# 1NC

## Offcase

### 1NC Politics

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#### Rouhani will get a nuclear deal because he’s keeping hardliners in check --- empowering hardliners would scuttle the deal

Fox News, 9-28-2013, “Rouhani begins tougher mission of selling US outreach to hard-liners at home,” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/28/analysis-rouhani-begins-tougher-mission-selling-us-outreach-to-hard-liners-at/

Before leaving for the United Nations, Iran's President Hassan Rouhani said he hoped to open a new era in dialogue with Washington. He returned to Tehran on Saturday with more in hand than even the most optimistic predictions.¶ Now begins the harder task for Rouhani and his inner circle of Western-educated envoys and advisers, who are suddenly partners with the White House in a potentially history-shifting reset in the Middle East that could rival in scope the Arab Spring or Israel's peace pact with Egypt. To build on the stunning diplomatic openings of the past days, Rouhani and his allies now must navigate political channels that make President Barack Obama's showdowns with his domestic critics seem almost genteel by comparison. Possibly standing in the way of Rouhani's overtures is an array of hard-liners, led by the hugely powerful Revolutionary Guard, that hold sway over nearly everything from Iran's nuclear program to a paramilitary network that reaches each neighborhood. What's ahead will measure Rouhani's resolve. It also will test how much the Guard and its backers are willing to accept something other than spite and suspicion toward the U.S. — and what it could all mean for the Guard's regional footholds that include Syria and the anti-Israel militia Hezbollah in Lebanon. At Rouhani's airport arrival in Tehran, backers cheered and held aloft a placard calling him a "lord of peace," while opponents shouted insults and chanted "death to America." One thing is certain, however. The rapid-fire momentum of diplomacy over the past days — fed by Twitter's no-breather pace — cannot be maintained. The linchpin, as always, remains Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the gate keeper for every key decision. He has so far given critical support to Rouhani's overtures with Washington — calling for "heroic flexibility" in diplomacy — while giving the Guard a rare scolding to keep its distance from political developments. As long as Rouhani carries Khamenei's favor, there is unprecedented credibility to his offers to settle the impasse over Iran's nuclear ambitions and possibly forge ahead on other fronts after a more than three-decade diplomatic estrangement with the U.S. But Khamenei also is not interested in tearing apart the country. Strong objections from the Guard and other hard-line factions would certainly get his attention. Even a slight roll back in Khamenei's backing for Rouhani would be magnified on the world stage, raising doubts in the West about whether it's worth investing the diplomatic capital in mending ties with Iran.

#### The prospect that Congress could block military action guarantees failure of Iran diplomacy by emboldening hard-liners --- triggers Israel strikes

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Still, for the opponents of authorization, these arguments are portrayed as abstractions. Only threats that are immediate and directly affect us should produce U.S. military strikes. Leaving aside the argument that when the threats become immediate, we will be far more likely to have to use our military in a bigger way and under worse conditions, there is another argument to consider: should opponents block authorization and should the president then feel he cannot employ military strikes against Syria, this will almost certainly guarantee that there will be no diplomatic outcome to our conflict with Iran over its nuclear weapons.¶ I say this for two reasons. First, Iran’s President Rouhani, who continues to send signals that he wants to make a deal on the nuclear program, will inevitably be weakened once it becomes clear that the U.S. cannot use force against Syria. At that point, paradoxically, the hard-liners in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and around the Supreme Leader will be able to claim that there is only an economic cost to pursuing nuclear weapons but no military danger. Their argument will be: Once Iran has nuclear weapons, it will build its leverage in the region; its deterrent will be enhanced; and, most importantly, the rest of the world will see that sanctions have failed, and that it is time to come to terms with Iran.¶ Under those circumstances, the sanctions will wither. What will Rouhani argue? That the risk is too high? That the economic costs could threaten regime stability? Today, those arguments may have some effect on the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei precisely because there is also the threat that all U.S. options are on the table and the president has said he will not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Should he be blocked from using force against Syria, it will be clear that all options are not on the table and that regardless of what we say, we are prepared to live with an Iran that has nuclear arms.¶ Israel, however, is not prepared to accept such an eventuality, and that is the second reason that not authorizing strikes against Syria will likely result in the use of force against Iran. Indeed, Israel will feel that it has no reason to wait, no reason to give diplomacy a chance and no reason to believe that the United States will take care of the problem. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees Iran with nuclear weapons as an existential threat and, in his eyes, he must not allow there to be a second Holocaust against the Jewish people. As long as he believes that President Obama is determined to deal with the Iranian threat, he can justify deferring to us. That will soon end if opponents get their way on Syria.¶ Ironically, if these opponent succeed, they may prevent a conflict that President Obama has been determined to keep limited and has the means to do so. After all, even after Israel acted militarily to enforce its red line and prevent Syria’s transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad, Iran and Hezbollah have been careful to avoid responding. They have little interest in provoking Israeli attacks that would weaken Syrian forces and make them vulnerable to the opposition.¶ For all the tough talk about what would happen if the United States struck targets in Syria, the Syrian and Iranian interest in an escalation with the United States is also limited. Can the same be said if Israel feels that it has no choice but to attack the Iranian nuclear infrastructure? Maybe the Iranians will seek to keep that conflict limited; maybe they won’t. Maybe an Israeli strike against the Iranian nuclear program will not inevitably involve the United States, but maybe it will — and maybe it should.

#### Strikes escalate to great power nuclear and biological war

Dennis Ray Morgan 9, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693

This scenario has gained even more plausibility since a January 2007 Sunday Times report [13] of an Israeli intelligence leak that Israel was considering a strike against Iran, using low-yield bunker busting nukes to destroy Iran’s supposedly secret underground nuclear facilities. In Moore’s scenario, non-nuclear neighboring countries would then respond with conventional rockets and chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Israel then would retaliate with nuclear strikes on several countries, including a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, who then retaliates with an attack not only on Israel butpre-emptively striking India as well. Israel then initiates the ‘‘Samson option’’ with attacks on other Muslim countries, Russia, and possibly the ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ cities of Europe. At that point, all-out nuclear war ensues as the U.S. retaliates with nuclear attacks on Russia and possibly on China as well.11

#### Iran prolif causes nuclear war

Edelman 11 - Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9 (Eric, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, proquest)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention ofWeapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates- all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)-have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium-the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.¶ Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and difficult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states' access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.¶ There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.¶ There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.¶ Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.¶ The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt.¶ N-PLAYER COMPETITION¶ Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.¶ More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

### 1NC XO CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an Executive Order committing the executive branch to Solicitor General Representation and advance consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel over decisions to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

#### The Office of Legal Counsel should issue a formal, public opinion recommending against \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ without prior Congressional authorization.

#### Executive pre-commitment to DOJ advice solves the aff

* Internal restrictions are comparatively more effective
* Pre-commitment solves groupthink/bias --- causes OLC lawyers to play devil’s advocate

Pillard 5 – JD from Harvard, Faculty Director of Supreme Court Institute at Georgetown University Law Center, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ (February, Cornelia T., Michigan Law Review, 103.4, “The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands”, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676-758, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/189/)

V. ENABLING EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM¶ The courts indisputably do not and cannot fully assure our enjoyment of our constitutional rights, and it is equally clear that the federal executive has an independent constitutional duty to fulfill the Constitution's promise. Executive constitutionalism seems ripe with promise. Yet, it is striking how limited and court-centered the executive's normative and institutional approaches to constitutional questions remain.¶ One conceivable way to avoid the pitfalls of court-centric executive lawyering on one hand and constitutional decisions warped by political expedience on the other would be to make the Solicitor General and Office of Legal Counsel - or perhaps the entire Department of Justice - as structurally independent as an independent counsel or independent agency.207 Making the SG and OLC independent in order to insulate them from politics presumably would alleviate the "majoritarian difficulty" resulting from their service to elected clients. Promoting fuller independence in that sense does not, however, appear to be clearly normatively attractive, constitutionally permissible, nor particularly feasible. In all the criticism of our current constitutionalism, there is little call for an SG or OLC that would act, in effect, as a fully insulated and jurisprudentially autonomous constitutional court within the executive branch, operating with even less transparency and accountability than the Supreme Court. Moreover, as a practical matter it would be complex and problematic to increase the independence of the SG and OLC. The federal government faces Article II obstacles to formally insulating executive lawyers from politics and institutional pressures, and the president and his administration likely would be less amenable to guidance from such unaccountable lawyers.208¶ The challenge, rather, is to draw forth from the executive a constitutional consciousness and practice that helps the government actively to seek to fulfill the commitments of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, interpreted by the executive as guiding principles for government. Adjustments to executive branch constitutional process and culture should be favored if they encourage the executive to use its experience and capacities to fulfill its distinctive role in effectuating constitutional guarantees. There is transformative potential in measures that break ingrained executive branch habits of looking to the Constitution only as it is mediated through the courts, and of reflexively seeking, where there is no clear doctrinal answer, to minimize constitutional constraint. It is difficult fully to imagine what kinds of changes would best prompt executive lawyers and officials to pick up constitutional analysis where the courts leave off, and to rely on the Constitution as an affirmative, guiding mandate for government action; what follows are not worked-out proposals, but are meant to be merely suggestive.¶ A. Correcting the Bias Against Constitutional Constraint¶ As we have seen, the SG's and OLC's default interpretive approach to individual rights and other forms of constitutional constraints on government is to follow what clear judicial precedents there are and, where precedents are not squarely to the contrary, to favor interpretations that minimize constitutional rights or other constitutional obligations on federal actors. Those court-centered and narrowly self-serving executive traditions produce a systematic skew against individual rights.¶ 1. Encourage Express Presidential Articulation of Commitment to Constitutional Rights¶ To the extent that a president articulates his own rights-protective constitutional vision with any specificity, he ameliorates the tension his constitutional lawyers otherwise face between advancing individual rights and serving their boss's presumed interest in maximum governing flexibility. Case or controversy requirements and restrictions against courts issuing advisory opinions do not, of course, apply to the executive's internal constitutional decisionmaking, and presidents can better serve individual rights to the extent that they expressly stake out their constitutional commitments in general and in advance of any concrete controversy."° When the president takes a stand for advancing abortion rights, property rights, disability rights, "charitable choice," a right to bear arms, or full remediation of race and sex discrimination, he signals to his lawyers that they should, in those areas, set aside their default bias in favor of preserving executive prerogative, even if it requires extra executive effort or restraint to do so.¶ If presented in a concrete setting with a choice between interpreting and applying the Constitution in fully rights-protective ways or sparing themselves the effort where Supreme Court precedent can be read not to require it, government officials typically default to the latter course without considering whether they might thereby be giving short shrift to a constitutional duty. A president's stated commitment to protection of particular rights, however, flips the default position with respect to those rights, acting as a spur to executive-branch lawyers and other personnel to work to give effect to constitutional rights even where, for a range of institutional reasons, the courts would not. A president is thus uniquely situated to facilitate full executive-branch constitutional compliance by precommitting himself to a rights-protective constitutional vision, and thereby making clear that respect for constitutional rights is part of the executive's interest, not counter to it.

#### OLC opinions solve the whole aff without linking to any of our DA’s

Trevor Morrison 11, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, “LIBYA, ‘HOSTILITIES,’ THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, AND THE PROCESS OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL INTERPRETATION,” Harvard Law Review Forum Vol.124:42, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124\_forum\_morrison.pdf

Deeply rooted traditions treat the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) as the most important source of legal advice wit h- in the executive branch. A number of important norms guide the provision and handling of that advice. OLC bases its answers on its best view of the law, not merely its sense of what is plausible or arguable. 6 To ensure that it takes adequate account of competing perspectives within the executive branch, it typically requests and fully considers the views of other affected agencies before answering the questions put to it. Critically, once OLC arrives at an answer, it is treated as binding within the executive branch unless overruled by the Attorney General or the President. That power to overrule, moreover, is wielded extremely rarely — virtually never. As a result of these and related norms, and in spite of episodes like the notorious “torture memos,” OLC has earned a well-deserved reputation for providing credible, authoritative, thorough and objective legal analysis. The White House is one of the main beneficiaries of that reputation. When OLC concludes that a government action is lawful, its conclusion carries a legitimacy that other executive offices cannot so readily provide. That legitimacy is a function of OLC’s deep traditions and unique place within the executive branch. Other executive offices — be they agency general counsels or the White House Counsel’s Office — do not have decades-long traditions of providing legal advice based on their best view of the law after fully considering the competing positions; they have not generated bodies of authoritative precedents to inform and constrain their work; and they do not issue legal opinions that, whether or not they favor the President , are treated as presumptively binding within the executive branch. (Nor should those other offices mimic OLC; that is not their job.) Because the value of a favorable legal opinion from OLC is tied inextricably to these aspects of its work, each successive presidential administration has a strong incentive to respect and preserve them.

### 1NC Bomb China CP

\*\*\*Re-write the second plank to mirror the aff’s plan with “conventional, biological, or chemical warfare” or something like that to exclude nukes. Be sure to

#### Text:

#### The President of the United States should execute a disarming strike utilizing low-yield airburst nuclear weapons on the Chinese nuclear arsenal if and only if he believes he has the non-extra-Constitutional authority to do so.

#### The United States Federal Government should preclude the President from initiating conventional, biological, or chemical warfare without prior authorization from Congress, unless acting to repel armed attacks against the United States.

#### First, the counterplan solves the case --- it applies the same restrictions as the plan to every category of warmaking except nuclear strikes --- that’s sufficient because every 1AC card is about conventional intervention

#### Second, it’s net-beneficial --- US-Sino war is inevitable --- it will escalate and go nuclear --- diplomacy, deterrence, and crisis management can’t check

Avery Goldstein, October 2013, the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and IR and Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China @ the University of Pennsylvania, “China’s Real and Present Danger,” September/October 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger?cid=soc-twitter-in-essays-chinas\_clear\_and\_present\_danger-100713

Much of the debate about China’s rise in recent years has focused on the potential dangers China could pose as an eventual peer competitor to the United States bent on challenging the existing international order. But another issue is far more pressing. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak compared to the United States, there is a real danger that Beijing and Washington will find themselves in a crisis that could quickly escalate to military conflict. Unlike a long-term great-power strategic rivalry that might or might not develop down the road, the danger of a crisis involving the two nuclear-armed countries is a tangible, near-term concern -- and the events of the past few years suggest the risk might be increasing.¶ Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington have managed to avoid perilous showdowns on several occasions: in 1995–96, when the United States responded to Chinese missile tests intended to warn Taiwanese voters about the danger of pushing for independence; in 1999, when U.S. warplanes accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air assault on Serbia; and in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, leading to the death of the Chinese pilot and Beijing’s detention of the U.S. plane and crew. But the lack of serious escalation during those episodes should not breed complacency. None of them met the definition of a genuine crisis: a confrontation that threatens vital interests on both sides and thus sharply increases the risk of war. If Beijing and Washington were to find themselves in that sort of showdown in the near future, they would both have strong incentives to resort to force. Moreover, the temptations and pressures to escalate would likely be highest in the early stages of the face-off, making it harder for diplomacy to prevent war.¶ THIN RED LINES¶ It might seem that the prospects for a crisis of this sort in U.S.-Chinese relations have diminished in recent years as tensions over Taiwan have cooled, defusing the powder keg that has driven much Chinese and U.S. military planning in East Asia since the mid-1990s. But other potential flash points have emerged. As China and its neighbors squabble over islands and maritime rights in the East China and South China seas, the United States has reiterated its treaty commitments to defend two of the countries that are contesting China’s claims (Japan and the Philippines) and has nurtured increasingly close ties with a third (Vietnam). Moreover, the Obama administration’s “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia, a diplomatic turn matched by planned military redeployments, has signaled that Washington is prepared to get involved in the event of a regional conflict.¶ China might be less cautious about triggering a crisis -- and less cautious about firing the first shot if a crisis ensued. ¶ Also, the United States insists that international law affords it freedom of navigation in international waters and airspace, defined as lying beyond a country’s 12-mile territorial limit. China, by contrast, asserts that other countries’ military vessels and aircraft are not free to enter its roughly 200-mile-wide “exclusive economic zone” without express permission -- a prohibition that, given Beijing’s territorial claims, could place much of the South China Sea and the airspace above it off-limits to U.S. military ships and planes. Disputes over freedom of navigation have already caused confrontations between China and the United States, and they remain a possible trigger for a serious crisis.¶ It is true that China and the United States are not currently adversaries -- certainly not in the way that the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold War. But the risk of a U.S.-Chinese crisis might actually be greater than it would be if Beijing and Washington were locked in a zero-sum, life-and-death struggle. As armed adversaries on hair-trigger alert, the Soviet Union and the United States understood that their fundamentally opposed interests might bring about a war. After going through several nerve-racking confrontations over Berlin and Cuba, they gained an understanding of each other’s vital interests -- not to be challenged without risking a crisis -- and developed mechanisms to avoid escalation. China and the United States have yet to reach a similar shared understanding about vital interests or to develop reliable means for crisis management.¶ Neither China nor the United States has clearly defined its vital interests across broad areas of the western Pacific. In recent years, China has issued various unofficial statements about its “core interests” that have sometimes gone beyond simply ensuring the territorial and political integrity of the mainland and its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing has suggested, for example, that it might consider the disputed areas of the East China and South China seas to be core interests.¶ Washington has also been vague about what it sees as its vital interests in the region. The United States hedges on the question of whether Taiwan falls under a U.S. security umbrella. And the United States’ stance on the maritime disputes involving China and its neighbors is somewhat confusing: Washington has remained neutral on the rival sovereignty claims and insisted that the disputes be resolved peacefully but has also reaffirmed its commitment to stand by its allies in the event that a conflict erupts. Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about the “redlines” that cannot be crossed without risking conflict increases the chances that either side could take steps that it believes are safe but that turn out to be unexpectedly provocative.¶ MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE COLD WAR?¶ Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today’s environment might be even more dangerous.¶ The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force. Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best way to get it to back off.¶ The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check, because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides’ conventional forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side’s fear of escalation through what the economist Thomas Schelling calls a “competition in risk-taking.” In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. But because using conventional forces would be only the first step in an unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated nuclear catastrophe.¶ China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came -- which is one reason why war never came. In addition, China’s official “no first use” nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese military’s preparation and training for conflict, might reinforce Beijing’s confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued, China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot.¶ Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks, today’s more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted countermeasures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons.¶ Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions and underestimate the risks of miscommunication. ¶ Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks, fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against China’s satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.¶ COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN¶ A U.S.-Chinese crisis might also be more dangerous than Cold War showdowns because of the unreliability of the existing channels of communication between Beijing and Washington. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the importance of direct communication between their top leaders and set up the Moscow–Washington hot line. In 1998, China and the United States also set up a hot line for direct communication between their presidents. But despite the hot line’s availability, the White House was not able to contact China’s top leaders in a timely fashion following the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing or the 2001 spy-plane incident. China’s failure to use the hot line as intended might have reflected the reluctance of its leaders to respond until they had reached an internal consensus or until they had consulted widely with their military. The delay might also have reflected China’s difficulties in coordinating policy, since China lacks a dependable counterpart to the U.S. National Security Council. Whatever the reason, experience suggests that frustrating delays in direct communication are likely during what would be the crucial early moments of an unfolding U.S.-Chinese crisis.¶ Instead, communication between the two countries might initially be limited to either public statements or tacit signals sent through actions. But public statements are aimed at multiple audiences, and nationalist passions in either China or the United States, as well as pressure from allies, might force either side to take a more aggressive public stance than it actually felt was warranted. Absent direct and confidential communication, the two countries might be unable to discuss politically sensitive proposals. They might also be unable to share information that could help head off a disastrous escalation, such as classified details about military capabilities or military maneuvers already under way.¶ Communicating through actions is also problematic, with many possibilities for distortion in sending messages and for misinterpretation in receiving them. Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions and underestimate the risks of escalation resulting from miscommunication. For example, the analysts Andrew Erickson and David Yang have drawn attention to Chinese military writings that propose using China’s antiship ballistic missile system, designed for targeting U.S. aircraft carriers, to convey Beijing’s resolve during a crisis. Some Chinese military thinkers have suggested that China could send a signal by firing warning shots intended to land near a moving U.S. aircraft carrier or even by carefully aiming strikes at the command tower of the U.S. carrier while sparing the rest of the vessel. But as the political scientist Owen Coté has noted, even a very accurate antiship ballistic missile system will inevitably have some margin of error. Consequently, even the smallest salvo of this kind would entail a risk of inadvertent serious damage and thus unintended escalation.¶ A final important factor that could make a U.S.-Chinese crisis more dangerous than those during the Cold War is geography. The focus of Cold War confrontations was primarily on land, especially in central Europe, whereas a future confrontation between China and the United States would almost certainly begin at sea. This difference would shape a U.S.-Chinese crisis in a number of ways, especially by requiring both sides to make some fateful choices early on. China’s small fleet of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and its much larger fleet of conventionally armed attack submarines are most secure when they remain in the shallow waters near the Chinese mainland, where poor acoustics compromise the effectiveness of U.S. undersea antisubmarine operations. Their proximity to Chinese land-based aircraft and air defenses also limits Washington’s ability to rely on its airpower and surface ships to counter them. For China’s submarine forces to play a role in a showdown with the United States, however, they would have to move out of those safer waters.¶ The prospect of China’s submarines breaking out would dramatically increase the instability of a crisis. Although U.S. antisubmarine warfare technology would be more effective against China’s submarines operating in less noisy open waters (where the United States also enjoys air superiority), it would not be perfect: some U.S. naval assets that came within range of surviving Chinese submarines would be at risk. Early in a crisis, therefore, the United States would be tempted to minimize this risk by sinking Chinese attack submarines as they tried to leave their home waters. Especially because there are only a few narrow routes through which Chinese submarines can reach deeper waters, the United States would be tempted to strike early rather than accept an increased risk to U.S. naval forces. Regardless of the U.S. decision, any Chinese attack submarines that managed to reach distant deeper waters would face a “use them or lose them” dilemma, thanks to their greater vulnerability to U.S. antisubmarine forces -- one more potential trigger for escalation.¶ China’s nuclear-armed SSBNs present other risks. Under its no-first-use policy, China has clearly stated that any attack on its strategic nuclear forces would justify nuclear retaliation, making a U.S. strike against its SSBNs seem unlikely. Early in a crisis, therefore, Beijing would probably believe that it could safely deploy its SSBNs to distant, deeper waters, where they would be best positioned to execute their launch orders. Such a deep-water deployment, however, would introduce new dangers. One is the possibility that U.S. naval forces might mistake a Chinese SSBN for a conventional attack submarine and fire on it, inviting Chinese nuclear retaliation. Another is the danger that a Chinese SSBN could escalate the conflict without explicit orders from Beijing, owing to the limited communication such submarines maintain with the mainland in order to avoid detection.

#### Full-scale China war causes extinction

Strait Times 2k (The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, 2000, L/N)

The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

#### U.S. first-strike is key to prevent and contain the impact to the inevitable US-Sino war

Lieber and Press 7 – Keir Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, July/August 2007, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200707/china-nukes

From a military perspective, this modernization has paid off: A U.S. nuclear first strike could quickly destroy China’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Whether launched in peacetime or during a crisis, a preemptive strike would likely leave China with no means of nuclear retaliation against American territory. And given the trends in both arsenals, China may live under the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for years to come.¶ This assessment is based on unclassified information, standard targeting principles, and formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. (And we systematically chose conservative estimates for key unknowns, meaning that our analysis understates U.S. counterforce capabilities.) The simplest version of an American preemptive strike would have nuclear-armed submarines in the Pacific launch Trident II missiles at the Chinese ICBM field in Henan province. The Navy keeps at least two of these submarines on “hard alert” in the Pacific at all times, meaning they’re ready to fire within 15 minutes of a launch order. Since each submarine carries 24 nuclear-tipped missiles with an average of six warheads per missile, commanders have almost 300 warheads ready for immediate use. This is more than enough to assign multiple warheads to each of the 18 Chinese silos. Chinese leaders would have little or no warning of the attack.¶ During the Cold War, U.S. submarines posed little danger to China’s silos, or to any other hardened targets. Each warhead on the Trident I missiles had little chance—roughly 12 percent—of success. Not only were those missiles inaccurate, their warheads had a relatively small yield. (Similarly, until the late 1980s, U.S. ICBMs lacked the accuracy to carry out a reliable disarming attack against China.) But the Navy’s new warheads and missiles are far more lethal. A Trident II missile is so accurate, and the newer W88 warhead so powerful, that if the warhead and missile function normally, the destruction of the silo is virtually assured (the likelihood is calculated as greater than 99 percent).¶ In reality, American planners could not assume such near-perfect results. Some missiles or warheads could malfunction: One missile’s rockets might fail to ignite; another’s guidance system might be defective. So a realistic counterforce plan might assign four warheads to each silo. The U.S. would “cross-target” the missiles, meaning that the warheads on each missile would each go to different silos, so that a silo would be spared only if many missiles malfunctioned. Even assuming that 20 percent of missiles malfunctioned—the standard, conservative assumption typically used by nuclear analysts—there is a 97 percent chance that every Chinese DF-5 silo would be destroyed in a 4-on-1 attack. (By comparison, a similar attack using Cold War–era Trident I missiles would have produced less than a 1 percent chance of success. The leap in American counterforce capabilities since the end of the Cold War is staggering.)¶ Beyond bolstering the ability to conduct a first strike, the improvements to U.S. counterforce weapons also allow war planners to design nuclear options that will make the weapons more “usable” during high-stakes crises. Nuclear planners face many choices when they consider striking a given target. First, they must choose a warhead yield. The American arsenal includes low-yield weapons such as the B-61 bomb, which can detonate with as little explosive force as 0.3 kilotons (one-fiftieth the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima), and high-yield weapons such as the B-83 bomb, which can yield 1,200 kilotons (80 times the strength of the Hiroshima bomb). For a military planner, high-yield weapons are attractive because they’re very likely to destroy the target—even if the weapon misses by some distance. Low-yield warheads, on the other hand, can be more discriminating, if planners want to minimize civilian casualties.¶ A second key decision for war planners is whether to set the weapon to detonate at ground level or in the air above the target. A groundburst creates enormous overpressure and ground shock, ideal for destroying a hardened target. But groundbursts also create a lot of radioactive fallout. Dirt and other matter is sucked up into the mushroom cloud, mixes with radioactive material, and, after being carried by the wind, falls to earth in the hours after the blast, spreading lethal radiation.¶ Airbursts create smaller zones of extremely high overpressure, but they also generate very little fallout. If the detonation occurs above a threshold altitude (which depends on the weapon yield), virtually no heavy particles from the ground mix with the radioactive material in the fireball. The radioactive material rises into the high atmosphere and then falls to earth over the course of several weeks in a far less dangerous state and over a very wide area, greatly reducing the harm to civilians.¶ In the past, a nuclear attack on China’s arsenal would have had horrific humanitarian consequences. The weapons were less accurate, so an effective strike would have required multiple high-yield warheads, detonating on the ground, against each target. The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council modeled the consequences of such an attack—similar to the submarine attack described above—and published their findings in 2006. The results were sobering. Although China’s long-range missiles are deployed in a lightly populated region, lethal fallout from an attack would travel hundreds of miles and kill more than 3 million Chinese civilians. American leaders might have contemplated such a strike, but only in the most dire circumstances.¶ But things are changing radically. Improved accuracy now allows war planners to target hardened sites with low-yield warheads and even airbursts. And the United States is pushing its breakthroughs in accuracy even further. For example, for many years America has used global-positioning systems in conjunction with onboard inertial-guidance systems to improve the accuracy of its conventionally armed (that is, nonnuclear) cruise missiles. Although an adversary may jam the GPS signal near likely targets, the cruise missiles use GPS along their flight route and then—if they lose the signal—use their backup inertial-guidance system for the final few kilometers. This approach has dramatically improved a cruise missile’s accuracy and could be applied to nuclear-armed cruise missiles as well. The United States is deploying jam- resistant GPS receivers on other weapons, experimenting with GPS on its nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and planning to deploy a new generation of GPS satellites—with higher-powered signals to complicate jamming.¶ The payoff for equipping cruise missiles (or nuclear bombs) with GPS is clear when one estimates the civilian casualties from a lower-yield, airburst attack. We asked Matthew McKinzie, a scientific consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council and coauthor of the 2006 study, to rerun the analysis using low-yield detonations compatible with nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal. Using three warheads per target to increase the odds of destroying every silo, the model predicts fewer than 1,000 Chinese casualties from fallout. In some low-yield scenarios, fewer than 100 Chinese would be killed or injured from fallout. The model is better suited to predicting fallout casualties than to forecasting deaths from the blast and fire, but given the low population in the rural region where the silos are, Chinese fatalities would be fewer than 6,000 in even the most destructive scenario we modeled. And in the future, there may be reliable nonnuclear options for destroying Chinese silos. Freed from the burden of killing millions, a U.S. president staring at the threat of a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. forces, allies, or territory might be more inclined to choose preemptive action. ¶ Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Imbalance¶ The most plausible flash point for a serious U.S.-China conflict is Taiwan. Suppose Taiwan declared independence. China has repeatedly warned that such a move would provoke an attack, probably a major air and naval campaign to shatter Taiwan’s defenses and leave the island vulnerable to conquest. If the United States decided to defend Taiwan, American forces would likely thwart China’s offensive, since aerial and naval warfare are strengths of the U.S. military. But looming defeat would place great pressure on China’s leaders. Losing the war might mean permanently losing Taiwan. This would undermine the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, which increasingly relies on the appeal of nationalism to justify its rule. A crippling defeat would also strain relations between political leaders in Beijing and the Chinese military. To stave off a regime-threatening disaster, the political leaders might decide to raise the stakes by placing part of the Chinese nuclear force on alert in hopes of coercing the United States into accepting a negotiated solution (for example, a return to Taiwan’s pre-declaration status).¶ By putting its nuclear forces on alert, however, China’s leaders would compel a U.S. president to make a very difficult decision: to accede to blackmail (by agreeing to a cease-fire and pressuring the Taiwanese to renounce independence), to assume that the threat is a bluff (a dangerous proposition, given that each Chinese ICBM carries a city-busting 4,000-kiloton warhead), or to strike the Chinese missiles before they could be launched.¶ How do America’s growing counterforce capabilities affect this scenario? First, American nuclear primacy may prevent such a war in the first place. China’s leaders understand that their military now has little hope of defeating U.S. air and naval forces. If they also recognize that their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable—and that placing it on alert might trigger a preemptive strike—the leaders may conclude that war is a no-win proposition.¶ Second, if a war over Taiwan started anyway, U.S. nuclear primacy might help contain the fighting at the conventional level. Early in the crisis, Washington could quietly convey to Beijing that the United States would act decisively if China put its vulnerable nuclear arsenal on alert.¶ Finally, if China threatened to launch nuclear attacks against America’s allies, its territory, or its forces in Asia, nuclear primacy would make a preemptive first strike more palatable to U.S. leaders. Any decision to attack China’s ICBM force, though, would be fraught with danger. A missile silo might have escaped detection. Furthermore, a strike on China’s 18 ICBMs would leave Beijing with roughly 60 shorter-range nuclear missiles with which to retaliate against U.S. forces and allies in the region. However, in the aftermath of a “clean” disarming strike—one that killed relatively few Chinese—American leaders could credibly warn that a Chinese nuclear response would trigger truly devastating consequences, meaning nuclear attacks against a broader target set, including military, government, and possibly even urban centers. In light of warnings from Chinese defense analysts and from within China’s military that it might use nuclear weapons to avoid losing Taiwan, an American president might feel compelled to strike first. In this terrible circumstance, he or she would reap the benefits of the past decade’s counterforce upgrades.

#### Plan and perm make first strike impossible --- Congress would never approve a first strike, and waiting until a crisis makes it less likely to be successful

James J. Wirtz 7, et al, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Winter 2006-2007, “The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?”, International Security

Lieber and Press's bolt-out-of-the-blue scenario is within the realm of possibility, but it is not realistic. Surprise attacks sometimes occur and generally succeed, so there is always a chance that a nuclear-armed state could be caught napping. n4 Government officials, military officers, and the general public have an uncanny ability to ignore what in hindsight are clear indicators of trouble. n5 But a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack is unlikely in the absence of significant political motivation for undertaking such a risky act. If a crisis increases the political salience of preemption, it is likely to generate pressures on both sides to alert their forces, reducing the technical opportunity to launch a splendid first strike. Modest, nonprovocative actions could greatly increase a state's secure second-strike capability; the availability of partial-alert measures such as moving a few mobile missiles from garrison or putting submarines out to sea increases the probability that some action will be taken in response to a warning. When the technical possibility of launching a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack exists, policymakers will lack the political motivation for rolling the dice. And during a crisis when preemption appears politically tempting, the likelihood that both sides would alert their forces eliminates the technical opportunity to disarm the opponent. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the scenario identified by Lieber and Press might occur, but that the problem they identify is not especially significant. This observation still leaves open the possibility that U.S. policymakers might order an attack to disarm Russians simply because it appears as if they can. A bolt-out-of-the-blue attack, however, would remain unlikely because even a remote possibility of retaliation is likely to deter all but the most risk-acceptant individuals. U.S. policymakers are not going to launch a preventive war because they are enticed by the fact that a deteriorating Russian day-alert posture creates a higher probability of launching a splendid first strike. Instead, they will more likely be deterred by the lingering probability that a few (dozen, score, hundred?) nuclear weapons might land on major U.S. urban-industrial centers. Deterrence works not only because the United States military can kill some Russians, but also because of the fear that in a nuclear war, Russia might destroy some U.S. countervalue targets. Of course, the only way to win a nuclear war is by firing first, and it would be preferable to destroy all of your opponent's nuclear forces before they can be used against you. But U.S. and Russian policymakers are more likely to be terrified by the prospect of even a couple of nuclear weapons fired in retaliation than energized by the opportunity to attempt to catch the opponent napping. The analytical excursion offered by Lieber and Press, however, sidesteps the entire issue of retaliation and deterrence. Because the results of the stochastic analytical techniques the authors employ are largely driven by the assumptions that guide their analysis, the U.S. policymakers in their scenario need not fear Russian retaliation. The assumptions that the United States is able to catch the Russians in a extremely weak day-alert position--with their submarines in port, bombers concentrated on a few runways, and their mobile missiles in garrison, while launching a fully generated nuclear force undetected by either Russian early warning systems or overhead and human surveillance of the United States--determine the outcome of the exchange. By assuming that "Russia is unable to launch its missiles before the first wave of U.S. warheads arrives on target" (p. 19), or that "the Russian early warning system would probably not give Russia's leaders the time they need to retaliate" (p. 22), one grants the United States a splendid first-strike capability before even beginning the analysis. Given the assumptions that drive Lieber and Press's nuclear exchange, the outcome enjoyed by the United States would be no different than if the Russians lacked a nuclear arsenal: in both situations, the United States could destroy or threaten to destroy Russia with no fear of retaliation. n6 This result does not correspond to reality because so long as a state possesses a nuclear arsenal, there is always a possibility--however remote--that nuclear retaliation might occur following a nearly splendid first strike. n7

## New Advantage

## SOP

### 1NC---NSS Double Bind

#### Their Rehman ev is only describing the 2002 NSS preemption doctrine

Rehman 12 – 1AC Author – Fehzan Rehman, International Relations at the University of Westminster, "Analyzing America’s National Security Strategy", e-International Relations, 9-13, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/13/analyzing-americas-national-security-strategy/

The 11th September 2001 attacks on America catalysed the foreign policy objectives and decisions made by President George W. Bush, known as the Bush Doctrine. Some aspects of the Bush Doctrine were codified, particularly with a document called The National Security Strategy (NSS). This essay questions the implications the NSS has had on sovereignty and international law. Are we coming to a new age of collective security, where American exceptionalism sets the standards for interventions, and such institutions like the UN can be seen as a limit to a state’s sovereignty? Are we seeing a trend set by America where institutions like the UN and its international power will dwindle and have a similar fate as its predecessor, the League of Nations?

#### Obama already repudiated that --- creates a double bind --- either the status quo solves or the aff can’t

AP 10 Associated Press writers Anne Gearan and Robert Burns, “ Obama's National Security Strategy Turns Away From Bush Administration Goals,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/26/obamas-national-security\_n\_590109.html

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama is breaking with the go-it-alone Bush years in a new strategy for keeping the nation safe, counting more on U.S. allies to tackle terrorism and other global problems. It's an approach that already has proved tricky in practice.¶ The administration's National Security Strategy, a summary of which was obtained Wednesday by The Associated Press, also for the first time adds homegrown terrorism to the familiar menu of threats facing the nation – international terror, nuclear weapons proliferation, economic instability, global climate change and an erosion of democratic freedoms abroad.¶ From mustering NATO forces for Afghanistan to corralling support to pressure North Korea to give up its illicit nuclear weapons program, the U.S. has sometimes struggled in leaning on friends and allies in recent years. Still, the new strategy breaks with some previous administrations in putting heavy emphasis on the value of global cooperation, developing wider security partnerships and helping other nations provide for their own defense.¶ In his first 16 months in office, Obama has pursued a strategy of gentle persuasion, sometimes summarized as "engagement."¶ His administration has attended more closely to ties with Europe, sought a "reset" of relations with Russia, pushed harder to restart stalled Mideast peace talks and consulted widely on a roadmap for defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.¶ Obama's critics, however, assert that his policies have largely failed, given the continued defiance of Iran and North Korea on nuclear development, the stalemate in Afghanistan and rising worries about terrorist attacks at home.¶ Presidents use their national security strategy to set broad goals and priorities for keeping Americans safe. But the document isn't an academic exercise: it has far-reaching effects on spending, defense policies and security strategy.¶ For example, President George W. Bush's 2002 strategy document spelled out a doctrine of pre-emptive war.¶ "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends," the Bush strategy said, with Iraq clearly in mind. The following year U.S. forces invaded, launching a conflict that has lasted far longer and cost far more money and lives than Bush intended.¶ Obama's new strategy is expected to move away from that doctrine.

### 1NC---No Modeling

#### No norm against preemption exists regardless of US action --- means it’s inevitable

Keir A. Lieber 2, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame and Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University, December 2002, http://164.109.48.86/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm

Some analysts believe that it is counterproductive to make explicit the conditions under which America will strike first, and there are compelling reasons for blurring the line between preemption and prevention. The attacks of September 11th demonstrate that terrorist organizations like al Qaeda pose an immediate threat to the United States, are not deterred by the fear of U.S. retaliation, and would probably seize the opportunity to kill millions of Americans if WMD could effectively be used on American soil. A proactive campaign against terrorists thus is wise, and a proclaimed approach toward state sponsors of terrorism might help deter those states from pursuing WMD or cooperating with terrorists in the first place. Other critics have argued that the Bush NSS goes well beyond even the right to anticipatory self-defense that has been commonly interpreted to flow from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and thus the Bush strategy will undermine international law and lead other states to use U.S. policy as a pretext for aggression. The most common examples are that the broad interpretation of legitimate preemption could lead China to attack Taiwan, or India to attack Pakistan. This logic is not compelling, however, as these states are not currently constrained from taking action by any norm against preemption, and thus will not be emboldened by rhetorical shifts in U.S. policy.

### 1NC---No Modeling---Russia-Specific

#### No Russia modeling

Harvey 9 – Cole Harvey, The Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Arms Control Association, October 19, 2009, “Revised Russian Nuke Doctrine Aimed at Near Abroad,” online: http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2009/10/19/122818/80

Russia’s apparent willingness to consider the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in small-scale conflicts comes as the United States is reportedly contemplating scaling back the Bush doctrine of preventive warfare. The two developments are probably unrelated – prompted in Washington by the U.S. experience in Iraq, and in Moscow by persistent worries of conventional inferiority and encirclement by potentially hostile states.

### 1NC---Hype

#### Reject their hyperbolic claims --- multiple checks prevent SOP imbalance

John Yoo 9, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Crisis and Command,” Book, p. x-xi

This book is also written out of respect for Congress as well as the President. I have had the honor to serve as general counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee under the chairmanship of Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, a good and decent man as well as a strward of the Senate. I have the greatest respect for the awesome powers of Congress and the ways in which Congress and the broader political system can check any Chief Executive. It was Congress that forced the resignation of Richard Nixon through hearings, political pressure, spending constraints, and ultimately, the threat of impeachment. Today’s critics of the Presidency underestimate the power of politics to corral any branch of government that goes too far. They give too much credit to appeals to abstract notions of constitutional balance to restrain a truly out-of-control President, or misread active responses to unprecedented challenges as challenges to the Constitution. The hyperbole in such rhetoric is manifest in overwrought yet commonplace invocations of “treason” or “tramplings” of the Constitution. Has the Constitution indeed been trampled on? History provides us with a guide.¶ Certainly, the fear that a President might abuse power for personal gain or to maintain his or her position has haunted America from her birth. Executive power, as the Founding Fathers well knew, always carries the possibility of dictatorship. In their own day, the great Presidents were all accused of wielding power tyrannically. Yet, they were not dictators. They used their executive powers to the benefit of the nation. Once the emergency subsided, presidential power receded and often went into remission under long periods of congressional leadership. When chief executives misused their powers, the political system blocked or eventually ejected the President. No dictator has ever ruled in the United States, yet critics of contemporary presidential power wish to work radical change in current practice out of fear of impending dictatorship.

### 1NC---Preemption Good

#### Preemption is good --- solves global war

Steven Westphal 3, Lt. Col. 2003, Counterterrorism: Policy of Preemptive Action, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/westphal.pdf

Preemptive strikes risk causing potential crisis to escalate quickly. However, the risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of action. Weapons of mass destruction could enable our adversaries to inflict massive harm **on the United States,** our military forces at home and abroad **and our allies** and friends. Some states**, including several that** have supported and **continue to support terrorism, already possess** weapons of mass destruction and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those friends and allies – without compunction and without warning.29 It is against these **adversaries,** rogue states and terrorist groups that preemptive strikes are ideally intended and suited. Preemptive strikes are not intended for the illegitimate use of the strong to further their own imperialistic agendas. Preemptive strikes are intended to be used as a preventive deterrent against an enemy, initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence, to prevent an enemy attack that is imminent or to prevent an attack that will occur at a later time. The underlying emphasis is that preemptive strikes are a deterrent and preventive measure used to forestall, preclude and stop anticipated or feared attacks by an enemy based on incontrovertible evidence.¶ Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devasting consequences **of weapons of mass destruction use against our forces and civilian** population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD–armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.30 ¶ The United States’ policy on Counter-Terrorism and its acknowledgement and use of preemptive strikes; is good, pragmatic, rational and just. The nature of the enemy has changed; the nature of the threat has changed, so the response to the new enemy and new threats must change. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorist, the U.S. can not solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. Preemptive strikes may be our best or only option **to avert a catastrophic attack.** Prudence dictates that the United States must act preemptively, and it must act alone if necessary, to stop rogue states, terrorism and terrorists before they have the opportunity to inflict potentially catastrophic attacks **upon our country and the world.** The economies, environments, freedoms, interest, liberties, lives and values of millions of peoples and countries around the world depend upon our ability to act preemptively to stop terrorist and rogue states before they can attack. The stated policy, written policy and justifiable use of Preemptive Strikes by the United States, is a necessary response and a necessary method to deter and eventually stop the scourge of terrorism**.**

#### Specifically, preemption solves loose nukes, North Korea, and Iran war --- all go nuclear

Jonas 12 [George Jonas (staffwriter for Natl Post; contributer to WSJ and others; prolific author) “What's wrong with 'pre-emptive' war?”; January 11, 2012; http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/01/11/george-jonas-the-case-for-pre-emptive-war/]

**What justifies preemptive war**? Presidential hopeful Ron Paul may think he alone worries about this. In fact, it's hard to find anyone who doesn't. Last time I raised the question was more than a decade ago, after Osama bin Laden told Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir that he had nuclear weapons. The lie fooled no one, but it invited the question of **why was it necessary to wait until it became the truth?**¶I wrote at the time that no month passes without a police officer being investigated for having an itchy trigger finger. The facts are usually identical. **A suspect appears to reach for what the officer thinks is a gun, to which the officer responds by shooting first.**¶ **By definition, pre-emptive action is always "too early." If it's not too early, it isn't preemptive, and if it's not preemptive,** it's often too late. No month passes without a police officer being shot, either, for choosing to wait for a suspect to pull the trigger first.¶ **The dilemma becomes** infinitely greater **when it goes beyond police officers and guns to sovereign nations and** nuclear weapons. U.S. president George W. Bush had to face it, just as Barack Obama is facing it today.¶ Eleven years ago, in a speech beamed by satellite to the Warsaw meeting of East European leaders, Bush raised the specter of bin Laden's alQaeda network going after nuclear weapons. Though he spoke before bin Laden made his claim (Bush's speech may have given him the idea) the president's reference was quite specific. By then, Pakistan had nuclear weapons. While General Pervez Musharraf 's government was America's ally (sort of) in the war against terror, Pakistan itself had been instrumental in setting up the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. There was always a substantial and militant minority in Pakistan - among the general population as well as in the governing elite, such as the powerful Inter-Service Intelligence or ISI - that supported the Taliban's fanatical Islamists who hosted and protected al-Qaeda before and since 9/11.¶ **It was evident** 10 years ago **that if** General **Musharraf 's government, which was by no means secure, were to be toppled,** there was at least a chance that **bin Laden might gain access to nuclear weapons**. As The Daily Telegraph reported at the time, two Pakistani nuclear scientists admitted - boasted might be a better word - of having met bin Laden earlier in 2001, and Pakistan moved its nuclear weapons "to ensure their safety in the event of an Islamic coup." **The scenario**, though not likely, **was viewed as having a 5% probability. A small chance - but with** colossal consequences.¶ No responsible government would accept a 5% chance of a catastrophe of such magnitude in an area of public hygiene. The authorities would unquestionably take the position that an ounce of pre-emption is worth a pound of cure. But what would "preemption" entail in a case of armed fanatics? On a minor scale, consider the 1993 tragedy at Waco.¶ Though the FBI may have stormed David Koresh's compound as an act of administrative vengeance, the authorities also wanted to pre-empt a fanatical cult that had an arsenal of illegal firearms from harming others. The ensuing mayhem, particularly the fiery deaths of children, rightly shocked the conscience of a nation.¶ The mayhem at Waco would be a boy scout jamboree compared to the results of a pre-emptive strike (let alone a pre-emptive nuclear strike) on a country. How would the mere possession of nuclear capability justify such an attack?¶ After all, no one loses any sleep over, say, France's nuclear capabilities. If France can have weapons of mass destruction without the world feeling endangered, why should Pakistan, or even Iran, be judged by a different yardstick? What's wrong with a "Muslim bomb"? If the West can possess nuclear weapons, why can't Islam?¶ "Because the West is more civilized than Islam," blurted out Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 10 years ago, before quickly apologizing for his remark. But Berlusconi aside, the difference between storing a case of dynamite at the Army Corps of Engineers or in the chimp enclosure at the zoo is self-evident.¶ We let chimps store dynamite to teach them responsible behaviour. **If North Korea and Pakistan have nuclear weapons today; if Iran is on the verge of acquiring them, it's because, having no stomach for hard choices,** we reduced our choices to zero. Paradoxically, if the world blows up tomorrow, our humanitarian scruples will share the blame.¶ After Waco, the authorities pleaded that they had a duty to force their way into the compound because of the threat Koresh and his armed disciples represented to the larger community. The courts agreed. But if guns in the hands of Koresh & company's justified the incineration of children, **it's hard to think of collateral damage that keeping w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **from** Mahmoud **Ahmadinejad or Kim Jong-un wouldn't justify.**¶ **Iran's rulers are pressing on.** They're now threatening to close international sea lanes to shipping in the Persian Gulf. They don't yet have the bomb. **What will they threaten to do when they do? We shall all soon know.**

## Warfight/Intervention

### 1NC---Obama Solves

#### Squo solves --- Obama rejected the Bush doctrine

Aziz 13 (Omer, graduate student at Cambridge University, is a researcher at the Center for International and Defense Policy at Queen’s University, “The Obama Doctrine's Second Term,” Project Syndicate, 2-5, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/blog/the-obama-doctrine-s-second-term--by-omer-aziz>)

The Obama Doctrine’s first term has been a remarkable success. After the $3 trillion boondoggle in Iraq, a failed nation-building mission in Afghanistan, and the incessant saber-rattling of the previous Administration, President Obama was able to reorient U.S. foreign policy in a more restrained and realistic direction. He did this in a number of ways. First, an end to large ground wars. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it in February 2011, anyone who advised future presidents to conduct massive ground operations ought “to have [their] head examined.” Second, a reliance on Secret Operations and drones to go after both members of al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in Pakistan as well as East Africa. Third, a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific — a region neglected during George W. Bush's terms but one that possesses a majority of the world’s nuclear powers, half the world’s GDP, and tomorrow’s potential threats. Finally, under Obama's leadership, the United States has finally begun to ask allies to pick up the tab on some of their security costs. With the U.S. fiscal situation necessitating retrenchment, coupled with a lack of appetite on the part of the American public for foreign policy adventurism, Obama has begun the arduous process of burden-sharing necessary to maintain American strength at home and abroad. What this amounted to over the past four years was a vigorous and unilateral pursuit of narrow national interests and a multilateral pursuit of interests only indirectly affecting the United States. Turkey, a Western ally, is now leading the campaign against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Japan, Korea, India, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Australia all now act as de facto balancers of an increasingly assertive China. With the withdrawal of two troop brigades from the continent, Europe is being asked to start looking after its own security. In other words, the days of free security and therefore, free riding, are now over. The results of a more restrained foreign policy are plentiful. Obama was able to assemble a diverse coalition of states to execute regime-change in Libya where there is now a moderate democratic government in place. Libya remains a democracy in transition, but the possibilities of self-government are ripe. What’s more, the United States was able to do it on the cheap. Iran’s enrichment program has been hampered by the clandestine cyber program codenamed Olympic Games. While Mullah Omar remains at large, al Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been virtually decimated. With China, the United States has maintained a policy of engagement and explicitly rejected a containment strategy, though there is now something resembling a cool war — not yet a cold war — as Noah Feldman of Harvard Law School puts it, between the two economic giants. The phrase that best describes the Obama Doctrine is one that was used by an anonymous Administration official during the Libya campaign and then picked up by Republicans as a talking point: Leading From Behind. The origin of the term dates not to weak-kneed Democratic orthodoxy but to Nelson Mandela, who wrote in his autobiography that true leadership often required navigating and dictating aims ‘from behind.’ The term, when applied to U.S. foreign policy, has a degree of metaphorical verity to it: Obama has led from behind the scenes in pursuing terrorists and militants, is shifting some of the prodigious expenses of international security to others, and has begun the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. The Iraq War may seem to be a distant memory to many in North America, but its after-effects in the Middle East and Asia tarnished the United States' image abroad and rendered claims to moral superiority risible. Leading From Behind is the final nail in the coffin of the neoconservatives' failed imperial policies.

### 1NC---No Impact

#### No escalation---executives will be responsible

Weiner 7 Michael Anthony, J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt School of Law, 2007, “A Paper Tiger with Bite: A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Weiner.pdf

IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXONERATED WPR AND THE WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING The WPR is an effective piece of war powers legislation. As Part III made clear, no presidential unilateral use of force since 1973 has developed into a conflict that in any way resembles the WPR's impetus, Vietnam. Rather, the great majority of these conflicts have been characterized by their brevity, safety, and downright success. Yes, there have been tragic outcomes in Lebanon and Somalia; but what happened in response to those tragedies? In Lebanon, President Reagan actually submitted to being Congress's "messengerboy," 203 asking for its permission, per the WPR, to continue the operation. And in Somalia, at the first sight of a looming disaster, it was President Clinton who cut short the operation. Thus, from 1973 on, it is easy to argue that sitting Executives have made responsible use of their power to act unilaterally in the foreign affairs realm. The WPR has even contributed to a congressional resurgence in the foreign affairs arena. In many of these conflicts, we have seen Congress conducting numerous votes on whether and how it should respond to a unilaterally warring Executive. In some of the conflicts, Congress has come close to invoking the WPR against rather impetuous Executives. 20 4 In Lebanon, Congress actually succeeded in the task.20 5 It is this Note's contention, though, that even when Congress failed to legally invoke the WPR, these votes had normative effects on the Executives in power. Such votes demonstrate that Congress desires to be, and will try to be, a player in foreign affairs decisions. So, perhaps the enactment of the WPR, the rise of Congress (at least in the normative sense) and the successful string of unilateral presidential uses of force are just a series of coincidences. This Note, however, with common sense as its companion, contends that they are not. Rather, it is self-evident that the WPR has played a significant role in improving the implementation of presidential unilateral uses of force.

#### Multiple factors solve exec overreach

Posner and Vermeule 9**,** \* University of Chicago – Law School AND \*\*Harvard University – Harvard Law School, Eric and Adrian, “Tyrannophobia” 9/15, SSRN

Demography and the Administrative State. The best explanation for the lack of dictatorship in America – at least in America today, as opposed to the 19th century – is neither psychological nor institutional, but demographic. Part III examined the strong comparative evidence that wealth is the best safeguard for democracy. Equality, homogeneity, and education matter as well. How does the United States, circa 2009, fare on these dimensions? Ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity have declined, but because of its high performance on other margins, there is little cause for concern about American democracy. The United States has an enormously rich, relatively well-educated population and multiple overlapping cleavages of class, race, religion and geography. Simply by virtue of its high per capita income, the likelihood of dictatorship in the United States is almost nil, at least if the historical pattern reflects causation. The highwater mark of the modern presidency’s approach to domestic dictatorship – Nixon’s “third-rate burglary” of the offices of his political opponents – was pathetic stuff in historical and comparative perspective, and immediately put Nixon on a slippery slope to disgrace. Likewise, comparisons between Weimar Germany and the United States of the Bush administration87 were worse than irresponsible; they were ignorant.

We add a less obvious point. Legal scholars, especially those of a libertarian or civil-libertarian bent, often express concern that the formal separation of powers has atrophied over the course of the 20th century. On this account, economic and security crises, the rise of the administrative state, the death of the nondelegation doctrine, the imperial presidency, the ineffectual character of the War Powers Resolution and the other framework statutes of the 1970s, all mean that in many domains presidents operate without substantial legal checks, although they have political incentives to cooperate with Congress and to seek statutory authorization for their actions. Among the framer’s miscalculations was their failure to understand the “presidential power of unilateral action”88 – the president’s power to take action in the real world, with debatable legal authority or none at all, creating a new status quo that then constrains the response of other institutions. In the most overheated version of this view, such developments are taken to pose a real risk of executive tyranny in the United States.89

We suggest, however, that the same large-scale economic and political developments that have caused a relaxation of the legal checks on the executive have simultaneously strengthened the nonlegal checks. Legal checks on the presidency have been relaxed largely because of the need for centralized, relatively efficient government under the complex conditions of a modern dynamic economy and a highly interrelated international order. Yet those economic and political conditions have themselves helped to create de facto constraints on presidential power that make democracy in the United States extremely stable.

The modern economy, whose complexity creates the demand for administrative governance, also creates wealth, leisure, education and broad political information, all of which strengthen democracy and make a collapse into authoritarian rule nearly impossible. Modern presidents are substantially constrained, not by old statutes or even by Congress and the courts, but by the tyranny of public and (especially) elite opinion. Every action is scrutinized, leaks from executive officials come in a torrent, journalists are professionally hostile, and potential abuses are quickly brought to light. The modern presidency is a fishbowl, in large part because the costs of acquiring political information have fallen steadily in the modern economy, and because a wealthy, educated and leisured population has the time to monitor presidential action and takes an interest in doing so. This picture implies that modern presidents are both more accountable than their predecessors and more responsive to gusts of elite sentiment and mass opinion, but they are not dictators in any conventional sense.

More tentatively, we also suggest that the relaxation of legal checks may itself have contributed to the growth of the political checks, rather than both factors simply being the common result of a complex modern economy. On this hypothesis, the administrative and presidential state of the New Deal and later has, despite all its inefficiencies, plausibly supplied efficiency-enhancing regulation, political stability, and a measure of redistribution, and these policies have both added to national economic and cultural capital and dampened political conflict. The administrative state has thus helped to create a wealthy, educated population and a super-educated elite whose members have the leisure and affluence to care about matters such as civil liberties, who are politically engaged to a fault, and who help to check executive abuses. While the direct effects of wealth, education and other factors on the stability of democracy are clear in comparative perspective, there is more dispute about the overall economic effects of regulation and the administrative state,90 so we offer this as a hypothesis for further research.

#### Political constraints check

Eric Posner 11, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, \*\* and Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, March 2011, The Executive Unbound, p. 176-7

So far we have attempted to show that the administrative state relaxes legal constraints on the executive, but generates political constraints in the form of public opinion. In this chapter we fit this picture together with the fear of unbridled executive power that is such a prominent strand in liberal legalism. We suggest that liberal legalists overlook the importance of de facto constraints arising from politics, and thus equate a legally unconstrained executive with one that is unconstrained tout court. The horror of dictatorship that results from this fallacy and that animates liberal legalism is what we call "tyrannophobia." Tyranny looms large in the American political imagination. For the framers of the Constitution, Caesar, Cromwell, James II, and George III were antimodels; for the current generation, Hitler takes pride of place, followed by Stalin, Mao, and a horde of tyrants both historical and literary. Students read 1984 and Animal Farm and relax by watching Chancellor Palpatine seize imperial power in Star Wars. Unsurprisingly, comparisons between sitting presidents and the tyrants of history and fiction are a trope of political discourse. Liberals and libertarians routinely compared George W. Bush to Hitler, George III, and Caesar. Today, Barack Obama receives the same treatment, albeit in less respectable media of opinion. All major presidents are called a "dictator" or said to have "dictatorial powers" from time to time.' Yet the United States has never had a Caesar or a Cromwell, or even come close to having one, and rational actors should update their risk estimates in the light of experience, reducing them if the risk repeatedly fails to materialize. By now, 235 years after independence, these risk estimates should be close to zero. Why then does the fear of dictatorship—tyrannophobia—persist so strongly in American political culture? Is the fear justified, or irrational? Does tyrannophobia itself affect the risk of dictatorship? If so, does it reduce the risk or increase it?

#### Their authors are wrong

Jack Goldsmith 12, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, p. xi-xiii

The problem with the conventional wisdom about the expansion of presidential power is that it tells only half the story. The rest of the story, the one I tell in this book, is a remarkable and unnoticed revolution in wartime presidential accountability that checked and legitimated this growth in presidential power. The U.S. Constitution creates a system of "checks and balances" that gives other institutions—Congress, the courts, and the press—the motives and tools to counteract the President when they think he is too powerful, pursues the wrong policies, or acts illegally. Far from rolling over after 9/11, these institutions pushed back far harder against the Commander in Chief than in any other war in American history. The post-9/11 Congress often seemed feckless, especially in its oversight responsibilities. But it nonetheless managed to alter and regulate presidential tactics on issues—interrogation, detention, surveillance, military commissions, and more—that in previous wars were controlled by the President. Congress was often spurred to action because the American press uncovered and published the executive branch's deepest secrets. It was also moved by federal judges who discarded their traditional reluctance to review presidential military decisions and threw themselves into questioning, invalidating, and supervising a variety of these decisions—decisions that in other wars had been the President's to make. Judicial review of the Commander in Chief's actions often left him without legal authority to act, forcing him to work with Congress to fill the legal void. These traditional forces received crucial support from something new and remarkable: giant distributed networks of lawyers, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large, against them. On the inside, military and national security lawyers devoted their days and many of their nights to ensuring that the Commander in Chief complied with thousands of laws and regulations, and to responding to hundreds of lawsuits challenging presidential wartime action. These lawyers' checks were complemented by independent executive-branch watchdogs, such as inspectors general and ethics monitors, who engaged in accountability-enhancing investigations of the President's military and intelligence activities. These actors were empowered by a culture of independence that had grown up quietly in the previous three decades. And they enforced laws traceable to 1970s congressional reforms of the presidency that most observers assumed were dead but that turned out to be alive and quite fearsome. On the outside, nongovernmental organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights connected up with thousands of like-minded lawyers and activists in the United States and abroad. Together, these forces—often, once again, invoking laws and institutions traceable to decades-old legal reforms—swarmed the government with hundreds of critical reports and lawsuits that challenged every aspect of the President's war powers. They also brought thousands of critical minds to bear on the government's activities, resulting in bestselling books, reports, blog posts, and press tips that shaped the public's view of presidential action and informed congressional responses, lawsuits, and mainstream media reporting. The pages that follow will show that these forces worked together in dynamic ways to uncover, challenge, change, and then effectively approve nearly every element of the Bush counterterrorism program. There are many reasons why Barack Obama continued so much of the Bush program as it stood in January 2009. But the most significant reason was that almost all of this program had been vetted, altered, and blessed—with restrictions, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large, against them.

### 1NC---Squo Solves International Coalitions

#### Obama’s personality solves their international coalition arguments regardless of intervention

Mead 11 – James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine, former Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (8/22, Walter Russell, American Interest, “W Gets A Third Term In The Middle East”, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/08/22/w-gets-a-third-term-in-the-middle-east/)

The most irritating argument anyone could make in American politics is that President Obama, precisely because he seems so liberal, so vacillating, so nice, is a more effective neoconservative than President Bush. As is often the case, the argument is so irritating partly because it is so true.¶ President Obama is pushing a democracy agenda in the Middle East that is as aggressive as President Bush’s; he adopts regime change by violence if necessary as a core component of his regional approach and, to put it mildly, he is not afraid to bomb. But where President Bush’s tough guy posture (“Bring ‘Em On!”) alienated opinion abroad and among liberals at home, President Obama’s reluctant warrior stance makes it easier for others to work with him.¶ In some ways, President Obama’s Middle Eastern foreign policy does for President Bush’s democratization policy what President Eisenhower did for President Truman’s containment doctrine. In both cases, a necessary and useful foreign policy had become deeply unpopular; Eisenhower implemented containment but made the country feel better about it — partly by rhetorical shifts, partly by tweaking the execution. Obama is trying to do the same thing with Bush’s transformation agenda.¶ In many ways we are living through George W. Bush’s third term in the Middle East, and neither President Obama’s friends nor his enemies want to admit it. President Obama, in his own way and with his own twists, continues to follow the core Bush policy of nudging and sometimes pushing nasty regimes out of power, aligning the US with the wave of popular discontent in the region even as that popular sentiment continues to dislike, suspect and reject many aspects of American power and society. And that policy continues to achieve ambivalent successes: replacing old and crustily anti-American regimes, rooted deeply in the culture of terror and violence within and beyond their borders, with weaker, more open and — on some issues at least — more accommodating ones.¶ Additionally, the combination of tough military attacks on Al Qaeda and its affiliates wherever they rear their ugly heads and the opening of new political space in the Middle East continues to marginalize the acolytes of Bin Laden. There was a time when Bin Laden hoped to become the voice of Arab protest and resistance; the US had killed his dream long before Team Six got to his house.¶ Obama is better than Bush at building international coalitions and managing the appearance of American policy in a contentious world. In Libya, Obama faced a constraint not dissimilar to Bush’s situation in Iraq. Both presidents got something from the Security Council, but neither got enough. Bush responded by defying the body over the failed “second resolution” on Iraq; Obama simply ignored the gap between what the resolution allowed and what the US needed, stretching a humanitarian mandate to effect regime change.¶ Gratuitous snubs to global sensibilities were one of the Bush administration’s most expensive failings; when the WMD in Iraq did not appear and the occupation turned into a nightmare, an infuriated world (and many Americans) rejoiced at what they saw as a well deserved comeuppance. President Obama’s more conciliatory stance does nothing to win over America’s enemies — but it makes it harder for those enemies to mobilize world opinion on their side. He has also cut the legs off the anti-war movements at home by depriving it of a clear target. Nobody in America much likes all the wars we are fighting in so many obscure places — but the anti-war movement has been reduced to its irrelevant hard core.¶ Obama has plenty of faults of his own, and, like Bush’s, his mistakes can be costly. He has never understood the dynamics of the US-Israel relations or the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He clearly underestimated the conflict in Libya; we shall see whether he and the allies have underestimated the problems of reconstruction. The combination of a surge in Afghanistan with the naming of a date for withdrawal sent mixed signals and probably encouraged the Taliban to fight on.¶ But since the world hates Obama less than it hated Bush, the US and the global press are more forgiving of his errors, and pass lightly over shortcomings and contradictions that, if Bush were still in the White House, would be the mainstay of the nightly news. When was the last time you read something about Obama’s failure to close Guantanamo?¶ The result is that the advance of US power in the Middle East that began under Bush has continued and developed under Obama. Our worst enemies disappear; the Gulf monarchies are more dependent on us than ever; the coalition against Iran deepens and strengthens.

### 1NC---Congress -/-> Credibility

#### Congress doesn’t enhance cred --- narrow majorities make us look unsure --- empirics prove

* the “Congress = Anti-War” ev proves that majorities would be narrow

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It is also not obvious that congressional deliberation ensures consensus. Legislative authorization might reflect ex ante consensus before military hostilities, but it also might merely represent a bare majority of Congress or an unwillingness to challenge the President’s institutional and political strengths regardless of the merits of the war. It is also no guarantee of an ex post consensus after combat begins. Thus, the Vietnam War, which Ely and others admit satisfied their constitutional requirements for congressional approval, did not meet with a consensus over the long term but instead provoked some of the most divisive politics in American history. It is also difficult to claim that the congressional authorizations to use force in Iraq, of either the 1991 or 2002 varieties, reflected a deep consensus over the merits of war there. Indeed, the 1991 authorization barely survived the Senate and the 2002 one received significant negative votes and has become an increasingly divisive issue in national political and the 2004 presidential election. Congress’s authorization for the use of force in Iraq in 2003 has not served as a guarantee of political consensus. ¶ Conversely, a process without congressional declarations of war does not necessarily result in less deliberation or consensus. Nor does it seem to inexorably lead to poor or unnecessary war goals. Perhaps the most important example, although many might consider it a “war,” is the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1946 through 1991. War was fought throughout the world by the superpowers and their proxies during this period. Yet the only war arguably authorized by Congress – and even this is a debated point – was Vietnam. The United States waged war against Soviet proxies in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union fought in Afghanistan, and the two almost came into direct conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the division over Vietnam, there appeared to be a significant bipartisan consensus on the overall strategy (containment) and goal (defeat of the Soviet Union, protection of Europe and Japan), and Congress consistently devoted significant resources to the creation of a standing military to achieve them. Different conflicts during this period that did not benefit from congressional authorization, such as conflicts in Korea, Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo, did not suffer from a severe lack of consensus, at least at the outset. Korea initially received the support of the nation’s political leadership, and it seems that support declined only once battlefield reverses had occurred. Grenada and Panama did not seem to suffer from any serious political challenge, and while Kosovo met with some political resistance, it does not appear to have been significant.

### 1NC---Congress -/-> Better Wars

#### Congress doesn’t solve “better wars” or adventurism

Jide Nzelibe 6, Asst. Profesor of Law @ Northwestern, and John Yoo, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, “Rational War and Constitutional Design,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, SSRN

But before accepting this attractive vision, we should ask whether the Congress first system produces these results. In other words, has requiring congressional ex ante approval for foreign wars produced less war, better decision making, or greater consensus? Students of American foreign policy generally acknowledge that comprehensive empirical studies of American wars are impractical, due to the small number of armed conflicts. Instead, they tend to focus on case studies. A cursory review of previous American wars does not suggest that congressional participation in war necessarily produces better decision making. We can certainly identify wars, such as the Mexican-American War or the Spanish-American War, in which a declaration of war did not result from extensive deliberation nor necessarily result in good policy.14 Both wars benefited the United States by expanding the nation’s territory and enhanced its presence on the world stage,15 but it seems that these are not the wars that supporters of Congress’s Declare War power would want the nation to enter – i.e., offensive wars of conquest. Nor is it clear that congressional participation has resulted in greater consensus and better decision making. Congress approved the Vietnam War, in the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and the Iraq war, both of which have produced sharp division in American domestic politics and proven to be mistakes.

The other side of the coin here usually goes little noticed, but is just as important for evaluating the substantive performance of the Congress-first system. To a significant extent, much of the war powers literature focuses on situations in which the United States might erroneously enter a war where the costs outweigh the expected benefits. Statisticians usually label such errors of commission as Type I errors. Scholars rarely, if ever, ask whether requiring congressional ex ante approval for foreign wars could increase Type II errors. Type II errors occur when the United States does not enter a conflict where the expected benefits to the nation outweigh the costs, and this could occur today when the President refuses to launch a preemptive strike against a nation harboring a hostile terrorist group, for example, out of concerns over congressional opposition. It may be the case that legislative participation in warmaking could prevent the United States from entering, or delaying entry, into wars that would benefit its foreign policy or national security. The clearest example is World War II. During the inter-war period, Congress enacted several statutes designed to prevent the United States from entering into the wars in Europe and Asia. In 1940 and 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that America’s security would be threatened by German control of Europe, and he and his advisers gradually attempted to bring the United States to the assistance of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.16 Nonetheless, congressional resistance prevented Roosevelt from doing anything more than supplying arms and loans to the Allies, although he arguably stretched his authority to cooperate closely with Great Britain in protecting convoys in the North Atlantic, among other things. It is likely that if American pressure on Japan to withdraw from China had not helped triggered the Pacific War, American entry into World War II might have been delayed by at least another year, if not longer.17 Knowing what we now know, most would agree that America’s earlier entry into World War II would have been much to the benefit of the United States and to the world. A more recent example might be American policy in the Balkans during the middle and late 1990s.

### 1NC---Offense

#### [read a card from “Link---Congress---International Credibility” in the link section of the Flex DA]

#### Only a risk of our offense --- public sentiment is strongly ANTI-WAR --- means including Congress could only hurt warfighting

Emily Lodish 9/10/13, writer for the Global Post, “Americans don't support war like they used to,” <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/130910/obama-contends-war-weary-americans>

Even though most Americans believe that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gassed his own people, a strong majority of Americans are against the United States authorizing a military strike against his regime — this according to a CNN/ORC International poll released Monday.¶ CNN reports:¶ More than seven in 10 say such a strike would not achieve significant goals for the United States and a similar amount say it's not in the national interest for the country to get involved in Syria's civil war.¶ Obama has had to contend with this increasingly war-weary public as his administration debates its strategy to stop the use and spread of chemical weapons in Syria.¶ When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, which was shortly after 9/11, the American public strongly supported military action. But approval ratings among the American public for military action have never risen to such heights again.¶ Here is a look at America's dwindling support for military action abroad.¶ AFGHANISTAN INVASION¶ When the invasion began in October 2001, polls indicated that about 88 percent of Americans supported the effort.¶ Americans in Los Angeles call for military action in Afghanistan after a memorial service for victims of 9/11. (Lucy Nicholson/AFP/Getty Images)¶ IRAQ INVASION¶ Before the Iraq War in March 2003, polls showed that 47-60 percent of the US public supported the invasion. ¶ Sailor Jason Buerger hugs his son, Kyle, while his daughters wait before he is deployed to Iraq on March 3, 2003. (Sandy Huffaker/Getty Images)¶ PAKISTAN DRONE STRIKES¶ American support for drone strikes in Pakistan is divided. In February 2013, 56 percent of Americans supported them, according to the Pew Research Center. But others have expressed concern over their legality, as well as mounting civilian casualities.¶ A US Predator drone armed with a missile stands on the tarmac in Afghanistan. (Massoud Hossaini/AFP/Getty Images)¶ LIBYA INTERVENTION¶ Before March 2011, when the US intervened in Libya, only 22 percent of American voters thought the United States should get involved.¶ A US warship fires Tomahawk cruise missiles targeting sites along Libya's coast on March 19, 2011. (Nathanael Miller/US Navy via Getty Images)¶ SYRIA STRIKE¶ Late last month, days after news broke of a chemical weapons attack in Damascus, Syria's capital, only 9 percent of Americans supported a military intervention in Syria. After a two-week PR push by the Obama administration and a national debate, still more than 70 percent of Americans did not support any kind of strike on Syria.

# 2NC

## PGS

#### PGS Terminally Skrewed

Manzo 8 – Vince Manzo, CDI Research Assistant, “An Examination of the Pentagon’s Prompt Global Strike Program: Rationale, Implementation, and Risks”, Center for Defense Information, http://www.infodefensa.com/wp-content/uploads/PGSfactsheet[1].pdf

In light of these risks and potential operational complications, it is worth questioning the rationale of the PGS program. The Pentagon has not demonstrated why strategically deployed forward operating bases do not provide sufficient rapid strike capabilities against rogue states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the two most frequently cited justifications for a PGS capability. Similarly, if the United States possesses the rapid and precise intelligence gathering capability necessary to execute a PGS, this capability by itself may create alternative options that obviate the need for a rapid military strike. In addition to questions about the primary rationale for PGS, the question of whether or not the United States will ever possess the commensurate intelligence capabilities to execute a PGS casts doubt on the feasibility of the PGS concept.

#### Not a sufficient internal link

Congress concerned about executive control over war-making powers might be best advised to pay closer attention to procurement decisions. If the president continues to claim the right to use certain weapons of war without Congressional oversight, then Congress is clearly within its powers to deny those weapons to the president, or at least to demand accountability.

## SOP

### 1NC---NSS Double Bind

#### Their Rehman ev is only describing the 2002 NSS preemption doctrine

Rehman 12 – 1AC Author – Fehzan Rehman, International Relations at the University of Westminster, "Analyzing America’s National Security Strategy", e-International Relations, 9-13, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/13/analyzing-americas-national-security-strategy/

The 11th September 2001 attacks on America catalysed the foreign policy objectives and decisions made by President George W. Bush, known as the Bush Doctrine. Some aspects of the Bush Doctrine were codified, particularly with a document called The National Security Strategy (NSS). This essay questions the implications the NSS has had on sovereignty and international law. Are we coming to a new age of collective security, where American exceptionalism sets the standards for interventions, and such institutions like the UN can be seen as a limit to a state’s sovereignty? Are we seeing a trend set by America where institutions like the UN and its international power will dwindle and have a similar fate as its predecessor, the League of Nations?

#### Obama already repudiated that --- creates a double bind --- either the status quo solves or the aff can’t

AP 10 Associated Press writers Anne Gearan and Robert Burns, “ Obama's National Security Strategy Turns Away From Bush Administration Goals,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/26/obamas-national-security\_n\_590109.html

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama is breaking with the go-it-alone Bush years in a new strategy for keeping the nation safe, counting more on U.S. allies to tackle terrorism and other global problems. It's an approach that already has proved tricky in practice.¶ The administration's National Security Strategy, a summary of which was obtained Wednesday by The Associated Press, also for the first time adds homegrown terrorism to the familiar menu of threats facing the nation – international terror, nuclear weapons proliferation, economic instability, global climate change and an erosion of democratic freedoms abroad.¶ From mustering NATO forces for Afghanistan to corralling support to pressure North Korea to give up its illicit nuclear weapons program, the U.S. has sometimes struggled in leaning on friends and allies in recent years. Still, the new strategy breaks with some previous administrations in putting heavy emphasis on the value of global cooperation, developing wider security partnerships and helping other nations provide for their own defense.¶ In his first 16 months in office, Obama has pursued a strategy of gentle persuasion, sometimes summarized as "engagement."¶ His administration has attended more closely to ties with Europe, sought a "reset" of relations with Russia, pushed harder to restart stalled Mideast peace talks and consulted widely on a roadmap for defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.¶ Obama's critics, however, assert that his policies have largely failed, given the continued defiance of Iran and North Korea on nuclear development, the stalemate in Afghanistan and rising worries about terrorist attacks at home.¶ Presidents use their national security strategy to set broad goals and priorities for keeping Americans safe. But the document isn't an academic exercise: it has far-reaching effects on spending, defense policies and security strategy.¶ For example, President George W. Bush's 2002 strategy document spelled out a doctrine of pre-emptive war.¶ "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends," the Bush strategy said, with Iraq clearly in mind. The following year U.S. forces invaded, launching a conflict that has lasted far longer and cost far more money and lives than Bush intended.¶ Obama's new strategy is expected to move away from that doctrine.

### 2NC---NSS Double Bind

#### Their 1AC author supports our double bind --- says the 2002 NSS means preemption modeling is inevitable

Sloane 8 -- 1AC Author – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)

Many states took note, for example, when in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS"), President Bush asserted that the United States had the right under international law to engage in preventive wars of [\*350] self-defense. n57 While, contrary to popular belief, the United States never in fact formally relied on that doctrine in practice, many would argue that President Bush de facto exercised this purported right when he initiated an armed conflict with Iraq based on claims, which have since proved unfounded, about its incipient programs to develop catastrophic weapons. The 2006 NSS notably retreats from the 2002 NSS's robust claims of a right to engage in preventive wars of self-defense. n58 Yet even within this brief, four-year period, an astonishing number of other states have asserted a comparable right to engage in preventive self-defense. These include not only states that the United States has described as "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran, but Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, and (though technically not a state) Taiwan. n59 I doubt we will welcome the consequences of this pattern for the evolving jus ad bellum of the twenty-first century.

### 1NC---No Modeling

#### No norm against preemption exists regardless of US action --- means it’s inevitable

Keir A. Lieber 2, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame and Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University, December 2002, http://164.109.48.86/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm

Some analysts believe that it is counterproductive to make explicit the conditions under which America will strike first, and there are compelling reasons for blurring the line between preemption and prevention. The attacks of September 11th demonstrate that terrorist organizations like al Qaeda pose an immediate threat to the United States, are not deterred by the fear of U.S. retaliation, and would probably seize the opportunity to kill millions of Americans if WMD could effectively be used on American soil. A proactive campaign against terrorists thus is wise, and a proclaimed approach toward state sponsors of terrorism might help deter those states from pursuing WMD or cooperating with terrorists in the first place. Other critics have argued that the Bush NSS goes well beyond even the right to anticipatory self-defense that has been commonly interpreted to flow from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and thus the Bush strategy will undermine international law and lead other states to use U.S. policy as a pretext for aggression. The most common examples are that the broad interpretation of legitimate preemption could lead China to attack Taiwan, or India to attack Pakistan. This logic is not compelling, however, as these states are not currently constrained from taking action by any norm against preemption, and thus will not be emboldened by rhetorical shifts in U.S. policy.

### 1NC---No Modeling---Russia-Specific

#### No Russia modeling

Harvey 9 – Cole Harvey, The Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Arms Control Association, October 19, 2009, “Revised Russian Nuke Doctrine Aimed at Near Abroad,” online: http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2009/10/19/122818/80

Russia’s apparent willingness to consider the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in small-scale conflicts comes as the United States is reportedly contemplating scaling back the Bush doctrine of preventive warfare. The two developments are probably unrelated – prompted in Washington by the U.S. experience in Iraq, and in Moscow by persistent worries of conventional inferiority and encirclement by potentially hostile states.

## Warfight/Intervention

### 2NC---Obama Solves

#### The status quo solves --- reject their evidence because none of it assumes Obama or cites anything close to a specific scenario --- it’s just nebulous fear-mongering --- Obama has rejected the Bush Doctrine and restrained intervention --- that’s Aziz.

#### Intervention impact is all hype --- historical record strongly denies

Brooks et al. 13, Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51

temptation. For many advocates of retrenchment, the mere possession of peerless, globe-girdling military capabilities leads inexorably to a dangerous expansion of U.S. definitions of national interest that then drag the country into expensive wars. 64 For example, sustaining ramified, long-standing alliances such as NATO leads to mission creep: the search for new roles to keep the alliance alive. Hence, critics allege that NATO’s need to “go out of area or out of business” led to reckless expansion that alienated Russia and then to a heedless broadening of interests to encompass interventions such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya. In addition, peerless military power creates the temptation to seek total, non-Clausewitzian solutions to security problems, as allegedly occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. 65 Only a country in possession of such awesome military power and facing no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial solutions such as containment and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building in such unlikely places. In addition, critics contend, the United States’ outsized military creates a sense of obligation to use it if it might do good, even in cases where no U.S. interests are engaged. As Madeleine Albright famously asked Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about, if we can’t use it?” Undoubtedly, possessing global military intervention capacity expands opportunities to use force. If it were truly to “come home,” the United States would be tying itself to the mast like Ulysses, rendering itself incapable of succumbing to temptation. Any defense of deep engagement must acknowledge that it increases the opportunity and thus the logical probability of U.S. use of force compared to a grand strategy of true strategic disengagement. Of course, if the alternative to deep engagement is an over-the-horizon intervention stance, then the temptation risk would persist after retrenchment. The main problem with the interest expansion argument, however, is that it essentially boils down to one case: Iraq. Sixty-seven percent of all the casualties and 64 percent of all the budget costs of all the wars the United States has fought since 1990 were caused by that war. Twenty-seven percent of the causalities and 26 percent of the costs were related to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. All the other interventions—the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, the subsequent airstrike campaigns in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya, and so on—account for 3 percent of the casualties and 10 percent of the costs. 66 Iraq is the outlier not only in terms of its human and material cost, but also in terms of the degree to which the overall burden was shouldered by the United States alone. As Beckley has shown, in the other interventions allies either spent more than the United States, suffered greater relative casualties, or both. In the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, for example, the United States ranked fourth in overall casualties (measured relative to population size) and fourth in total expenditures (relative to GDP). In Bosnia, European Union (EU) budget outlays and personnel deployments ultimately swamped those of the United States as the Europeans took over postconflict peacebuilding operations. In Kosovo, the United States suffered one combat fatality, the sole loss in the whole operation, and it ranked sixth in relative monetary contribution. In Afghanistan, the United States is the number one financial contributor (it achieved that status only after the 2010 surge), but its relative combat losses rank fifth. 67 In short, the interest expansion argument would look much different without Iraq in the picture. There would be no evidence for the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, and the overall pattern of intervention would look “unrestrained” only in terms of frequency, not cost, with the debate hinging on whether the surge in Afghanistan was recklessly unrestrained. 68 How emblematic of the deep engagement strategy is the U.S. experience in Iraq? The strategy’s supporters insist that Iraq was a Bush/neoconservative aberration; certainly, there are many supporters of deep engagement who strongly opposed the war, most notably Barack Obama. Against this view, opponents claim that it or something close to it was inevitable given the grand strategy. Regardless, the more important question is whether continuing the current grand strategy condemns the United States to more such wars. The Cold War experience suggests a negative answer. After the United States suffered a major disaster in Indochina (to be sure, dwarfing Iraq in its human toll), it responded by waging the rest of the Cold War using proxies and highly limited interventions. Nothing changed in the basic structure of the international system, and U.S. military power recovered by the 1980s, yet the United States never again undertook a large expeditionary operation until after the Cold War had ended. All indications are that Iraq has generated a similar effect for the post–Cold War era. If there is an Obama doctrine, Dominic Tierney argues, it can be reduced to “No More Iraqs.” 69 Moreover, the president’s thinking is reflected in the Defense Department’s current strategic guidance, which asserts that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” 70 Those developments in Washington are also part of a wider rejection of the Iraq experience across the American body politic, which political scientist John Mueller dubbed the “Iraq Syndrome.” 71 Retrenchment advocates would need to present much more argumentation and evidence to support their pessimism on this subject.

#### No risk of future large-scale US intervention --- war weariness

Irfan Husain, 9-16-2013, “R2P, R.I.P?” Dawn, http://dawn.com/news/1043101/r2p-rip

The Syrian bayonet has just met mush in the form of endless dithering in Washington. Despite the belligerent posture adopted by Obama throughout this crisis, it was always clear that his heart wasn’t in it. And even more obviously, the American people don’t have the stomach for yet another military adventure in the Middle East. After well over a trillion dollars, thousands of lives, and twelve years of wars fought in distant lands for unclear reasons, a deep war-weariness has set in. In parliaments from London to Washington, the mood seems to be: no more blank cheques for open-ended conflicts. When Obama sought Congressional approval for strikes against Syria, congressmen across the United States reported almost universal opposition from their constituents. This was unusual in a country that has fought dozens of wars, battles and skirmishes across the world since the Second World War. And the American people are prone to salute the flag when the bugle sounds, irrespective of their feelings for the bugler. In this case, widespread disenchantment with the idea of yet another war among Democrats, together with a Republican loathing for Obama, has produced a tidal wave of anti-war sentiment. This mirrored a similar reluctance to start a fresh conflict, no matter what the cause, in Britain. As opinion polls show, the French people oppose their country’s participation in air strikes against Syria. And yet the French hailed President Hollande as a hero for sending forces to stop an Islamist takeover of Mali last year. Given the fact that it has been the US, Britain and France at the forefront of nations to have intervened in other countries under the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, or have invaded states without UN authorisation, it seems we have reached a turning point in an era of armed conflict.

#### Bush doctrine is dead – climate of fiscal austerity makes future interventionism extremely unlikely

Bill Schneider 11, 6-27-2011, “The Death of the Bush Doctrine,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-schneider/the-death-of-the-bush-doc\_b\_885189.html

The Bush Doctrine is dead. It was mortally wounded in Iraq. It finally expired in Afghanistan. The doctrine was promulgated by President George W. Bush in his second inaugural address on January 20, 2005, when he said, "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." That made it a matter of U.S. national security to turn other countries into democracies. Even to force democracy with guns and tanks, as we did in Iraq, and as we are trying to do in Afghanistan. We're now seeing growing impatience with Afghanistan in the Republican Party. "I think we have learned that our troops should not go off and try to fight a war of independence for another nation," Mitt Romney said at this month's Republican debate in New Hampshire. Jon Huntsman advocates "an aggressive drawdown" of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. "I'm not sure the fate of our country is going to be determined on the prairies of Afghanistan," Huntsman said last week. After the GOP debate, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said, "I was disappointed that no one articulated why it matters if we win or lose in Afghanistan." Graham is close to Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), a leading proponent of the Bush Doctrine. McCain has been harshly critical of what he calls the "isolationist-withdrawal-lack-of-knowledge-of-history attitude that seems to be on the rise." Last week, 225 House Republicans and 70 Democrats voted down a bill that would authorize the president to use force in Libya. The bill is being co-sponsored by John McCain in the Senate. Public support for removing U.S. troops from Afghanistan "as soon as possible" is on the rise. A majority of Americans (56%) now favors withdrawal, according to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center. Republicans are divided: 53% favor keeping the troops there, while 43% want them to come home. Why are Republicans turning against the Bush Doctrine? Partisanship has something to do with it. Afghanistan has become Obama's war, especially after the president announced a surge of troops in 2009. Then there are the polls showing the war losing public support. But there's something going on here besides political expediency. There's also an issue of principle. The principle is small government. It is the guiding principle of the Tea Party movement, which is gaining ascendancy over the GOP. Small government was never compatible with the Bush Doctrine. Tea Party activists call President Bush a "big government conservative." Under Bush, deficit spending mushroomed. We got a costly prescription drug program, the only new entitlement program ever initiated by a Republican president. And we got a huge increase in defense spending as a result of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan is costing the U.S. more than $300 million a day. Rank-and-file Republican Members of Congress are surprisingly willing to consider serious cuts in defense spending. "I know there are sacred cows [in the defense budget]," freshman Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-IL) told the Washington Post. "But we cannot afford them any more." President Clinton used to call the United States "the world's indispensable nation." That is still true. The rule in world affairs is, unless the United States acts, nothing will happen. If the United States had not gone to war in 1991, Kuwait would be part of Iraq. If the U.S. had not acted in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing would never have been stopped. If the U.S. had not led an invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban would still be in power, harboring al Qaeda terrorists. President Obama pledges that the U.S. will continue to act. But from now on, we won't always do it on our own. And we will do it more cheaply. Meanwhile, the Republican Party is facing a showdown between the forces that want to shrink government and the forces that favor an interventionist foreign policy. The doctrine of small government is trumping the Bush Doctrine. The Tea Party is shoving aside the neo-conservatives. Why did the Bush Doctrine die? Because it was too expensive. And because we learned a painful lesson in Iraq and Afghanistan: the U.S. military is no good at nation-building. Back in 2000, in a campaign debate with Al Gore, then-Gov. Bush warned, "If we don't stop extending our troops all around the world in nation-building missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road." We didn't, and we do.

#### Bush doctrine is dead --- no preemption or intervention coming

Michael Williams 11, 10-21-2011, writer @ the Guardian, “Another win for the Obama Doctrine,” Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/oct/21/another-win-obama-doctrine

President Obama's latest foreign intervention in Libya reflects an evolution of the American way of war and the crystallisation of the "Obama Doctrine". Gone are the "shock and awe", trillion-dollar campaigns of the Bush era – right on cue, the president has followed Thursday's news of Muammar Gaddafi's death with Friday's announcement of the final pullout of US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. In this age of austerity and public fatigue with foreign exploits, the Obama White House has diligently combined military force, technology, intelligence assets and patience to rack up an unassailable list of "wins" for the president on foreign affairs. The success and strength of the the president's doctrine lies in the fact that it is not doctrinaire. The Obama Doctrine is based upon the very pragmatic concept that the United States should defend primary and secondary interests when it can, but that there is no hard-and-fast rule on intervention. There is no "off limits" zone à la the Monroe Doctrine, no Truman-esque hard line such as the containment of the USSR that led to the Vietnam war. The Obama Doctrine is also a far cry from the Bush Doctrine's "you're either with us or you're against us" mentality, which held that democracy promotion could be achieved via direct regime change – so saddling the US with $1tn of debt and an unwinnable war in Iraq. The Bush Doctrine played right into Osama bin Laden's hands; the Obama Doctrine killed Bin Laden. The methods behind the Obama Doctrine are just as important as the thinking. We are witnessing an evolution in the American way of war. The broad-brush "global war on terror" of Rumsfeld and Bush is being replaced by a far more sophisticated mix of ingredients. Unmanned aerial vehicles have replaced boots on the ground. This effort concentrates on gathering intelligence on opponents and then using the American technological advantage to eliminate enemy leadership. Under President Obama, the use of drones has more than tripled. While such a policy raises moral, ethnical and legal issues, the effectiveness in decimating the al-Qaida network and Taliban leaders is hard to dispute. More open to dispute, though, is the new US approach to active intervention where the US seemingly plays a secondary role to allies. But in the current climate, not being the obvious lead nation is a vote winner in the US following the costly involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reminiscent of the Nixon Doctrine, the Obama White House actively supported allies in the Libya campaign, but it largely avoided doing the direct fighting. The reality of Libya, however, is that the war was substantially underwritten by the US. US C4ISTR technology tracked and targeted enemy forces; 75% of in-flight refueling for combat aircraft was provided by the US. Washington supplied satellite communications for all allied forces. American specialists at Nato's regional HQ in Naples, Italy prepared the targeting packages. When the Europeans ran out of munitions, it was the US that provided them with more, to keep the operation running. Europeans did contribute substantially to the effort – flying around 85% of the combat missions, putting special forces trainers on the ground and providing ships to embargo Libya – but the mission would not have functioned with the US, end of story. Now that Gaddafi is dead and his regime removed, on the surface the Libya operation looks like a big success for the president. Appearances can be deceiving, though – just ask President George W Bush. In December 2002, it looked like Afghanistan was a success as well– but what comes after the government falls is just as important as the war (if not more so). There still seems to be far too little thinking about what comes after the war: the intervention in Libya is not so different in this regard to Afghanistan or, indeed, Iraq. The euphoria over Gaddafi's fall, we should remember, may prove shortlived. How secure is the National Transitional Council's authority, and will it prove capable of making the transition to a legitimate, democratic form of government? What if, in fact, Islamic extremists emerge as a major force? Or what if, perhaps, another military junta seizes power? Will we think the mission a success if, over coming months, the country decays into civil war? Can the US and its Nato allies stay out of Libya if the security situation deteriorates? All of these questions remain to be answered. Until we see how Libya pans out, the validity of the Obama Doctrine remains questionable. For the time being, the president will most likely continue with his pragmatic approach. He will not intervene anywhere and everywhere, but he will act when he feels the situation requires it and the judicious use of American resources can achieve a limited set of goals. The White House has been wisely restrained in intervening over the Arab Spring, but it is becoming increasingly hard for Obama to avoid acting against America's Middle East foil, Iran.

### 2NC---No Impact

#### Interventions won’t escalate --- their own empirics prove --- none of the past incidents like Afghanistan or Iraq escalated or drew in great powers --- Congress always gets involved if wars get too big --- that’s Weiner

### 1NC---Squo Solves International Coalitions

#### Obama’s personality solves their international coalition arguments regardless of intervention

Mead 11 – James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine, former Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (8/22, Walter Russell, American Interest, “W Gets A Third Term In The Middle East”, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/08/22/w-gets-a-third-term-in-the-middle-east/)

The most irritating argument anyone could make in American politics is that President Obama, precisely because he seems so liberal, so vacillating, so nice, is a more effective neoconservative than President Bush. As is often the case, the argument is so irritating partly because it is so true.¶ President Obama is pushing a democracy agenda in the Middle East that is as aggressive as President Bush’s; he adopts regime change by violence if necessary as a core component of his regional approach and, to put it mildly, he is not afraid to bomb. But where President Bush’s tough guy posture (“Bring ‘Em On!”) alienated opinion abroad and among liberals at home, President Obama’s reluctant warrior stance makes it easier for others to work with him.¶ In some ways, President Obama’s Middle Eastern foreign policy does for President Bush’s democratization policy what President Eisenhower did for President Truman’s containment doctrine. In both cases, a necessary and useful foreign policy had become deeply unpopular; Eisenhower implemented containment but made the country feel better about it — partly by rhetorical shifts, partly by tweaking the execution. Obama is trying to do the same thing with Bush’s transformation agenda.¶ In many ways we are living through George W. Bush’s third term in the Middle East, and neither President Obama’s friends nor his enemies want to admit it. President Obama, in his own way and with his own twists, continues to follow the core Bush policy of nudging and sometimes pushing nasty regimes out of power, aligning the US with the wave of popular discontent in the region even as that popular sentiment continues to dislike, suspect and reject many aspects of American power and society. And that policy continues to achieve ambivalent successes: replacing old and crustily anti-American regimes, rooted deeply in the culture of terror and violence within and beyond their borders, with weaker, more open and — on some issues at least — more accommodating ones.¶ Additionally, the combination of tough military attacks on Al Qaeda and its affiliates wherever they rear their ugly heads and the opening of new political space in the Middle East continues to marginalize the acolytes of Bin Laden. There was a time when Bin Laden hoped to become the voice of Arab protest and resistance; the US had killed his dream long before Team Six got to his house.¶ Obama is better than Bush at building international coalitions and managing the appearance of American policy in a contentious world. In Libya, Obama faced a constraint not dissimilar to Bush’s situation in Iraq. Both presidents got something from the Security Council, but neither got enough. Bush responded by defying the body over the failed “second resolution” on Iraq; Obama simply ignored the gap between what the resolution allowed and what the US needed, stretching a humanitarian mandate to effect regime change.¶ Gratuitous snubs to global sensibilities were one of the Bush administration’s most expensive failings; when the WMD in Iraq did not appear and the occupation turned into a nightmare, an infuriated world (and many Americans) rejoiced at what they saw as a well deserved comeuppance. President Obama’s more conciliatory stance does nothing to win over America’s enemies — but it makes it harder for those enemies to mobilize world opinion on their side. He has also cut the legs off the anti-war movements at home by depriving it of a clear target. Nobody in America much likes all the wars we are fighting in so many obscure places — but the anti-war movement has been reduced to its irrelevant hard core.¶ Obama has plenty of faults of his own, and, like Bush’s, his mistakes can be costly. He has never understood the dynamics of the US-Israel relations or the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He clearly underestimated the conflict in Libya; we shall see whether he and the allies have underestimated the problems of reconstruction. The combination of a surge in Afghanistan with the naming of a date for withdrawal sent mixed signals and probably encouraged the Taliban to fight on.¶ But since the world hates Obama less than it hated Bush, the US and the global press are more forgiving of his errors, and pass lightly over shortcomings and contradictions that, if Bush were still in the White House, would be the mainstay of the nightly news. When was the last time you read something about Obama’s failure to close Guantanamo?¶ The result is that the advance of US power in the Middle East that began under Bush has continued and developed under Obama. Our worst enemies disappear; the Gulf monarchies are more dependent on us than ever; the coalition against Iran deepens and strengthens.

## AT: Intervention Advantage

### 1NC---AT: Groupthink

#### Informal, internal checks are sufficient to address groupthink

Kennedy 12, JD from USC, MA in Middle Eastern Regional Studies from Harvard [Copyright (c) 2012 Gould School of Law Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal Spring, 2012 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 21 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 633 LENGTH: 23138 words NOTE: THE HIJACKING OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: GROUPTHINK AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD NAME: Brandon Kennedy\* BIO: \* Class of 2012, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; M.A. Regional Studies: Middle East 2009, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; B.A. Government 2009, Harvard University.]

Neither the president nor the decision-making group members implement "hybrid" checks; the checks do, however, originate in the executive branch and directly affect the president and the group members. Hybrid checks relate to the bureaucratic machine and typically address the structural faults within the executive branch that can affect the core decision-making group. Although the president and his or her advisers constitute the insiders of the decision-making group, they ultimately belong [\*676] to a larger organization - the executive branch - and thereby become part of the bureaucratic machine. 1. Inter-Agency Process The "inter-agency process" check involves getting approval for, or opinions about, a proposed decision from **other agencies**. n252 The inter-agency process is particularly common for national security and foreign policy decisions. n253 "Occasionally, it will operate at a higher level in principals' committees involving Cabinet-level or sub-Cabinet people and their deputies," thus directly checking the decision-making group members. n254 2. Intra-Agency Process Another similar check is the "intra-agency process," in which the circulation of proposed decisions **within the agency** empowers dissidents and harnesses a diversity of thinking. n255 If nothing else, the process catches errors, or at least increases the odds of avoiding them, given the number of people who must review or approve a document or decision within the agency. n256 3. Agency or Lawyer Culture The culture of a particular agency - the institutional self-awareness of its professionalism - provides another check. n257 "Lawyer culture" - which places high value on competencyand adherence to rules and laws - resides at the core of agency culture; n258 its "nay-saying" objectivity "is especially important in the small inner circle of presidential decision making to counter the tendency towards groupthink and a vulnerability to sycophancy." n259 [\*677] 4. Public Humiliation A final check in this category is the "public humiliation" check. n260 This check only comes into play when the previous three have failed, and involves the threat to ""go public' by leaking embarrassing information or publicly resigning."

#### No groupthink---executives are fragmented and pluralistic---Congress is far more prone to flawed decision-making

Posner 7 – \*Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School AND \*\*professor at Harvard Law School (Eric and Adrian, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts p. 46-47)

The idea that Congress will, on net, weed out bad policies rests on an institutional comparison. The president is elected by a national constituency on a winner-take-all basis (barring the remote chance that the Electoral College will matter), whereas Congress is a summation of local constituencies and thus affords more voice to political and racial minorities. At the level of political psychology, decisionmaking within the executive is prone to group polarization and other forms of groupthink or irrational panic,51 whereas the internal diversity of legislative deliberation checks these forces. At the level of political structure, Congress contains internal veto gates and chokepoints—consider the committee system and the fi libuster rule—that provide minorities an opportunity to block harmful policies, whereas executive decisionmaking is relatively centralized and unitary. The contrast is drawn too sharply, because in practice **the executive is a they, not an it**. Presidential oversight is incapable of fully unifying executive branch policies, which means that **disagreement flourishes within the executive as well, dampening panic and groupthink** and providing minorities with political redoubts.52 Where a national majority is internally divided, the structure of presidential politics creates chokepoints that can give racial or ideological minorities disproportionate influence, just as the legislative process does. Consider the influence of Arab Americans in Michigan, often a swing state in presidential elections. It is not obvious, then, that statutory authorization **makes any difference at all**. One possibility is that a large national majority dominates both Congress and the presidency and enacts panicky policies, oppresses minorities, or increases security in ways that have ratchet effects that are costly to reverse. If this is the case, a requirement of statutory authorization does not help. Another possibility is that there are internal institutional checks, within both the executive branch and Congress, on the adoption of panicky or oppressive policies and that democratic minorities have real infl uence in both arenas. If this is the case, then a requirement of authorization is not necessary and does no good. Authorization only makes a difference in the unlikely case where the executive is thoroughly panicky, or oppressively majoritarian, while Congress resists the stampede toward bad policies and safeguards the interests of oppressed minorities. Even if that condition obtains, however, the argument for authorization goes wrong by failing to consider both sides of the normative ledger. As for majoritarian oppression, the multiplicity of veto gates within Congress may allow minorities to block harmful discrimination, but it also allows minorities to block policies and laws which, although targeted, are nonetheless good. As for panic and irrationality, if Congress is more deliberative, one result will be to prevent groupthink and slow down stampedes toward bad policies, but another result will be to delay necessary emergency measures and **slow down stampedes toward good policies**. Proponents of the authorization requirement sometimes assume that quick action, even panicky action, **always** produces bad policies. But there is no necessary connection between these two things; expedited action is sometimes good, and panicky crowds can stampede either in the wrong direction or in the right direction. Slowing down the adoption of new policies through congressional oversight retards the adoption not only of bad policies, but also of good policies that need to be adopted quickly if they are to be effective.

### 2NC---AT: Groupthink

#### Their groupthink arguments are wrong --- the executive isn’t a monolith --- internal executive bureaucracy forces reconsideration of every action by multiple different actors --- ensures dissenting voices are heard --- especially true because lawyers are inherently predisposed to challenge legality of every policy --- that’s Kennedy and Posner. Congress is equally prone to groupthink anyway.

#### Obama’s cabinet solves groupthink

Pillar 13 -- Brookings Foreign Policy Senior Fellow [Paul, "The Danger of Groupthink," The National Interest, 2-26-13, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:6rnyjYlVKY0J:www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/26-danger-groupthink-pillar+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us]

David Ignatius has an interesting take on national security decision-making in the Obama administration in the wake of the reshuffle of senior positions taking place during these early weeks of the president's second term. Ignatius perceives certain patterns that he believes reinforce each other in what could be a worrying way. One is that the new team does not have as much “independent power” as such first-term figures as Clinton, Gates, Panetta and Petraeus. Another is that the administration has “centralized national security policy to an unusual extent” in the White House. With a corps of Obama loyalists, the substantive thinking may, Ignatius fears, run too uniformly in the same direction. He concludes his column by stating that “by assembling a team where all the top players are going in the same direction, he [Obama] is perilously close to groupthink.” We are dealing here with tendencies to which the executive branch of the U.S. government is more vulnerable than many other advanced democracies, where leading political figures with a standing independent of the head of government are more likely to wind up in a cabinet. This is especially true of, but not limited to, coalition governments. Single-party governments in Britain have varied in the degree to which the prime minister exercises control, but generally room is made in the cabinet for those the British call “big beasts”: leading figures in different wings or tendencies in the governing party who are not beholden to the prime minister for the power and standing they have attained. Ignatius overstates his case in a couple of respects. Although he acknowledges that Obama is “better than most” in handling open debate, he could have gone farther and noted that there have been egregious examples in the past of administrations enforcing a national security orthodoxy, and that the Obama administration does not even come close to these examples. There was Lyndon Johnson in the time of the Vietnam War, when policy was made around the president's Tuesday lunch table and even someone with the stature of the indefatigable Robert McNamara was ejected when he strayed from orthodoxy. Then there was, as the most extreme case, the George W. Bush administration, in which there was no policy process and no internal debate at all in deciding to launch a war in Iraq and in which those who strayed from orthodoxy, ranging from Lawrence Lindsey to Eric Shinseki, were treated mercilessly. Obama's prolonged—to the point of inviting charges of dithering—internal debates on the Afghanistan War were the polar opposite of this. Ignatius also probably underestimates the contributions that will be made to internal debate by the two most important cabinet members in national security: the secretaries of state and defense. He says John Kerry “has the heft of a former presidential candidate, but he has been a loyal and discreet emissary for Obama and is likely to remain so.” The heft matters, and Kerry certainly qualifies as a big beast. Moreover, the discreet way in which a member of Congress would carry any of the administration's water, as Kerry sometimes did when still a senator, is not necessarily a good indication of the role he will assume in internal debates as secretary of state. As for Chuck Hagel, Ignatius states “he has been damaged by the confirmation process and will need White House cover.” But now that Hagel's nomination finally has been confirmed, what other “cover” will he need? It's not as if he ever will face another confirmation vote in the Senate. It was Hagel's very inclination to flout orthodoxy, to arrive at independent opinions and to voice those opinions freely that led to the fevered opposition to his nomination.

#### Groupthink theory is flawed --- correlation, not causation

Anthony Hempell 4, User Experience Consulting Senior Information Architect, “Groupthink: An introduction to Janis' theory of concurrence-seeking tendencies in group work.,” <http://www.anthonyhempell.com/papers/groupthink/>, March 3

In the thirty years since Janis first proposed the groupthink model, there is still little agreement as to the validity of the model in assessing decision-making behaviour (Park, 2000). Janis' theory is often criticized because it does not present a framework that is suitable for empirical testing; instead, the evidence for groupthink comes from largely qualitative, historical or archival methods (Sunstein, 2003). Some critics go so far as to say that Janis's work relies on "anecdote, casual observation, and intuitive appeal rather than rigorous research" (Esser, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003, p.142). While some studies have shown support for the groupthink model, the support tends to be mixed or conditional (Esser, 1998); some studies have revealed that a closed leadership style and external threats (in particular, time pressure) promote groupthink and defective decision making (Neck & Moorhead, 1995, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999); the effect of group cohesiveness is still inconclusive (Mullen, Anthony, Salas & Driskel, 1994, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999). Janis's model tends to be supported by studies that employ a qualitative case-study approach as opposed to experimental research, which tends to either partially support or not support Janis's thesis (Park, 2000). The lack of success in experimental validation of groupthink may be due to difficulties in operationalizing and conceptualizing it as a testable variable (Hogg & Hains, 1998; Park, 2000). Some researchers have criticized Janis for categorically denouncing groupthink as a negative phenomenon (Longley & Pruitt, 1980, cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Sniezek (1992) argues that there are instances where concurrence-seeking may promote group performance. When used to explain behaviour in a practical setting, groupthink has been frames as a detrimental group process; the result of this has been that many corporate training programs have created strategies for avoiding groupthink in the workplace (Quinn, Faerman, Thompson & McGrath, 1990, cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Another criticism of groupthink is that Janis overestimates the link between the decision-making process and the outcome (McCauley, 1989; Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang & Feld, 1992; cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Tetlock et al argue that there are many other factors between the decision process and the outcome. The outcome of any decision-making process, they argue, will only have a certain probability of success due to various environmental factors (such as luck). A large-scale study researching decision-making in seven major American corporations concluded that decision-making worked best when following a sound information processing method; however these groups also showed signs of groupthink, in that they had strong leadership which attempted to persuade others in the group that they were right (Peterson et al, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003). Esser (1998) found that groupthink characteristics were correlated with failures; however cohesiveness did not appear to be a factor: groups consisting of strangers, friends, or various levels of previous experience together did not appear to effect decision-making ability. Janis' claims of insulation of groups and groups led by autocratic leaders did show that these attributes were indicative of groupthink symptoms. Moorhead & Montanari conducted a study where they concluded that groupthink symptoms had no significant effect on group performance, and that "the relationship between groupthink-induced decision defects and outcomes were not as strong as Janis suggests" (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986, p. 399; cited by Choi & Kim, 1999).

#### The historical support for groupthink theory is suspect

Scheeringa 10 (Daniel, Was the Decision to Invade Iraq and the Failure of Occupation Planning a Case of Groupthink? Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In Political Science. pg. lexis)

In *Groupthink and Government*, Paul t‟Hart undertakes a thorough examination of the theory. He examines the theory from social-psychological and political perspectives. He also applies groupthink theory to the Iran-contra scandal of the late 1980‟s. In “Groupthink, Bay of Pigs and Watergate Reconsidered” Bertram Raven used groupthink theory to examine the decisions leading to the Watergate scandal. He concluded that while groupthink was a factor, other factors, such as Nixon‟s influence and political considerations, also weighed on the group dynamic. Raven uses the Watergate example as evidence that groupthink does not necessarily lead to failure, which is the converse of the argument that failure is not necessarily caused by groupthink24. In “Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well Has Groupthink Theory Stood the Test of Time?” Kramer contends that new historical information regarding Presidents Kennedy‟s and Johnson‟s decision-making processes shows 16

that their decisions were less the result of group dynamics than Janis suggested, casting doubt on the fundamental tenets of groupthink theory25.

#### Groupthink doesn’t cause failed interventions --- other explanations are key --- they can’t solve

Scheeringa 10 (Daniel, Was the Decision to Invade Iraq and the Failure of Occupation Planning a Case of Groupthink? Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In Political Science. pg. lexis)

This thesis also examines literature that suggests alternative explanations for the Bush administration‟s decisions. The imperfect applicability of groupthink theory to those decisions leads me to hypothesize that the decision to invade and the failure to plan the occupation were the results of other types of cognitive error, combined with ideological agenda setting. In “Invading and Occupying Iraq: Some Insights from Political Psychology” Houghton uses the non-theoretical literature on the Iraq war to examine the cognitive errors present in the decision process. Groupthink was only one error in a list that included the drunkard‟s search, impulse decisions, improper use of analogy and the prominence of denial and wishful thinking, among others. Houghton finds evidence pointing to the presence of groupthink in some of the behavior of President Bush and top officials, and especially in places such as the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Pentagon‟s Office of Special Plans35. In “Decision Making during International Crises,” Janis and Herek test the hypothesis that high-quality decision-making procedures during crises are associated with better results than poor decision-making procedures. To differentiate high quality from low quality, the authors judge each process using seven symptoms of defective decision-making. These criteria are: gross omission in surveying alternatives, gross omissions in surveying objectives, failure to examine major costs and risks of preferred choice, poor information search, selective bias in processing information at hand, failure to reconsider originally rejected alternatives, failure to work out detailed implementation, monitoring, and contingency plans. When applying these criteria to a series of international crises since World War II, Janis and Herek found sizable relationships between positive outcomes and decision-making processes that avoided the seven symptoms.36 In “The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,” Alexander George prescribes a foreign policy decision-making process where the decision maker institutes a structured competition among differing viewpoints that results in a mixed system that combines a centralized management system with a pluralistic system.37 In “The Transformation of Policy Ideas” and Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order, Legro maintains that collective ideas, especially those regarding foreign policy, change as a result of a process of collapse and consolidation. A significant external shock is not sufficient to change collective ideas, but must be followed by social coordination around the new idea.38

#### Groupthink theory is based on over-generalizations, skewed studies, and ignores potential positives

Ramon Aldag 93, professor in the Management and Human Resources dept. of U-Wisconsin School of Business, and Sally Fuller, School of Business, U-Washington, “Beyond Fiasco : A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 113, Issue 3, EBSCO

Groupthink has been overwhelmingly viewed as an unalayed evil, leading to uniformly negative outcomes. Indeed, such a view is universally implicit in the language of groupthink (e.g., the common references to “symptoms of groupthink,” “victims of groupthink,” and “defects of groupthink”). When used in groupthink research, such negative terminology can invite distortions in responses caused by scale-use tendencies and related psychometric difficulties and can also result in framing effects.¶ Individuals (whether subjects or researchers) presented with negatively framed terminology may adopt the readily available negative frame and respond accordingly ( Bazerman, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Therefore, even simple attempts by the subjects to give responses that are consistent with the tone of the questions would result in negatively oriented responses. In many cases, failed decisions are examined and characteristics of groupthink are then sought. There is evidence that when individuals are provided with knowledge of a negative outcome, they infer a negative process ( Guzzo, Wagner, Maguire, Herr, & Hawley, 1986). Furthermore, a focus only on the conjunction of groupthink characteristics and negative outcomes invites illusory correlation (cf. Einhorn, 1980; Hogarth, 1980; Kleinmuntz, 1990).¶ On a more fundamental level, this framing has resulted in a focus on error rather than on decision quality per se. Janis (1982) noted that he began studying fiascoes “for the purposes of studying sources of error in foreign policy decision-making” (p. 9). However, there is more to the performance of a football team than the absence of fumbles and interceptions, and there is more to group decision quality than the absence of error. A focus on negative outcomes of group processes may divert attention from group synergies. One example is the assembly effect bonus, which, as noted by Collins and Guetzkow (1964), “is productivity which exceeds the potential of the most capable member and also exceeds the sum of the efforts of the group members working separately” (p. 58). There is considerable evidence for this assembly effect bonus, at least in some contexts (e.g., Burleson, Levine, & Samter, 1984). Thus, researchers may learn little about superior group performance by a focus solely on fiascoes. Instead, a focus on decisions with a broad range of outcomes, including superior performance, is necessary.¶ The consequences of the groupthink model's focus on fiascoes are doubly ironic. First, the consideration only of fiascoes precludes generalization to other decision situations used in virtually all attempts to assess the validity of groupthink. Second, the focus on fiascoes makes it impossible to say anything even about the determinants of fiascoes.

#### Reject their case studies --- they’re done with students and don’t apply to military policy

Ramon Aldag 93, professor in the Management and Human Resources dept. of U-Wisconsin School of Business, and Sally Fuller, School of Business, U-Washington, “Beyond Fiasco : A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 113, Issue 3, EBSCO

As suggested by the earlier review, most support for groupthink has come from retrospective case studies that have focused on decision fiascoes rather than comparing the decision-making processes associated with good versus bad decisions.¶ Experimental studies of groupthink have considered only a small portion of the model, often without a cohesive group and in situations inconsistent with Janis's (1971, 1972, 1982, 1989) antecedents. Furthermore, they have relied exclusively on student samples dealing with hypothetical or simulated decisions, with potential resultant problems for external validity. Military strategists, managers, politicians, or other “real-world” decision makers have never been used. In the laboratory, many real-world group characteristics, including ongoing power relationships and political maneuverings, have been necessarily ignored. Although student samples in laboratory settings may be valuable to address many issues relating to group problem solving, their use to examine groupthink is problematic.

### 1NC---AT: Spoofing

#### They don’t solve spoofing:

#### A) Terrorists will just bait OTHER countries to intervene

#### B) Congress wouldn’t be able to know any better

#### C) No lashout hysterics

Mueller 5 (John, Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University, Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NB.PDF)

However, history clearly demonstrates that overreaction is not necessarily inevitable. Sometimes, in fact, leaders have been able to restrain their instinct to overreact. Even more important, **restrained reaction--or even capitulation to terrorist acts--has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically**. That is, there are many instances where leaders did nothing after a terrorist attack (or at least refrained from overreacting) and did not suffer politically or otherwise. Similarly, after an unacceptable loss of American lives in Somalia in 1993, Bill Clinton responded by withdrawing the troops without noticeable negative impact on his 1996 re-election bid. Although Clinton responded with (apparently counterproductive) military retaliations after the two U.S. embassies were bombed in Africa in 1998 as discussed earlier, his administration did not have a notable response to terrorist attacks on American targets in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) in 1996 or to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and these non-responses never caused it political pain. George W. Bush's response to the anthrax attacks of 2001 did include, as noted above, a costly and wasteful stocking-up of anthrax vaccine and enormous extra spending by the U.S. Post Office. However, beyond that, it was the same as Clinton's had been to the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the same as the one applied in Spain when terrorist bombed trains there in 2004 or in Britain after attacks in 2005: the dedicated application of police work to try to apprehend the perpetrators. This approach was politically acceptable even though the culprit in the anthrax case (unlike the other ones) has yet to be found. The demands for retaliation may be somewhat more problematic in the case of suicide terrorists since the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act are already dead, thus sometimes impelling a vengeful need to seek out other targets. Nonetheless, the attacks in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, and against the Cole were all suicidal, yet no direct retaliatory action was taken. **Thus, despite short-term demands that some sort of action must be taken**, experience suggests politicians can often successfully ride out this demand after the obligatory (and inexpensive) expressions of outrage are prominently issued.

#### Blumrosen says Congress can’t solve – no resources or experts

Blumrosen 11 – Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor Emeritus at the Rutgers School of Law and Steven M. Blumrosen, J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law, "Restoring the Congressional Duty to Declare War", Rutgers Law Review, Winter, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 407, Lexis

Professor Phillip Bobbit has focused on the difficulties of assigning ―blame‖ for a terrorist attack from an uncertain source, and the dangerous consequences of a rush to judgment.516 An attack against our water supply, electrical grid, or the transportation system, where the perpetrators plant phony evidence that the plot originated in Russia, China, or Iran could lead us to a nuclear response that would ―bomb us all‖ into the stone age. This would suit only those who believe that western civilization is an abomination.¶ **=====THEIR CARD ENDS=====**¶ Congress must be alert to determine what actions a President plans to take after a ―terrorist incident‖ against the United States, and satisfy itself and the public that the President has not ―rushed to judgment‖ about the culprits and their backers. The President‘s claim that time is of the essence, is rarely the case. In connection with the Second Iraq War, the President pressured Congress to act favorably just before the bi-annual election in 2002, then waited five months to commencee hostilities. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was rushed through on flimsy evidence in August, 1964. Johnson had no intention of using it until after the presidential elections in ¶ November, so he could run for election on a policy of keeping our boys out of Vietnam.517 After his victory, he made the decision to deploy more than half a million troops to Vietnam. ¶ Congress should gird itself for negotiations with the White House and for serious reviews of the facts, rather than the meaningless speechmaking that accompanied the 2002 AUMF against Iraq or the worry about the political consequences of a serious review of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Congress has a problem of resources.518 The presidential staff consists of thousands of professionals in the Departments of Justice, Defense, State and the Intelligence agencies.519 Congress needs a stand-by committee of experts on both war and diplomacy to evaluate proposals for military action.520 While we believe that Presidents and Congresses will continue to rely on the AUMF because it simplifies life at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, we also believe that the AUMF has served the nation so badly that we cannot continue to rely on the Vietnam War cases. Congress may reform itself, but at the moment, hope lies with a judiciary that may yet absorb the significance of June 1, 1787.

### 2NC---AT: Spoofing---XT No Lashout

#### U.S. won’t over-react to terrorism

Jenkins-Smith 4 (Hank C., Ph.D., Professor of Government – Texas A&M University, and Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D., Research Scientist – Texas A&M University, Fall)

 Our final contrasting set of expectations relate to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our **data show that** **support for using** conventional **U.S. military force to retaliate against terrorists** initially averaged above midscale, but **did not reach a high level of emotional demand** for military action. **Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002**. Furthermore, **panelists** both in 2001 and 2002 **preferred** that **high levels of certainty about culpability** (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established **before taking military action.** Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these **results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics** that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes, in the immediate aftermath of the event, demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But **even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured** . On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willing-ness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

### 2NC---Congress -/-> Better Wars

#### Congress doesn’t lead to better war decision making --- Vietnam and Iraq prove they’re just as likely to endorse bad wars --- ex ante approval slows reaction speech which makes intervention ineffective --- WW2 proves --- prefer Nzelibe because he’s a law prof. and looks at empirics over pure theory.

#### ZERO empirical evidence supports the view that Congress leads to better wars

Jide Nzelibe 6, Asst. Profesor of Law @ Northwestern, and John Yoo, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, “Rational War and Constitutional Design,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, SSRN

We must compare the impact of Type I and Type II errors under a Congress-first system with the results of a President-first approach. Presidents may cause the United States to begin wars that appear unnecessary or unwise initially; however, some of these conflicts may look better in hindsight. The Cold War experience, which provides the best examples of major military hostilities conducted without ex ante congressional authorization, does not stand as an unambiguous example of how legislative control promotes institutional deliberation and results in better conflict selection. Many of the conflicts, such as Panama and Grenada, ended successfully for the United States. To be sure, the Korean War, which many would consider a draw, did not, but the Korean War may have succeeded in its broader objectives of containing the expansion of communism in East Asia. Statements defending congressional approval of military hostilities, in effect, argue that congressional authorization produces deliberation, consensus, and good selection of wars. However, there is little or no empirical data to support this conclusion, and some of the best known anecdotes from the historical record point in the other direction. If empirical data on American wars would be too difficult to analyze, perhaps we should proceed along a different line, by constructing better models of state behavior in the international system to judge the efficacy of warmaking arrangements. We do not claim that the empirical record shows that a President-first approach is always superior. We argue that the Congress-first approach is based on unproven and questionable assumptions, and that as a matter of theory an approach that allows the President to choose whether to seek congressional support for war will be superior. We do not attempt to provide new empirical analysis here, but we will show as a matter of theory why the Congress-first approach does not provide the benefits claimed by its proponents

#### Congress is less accountable than the President --- they only focus on parochial interests --- AND squo power of the purse is sufficient to solve the aff

Jide Nzelibe 6, Asst. Profesor of Law @ Northwestern, and John Yoo, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, “Rational War and Constitutional Design,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, SSRN

A significant number of scholars have argued that the President remains more politically accountable than other institutions. Indeed, much of the current work on the separation of powers commonly assumes that the President answers to a "national constituency," while Congress usually looks to "parochial interests." 1 7 Critics of the majoritarian President, on the other hand, emphasize that the Electoral College's winner-take-all system gives the President an incentive to cater to a narrower political constituency than the median legislator. 1 8 Despite these varying views on the accountability of the political branches, one can reasonably conclude that presidential accountability will become more pronounced in matters of foreign policy and national security. In foreign affairs, the Constitution's Framers indisputably attempted to suppress the parochial interests that had beset the Articles of Confederation. They centralized authority over national security, foreign policy, and international trade in the national government. 1 9 Over time, control over those issues has migrated to the executive branch, a fact that even critics of the "imperial presidency" recognize. 2 ° More importantly, Presidents are often identified with the nation's successes or failures in foreign policy, and they will bear the lion's share of the electoral consequences of victory or defeat in war." The benefits of delegating war power to the executive might be outweighed by a variety of agency costs. The President, for example, might wish only to satisfy the majority necessary to elect him, which could constitute as little as twenty-five percent of the population (the fifty percent of the states with fifty percent of the electoral votes) .22 Alternatively, the President might be a lame duck in his second term, or he might have a short time horizon that extends only to the next election. A President might use war as a pretext to expand his powers, which he could misuse for domestic purposes. 2 3 Finally, a President might seek personal glory in war rather than the national interest. Arguments in favor of a requirement that Congress first authorize war, however, do not explain how congressional participation would reduce these agency costs. If Congress seeks to represent the median voter, as some theories of legislation suggest, then it is unclear that Congress's constituency is any broader than the President's. The median member of the House of Representatives could represent a constituency that is as little as twenty-five percent of the electorate. 4 The constitutional allocation of Senate seats might bias Congress toward the interests of rural areas. Congress might be just as susceptible as the President to the temptation of using war as a pretext to expand its domestic powers. During the McCarthy era, members of Congress, rather than the executive branch, pressed to reduce civil liberties because of national security concerns. Congress also might have objects in mind that have more to do with national glory than with the real interests of the electorate. The War of 1812 centered more on the congressional dream of adding Canada to the American republic than on national self-defense or presidential ambitions. 2 5 The choice between the Congress-first view and the current system of war powers is not one of total versus zero congressional participation. The question really is one of ex ante versus ex post participation. Even under the strongest President-first theories, Congress still retains the ability to check presidential foreign policy and national security decisions through the funding power. Often Congress can exercise that authority ex ante. It had the opportunity, for example, to prevent Presidents from waging the Persian Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by refusing to appropriate money before the fighting began. Some Congress-first scholars doubt the effectiveness of Congress's appropriation power in constraining presidential military ventures,2 6 but Congress has frequently used the threat to cut off funding to force withdrawal of forces and terminate conflicts. 7 With the high costs of modern conflict, any significant military undertaking will require Presidents to seek congressional cooperation. Critics of presidential power fail to explain why political accountability would be enhanced by requiring that Congress not just provide funding for military hostilities ex ante, but also go to the additional step of enacting legislation authorizing the conflict.

### 1NC---Ikenberry Votes Neg

#### They don’t access Ikenberry --- he says complete overhaul of grand strategy is necessary

Ikenberry 11 – G. John Ikenberry, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “A World of Our Making”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Issue #21, Summer, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all>

Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building¶ American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful?¶ Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long-term threats and opportunities that lie beyond the country’s shores. Given the great shifts in the global system and the crisis of liberal hegemonic order, how should the United States pursue grand strategy in the coming years? The answer is that the United States should work with others to rebuild and renew the institutional foundations of the liberal international order and along the way re-establish its own authority as a global leader. The United States is going to need to invest in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities. That is, the United States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building.¶ It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu oriented. With a positional grand strategy, a great power seeks to diminish the power or threat embodied in a specific challenger state or group of states. Examples are Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet bloc, and perhaps—in the future—Greater China. With a milieu-oriented grand strategy, a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security. This might entail building the infrastructure of international cooperation, promoting trade and democracy in various regions of the world, and establishing partnerships that might be useful for various contingencies. My point is that under conditions of unipolarity, in a world of diffuse threats, and with pervasive uncertainty over what the specific security challenges will be in the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary.¶ The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did with the fascist and communist powers of the last century. Indeed, compared with the dark days of the 1930s or the Cold War, America lives in an extraordinarily benign security environment. Rather than a single overriding threat, the United States and other countries face a host of diffuse and evolving threats. Global warming, nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy security, health pandemics—these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats could endanger Americans’ lives and way of life either directly or indirectly by destabilizing the global system upon which American security and prosperity depends. What is more, these threats are interconnected—and it is their interactive effects that represent the most acute danger. And if several of these threats materialize at the same time and interact to generate greater violence and instability, then the global order itself, as well as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk.¶ What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security interdependence. More and more of what goes on in other countries matters for the health and safety of the United States and the rest of the world. Many of the new dangers—such as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violence—stem from the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, technologies of violence are evolving, providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at a greater distance. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and protections. The United States can-not hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action against this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges.¶ This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from threats. To engage in liberal order building is to invest in international cooperative frameworks—that is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc.—in which the United States operates. To build international order is to increase the global stock of “social capital”—which is the term Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and other social scientists have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems.¶ If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are the specific objectives and what is the policy agenda? There are five such objectives. First, the United States needs to lead in the building of an enhanced protective infrastructure that helps prevent the emergence of threats and limits the damage if they do materialize. Many of the threats mentioned above are manifest as socioeconomic backwardness and failure that cause regional and international instability and conflict. These are the sorts of threats that are likely to arise with the coming of global warming and epidemic disease. What is needed here is institutional cooperation to strengthen the capacity of governments and the international com-munity to prevent epidemics or food shortages or mass migrations that create global upheaval—and mitigate the effects of these upheavals if they occur. The international system already has a great deal of this protective infrastructure—institutions and networks that pro-mote cooperation over public health, refugees, and emergency aid. But as the scale and scope of potential problems grow in the twenty-first century, investments in these preventive and management capacities will also need to grow. Early warning systems, protocols for emergency operations, standby capacities, etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure.¶ Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The idea is to update the old bargains that lie behind these security pacts. In NATO, but also in the East Asia bilateral partner-ships, the United States agrees to provide security protection to the other states and brings its partners into the process of decision-making over the use of force. In return, these partners agree to work with the United States—providing manpower, logistics, and other types of support—in wider theaters of action. The United States gives up some autonomy in strategic decision-making, although it is more an informal restraint than a legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support.¶ Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and legitimate collective action. The first move here should be to reform the United Nations, starting with the expansion of the permanent membership on the Security Council. Several plans have been proposed. All of them entail adding new members—such as Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others—and reforming the voting procedures. Almost all of the candidates for permanent membership are mature or rising democracies. The goal, of course, is to make them stakeholders in the United Nations and thereby strengthen the primacy of the UN as a vehicle for global collective action. There really is no substitute for the legitimacy that the United Nations can offer to emergency actions—humanitarian interventions, economic sanctions, uses of force against terrorists, and so forth. Public support in advanced democracies grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action.¶ Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China will most likely be a dominant state, and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The United States should respond to the rise of China by strengthening the rules and institutions of the liberal international order—deepening their roots, integrating rising capitalist democracies, sharing authority and functional roles. The United States should also intensify cooperation with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliances and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global system—one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it.¶ The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East Asia that can provide a framework for managing the coming shifts. The idea is not to block China’s entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region.¶ Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American officials after World War II championed the building of a rule-based postwar order, they articulated a distinctive internationalist vision of order that has faded in recent decades. It was a vision that entailed a synthesis of liberal and realist ideas about economic and national security, and the sources of stable and peaceful order. These ideas—drawn from the experiences with the New Deal and the previous decades of war and depression—led American leaders to associate the national interest with the building of a managed and institutionalized global system. What is needed today is a renewed public philosophy of liberal internationalism—a shift away from neoliberal-ism—that can inform American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation.¶ Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today.¶ The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with rules rather than dominate with power; provide public goods and connect their provision to cooperative and accommodative policies of others; build and renew international rules and institutions that work to reinforce the capacities of states to govern and achieve security and economic success; keep the other liberal democracies close; and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization.¶ As it navigates this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security. It will not be able to depend on unipolar power or airtight borders. It will need, above all else, authority and respect as a global leader. The United States has lost some of that authority and respect in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.

### No Tyranny Impact

#### No impact to tyranny

Eric Posner 11, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, \*\* and Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, March 2011, The Executive Unbound, p. 179-80

Furthermore, risks are a product both of the probability that an event will materialize—here, that a dictator will take power—and of the harms that will occur if the risk does materialize. On the margin of probability, the unjustified variety of tyrannophobia takes the form of exaggerated perception of the risk that a dictatorship will occur, through the creeping expansion of executive power, through a sudden seizure of executive power in a crisis, or through some other sequence. We consider versions of these claims below. On the margin of harm, the question is whether the tyrannophobe rationally considers the evidence about the costs and benefits of dictatorship? Liberal legalists sometimes imply that dictatorship has catastrophic effects on welfare, but this is a caricature, not supported by the evidence. It is not even clear whether authoritarian governments systematically offer different public policies than democracies do. A comparison of democracies and non-Communist nondemocracies between 1960 and 1990 finds that the two regime-types offer very similar substantive public policies; they differ principally in terms of policies related to winning or maintaining public office, in that nondemocracies are more likely to select leaders through violence.8 More generally, 'Although some studies have established a significant positive link between measures of political freedom and [income] growth…others have found that authoritarian regimes have better growth records."9 Likewise, a recent survey finds that "there is no evidence that constraints on the executive predict growth.' Yet the most recent study finds that dictatorships do produce fewer public goods than democracies do." Some of these findings can be reconciled by the hypothesis that dictatorial regimes exhibit higher variance than democratic regimes and a higher dispersion of growth rates;" perhaps democracy has both a lower downside and a lower upside." Whether that trade-off is desirable depends upon the nature of the status quo ante, the risk aversion of the population, and the absolute level of performance under the democratic alternative." It is not our contention that dictatorship is superior to democracy. Among other problems, political freedom and equality are themselves components of welfare. Certainly, in the developed world, where democracies function well, dictatorship has little to recommend it. The cross-country evidence we have cited suggests more ambiguity about the developing world. It may be that a dictatorship that keeps order and delivers a few other public goods is superior to a democracy that quickly degenerates into anarchy. Our more modest point is just that institutional design of democratic institutions should not assume that the loss of well-being caused by a transition from democracy to dictatorship is higher than it in fact is.

### AT SOP

#### The separation of powers is obsolete and is utterly incapable of regulating the executive – the executive is simply too large to effectively monitor

Posner and Vermeule 10 - \*professor of law at the University of Chicago AND \*\*professor of law at Harvard (Eric and Adrian, The Executive Unbound, p. 17-18)

We begin with the constitutional framework, and with the official constitutional theory of liberal legalism. In this theory lawmaking powers are separated among three different branches-legislature, executive, and judiciary-in order to promote an institutional division of labor and to protect liberty The liberty-protecting function of the separation of powers, Madison suggested, is that the combination of powers in one institution would be "the very definition of tyranny". Mutual checking and monitoring by the branches of government would prevent concentration of power suppress the evils of factionalism, and conduce to better policymaking overall.

This theory has collapsed. Its fit with reality is no longer merely imperfect, in the way that all regulative ideals are imperfect; rather it does not even approximate the political terrain it purports to cover. We will proceed to explain this conclusion in three steps. First, we examine the checking function of the separation of powers. Here Madison made two crucial mistakes: first in assuming that the individual ambitions of government officials would cause them to support the power of the institutions they occupy and second in assuming that some invisible-hand mechanism would cause the mutual contest among institutions to produce a socially beneficial system of mutual checks. Nothing in the actual separation-of-powers system, however, guarantees or even generally tends to produce socially beneficial results. In particular, we show that the system will predictably lead to suboptimal checking-to a political regime in which some institutions (such as legislature and judiciary) do too little to check the swelling power of others (such as the executive).

Second, we examine the monitoring function of the separation of powers, focusing particularly on legislative and judicial monitoring of the executive. The vastly increased complexity and scale of the executive, since Madison's day ensures that the monitoring function is largely obsolete. In the administrative state, the scope of the executive's responsibility is vast, and legislative and judicial institutions lack the capacity to monitor any important fraction of what the executive does, even where opposing political parties occupy the executive and other branches, and even with the help of "fire alarms"-alerts from interest groups with stakes in particular issues.2 In many of the most important domains, and those most difficult to monitor-those involving intelligence, foreign affairs and national security or highly complex questions of economic policy-legislators and the courts are overmatched, for enduring structural reasons that prevail no matter what the contingent political constellation. We thus reject any strong version of the "congressional dominance" thesis-the idea that Congress, sometimes enlisting the aid of interest groups and the courts, exerts implicit but effective control over executive and administrative behavior.

## Condo

### 2NC—Condo Good

#### Counter-interpretation—one conditional CP/one conditional critique.

Standards—

Argument Innovation—debaters are risk-averse—a fallback strategy encourages introduction of new positions—solves research skills.

Neg Flex—in-round testing is critical to balance aff prep.

Nuanced Advocacy—contradictory positions force aff defense of the political middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—prevents ideological extremism.

Strategic Thinking—causes introduction of the best arguments—necessitates intelligent coverage decisions—key to info processing and argument evaluation.

[If Dispo] Logic—a decision maker can always chose the status quo.

Substance crowd-out—re-appropriating time spent on condo solves fairness offense.

High Threshold—the 2AR is reactive and persuasive—theory has a 1-to-5 time trade-off—unless we make debate impossible, vote neg.

Defense—

Fairness impossible—resource and coaching differentials—no terminal impact—no one quits b/c of the process CP.

Skew inevitable—DAs and T

Contradictions inevitable—Security K and Deterrence DA

2NR collapse solves depth.

Cheating strategies lose to theory & competition args.

Judge is a referee—potential abuse isn’t a voter—blaming us for other teams behavior is unfair—voting down abuse solves their offence.

# 1NR

### 2NC---Impact Calculus

#### DA outweighs --- strikes on Iran cause rapid Middle East instability --- chain reactions draw in Russia, China, and the US --- causes nuclear war --- that’s Morgan.

#### Fastest timeframe --- plan sends the immediate signal that strikes are off-the-table --- causes Iran to leave negotiations --- creates use-or-lose pressures for Israel to strike.

#### Timeframe outweighs --- you can only die once, so default to a live-longest framework --- intervening actors can solve their nebulous, far-off intervention scenarios.

#### We turn the case --- the disad impact literally is the aff --- Israeli preemption is a short-term scenario for their (R2P///Intervention) and SOP advantages. Great power war makes the international cooperation impossible.

#### They’ve conceded Iran strikes would lead to biowar --- that causes extinction --- o/w nuclear war

Anders Sandberg 8, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction>

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Strikes escalate to nuclear war---draws in every major power

Patrick Henningsen 12, communications consultant and Managing Editor of the 21st Century Wire online journal, contributor to the Centre for Research on Globalization, January 5, 2012, “Why Attacking Iran Will Not Work in 2012. Failure could Result in a US-Israel Military and Economic Tailspin,” online: http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28511

Neither the US or Israel has engaged in a bona fide naval conflict in decades. In the case of the US, owner of the world’s largest navy, its last true naval military affair was WWII. As Great Britain painfully discovered during its costly Falkland Island War adventure, even one rudimentary French-made Exocet Missile launched by Argentina below radar, was enough to not only cripple a major piece of its naval fleet, but also enough of a black eye to nearly derail majority public support for their ill-conceived war effort from the opposition and back-benchers home in London.

Similarly, the Iranian defense has the capability to sink not one, but many US Naval ships currently flexing their muscles on the periphery of Iranian territorial waters. Such an event would register with shock and horror in the US public mind, but worse, may be used by Washington hawks to justify a revenge nuclear strike against Iranian civilians. Both Washington and Tel Aviv have already raised the talking point of deploying “tactical nukes” against Iran. Such foreshadowing should not be ignored, as it is often a clear indicator of things to come.

Any nuclear conflagration by the US or Israel would most certainly result in a global backlash against the West – at its worst acting as a procession into the hot stages of World War III – or at its very least, re-balkanizing the geopolitical scene into a New Cold War, with the West on one side and Iran, China, Pakistan, and Russia on the other.

### 2NC---UQ---AT: Syria Thumps (O’Hanlon)

#### Syria not a coherent arg

#### The plan establishes an ex ante restriction on the President’s ability to initiate the use of force – this makes the threat of force inherently less credible to both Iran and Israel.

#### Our Ross evidence says that if Obama had lost the Congressional authorization vote in Syria, Rouhani’s arguments to make concessions on the nuclear program would have been far less credible to Khamenei, who would have bought Revolutionary Guard arguments that there is no military cost to having the nuclear program. Ross says it’s the equivalent of formally removing the military option from the table – it tanks negotiations and causes Israel to take matters into their own hands.

#### Obama got lucky in Syria – but the plan is worse than even a ‘say no’ vote would have been. If Congress had said no, Obama still has a plausible claim to independent authority. The plan rewrites the boundaries of his authority, which would weaken his overall foreign policy stance

Mataconis, 9/6/13 – DC attorney (Doug, “What Would Obama Do If Congress Says No On Syria?” <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/what-would-obama-do-if-congress-says-no-on-syria/>)

To answer this question, we must examine what the President could do, what we think he would do, and, of course, what he should do, in the event he loses the vote.¶ The President is walking a tightrope here, obviously. If he were to come right out and say that he was inclined to strike regardless of what Congress said, then he would likely guarantee that he would end up losing the vote in the end simply because he annoyed Congress. At the same time, he can’t necessarily say that he would absolutely comply with Congress’s will, then he risks weakening his position on the foreign policy front and creating a precedent that could unduly bind future Presidents. Even Blinken’s statement is far more nuanced than most of the reports about it would have you believe. What Blinkin said was that it was not the President’s intention to act in defiance of Congressional will. That’s a far cry from saying that he would comply with that will. So, we’re left, somewhat intentionally, in an ambiguous world where we’re forced to speculate about how the President would react to the loss, and what that would mean for domestic politics and his relationship with Congress. ¶ Legally, the situation here is also ambiguous. While many will be quick to draw an analogy between this Congressional vote and the vote in Parliament last week, after which British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that he would abide by the vote and that Britain would not be participating in an attack on Syria, that analogy fails. Unlike the American President, the powers when it comes to warmaking and the use of military force are far more constrained. By the terms of the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief of America’s armed forces. The British Prime Minister does not hold a similar position. Instead, the C-in-C of British armed forces is, technically at least, Queen Elizabeth II. That authority, of course, has been vested in Parliament along with most other Royal powers, and Parliament further vests it in the Prime Minister and various other defense officials. If Parliament says that certain action cannot be taken, then the Prime Minister has to be consider him or herself bound by that decision or otherwise risk a vote of no confidence that results in their removal from office. The President’s authority, however, is far broader and over 200+ years of American history has been interpreted to permit him to commit American forces in a wide variety of circumstances. Whether those interpretations are correct is, of course, debatable, but the precedents do exist and Congress has done little to restrain such actions by previous Presidents (or, in the case of Libya, by this President.) Given all of this, a statement by President Obama that he would absolutely follow Congressional will in this matter would arguably constitute an historical rewriting of the relationship between the branches of government.¶ The fact that President Obama may be able to make a credible legal/historical case for acting without Congressional authority, though, is only half the equation. The other thing to consider if Congress votes down a Syria AUMF is what the political consequences would be if the President acted notwithstanding that result. Without question, it would further damage the relationship between the White House and the House and Senate GOP at a time when the Federal Government still has to deal with several immediate issues beyond Syria, such as the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget, and the impending Debt Ceiling vote. It would likely reinvigorate the Tea Party and other groups opposed to the President’s agenda. And, it would bring closer the point in his Second Term when President Obama would become a “lame duck.” It’s also likely that many House and Senate Democrats who opposed the AUMF would be upset at such a direct Presidential snub of Congressional prerogative. We might even see impeachment or censure proceedings in Congress. Candidates for 2014 and 2016 would be required to take a position on what the President did, and Washington would generally become even more of a mess than it already is. Given all of this, the political factors would seem to argue strongly that, if he loses the vote, the President should state that he will respect the vote while doing so in a manner that preserves traditional Presidential powers and reserving the right to return to the Syria issue if circumstances warrant. Any other option would seem to be political suicide.

#### Syria maintained uncertainty over the scope of war powers --- Obama can still reasonably argue he has authority to strike without Congress which keeps Iran at the bargaining table

Zeisberg 9/25/13 - associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan (Mariah, “Debate over War Powers may yield positive outcome,” <http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/09/debate-over-war-powers-resolution-may-yield-positive-outcome/>)

Uncertainty about what the Constitution requires is thick: even as President Obama called for legislative authorization to bolster the legitimacy of strikes, and even as he now appeals to the UN for a resolution authorizing military sanctions if Syria does not comply with the U.S.-Russia agreement for destroying its chemical weapons, the president nevertheless maintains that he has the authority to commit the U.S. to hostilities in Syria without Congressional (or UN) authorization.¶ Robert Gates criticized the president for running a risk of looking “weak” if Congress did not authorize military action, and agreed with Leon Panetta that the president obviously has all power needed for strikes in Syria.¶ On the other hand, constitutional scholars Louis Fisher, Stephen Griffin, and Sandy Levinson have argued that Obama’s constitutional grounding for independent strikes is either non-existent or extremely weak. Congress itself has been divided over whether authorization is necessary for a presidential strike in Syria.¶ While the Constitution tells us that Congress has the power to “declare war,” the text nowhere defines what kinds of hostilities count as war – which has enabled some opportunism in the Obama administration, and in many other presidential administrations too.¶ Even the War Powers Resolution restricts “hostilities” without defining the term, and there, too, Obama has been willing to press language to (or beyond) its absolute limit.¶ Constitutional and statutory text that does not define the meaning of the key words that separate one institution’s authority from another necessarily insert some measure of uncertainty into the branches’ war powers regime.¶ What to make of these tensions and ambiguities? Has the Constitution failed in its task to provide a definitive legal framework that can guide decision-makers about important questions such as which institution has the power to take the country to war? Isn’t the point of a Constitution to resolve this kind of conflict? If it is so pervasively difficult to read our political culture and know which branch has war authority, then does that mean that the Constitution has failed to do its job – or worse, that we are witnessing an epidemic of reckless infidelity to the Constitution’s mandates?¶ In fact, I think that uncertainty as to the meaning of the Constitution’s war powers regime in Syria is not catastrophic but may actually carry benefits.¶ As diplomacy around Syria unfolds, I want to draw attention to a few of the intersections between domestic constitutional debates and the conditions for effective international action.¶ First, it is arguably the threat of intervention which moved Russia into high gear in negotiations with Syria. But President Obama needed a plausible claim of independent presidential empowerment for such a claim to be credible.¶ At the same time, such a claim, unresisted, raises the specter of undefined aims, mission creep, costly wars without broad public support, unconsidered policy complexities, and troubling bellicose precedent that are a hallmark of presidentialism in war. This is, in part, why congressional mobilization to defend its institutional prerogatives has been so welcomed by some prominent war powers scholars.¶ Obama’s subsequent willingness to back down, to accommodate claims to legislative empowerment – derided by many as a weak or vacillating choice — seems in turn to have created time and space for a diplomatic process to unfold in the place of a military one.¶ Recent developments in that process include not only a Russian-brokered plan to confiscate all chemical weapons from the Assad regime but also statements by the Ayatollah Khamenei signaling openness to diplomacy and by President Rouhani that Iran would not develop a nuclear weapon.¶ And now Obama is moving this technique of vacillating red lines up to the level of global institutions.¶ On the one hand he is pressing the UN to back up the U.S.-Russia agreement with sanctions, but at the same time says that he reserves the power to act outside the UN, and has argued that “without a credible military threat, the Security Council had demonstrated no inclination to act at all.”¶ We have yet to see what kind of domestic or international push-back would await him if he tried to translate this rhetorical willingness to act outside the UN into concrete action.¶ Obama’s constitutional “vacillations” may end up being productive in sundering the Assad regime from its chemical weapons. Only time will tell.¶ For constitutional scholars, it is worth noting the positive role that uncertainty and textual ambiguity can create in generating good international outcomes.

#### Syria was a win for Obama – even though Congress would have said no, it never got the chance and the perceived threat was credible. This drove Iran to negotiate over nuclear weapons because the Syria deal disavowed regime change as a goal in US policy

Sorcher, 9/26/13 – National Security Correspondent for the National Journal (Sara, “U.S. to Despots: Lose Your Weapons, Keep Your Job” National Journal,

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/u-s-to-despots-lose-your-weapons-keep-your-job-20130926>

President Obama called for military action in Syria and then stood down when strongman Bashar al-Assad promised to give up his chemical weapons. He did not use cruise missiles when Assad crossed his "red line." But this was not a sign of toothlessness telegraphed to Syria's patron, Iran—another state developing weapons of mass destruction—as some Monday-morning quarterbacks insist. Quite the opposite. Obama's narrow goal had always been to remove chemical weapons from the equation. The real message sent by diplomacy with Syria is that Washington is not secretly aiming for regime change. The move says to Tehran: Forgo your nuclear-weapon dreams and, while other unsavory behavior will be condemned, you will be left alone.¶ "If we get the chemical-weapons deal in Syria, and acknowledge tacitly [that] Assad will remain in power, that is a useful model for Iran," says Jon Wolfsthal, a former National Security Council director for nonproliferation. Of course, the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, was elected with a mandate to solve his nation's economic woes, which is another impetus for negotiation with the West. But Obama helped his case by signaling that "they don't need weapons of mass destruction and nuclear deterrent. And by trading it away, they might get the legitimacy they crave," says Wolfsthal, now deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.¶ This approach involved difficult policy trade-offs. The Syria deal sparked criticism from defense hawks who believe Obama let Assad escape military punishment for his crimes. Similarly, a deal with Iran may mean ignoring past violations and human-rights abuses. But the United States has often inked deals with rogue nations, prioritizing its national security over punishing bad behavior—with mostly positive results, especially when coupled with economic pressure and the threat of force, both still on the table in Syria and Iran.¶ In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq over its purported possession of weapons of mass destruction. Suddenly, Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi wanted to rejoin the international community, apparently realizing his own arsenal and clandestine nuclear program were not worth the potential costs. "The U.S. willingness to negotiate sent the same signal the Syria deal did: 'We will not try to overthrow your regime; we're narrowing our demands,' " says Daniel Drezner, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Qaddafi was implicitly allowed to continue his repressive dictatorship, and the model worked until he began slaughtering his own people during the Arab Spring.¶ Washington turned on him, which could worry rogue nations looking for security by giving up nonconventional arsenals. But realistically, American policymakers aren't exactly jonesing to use military force in support of humanitarian goals, especially in high-stakes countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria. "Washington tends to hold its nose and deal with regimes that it finds distasteful if those regimes are willing to abide by agreements that neutralize their most threatening behavior," says Charles Kupchan, a Georgetown University professor and the author of How Enemies Become Friends. War weariness at home also pushes a president to choose deals over principles.¶ Myanmar is another case in point. The military junta was working to acquire nuclear and missile technology at the same time it was repressing democracy, presenting the U.S. government with a serious proliferation concern, according to Wolfsthal. So when the country wanted its good standing back, Washington traded financial and diplomatic carrots for disarmament and political reform. Myanmar signed the Additional Protocol, the gold standard for nuclear inspections, after a short visit by Obama in 2012, and later the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. could have been a stickler and punished the junta for every illicit activity, but it compromised.¶ The same strategy can have beneficial results with allies. Some scientists in South Korea were discovered to be enriching uranium in 2000 in violation of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. Rather than seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution or condemning the country, Washington worked with Seoul to shut down the program. It did.¶ Military force can be more coercive in getting adversaries to comply when it's still just a threat. Despite Beltway dillydallying, Russia and Syria both appeared to believe that Washington would strike before agreeing to compromise. Bombing would not have stripped Assad of his chemical weapons or even his ability to use them. Similarly, it would not be easy for the U.S. to simply bomb Iran out of the nuke business without risk of retaliation. Even a Syria strike might have forced Iran (which also despises chemical weapons, dating back to the Iran-Iraq war) to abandon its recent outreach toward the United States.

### Koffler

#### All signs point to successful Iran negotiations --- prefer recent evidence

Mike Eckel 10/24/13, correspondent @ the Christian Science Monitor, “Iran halts 20-percent enrichment. Are nuclear talks working? (+video),” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1024/Iran-halts-20-percent-enrichment.-Are-nuclear-talks-working-video

By most accounts, the negotiations in Geneva over Iran’s nuclear program are going well.¶ Diplomats have been tight-lipped, but signals sent by Iran and by diplomats from the US and other world powers indicate the sides are finding common ground in the dispute over Iran's nuclear intentions. Tehran insists its program is for research and electricity generation, but the US and others, particularly Israel, are skeptical. ¶ For optimists, a claim Thursday that Iran has halted enrichment of uranium to the critical 20-percent threshold is a sign that 24 years of bile and bluster between Tehran and Washington may be at an end. ¶ A halt to 20 percent enrichment is among the key concessions wanted by the West, and according to The Associated Press, Iran made that offer at last week's talks. (Twenty percent is important because the most challenging part of uranium enrichment happens below that threshold; once you get to 20 percent, it’s relatively easy to enrich up to bomb-grade levels).¶ Unnamed US officials say talks are going well.¶ “I have never had such intense, detailed, straightforward, candid conversations with the Iranian delegation before,” said one US negotiator who gave reporters an off-the-record briefing last week.¶ The loudest voice in the pessimists' camp is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who wants to force the Iranians to give up their fissile material altogether. He insists Iran open up its underground facilities and says the only reason someone would burrow scientific facilities into mountainsides is to protect them from air strikes, a point he reiterated in meetings with US Secretary of State John Kerry on Wednesday.¶ "They should get rid of the amassed fissile material, and they shouldn't have underground nuclear facilities," Netanyahu was quoted as saying. Mr. Kerry has insisted the US is proceeding with “eyes wide open” when it comes to negotiating with the Iranians, and that “no deal is better than a bad deal.”¶ There are plenty of trends pointing toward a breakthrough. Economic sanctions appear to be having a serious impact on the Iranian economy (though they may not be as debilitating as some have suggested.) The West succeeded in getting Iran’s closest ally, Syria, to give up its chemical weapons, for instance.

#### Iran will compromise on its nuclear program now

Rick Gladstone 10/16/13, writer at the New York Times, “Examining the Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Talks,” NYT, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/world/middleeast/examining-the-status-of-irans-nuclear-program-and-talks.html?_r=0>

Negotiators in Iran’s protracted nuclear dispute reported “substantive and forward looking negotiations” on Wednesday and said they would reconvene Nov. 7 to 8 for further talks. The following covers some questions about Iran’s nuclear program. ¶ Q. What is the current status of Iran’s nuclear program?¶ A. Iran’s ability to refine uranium, the fuel for peaceful nuclear energy and weapons, has grown significantly, according to the most recent inspection reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear-monitoring arm of the United Nations. Since last February, Iran has roughly quintupled, to more than 1,000, the advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear facility in the central city of Natanz. Iran also appears to have equipped a formerly secret subterranean facility known as Fordo, near the holy city of Qum, with 3,000 older-model centrifuges¶ According to the most recent I.A.E.A. report, Iran has accumulated 185.8 kilograms, or about 410 pounds, of uranium enriched to about 20 percent purity, which is considered a short technical step away from refinement to bomb-grade material. Experts differ on the amount of 20 percent uranium Iran would need to make a bomb. But Israel, which has said it would regard a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, has dropped numerous warnings that Iran should not exceed 240 kilograms, or 529 pounds.¶ Nonproliferation experts have also expressed concern over Iran’s construction of a thermal heavy-water research reactor in Arak, about 200 miles southwest of Tehran, because it could be a source of plutonium, another fuel for a weapon.¶ While Iran has promised more transparency in its nuclear program and repeatedly asserted its peaceful nature, the I.A.E.A. has expressed concern about unanswered questions over some aspects. The most prominent is Iran’s refusal to allow inspectors to visit Parchin, a highly restricted military site just south of Tehran suspected of having been the site of experiments, years ago, in testing triggers for nuclear weapons. ¶ Q. What was accomplished in the latest round of talks?¶ A. No breakthroughs were reported, but for the first time, Iran and the group of six major powers seeking to curtail the Iranian program — Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — described the discussions as frank and detailed. The Iranians proposed what they called a compromise that would put unspecified limits on the program in exchange for an acknowledgment that the country has a legal right to enrich its own uranium. In addition, the Iranians want an early end to the economic sanctions imposed by Western nations, most notably constraints on Iran’s banking and oil industries. The major powers described Iran’s proposal as “an important contribution,” suggesting that they would respond with a counterproposal.¶ Aides to Hassan Rouhani, the country’s new president, have said Iran wants an agreement in six months.

### 2NC---Link---Top Level

#### The plan emboldens Iranian hardliners – 1NC Ross evidence says that congressional force authorization requirements are perceived as taking the credible threat of force off the table. That reduces pressure on the Iranian regime and gives a free hand to hardliners that want to argue there’s no cost to nuclearization. 1NC Fox News ev says that tanks the deal – even small moves can shift Khamenei over to the hardliners side.

#### Prefer our evidence – Ross was Obama’s Middle East advisor and is a fellow at the Washington Institute, substantially more qualified than their pundits

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#### Only a credible threat of force keeps Iran at the negotiating table – failure causes an Israeli strike

Mideast Mirror, 10-1-2013, “When Bibi met Barack,” ln

The front pages of all of the Israeli newspapers look remarkably similar on Tuesday, with identical photographs of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and United States President Barack Obamashaking hands at the start of the their meeting at the White House. The papers report on the meeting in similar tones, headlining Netanyahu's assertion that Iran's recent conciliatory remarks have to be matched by 'transparent, verifiable, meaningful actions' and Obama's comments that the military option is still on the table. 'Iran is committed to Israel's destruction, so for Israel, the ultimate test of a future agreement with Iran is whether or not Iran dismantles its military nuclear program,' Netanyahu said after his meeting with the President. 'In this regard, I want to express my appreciation to you for the enormous work that's been done to have a sanctions regime in place to thwart Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons,' he added. 'I believe that it's the combination of a credible military threat and the pressure of those sanctions that have brought Iran to the negotiating table.' 'I also believe that if diplomacy is to work, those pressures must be kept in place,' Netanyahu told Obama. 'And I think they should not be lessened until there is verifiable success. And in fact, it is Israel's firm belief that if Iran continues to advance its nuclear program during negotiations, the sanctions should be strengthened. I think, this is still the only formula that can get a peaceful resolution of this problem.' Obama, for his part, said that Washington would not ease up on its sanctions against Iran unless and until Tehran halted its nuclear arms program. During the meeting between the two leaders, the prime minister discussed Iran's advanced nuclear work, presenting documentation showing that Iran was further along in its nuclear development than international inspectors suspect. Netanyahu also presented Obama with the key points he intends to make in his speech to the UN General Assembly later today. Among other things, Netanyahu is expected to say that he does not rule out diplomatic dialogue with the new Iranian president, provided that the talks will establish real results. Obama said that it was clear that, despite Rowhani's 'charm offensive,' the U.S. would not take Iran at its word, and expected to see actions - specifically a reduction in the level of uranium enrichment as demanded by the international community - that can be verified. The U.S., he said, would negotiate with Iran 'with its eyes wide open,' and consult closely with Israel on the developments. He stressed that the U.S. was not ruling out any option on Iran, including the military option. Although Haaretz, like all the other papers, leads its print edition with the Iranian aspects of the Netanyahu-Obama meeting, its website reports this morning that the U.S. president used the occasion to urge Netanyahu to advance more quickly in the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. A senior U.S. official told the newspaper that besides discussing the Iranian threat, the two leaders spoke at length about the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Obama told Netanyahu that he appreciates the difficult steps he took in order to renew the negotiations - especially the release of Palestinian prisoners. Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry also met Netanyahu on Monday. In remarks to reporters ahead of the meeting, Kerry focused on the Palestinian issue. 'We are committed to continuing to work constructively to move forward on the peace process, though it is always difficult and complicated. We know that. But we're working in good faith,' he added. 'I have confidence in the prime minister's commitment to this effort, and I also want him to know that as we reach out to respond to Iran's efforts to purportedly change its relationship with the world, we do so very aware of and sensitive to the security needs of Israel and the demands for certainty and transparency and accountability in this process.' U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, addressing the annual conference of the left-wing J Street lobby, also spoke about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, saying that there are now 'serious efforts underway' to solve some of the most important challenges that exist. 'I believe Israel's security requires a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians,' he said. 'The Palestinian-Israeli issue involves the least ideological and least sectarian Arabs in the Middle East,' Biden noted, adding that peace would bring stability in the region. Meanwhile, in the latest Iranian response to some of Netanyahu's recent comments about the so-called Iranian charm offensive, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif accused the prime minister of lying. 'We have seen nothing from Netanyahu but lies and actions to deceive and scare, and international public opinion will not let these lies go unanswered,' Zarif said in an interview with Iranian television broadcast on Tuesday. Elsewhere, in a widely quoted opinion article, the former head of the IDF's Military Intelligence, Amos Yadlin has advised Netanyahu not to try and prevent the U.S. from talking to Iran and reaching an agreement with it regarding its nuclear program. Yadlin, who is currently the head of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), published an article on the institute's website and in Yedioth Ahronoth, in which he explained that the talks have positive potential for Israel. If they succeed, Iran's nuclear weapons program will be halted. If they fail - Iran'sdeception will be exposed and there will be renewed legitimacy for a military strike against it. Netanyahu 'faces a tough mission,' assesses Yadlin - who, perhaps relevantly, was one of eight IAF pilots who dropped bombs on Iraq's Tammuz nuclear plant in 1981. The full article appears below.

#### Israeli perception is enough to trigger the link – keeping all options on the table is keeping Netanyahu in check now

Mideast Mirror, 10-1-2013, “When Bibi met Barack,” ln

A CAREFULLY CRAFTED MESSAGE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon says that the meeting between United States President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu proved that Iranian President Hassan Rowhani did not drive a wedge on the nuclear issue between the two leaders and despite recent diplomatic developments the U.S. and Israel remain on the same page. "U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu know well how to use their meetings to make their displeasure over various issues known to one another and to the world. Obama did this during his very first meeting as president with Netanyahu in May 2009, when he blindsided the newly elected prime minister during their joint statements with a demand for a settlement freeze. He did it again in March 2010, soon after the blowup over the announcement to build in Jerusalem's Ramat Shlomo neighborhood during Vice President Joe Biden's visit, when he did not allow non-official photographers to record their meeting, and issued no statement afterward. Then in May 2011 it was Netanyahu's turn. During the joint statement in the Oval Office following that meeting, Netanyahu 'lectured' the president about exactly why it was impossible for Israel to return to the 'indefensible' pre-1967 lines, which Obama had called for the day before, albeit, with mutually agreed land swaps. When they want the world or their constituents to see discord, they know very well how to do so. On Monday it was crystal clear that they had no interest in doing so. What emerged from their brief joint appearance after Monday's meeting was an obvious effort to publicly play down any differences about Iran. Although the statements at these events are always made with the leaders sitting casually in comfortable chairs, their words are not off-the-cuff remarks. Rather, they are carefully thought out and crafted beforehand. Obama, in his remarks, sent a message that, yes, the U.S. was well aware of what Netanyahu has been warning ever since Iranian President Hassan Rowhani's election victory in June, that what was important were actions, not words. 'Given the statements and actions from the Iranian regime in the past, the threats against Israel, the acts against Israel, it is absolutely clear that words are not sufficient,' Obama said, adding that 'we have to have actions that give the international community confidence that in fact they are meeting their international obligations fully and that they are not in a position to have a nuclear weapon.' 'We enter into these negotiations very clear-eyed,' he said. 'They will not be easy, and anything that we do will require the highest standards of verification in order for us to provide the sort of sanctions relief that I think they are looking for.' And, he added, 'as president of the United States, I've said before, and I will repeat that we take no options off the table, including military options, in terms of making sure that we do not have nuclear weapons in Iran that would destabilize the region and potentially threaten the United States of America.' Those words were meant to soothe Netanyahu's concerns, first by assuring him - and all those listening - that the U.S. was 'clear eyed' about Rowhani, and would not be taken in by his 'charm offensive,' and secondly by stressing that 'all options are still on the table.' In the past the 'all options are on the table' line lost much of its punch because it was repeated so often that it seemed almost a throw-away line. But this was the first time since Rowhani's trip to the U.S. and Washington's outreach to Iran that these words have been repeated by Obama. Israel was itching to hear them, and was disappointed that Obama did not repeat the mantra during his speech to the UN last week. These words are important for Jerusalem not because it is longing - as some argue - for a U.S. military strike on Iran, but rather because of the firm belief that Iran - as Syria did with its chemical weapons arsenal - will only back down if it believes that if it does not, it will face military action. Netanyahu's words, as well, were indicative of an attempt to emphasize the agreements on Iran, rather than underline the disagreements. He tellingly did not come out at all against a U.S.-Iranian dialogue, or against the seeds of a new, more open policy toward Iran that were planted in Washington last week. Rather, Netanyahu expressed his appreciation for the work that has been done to place the sanctions regime on Iran, and said he appreciated Obama's comments 'that Iran's conciliatory words have to be matched by real actions - transparent, verifiable, meaningful actions.' Tehran was listening carefully to the words spoken Monday in the Oval Office. And the message that Obama and Netanyahu wanted it, as well as the rest of the world, to hear was that onIran's nuclear issue, the U.S. and Israel - despite the dramatic developments of the last week and a half - remain on the same page. Some argue that Netanyahu went to the U.S. this week to try and drive a wedge between Rowhani and Obama. The tone and tenor of Monday's comments indicate that what truly happened was that Rowhani, at least when it comes to the nuclear issue, has failed to drive a wedge between Obama and Netanyahu."

#### Plan kills US diplomacy and Iran talks --- emboldens hardliners

Alterman 13, CSIS Middle East program director, 9-4-13

(Jon, “US-Iran Nuclear Deal Hinges On Syria Vote”, [www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html), ldg)

There is, however, an even more stark consequence of Obama losing the Syria vote in Congress. Should the White House, with its immense power and prestige, fail to build sufficient support, leaders around the world will conclude that this president can be defied with impunity. If he cannot win the support of those close to him, what hope does he have of winning over those at a distance?

The consequence here would be a combination of much more difficult diplomacy and even more bad behavior around the world that requires diplomacy to address. Hard-liners in Iran and their allies around the Middle East would certainly be emboldened, and regional states would be far less likely to rely on US cues in managing their own issues. Arab-Israeli negotiations, as well, would be dealt a fundamental blow, as each party would retreat to its own maximal position. China, Russia and a host of other countries are watching closely as well.

### 2NC---Link---Force On Table

#### Israel will strike unilaterally if they perceive force being taken off the table – they’re reassured in the status quo

Mideast Mirror, 10-1-2013, “When Bibi met Barack,” ln

A FRIENDLY COMPROMISE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that, while Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and United States President Barack Obama have agreed on several issues that Israel sees as vital in the international handling of the Iranian nuclear issue, there were still significant gaps between them. "Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did not get everything that he wanted from his meeting yesterday with United States President Barack Obama. So much is clear. In fact, it was clear even before the meeting began. But as Amos Yadlin said last night, the United States and Israel share common ground in their understand of intelligence information and the same goal - preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-capable nation. Nonetheless, there are still gaps between Jerusalem and Washington in terms of how the danger is perceived. Israel carries the traumatic baggage of the Holocaust, Yadlin said yesterday in an interview on Channel 1, while the Americans have the baggage of their bloody wars in the Middle East. The essence of the gap is that while Israel does not feel the need to reevaluate Iranian rhetoric in order to know that the ayatollahs still want to destroy us, the United States and the Europeans plan to give Rowhani another chance. Taking a sober look at this gap which could manifest itself in future spats, it is clear that Netanyahu and Obama managed not only to avoid a divisive argument, but - most importantly - to formulate a joint position that allows them to agree to a compromise on two important issues: Firstly, the sanctions imposed on Iran will not be lifted precipitously. The successful imposition of sanctions which was encouraged by Israel and spearheaded by the United States, and which the rest of the world was to some extent press ganged into agreeing, is a key component of any hope that Tehran will accept to freeze its nuclear project. There are several elements to the sanctions and, as Secretary of State John Kerry said last week, no deal is better than a bad deal. There could be an argument in the future over what exactly constitutes a bad deal. As far as Israel is concerned, a bad deal would be one in which the West agrees to lift some or all of the sanctions in exchange for only a very minor Iranian concession. Secondly, the two leaders have agreed that the military option is still very much on the table. Obama said as much and when he did, Netanyahu almost glowed with pleasure. And let us not forget, as Yadlin reminded us last night, that Israel has the ability to act alone in order to thwart the Iranian nuclear project - even without a green light from Washington. What is needed most, Yadlin said, is American support in the days, months and years after such an attack. The chance of getting such support depends on whether or not Obama agrees that there was no other alternative. In order to ensure that this is the case, Israel needs to go along with the United States' efforts to forge a diplomatic solution.

#### Obama is keeping the use of force on the table now – hardline pressure is key to build support towards a deal

Erin McClam, 10-1-2013, “Obama, after meeting Israel PM, says 'no options off the table' on Iran,” NBC News, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/09/30/20756304-obama-after-meeting-israel-pm-says-no-options-off-the-table-on-iran?lite

President Barack Obama said Monday that “we take no options off the table, including military options” to make sure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon that could further destabilize the Middle East. Obama made the remark in the Oval Office after a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who encouraged Obama to keep sanctions in place against Iran, and perhaps even tighten them, during coming talks on the Iranian nuclear program. The two leaders met three days after Obama placed a call to the president of Iran, the first direct conversation between the leaders of those two countries since 1979. The Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, has indicated interest in a deal on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran says that the program is peaceful, but the West suspects — and Israel insists — that Iran has designs on a nuclear bomb. “Iran is committed to Israel’s destruction,” Netanyahu said Monday. “For Israel, the ultimate test of a future agreement with Iran is whether or not Iran dismantles its military nuclear program.” Obama said that longstanding economic sanctions against Iran are one reason Iran has come to the bargaining table to talk about its nuclear ambitions. He said it was important to give diplomacy a chance, but stressed that Iran must make good on its promises.

#### Only a credible military option keeps Iran at the table

Mideast Mirror, 10-1-2013, “When Bibi met Barack,” ln

A (good) agreement must be given a chance, even if it seems that the Iranian move is an exercise in deceit. Exposing the deceit can yield strategic benefits. Negotiations between the United States and Iran could go in three directions, two of which could be positive for Israel: a good agreement that would keep Iran far from the bomb, or a resounding failure that would grant legitimacy to other actions designed to stop the project. The challenge facing Prime Minister Netanyahu is to prevent a bad agreement and reach an understanding with the United States on the questions of process and essence: what sort of negotiations process and what sort of deal would be detrimental for America's and Israel's vital interests. It is important to understand, influence, and if possible reach a conclusion on what America's policy will be if the negotiations fail or the agreement is violated in the future, and how effective levers of influence on Iran - sanctions and a credible military option - can be preserved, as only they are capable of changing the Iranian behavior."

#### The plan is a signal of weakness vis-à-vis Iran

Miller 9-26, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars new indicatives vice president, 9-26-13

(Aaron, “Dealing with Iran: Get ready for a wild ride”, [http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-miller-iran-nuclear-negotiations-20130926,0,6474158.story](http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-miller-iran-nuclear-negotiations-20130926%2C0%2C6474158.story), ldg)

U.S. diplomacy must take these fears into account, both for their merits and for political reasons. Washington will have to negotiate not just for itself but for its vulnerable allies. And Israel is the key. The task will be to determine what the Israelis really need, and then to reconcile those needs with U.S. goals, making it unmistakably clear that the president will not participate in a charade that allows the Iranians to run down the diplomatic clock while continuing to develop nuclear weapons capacity. In the end, the president needs to be willing — and make his willingness clear — to use any means, including force, to prevent Iran from making weapons. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and President Obama both have tough domestic politics to deal with. Even though Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, empowered Rouhani to launch his diplomatic bid, that hardly means he's a believer in an enhanced U.S.-Iranian relationship. Indeed, tension in that relationship may actually serve to consolidate Khamenei's control. Sanctions have created pressure to reach an agreement with the U.S. But suspicious hard-liners, including Khamenei, will be watching and weighing both U.S. diplomacy and Rouhani's own capacity to negotiate carefully and avoid missteps or traps.