sometimes they might cite our norms as cover for their decisions. But the crucial word here is "cover." They would have adopted the same rules, anyway. The cover may bamboozle some and thus be counted a cost. But this would seem marginal compared to the harm of allowing raw international law to trump domestic law.

#### Human Rights Cred is irrelevant — public opinion, global norms, and NGO networks outweigh US policy

Andrew Moravcsik 5, PhD and a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, 2005, "The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy," American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/paradox.pdf

It is natural to ask: What are the consequences of U.S. "exemptionalism” and noncompliance? International lawyers and human rights activists regularly issue dire warnings about the ways in which the apparent hypocrisy of the United States encourages foreign governments to violate human rights, ignore international pressure, and undermine international human rights institutions. In Patricia Derian's oft-cited statement before the Senate in I979: "Ratification by the United States significantly will enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of these standards. It will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the treaties. And, in countries where human rights generally are not respected, it will aid citizens in raising human rights issues.""' One constantly hears this refrain. Yet there is little empirical reason to accept it. Human rights norms have in fact spread widely without much attention to U.S. domestic policy. In the wake of the "third wave" democratization in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, government after government moved ahead toward more active domestic and international human rights policies without attending to U.S. domestic or international practice." The human rights movement has firmly embedded itself in public opinion and NGO networks, in the United States as well as elsewhere, despite the dubious legal status of international norms in the United States. One reads occasional quotations from recalcitrant governments citing American noncompliance in their own defense-most recently Israel and Australia-but there is little evidence that this was more than a redundant justification for policies made on other grounds. Other governments adhere or do not adhere to global norms, comply or do not comply with judgments of tribunals, for reasons that seem to have little to do with U.S. multilateral policy.

### Warming

#### No climate multilateralism — nationalism ensures gridlock

David Held 13, Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

Gridlock exists across a range of different areas in global governance today, from security arrangements to trade and finance. This dynamic is, arguably, most evident in the realm of climate change. The diffusion of industrial production across the world—a process enabled by economic globalization—has created a situation in which the basic consumption of each individual directly affects the life chances of every other individual on the planet, as well as the life chances of future generations.¶ This is a powerful and entirely new form of global interdependence. Bluntly put, the future of our civilization depends on our ability to cooperate across borders. And yet, despite twenty years of multilateral negotiations under the UN, a global deal on climate change mitigation or adaptation remains elusive, with differences between developed countries, which have caused the problem, and developing countries, which will drive future emissions, forming the core barrier to progress. Unless we overcome gridlock in climate negotiations, as in other issue areas, we will be unable to continue to enjoy the peace and prosperity we have inherited from the postwar order.¶ There are, of course, several forces that might work against gridlock. These include the potential of social movements to uproot existing political constraints, catalysed by IT innovation and the use of associated technology for coordination across borders; the capacity of existing institutions to adapt and accommodate factors such as emerging multipolarity (the shift from the G-5/7 to the G-20 is one example); and efforts at institutional reform which seek to alter the organizational structure of global governance (for example, proposals to reform the Security Council or to establish a financial transaction tax). ¶ Whether there is the political will or leadership to move beyond gridlock remains a pressing question. Social movements find it difficult to convert protests into consolidated institutional change. At the same time, the political leadership of the great power blocs appears dogged by national concerns: Washington is sharply divided, Europe is preoccupied with the future of the Euro and China is absorbed by the challenge of sustaining economic growth as the prime vehicle of domestic legitimacy. Against this background, the further deepening of gridlock and the continuing failure to address global collective action problems appears likely.

### AT: Heg

#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### PRISM destroyed soft power / credibility

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For the past few months, the United States has been rocked by a series of scandals. It all started with the events in Benghazi, when Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists attacked the General Consulate there and murdered four diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya. Then there was the scandal exposed when it was revealed that the Justice Department was monitoring the calls of the Associated Press. The Internal Revenue Service seems to have targeted certain political groups. Finally, there was the vast National Security Agency apparatus for monitoring online activity revealed by Edward Snowden. Together, these events provoke a number of questions about the path taken by contemporary Western societies, and especially the one taken by America.¶ Large and powerful institutions, especially those in the security sphere, have become unaccountable to the public, even to representatives of the people themselves. Have George Orwell’s cautionary tales of total government control over society been realized?¶ At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, my fellow students and I read Orwell’s 1984 and other dystopian stories and believed them to portray fascist Germany or the Soviet Union—two totalitarian regimes—but today it has become increasingly apparent that Orwell, Huxley and other dystopian authors had seen in their own countries (Britain and the United States) certain trends, especially as technological capabilities grew, that would ultimately allow governments to exert total control over their societies. The potential for this type of all-knowing regime is what Edward Snowden revealed, confirming the worst fears that the dystopias are already being realized.¶ On a practical geopolitical level, the spying scandals have seriously tarnished the reputation of the United States. They have circumscribed its ability to exert soft power; the same influence that made the U.S. model very attractive to the rest of the world. This former lustre is now diminished. The blatant everyday intrusions into the private lives of Americans, and violations of individual rights and liberties by runaway, unaccountable U.S. government agencies, have deprived the United States of its authority to dictate how others must live and what others must do. Washington can no longer lecture others when its very foundational institutions and values are being discredited—or at a minimum, when all is not well “in the state of Denmark.”¶ Perhaps precisely because not all is well, many American politicians seem unable to adequately address the current situation. Instead of asking what isn’t working in the government and how to ensure accountability and transparency in their institutions, they try, in their annoyance, to blame the messenger—as they are doing in Snowden’s case. Some Senators hurried to blame Russia and Ecuador for anti-American behavior, and threatened to punish them should they offer asylum to Snowden.¶ These threats could only cause confusion in sober minds, as every sovereign country retains the right to issue or deny asylum to whomever it pleases. In addition, the United States itself has a tradition of always offering political asylum to deserters of the secret services of other countries, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union and other ex-socialist countries. In those situations, the United States never gave any consideration to how those other countries might react—it considered the deserters sources of valuable information. As long as deserters have not had a criminal and murderous past, they can receive political asylum in any country that considers itself sovereign and can stand up to any pressure and blackmail.¶ Meanwhile, the hysteria of some politicians, if the State Department or other institutions of the executive branch join it, can only accelerate the process of Snowden’s asylum. For any country he might ask will only be more willing to demonstrate its own sovereignty and dignity by standing up to a bully that tries to dictate conditions to it. In our particular case, political pressure on Russia and President Putin could turn out to be utterly counterproductive. I believe that Washington has enough levelheaded people to understand that fact, and correctly advise the White House. The administration will need sound advice, as many people in Congress fail to understand the consequences of their calls for punishment of sovereign countries or foreign political leaders that don’t dance to Washington’s tune.¶ Judging by the latest exchange between Moscow and Washington, it appears that the executive branches of both countries will find adequate solutions to the Snowden situation without attacks on each other’s dignity and self-esteem. Russia and the United States are both Security Council members, and much hinges on their decisions, including a slew of common problems that make cooperation necessary.¶ Yet the recent series of scandals has caused irreparable damage to the image and soft power of the United States. I do not know how soon this damage can be repaired. But gone are the days when Orwell was seen as a relic of the Cold War, as the all-powerful Leviathan of the security services has run away from all accountability to state and society. Today the world is looking at America—and its model for governance—with a more critical eye.

### 1NC — Capability OW/No Deterrence

#### Capability outweighs credibility — US actions appear irrational, so countries don’t interpret our signals

Steve Chapman 9/5/13, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, “War in Syria: The Endless Quest for Credibility,” http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/05/war-in-syria-the-endless-quest-for-credi

The United States boasts the most powerful military on Earth. We have 1.4 million active-duty personnel, thousands of tanks, ships and planes, and 5,000 nuclear warheads. We spend more on defense than the next 13 countries combined. Yet we are told we have to bomb Syria to preserve our credibility in world affairs.¶ Really? You'd think it would be every other country that would need to confirm its seriousness. Since 1991, notes University of Chicago security scholar John Mearsheimer, the U.S. has been at war in two out of every three years. If we haven't secured our reputation by now, it's hard to imagine we ever could.¶ On the surface, American credibility resembles a mammoth fortress, impervious to anything an enemy could inflict. But to crusading internationalists, both liberal and conservative, it's a house of cards: The tiniest wrong move, and it collapses.¶ In a sense, though, they're right. The U.S. government doesn't have to impress the rest of the world with its willingness to defend against actual attacks or direct threats. But it does have to continually persuade everyone that we will lavish blood and treasure for purposes that are irrelevant to our security.¶ Syria illustrates the problem. Most governments don't fight unless they are attacked or have dreams of conquest and expansion. War is often expensive and debilitating even for the winners, and it's usually catastrophic for losers. Most leaders do their best to avoid it.¶ So even though the Syrian government is a vicious, repressive dictatorship with a serious grudge against Israel, it has mostly steered clear of military conflict. Not since 1982 has it dared to challenge Israel on the battlefield. When Israeli warplanes vaporized a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007, Bashar al-Assad did nothing. The risks of responding were too dire.¶ But the U.S. never faces such sobering considerations. We are more secure than any country in the history of the world. What almost all of our recent military interventions have in common is that they involved countries that had not attacked us: Libya, Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, Grenada and North Vietnam.¶ With the notable exception of the Afghanistan invasion, we don't fight wars of necessity. We fight wars of choice.¶ That's why we have such an insatiable hunger for credibility. In our case, it connotes an undisputed commitment to go into harm's way even when -- especially when -- we have no compelling need to do so. But it's a sale we can never quite close.¶ Using force in Iraq or Libya provides no guarantee we'll do the same in Syria or Iran or Lower Slobbovia. Because we always have the option of staying out, there's no way to make everyone totally believe we'll jump into the next crisis.¶ The parallel claim of Washington hawks is that we have to punish Assad for using nerve gas, because otherwise Iran will conclude it can acquire nuclear weapons. Again, our credibility is at stake. But how could the Tehran regime draw any certain conclusions based on what happens in Syria?¶ Two American presidents let a troublesome Saddam Hussein stay in power, but a third one decided to take him out. George W. Bush tolerated Moammar Gadhafi, but Barack Obama didn't. Ronald Reagan let us be chased out of Lebanon, only to turn around and invade Grenada. If you've seen one U.S. intervention, you've seen one.¶ What should be plain to Iran is that Washington sees nuclear proliferation as a unique threat to its security, which Syria's chemical weapons are not. Just because we might let Assad get away with gassing his people doesn't mean we will let Iran acquire weapons of mass destruction that would be used only against other countries. Heck, we not only let Saddam get away with using chemical weapons against Iran -- we took his side.¶ Figuring out the U.S. government's future impulses is hard even for Americans. There's no real rhyme or reason. But because we're so powerful, other governments can ill afford to be wrong. What foreigners have to keep in the front of their minds is not our inclination to act but our capacity to act -- which remains unparalleled whatever we do in Syria.¶ Credibility is overrated. Sure, it's possible for hostile governments to watch us squabble over Syria and conclude that they can safely do things we regard as dangerous. But there are graveyards full of people who made that bet.

## Legal

### Multilat Fails

#### Cooperation fails — multiple interlocking factors create gridlock

David Held 13, Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.¶ Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.

#### Multilat fails — disagreements prevent consensus action — empirics prove

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Just before Christmas, the U.N. Security Council adopted an arms embargo on Eritrea, which has been supplying weapons to Islamic insurgents in nearby Somalia. In one sense, the strictly worded measure is a symbol of the international community’s determination to stop tragic conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The resolution, however, is years late and could end up having little effect. A similar U.N. embargo on Somalia has not prevented weapons from being freely traded in Mogadishu. The concept of global collective security, unfortunately, has not worked well, either last century or this one. It is no surprise that the United Nations is not meeting important challenges, but even once-successful global institutions are losing effectiveness. The International Monetary Fund, for instance, completely failed to handle—or even anticipate—the global economic downturn. The G-7 and G-8 are now thought to be irrelevant, and the G-20, considered a replacement for these two groupings, has little to show for three grand gatherings in 2008 and 2009. The World Trade Organization has been unable to prevent a resurgence of protectionism, and its Doha Round negotiations, now more than eight years old, have stalled. These negotiations could be the first major trade talks to fail since the 1930s. Last month’s Copenhagen climate change summit, the 15th installment of the once-productive Conference of the Parties talks, flopped even though it was hailed as “the most important meeting in the history of the world.” Weak nuclear rogues like Syria are now getting the better of the once-mighty International Atomic Energy Agency. North Korea has already outsmarted the watchdog organization by covertly building plutonium-core weapons, and Iran is developing an atomic warhead with impunity.  President Obama says the United States cannot solve the world’s problems alone. Maybe that’s true, but sooner or later he has to realize he’s not going to get the help of the world’s other powers. The “international community” is not coming together to solve common problems. This is not how we thought things would work out two decades ago. In the early 1990s, optimistic Western analysts predicted that, with the Soviet Union gone, the world would enter a generally harmonious era. As Francis Fukuyama famously argued, events would continue to occur, but “the evolution of human societies through different forms of government had culminated in modern liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism.” Because democracies did not fight one another, the reasoning went, the international system would become more manageable. Nations would generally tend to agree with one another on the big issues—or at least manage to get along. In this type of world, multilateralism was not only considered possible, it was thought to be necessary and even desirable. Multilateralism, by its emphasis on consensual action, implicitly delegitimized America’s leading role in defending core Western values. So did the concept of globalization. Trade, the theory went, would lead to open -economies, open economies to prosperity, prosperity to representative governance, and representative governance to peace. In this extraordinarily benign environment, the impersonal forces of history, relentlessly grinding forward, would finish off Communists, autocrats, and bad actors of all stripes. As we now know, the opposite occurred. When the political barriers to trade fell, globalization indeed kicked into high gear, creating unprecedented amounts of wealth and liquidity. But global prosperity also strengthened hardline states, notably China and Russia, giving them the means to resist democratization, pursue aggressive foreign policies, and even bend the international system more to their liking. The Chinese, in particular, are displaying a newfound “sense of triumphalism” (as a senior U.S. official put it to the Washington Post last week) and are acting as if their economic success means they don’t have to listen to anybody. Developing democracies, such as India and Brazil, also gained prominence and a platform to pursue policies that differed from those of the more advanced nations.  The result is a world with many different voices, one where consensus, or even agreement, on important issues is not possible. Simply put, among the 195 nations of the world there is no common view of the troubling events of the day and no accepted approach to handling them. Even though the conditions that gave rise to multilateralism no longer exist, the concept has not only survived but attained the status almost of a geopolitical religion. In this environment, solutions are legitimate only if they are multilateral. Yet because multilateral solutions are becoming increasingly difficult to reach, problems fester. Most of the time, the best the international community can manage are lowest common denominator fixes on matters marginal to global security. It was thus utterly predictable that the Security Council chose last month to deal with Eritrea instead of, say, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

## Legal Crisis

#### Status quo target vetting is carefully calibrated to avoid every aff impact in balance with CT--- there’s only a risk that restrictions destroy it

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Target vetting is the process by which the government integrates the opinions of subject matter experts from throughout the intelligence community.180 The United States has developed a formal voting process which allows members of agencies from across the government to comment on the validity of the target intelligence and any concerns related to targeting an individual. At a minimum, the vetting considers the following factors: target identification, significance, collateral damage estimates, location issues, impact on the enemy, environmental concerns, and intelligence gain/loss concerns.181 An important part of the analysis also includes assessing the impact of not conducting operations against the target.182 Vetting occurs at multiple points in the kill-list creation process, as targets are progressively refined within particular agencies and at interagency meetings.

A validation step follows the vetting step. It is intended to ensure that all proposed targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in strategic guidance.183 The term strategic is a reference to national level objectives—the assessment is not just whether the strike will succeed tactically (i.e. will it eliminate the targeted individual) but also whether it advances broader national policy goals.184 Accordingly, at this stage there is also a reassessment of whether the killing will comport with domestic legal authorities such as the AUMF or a particular covert action finding.185 At this stage, participants will also resolve whether the agency that will be tasked with the strike has the authority to do so.186 Individuals participating at this stage analyze the mix of military, political, diplomatic, informational, and economic consequences that flow from killing an individual. Other questions addressed at this stage are whether killing an individual will comply with the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement (including theater specific rules of engagement). Further bolstering the evidence that these are the key questions that the U.S. government asks is the clearly articulated target validation considerations found in military doctrine (and there is little evidence to suggest they are not considered in current operations). Some of the questions asked are:

• Is attacking the target lawful? What are the law of war and rules of engagement considerations?

• Does the target contribute to the adversary's capability and will to wage war?

• Is the target (still) operational? Is it (still) a viable element of a target system? Where is the target located?

• Will striking the target arouse political or cultural “sensitivities”?

• How will striking the target affect public opinion? (Enemy, friendly, and neutral)?

• What is the relative potential for collateral damage or collateral effects, to include casualties?

• What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the adversary, friendly forces, or multinational partners?

• What would be the impact of not conducting operations against the target?187

As the preceding criteria highlight, many of the concerns that critics say should be weighed in the targeted killing process are considered prior to nominating a target for inclusion on a kill-list.188 For example, bureaucrats in the kill-list development process will weigh whether striking a particular individual will improve world standing and whether the strike is worth it in terms of weakening the adversary's power.189 They will analyze the possibility that a strike will adversely affect diplomatic relations, and they will consider whether there would be an intelligence loss that outweighs the value of the target.190 During this process, the intelligence community may also make an estimate regarding the likely success of achieving objectives (e.g. degraded enemy leadership, diminished capacity to conduct certain types of attacks, etc.) associated with the strike. Importantly, they will also consider the risk of blowback (e.g. creating more terrorists as a result of the killing).191

#### The US and Russia created a deal on Syria — here’s what it does

Washington Post 9/14 “US-Russia agreement to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons at a glance,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-russia-agreement-to-destroy-syrias-chemical-weapons-at-a-glance/2013/09/14/9803b82c-1d37-11e3-80ac-96205cacb45a\_story.html

—The U.S. and Russia agree to work together on a U.N. Security Council resolution that would ensure verification of the agreement to secure and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stocks and remove its capability to produce such weapons.¶ The resolution would come under Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter, which allows for military action. But U.S. officials acknowledge Russia would veto such a step and they do not contemplate seeking authorization for the use of force.¶ U.S. officials stress that President Barack Obama retains his right to conduct military strikes to defend American national security interests in the absence of U.N. authorization.¶ —The U.S. and Russia give Syria one week, until Sept. 21, to submit “a comprehensive listing, including names, types and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.”¶ —The U.S. and Russia agree that international inspectors should be on the ground in Syria by November and complete their initial work by the end of the month. They must be given “immediate and unfettered” access to inspect all sites. The destruction of chemical agent mixing and filling equipment must be completed by the end of November.¶ —The U.S. and Russia agree that all of Syria’s chemical weapons stocks, material and equipment must be destroyed by mid-2014.

#### Targeting citizens in narrow cases with strict criteria is certainly legal---particularly al-Awlaki

Jack Goldsmith 12, Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, 3/19/12, “Fire When Ready,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire\_when\_ready

This is the background against which to assess Attorney General Holder's claim that the Constitution "guarantees due process, not judicial process." Holder was referring to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on taking life without due process, a further legal limitation on the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. Critics belittled Holder for distinguishing due process from judicial process, but Holder is right. The Supreme Court has ruled in many contexts that due process does not always demand judicial scrutiny. It has also ruled that the type and extent of process due depends on the nature and circumstances of the deprivation, including a balance between the interests of the individual and the government.

A U.S. citizen's interest is obviously at its height when he is targeted with lethal force. The government's interest is at its height when it seeks to incapacitate a threatening enemy in a congressionally sanctioned war. Holder only defended the wartime authority to kill a U.S. citizen who presents "an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and for whom "capture is not feasible," and only when operations are "conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles." In these circumstances, he claimed, high-level executive deliberation, guided by judicial precedent and subject to congressional oversight, is all the process that is due.

Is Holder right? It is hard to say for sure because the due process clause has never before been thought relevant to wartime presidential targeting decisions. The system described above goes far beyond any process given to any target in any war in American history. Awlaki was not given a formal notice and opportunity to defend himself in court, but war does not permit such formal practices. One predicate for the killing was that Awlaki was in hiding -- beyond legal process or the reasonable possibility of capture -- and plotting and directing attacks on the United States. The U.S. government made clear that if Awlaki "were to surrender or otherwise present himself to the proper authorities in a peaceful and appropriate manner, legal principles with which the United States has traditionally and uniformly complied would prohibit using lethal force or other violence against him in such circumstances." And as Judge Bates noted, while Awlaki's placement on a targeting list was publicly disclosed in January 2010, Awlaki publicly disclaimed any intention of challenging his status or turning himself in.

It is hard to see how the executive branch could have taken its constitutional responsibilities more seriously while honoring its obligation to keep the nation safe. In light of Judge Bates's ruling and the analysis on which it rests, and until Congress thinks the president's approach to targeting requires change, the current system -- executive deliberation guided by judicial precedent and subject to congressional oversight -- almost certainly satisfies any constitutional requirement. In any event, it belies the claim that the president is not subject to checks and balances.

#### No Russia war---no motive or capability

Betts 13 Richard is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies @ Columbia. “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, Vol. 92, Issue 2, Online

These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse. First, the East-West balance of military capabilities, which at the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has become utterly lopsided. Russia is now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal. There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for aggression, except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's capabilities are now far greater.¶ Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their interests. During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal.

# 1NR

### OVW

**Disad outweighs and turns case – Harris and Burrows cite military economic stimuli, weakening multilateral institutions, and middle east proliferation – reverses the norms that have made the squo peaceful**

**Deudney and Ikenberry 09** [Daniel, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Myth of the Autocratic Revival :Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb]

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities -- of pushes and pulls -- that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while **creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving**. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become **largely obsolete.** Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people -- particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites -- have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The **declining utility** **of war**, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.

Downturn causes war in Asia – draws in China – destroys civilization

**SEP 11** [9/1, Socialist Equality Party, conference, “The breakdown of capitalism and the tasks of the working class”]

9. The working class must base itself on a scientific assessment of the global political and economic situation. Nothing less than a systemic breakdown in the entire structure of world capitalism is underway, like that which began with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The global profit system was only restabilised after World War II on the basis of the strength of American capitalism. Now, after a protracted economic decline, the US, the world’s chief debtor nation, is the principal source of economic instability and militarism. 10. Geopolitical tensions, and the use of military force to gain economic advantage, as in Libya, the Middle East, and Central Asia, will only intensify as the global crisis deepens. The Obama administration has ominously declared that the United States will now “refocus on Asia” to block the growing influence of China, posing the danger of open conflict and a catastrophic war between nuclear-armed states….15. Oppose militarism and war A third world war between nuclear-armed states would spell the end of human civilisation.

#### Turns due process- kills constitutional signal

Krugman 9/29/13 – Nobel Prize winning economist (Paul, “Rebels Without a Clue” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>

Meanwhile, on the politics, reasonable people know that Mr. Obama can’t and won’t let himself be blackmailed in this way, and not just because health reform is his key policy legacy. After all, once he starts making concessions to people who threaten to blow up the world economy unless they get what they want, he might as well tear up the Constitution. But Republican radicals — and even some leaders — still insist that Mr. Obama will cave in to their demands.

#### Destroys US legitimacy and signaling

Norm Ornstein 13, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy. Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

### 2NC---Obama Pushing

#### Obama is pushing --- he’s in the fray

Blake 9/18 (Aaron, Covers National Politics for the Washington Post, The Washington Post, Post Politics, Carney Assures That Obama 'Has Twisted Arms')

White House press secretary Jay Carney on Wednesday fought back against criticism that President Obama has been disengaged from legislative battles on Capitol Hill.¶ "He has twisted arms," Carney said. "He has used the powers that are available to him to try to convince, persuade, cajole Republicans into doing the sensible thing...."¶ Pressed on Obama's role in the current budget debate and his refusal to negotiate over the debt ceiling, Carney rebuffed the idea that the president isn't involved.¶ “You’re assuming he’s above the fray," Carney said. "He’s not. He’s in the fray. And he was in the fray today, and he'll be in the fray until Congress does the right thing.”

#### He’s using his bully pulpit to hold the line

The Hill 10/1/13 Obama schedules events to hammer Boehner on shutdown, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/326009-obama-schedules-events-to-hammer-boehner-on-shutdown>

President Obama will hold a series of events in the coming days to highlight the consequences of the government shutdown.

The events will hammer home the White House’s argument that it is Republicans who are preventing the government from reopening, White House aides say. They will also portray Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) as unwilling to buck a “faction” of the Republican caucus.

On Thursday, the president will appear at a local construction company that has benefited from federal loans. While there, he will highlight the real-world consequences of a shutdown, while casting blame for the crisis at the feet of House leadership.

The speech will follow a meeting Wednesday between Obama and top corporate executives, intended to force the hand of Republicans and pressure them to come to the table with a deal.

The meeting will remind the business leaders of the “consequences of the mere flirtation of default,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said on Tuesday.

On Tuesday, Obama appeared in the Rose Garden, using the bully pulpit to underscore the fact that he would not compromise on the current budget fight or the upcoming debt-ceiling clash, which White House officials say would be catastrophic to the economy.

“I will not negotiate over Congress’s responsibility to pay bills it’s already racked up,” Obama told reporters in a 20-minute statement. “I’m not going to allow anybody to drag the good name of the United States of America through the mud just to refight a settled election or extract ideological demands.”

The president’s apparent resoluteness came even as the White House grappled with the practical consequences of a shutdown.

In the White House press office, officials normally devoted to spinning the president’s message picked up some of the grunt work — like shepherding reporters across the White House grounds and placing the president’s remarks on his podium — usually reserved for now-furloughed low-level staffers.

The White House’s Twitter feed even promoted the wrong time for Obama’s remarks, more indication of the behind-the-scenes strain.

Most of the White House’s 438-member staff was deemed nonessential and sent home by midday, with only 129 staying at work. In the White House residence, only 15 of the 90 staffers were not furloughed.

The administration wouldn’t comment on who specifically was allowed to continue working, and who was sent home. But both White House senior adviser Valerie Jarrett and photographer Pete Souza could be observed through the windows of the Oval Office Tuesday afternoon.

The shutdown also threatened to throw a wrench in the president’s planned departure for an economic summit in Asia this weekend. Former President Clinton scrapped a trip to Japan during the 1995 shutdown, instead dispatching then-Vice President Al Gore.

Carney would only say that the trip remained on the president’s schedule, dodging questions about whether it was even logistically possible for Obama to travel amid a shutdown.

Despite the squeeze on resources, senior administration officials say the president has no intention to budge on this issue — or on the fight over the debt ceiling.

“It would set a really bad precedent,” one former senior administration official said. “And it would be a mistake on both fronts.”

There is a concern among White House officials that if Democrats accept a continuing resolution that includes concessions to the Tea Party, those House members would feel even more emboldened before fights over the debt ceiling or a funding bill that covers the entire year.

The White House is also betting that House Republicans will feel pressured to give in over the course of the next few days, according to the former administration official.

A spokesman for the president on Tuesday pointed to a pair of polls showing that voters are opposed to the idea of shutting down the government to oppose ObamaCare.

#### Obama will influence the GOP from behind the scenes

Sink 9/18/13 (Justin, The Hill, “Amid fiscal fights, Obama courting business leaders”

<http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/322883-amid-fiscal-fights-obama-courting-business-leaders>)

President Obama will address the Business Roundtable (BRT) on Wednesday as he works to get corporate leaders on his side during this fall’s fiscal showdowns with the GOP.¶ The White House is hoping that Obama can rally the influential organization, made up of conservative chief executives from the nation’s largest corporations, to help build pressure on congressional Republicans.¶ According to a White House official, the president will ask business leaders "to help send the message to Congress that a default would be disastrous for our economy and for businesses across the country."¶ "Some Republicans in Congress are playing a reckless political game by threatening to leave the economy hanging in the balance for an ideological agenda that has no chance of becoming law—a game that last time had real consequences, hurting growth and business confidence," the official said.¶ Obama is expected to note that during debt ceiling negotiations in the summer of 2011, the stock market decreased 17 percent, the nation's credit rating was downgraded, and consumer confidence dropped to its lowest level since the financial crisis. He'll argue to the assembled corporate executives that failure to strike a deal would again endanger the economy — and their bottom lines.¶ “The president’s focus, as is always the case when he meets with this group, is what we can do together to keep the American economy growing,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said on Tuesday.¶ But the sell will not be an easy one — the association’s officials have been critical of the president, and members of the group are wary of the administration’s aggressive regulatory push on labor and environmental issues.¶ And congressional Republicans are accusing the president of employing "scare tactics" to gain leverage.¶ "No one is threatening to default," said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). "The president only uses these scare tactics to avoid having to show the courage needed to deal with our debt crisis. Every major deficit deal in the last 30 years has been tied to a debt limit increase, and this time should be no different."¶ Obama has leaned on the organization in the past. Shortly after the president’s last visit in December for a speech and closed-door discussion, the CEOs sent a letter to congressional leaders arguing all options — including tax increases — should be on the table as negotiators sought a “fiscal-cliff” deal.¶ That gesture, a reversal from the group’s stance just five months earlier, ratcheted up pressure on congressional Republicans. The GOP subsequently stumbled, and Obama struck a deal that many Democrats embraced.

#### Political capital is key --- Allen says Obama must use his bully pulpit to solidify pressure on the GOP

#### The entire Dem strategy in the debt debate relies on Obama’s political capital

Liasson 9/21/13 (Mara, “Have Obama's Troubles Weakened Him For Fall's Fiscal Fights?” NPR, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/09/21/224494760/have-obamas-troubles-weakened-him-for-falls-fiscal-fights>)

"[Obama] had some missteps within the caucus," Manley says, but "now that he has those situations behind him ... he can turn his attention to the debt limit and the spending issues." Manley says the president will be well-positioned to take on Republicans in those fiscal fights, "if only because ... their policies are so out of the mainstream that they won't enjoy any support on the Hill and/or with the American people." The plan to bomb Syria was extremely unpopular. But on budget issues, the president is on firmer footing with the public, who may not like Obamacare but don't want it repealed or defunded. So, in the House at least, Republicans are making demands the president cannot and will not meet. "You have never seen, in the history of the United States, the debt ceiling or the threat of not raising the debt ceiling being used to extort a president or a governing party, and trying to force issues that have nothing to do with the budget and have nothing to do with the debt," Obama has said. White House officials say Democrats will always have internal divisions, but right now they are nothing compared with the fights inside the GOP. "There is essentially a civil war brimming in the Republican Party right now," says Dan Pfeiffer, the president's senior adviser. Pfeiffer points to open warfare between Tea Party conservatives and moderates, and even between House and Senate conservatives, as Republicans struggle to settle on a viable budget strategy. "The important thing is, as we head into these budget battles this fall, Democrats ... are in lock-step about the way to approach this," he says, "which is that we are not going to negotiate on the debt ceiling — we're not going to allow the full faith and credit of the United States to be held hostage by the Republicans, who want to ... deny health insurance to millions of Americans. We're in lock-step and they're divided, so I feel pretty good about that." Despite the setbacks of the spring and summer, the Obama team is counting on the latent power of the presidency — one of the most resilient institutions in American life. Unlike on Syria, Obama seems to have a budget strategy. He's hanging tough on his two red lines: no negotiations on the debt ceiling and no changes to Obamacare. The president is willing for now to let the Republicans flirt with the unpopular and dangerous possibilities of a government shutdown and a debt default. It's a high-stakes game of chicken, and one where the White House feels confident it has the upper hand.

#### Obama’s overall power determines success in the debt debate

Julie Pace 9/14, AP, 9-14-2013, “Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda,” Sandusky Register, http://www.sanduskyregister.com/article/4648721

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis. "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach. "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said. The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1. Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities. Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support.¶ Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012.¶ Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers.¶ "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is."¶ For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action.¶ Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.¶ That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul.¶ On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law.¶ The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending.¶ "You can't talk about increasing the debt limit unless you're willing to make changes and reforms that begin to solve the spending problem that Washington has," the Ohio Republican said.

#### Obama needs maximum PC for the debt ceiling

Lillis 9/7/13 (Mike, The Hill, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote” Read more: http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2gWiT9H8u)

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria. Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling. Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies. But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East. “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles. "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."

#### Obama needs to preserve his influence and bargaining chips for the debt debate

Langenkamp 13 Global political analyst at ECR Research and Interest & Currency Consultants [Andy Langenkamp, Obama to Take Over Baton From Fed?, 7-12-13, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-langenkamp/obama-to-take-over-baton-_b_3571885.html>]

Risky fiscal fall¶ As the U.S. Fed is not planning to boost the asset markets for much longer, growth will have to come from the private sector albeit with help from the government. However, it remains to be seen if politicians in the United States will be able to contribute to a healthy base for economic growth later this year.¶ As growth has picked up, concerns over the fiscal health of the United States have receded into the background. The fiscal problems may be out of the limelight, but they have not gone away. A relatively quiet summer will be followed by a hectic fall. Democrats and Republicans will cross fiscal swords. On October 1st, the U.S. federal budget runs out, the sequester for the fiscal year 2014 takes effect, and the U.S. will hit the debt ceiling. In 2014 too, the U.S. federal government may well need a so-called "continuing resolution" just to keep going.¶ Political hot potatoes¶ The fiscal debate is not the only "interesting" item on the agenda in the last part of the year. Political issues that could make waves in Q4 are the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada to the U.S., immigration law reform, the ongoing story of Obamacare, and the nomination of the next Fed chairperson.¶ The above issues give the president some bargaining chips as he attempts to strike a fiscal deal. Maybe he can deliver a grand bargain via package deals. But equally, debate will then spiral out of control and create an (even more) poisonous atmosphere in Washington.¶ Scandals threat to Obama?¶ Lately, Obama has been under attack from various sides. Several scandals threaten to undermine his reputation. AP and Fox journalists have been spied upon and the Internal Revenue Service has deliberately targeted organizations linked to the Tea Party for extra scrutiny. Meanwhile, the effects of the affair surrounding the deadly assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi (Libya) are lingering on. The latest uproar of course concerns the National Security Agency's snooping activities. This has led to a global outcry and has undermined Obama's reputation and political power abroad.¶ Obama's weakened hand reduces the chance that he can move the fiscal agenda forward. Meanwhile, Mr. Obama seems increasingly preoccupied with his legacy. U.S. presidents want to leave their mark on world affairs as the end of their last term approaches. Several have tried to solve the thorny Israeli-Palestinian problem (Clinton made a brave but ultimately naive and fruitless attempt). Obama appears to focus on, among others, reducing the world's nuclear stockpile -- witness his recent speech in Berlin -- and closing Guantánamo Bay.¶ Still some cards up his sleeves?¶ The U.S. president still has some political capital at his disposal. His approval rating (50 percent) may not be spectacular but it exceeds the dismal endorsement of Congress (15 percent). Many voters still give him the benefit of the doubt; just 26 percent of Americans are satisfied with the direction the U.S. is taking, but Obama's ratings indicate many do not believe he is to blame for their disappointment. In any case, the presidential "approval premium" has not been this high since Reagan. Perhaps this will give Mr. Obama the courage to get down to business in Q4 and take decisive steps towards restoring the fiscal health of America.

#### Political capital is key to get the job done

Lillis and Wasson 9/7 Mike, the Hill writer, Erik, the Hill writer, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote,” 9/7, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2fOPUfPNr

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria. **Obama needs** all the political capital he can muster **heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling**. Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies. But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East. “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles. "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "**We need a** maximally strong president **to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."**

#### Persuasion and mobilization skills are key

AP 9/9/13 <http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_24046750/syria-budget-could-become-obamas-make-or-break>

The tasks stacking up before President Barack Obama over the coming weeks will test his persuasive powers and his mobilizing skills more than at any other time in his presidency.¶ How well Obama handles the challenges could determine whether he leads from a position of strength or whether he becomes a lame duck one year into his second term.¶ Between now and the end of October, Obama must persuade wary lawmakers that they should grant him authority to take military action against Syria; take on Congress in an economy-rattling debate over spending and the nation's borrowing limit; and oversee a crucial step in putting in place his prized health care law.¶ The Syria vote looms as his first, biggest and perhaps most defining challenge. His mission is persuading Congress to approve armed action against the Syrian government in response to a chemical attack that Obama blames on President Bashar Assad's government.¶ "It's conceivable that, at the end of the day, I don't persuade a majority of the American people that it's the right thing to do," Obama said in a news conference Friday.¶ His chief of staff, Denis McDonough, was asked on "Fox News Sunday" whether a congressional rejection might endanger Obama's presidency. He said, "Politics is somebody else's concern. The president is not interested in the politics of this."¶ Presidents tend to have an advantage on issues of national security, a tradition demonstrated by the support Obama has won for action in Syria from the bipartisan leadership of the House. But that has not translated into support among the rank and file.¶ "Congress can look presidents in the eye on a level gaze regarding the budget," said presidential historian H.W. Brands. "But on war and peace, they have to look up to the president; he's the commander in chief.¶ "If he does lose, even if the loss comes about partly as a result from negative Democratic **vote**s, the Republicans are going to get the bit in their teeth and say 'We're not going to give this guy anything,' " said Brands, a professor at the University of Texas at Austin.¶ By that reasoning, success on Syria could give Obama some momentum.¶ "If he gets the authority, it shows that he's not a lame duck," said John Feehery, a Republican strategist and former House GOP leadership aide. "If he doesn't get the authority, it's devastating. People see him as the lamest of lame ducks."¶ At the White House, Syria has eclipsed all other matters for now. Win or lose, Obama and lawmakers next will run headlong into a budget debate.¶ Congress has a limited window to continue government operations before the new budget year begins Oct. 1.¶ Congressional leaders probably will agree to hold spending at current budget levels for about two or three months. That would delay a confrontation with the White House and pair a debate over 2014 spending levels with the government's need to raise its current $16.7 trillion borrowing limit. The Treasury says the government will hit that ceiling in mid-October.

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#### Debt ceiling will be raised now --- Obama’s standing strong and the GOP is weakening their calls for concessions --- leaked statements from top GOP leadership including Paul, McConnell, and Boehner all prove they are beginning to fold, but it’s not certain --- that’s Beutler and Allen.

#### Boehner will give in because of Obama pressure --- recent statements prove --- he’ll get enough Republicans on board

- But uniqueness doesn’t outweigh the link because Dems still need to get a “clean debt ceiling increase” to get it to pass

Greg Sargent 10/3/13, writer @ The Washington Post, “John Boehner gives away the game (a bit),” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/03/john-boehner-gives-away-the-game-a-bit/

Multiple reports today inform us that John Boehner is privately telling colleagues that in the end, he won’t allow default and will even let a debt ceiling hike pass with mostly Dem votes if it comes down to it. Plenty of folks are rightly skeptical about this development. But it’s not entirely without significance.¶ The Post’s account points out that this may be a trial balloon designed to gauge how this will play with conservatives. Meanwhile, a spokesman for Boehner has been reiterating that Boehner does not intend to allow default, even as that spokesman is simultaneously reiterating that he will expect concessions in exchange for raising the debt limit, anyway. Why? Because a “clean” debt limit cannot pass the House.¶ This is a variation on the glaring absurdity that’s been at the heart of Boehner’s position for some time, i.e, the simultaneous insistence that he knows the debt limit hike must happen — and that the contrary is not an option — even as he asks us to grant the presumption that the prospect of default gives him leverage. The twist added here is that this leverage is derived from the fact that only way to avert default is for Dems to give up enough in concessions so a high enough number of Republicans will vote to raise the debt limit to get it through. The game is that Boehner knows it must be raised — wink, wink — but all those crazies in his caucus will need some goodies to get them to go along.¶ Note these details from the Post’s write up:¶ In a series of small-group meetings in his office suite, Boehner has told fellow Republicans that he will not permit a vote on a “clean” short-term spending bill that does not end or delay parts of the new federal health-care law. But the aides indicated that Boehner is willing to risk infuriating some of the most conservative House GOP lawmakers by relying on a majority of Democratic votes — and less than a majority of Republicans — to pass a debt-ceiling increase.¶ What still needs to be nailed down is whether Boehner is prepared to allow a vote on a “clean” debt ceiling increase. Quotes from his spokespeople suggest not, but on the other hand, if a debt ceiling increase is going to pass with mostly Dems, it would have to be clean. More clarification here would be useful.¶ More broadly, what seems to be going on here is that this is Boehner’s “big give,” as one Dem aide put it to me sarcastically. Boehner is signaling flexibility in the sense that he just may be willing to give Dems the “clean” debt ceiling increase they want, but only in a larger context where Dems will be expected to make concessions in exchange for keeping the government open. In other words, whether or not Boehner ends up being open to a “clean” debt ceiling vote, the larger picture will remain that Democrats will still have to hand over a series of concessions in exchange for GOP cooperation in returning us to something resembling governing normalcy.¶ So in one sense, this isn’t much of a concession. On the other hand, the mere fact that Boehner sees a need to telegraph nominal flexibility to begin with could be a key tell. With Obama warning that Wall Street should take the possibility of default seriously, Boehner seems to see a need to underscore, again, that he will not allow default under any circumstances, and that keeping alive any doubts about this is politically untenable. Dems will look at this and probably only be even more encouraged to hold to a hard line on both the government shutdown and the debt limit. Boehner’s trial balloon is also useful in the sense that it makes the glaring absurdity that’s always been at the heart of his position even more glaringly absurd.

#### Shutdown consolidated Obama’s momentum --- the GOP is running out of steam

Ezra Klein 9/28/13, writer @ the Washington Post, “The House GOP’s shutdown plan is great news,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/28/the-house-gops-shutdown-plan-is-great-news/

House Republicans plan to attach a one-year delay of Obamacare to the continuing resolution. That sharply increases the chances of a government shutdown beginning Monday night.¶ Good.¶ Speaker Boehner's original plan was to pass a clean bill to fund the government and then attach the one-year delay of Obamacare to the debt-ceiling bill. It was a strategy that would minimize the chances of a shutdown but maximize the chances of a default.¶ Boehner wanted that strategy because he thought Republicans had more leverage on the debt limit than they do on the shutdown. A shutdown, after all, is just bad for the economy. A default is catastrophic for it. You'd have to be insanely reckless to permit the federal government to default on its debts. And Boehner believes that House Republicans are insanely reckless and that President Obama isn't.¶ But that strategy failed. Boehner's members refused to wait for the debt ceiling. They want their showdown now. And that's all for the better.¶ Moving the one-year delay of Obamacare to the CR maximizes the chances of a shutdown but makes a default at least somewhat less likely. If a shutdown begins Monday night, Republicans and Democrats will have more than two weeks to resolve it before hitting the debt ceiling.¶ As Alec Phillips put it in a research note for Goldman Sachs, "If a shutdown is avoided, it is likely to be because congressional Republicans have opted to wait and push for policy concessions on the debt limit instead. By contrast, if a shutdown occurs, we would be surprised if congressional Republicans would want to risk another difficult situation only a couple of weeks later. The upshot is that while a shutdown would be unnecessarily disruptive, it might actually ease passage of a debt limit increase."¶ One way a shutdown makes the passage of a debt limit increase easier is that it can persuade outside actors to come off the sidelines and begin pressuring the Republican Party to cut a deal. One problem in the politics of the fiscal fight so far is that business leaders, Wall Street, voters and even many pundits have been assuming that Republicans and Democrats will argue and carp and complain but work all this out before the government closes down or defaults. A shutdown will prove that comforting notion wrong, and those groups will begin exerting real political pressure to force a resolution before a default happens.

#### Compromise likely --- market predictions prove

Cordell Eddings 10/4/13, Bloomberg Business Week, “Markets Suggest Debt-Ceiling Compromise, Pimco’s El-Erian Says,” Bloomberg, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-04/markets-suggest-debt-ceiling-compromise-pimco-s-el-erian-says

Financial markets suggest that most investors anticipate that U.S. lawmakers will raise the limit on the nation’s debt and avoid a default on government securities, Pacific Investment Management Co.’s Mohamed El-Erian said.¶ “The alternative would be too awful to contemplate,” El-Erian, chief executive and co-chief investment officer at the world’s biggest manager of bond mutual funds, said on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop” with Betty Liu. “Most people in the market think we will avoid a debt-ceiling debacle.”¶ A partial U.S. government shutdown entered a fourth day amid wrangling by lawmakers over the budget and debt limit. The U.S. will run out of borrowing authority Oct. 17 and will have $30 billion in cash after that. The country would be unable to pay all of its bills sometime between Oct. 22 and Oct. 31, according to the Congressional Budget Office.¶ The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) gained 0.6 percent to 1,689.36 at 12:29 p.m. in New York, while the Stoxx Europe 600 Index climbed 0.1 percent. The yield on 10-year Treasuries increased four basis points to 2.65 percent.¶ The Treasury Department yesterday released a report about the consequences of reaching the debt ceiling, saying it may have catastrophic results that last decades, such as higher interest rates and slower economic growth.¶ ‘Quite Catastrophic’¶ “If the debt ceiling gets taken hostage by politicians, you will see a much different reaction,” El-Erian said from Pimco’s headquarters in Newport Beach, California. “The market expects as we get closer to Oct. 17 some realism will start occurring on Capitol Hill and politicians will avoid what potentially could be quite catastrophic both for the U.S. and the global economy.”

#### The GOP will blink --- they’ve been weakened by shutdown fighting

Victoria Craig 10/1/13, Fox Business, “Politics Forces Partial Shutdown, What's Next for Debt Limit?,” http://www.foxbusiness.com/government/2013/10/01/politics-forces-partial-shutdown-what-next-for-debt-limit/

“While Congress remains in session, our U.S. economists note that the path forward is not entirely clear, adding that it could take a week or more before the impasse over government funding is resolved. Indeed, the budget debate may carry through to the next and much more significant deadline of the debt ceiling,” the investment bank wrote.¶ Michael Block, chief strategist at Rhino Trading Partners said though there are no plans for members of Congress to meet and negotiate, he sees a light at the end of the tunnel. ¶ “I see this dragging on another week before the Speaker blinks and cobbles enough support to pass a stopgap funding bill. Perhaps he gets rid of the excise tax on medical devices as a compromise from the Democrats. Perhaps not. Maybe this is finally the end for Boehner’s leadership in the House. I don’t think so, but time will tell,” Block wrote to clients.¶ The Other (Bigger) Fiscal Crisis¶ While the American people wait for transportation, education, and some defense funding to be restored, there’s an arguably bigger battle brewing in Congress and it’s more likely to have a much bigger impact on the U.S. economy if Congress, again, fails to come to the negotiating table.¶ On October 17, the U.S. Treasury Department will exhaust its “extraordinary measures,” according to Treasury Secretary Jack Lew. At that point, Congress must decide whether to increase the nation’s borrowing limit or risk a default, for the first time in history, on the government’s financial obligations.¶ In the event lawmakers fail to come to an agreement on the debt ceiling, many worry ratings services will begin to downgrade U.S. sovereign debt. In 2011, the Dow plunged more than 600 points in a single session as part of a days-long rout on the heels of Standard & Poor’s removal of America’s top-notch rating as fears pulsed across global financial markets.¶ The question is, though, what will the impact be this time around? The last time the government experienced a similar shutdown scenario in February of 1996, it lasted 21 days and, according to the Congressional Research Service, cost the U.S. about $1.5 billion. In today’s dollar, an equivalent shutdown is estimated to run about $2.29 billion, a calculation by FOX Business shows.¶ “As for the impact, we imagine a one week shutdown should shave just one or two tenths off of growth but the longer this drags on, the more impactful it will be. BTIG is less sure than some others of the second order effects on growth and as such, we are not sure a longer term shutdown will be as detrimental as more dire forecasts,” Dan Greenhaus, chief global strategist at market-maker BTIG wrote in a note to clients Monday.¶ Citigroup, in a note to clients late Monday, said all the political brinkmanship signals a neutral outlook for an agreement to come on the debt ceiling.¶ “On Thursday, House leadership floated a debt-limit bill that also included more than 30 other policy proposals, potentially forecasting more rounds of the ping pong game. A reasonable view of market risk suggests this uncertainty must carry over into the debt-ceiling debate even after the CR is finally resolved,” the No. 3 U.S. bank wrote.¶ But while many investors and analysts see the failure to compromise over the federal budget, Goldman Sachs said it would be a mistake to interpret that failure as a sign of greater risk for a failure to negotiate on the debt ceiling.¶ “We would be surprised if congressional Republicans would want to risk another difficult situation only a couple of weeks later. The upshot is that while a shutdown would be unnecessarily disruptive, it might actually ease passage of a debt limit increase,” the investment bank wrote in a note to clients last week.¶ The investment bank said it expects a deal to raise the debt ceiling by the October deadline, with little back-and-forth negotiations.

#### Chance of hitting the ceiling is below 50% but there’s still a sizeable risk

Jonathan Capehart 9/30, WashPost, “Dancing on the debt ceiling: Brace for impact,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/09/30/dancing-on-the-debt-ceiling-brace-for-impact/

I thought it was just me, but it turns out the absolute confidence that the White House and Congress would work things out before the deadline in 2011 is absolutely gone now. “In 2011, despite the histrionics, all signs pointed to a messy but stable conclusion to the debt ceiling. The situation now is far more dire,” Jim Kessler, senior vice president for policy at the centrist think tank Third Way, told me Friday. “There’s a one in four chance that we crack the debt ceiling. It may be fixed 24 hours later when the markets swoon, but the short- and long-term damage it would do to the economy is anyone’s guess. We’ve never been here before.”¶ Steve Bell, senior director of the economic policy project at the Bipartisan Policy Center, was equally dire. “I believed there was virtually no chance, nil, that we would default in any form in 2011, because so many legislative gimmicks remained — special committee, expedited process, et al. Those have been exhausted,” he said. “At this point, I believe that somewhere between a 15-25 percent chance of the United States defaulting on some of its bills/debts owed, exists.”

#### Obama has leverage now because of the shut-down fight --- the GOP will give in

Dovere 10/1/13 (Edward, Politico, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line,”

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>)

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

### Link

#### TK restrictions would decimate Obama’s domestic agenda

HUGHES 2/6/13 White House Correspondent—The Washington Examiner [Brian Hughes, Obama's base increasingly wary of drone program, http://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-base-increasingly-wary-of-drone-program/article/2520787]

The heightened focus on President Obama's targeted killings of American terror suspects overseas has rattled members of his progressive base who have stayed mostly silent during an unprecedented use of secret drone strikes in recent years.¶ During the presidency of George W. Bush, Democrats, including then-Sen. Obama, hammered the administration for employing enhanced interrogation techniques, which critics labeled torture.¶ Liberals have hardly championed the president's drone campaign but have done little to force changes in the practice, even as the White House touts the growing number al Qaeda casualties in the covert war.¶ The issue grates on some Democrats who backed Obama over Hillary Clinton because of her vote in favor of the war in Iraq, only to see the president ignore a campaign promise to close the detainee holding camp in Guantanamo, Cuba, and mount a troop surge in Afghanistan.¶ With the confirmation hearing Thursday for John Brennan, Obama's nominee for CIA director -- and the architect of the drone program -- Democrats will have a high-profile opportunity to air their concerns over the controversial killings.¶ "You watch and see -- the left wing of the party will start targeting Obama over this," said Larry Sabato, a political scientist at the University of Virginia. "It's inevitable. The drumbeat will increase as time goes on, especially with each passing drone strike."¶ Obama late Wednesday decided to share with Congress' intelligence committees the government's legal reasoning for conducting drones strikes against suspected American terrorists abroad, the Associated Press reported. Lawmakers have long demanded to see the full document, accusing the Obama administration of stonewalling oversight efforts.¶ Earlier in the day, one Democrat even hinted at a possible filibuster of Brennan if given unsatisfactory answers about the drone program.¶ "I am going to pull out all the stops to get the actual legal analysis, because with out it, in effect, the administration is practicing secret law," said Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. "This position is no different [than] that the Bush administration adhered to in this area, which is largely 'Trust us, we'll make the right judgments.' "¶ In a Justice Department memo released this week, the administration argued it could order the killing of a suspected American terrorist even with no imminent threat to the homeland.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney insisted on Wednesday that the administration had provided an "unprecedented level of information to the public" about the drone operations. Yet, questions remain about who exactly orders the killings, or even how many operations have been conducted.¶ "There's been more noise from senators expressing increased discomfort [with the drone program]," said Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project. "For Brennan, there's going to be more opposition from Democrats than Republicans. It's not just drones but the issue of torture."¶ Facing concerns from liberals, Brennan had to withdraw his name from the running for the top CIA post in 2008 over his connections to waterboarding during the Bush administration.¶ Since becoming president, Obama has championed and expanded most of the Bush-era terror practices that he decried while running for the White House in 2008.¶ It's estimated that roughly 2,500 people have died in drone strikes conducted by the Obama administration.¶ However, most voters have embraced the president's expanded use of drone strikes. A recent Pew survey found 62 percent of Americans approved of the U.S. government's drone campaign against extremist leaders. And some analysts doubted whether Democratic lawmakers would challenged Obama and risk undermining his second-term agenda.¶ "Democrats, they're going to want the president to succeed on domestic priorities and don't want to do anything to erode his political capital," said Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. "It's just so partisan right now. An awful lot of [lawmakers] think the president should be able to do whatever he wants."

#### Obama would fight TK restrictions

* AT: “He supports drone court”

NYT 13 5-24-2013 (The End of the Perpetual War, lexis)

In the past, we have been deeply troubled by the administration's insistence that the review of planned targeted killings be handled entirely within the executive branch. On Thursday, he said he was willing to talk to Congress about ''options for increased oversight'' -- including the establishment of ''a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action'' or ''an independent oversight board in the executive branch.'' Mr. Obama said he had constitutional and operational concerns about both ideas; in the end, he may not agree to either. But at least he did not contemptuously dismiss them as some of his advisers have done in the past.

#### Reducing war powers will end Obama’s credibility with Congress --- cause stronger GOP pushback on the debt ceiling

Seeking Alpha 9/10/13 (“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight”, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight>)

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability.¶ I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four.¶ While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling.¶ Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues.¶ Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight.¶ I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011.¶ As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%. Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event.¶ Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time.¶ Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade.¶ I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks.¶ The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama.¶ Remember, in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.

#### Fights caused by the plan distract from congressional efforts to resolve the debt ceiling --- collapses the economy

Norm Ornstein 13, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy. Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

### AT Obama solves

#### Default is inevitable if Congress can’t raise the ceiling --- no stop gap can solve

Brad Plumer 9/10/13, writer for Washington Post’s Wonkblog, “We could breach the debt ceiling as soon as Oct. 18. Here’s what happens next.,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/10/we-could-breach-the-debt-ceiling-as-soon-as-oct-18-heres-what-happens-next/

That leaves three other possibilities if we hit the “X Date”: First, Treasury could try to buy time by merely delaying payments — agency officials deemed this the least-bad approach back in 2011. If Treasury was facing $10 billion in obligations on Monday, but only $7 billion in revenue came in, the agency could wait until it had the full $10 billion on hand before paying Monday’s bills in full. The problem is that during the delay, Tuesday’s bills are piling up. Then Wednesday’s. This tactic would quickly become unsustainable.¶ Second, the White House’s Office of Management and Budget could try to stem the rush of invoices coming out of government agencies. Technically, the OMB has latitude to tell federal agencies that they can’t spend funds allotted them until later in the year — a power known as “apportionment.” The hitch is that this process can take weeks to have a meaningful impact, as former OMB official Barry Anderson told me back in January. And OMB can only slow the rate of agency spending; it can’t stop it altogether.¶ Third, as we’ve discussed before, the Obama administration could try to find some extraordinary way to get around the debt ceiling. Some Democrats have suggested that Obama can just declare the ceiling unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment. Others have suggested that he should mint a platinum coin to fund the government (yes, really). But administration officials have explicitly ruled out these moves.¶ Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has insisted there are only two ways the debt ceiling fight can go: Either Congress lifts the debt ceiling, or the U.S. government defaults. Obama is “not going to be negotiating over the debt limit,” Lew told CNBC in August. “Congress has already authorized funding, committed us to make expenditures. We’re now in a place where the only question is, will we pay the bills that the United States has incurred?”

#### No stop-gap measure is sufficient to avoid default

Masters 12 Jonathan is an online writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. “U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences,” Dec 6, http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/us-debt-ceiling-costs-consequences/p24751

If the debt limit is reached again in 2013 despite such emergency measures, federal spending would have to plummet dramatically or taxes would have to rise significantly (or a combination thereof). However, Geithner has warned in the past that because the government's obligations are so great, "immediate cuts in spending or tax increases cannot make the necessary cash available." If Treasury is unable to issue new debt or take further actions to bridge the deficit, the government would be forced to default on some of its financial commitments, limiting or delaying payments to creditors, beneficiaries, vendors, and other entities. Among other things, these payments could include military salaries, Social Security and Medicare payments, and unemployment benefits.

### AT: Fiat Immediate

**1. Plan still requires a debate – the magic wand kills disad links based off of international responses, political responses, and funding – vote neg to preserve neg ground.**

**2. There is still a link – Obama still voted for the plan and got it passed which means members of congress will look back and say, “WHAT THE HELL JUST HAPPENED?” and freak out on Obama. This will cost more capital than if he had to fight for it in the first place.**

### AT Resilient

#### No resiliency --- stimulus spending has been winded down --- means the debt ceiling collapses the economy

Goldfarb 13 Zach is a writer for the Washington Post. “‘Fiscal cliff’ deal does little to tame threats from debt ceiling, high unemployment rates,” 1/1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/fiscal-cliff/fiscal-cliff-deal-does-little-to-tame-threats-from-debt-ceiling-high-unemployment-rates/2013/01/01/8e4c14aa-5393-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f\_story.html

The deal fell somewhere in between. But by gaining the support of both sides, it did not achieve what many economists believe is necessary forthe short- and long-term success of the U.S. economy.¶ Leaving the fate of the debt ceiling up in the air will cause anxiety among businesses and individuals, potentially crimping hiring, investing and consumer spending.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation’s bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shak[e]ing world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.¶ And while a default would be all but certain to push the economy into recession, growth is likely to be slow — and job-market improvement slight — even without such a cataclysmic event. The unemployment rate, which stands at 7.7 percent, is not expected to fall below 7.4 percent by the end of this year, and not below 6 percent until at least 2016 or later.¶ In the midst of the recession, the government stepped in with spending programs and deep tax cuts to lift growth and reduce unemployment. A majority of economists say those efforts worked.¶ But federal stimulus has been winding down. And the spending cuts and tax hikes set for 2013 are expected to be a drag on the economy — with government policy offsetting much of the robust recovery being experienced in the private sector.¶ Nor does the agreement do what many analysts say is necessary to achieve long-term budget savings and tame the federal debt, which is projected to grow rapidly as a percentage of the economy in the coming decades.

### AT other

#### Collapses dollar heg

Masters 12 Jonathan is an online writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. “U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences,” Dec 6, http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/us-debt-ceiling-costs-consequences/p24751

Historically, the U.S. Treasury market has been driven by huge investments from surplus countries like Japan and China, which view the United States as the safest place to store their savings. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report suggests that a loss of confidence in the debt market could prompt foreign creditors to unload large portions of their holdings, thus inducing others to do so, and causing a run on the dollar in international markets. However, others claim that a sudden sell-off would run counter to foreign economic interests, as far as those interests run parallel to a robust U.S. economy.¶ While many U.S. exporters would benefit from dollar depreciation because it would increase foreign demand for their goods (effectively making them cheaper), the same firms would also bear higher borrowing costs from rising interest rates.¶ A potential long-term concern of some U.S. officials is that persistent volatility of the dollar will add force to recent calls by the international community for an end to its status as the world's reserve currency. A 2010 survey performed by the McKinsey Global Institute found fewer than 20 percent of business executives surveyed expected the dollar to be the dominant global reserve currency by 2025.

#### History proves dollar primacy is key to heg --- decline makes the US unable to finance deficits

Looney 3 Robert, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Political power and prestige. The benefits of "power and prestige" are nebulous. Nevertheless, the loss of key currency status and the loss of international creditor status have sometimes been associated, along with such non-economic factors as the loss of colonies and military power, in discussions of the historical decline of great powers. Causality may well flow from key currency status to power and prestige and in the opposite direction as well.[8] On a broader scale, Niall Ferguson[9] notes that one pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. government sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency. Quoting several noted authorities, he notes that [the role of the dollar] enabled the United States to be "far less restrained…than all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or strategic policies it decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a 'hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy form foreigners in the form of seignorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). The web contains many more radical interactions of the dollar's role. Usually something along the following lines: World trade is now a game in which the U.S. produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies…. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the U.S. has extracted from oil-producing countries for U.S. tolerance of the oil-exporting cartel since 1973.[10] America's coercive power in the world is based as much on the dollar's status as the global reserve currency as on U.S. military muscle. Everyone needs oil, and to pay for it, they must have dollars. To secure dollars, they must sell their goods to the U.S., under terms acceptable to the people who rule America. The dollar is way overpriced, but it's the only world currency. Under the current dollars-only arrangement, U.S. money is in effect backed by the oil reserves of every other nation.[11] While it is tempting to dismiss passages of this sort as uninformed rants, they do contain some elements of truth. There are tangible benefits that accrue to the country whose currency is a reserve currency. The real question is: if this situation is so intolerable and unfair, why hasn't the world ganged up on the United States and changed the system? Why haven't countries like Libya and Iran required something like euros or gold dinars in payment for oil? After all, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 the International Monitary Fund's Standard Drawing Rights (unit of account) was certainly an available alternative to the dollar.[12]

#### Dollar hegemon key to global trade and the economy

Caploe 8 David, The Straits Times, “It's the fiscal deficit, stupid,” Sept 2 Lexis

The origins of this system lie in the shattered condition of the world economy after World War II. At that time, the only currency universally accepted for international trade was the US dollar. This 'dollar hegemony' has enabled the US to survive and prosper for decades despite the fact it has run consistent balance of payments deficits since 1959 - a condition that would have devastated any other country whose currency wasn't the world's 'reserve currency'. Put simply, countries accept dollars, even in their currently weakened state, to buy and sell from each other - above all oil, which has been priced in US dollars since even before World War II. The result of dollar hegemony has been a 'win-win' situation for both the US and the rest of the world: The US can import goods and services far beyond its immediate ability to pay, and the rest of the world has been willing to take dollars, which they can use themselves. In this way, America serves as not just the global consumer of last resort - the place where countries know they are usually able to off-load their inventories - but also the global financier of last resort. That is, the supply of dollars moving around the world has, for the last half century, helped maintain the flow of not just trade, but international investment as well.

#### Trade and growth solve global war

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Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark

on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers,

like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### AT turn in

**Economic collapse causes war**

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Mathew, and Jennifer “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so,history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivalscombined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertaintyof Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for thesecountries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.