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#### Congress will ultimately compromise to avert shutdown – GOP divisions make it more likely, not less

Tom Cohen, 9-20-2013, “Congress: will it be a government shutdown or budget compromise?” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/19/politics/congress-shutdown-scenarios/index.html?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn\_allpolitics+(RSS%3A+Politics)

There hasn't been a government shutdown in more than 17 years, since the 28 days of budget stalemate in the Clinton administration that cost more than $1 billion. Now we hear dire warnings and sharpening rhetoric that another shutdown is possible and perhaps likely in less than two weeks when the current fiscal year ends. Despite an escalating political imbroglio, the combination of how Congress works and what politicians want makes the chances of a shutdown at the end of the month uncertain at best. In particular, a rift between Republicans over how to proceed has heightened concerns of a shutdown in the short run, but remains a major reason why one is unlikely in the end. A more probable scenario is a last-minute compromise on a short-term spending plan to fund the government when the current fiscal year ends on September 30. After that, the debate would shift to broader deficit reduction issues tied to the need to raise the federal debt ceiling sometime in October. "There's going to be a lot of draconian talk from both sides, but the likelihood of their being an extended shutdown is not high," said Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution. Government shutdown: Again? Seriously? Conservatives tie Obamacare to budget talks While the main issue is keeping the government funded when the new fiscal year begins October 1, a conservative GOP wing in the House and Senate has made its crusade against Obamacare the focus of the debate. They demand a halt to funding for the signature program from President Barack Obama's first term, and they seem indifferent about forcing a government shutdown if that doesn't happen. "I will do everything necessary and anything possible to defund Obamacare," Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas said Thursday, threatening a filibuster and "any procedural means necessary." The GOP split was demonstrated later Thursday by Sen. John McCain, who told CNN that "we will not repeal or defund Obamacare" in the Senate. "We will not, and to think we can is not rational," McCain said. A compromise sought by House Speaker John Boehner and fellow GOP leaders would have allowed a symbolic vote on the defunding provision that the Senate would then strip out. The result would have been what legislators call a "clean" final version that simply extended current levels of government spending for about two months of the new fiscal year, allowing time for further negotiations on the debt ceiling. However, conservative opposition to the compromise made Boehner agree to a tougher version that made overall government funding contingent on eliminating money for Obamacare. Moderate Republicans question the strategy, but fear a right-wing backlash in the 2014 primaries if they go against the conservative wing. In reference to the divisions in the House, McCain said it was "pretty obvious that (Boehner) has great difficulties within his own conference." The House passed the tea party inspired plan on an almost strictly party line vote on Friday, setting in motion what is certain to be 10 days or so of legislative wrangling and political machinations. The measure now goes to the Democratic-led Senate, where Majority Leader Harry Reid made clear on Thursday that any plan to defund Obamacare would be dead on arrival. Instead, the Senate was expected to strip the measure of all provisions defunding Obamacare and send it back to the House. "They're simply postponing an inevitable choice they must face," Reid said of House Republicans. Here is a look at the two most-discussed potential outcomes -- a government shutdown or a short-term deal that keeps the government funded for a few months while further debate ensues. House GOP: defund Obamacare or shut government down Shutdown scenario According to West, the ultimate pressure on whether there is a shutdown will rest with Boehner. With the Republican majority in the House passing the spending measure that defunds Obamacare, Senate Democrats say they will stand united in opposing it. "Don't make it part of your strategy that eventually we'll cave," Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York warned Republicans on Thursday. "We won't. We're unified, we're together. You're not." That means the Senate would remove any provisions to defund Obamacare and send the stripped-down spending proposal back to the House. Boehner would then have to decide whether to put it to a vote, even though that could undermine his already weakened leadership by having the measure pass with only a few dozen moderate Republicans joining Democrats in support. If he refuses to bring the Senate version to the floor for a vote, a shutdown would ensue. "The key player is really Boehner," West said. Polls showing a decrease in public support for the health care reforms embolden the Republican stance. Meanwhile, surveys showing most people oppose a government shutdown and that more would blame Republicans if it happens bolster Democratic resolve. Compromise scenario Voices across the political spectrum warn against a shutdown, including Congressional Budget Office Director Douglas Elmendorf, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Republican strategist Karl Rove. "Even the defund strategy's authors say they don't want a government shutdown. But their approach means we'll get one," Rove argued in an op-ed published Thursday by the Wall Street Journal. He noted the Democratic-controlled Senate won't support any House measure that eliminates funding for Obamacare, and the White House said Thursday that Obama would veto such a spending resolution. "Republicans would need 54 House Democrats and 21 Senate Democrats to vote to override the president's veto," Rove noted, adding that "no sentient being believes that will happen." West concurred, telling CNN that "you can't expect a president to offer his first born to solve a political problem for the other party." "It's the House split that's causing this to happen," he noted. "People now equate compromise with surrender. It's hard to do anything under those circumstances." Under the compromise scenario, the Senate would remove provisions defunding Obamacare from what the House passes while perhaps making other relatively minor changes to provide Boehner and House Republicans with political cover to back it.

#### The plan would trade off with Congress’s ability to avert the shutdown - GOP has momentum and will, but they need literally every hour to get it done

Frank James, 9-13-2013, “Congress Searches For A Shutdown-Free Future,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/09/13/221809062/congress-searches-for-a-shutdown-free-future

The only thing found Thursday seemed to be more time for negotiations and vote-wrangling. Republican leaders recall how their party was blamed for the shutdowns of the mid-1990s and earnestly want to avoid a repeat, especially heading into a midterm election year. Cantor alerted members Thursday that during the last week of September, when they are supposed to be on recess, they will now most likely find themselves in Washington voting on a continuing resolution to fund the government into October. It looks like lawmakers will need every hour of that additional time. While talking to reporters Thursday, Boehner strongly suggested that House Republicans weren't exactly coalescing around any one legislative strategy. "There are a lot of discussions going on about how — about how to deal with the [continuing resolution] and the issue of 'Obamacare,' and so we're continuing to work with our members," Boehner said. "There are a million options that are being discussed by a lot of people. When we have something to report, we'll let you know."

#### Shutdown wrecks the economy

Yi Wu, 8-27-2013, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea

Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a letter last week calling on Speaker John Boehner to reject any spending bills that include implementation of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Some Senate Republicans echo their House colleagues in pondering this extreme tactic, which is nothing other than a threat of government shutdown as neither congressional Democrats nor President Obama would ever agree on a budget that abolishes the new health care law. Unleashing this threat would amount to holding a large number of of the federal government's functions, including processing Social Security checks and running the Centers for Disease Control, hostage in order to score partisan points. It would be an irresponsible move inflicting enormous damage to the U.S. economy while providing no benefit whatsoever for the country, and Boehner is rightly disinclined to pursue it. Government shutdowns are deleterious to the economy. Two years ago in February 2011, a similar government shutdown was looming due to a budget impasse, and a research firm estimated that quater's GDP growth would be reduced by 0.2 percentage points if the shutdown lasted a week. After the budget is restored from the hypothetical shutdown, growth would only be "partially recouped," and a longer shutdown would result in deeper slowdowns. Further, the uncertainties resulting from a shutdown would also discourage business. A shutdown was avoided last-minute that year, unlike in 1995 during the Clinton administration where it actually took place for four weeks and resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point dent in GDP growth. Billions of dollars were cut from the budget, but neither Boehner nor the Republicans at the time were reckless enough to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 2

#### There’s uncheck expansion of war powers now

David Gray Adler 11, Director of the Andrus Center for Public Policy @ Boise State University, March 4, “Presidential Ascendancy in Foreign Affairs and the Subversion of the Constitution,” http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/GermanAmericanConf2011/Adler.pdf

Presidential domination of American foreign affairs has become a commonplace after a half - century of unchecked expansion of executive powers. The emergence of a “presidential monopoly” over the conduct of foreign relations, built atop an extraordinary concentration of power in the president, reflects the doctrine of executive supremacy launched by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss - Wright . 11 Across the decades, advocates of expansive presiden tial power in the realm of foreign affairs and national security have sought legal sanction in Justice George Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in Curtiss - Wright . In one way or another, the White House has adduced Sutherland’s characterization of the president as the “sole organ” of American foreign policy, endowed with plenary, inherent and extra - constitutional powers to initiate war, authorize torture, seize and detain American citizens indefinitely, set aside laws, establish military tribunals and s uspe nd and terminate treaties, in addition to assertions of authority to order covert operations, extraordinary rendition and warrantless wiretapping.

#### Plan spills over to destabilize all presidential war powers.

Heder 10 (Adam, J.D., magna cum laude , J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER,” St. Mary’s Law Journal Vol. 41 No. 3, <http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Hederreadytogo.pdf>)

This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquist’s oftquoted language from the landmark “political question” case, Goldwater v. Carter . 121 In Goldwater , a group of senators challenged President Carter’s termination, without Senate approval, of the United States ’ Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 122 A plurality of the Court held, 123 in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, that this was a nonjusticiable political question. 124 He wrote: “In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, . . . the instant case in my view also ‘must surely be controlled by political standards.’” 125 Notably, Justice Rehnquist relied on the fact that there was no constitutional provision on point. Likewise, there is **no constitutional provision** on whether Congress has the legislative power to **limit, end, or otherwise redefine the scope of a war**. Though Justice Powell argues in Goldwater that the Treaty Clause and Article VI of the Constitution “add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone,” 126 **the same cannot be said about Congress’s legislative authority** to terminate or limit a war in a way that goes beyond its explicitly enumerated powers. There are no such similar provisions that would suggest Congress may decline to exercise its appropriation power but nonetheless legally order the President to cease all military operations. Thus, the case for deference to the political branches on this issue is even greater than it was in the Goldwater context. Finally, the Constitution does not imply any additional powers for Congress to end, limit, or redefine a war. The textual and historical evidence suggests the Framers purposefully **declined to grant Congress such powers**. And as this Article argues, granting Congress this power would be **inconsistent with the general war powers structure of the Constitution.** Such a reading of the Constitution would **unnecessarily empower Congress** and **tilt the scales heavily in its favor**. More over, it would strip the President of his Commander in Chief authority to direct the movement of troops at a time **when the Executive’s expertise is needed.** 127 And fears that the President will grow too powerful are unfounded, given the reasons noted above. 128 In short, the Constitution does not impliedly afford Congress any authority to prematurely terminate a war above what it explicitly grants. 129 Declaring these issues nonjusticiable political questions would be the most practical means of balancing the textual and historical demands, the structural demands, and the practical demands that complex modern warfare brings . Adjudicating these matters would only lead the courts to engage in impermissible line drawing — lines that would both confus e the issue and add layers to the text of the Constitution in an area where the Framers themselves declined to give such guidance.

#### The aff sets a precedent for future war powers allocation

Fred Barbash 7, senior editor @ Politico and teacher @ Northwestern’s Medill School of Journalism, 1/31, “Why Would Congress Surrender?,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013001652.html

At issue is the constitutional law governing the war power of the executive branch, specifically the vastness of the "battlefield" over which President Bush claims inherent authority as commander in chief. Also at issue are all the comparable claims yet to be made by presidents yet unborn, armed with the precedents being set right now.¶ In these matters, there is no such thing as inaction. In a contest between two branches over separation of powers, silence speaks as powerfully as words.¶ That's because the Supreme Court rarely involves itself in disputes between Congress and the executive, expressly making it a two-way conversation -- a "shared elaboration" or "shared dialogue" in the words of scholars -- between the elected branches. When one branch drops out by failing to respond, the other branch effectively sets the precedent, which is passed along to the next generation and the generation after that.¶ Inaction, indeed, strengthens that precedent. Over time, inaction is taken as acquiescence, a form of approval, and the precedent becomes entrenched until it's as good as law.¶ This is precisely what has occurred over the years. Successive decades of congressional acquiescence in the face of executive claims of war power have allowed the law to be settled exclusively by the executive branch.

#### Effective executive response is key to prevent global crises – turns case

Ghitis 13 (Frida, world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics Review. A former CNN producer and correspondent, she is the author of *The End of Revolution: A Changing World in the Age of Live Television*. “World to Obama: You can't ignore us,” 1/22, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/ghitis-obama-world)

And while Obama plans to dedicate his efforts to the domestic agenda, a number of brewing international crises are sure to steal his attention and demand his time. Here are a few of the foreign policy issues that, like it or not, may force Obama to divert his focus from domestic concerns in this new term.¶ Syria unraveling: The United Nations says more than 60,000 people have already died in [a civil war t](http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/02/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html)hat the West has, to its shame, done little to keep from spinning out of control. Washington[has warned](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/middleeast/nato-prepares-missile-defenses-for-turkey.html?_r=0) that the use of chemical or biological weapons might force its hand. But the regime [may have already used them](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/19/us-syria-chemical-newspaper-idUSBRE90I0JV20130119). The West has failed to nurture a moderate force in the conflict. Now Islamist extremists are growing [more powerful](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/fighter-syria-aleppo-turkey.html) within the opposition. The chances are growing that worst-case scenarios will materialize. Washington will not be able to endlessly ignore this dangerous war.¶ Egypt and the challenge of democracy: What happens in Egypt strongly influences the rest of the Middle East -- and hence world peace -- which makes it all the more troubling to see liberal democratic forces lose battle after battle for political influence against Islamist parties, and to hear blatantly [anti-Semitic speech](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/world/middleeast/egypts-leader-morsi-made-anti-jewish-slurs.html) coming from the mouth of Mohammed Morsy barely two years before he became president.¶ Iran's nuclear program: Obama took office promising a new, more conciliatory effort to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear enrichment program. Four years later, he has succeeded in implementing international sanctions, but Iran has continued enriching uranium, leading [United Nations inspectors](http://news.yahoo.com/un-credible-evidence-iran-working-nuke-weapons-153544271.html) to find "credible evidence" that Tehran is working on nuclear weapons. Sooner or later the moment of truth will arrive. If a deal is not reached, Obama will have to decide if he wants to be the president on whose watch a nuclear weapons race was unleashed in the most dangerous and unstable part of the world.¶ North Africa terrorism: A much-neglected region of the world is becoming increasingly difficult to disregard. In recent days, [Islamist extremists](http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/18/opinion/ghitis-algeria-hostage-crisis/index.html?hpt=op_t1) took American and other hostages in Algeria and France sent its military to fight advancing Islamist extremists in Mali, a country that once represented optimism for democratic rule in Africa, now overtaken by militants who are potentially turning it into a staging ground for international terrorism.¶ Russia repression: As Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in [crushing opposition](http://www.france24.com/en/20121027-russian-opposition-leaders-detained-protest-navalny-udaltsov-vladimir-putin) to his [increasingly authoritarian](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/russia)rule, he and his allies are making anti-American words and policies their favorite theme. A recent ban on adoption of Russian orphans by American parents is only the most vile example. But Washington needs Russian cooperation to achieve its goals at the U.N. regarding Iran, Syria and other matters. It is a complicated problem with which Obama will have to wrestle.¶ Then there are the long-standing challenges that could take a turn for the worse, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obama may not want to wade into that morass again, but events may force his hand.¶ And there are the so-called "black swans," events of low probability and high impact. [There is talk](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21569757-armed-clashes-over-trivial-specks-east-china-sea-loom-closer-drums-war) that China and Japan could go to war over a cluster of disputed islands.¶ A war between two of the world's largest economies could prove devastating to the global economy, just as a sudden and dramatic reversal in the fragile Eurozone economy could spell disaster. Japan's is only the hottest of many territorial disputes between China and its Asian neighbors. Then there's North Korea with its nuclear weapons.¶ We could see regions that have garnered little attention come back to the forefront, such as Latin America, where conflict could arise in a post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela.¶ The president -- and the country -- could also benefit from unexpectedly positive outcomes. Imagine a happy turn of events in Iran, a breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians, the return of prosperity in Europe, a successful push by liberal democratic forces in the Arab uprising countries, which could create new opportunities, lowering risks around the world, easing trade, restoring confidence and improving the chances for the very agenda Obama described in his inaugural speech.¶ The aspirations he expressed for America are the ones he should express for our tumultuous planet. Perhaps in his next big speech, the State of the Union, he can remember America's leadership position and devote more attention to those around the world who see it as a source of inspiration and encouragement.¶ After all, in this second term Obama will not be able to devote as small a portion of his attention to foreign policy as he did during his inaugural speech.¶ International disengagement is not an option. As others before Obama have discovered, history has a habit of toying with the best laid, most well-intentioned plans of

### 3

The United States Executive Branch should establish binding executive branch policy that precludes the use of United States Armed Forces in military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran that is initiated by the United States or others.

#### Executive negotiations are vital for reaching a nuclear deal – Obama’s been laying the groundwork

Mark Landler 9/19, White House correspondent for The New York Times, September 19, 2013, “Through Diplomacy, Obama Finds a Pen Pal in Iran,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/world/middleeast/through-diplomacy-obama-finds-a-pen-pal-in-iran.html?_r=0>

Few American presidents have held a deeper belief in the power of the written word than President Obama. And in few ways has that belief been more tested than in his frustrating private correspondence with the leaders of Iran, a country with which the United States has had no diplomatic ties for 34 years. This week, Mr. Obama indicated that he might finally have found a pen pal in Tehran. At the core of Iran’s recent diplomatic charm offensive — a process that has included the release of 11 prominent political prisoners and a series of conciliatory statements by top Iranian officials — is an exchange of letters, confirmed by both sides, between Mr. Obama and President Hassan Rouhani. The election of Mr. Rouhani, a moderate, in June kindled hopes that diplomacy might end the chronic impasse with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. But the letters, and the cautious hope they have generated, suggest there is a genuine opportunity for change. It is not the first time since entering the White House that Mr. Obama has put pen to paper to try to sway Iran’s leadership. Until now, he has had little to show for it: even under the pain of punishing economic sanctions, the Iranian government has shown little interest in negotiating a deal with Washington on its nuclear program. This time, Mr. Rouhani said in an NBC News interview broadcast on Wednesday, the tone of Mr. Obama’s letter was “positive and constructive.” He added, “It could be subtle and tiny steps for a very important future.” Mr. Obama, speaking to the Spanish-language network Telemundo on Tuesday, said there were indications that Mr. Rouhani “is somebody who is looking to open dialogue with the West and with the United States, in a way that we haven’t seen in the past. And so we should test it.” The president has tested Iran before. Having promised as a candidate to extend an olive branch to old enemies, he sent a letter early in his first term to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, proposing a new diplomatic chapter. Ayatollah Khamenei sent a reply, but failed to take Mr. Obama up on his offer. Their correspondence was cut short after Iran’s disputed presidential election in June 2009 unleashed a popular uprising. The ensuing bloody crackdown all but snuffed out diplomacy for the next year. The re-elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, wrote a lengthy letter to Mr. Obama in 2010, but it did nothing to break the diplomatic ice. The White House declined to discuss the contents of Mr. Obama’s letter to Mr. Rouhani. But a senior administration official said it reflected the president’s judgment that Mr. Rouhani should be taken “very seriously,” in part because he appeared to have a broad mandate within Iran. This is the first time that Mr. Obama has written directly to an Iranian president, and not the supreme leader. That suggests that the White House believes Ayatollah Khamenei has empowered Mr. Rouhani, at least for now, to seek an opening with the West. Mr. Ahmadinejad, though not as hostile to a nuclear agreement as sometimes portrayed, was undermined by other senior officials and did not enjoy the supreme leader’s full confidence. “The administration’s previous position was that we correspond with the person who makes decisions,” said Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Now they’re sending them to Rouhani.” Another major difference is that the new exchange of letters comes in the wake of the administration’s agreement with Russia to seek the peaceful transfer of Syria’s chemical weapons. To make that plan work, analysts said, it would be helpful for Iran, as the staunchest regional ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, to play a constructive role. Whether that is possible is highly questionable, of course. But it gives Mr. Obama a broader diplomatic context in which to engage Mr. Rouhani. The United States has generally insisted on negotiating with Iran purely on its nuclear program, which has left both sides with little to talk about after the inevitable clashes over the number of centrifuges or the amount of enriched uranium that the Iranians are producing. “At the end of the day, Obama stumbled into diplomacy because of what happened with Syria,” said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, who has written a book about Mr. Obama’s diplomatic efforts, “A Single Roll of the Dice.” Iran’s news media have reported that Mr. Obama’s letter included a plea to re-engage in diplomacy; a suggestion — depending on how any talks went — that the United States would be willing to ease sanctions; and a request to initiate direct discussions between Washington and Tehran, something diplomats say is critical to striking a nuclear deal.

#### Direct and sustained negotiation is key to giving Iran a security guarantee – Congress’s role is limited to supporting the president

FCNL 9, Friends Committee on National Legislation, May/June 2009, “President Obama's New Iran Policy Faces Challenges in Coming Months,” http://fcnl.org/resources/newsletter/mayjun09/president\_obamas\_new\_iran\_policy\_faces\_challenges\_in\_coming\_months/

What will it take for the Obama administration's initiative and early signs of positive change to develop into a new and constructive relationship between the United States and Iran? ¶ From the U.S. perspective it will require resolution of the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, and Iran’s strident anti-Israel rhetoric. From the Iranian perspective it will require an end to economic sanctions, a U.S. security guarantee against regime change, access to Western technology to develop its petroleum and other industries, and full integration into the global economy.¶ Building such a new relationship will require careful and sustained negotiation. For negotiations to succeed, former Carter administration national security advisor Zibigniew Brzezinski told a Senate panel in March, "We need to show patience and prudence and shape the atmospherics of engagement."¶ On the other hand, Brzezinski said, if the real goal is to have a negotiating process that is deliberately designed to fail and to blame Iran for the failure, then the United States should proceed differently. It should insist on preconditions to talks or immediate concessions by Iran, publicly threaten Iran with more economic sanctions, and keep talking about the use of military force as an option, the desirability of regime change in Iran, and Iran as a sponsor of terrorism. Most importantly, if the United States wants talks to fail, Brzezinski said, the administration should impose a tight time limit on negotiations.¶ The Obama administration's Iran policy hangs in the balance between the constructive and self-defeating courses that Brzezinski outlines. Which road the administration will take should become clear between now and the end of the year. Voters should appeal to their Members of Congress to support the president when he takes diplomatic initiatives designed to open and sustain, not close and defeat, negotiations.

### 4

The United States federal government should offer sanction relief to the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for nuclear concessions from the Islamic Republic from Iran.

This is what their solvency evidence is in the context of

Alterman, 13 (Jon B. Alterman holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and directs the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Al-monitor. US-Iran Nuclear Deal Hinges On Syria Vote. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html)

To start, it is worth noting the extent to which foreign governments are sophisticated consumers of American political information. Decades of international cable news broadcasts and newspaper websites have brought intimate details of US politics into global capitals. Foreign ministers in the Middle East and beyond are US news junkies, and they seem increasingly distrustful of their embassies. For key US allies, the foreign minister often seems to have made him- or herself the US desk officer. Most can have a quite sophisticated discussion on congressional politics and their impact on US foreign relations. The Iranian government is no exception. While former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was emotional and shrill in his opposition to the United States, there remains in Iran a cadre of Western-trained technocrats, fluent in English and nuanced in their understanding of the world. President Hassan Rouhani has surrounded himself with such people, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has charged them with investigating a different relationship between Iran and the United States. As they do so, they cannot help but be aware that on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, the US House of Representatives voted 400–20 to impose stiff additional sanctions on Iran. The House saw Rouhani’s electoral victory as a call for toughness, not potential compromise. If Iran were to make concessions in a negotiation with the United States, they would surely seek sanctions relief and other actions requiring congressional approval. To make such concessions to Obama, they would need some confidence that he can deliver. A president who cannot bring around a hostile Congress is not a president with whom it is worth negotiating.

### Strikes

No strikes- Rohani’s election changes motivation

Kambiz Foroohar 6/17/13 journalist for Bloomberg, 6/17/13, "Rohani Victory May Curb Support for Israeli Attack on Iran," Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-16/rohani-victory-may-undermine-support-for-israeli-attack-on-iran.html

¶ Iranian President-Elect Hassan Rohani’s vow to improve ties with the world carried him to a surprise first-round win. It also may have rewound the clock on a potential military strike against his country over its nuclear program.¶ “Those advocating an attack on Iran have been dealt a setback,” said Suzanne Maloney, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy in Washington. “The chances of an attack on Iran are even more remote than they have been in many years.”¶ While Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, 73, retains the power over national security, especially the nuclear program, past presidents have been able to influence the tone of foreign policy. The departure of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose anti-Israel rhetoric and questioning of the Holocaust made Iran a pariah and helped prompt more sanctions, removes a lightning rod for global scorn.¶ Western countries signaled an interest in engaging with Rohani. The British Foreign Office urged him to set a new course for Iran, and the European Union’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said she hoped his victory will lead to a “swift diplomatic solution” to the standoff over the nuclear program.¶ The question is whether Rohani will have influence beyond changing the image Iran presents to the world.¶ “Ahmadinejad was a figure everyone loves to hate,” said Gerald Steinberg, professor of political science at Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel. “Rohani is more sophisticated and a softer face of the same Iranian leadership.”¶

#### No military intervention

Tony Karon ‘12, senior editor at TIME, where he has covered international conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and the Balkans since 1997, 10/10/12, "Obama’s Iran Policy: Why Diplomacy Remains the Likely Course," TIME, world.time.com/2012/10/10/is-the-white-house-weighing-a-military-strike-on-iran/

Rothkopf’s piece on the ostensible emergence of a war-lite option on Iran begins from the premise that President Obama is vulnerable to political attacks from Mitt Romney over his handling of Iran, and might benefit from letting it be known that he’s considering a “surgical strike” on Iran — a scenario ostensibly more believable because it supposedly requires less of a military commitment. “It may be that the easiest way for the Obama team to defuse Romney’s critique on Iran is simply to communicate better what options they are in fact considering,” Rothkopf writes. “It’s not the size of the threatened attack, but the likelihood that it will actually be made, that makes a military threat a useful diplomatic tool. And perhaps a political one, too.”¶ But that assumes Obama faces a major political problem on Iran — an assumption unlikely to be shared by the president’s reelection team at this stage: In most mainstream campaign analyses, being branded “soft on Iran” doesn’t rank particularly prominently among the many reasons why Obama might lose his reelection bid, even if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had once hoped to leverage campaign concerns to press Obama towards Israel’s positions on Iran.¶ Instead, however, Netanyahu had to accept defeat, having isolated himself not only internationally, but also domestically, by his threat to take unilateral military action against Iran before November’s U.S. presidential election. The Israeli leader’s U.N. speech last month effectively took the “October Surprise” option off the table, by making clear that Israel’s own “red line” — Iran having a sufficient stockpile of medium enriched uranium to reprocess into one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade materiel — wouldn’t be reached before next spring or summer. The Israelis have lately dialed down their skepticism of the impact of sanctions on Iran, and on Tuesday Haaretz reported that the Israeli military concurs with the IAEA’s finding that Iran has converted much of its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium into fuel plates for a medical-research reactor that would be of no use in a dash to create weapons-grade materiel.¶ Netanyahu on Tuesday called new elections, to be held next January or February, making prospects for a military strike on Iran before that even more remote. But President Obama had declined to offer even the consolation prize of a publicly stated U.S. red line that would limit his freedom of maneuver. Still, Netanyahu made clear his government would continue to coordinate its positions and actions with Washington — which is presumably the purpose of the U.S.-Israeli discussions referred to by Rothkopf’s source. In those discussions, the Israelis no doubt would like to cajole the U.S. into articulating a military threat, and to package it in ways more politically palatable in Washington, which appears to be the logic outlined by Rothkopf’s source:¶ Were it clearer that the primary Iran option being discussed is this very limited surgical strike, then a U.S. threat of force would be that much more credible. And if it were more credible — because it seemed like the kind of risk the president is more willing to undertake — then it would have the added benefit of providing precisely the kind of added leverage that might make diplomacy more successful. In other words, the public contemplation of a more limited, doable mission provides more leverage than the threat of even more robust action that is less likely to happen.¶ While such an argument is clearly being made, it’s harder to detect signs that it’s been accepted. For one thing, no U.S. “red lines” have been stated, without which a military threat can’t be made. And the logic of the argument for a “lite” strike will certainly be questioned by powerful players in Washington. It’s hard to see how or why Iran would respond differently to a brief “surgical” strike than it would to a sustained air campaign, or how such a scenario would avert the negative consequences that have restrained the U.S. from considering military action at this stage. The idea that an unprovoked act of war against Iran could be contained, a cakewalk over within hours that would set the world to rights, will likely be seen as a flight of fancy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have strongly counseled against what they deem a highly risky and unnecessary military action that’s more likely to result in Iran building nuclear weapons than the neutering of that threat.¶ The Obama Administration has repeatedly signaled that it will take military action if necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but there’s a large gap between that implied “red line” and Netanyahu’s one. A comprehensive study published Monday by the respected technical specialists at the Washington-based Institute for Science in International Security (ISIS) notes that should Iran seek to “dash” for the bomb once it had sufficient medium enriched uranium for reprocessing into a single bomb’s worth of highly-enriched materiel — itself an unlikely “dash” point since a single bomb does not a nuclear deterrent make — it would take Iran between two and four months to reprocess into weapons-grade materiel, and “many additional months” to fabricate and miniaturize it into a working missile warhead. Iran therefore remains unlikely to cross U.S. red lines any time next year, which makes the discussion with the Israelis about just how the U.S. would strike should it deem military action necessary a somewhat academic exercise at this stage.¶ Even the proposition that the Iranians are more likely to surrender on the nuclear issue if facing a threat of war, while popular among Washington hawks, is viewed with skepticism by many Iranian analysts.¶ But while the Administration and the Israelis continue to discuss their respective red lines and the hypotheticals of what form of military action the U.S. would take if it deemed such action necessary, the focus of the Iran nuclear issue is more likely to shift, after the U.S. election, to a resumption of the stalled negotiations with Iran. Recent reports of Iran having offered a nine-step plan to cap their uranium enrichment at low levels in exchange for the removal of sanctions was dismissed by the U.S. as insufficient, but it signals nonetheless that the Iranians are in the market for a compromise, even if they’re nowhere near capitulating to the full menu of Western demands. Needless to say, also, any discussion over compromises is one in which the Israelis would do whatever they could to have a casting vote.¶ That diplomatic conversation is likely to continue into next year, framed by November’s U.S. presidential election, Israel’s parliamentary election next January or February, and Iran’s poll to elect a replacement to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad next June. Don’t bet on seeing any military action, lite or heavy, before then — or even after.

#### No escalation- stability outweighs

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Making Department at the US Naval War College, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, 49(4), p. 83-98

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intraMuslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

### Proxy Wars

Pesaran says that Western countries need to lift sanctions to stop violence- aff obviously doesn't do that

Mousavian qualifies this and says that those who advocate sanctions and regime change are what cause radicalization- the plan doesnt impact

No proxy wars and no escalation

Kaye & Wehrey 11 – Dalia Dassa Kay, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Frederic Wehrey, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, July-August 2011, “Arab Spring, Persian Winter,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4

Second, the "resistance bloc" that Iran leads is far less coordinated and omnipotent than Doran claims. Indeed, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria are less a coherent bloc than a temporary coalition in which local and short-term tactical interests have always trumped ideological or religious affinity. As the individual members of this bloc face mounting domestic pressures, their diverging agendas are only likely to intensify, making it difficult for Tehran to orchestrate a grand strategy.

The weakest link for Tehran right now is Damascus, which is facing a civil war and, from the Iranian perspective, looks increasingly like a liability rather than an asset. Syria has long served as Tehran's entree onto the Arab stage, enabling it, at least symbolically, to overcome its fundamental isolation as a Persian power. Continued turmoil in Syria will jeopardize this role, depriving Iran of a key state partner in the Levant. At the same time, Hezbollah is staying out of the limelight in the Arab Spring as it focuses on building a consensus-based government and consolidating its power in Lebanon. Hamas, for its part, has refused to offer vocal support for Assad's regime against the opposition, taking care to preserve its self-image as a populist movement. The case of Iraq offers an instructive lesson on the limits of nonstate actors in the resistance bloc: the fratricidal violence of the Iranian-backed "special groups," militias that killed Iraqi civilians and security forces in 2007-8, provoked a widespread backlash within Iraq against Iran.

#### No Israeli aggression or overreaction to attacks---they will show restraint

Korski 11—senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Former Stat Dept. official (Daniel, The government should acknowledge Israeli restraint, 27 March 2011, http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/6818828/the-government-should-acknowledge-israeli-restraint.thtml)

With NATO planes circling above Libya, Saudi troops quashing protests in Bahrain, and troops killing civilians in Syria and Yemen, there has been little attention paid to Israel. But Israel has recently been the victim of a series of violent attacks. More than 30 people were injured in a bombing in Jerusalem, and Islamic Jihad's military wing, the Al-Quds Brigade, has fired mortars and rockets into Israel for days on end. The attacks suggest that Hamas is, once again, struggling to rein in other terrorist groups like Islamic Jihad. Some IDF commanders fear a descent into chaos in Gaza.

In the face of the onslaught, however, the Israeli government has shown amazing restraint. Though Israeli aircraft have attacked targets in Gaza, and Benjamin Netanyahu has talked tough, the response has in fact been far less severe than in the past. And far less than many Israeli voters demand.

The Israeli government is clearly keen to avoid derailing the events in the rest of the Middle East. Defence Minister Ehud Barak has even said as much. For governments that are always quick to criticise Israeli actions — which now, sadly, includes the Cameron administration — this is an occasion to express sympathy with, and understanding of, Israel's situation and its show of restraint. Not necessarily publicly, but in private messages.

### Iran Prolif

#### LOL – this article is about the idea of India offering Iran a positive security guarantee which would obligate India to come to Iran’s defense if they were attacked---clearly the plan doesn’t do anything remotely close to that---this is the paragraph right after their card, which could not possibly be more out of context

Forbes, 13 (Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, lecturer at HEC Paris business school, journalist at Business Insider, business and economics columnist at Atlantico, A Completely Unrealistic Iran Grand Bargain Proposal. http://www.forbes.com/sites/pascalemmanuelgobry/2013/03/12/a-completely-unrealistic-iran-grand-bargain-proposal/)

Any Grand Bargain deal that would have any chance of getting the Iranian leadership onboard would therefore have to square that circle and provide iron-clad security guarantees to the Iranian regime. It can’t be a “cross your heart” promise from the US and Israel not to attack Iran, because that wouldn’t be credible. Iran would have to get an ironclad, credible security guarantee.

#### \*\*\*DARTMOUTH’S CARD ENDS---NO TEXT REMOVED\*\*\*

So here’s my completely unrealistic idea: India must provide the security guarantee. In return for everything we want from Iran, India would sign a defense treaty with Iran similar to the one between the United States and Japan.

This could conceivably be acceptable for Iran because India is a nuclear state and a significant power; its security guarantee would therefore be credible. Israel or Iran just wouldn’t attack a country that has a security treaty with India. India is not aligned with the US in the way that, say, Great Britain is, which makes it good for Iran, but is totally acceptable to the US as a security guarantor in the region\* because it’s (mostly) a peaceful democracy. India would obviously love it since it would instantly make it a key player in the Middle East and would validate its status as an emerging great power, which it craves.

#### No impact to Iranian prolif---they’ll be cautious and moderate

Kenneth Waltz 12, senior research scholar @ Saltzman, Poly Sci Prof @ Columbia, September/October 2012, “Iran and the Bomb – Waltz Replies,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 157-162

In arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent an unacceptable threat to the United States and its allies, Colin Kahl rejects my contention that states tend to become more cautious once they obtain nuclear weapons and claims that I minimize the potential threat of an emboldened Islamic Republic. He accuses me of misreading history and suggests that I overestimate the stability produced by nuclear deterrence. In fact, it is Kahl who misunderstands the historical record and who fails to grasp the ramifications of nuclear deterrence.

In Kahl's view, new nuclear states do not necessarily behave as status quo powers and can instead be highly revisionist. Seeking a precedent, he highlights the fact that the Soviet Union encouraged North Korea to launch a potentially risky invasion of South Korea in 1950, shortly after the Soviets had tested their first nuclear bomb. But Kahl neglects to explain the context of that decision. Some time before, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly identified the United States' security commitments in Asia; defending South Korea was not among them. The United States had also signaled its lack of interest in protecting the South Koreans by declining to arm them with enough weapons to repel a Soviet-backed invasion by the North. The Soviet Union therefore had good reason to assume that the United States would not respond if the North Koreans attacked. In light of these facts, it is difficult to see Stalin's encouragement of the invasion as an example of bold, revisionist behavior. Contrary to Kahl's claims, the beginning of the Korean War hardly supplies evidence of Soviet nuclear adventurism, and therefore it should not be understood as a cautionary tale when considering the potential impact that possessing a nuclear arsenal would have on Iranian behavior.

Kahl seems to accept that nuclear weapons create stability -- or a form of stability, at least. But he notes -- as do most scholars of nuclear matters, myself included -- that nuclear stability permits lower-level violence. Taking advantage of the protection that their atomic arsenals provide, nuclear-armed states can feel freer to make minor incursions, deploy terrorism, and engage in generally annoying behavior. But the question is how significant these disruptive behaviors are compared with the peace and stability that nuclear weapons produce.

Kahl points to the example of Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons have probably increased its willingness to wage a low-intensity fight against India, which makes the subcontinent more prone to crises. As Kahl correctly argues, Pakistan's increased appetite for risk probably played a role in precipitating the so-called Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999. But the Kargil War was the fourth war fought by the two countries, and it paled in comparison to the three wars they fought before they both developed nuclear weapons. In fact, the Kargil conflict was a war only according to social scientists, who oddly define "war" as any conflict that results in 1,000 or more battlefield deaths. By historical standards, that casualty rate constitutes little more than a skirmish. Far from proving that new nuclear states are not swayed by the logic of deterrence, the Kargil War supports the proposition that nuclear weapons prevent minor conflicts from becoming major wars. Indeed, nuclear weapons are the only peace-promoting weapons that the world has ever known, and there is no reason to believe that things would be different if Iran acquired such arms.

Kahl also frets that a nuclear-armed Iran would step up its support for terrorist groups. Terrorism is tragic for those whose lives it destroys and unnerving for countries that suffer from it. But the number of annual fatalities from international terrorism is vanishingly small compared with the casualties wrought by major wars. Of course, like Kahl, I would not welcome increased Iranian support for Hezbollah or an increased supply of more potent Iranian arms to Palestinian militants. And I, too, hope for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the disputes between Israel and its neighbors. But the last several decades have not offered much reason to believe those goals can be easily attained, and I would rather see the possibility of major war reduced through nuclear stability, even if the price is an increase in disruptive activities and low-level conflict.

Just a few months ago in these pages, Kahl eloquently expressed his opposition to a proposed preventive strike on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities, warning that it could spark a regional war ("Not Time to Attack Iran," March/April 2012). I agree. But Kahl and I differ on what the United States can achieve in its showdown with the Islamic Republic. Kahl appears to believe that it is possible for the United States to forgo risky military action and still prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons through a combination of sanctions and diplomacy. I strongly doubt that. Short of using military force, it is difficult to imagine how Iran could be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if it is determined to do so. That outcome would produce a lamentable possible increase in terrorism and lower-level conflict. But the many benefits of regional stability would far outweigh the costs.

#### Iran won’t be aggressive—history proves

Paul R. Pillar 12, Visiting Professor and Director of the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served in the Central Intelligence Agency for 28 years, "We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran," March/April, The Washington Monthly, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php?page=all>

Given the momentousness of such an endeavor and how much prominence the Iranian nuclear issue has been given, one might think that talk about exercising the military option would be backed up by extensive analysis of the threat in question and the different ways of responding to it. But it isn’t. Strip away the bellicosity and political rhetoric, and what one finds is not rigorous analysis but a mixture of fear, fanciful speculation, and crude stereotyping. There are indeed good reasons to oppose Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and likewise many steps the United States and the international community can and should take to try to avoid that eventuality. But an Iran with a bomb would not be anywhere near as dangerous as most people assume, and a war to try to stop it from acquiring one would be less successful, and far more costly, than most people imagine.¶ What difference would it make to Iran’s behavior and influence if the country had a bomb? Even among those who believe that war with the Islamic Republic would be a bad idea, this question has been subjected to precious little careful analysis. The notion that a nuclear weapon would turn Iran into a significantly more dangerous actor that would imperil U.S. interests has become conventional wisdom, and it gets repeated so often by so many diverse commentators that it seldom, if ever, is questioned. Hardly anyone debating policy on Iran asks exactly why a nuclear-armed Iran would be so dangerous. What passes for an answer to that question takes two forms: one simple, and another that sounds more sophisticated.¶ The simple argument is that Iranian leaders supposedly don’t think like the rest of us: they are religious fanatics who value martyrdom more than life, cannot be counted on to act rationally, and therefore cannot be deterred. On the campaign trail Rick Santorum has been among the most vocal in propounding this notion, asserting that Iran is ruled by the “equivalent of al-Qaeda,” that its “theology teaches” that its objective is to “create a calamity,” that it believes “the afterlife is better than this life,” and that its “principal virtue” is martyrdom. Newt Gingrich speaks in a similar vein about how Iranian leaders are suicidal jihadists, and says “it’s impossible to deter them.”¶ The trouble with this image of Iran is that it does not reflect actual Iranian behavior. More than three decades of history demonstrate that the Islamic Republic’s rulers, like most rulers elsewhere, are overwhelmingly concerned with preserving their regime and their power—in this life, not some future one. They are no more likely to let theological imperatives lead them into self-destructive behavior than other leaders whose religious faiths envision an afterlife. Iranian rulers may have a history of valorizing martyrdom—as they did when sending young militiamen to their deaths in near-hopeless attacks during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s—but they have never given any indication of wanting to become martyrs themselves. In fact, the Islamic Republic’s conduct beyond its borders has been characterized by caution. Even the most seemingly ruthless Iranian behavior has been motivated by specific, immediate concerns of regime survival. The government assassinated exiled Iranian dissidents in Europe in the 1980s and ’90s, for example, because it saw them as a counterrevolutionary threat. The assassinations ended when they started inflicting too much damage on Iran’s relations with European governments. Iran’s rulers are constantly balancing a very worldly set of strategic interests. The principles of deterrence are not invalid just because the party to be deterred wears a turban and a beard.¶ If the stereotyped image of Iranian leaders had real basis in fact, we would see more aggressive and brash Iranian behavior in the Middle East than we have. Some have pointed to the Iranian willingness to incur heavy losses in continuing the Iran-Iraq War. But that was a response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of the Iranian homeland, not some bellicose venture beyond Iran’s borders. And even that war ended with Ayatollah Khomeini deciding that the “poison” of agreeing to a cease-fire was better than the alternative. (He even described the cease- fire as “God’s will”—so much for the notion that the Iranians’ God always pushes them toward violence and martyrdom.)

#### No nuclear dominoes

Steven A. Cook 12, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Foreign Policy: Don't Fear A Nuclear Armed Iran," April 3, <http://www.npr.org/2012/04/03/149906811/foreign-policy-dont-fear-a-nuclear-armed-iran>

This logic was undoubtedly at work when Pakistan embarked on a nuclear program in 1972 to match India's nuclear development program. Yet for all its tribulations, the present-day Middle East is not the tinderbox that South Asia was in the middle of the 20th century. Pakistan's perception of the threat posed by India — a state with which it has fought four wars since 1947 — is far more acute than how either Egypt or Turkey perceive the Iranian challenge. And while Iran is closer to home for the Saudis, the security situation in the Persian Gulf is not as severe as the one along the 1,800-mile Indo-Pakistani border.¶ Most important to understanding why the Middle East will not be a zone of unrestrained proliferation is the significant difference between desiring nukes and the actual capacity to acquire them. Of all three states that Shavit mentioned, the one on virtually everyone's list for possible nuclear proliferation in response to Iran is Turkey. But the Turkish Republic is already under a nuclear umbrella: Ankara safeguards roughly 90 of the United States' finest B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik airbase, near the city of Adana. These weapons are there because Turkey is a NATO member, and Washington's extended deterrence can be expected to at least partially mitigate Turkey's incentives for proliferation.¶ But even if the Turks wanted their own bomb, they have almost no capacity to develop nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, Turkey does not even possess the capability to deliver the 40 B61 bombs at Incirlik that are allocated to Turkish forces in the event of an attack, according to a report released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.¶ Given the changes in Turkey's foreign policy and its drive for global influence, it is conceivable that it will want to develop a Turkish version of France's force de frappe. However, Ankara would literally be starting from scratch: Turkey has no fissile material, cannot mine or enrich uranium, and does not possess the technology to reprocess spent fuel, all of which are required for nuclear weapons development.¶ This does not mean that Turkey is not interested in nuclear technology. Yet Ankara's efforts, to the extent that they exist beyond the two small-scale facilities in Ankara and Kucukcekmece, are directly related to the country's predicted energy shortfall resulting from the combination of a booming economy and growing population. The Turkish government has announced plans for civilian nuclear power to provide a quarter of Turkey's electricity needs by 2040. But even this three-decade timeline seems overly optimistic given the inchoate nature of Turkey's nuclear research.¶ The Egyptians are way ahead of the Turks in developing nuclear infrastructure, but don't expect to see the rise of a nuclear power on the Nile anytime soon. Egypt's nuclear program is actually older than India's, and was established only three years after Israel founded its Atomic Energy Commission. The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission, which Gamal Abdel Nasser established in 1955, was exclusively dedicated to the development of peaceful atomic energy, though there were suspicions to the contrary. The 1956 nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union transferred to Egypt a 2-megawatt light water reactor that only produced small amounts of plutonium.¶ There were, of course, worrying signs about the Egyptian program — specifically Cairo's refusal to open the Inshas reactor to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection until after the peace treaty with Israel. Yet neither President Anwar Sadat nor his successor, the recently deposed Hosni Mubarak, ever made any effort to develop nuclear weapons technology. Sadat signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980, and Mubarak negotiated with the United States, France, Canada, and Germany for reactors and funding for Egypt's nuclear program. Nothing, however, ever came of these discussions because of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster — and the fact that the Egyptians never signed what is known as the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA enhanced powers to inspect nuclear facilities. Given the trajectory of Egypt's nuclear development, Cairo's rejection of the Additional Protocol had more to do with politics and sovereignty than plans for a clandestine weapons program.¶ Even after Mubarak's son Gamal triumphantly declared at the ruling party's 2006 convention that Egypt was going to ramp up its nuclear development program, it is hard to believe that Egyptians ever really took him seriously. Mubarak spent $160 million on consultants to tell him where to build 10 planned nuclear power plants, and selected a location along the Mediterranean for the first one. But each of the power plants comes with a price tag of $1.5 billion — and this is a country that in the last 15 months has spent approximately $26 billion of its $36 billion foreign currency reserves just to stay afloat.¶ One has to wonder about the pundits' warning of an Egyptian bomb: Have they even been to Egypt lately? If so, they might have a better grasp of Egypt's ramshackle infrastructure and the dire state of its economy, neither of which can support a nuclear program.¶ What about Saudi Arabia, then, the Sunni power that is on the tip of most analysts' tongues when it comes to Shiite Iran getting the bomb? Saudi Arabia has the cash to make large-scale investments in nuclear technology. Indeed, the only factor that makes warnings about Saudi proliferation — such as that delivered by former Ambassador the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal last year — even remotely credible is the resources the Saudis can muster to buy a nuclear program. Yet, while Riyadh can outfit itself with nuclear facilities with ease, it does not have the capacity to manage them. Mohamed Khilewi, a former Saudi diplomat, claims that the kingdom has been developing a nuclear arsenal to counter Israel since the mid-1970s — but he offers no substantiated evidence to support these claims.¶ In fact, the country has no nuclear facilities and no scientific infrastructure to support them. It's possible that Saudi Arabia could import Pakistanis to do the work for them. But while Saudis feel comfortable with Pakistanis piloting some of their warplanes and joining their ground forces, setting up a nuclear program subcontracted with Pakistani know-how — or even acquiring a nuclear device directly from Islamabad — poses a range of political risks for the House of Saud. No doubt there would be considerable international opprobrium. Certainly Washington, which implicitly extends its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, would have a jaundiced view of a nuclear deal between Riyadh and Islamabad. Moreover, it's one thing to hand the keys to an F-15 over to a foreigner, but letting them run your nuclear program is another matter altogether.¶ The concern about Saudi proliferation stems from fears that the kingdom would be forced to act if both Iran and Israel possessed a nuclear arsenal. "We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don't," an unnamed Saudi official declared to the Guardian on the sidelines of a meeting between Prince Turki al Faisal and NATO officials in June 2011. "It's as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit."¶ Yet given the fact that the Saudis have very little nuclear infrastructure to speak of, this kind of statement is little more than posturing designed to force the U.S. hand on Iran. Unlike similar warnings by Israel, which has the capacity to follow through on its threat to attack Iran's nuclear sites, Riyadh's rhetoric about acquiring nuclear weapons is empty. What is amazing is how many people take the Saudis seriously. If Khilewi had been telling the truth, now would seem like a good time for the Riyadh to give Tehran a look at what the royal family has been hiding in the palace basement all these years — but so far, we have only heard crickets.¶ Despite its flimsiness, it is hard to ignore the utility of the Middle East's nuclear dominoes theory. For those who advocate a preventive military strike on Iran, it provides a sweeping geopolitical rationale for a dangerous operation. But the evidence doesn't bear this argument out: If Washington decides it has no other option than an attack, it should do so because Iran is a threat in its own right, and not because it belives it will thwart inevitable proliferation in places like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. It won't, for the simple reason that there is no reason to believe these countries represent a proliferation risk in the first place.

### Israel Strikes

#### No strikes- Israel will compromise- red lines empirically denied

Graham Allison 8/1/13 the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, 8/1/13, "Will Iran Get a Bomb- or Be Bombed Itself- This Year?" The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/will-iran-get-a-bomb-or-be-bombed-itself-this-year/278253/

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will continue to press for an early decision, arguing that sanctions are ineffective and only give Iran more time to expand its nuclear program. Expect President Obama, key members of the Israeli national security establishment, and others to continue arguing that sanctions and covert actions must be allowed more time to work, and that new sanctions and covert actions will be even more effective.¶ At the UN last September, Netanyahu drew a clear red line, near to but short of a nuclear bomb, and threatened that crossing it would trigger an attack on Iran. But his speech revealed his own frustration about the predicament in which he finds himself. He knows that Israel and the U.S. have been complicit in a drama in which they have repeatedly drawn red lines, asserted that Iran would never be allowed to cross them but, after watching Iran cross the line, retreated to the next operational obstacle on the path to a bomb, and declared it to be the real red line (see Table 8).¶ [Table removed]¶ Netanyahu himself was sounding the alarm as long ago as 1992, when he suggested Iran was "3 to 5 years" from a bomb; in 1996, he warned Congress that the "deadline for preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb is getting extremely close." Since then, Israeli politicians and officials have announced numerous "last chances" and "points of no return." In 2003, the head of Israeli military intelligence forecast that Iran would soon cross the "point of no return" at which "it would require no further outside aid to bring the program to fruition." A year later, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned that Iran would cross this point if it were allowed to develop a "technical capability" for operating an enrichment facility. As Iran approached that capability, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described the tipping point not as the capability, but as the "enrichment of uranium" itself. Simultaneously, the head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, warned that Iran would reach this technological point of no return by the end of 2005. After Iran began enriching uranium, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert drew a new line in 2006 as enrichment "beyond a limited number of cascades."¶ As Iran has crossed successive red lines, Israel has retreated to the next and, in effect, hit the repeat button. From conversion of uranium; to production of LEU; to a stockpile of LEU sufficient (after further enrichment) to make one nuclear bomb; to a stockpile sufficient for a half dozen bombs; to enrichment beyond LEU to MEU; to the operation of centrifuges enriching MEU at the deep underground, formerly covert facility at Fordow, that created a "zone of immunity"; to achievement of an undefined "nuclear weapons capability," Israel's warnings have grown louder -- but no more effective. That these "points of no return" have been passed is a brute fact and hard to ignore.

#### No Israeli strikes---politics have changed

Mark Landler ‘13 NYT Reporter, "A Goal for Obama in Israel: Finding Some Overlap on Iran," March 18, 2013, [www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/middleeast/obama-in-israel-visit-to-seek-common-ground-with-netanyahu-on-iran.html?pagewanted=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit\_th\_20130319](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/middleeast/obama-in-israel-visit-to-seek-common-ground-with-netanyahu-on-iran.html?pagewanted=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130319)

Some analysts believe that Mr. Obama now holds the upper hand, in part because doubts about the wisdom of a unilateral strike have grown in Israel since last year, when it was widely discussed.¶ Iran has made enough progress reinforcing its Fordo nuclear facility that it is no longer clear whether Israeli warplanes could destroy it.¶ “There has been a dramatic change in the policy views of most Israeli elites since last fall,” Mr. Kupchan said. “There is a fresh sense that there’s not as much they can do militarily.”¶ The politics in Israel, moreover, have changed. Ehud Barak, the defense minister who was a leading hawk on Iran, has left Mr. Netanyahu’s cabinet. The prime minister’s new cabinet, though not necessarily composed of doves, will need to be briefed before the ministers are likely to vote in favor of unilateral action, analysts said.

#### No escalation

Thomas Rogan ‘12, BA in war studies from King's College London and an MSc in Middle East politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, 8/18/12, “Israeli could attack Iran without causing a major war in the region,” The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/18/israeli-attack-iran>

Over the last few days, Israeli newspapers have been consumed by reports that the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has decided to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities some time this autumn. Although Netanyahu has an obvious interest in increasing pressure on Iran, it would be an error to regard these reports as simple rhetorical sensationalism. In my opinion, whether this year or next, Israel is likely to use its airforce to attack Iran.¶ While it is impossible to know for sure whether Netanyahu will act, it is possible to consider the likely repercussions that would follow an Israeli attack. While it is likely that Iran would retaliate against Israel and possibly the US in response to any attack, it is unlikely that Iran will instigate a major war. Albeit for different reasons, Iran, Israel and the US all understand that a war would not serve their interests.¶ First, the Israeli policy angle. If Netanyahu decides to order an attack on Iran, his focus will be on maximising the success of that action and minimising any negative consequences that might follow. In terms of Iranian retaliation, Israel would expect Iran's core non-state allies Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah to launch rocket attacks into Israeli territory.¶ However, present success with advanced defence systems has helped increase Israeli confidence in their ability to absorb this method of retaliation. Beyond rocket attacks, the Israeli leadership also understands that a likely mechanism for Iranian retaliation is via attacks against Israeli interests internationally. Whether carried out by the Iranian Quds Force or Hezbollah, or a combination of both, various incidents this year have shown Israel that Iran continues to regard covert action as a powerful weapon.¶ The key for Israel is that, while these Iranian capabilities are seen as credible, they are not seen to pose intolerable threats to Israel. Faced with rocket strikes or limited attacks abroad – to which the likely response would be air strikes or short-duration ground operations (not a repeat of 2006) in Lebanon and Gaza – Israel would be unlikely to pursue major secondary retaliation against Iran. Certainly, Israel would not want to encourage intervention by Syria's Assad alongside Iran (an outcome that might follow major retaliatory Israeli action).¶ If Netanyahu does decide to take action, Israeli objectives would be clearly limited. The intent would be to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability while minimising escalation towards war. Israel has no interest in a major conflict that would risk serious damage to the Israeli state.¶ Though holding opposite objectives, Iran's attitude concerning a major war is similar to Israel's.¶ While Iran regards nuclear capability as prospectively guaranteeing the survival of its Islamic revolution, clerical leaders also understand that initiating a major war would make American intervention likely. Such intervention would pose an existential threat to the theocratic project that underpins the Islamic Republic.¶ Thus, in the event of an Israeli attack, Iran's response would be finely calibrated towards achieving three objectives:¶ • First, punishing Israel for its attack.¶ • Second, deterring further Israeli strikes and so creating space for a reconstituted Iranian nuclear programme.¶ • Finally, weakening US/international support for Israel so as to increase Israeli isolation and vulnerability.¶ Hezbollah, Hamas and other non-state allies would play a major role in effecting Iranian retaliation. Iran may also attempt to launch a number of its new Sajjil-2 medium-range missiles against Israel. Again, however, using these missiles would risk major retaliation if many Israeli citizens were killed.¶ As a preference, Iran would probably perceive that utilising Hamas and Hezbollah would allow retaliation without forcing Netanyahu into a massive counter-response. Crucially, I believe Iran regards that balancing its response would enable it to buy time for a reconstituted, hardened nuclear programme. In contrast to the relatively open current structure, sites would be deeper underground and far less vulnerable to a future attack. The nuclear ambition would not be lost, simply delayed. ¶ As a final objective for retaliation, Iran would wish to weaken Israel's relationship with the US and the international community. This desire might encourage Iran to take action against US navy assets in the Gulf and/or attempt to mine the Strait of Hormuz, so as to cause a price spike in global oil markets and increased international discomfort.¶ However, beyond their rhetoric, the Iranian leadership understand that they cannot win a military contest against the US, nor hold the strait for longer than a few days. For Iran then, as with Israel, regional war is far from desirable.¶ Finally, consider the US. It is now clear that Obama and Netanyahu disagree on Iran. In my opinion, Netanyahu does not believe Obama will ever be willing to take pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear programme. Conversely, Obama believes Netanyahu's diplomatic expectations are too hasty and excessively restrictive.¶ The policy distance between these two leaders appears increasingly irreconcilable. If Netanyahu decides to go it alone and attack Iran, the US president will face the unpleasant scenario of having to protect American interests while avoiding an escalation dynamic that might spin out of control towards war. This difficulty is accentuated by Obama's re-election race and his fear of the domestic economic fallout that may come from the decisions that he might have to make. Again, the simple point is that the US government has no interest in a war with Iran. ¶ If Netanyahu decides to take military action, he will do so in a strategic environment in which Israel, Iran and the US have no preference for a major war. Each state views the prospect of a war as counter to their particular long-term ambitions.¶ Because of this, while serious**,** Iranian retaliation would be unlikely to produce an escalatory dynamic leading to war. The leadership of each of these states will restrain their respective actions in the pursuit of differing long-term objectives but common short-term ones.

#### Iran won’t strike Israel- fears backlash

Alireza Nader ‘13, senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation; Iran specialist and author of Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran, 5/29/13, “Think Again: A Nuclear Iran,” [www.rand.org/blog/2013/05/think-again-a-nuclear-iran.html](http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/05/think-again-a-nuclear-iran.html)

“Iran would nuke Israel”¶ No way. Khamenei may describe Israel as a “cancer that must be removed,” but he doesn't wake up every morning thinking of destroying Israel. The Islamic Republic's hatred for Israel is real, but its policies toward Israel are more pragmatic than often assumed.¶ Iran's leadership sees Israel through the prism of the shah's cozy, under-the-table relations with Tel Aviv. While the shah viewed an Iranian-Israeli alliance as a tool to contain communism and pan-Arabism, the Islamic Republic sees Israel as an outpost of Western “colonialism” in the region. The revolutionary regime sees the “liberation” of Muslims, especially Palestinians, as one of its core foreign-policy objectives.¶ But beyond ideology, opposition to Israel offers the Islamic Republic several practical benefits. It notably alleviates Iran's own regional isolation in the Middle East, providing a unifying goal that appeals to Sunni Arabs and distracts from Iran's espousal of Shia clerical rule.¶ Iran is likely to oppose Israel as long as its revolutionary system exists, providing military and financial support to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. But the Iranian regime is not fanatical in its perceptions of Israel. For example, Tehran has hesitated to attack Israel with its own missiles, as it fears the Israeli reaction. Any Iranian nuclear attack against Israel would certainly mean massive Israeli and U.S. retaliation, and the regime's destruction.¶ From Khamenei's point of view, Israel's existence is a much better alternative than a nuclear war resulting in mutual destruction. The regime can blame Israel for all the region's woes, taking some pressure off itself. Hence, the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders in Syria is not due to Tehran's opposition to Sunni insurgents, but ascribed by the regime to “Zionist plots.”

#### No middle east war---all players in the region are pragmatic and will balance accordingly

Hadar 11/2/11—former prof of IR at American U and Mount Vernon-College. PhD in IR from American U (Leon, Overhauling U.S. Policy in the Middle East, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/overhauling-us-policy-the-middle-east-6087)

But the changes emerging from the so-called Arab Spring go beyond a clash between pro-Western movements and Islamist groups. The shifting balance of power in the Middle East—triggered in part by eroding American influence in the region—is bringing to the fore realpolitik concerns that likely will overcome ideological considerations in the new Middle East. The Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange, the U.S. role in Libya’s civil war and the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq all point in that direction.

Let’s begin with the prisoner exchange. The interesting thing about the exchange of one Israeli soldier for more than 1,000 jailed Palestinians was not that it happened, but that it happened now, when Islamist influence seems to be on the rise in Egypt.

Israeli leaders, with the support of most of the public and the elites, have been negotiating a deal along these lines for the last five years with Egyptian security officials playing the main role as mediator.

But following the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s pro-American in Egypt, the conventional wisdom in Cairo and Jerusalem was that the Israeli-Hamas negotiations would collapse. Pundits were predicting that the fall of a pro-American leader committed to the peace accords between Israel and Egypt would make it difficult for any new government to embrace policies perceived as beneficial to Israel.

In fact, anti-Israel rhetoric and demonstrations emanating from Tahrir Square and elsewhere—coupled with the growing diplomatic strains between the ruling Israeli Likud government and Islamist Turkish leaders and the continuing military tensions between the Jewish state and the Ayatollahs in Tehran—seemed to play directly into Israeli fears of being surrounded by a hostile Muslim entity.

Yet this nightmare scenario assumed that the Muslims in the Middle East—Egyptians, Turks, Iranians and Saudis as well as multiple tribes, sects and ethic groups—were going to form a unified political and military front to confront Israel. This scenario is based in part on real fears about the policies of Iran and Turkey and the rhetoric emanating from the Arab Street. But such fears have been amplified by Israeli ultra-nationalists and American neoconservatives with an agenda: They want to resist any serious challenge to the Israeli-Palestinian status quo and mobilize Israelis and their Washington supporters into new confrontations in the Middle East.

That the current Egyptian military leaders have decided to help the Israelis gain the release of Sergeant Noam Shalit was clearly not a reflection of dormant pro-Israeli inclinations in Cairo. Neither was the freedom of the Palestinian prisoners a reflection of any support for the Palestinian cause. Like Anwar Sadat and Mubarak, these leaders operate based on what they consider Egyptian national interests. And those interests include preserving the peace agreement with Israel and avoiding a military conflict with that country for the foreseeable future.

Indeed, contrary to what some Americans seem to believe, it is not the Egyptian-Israeli treaty agreement of 1979 or the billions of dollars in U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt that have induced the Egyptians to refrain from going to war with Israel. The 1979 accord reflected the reality that the evolving power balance led both Israel and Egypt to conclude that a war between them would be too costly and detrimental to their interests.

The global and regional developments since 1979 have strengthened the determination of both sides to maintain peace. Egypt, economically bankrupt and unable to feed and educate its own people, is certainly not positioned to pursue military confrontation with Israel.

Moreover, the rise in power and influence of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood makes it more likely that future governments in in Cairo will have an interest in co-opting Gaza Strip Hamas leaders, whose movement is a political offshoot of the Islamist party founded in Egypt in 1928.

In a way, Hamas may be evolving into a client (mini)state of a more Islamist-oriented Egypt. In that context, Egypt’s interest would be in providing Hamas with enough support to prevent it from coming under the influence of the more radical players in the region, such as Iran. At the same time, driven by the kind of calculus that affects any relationship between leading powers and client states, Cairo would need to ensure that Hamas’s policies would not draw Egypt into a military conflict with Israel. Helping negotiate the Hamas-Israel deal fits nicely into such a strategy. It encourages Hamas to start reorienting its foreign policy from Syria, and by extension Iran, and more towards Egypt. That could create conditions for more pragmatic deals between Israel and Hamas, negotiated with Egyptian assistance. These wouldn’t likely bring about a peace accord between the two sides but might allow the ministate in the Gaza Strip to become an Egyptian protectorate of sorts that could coexist with Israel for some time to come.

That Turkey has also played an active role in negotiating the Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange is also an encouraging sign, notwithstanding the stresses in the relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem. The Turks have no interest in exacerbating tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors because that could destabilize the Middle East, Turkey’s new diplomatic and economic frontier.

It’s probably not realistic to expect the emergence of a diplomatic and military axis between Egypt and Turkey that would join with Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf oil sheikdoms to counter the influence of Iran and its satellites in Iraq and Lebanon and to manage the power transition in Syria. Turkey and Iran, after all, share common interests in curbing Kurdish irredentism inside their borders. Unlike the Saudis and the Israelis, Turkey wants to avoid a military confrontation between the United States and Iran.

But the reemergence of new cooperative and competing centers of power in the Middle East—Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia—provide the United States, the European Union (EU) and Israel with new strategic opportunities. Instead of wasting time and resources on fantastical freedom agendas and countering the imaginary or real influence of political Islam, a more effective policy would be to hedge one’s strategic bets by forming ad hoc partnerships with these players to advance concrete interests.

Hence, in the aftermath of the agreement with Hamas, Israel could improve its relationship with Cairo and Ankara and perhaps even create the conditions for some sort of coexistence with Hamas-ruled Gaza. This could, not coincidentally, put more diplomatic pressure on the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Indeed, the Israeli-Egyptian-Turkish collaboration that led to the prisoner exchange is one example of such a creative strategic approach that seeks new opportunities rather than fixating on old threats.

What this suggests for the United States is that there may be cost-effective ways of securing American interests in the Middle East at a time of political change there and of diminishing American military and economic resources. Libya offers a better approach than Iraq. Rather than pursuing hegemonic and ideologically driven policies, the United States could provide incentives for other players to handle some of the heavy lifting.

Indeed, the Iraq War could provide a case study of how not to pursue U.S. interest in the Middle East. President George W. Bush and his neoconservative advisers disregarded the ethnic and sectarian realities in Iraq and the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Thus they helped shift power in Iraq from the Arab-Sunnis to the Arab-Shiites, all the while strengthening Iran.

That policy only harmed U.S. interests while failing to advance democratic values in Iraq, and it antagonized regional partners (Saudi Arabia; Turkey) as well as global players with interests to protect. The EU, for example, might have provided military and financial support to a more modest project aimed at containing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

In Libya, on the other hand, it was the European powers that took the military lead in bringing about regime change. America encouraged Britain and France to do so while it accepted a supporting military role.

The Obama administration’s policy in Libya, coupled with the announcement on withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq by year’s end, may not signal that Washington is about to embrace a grand new strategy for the Middle East. But it is does suggest it is beginning to adapt its policies to the changing balance of power in the region.

#### No Middle East war

Salem 11—Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center. PhD from Harvard (Paul, 'Arab Spring' Has Yet to Alter Region's Strategic Balance, carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=43907)

Despite their sweeping repercussions for both domestic and international players, the Arab uprisings have not led to a dramatically new regional order or a new balance of power. This could change, particularly if developments in Syria continue to escalate.

While Iran has welcomed uprisings against Western-backed regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, it dealt harshly with its own protesters and has been worried about recent events in Syria. Moreover, countries that threw out pro-Western dictators are not moving closer to Iran.

Egypt's and Tunisia’s future foreign policies are more likely to resemble Turkey's in becoming more independent while remaining allied with the West. And Iran's soft power has decreased as its regime looks increasingly repressive and new models of revolutionary success have emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, and other parts of the Arab world.

Turkey, for its part, bungled the opportunity to take advantage of this historic shift to bolster its influence in the Arab world. The Arab uprisings are effectively calling for the Arab world to be more like Turkey: democratic, with a vibrant civil society, political pluralism, secularism alongside Islam, and a productive and fairly balanced economy. However, after expressing clear support for Egyptian protesters, Turkey has hedged its bets in Libya and Syria.

Turkey has over $15 billion in business contracts with Moammar Kadafi's Libya and has built a close relationship with Syrian President Bashar Assad. Turkey's foreign policy of "zero problems" with neighbors is becoming harder to implement as peoples and governments in the neighborhood are increasingly on opposite sides.

Although Arab public opinion has held Turkey in very high esteem in past years, recent events have tarnished that image. This could have been Turkey's moment in the Middle East; the moment was lost.

Saudi Arabia has been taken aback by the loss of old allies and remains worried about increased Iranian influence, but has maintained its sphere of influence. Its military intervention in Bahrain shows that Riyadh is extremely worried not only about Iranian influence but about the wave of democratic change, and still has not figured out a way to achieve a balance between addressing growing demands by citizens for better governance and social justice, while keeping Iranian influence out of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Although the United States has generally suffered setbacks from the events of the past months, it is adjusting quickly to the new realities and stands to remain a key player in the coming period. It has not lost its leverage despite the demise of its main Egyptian and Tunisian allies, and has expressed support for protests after realizing they were not dominated by radical groups and that they echoed Western values.

Emerging global powers such as Russia, China, India and Brazil have had mixed reactions to the "Arab Spring." All were reluctant to approve Western-led military intervention in Libya, expressing concerns ranging from the risk of higher oil prices to a potential spillover effect on their shores.

As for Israel, even though its peace treaty with Egypt will remain in place, it no longer has any friends in the region after the departure of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, its declining relations with Turkey and growing unrest in Jordan. The recent Fatah-Hamas accord underlines Israel's predicament. Two difficult challenges lie ahead: The Palestinian Authority's unilateral move to declare Palestinian statehood by the end of the year and a potential Palestinian popular uprising encouraged by the success of neighboring populations.

Although the Arab Spring has been largely about internal democracy and reform, it has affected all of the major regional and international actors. However, so far there has been no major shift in the balance of power or the basic pattern of regional relations.

#### Empirically proven

Cook 7**—**CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania(Steven, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, 6 /28, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265, AG)

Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, **the region has** also **developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.**

#### Prefer our ev---theirs exaggerates minor differences and falsely hypes the risk of conflict---recent events prove

Steers 11—Huffington Post writer (Julia, Jordan: Why It's Not A Domino In The Middle East, 2/21/11, [www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/21/jordan\_n\_825896.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/21/jordan_n_825896.html))

In early February, Agence France Press, a leading French news service, published two reports saying the 36 tribesmen, out of a tribal population of over 2 million, had warned Jordan's royal family that their country "will sooner or later be the target of an uprising similar to the ones in Tunisia and Egypt due to the suppression of freedoms and the looting of public funds."

The royal family shot back with a statement condemning the AFP's coverage of the tribal warnings as unsubstantiated and defamatory, and threatening to "pursue legal action" against the news service. Many media outlets pounced saying the face-off meant that deep-seated unrest was brewing in Jordan, just as it was elsewhere in the region.

Unless, of course, it wasn't.

Some analysts say that the rush to define fast-moving, seismic protests has sometimes trumped accuracy in the coverage of the Middle East.

"This frenzy has caught the West by surprise and has resulted in events being reported without analysis, background or research," said Dr. Safwan M. Masri, Director of the Columbia University Middle East Research Center, in an interview with The Huffington Post.

Jordan is an anomaly of sorts, one of the Middle East's few constitutional monarchies. The King wields real executive power, and appoints the the prime minister and the Senate, but the country has a bicameral parliament, with a democratically elected Lower House. Their multi-ethnic population--the country has absorbed many Iraqi and Palestinian refugees in recent decades--is viewed domestically as a source of stability that sets Jordan apart from nearby countries prone to ethnic clashes. The Bedouin tribes, which make up close to 40 percent of the population, have historically been loyal to the monarchy.

# 2NC

## Solves Iran Security Guarantee

## 1AC Ev for CP

Mousavian ’13, Hossein Mousavian, Winter 2013, The Washington Quarterly, “An Opportunity for a U.S.-Iran Paradigm Shift,” <http://csisdev.forumone.com/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_Mousavian.pdf>, p. 138-139

It is crucial for U.S. policymakers, especially those who advocate sanctions and regime change, to understand that Iranian clerics are radicalized under threat. If this pressure were alleviated, it would inversely lead to their moderation.

Iran played in the release of the Western hostages held in Lebanon.30 Washington’s request for Iranian cooperation in the War on Terror also led to Iranian support in fighting al-/Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001.31

Walt 13

I'm 100 percent sure that the United States should engage Iran's new government seriously and patiently to see whether a deal can be struck.

Heinonen and Henderson, 13 (Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Rouhani and Iran's Nuclear Progress. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rouhani-and-irans-nuclear-progress)

 Despite being inaugurated only weeks ago, President Rouhani should hit the ground running on the nuclear issue. He served as Iran's top nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005 and was also involved in crafting nuclear policies as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 to 2005. His election was widely attributed to his campaign promises of bringing relief from international nuclear sanctions.¶ Since winning office, Rouhani has been assessing his strengths within Iran's power structure, which is dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has also been crafting a new nuclear negotiating team. Although he has already publicly indicated that suspending the nuclear program is not an option

### Overview

The counterplan has Obama issue a legally binding executive order to not strike Iran and to not get involved if others strike Iran —

Lander is from three days ago — says Obama is negotiating with Tehran now — our diplomatic charm offensive is working — they are exchanging letters and diplomats agree that it has created the opportunity for change — direct discussions are key to strike a deal.

Only presidential negotiations can solve — extend FCNL — congresses role in negotiations is support oriented.

### 2NC Solves – Obama/Rohani Talks

#### Obama is key to negotiating directly with Rohani over Iran’s nuclear program

Bloomberg 9/19, “Rohani Display of Moderation Draws Praise Amid Questions,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-19/rohani-display-of-moderation-draws-praise-amid-questions.html

After eight years of bellicose rhetoric from his predecessor, Iranian President Hassan Rohani’s smiling face is prompting a debate about whether his outreach is a promise or a ploy. In an interview that aired last night on NBC, Rohani said Iran won’t develop nuclear weapons, and in the last month he’s exchanged letters with President Barack Obama and named a diplomat known as a moderate as his foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator. Earlier this week, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for “heroic flexibility” in negotiations. Some Iran-watchers are hailing what they call an unprecedented opportunity to resolve the dispute over its nuclear program and end the country’s international isolation. Others who doubt Iran’s motives, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, say previous would-be reformers have all failed and Rohani’s charm offensive is a ploy to win relief from economic sanctions. Current and former U.S. policy makers say they’re reserving judgment until Rohani’s words are matched by actions. “The Iranians have launched a very serious and skillful public diplomacy campaign as a way of preparing the ground for negotiations” and are hoping “the image of reasonableness and flexibility” will persuade the international community to relax sanctions, said Robert Einhorn. He served as the Obama administration’s special adviser on nonproliferation until earlier this year and was a member of the U.S. negotiating team at several rounds of talks with Iran. UN Meetings Einhorn, now a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said in an interview that the U.S. and its partners “can’t rely on these encouraging statements. The test will be the positions the Iranians take at the negotiating table.” Obama has said Iran’s more conciliatory tone should be put to the test, and the administration hasn’t ruled out an Obama-Rohani meeting during the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York next week. White House press secretary Jay Carney said yesterday only that “there are currently no plans” for such an encounter. “It’s fair to say that the president believes there is an opportunity for diplomacy when it comes to the issues that have presented challenges to the United States and our allies with regards to Iran, and we hope that the Iranian government takes advantage of this opportunity,” Carney told reporters. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who said he will meet with the Iranian president next week, told reporters today in New York that he is pleased Iran is taking “some concrete steps” to deliver on Rohani’s campaign promises. High Stakes At stake are Iran’s nuclear program and the threat of military force by Israel, the U.S. or both if Iran moves to build a nuclear weapon, balanced against the possibility of improved relations after three decades of distrust if Iran resolves the international concerns over its nuclear research. The U.S. and other members of the UN Security Council, as well as Israel, say they have evidence that Iran is secretly trying to develop the ability to make nuclear weapons. Iran says its uranium enrichment and other programs are for civilian energy and medical research. “We have never pursued or sought a nuclear bomb, and we are not going to do so,” Rohani, who said he has “full authority” to resolve the matter, said in the interview with Ann Curry of NBC News that aired last night. “We solely are looking for peaceful nuclear technology.” ‘Exercise Flexibility’ In a meeting with commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Sept. 17, Khamenei appeared to support a new approach to international talks, comparing Iran to a wrestler who “may exercise flexibility for a tactical reason, but won’t forget who his rival is and what his goal is.” While Iran’s goal remains subject to debate, there have been multiple signs of moderation since Rohani took office Aug. 4. Yesterday, the Iranian government released 10 political prisoners, including lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh, according to the official Iranian Student News Agency. The government has eased press restrictions, limited anti-Western rhetoric and wished Jews a Happy Jewish New Year from the Twitter Inc. account of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Rohani’s cabinet members have opened accounts with Menlo Park, California-based Facebook Inc. and held regular press briefings. The culture ministry reopened the House of Cinema, a Tehran-based center for filmmakers and artists that was shut under the previous president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Different Reactions The reactions from a dozen Iran specialists interviewed about the new government’s message of openness ranged from optimism to disbelief. The skeptics called Zarif’s Rosh Hashanah message disingenuous after years of anti-Israel vitriol from Ahmadinejad and, according to the U.S. government, Revolutionary Guard plots and terrorist attacks against Jews, Western interests and even Saudi Arabia’s ambassador in Washington. Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington and an advocate of tough sanctions on Iran, dismissed the Jewish New Year message as a stunt. He said the only leaders whose attitudes matter are Iran’s supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guard. If Khamenei is Iran’s chairman of the board and the head of the Revolutionary Guard is the chief operating officer, Rohani and Zarif are “vice presidents for marketing and sales,” Dubowitz said. Khamenei’s Backing Some longtime Iran specialists, including former U.S. Ambassador John Limbert, counter that without Khamenei’s implicit backing, Rohani, a cleric and early follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran’s 1979 revolution, and Zarif, who served five years as Iran’s UN ambassador, wouldn’t be able to take the steps they have. Limbert, a Farsi-speaker who as a young diplomat was held hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for 444 days, called Rohani “very much an insider. These folks know each other well and have been together through three decades of the Islamic Republic of Iran. They know each other’s ideas and thoughts. They don’t need to get explicit orders to do this or that.” “I’m willing to curb my enthusiasm,” Limbert, now a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, said in an interview. “There’s nothing wrong with being skeptical given past performance, but you’ve got to have some patience. If we could never agree on anything, then I’d still be in Tehran” as a hostage. Revolution, Hostages The deep-seated mutual distrust since the 1979 revolution, hostage crisis and rupture in relations between the U.S. and Iran undermines the ability of either side to recognize or accept a good deal when one is presented, he said. Under President Bill Clinton, the U.S. offered a road map to better relations without preconditions, and Iran walked away. Likewise, when Iran offered what was called a grand bargain in 2003, the Bush administration ignored the opportunity and Iran disavowed it, according to Limbert. “The history has been if one side takes up what looks like a promising opening, then that opening disappears,” he said. “The attitude on both sides has been: Anything they offer has got to be cheating us, and if they show interest in an offer we made, then obviously it wasn’t a good offer.” Barbara Slavin, author of “Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation” and the only American print journalist granted a visa to cover Rohani’s inauguration, said she was struck last month that “there’s even more skepticism of him in Iran” than there is overseas. Oil Exports Ordinary Iranians are so frustrated and unhappy about the weak economy that Rohani “has got to do a lot to justify his election,” she said. The economy may be a driving force behind Iran’s push to negotiate over its nuclear program. Iran’s oil exports, the country’s main source of revenue, have fallen by half to less than 1 million barrels a day since U.S. and European Union sanctions went into effect in July 2012, according to the International Energy Agency in Paris. U.S. officials have said targeted sanctions that began in earnest in 2010 are one cause of the economic meltdown. Slavin also cites what she calls “the grotesque mismanagement of the economy under Ahmadinejad.” Slavin, a fellow at the Atlantic Council, a research institute in Washington, called the outreach by Rohani and Zarif “a do-over for both the pragmatists and the reformists, a chance to do what they couldn’t accomplish a decade ago.” Political Elite The skeptics cites failures by past presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami to moderate Iran’s international policy and resolve concerns over its nuclear program, which began under the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran. Slavin calls the current opening different because the reformist camp “has expanded and become the clear majority in Iran, even within the political elite. This is a big opportunity for them and they are tremendously motivated” and “they know if they don’t improve the economic situation, there will be regime change in Iran, one way or another.”

### 2NC Exec Key to Security Guarantee

#### Security guarantees result from direct negotiations – the president’s key to securing a deal

Bennis 8, Phyllis, SENIOR ANALYST, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, 2/6/8, “Obama’s policy on Iran,” http://www.tni.org/archives/bennis\_obamaoniran

It's very interesting that Obama has made clear the links between the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the rise in Iranian influence, because at the same time he has also been much clearer than the other candidates about supporting direct diplomacy with Iran to resolve all outstanding issues. And he's spoken directly about the need for having carrots as well as sticks. He has said that perhaps Iran's entry to the World Trade Organization, which the Iranian government desperately wants, would be an appropriate carrot, that there should not be solely an antagonistic view towards Iran. And very importantly, he actually said so--although he didn't specify what the content would be, he did say that he believed it would be appropriate to think about some kind of guarantees for Iran. And the significance of that is that it's been long known that what Iran really wants in this whole difficult relationship between Iran and the United States is precisely a security guarantee, a promise that the US will not try to invade and carry out “regime change.” And a security guarantee like that can really only come from the United States. It can't be made by the Europeans—they don't control the US. It can't be made by the UN. It can't be made by the IAEA. This is where a direct level of negotiations between Iran and the United States would have to be the venue for that kind of security guarantee in return for whatever is negotiated out that Iran would give. So the notion of Barack Obama calling for serious negotiations, including some kind of guarantee, is quite significant and quite different from the position of the other candidates.

### 2NC Exec Leadership Key to Iran Negotiations

#### Executive leadership is a game-changer in Iranian negotiations

James N. Miller et al 8, is Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy, as a senior professional staff member for the House Armed Services Committee, and as advisor to the Defense Science Board. Dr. Miller has also held positions at Hicks and Associates, Inc.; Duke University; and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Contributing Authors: Dennis Ross, Suzanne Maloney, Ashton B. Carter, Vali Nasr, Richard N. Haass , Sep 2008, “Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/MillerParthemoreCampbell\_Iran%20Assessing%20US%20Strategy\_Sept08.pdf

In order to make game-changing diplomacy work, the next president must work to build a sustainable international coalition, a working consensus at home, and bargaining leverage. Each of these tasks will be challenging. Appointing a talented and highly-regarded senior administration official to lead the charge will be very important, and presidential leadership will be essential.¶ While the next president must move quickly to start game-changing diplomacy, he must also assure that U.S. policy takes a long-term perspective. The next steps the United States takes on Iran’s nuclear program will be just that: next steps, not final answers. But by changing the nature of the game, an American diplomatic initiative will significantly increase the prospects for both near-term and long-term success.

#### Presidential leadership is key to sustaining support and leverage for negotiations with Iran

James N. Miller et al 8, is Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy, as a senior professional staff member for the House Armed Services Committee, and as advisor to the Defense Science Board. Dr. Miller has also held positions at Hicks and Associates, Inc.; Duke University; and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Contributing Authors: Dennis Ross, Suzanne Maloney, Ashton B. Carter, Vali Nasr, Richard N. Haass , Sep 2008, “Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/MillerParthemoreCampbell\_Iran%20Assessing%20US%20Strategy\_Sept08.pdf

The next president should offer to conduct negotiations with Iran across a wide range of issues. There would not be preconditions for conducting the negotiations, but American positions in the negotiations would depend on Iranian actions. The United States negotiated with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and did not precondition participation on the U.S.S.R. agreeing to specific outcomes. The Bush administration is now negotiating with North Korea despite its development and testing of nuclear weapons. It is past time to negotiate directly with Iran.¶ Conditionality means that progress in negotiations will depend on Iran’s willingness to compromise as well as moderate its behavior in the region. In the bilateral relationship, even modest steps such as cultural and educational exchanges will be difficult to sustain if Iran does not moderate its rhetoric and behavior. And more significant steps aimed at allowing Iran to join the international community will only be possible if Iran comports itself accordingly.¶ It will probably take a year to a year and a half to judge the effects of an initial diplomatic outreach to Iran. In early 2009 the United States would conduct internal discussions, consultations with friends and allies, and preparation for negotiations, with an offer to meet with Iranian negotiators by spring 2009. Iranian leaders may be preoccupied with elections scheduled for mid- 2009, and therefore respond slowly. As Iran does begin to respond, the United States must be prepared for either Iranian agreement or rejection, and condition its actions accordingly.¶ Key enablers ¶ The success or failure of game-changing diplomacy will be determined largely by the ability to establish and sustain an international coalition, create adequate support in the United States, and develop leverage for negotiations. All three efforts will require presidential leadership. BuIldIng and MaInTaInIng an InTERnaTIonal CoalITIon The development of a sustainable coalition is critical to the success of game-changing diplomacy. The international groundwork must be laid carefully.

## Solvency

#### They make negotiations fail —

Their Alterman evidence — which is their only Congress Key warrant — says quote “

If Iran were to make concessions in a negotiation with the United States, they would surely seek sanctions relief and other actions requiring congressional approval. “

I.E. In order for Iran to make any concessions on their nuclear prolif or on proxy wars, they want US sanctions relief and aid packages.

The plan does not fiat that. If anything, the plan makes aid/sanctions relief less likely — congress would already have given Iran a massive security guarantee.

Alterman says:

 A president who cannot bring around a hostile Congress is not a president with whom it is worth negotiating.

The plan makes Congress hostile because they have already made concessions.

#### Their ev says Iran will only negotiate if they perceive that Congress will move on lifting sanctions---Congress thinks both sanctions and the threat of force need to be strengthened

Tom Curry 9-22, National Affairs Writer, NBC News, 9/22/13, “What would talks with Iran mean for Obama?,” http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/09/22/20586858-what-would-talks-with-iran-mean-for-obama?lite

What kind of resistance would Obama face on easing sanctions with Iran?

The United States has enforced economic sanctions against Iran in some form or another since 1979's Iran Hostage Crisis, but they've intensified in recent years. They include restrictions on oil transactions, Iranian money transfers, and the assets of individuals or groups thought to be supporting terrorist organizations.

Easing these sanctions would be a hard sell for the president, but it could be necessary to pursue a diplomatic path.

"If we are going to make any progress with Iran, we will have to give up something, and that's what they're going to ask for," Sick said. "We're going to have to confront the question of whether we care more about a deal with Iran or about our pressure with sanctions."

But any move by Obama to ease the sanctions would face resistance from lawmakers.

According to Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "To ease up on sanctions without them taking credible action to stop their nuclear program that's leading toward nuclear weapons capability would be a big mistake."

Ayotte was one of 76 senators who sent a letter to Obama last month urging him "to bring a renewed sense of urgency" to dealing with the Iranian nuclear program.

The letter said "until we see a significant slowdown of Iran's nuclear activities, we believe our nation must toughen sanctions and reinforce the credibility of our option to use military force" at the same time as it explores diplomacy.

### 2NC—Condo Good

#### Counter-interpretation—one conditional CP/one conditional critique.

Standards—

Argument Innovation—debaters are risk-averse—a fallback strategy encourages introduction of new positions—solves research skills.

Neg Flex—in-round testing is critical to balance aff prep.

Nuanced Advocacy—contradictory positions force aff defense of the political middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—prevents ideological extremism.

Strategic Thinking—causes introduction of the best arguments—necessitates intelligent coverage decisions—key to info processing and argument evaluation.

[If Dispo] Logic—a decision maker can always chose the status quo.

Substance crowd-out—re-appropriating time spent on condo solves fairness offense.

High Threshold—the 2AR is reactive and persuasive—theory has a 1-to-5 time trade-off—unless we make debate impossible, vote neg.

Defense—

Fairness impossible—resource and coaching differentials—no terminal impact—no one quits b/c of the process CP.

Skew inevitable—DAs and T

Contradictions inevitable—Security K and Deterrence DA

2NR collapse solves depth.

Cheating strategies lose to theory & competition args.

Judge is a referee—potential abuse isn’t a voter—blaming us for other teams behavior is unfair—voting down abuse solves their offence.

# 1NR

### Ovw

#### Senkaku conflict is on the brink --- quick U.S. intervention is key to prevent global nuclear escalation

Klare 13 Michael is the Five College professor of peace and world security studies @ Hampshire College. He holds a Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute. “The Next War, 1/23, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/23/the\_next\_war\_100500.html

Don't look now, but conditions are deteriorating in the western Pacific. Things are turning ugly, with consequences that could prove deadly and spell catastrophe for the global economy.¶ In Washington, it is widely assumed that a showdown with Iran over its nuclear ambitions will be the first major crisis to engulf the next secretary of defense -- whether it be former Senator Chuck Hagel, as President Obama desires, or someone else if he fails to win Senate confirmation. With few signs of an imminent breakthrough in talks aimed at peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, many analysts believe that military action -- if not by Israel, then by the United States -- could be on this year's agenda.¶ Lurking just behind the Iranian imbroglio, however, is a potential crisis of far greater magnitude, and potentially far more imminent than most of us imagine. China's determination to assert control over disputed islands in the potentially energy-rich waters of the East and South China Seas, in the face of stiffening resistance from Japan and the Philippines along with greater regional assertiveness by the United States, spells trouble not just regionally, but potentially globally.¶ Islands, Islands, Everywhere¶ The possibility of an Iranian crisis remains in the spotlight because of the obvious risk of disorder in the Greater Middle East and its threat to global oil production and shipping. A crisis in the East or South China Seas (essentially, western extensions of the Pacific Ocean) would, however, pose a greater peril because of the possibility of a U.S.-China military confrontation and the threat to Asian economic stability.¶ The United States is bound by treaty to come to the assistance of Japan or the Philippines if either country is attacked by a third party, so any armed clash between Chinese and Japanese or Filipino forces could trigger American military intervention. With so much of the world's trade focused on Asia, and the American, Chinese, and Japanese economies tied so closely together in ways too essential to ignore, a clash of almost any sort in these vital waterways might paralyze international commerce and trigger a global recession (or worse).¶ All of this should be painfully obvious and so rule out such a possibility -- and yet the likelihood of such a clash occurring has been on the rise in recent months, as China and its neighbors continue to ratchet up the bellicosity of their statements and bolster their military forces in the contested areas. Washington's continuing statements about its ongoing plans for a "pivot" to, or "rebalancing" of, its forces in the Pacific have only fueled Chinese intransigence and intensified a rising sense of crisis in the region. Leaders on all sides continue to affirm their country's inviolable rights to the contested islands and vow to use any means necessary to resist encroachment by rival claimants. In the meantime, China has increased the frequency and scale of its naval maneuvers in waters claimed by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, further enflaming tensions in the region.¶ Ostensibly, these disputes revolve around the question of who owns a constellation of largely uninhabited atolls and islets claimed by a variety of nations. In the East China Sea, the islands in contention are called the Diaoyus by China and the Senkakus by Japan. At present, they are administered by Japan, but both countries claim sovereignty over them. In the South China Sea, several island groups are in contention, including the Spratly chain and the Paracel Islands (known in China as the Nansha and Xisha Islands, respectively). China claims all of these islets, while Vietnam claims some of the Spratlys and Paracels. Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines also claim some of the Spratlys.¶ Far more is, of course, at stake than just the ownership of a few uninhabited islets. The seabeds surrounding them are believed to sit atop vast reserves of oil and natural gas. Ownership of the islands would naturally confer ownership of the reserves -- something all of these countries desperately desire. Powerful forces of nationalism are also at work: with rising popular fervor, the Chinese believe that the islands are part of their national territory and any other claims represent a direct assault on China's sovereign rights; the fact that Japan -- China's brutal invader and occupier during World War II -- is a rival claimant to some of them only adds a powerful tinge of victimhood to Chinese nationalism and intransigence on the issue. By the same token, the Japanese, Vietnamese, and Filipinos, already feeling threatened by China's growing wealth and power, believe no less firmly that not bending on the island disputes is an essential expression of their nationhood.¶ Long ongoing, these disputes have escalated recently. In May 2011, for instance, the Vietnamese reported that Chinese warships were harassing oil-exploration vessels operated by the state-owned energy company PetroVietnam in the South China Sea. In two instances, Vietnamese authorities claimed, cables attached to underwater survey equipment were purposely slashed. In April 2012, armed Chinese marine surveillance ships blocked efforts by Filipino vessels to inspect Chinese boats suspected of illegally fishing off Scarborough Shoal, an islet in the South China Sea claimed by both countries.¶ The East China Sea has similarly witnessed tense encounters of late. Last September, for example, Japanese authorities arrested 14 Chinese citizens who had attempted to land on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to press their country's claims, provoking widespread anti-Japanese protests across China and a series of naval show-of-force operations by both sides in the disputed waters.¶ Regional diplomacy, that classic way of settling disputes in a peaceful manner, has been under growing strain recently thanks to these maritime disputes and the accompanying military encounters. In July 2012, at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian leaders were unable to agree on a final communiqué, no matter how anodyne -- the first time that had happened in the organization's 46-year history. Reportedly, consensus on a final document was thwarted when Cambodia, a close ally of China's, refused to endorse compromise language on a proposed "code of conduct" for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Two months later, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing in an attempt to promote negotiations on the disputes, she was reviled in the Chinese press, while officials there refused to cede any ground at all.¶ As 2012 ended and the New Year began, the situation only deteriorated. On December 1st, officials in Hainan Province, which administers the Chinese-claimed islands in the South China Sea, announced a new policy for 2013: Chinese warships would now be empowered to stop, search, or simply repel foreign ships that entered the claimed waters and were suspected of conducting illegal activities ranging, assumedly, from fishing to oil drilling. This move coincided with an increase in the size and frequency of Chinese naval deployments in the disputed areas.¶ On December 13th, the Japanese military scrambled F-15 fighter jets when a Chinese marine surveillance plane flew into airspace near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Another worrisome incident occurred on January 8th, when four Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese-controlled waters around those islands for 13 hours. Two days later, Japanese fighter jets were again scrambled when a Chinese surveillance plane returned to the islands. Chinese fighters then came in pursuit, the first time supersonic jets from both sides flew over the disputed area. The Chinese clearly have little intention of backing down, having indicated that they will increase their air and naval deployments in the area, just as the Japanese are doing.¶ Powder Keg in the Pacific¶ While war clouds gather in the Pacific sky, the question remains: Why, pray tell, is this happening now?¶ Several factors seem to be conspiring to heighten the risk of confrontation, including leadership changes in China and Japan, and a geopolitical reassessment by the United States.¶ \* In China, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and on what might be called national assertiveness. At the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held last November in Beijing, Xi Jinping was named both party head and chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him, in effect, the nation's foremost civilian and military official. Since then, Xi has made several heavily publicized visits to assorted Chinese military units, all clearly intended to demonstrate the Communist Party's determination, under his leadership, to boost the capabilities and prestige of the country's army, navy, and air force. He has already linked this drive to his belief that his country should play a more vigorous and assertive role in the region and the world.¶ In a speech to soldiers in the city of Huizhou, for example, Xi spoke of his "dream" of national rejuvenation: "This dream can be said to be a dream of a strong nation; and for the military, it is the dream of a strong military." Significantly, he used the trip to visit the Haikou, a destroyer assigned to the fleet responsible for patrolling the disputed waters of the South China Sea. As he spoke, a Chinese surveillance plane entered disputed air space over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble those F-15 fighter jets.¶ \* In Japan, too, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and national assertiveness. On December 16th, arch-nationalist Shinzo Abe returned to power as the nation's prime minister. Although he campaigned largely on economic issues, promising to revive the country's lagging economy, Abe has made no secret of his intent to bolster the Japanese military and assume a tougher stance on the East China Sea dispute.¶ In his first few weeks in office, Abe has already announced plans to increase military spending and review an official apology made by a former government official to women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II. These steps are sure to please Japan's rightists, but certain to inflame anti-Japanese sentiment in China, Korea, and other countries it once occupied.¶ Equally worrisome, Abe promptly negotiated an agreement with the Philippines for greater cooperation on enhanced "maritime security" in the western Pacific, a move intended to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Inevitably, this will spark a harsh Chinese response -- and because the United States has mutual defense treaties with both countries, it will also increase the risk of U.S. involvement in future engagements at sea.¶ \* In the United States, senior officials are debating implementation of the "Pacific pivot" announced by President Obama in a speech before the Australian Parliament a little over a year ago. In it, he promised that additional U.S. forces would be deployed in the region, even if that meant cutbacks elsewhere. "My guidance is clear," he declared. "As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region." While Obama never quite said that his approach was intended to constrain the rise of China, few observers doubt that a policy of "containment" has returned to the Pacific.¶ Indeed, the U.S. military has taken the first steps in this direction, announcing, for example, that by 2017 all three U.S. stealth planes, the F-22, F-35, and B-2, would be deployed to bases relatively near China and that by 2020 60% of U.S. naval forces will be stationed in the Pacific (compared to 50% today). However, the nation's budget woes have led many analysts to question whether the Pentagon is actually capable of fully implementing the military part of any Asian pivot strategy in a meaningful way. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at the behest of Congress, released last summer, concluded that the Department of Defense "has not adequately articulated the strategy behind its force posture planning [in the Asia-Pacific] nor aligned the strategy with resources in a way that reflects current budget realities."¶ This, in turn, has fueled a drive by military hawks to press the administration to spend more on Pacific-oriented forces and to play a more vigorous role in countering China's "bullying" behavior in the East and South China Seas. "[America's Asian allies] are waiting to see whether America will live up to its uncomfortable but necessary role as the true guarantor of stability in East Asia, or whether the region will again be dominated by belligerence and intimidation," former Secretary of the Navy and former Senator James Webb wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Although the administration has responded to such taunts by reaffirming its pledge to bolster its forces in the Pacific, this has failed to halt the calls for an even tougher posture by Washington. Obama has already been chided for failing to provide sufficient backing to Israel in its struggle with Iran over nuclear weapons, and it is safe to assume that he will face even greater pressure to assist America's allies in Asia were they to be threatened by Chinese forces.¶ Add these three developments together, and you have the makings of a powder keg -- potentially at least as explosive and dangerous to the global economy as any confrontation with Iran. Right now, given the rising tensions, the first close encounter of the worst kind, in which, say, shots were unexpectedly fired and lives lost, or a ship or plane went down, might be the equivalent of lighting a fuse in a crowded, over-armed room. Such an incident could occur almost any time. The Japanese press has reported that government officials there are ready to authorize fighter pilots to fire warning shots if Chinese aircraft penetrate the airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. A Chinese general has said that such an act would count as the start of "actual combat." That the irrationality of such an event will be apparent to anyone who considers the deeply tangled economic relations among all these powers may prove no impediment to the situation -- as at the beginning of World War I -- simply spinning out of everyone's control.¶ Can such a crisis be averted? Yes, if the leaders of China, Japan, and the United States, the key countries involved, take steps to defuse the belligerent and ultra-nationalistic pronouncements now holding sway and begin talking with one another about practical steps to resolve the disputes. Similarly, an emotional and unexpected gesture -- Prime Minister Abe, for instance, pulling a Nixon and paying a surprise goodwill visit to China -- might carry the day and change the atmosphere. Should these minor disputes in the Pacific get out of hand, however, not just those directly involved but the whole planet will look with sadness and horror on the failure of everyone involved.

#### Russian aggression causes nuclear war

Blank 9 – Dr. Stephen Blank is a Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,¶ The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD**.** First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171¶ Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,¶ But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

### UQ---AT: Syria Pounder

#### No Syria pounder --- wasn’t an abdication of any authority and won’t set a precedent --- prefer more qualified evidence

- Obama *chose* to ask, he wasn’t forced

- Doesn’t set a precedent because each crisis is different

- Doesn’t apply to the DA because Syria wasn’t a direct threat to US security

- Future presidents will ignore

- The AUMF expands his authority

Jack M. Balkin 9/3/13, is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment @ Yale Law School, and the founder and director of Yale's Information Society Project, an interdisciplinary center that studies law and new information technologies, “What Congressional Approval Won't Do: Trim Obama's Power or Make War Legal,” 2013, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-do-trim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/

One of the most misleading metaphors in the discussion of President Obama’s Syria policy is that the president has “boxed himself in” or has “painted himself into a corner.” These metaphors treat a president’s available actions as if they were physical spaces and limits on action as if they were physical walls. Such metaphors would make sense only if we also stipulated that Obama has the power to snap his fingers and create a door or window wherever he likes. The Syria crisis has not created a new precedent for limiting presidential power. To the contrary, it has offered multiple opportunities for increasing it.¶ If Congress says no to Obama, it will not significantly restrain future presidents from using military force. At best, it will preserve current understandings about presidential power. If Congress says yes, it may bestow significant new powers on future presidents -- and it will also commit the United States to violating international law. For Obama plans to violate the United Nations Charter, and he wants Congress to give him its blessing.¶ People who believe Obama has painted himself into a corner or boxed himself in might not remember that the president always has the option to ask Congress to authorize any military action he proposes, thus sharing the responsibility for decision if the enterprise goes sour. If Congress refuses, Obama can easily back away from any threats he has made against Syria, pointing to the fact that Congress would not go along. There is no corner. There is no box.¶ Wouldn’t congressional refusal make the United States look weak, as critics including Senator John McCain warn loudly? Hardly. The next dictator who acts rashly will face a different situation and a different calculus. The UN Security Council or NATO may feel differently about the need to act. There may be a new threat to American interests that lets Obama or the next president offer a different justification for acting. It just won’t matter very much what Obama said about red lines in the past. World leaders say provocative things all the time and then ignore them. Their motto is: That was then, and this is now.¶ If Congress turns him down, won’t Obama be undermined at home, as other critics claim? In what sense? It is hard to see how the Republicans could be less cooperative than they already are. And it’s not in the interest of Democrats to fault a president of their own party for acceding to what Congress wants instead of acting unilaterally. ¶ Some commentators argue (or hope) that whatever happens, Obama’s request for military authorization will be an important precedent that will begin to restore the constitutional balance between the president and Congress in the area of war powers. Don’t bet on it. By asking for congressional authorization in this case, Obama has not ceded any authority that he ­or any other president ­ has previously asserted in war powers. ¶ Syria presents a case in which previous precedents did not apply. There is no direct threat to American security, American personnel, or American interests. There is no Security Council resolution to enforce. And there is no claim that America needs to shore up the credibility of NATO or another important security alliance. Nor does Obama have even the feeble justification that the Clinton Administration offered in Kosovo­: that congressional appropriations midway through the operation offered tacit and retroactive approval for the bombings. ¶ It is naive to think that the next time a president wants to send forces abroad without congressional approval, he or she will be deterred by the fact that Barack Obama once sought congressional permission to bomb Syria. If a president can plausibly assert that any of the previous justifications apply -- ­including those offered in the Libya intervention -- the case of Syria is easily distinguishable. ¶ Perhaps more to the point, Congress still cannot go to the courts to stop the president, given existing legal precedents. Congress may respond by refusing to appropriate funds, but that is a remedy that they have always had -- and have rarely had the political will to exercise. ¶ The most important limit on presidential adventurism is political, not legal. It will turn less on the precedent of Syria than on whether the last adventure turned out well or badly. ¶ In fact, the Syria episode offers Obama­ and future presidents­ new opportunities for increasing presidential power. Obama has submitted a fairly broad authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) proposal to Congress. It is not limited either temporally or geographically; it does not specifically exclude the use of ground troops; and it requires only that the president determine that there is a plausible connection between his use of force and the use of weapons of mass destruction in the Syrian civil war. If Congress adopts this proposal, President Obama ­and every future president ­can simply add it to the existing body of AUMFs and congressional authorizations. ¶ In the American system, presidents often gain the most power not by acting unilaterally or in defiance of congressional statutes but by relying on previous congressional authorizations and interpreting them generously to expand their authority­ -- sometimes in ways that Congress never dreamed of. A case in point is the 2001 AUMF against al-Qaeda, which has no time limit. It has served as the justification for a wide range of executive actions by Presidents George W. Bush and Obama, and it will probably to continue to do so well into the future. That is a good reason to amend Obama’s proposal for a new AUMF to include a sunset clause, a geographical restriction, and a limit on what kinds of forces can be used.

#### Syria doesn’t set a precedent but the aff would --- our evidence is comparative

Ross Douthat 9/4/13, Op-ed columnist for the New York Times and former Senior Editor @ the Atlantic, “Syria and the Constitution,” http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/syria-and-the-constitution/#more-19029

Somehow I doubt that it will work out this way. It would be a good thing for the country if the older constitutional norms regained some force – if we declared war in cases where we now issue so-called authorizations for the use of military force, and issued authorizations in situations where presidents of both parties claim the power to act with no congressional blessing whatsoever. But when a constitutional power atrophies, it’s extremely unlikely to be restored through the kind of last-minute, poorly-thought-out, and self-undermining approach that the White House has taken in this case.¶ If President Obama had, from the beginning of this debate, framed the possibility of a Syria intervention as something that would of course require congressional approval, and spent the days immediately following Assad’s deployment of chemical weapons reaching out to key congressmen to make sure the votes were there, and only when he was certain gone ahead and publicly called for a resolution authorizing strikes … well, then you would have had a precedent that future presidents might feel some pressure to actually follow, because it would provide both a public civics lesson and a blueprint for how to pursue the constitutional course to a politically successful conclusion.¶ But so far this White House is failing on both counts. The official “lesson” that the president’s words and choices are delivering is not one that actually elevates Congress back to its Article I level of authority. Rather, it’s one that treats Congress as a kind of ally of last resort, whose backing remains legally unnecessary for warmaking (as the White House keeps strenuously emphasizing, and as its conduct regarding Libya necessarily implies), and whose support is only worth seeking for pragmatic and/or morale-boosting reasons once other, extra-constitutional sources of legitimacy (the U.N. Security Council, Britain, etc.) have turned you down. The precedent being set, then, is one of presidential weakness, not high-minded constitutionalism: Going to Congress is entirely optional, and it’s what presidents do when they’re pitching wars that they themselves don’t fully believe in, and need to rebuild credibility squandered by their own fumbling and failed alliance management. What future White House would look at that example and see a path worth following?¶ Ah, you might say, but if Congress actually votes the Syria authorization down, then future presidents will feel constrained by the threat of a similar congressional veto whether they want to emulate Obama or not. Except that it’s actually more likely that future presidents will look at a congressional rejection in the case of Syria and see a case for going to Congress even less frequently than recent chief executives have done. The lesson will be clear enough: Presidents who ignore Congress’s Article I powers (Clinton in Kosovo, Obama in Libya) get away with it, while presidents who respect those powers set themselves up for a humiliation. It would be one thing if Congress were clearly the assertive party here — if President Obama had gone to war without asking for authorization, for instance, and had then seen funding for the operation immediately cut off and articles of impeachment issued. But since nobody imagines that would have happened, a defeat here will look much like an unforced executive branch error, rather than a case of Congress breaking decisively with its ongoing tendency to abdicate to the other branches. And future administrations will act accordingly.

#### Syria increases war powers because it’s on Obama’s terms

Eric Posner 9/3/13, the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ U-Chicago, “Obama Is Only Making His War Powers Mightier,” Slate, [www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/09/obama_going_to_congress_on_syria_he_s_actually_strengthening_the_war_powers.html))

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever. It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.” Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him. The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.) People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way.

#### Syria only affects humanitarian intervention, not intervention against threats

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Peter Spiro at OJ, and David Rothkopf of FP whom he cites, both say that President Obama’s request for congressional authorization for Syria will allow Congress to hamstring future Presidents from using military force. Rothkopf exaggerates when he says that President Obama reversed “decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers” by going to Congress here, and Spiro exaggerates when he says that this is “a huge development with broad implications . . . for separation of powers.” What would have been unprecedented, and a huge development for separation of powers, is a unilateral strike in Syria. Seeking congressional authorization here in no way sets a precedent against President using force in national self-defense, or to protect U.S. persons or property, or even (as in Libya) to engage in humanitarian interventions (like Libya) with Security Council support. Moreover, the President and his subordinates have been implying for a while now that they will rely on Article II to use force without congressional authorization against extra-AUMF terrorist threats (and for all we know they already are). There is no reason to think that unilateral presidential military powers for national self-defense are in any way affected by the President’s decision today. That is as it should be.¶ To the extent that Spiro is suggesting that pure humanitarian interventions might be harder for presidents to do unilaterally after today (I think this is what he is suggesting, but I am not sure), I agree. Kosovo is the only other real precedent here, and the Clinton administration never explained why it was lawful as an original matter. The constitutional problem with pure humanitarian interventions – and especially ones (like Kosovo and Syria) that lack Security Council cover, and thus that do not implicate the supportive Korean War precedent – is that Presidents cannot easily articulate a national interest to trigger the Commander in Chief’s authority that is not at the same time boundless. President Obama, like President Clinton before him in Kosovo, had a hard time making that legal argument because it is in fact a hard argument to make. That is one reason (among many others) why I think it was a good idea, from a domestic constitutional perspective, for the President in this context to seek congressional approval.

#### The Syria precedent won’t be followed, not even by Obama

George Condon 9/5/13, National Journal, “What Obama's Gamble on Syria Means for Challenging Iran,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/what-obama-s-gamble-on-syria-means-for-challenging-iran-20130905

Anything a president does sets a precedent for the leaders who come after him. Except when it doesn’t. That is one constitutional reality brought home by President Obama’s unexpected decision to delay military action against Syria until Congress gives him authorization. With more than 200 examples to choose from in the history of American military operations over the past two centuries, a president can select just about any option and still be following a path first trod by a predecessor.¶ Future White Houses will study Obama’s actions. But what he has done may come back to haunt him first. The danger in Obama’s action is not in any precedent he sets for the presidents to come. It is in the precedent he is setting for himself, particularly regarding Iran. Tehran is less than 900 miles—a two-hour flight—from Damascus. But Iran is seen as a far greater potential threat both to Israel and to American interests than is Syria, despite the regional instability triggered by the civil war and by Syria’s support of terrorists. If Iran develops nuclear-weapons capability, Obama may want to strike quickly rather than following his own example with Syria and wait for a debate on Capitol Hill.¶ That is why it was important that when he announced his request to Congress, Obama emphasized, “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” History and the preponderance of legal opinion on the Constitution agree. Only five of those 200-plus instances of military operations followed Congress’s exercise of its constitutional right to declare war. Others followed congressional resolutions such as the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution that supported President Johnson’s actions against North Vietnam and the 1991 vote that authorized President Bush to wage the first Persian Gulf War.¶ But most were strictly presidential actions, and no court has ever held they were unconstitutional. Even the 1973 War Powers Act that sought, post-Vietnam, to prevent such solo presidential action has done little to restrain later operations. And that law may itself be an unconstitutional infringement on the powers of a commander in chief—a ruling that neither wary chief executives nor unsure Congresses have sought.¶ “The fact is, the Constitution is ambiguous, and nothing that gets done can change that fact,” says Anthony Cordesman, a widely respected former director of intelligence assessment at the Pentagon and a longtime defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Yes, this is a precedent. But is it binding? No, not continually. It can’t be.”

#### Presidents will just distinguish the circumstances of future crises to get around Syria

Charlie Savage 9/8/13, Washington correspondent for The New York Times, “Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all

In recent weeks, administration lawyers decided that it was within Mr. Obama’s constitutional authority to carry out a strike on Syria as well, even without permission from Congress or the Security Council, because of the “important national interests” of limiting regional instability and of enforcing the norm against using chemical weapons, Ms. Ruemmler said.¶ But even if he could act alone, that left the question of whether he should. The lack of a historical analogue and traditional factors that have justified such operations, she said, contributed to his decision to go to Congress.¶ “The president believed that it was important to enhance the legitimacy of any action that would be taken by the executive,” Ms. Ruemmler said, “to seek Congressional approval of that action and have it be seen, again as a matter of legitimacy both domestically and internationally, that there was a unified American response to the horrendous violation of the international norm against chemical weapons use.”¶ At a news conference last week, Mr. Obama argued that the United States should “get out of the habit” of having the president “stretch the boundaries of his authority as far as he can” while lawmakers “snipe” from the sidelines. But he also explained his decision in terms of very special circumstances: humanitarian interventions where there is no immediate pressure to act and the United Nations is blocked.¶ Jack Goldsmith, a head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush administration, said the limited criteria cited by Mr. Obama mean his move might not apply to more traditional future interventions. The more important precedent, he said, may concern international law and what he portrayed as Mr. Obama’s dismissive attitude toward whether or not having permission from the Security Council should stop humanitarian interventions.¶ Mr. Obama has in recent days repeatedly portrayed the Security Council system as incapable of performing its function of “enforcing international norms and international law,” and as so paralyzed by the veto power wielded by Russia that it is instead acting as a “barrier” to that goal.¶ Mr. Goldsmith said that in the Kosovo campaign, the Clinton administration shied away from arguing that it was consistent with international law to carry out a military attack not authorized by the Security Council purely for humanitarian reasons. Its fear was that such a doctrine could be misused by other nations, loosening constraints on war.¶ In his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Mr. Obama said all nations “must adhere to standards that govern the use of force.” But he also argued that humanitarian grounds justified military force and cited “the Balkans,” leaving ambiguous whether he meant Bosnia, which had some Security Council approval; Kosovo, which did not; or both.¶ Ms. Ruemmler said that while an attack on Syria “may not fit under a traditionally recognized legal basis under international law,” the administration believed that given the novel factors and circumstances, such an action would nevertheless be “justified and legitimate under international law” and so not prohibited.¶ Still, she acknowledged that it was “more controversial for the president to act alone in these circumstances” than for him to do so with Congressional backing.¶ Steven G. Bradbury, a head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush administration, said it would be “politically difficult” to order strikes if Congress refused to approve them. But he predicted future presidents would not feel legally constrained to echo Mr. Obama’s request. “Every overseas situation, every set of exigent circumstances, is a little different, so I don’t really buy that it’s going to tie future presidents’ hands very much,” he said.

#### The administration has explicitly clarified that Congress’s decision is non-binding

Glenn Greenwald 9/1/13, American political commentator for The Guardian, “Obama, Congress and Syria,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/01/obama-congress-syria-authorization

But what makes the celebratory reaction to yesterday's announcement particularly odd is that the Congressional vote which Obama said he would seek appears, in his mind, to have no binding force at all. There is no reason to believe that a Congressional rejection of the war's authorization would constrain Obama in any way, other than perhaps politically. To the contrary, there is substantial evidence for the proposition that the White House sees the vote as purely advisory, i.e., meaningless.¶Recall how - in one of most overlooked bad acts of the Obama administration - the House of Representatives actually voted, overwhelmingly, against authorizing the US war in Libya, and yet Obama simply ignored the vote and proceeded to prosecute the war anyway (just as Clinton did when the House rejected the authorization he wanted to bomb Kosovo, though, at least there, Congress later voted to allocate funds for the bombing campaign). Why would the White House view the President's power to wage war in Libya as unconstrainable by Congress, yet view his power to wage war in Syria as dependent upon Congressional authorization? ¶ More to the point, his aides are making clear that Obama does not view the vote as binding, as Time reports:¶ To make matters more complicated, Obama's aides made clear that the President's search for affirmation from Congress would not be binding. He might still attack Syria even if Congress issues a rejection."

### Impact---AT: Intervention Bad

#### No turns --- US intervention is inevitable --- it’s only a question of speed and effectiveness

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In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. ¶ Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present¶ That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. ¶ The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. ¶ Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.¶ To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. ¶ Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. ¶ So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. ¶ Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. ¶ Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? ¶ Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?¶ Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?¶ The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.

### Constistution

#### The aff turns the tide in war powers authority --- prevents continued expansion of executive power

FCNL 8, Friends Committee on National Legislation, the 501(c)(4) lobbying organization of the Religion Society of Friends (Quakers), October, “Reclaiming the Balance of Power: An Agenda for the 111th Congress,” Washington Newsletter No. 731, http://fcnl.org/assets/pubs/newsletter/2008/October.pdf

Pendulums swing by their nature, but sometimes they swing too far in one direction and need a push to return to balance. For several decades, the pendulum of power in the federal government has been swinging toward the president; in the past eight years, the president’s powers have reached unprecedented heights. The last two presidents have taken more power for themselves, but Congress has also ceded significant power to the executive branch. The 111th Congress has the opportunity to restore the balance. When members take their seats in January, reclaiming their constitutionally granted power to check the executive should be at the top of the agenda. Power Balanced by Design The framers of the Constitution had balance of power on their minds when they designed the U.S. government. They had recently rebelled against a monarchy with near total power over the people. Based on this experience, the framers limited specific government powers, such as compelling citizens to house soldiers in their homes, searching and seizing private property, and imposing taxes without a democratic process. The framers also structured the U.S. government to catch and prevent these kinds of abuses. They gave independent powers to the three branches of government — executive, legislative, and judicial — but they instituted mechanisms allowing the other branches to limit and balance these powers. In the first three words of the Constitution, “We the People,” the framers recognized a fourth branch of government to check the other three: the civil society. Unlike monarchs, U.S. presidents cannot act alone to commit their countries to war, empty their national treasuries, and impose new taxes on the citizenry to finance military adventures. Presidents can make treaties with other nations, and in time of war a president serves as commander in chief of the armed forces. Constitutionally, only Congress can formally declare war, “raise and support armies,” and increase taxes or otherwise fund a war. Maintaining these divisions is not easy. In the past 200 years, presidents have committed troops to military combat dozens of times without a formal declaration of war, and Congress has voted to cut off funding for war on only a few occasions. In the past eight years, Congress has failed to exercise adequate oversight of executive actions and uphold the Constitution in several areas. Most recently, President George W. Bush has defended the torture of prisoners held by the United States, denied prisoners the right to appeal their detention, and permitted spying on people in the United States without a warrant. Congress has turned a blind eye or acquiesced to the president’s requests to legalize his administration’s actions. The 111th Congress should reclaim its power on our behalf. In the mid-1970s, Congress passed laws to correct a pendulum of power that had swung too far toward the executive. The Congress that takes office in 2009 should do the same.

#### Congressional action now prevents Obama’s consolidation of Executive authority

Bruce Ackerman 11, Professor of Law @ Yale, and Oona Hathaway, Professor of I-Law @ Yale, “Limited War and The Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality,” Michigan Law Review, 109:447, http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf

We live in an age of limited war. Yet the legal structure for authorizing and overseeing war has failed to address this modern reality. Nowhere is this failure more clear than in the recent U.S. conflict in Iraq. Congress self-consciously restricted the war’s aims to narrow purposes—expressly authorizing a limited war. But the Bush Administration evaded these constitutional limits and transformed a well-defined and limited war into an open-ended conflict operating beyond constitutional boundaries. President Obama has thus far failed to repudiate these acts of presidential unilateralism. If he continues on this course, he will consolidate the precedents set by his predecessor’s exercises in institutional aggrandizement. The presidency is not solely responsible for this unconstitutional escalation. Congress has failed to check this abuse because it has failed to adapt its central power over the use of military force—the power of the purse—to the distinctive problem of limited war. Our proposal restores Congress to its rightful role in our system of checks and balances. We suggest that the House and Senate adopt new “Rules for Limited War” that would create a presumption that any authorization of military force will expire after two years, unless Congress specifies a different deadline. The congressional time limit would be enforced by a prohibition on future war appro- priations after the deadline, except for money necessary to wind down the mission.

#### The aff sets a precedent against expansive war powers --- it’ll last for generations

Maya Schenwar 9, Executive Director @ Truthout, 1/14, “Congress Aims to Take Back Constitutional War Powers,” http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/82004:congress-aims-to-take-back-constitutional-war-powers

Congress took little initiative to rein in Bush's excesses throughout his administration, and now, some members worry that his vast expansion of executive powers could set a dangerous precedent for generations to come. Unless Congress formally rejects Bush's generous interpretation of the role of the president, they say, the system of checks and balances could be permanently disrupted. Foremost on the list is one of Bush's most blatant unilateral actions: his recent signing, with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, of the US-Iraq security pact without consulting Congress. The pact could keep US troops in Iraq until the end of 2011.

#### Reasserting Congressional war powers reverses the precedent of unfettered Executive authority

Jim Webb 13, former U.S. senator from Virginia and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, March 1, “Congressional Abdication,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/article/congressional-abdication-8138?page=4

The inaction (some of it deliberate) of key congressional leaders during this period has ensured that the president’s actions now constitute a troubling precedent. Under the objectively undefinable rubric of “humanitarian intervention,” President Obama has arguably established the authority of the president to intervene militarily virtually anywhere without the consent or the approval of Congress, at his own discretion and for as long as he wishes. It is not hyperbole to say that the president himself can now bomb a country with which we maintain diplomatic relations, in support of loosely aligned opposition groups that do not represent any coalition that we actually recognize as an alternative. We know he can do it because he already has done it. Few leaders in the legislative branch even asked for a formal debate over this exercise of unilateral presidential power, and in the Senate any legislation pertaining to the issue was prevented from reaching the floor. One can only wonder at what point these leaders or their successors might believe it is their constitutional duty to counter unchecked executive power exercised on behalf of overseas military action. AT BOTTOM, what we have witnessed in these instances, as with many others, is a breakdown of our constitutional process. Opinions will surely vary as to the merits of the actual solution that was reached in each case, but this sort of disagreement, which in and of itself forms the basis of our form of government, is the precise reason why each one of these cases, and others, should have been properly debated and voted on by Congress. In none of these situations was the consideration of time or emergency so great as to have precluded congressional deliberation. In each, we can be certain that Congress was deliberately ignored or successfully circumvented, while being viewed by some members of the executive branch as more of a nuisance than an equal constitutional partner. And there is no doubt that some key congressional leaders were reluctant, at best, to assert the authority that forms the basis of our governmental structure. When it comes to the long-term commitments that our country makes in the international arena, ours can be a complicated and sometimes frustrating process. But our Founding Fathers deliberately placed checks and counterchecks into our constitutional system for exactly that purpose. The congressional “nuisance factor” is supposed to act as a valuable tool to ensure that our leaders—and especially our commander in chief—do not succumb to the emotions of the moment or the persuasions of a very few. One hopes Congress—both Republicans and Democrats—can regain the wisdom to reassert the authority that was so wisely given to it so many years ago.