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#### The affirmative advocates restricting war powers by ending Islamophobic indefinite detention policies.

#### Islamophobic values have seeped into our daily lives due to War on Terror indoctrination---we must inject justice in detention

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4. Standing with Muslims against the “War on Terror”¶ In this chapter, I have demonstrated that:¶ The overriding motive for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is to secure control over the Middle East and Central Asia for U.S. oil, military, and corporate interests.¶ Bush’s handlers have been planning imperial conquest of the world since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989.¶ From the evidence here and elsewhere, it is difficult to draw another conclusion than that Bush’s associates organized the 9-11 attacks to kick start popular support for this war. They have continued to justify the ‘‘war on terror’’ by claiming that Muslim terrorists pose an immanent danger to Americans.¶ In fact, however, terrorism actually poses minimal risk to Americans.¶ The ‘‘war on terror’’ is a concept modeled on Israel’s assaults on Palestinians to provide a cover for campaigns of territorial conquest.¶ Far from being ‘‘under attack,’’ America has pre-emptively attacked and conquered two sovereign states, and is threatening military domination of the entire world.¶ In other words, Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is a massive con job, perpetrated by a few oil and military elites, at the expense of Muslims particularly, but threatening the security and well-being of virtually everyone on the planet.¶ An immensely wealthy and powerful republic has been hijacked by a small cabal of individuals...The American people have...been deliberately lied to, their interests cynically misrepresented and misreported, the real aims and intentons of this private war of Bush the son and his junta concealed with complete arrogance." (Said, 2003)¶ Thomas Donnelly, author of the RAD blueprint for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ recently reaffirmed the neo-conservative commitment, not to protect Americans from ‘‘terrorism,’’ but to conquer the world.¶ This war, properly understood, is a struggle to build a [new] ... order throughout the ‘‘greater Middle East,’’ that giant swath of the planet that extends from West Africa to Southeast Asia. ...Operation Iraqi Freedom represented the first step in a generational commitment to Iraq, but also the commitment of many generations to transforming the greater Middle East....The vision of the Bush Doctrine is hugely ambitious; in embracing this great vision, the United States must obligate the resources and create the institutions necessary to realize it." (Donnelly, 2004, pp. ix, 111)¶ 4.1. ‘‘Either you are with us, or you are with the Terrorists’’¶ Fear and hatred of a scapegoated ‘‘enemy’’ are powerful tools by which despots confuse people into believing that their oppressors are their salvation. Just as anti-Semitism served to divide and silence progressive German movements in the early Nazi era, Islamophobia is dividing and silencing us now. No one wants to associate with “terrorists”, much less be labelled and persecuted as one. Many progressive Western people fear and despise “fundmentalist” Muslims, and thereby fall into the trap of allying themselves with, or at least not opposing, Islamophobic laws and practices in the name of opposing “terrorism”. They thereby collude in undercutting the fabric of rights, due process, and equality on which they too depend.¶ The Bush Doctrine rhetoric has succeeded in convincing most white Americans that “terrorists” pose a serious threat to their personal safety, and that the “war on terror” is necessary to protect them. Islamophobic language and values have seeped into the fiber of our daily lives. Bookstores now have “terrorism” sections, displaying some of the 5,036 mostly new books on the topic.15 Several U.S. colleges and universities now offer degrees in “homeland security.” Media images of “Arab extremists” have become routine.¶ Most Americans now believe that “terrorism” is such a big problem, that they should pay with their taxes, their freedoms, their decimated public services, and their children’s lives. In the summer of 2005, polls found that 79 percent of Americans believed that “the threat of terrorism against the U.S.” has increased or stayed about the same (Polling Report.com, 2005). Seventy-six percent thought “Osama bin Laden himself is currently planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States,” and 64 percent supported the Patriot Act. Sixty-four percent would be “willing to give up some of [their] personal freedom in order to reduce the threat of terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005). Almost half of all Americans “believe the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim-Americans” (Dean, 2005). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and shocking revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison, however, popular support for the “war on terror” plummetted. In November, 2005, 55 percent of Americans disapproved of the way Bush is “dealing with the war on terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005).¶ 4.2. Which Side are you on?¶ Before 9-11, the anti-globalization movement had been rapidly gaining influence and unity worldwide. Opposition to U.S.-dominated institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the G-8, NATO and APEC, had succeeded in disrupting and exposing several of their gatherings. And in their place, the World Social Forum and other progressive people’s movements were demonstrating that indeed there are excellent alternatives to globalization and corporate rule.¶ The 9-11 “attacks” and the “war on terror” derailed these hopeful movements and imposed crippling constraints on dissent, democracy, and national sovereignty. Under cover of Islamophobic targetting of Muslims, the U.S. is waging war on all movements for social justice both domestically and internationally, using its new post 9-11 legislative powers and bloated military and policing budgets. Domestically, the Bush administration is attacking democracy, abortion rights, the judiciary, environmental protections, social security, public education, women’s rights, union rights, and civil rights (Dorhrn, 2003). Internationally, it pressures other nations to enact similar “anti-terror” laws and policies, as well as demanding that they open their economies to full U.S. corporate rule.¶ As Bernadette Dorhn points out: “The result is a chilling effect. That is to say, people around the targets back away, get silent, don’t stand up when they see the cost of simply expressing your opinion or even making a joke, let alone publicly objecting to what’s going on” (2003).¶ Many progressive groups oppose Islamophobia and support Muslim victims of U.S. and Israeli assaults. These include civil liberties associations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, anti-Zionist Jewish and Christian groups, unions, peace groups, and student organizations like the Canadian Federation of Students. Secular, Jewish, and Christian groups have formed alliances with Palestinians and Iraqis in oppostion to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. In the U.S. the Center for Constitutional Rights works to end arbitrary detention of Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. In Canada, the Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada has mobilized broad support for Muslim detainees and their rights.¶ However, even these groups have not dared to challenge the Islamophobic base of the “anti-terror” legislation, for fear of being called pro-terrorist. They are thereby left arguing that the particular individuals for whom they advocate aren’t terrorists, while implicitly condoning the myth that “real” terrorists are lurking in the shadows. But under the Bush Doctrine, all Muslims are presumed to be either current or potential terrorists, and their civil liberties have been sacrificed in the name of “national security”.¶ To defeat the Bush plot for world control, we will need to challenge Islamophobic fear of “terrorists”, to assert clearly that there is little substantive terrorist threat. What terrorism there is could better be addressed through criminal justice systems and international law. More importantly we need to insist that the U.S. desist from both overt preemptive wars and covert state-financed terrorism. The actual security of both Americans and all other people will be best served by ending the occupations of the West Bank, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and recognizing the right of all nations to self-determination (including oil policies). We need to stand in solidarity with all Muslims, regardless of their religious beliefs. At this juncture, Islamophobia is the key barrier to effective mobilization against the Bush regime.

#### US detention policy is an act of Islamophobia informed by a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice

Theresa Koenigsknecht 12, Public History MA Candidate at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, October 4, “Perspectives on Post 9/11 Prejudices: Islamophobia”, http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/04/perspectives-on-post-911-prejudices-islamophobia/

Have the September 11th terrorist attacks changed how you view or treat others? For many, unfortunately, the answer is probably “yes.” The events of 9/11, the United States government’s response to them, and an increasing public misunderstanding of Islam have created a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice towards Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim). This “unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam” is popularly known as “Islamophobia.” Whether this attitude occurs intentionally or subconsciously, this mindset has resulted in intensifying stereotypes, hate crimes, discrimination and often condones the violation of civil rights of Muslim-Americans. The Muslim community’s response to the 9/11 attacks, both initially and today, remains remarkably patriotic and supports cooperation with government authorities. Yet immediately following 9/11, Muslim-Americans, as well as those perceived to be Muslims, often endured increased suspicion from other Americans and even experienced physical violence, supposedly in retaliation for the attacks. Over a decade later, Muslims are still subjected to hate crimes, workplace discrimination, unreasonable arrest and detention, passenger profiling, verbal (especially through hate mail and internet outlets) and physical harassment and abuse. Although racism and anti-Semitism are considered socially unacceptable, ethnic profiling against Muslim-Americans is often encouraged and accepted by government authorities and popular media. Fortunately, some people are actively working to counter the rise of Islamophobia and many communities have come together showing solidarity and interfaith cooperation with their Muslim neighbors. Anyone can take steps to defeat Islamophobia by encouraging empathy for others and participating in activities that promote discussion between people of different faiths and ethnicities. More information on countering Islamophobia can be found on The Muslim Public Affairs Council website which provides helpful resources, links and workshops. It is efforts such as these that can help create an atmosphere of trust and dialogue, as opposed to fear and misunderstanding. So what does Islamophobia have to do with Guantánamo? Muslims constitute almost all of those detained there since 9/11. For that reason, although Guantánamo may not figure largely in the minds of some Americans, Islamophobia strongly influences Western culture and plays a large part in what Americans do understand about Guantánamo and its detainees. To many American’s the prevalent misconception that Islam is equivalent with terrorism unfortunately justifies the violation of Muslim’s civil liberties in the United States as well as violations of detainees’ human rights at Guantánamo. Yet, the American Civil Liberties Union’s “A Call to Courage” report states that, “by allowing and in some cases actively encouraging the fear of terrorism to divide Americans by religion, race, and belief, our political leaders are fracturing this nation’s greatest strength: its ability to integrate diverse strands into a unified whole on the basis of shared, pluralistic, democratic values.” Remembering each person’s right to civil liberties and advocating for greater awareness and knowledge can persuade people to reconsider how they view or treat those around them and in time provide an antidote for Islamophobia.

#### These constructions create a broader state of violence against Islamic bodies and bodies that are racially marked to look like them—this manifests itself in xenophobic profiling and immigration policies

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To illustrate how race can be socially constructed, I will use myself as an example. In the United States, I am considered African American or Black American, with the defacto second class status that designation still implies. My parents and grandparents were all considered Black, even though some of them had very light skin. The most recent white person whom we can determine is an ancestor is my great-great grandfather, Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard.35 We even have members of the African American group who look white, yet are still considered part of the Black group. In South Africa, where I have taught many times, I was considered part of the historically mixed race group known as Coloured, due to my light skin, wavy hair and other characteristics. 7 During the apartheid era, this group had a buffer status between the de jure most privileged whites and the least privileged black Africans.3 " In Brazil, I learned that my same features would classify me as White, with all the defacto privileges that the designation still brings in that society.39 The pan-ethnicity term "Arab" and the religious signifier "Muslim" have been socially constructed as a synonymous "race" in the United States.4° While there are over 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide, only 15% are Arab.41 In the U.S., it is unclear, but there maybe between 4-8 million Muslims, of whom 22.4% are U.S. born and 23.8% are African American.42 There may be 3 million Arabs in the U.S., originating from 22 countries,43 and the Arab American Institute has revealed the little known fact that nearly three quarters of Arab Americans are Christians." In an important case, St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Arabs can be discriminated against on account of their race. Interestingly, those who merely look like Arabs or Muslims may be racially profiled on that basis as well. The double group can thus be considered larger than the number of actual members. According to one commentator, there may be, in this country, 7 million Arabs, 8 million Muslims, and 1.6 million South Asians, Latinos, and African Americans who could look "Arab," probably at least 10 million people,46 which I think even that is a vast underestimate of the numbers of the Blacks and Latinos in America who could pass as Arab. One African American radio personality stated that French citizen Zacharias Moussaoui, native of Morocco, who may have been the twentieth September 11 hijacker, looks like "a brother from around the way.' When my sons and I travel abroad, we are often mistaken for Arabs or Muslims. My partner James, who is a dark brown skinned Christian African American, often wears a kufi or skull cap to express his cultural affinity for Africa. He is always taken for a Muslim, although not an Arab. Sadly, I have told my NYU student son, who can phenotypically pass for Arab, that he has to be careful when flying so that he will not be mistaken for an Arab. Dressing in the popular ghetto styled baggy pants coupled with corn rowing his hair, and the use of an Ebonics dialect,48 helps ensure that he is not racially profiled as an Arab. Of course, when he lands in New York, his failure to be able to hail a cab indicates he is clearly seen as a Black - too risky to pick up.49 These two overlapping and socially constructed-as-synonymous groups, Arabs and Muslims, have come to be regarded in some of the negative ways that have historically characterized African Americans. While Arabs and Muslims are often stereotyped as dangerous, evil, sneaky, primitive, and untrustworthy, much as Blacks are, the criminality has a twist-they are considered potential or actual terrorists." They are forever "foreign, disloyal and imminently threatening,"'" whether they are citizens or not. Arabs and Muslims were racially profiled, victimized, and demonized as terrorists well before September 11 2 These activities have included: physical attacks by individuals and pro-Israel groups such as the Jewish Defense League; political attacks by pro-Israel lobby AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai Birth, as well as many other Democratic and Republican Party affiliated entities; blacklisting of prominent Arab American intellectuals such as Columbia professor Edward Said and Harvard professor Walid Khalidi; as well as vicious stereotypes in films and television that would not be tolerated if used to characterize other groups.53 For example, Jack Shaheen surveyed a number of movies and found the following characterizations of Arabs and Muslims: "assholes," "bastards," "camel-dicks," "pigs," "devil-worshipers," "jackels," "rats," "rag-heads," "towel-heads," "scum-buckets," "sons-of-dogs," "buzzards of the jungle," "sons-of-whores," "sons-of-unnamed goats," and "sons-of-she-camels." 4 It is difficult to imagine the movie industry applying those sorts of labels to Blacks or Jews today. Arab American campaign contributions have been returned as if Arab citizens have no right to participate in American politics 5 3 Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim activities have intensified during periods of high tensions in the Middle East, such as the 1980 Iran Hostage situation, 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, 1986 war against Libya, and the 1991 Gulf war.56 "The Supreme Court has upheld immigration laws discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race, national origin and political affiliation that would patently violate the constitution if the rights of citizens were at stake."57 The cases include Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," Nguyen v. US.,59 Reno v American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee,6 ' Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Incorporated,6 ' and The Chinese Exclusion cases.62 The plenary power doctrine has historically provided immunity from judicial scrutiny of immigration judgments, whether by Congress or the Executive branch. Many Americans assumed the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah federal building had to be done by Arabs or Muslims, rather than by white Christian militia member Timothy McVeigh.' After that incident, even though Arabs and Muslims were not involved, draconian immigration laws were passed in 1996 which singled out those groups. 65 Unfortunately, what happened to Arabs and Muslims under these 1996 laws was not unique. According to Kevin Johnson, these laws are part of a history of attempts to stiffle dissent that includes the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s and the Palmer Raids after World War 1.66 In that period after the war, the U.S. imprisoned people for years for speaking out against the war effort.67 During the cold war Red Scare, many people lost jobs and were subject to investigation, or were even imprisoned, because of rumored association with the Communist party.6 According to Jerry Kang, "wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of mistakes. Specifically we overestimate the threat posed by racial 'others,' in WWlI, Japanese Americans; today, Arab Americans, Muslims Middle Easterners, immigrants and anyone who looks like 'them . ,9, ? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)70 made it a crime to contribute to foreign groups deemed as terrorist, and created special deportation procedures, including the formation of special courts to evaluate secret evidence. 7 ' The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)72 supplemented AEDPA. That act prevents federal courts from reviewing a variety of immigration cases, with very limited exceptions. 3 These two laws "either explicitly-or according to INS interpretation, impliedly-authorize the use of classified evidence to exclude an 'alien terrorist' under special removal proceedings,74 to summarily remove an alien who is a 'national security' risk,7 and to deny bond to aliens in removal proceedings."76 Pursuant to these statutes, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deported or attempted to deport more than two dozen people on the basis of secret evidence-almost all were Muslim, mainly Arabs. 77 Ironically, in 2000, Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of racial profiling when it used secret evidence.78 After September 11 the situation affecting Arabs and Muslims dramatically worsened,79 and there have been profound effects on their civil rights.8 " Before that fateful date, 80% of Americans considered racial profiling wrong.8 After September 11, the polls reversed and 60% said profiling was fine, especially if directed against Arabs and Muslims. 82 U.S. Congressman John Cooksey of Louisiana likely expressed the sentiments of many when he stated on the radio, "If I see someone come in and he's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over and checked." 3 A survey done soon after September 11 said that nearly half would be in favor of having Arabs, including citizens, carry a special identification card.8 There were early reports that some Blacks and Latinos welcomed the law enforcement targeting of Arabs and Muslims.85 When I heard that comment, it reminded me that I preferred that my sons not be mistaken for Arabs when flying. On the other hand, I also realized that increased racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims has not meant that the long term racial profiling of African Americans has stopped. It merely means that my sons may be doubly profiled depending on the context. At the airport, they may be regarded as Arab terrorists, while at the taxi stand or ATM machine, they may be regarded as Black criminals.8 6 After September 11, Muslims and Arabs and people who look like them have been under siege." Over 1000 incidents of hate crimes were reported by February 2002.8 Even President Bush's Arab secret service agent was removed from an American Airlines plane. 9 Of five people who were killed, including a Sikh Indian, a Pakistani Muslim, an Egyptian Coptic Christian, and an Indian Hindu,9 none of them was a Muslim Arab, but all were socially constructed as such. The U.S. Justice Department opened up more than 380 investigations into violence or threats, which have taken the form of "telephone, internet, mail and face-to-face threats; minor assaults, assaults with dangerous weapons, and assaults resulting in serious injury or death; and vandalism, shootings, and bombings directed at homes, businesses, and places of worship."9 ' About 70 state and local criminal prosecutions were instigated against 80 defendants. 92 According to Bill Hing, Arabs and Muslims, whether citizens or not, are literally and figuratively being de-Americanized, which is "a twisted brand of xenophobia that is not simply hatred of foreigners, but also hatred of those who may not be foreigners but whom the vigilantes would prefer being removed from the country anyway."93 A member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has even said that in the event of another terrorist attack, the American government might consider interning Arab Americans,"4 reminiscent of the treatment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II.9 ' The legal position of Arabs and Muslims has especially declined since the exceptionally speedy passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act),96 which subjects noncitizens to guilt by association, ideological exclusion, unilateral executive detention, and racial profiling.97 Aliens are deportable for innocent association, without any proof that they supported terrorist activity.98 Noncitizens are now subject to the resurrection of ideological exclusion, that is that they will be denied a visa on the basis of pure speech if they are seen as endorsing or espousing terroristic activity or persuading others to support activity or a group.99 Aliens can be detained without any hearing or showing that they pose a threat to national security or are a flight risk. The defendant in a normal criminal proceeding can be held without bail only if he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. " Aliens can now be held not only during the proceeding which can take years, but also afterwards, indefinitely, even if the proceeding says they should not be removed from the country!!lo Rules that effect citizens and noncitizens alike include the authorization of secret searches and wiretaps without any probable cause as would normally be required by the Fourth Amendment. 0 2 Under the USA Patriot Act, over 1000 people were held for weeks or months with no charges in mass preventive detention. 03 They did not have access to lawyers and, in many cases, their families were not told where they were."° Some people were held as material witnesses, i.e. they might have information. Even they have been treated harshly.'0 5 Some have challenged that detention in court. While federal judges have found that the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for potential testimony before a grand jury is unlawful,'0 6 otherjudges have held the opposite. 1 7 According to Jerry Kang, [we] should not be surprised if courts determine that national security in the face of terrorism is-in the lingo of constitutional law- a 'compelling interest' and that rude forms of racial profiling, notwithstanding its over and under-inclusiveness, are 'narrowly tailored' to furthering that interest. It would be foolish to think that the courts will necessarily save us from the excesses of the more political branches, r' Little research has been done as to how all this has affected women in the Arab and Muslim communities, as many of the men detained were the sole or major breadwinners for their families as well as respected business owners, religious leaders, and community activists." These women are usually stereotyped as voiceless and passive, needing to be liberated from the all encompassing Afghanistan burqa or even the more modest varieties of head scarves many wear in the United States."' Some of them may not speak English, may not have been working, or even had a visa to work, if foreign born." In November 2001, the Bush Justice Department said it would interview some 5000 young men, solely based on age, date of arrival, and country of origin. Virtually all were Arabs or Muslims." 2 Some police departments refused to assist the federal government as they believed the policy constituted racial profiling."' They knew that law enforcement works best if it positively involves the community rather than terrorizes it."4 Needless to say, the affected groups have been outraged by the targeting."5 Some months later, the Justice Department announced it would interview 3000 additional men from countries with an Al Qaeda presence." 6 When the Justice Department announced the Absconder Apprehension Initiative in February 2002, they decided to prioritize the deportation of 6000 aliens out of the 300,000 foreigners who remained in the country after being ordered deported. Needless to say, these men were from Arab countries." 7 In April 2002, the Justice Department announced that it would put into effect a provision from IIRIRA, which gives the police the authority to enforce immigration laws."' This was controversial not only in immigrant communities, but with police concerned about racial profiling. "'We've spent decades establishing trust... with our very diverse communities,' says a San Diego spokesman. 'If there is an immigration emergency tied to criminal activity, of course we'll assist. But if it is simply an immigration violation.., we will not be involved.""" In June 2002, the Entry-Exit Registration System was established which now requires men from age 16 up, from 25 countries including nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, to register and be photographed, fingerprinted, interviewed, or else be deported.2 Over 1200 men have been detained under this program.' For example, in December 2002, 400 men from Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Syria were detained in Los Angeles under this program, and Amnesty International reported their harsh treatment included being shackled, hosed down with cold water, forced to sleep standing up, and kept from contacting family or legal counsel.'22 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has called for a dismantling of this registration system since it is "discriminatory in nature, ineffective and inefficient as a law enforcement strategy, and creates widespread ill-will in Arab American and Muslim communities across the country."'2 Of course, the inadequacy of all such profiling is shown by the fact that the airplane "shoe bomber" Richard Reid is a citizen of Great Britain;24 the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh is a Muslim convert, white upper middle class native of Main County, California; ' 25 potential "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla is a Puerto Rican, former Chicago gangbanger; 12 6 and alleged twentieth hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui, who was captured before September 11, is a citizen of France.' 7 None of them would have been identified through profiling on the basis of nationality. It is interesting to look at the disparate legal treatment of these men. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, got a public trial, whereas hundreds of foreign born Arabs and Muslims, also captured there, are being held in incommunicado detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'28 The President issued a military order that Al Qaeda members and other noncitizens could be tried in military tribunals or commissions without appeal to civilian courts, an action which has been heavily criticized by various scholars,'29 as well as our allies.130 At least two federal courts have denied habeas petitions filed by lawyers representing some of the detainees, refusing to assert jurisdiction over the cases. 13 1 There may be approximately 650 suspects from 43 countries in Cuba, and officials are preparing accommodations for up to 2000 inmates.13 1 Some scholars and government officials have suggested that detention and prosecution of captured suspects should not even be governed by international law. 1 3 Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz and others have argued that such persons could be tortured without violating any laws binding the U.S. 34 Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, is a former Chicago Latin Kings gang member who converted to Islam.' He was picked up by authorities as he returned from Pakistan and was allegedly planning to set off a dirty bomb containing radioactive materials. 36 He is now being held in incommunicado detention in a U.S. military prison as an "enemy combatant," without access to counsel or any court-military or civilian, and may never be tried. 1 37 In December 2002, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York judge Michael Mukasey issued a 102 page opinion affirming Padilla's right to consult counsel, but the government continues to resist the court's order. 38 Another U.S. citizen, Yaser Hamdi, born in Louisiana of Saudi descent, who was captured by Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, is also being held as an enemy combatant, after being discovered among the Guantanamo prisoners. 139 The U.S. government in both the Padilla and Hamdi cases is resisting petitions for habeas corpus and saying that courts should just accept the President's determinations as to their status.140 Ironically, putting U.S. citizens under military jurisdiction without access to legal counsel places them in a legal limbo where they have less rights than foreigners Reid or Moussaoui 14 1 In October 2002, Reid ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge William G. Young of the U.S. District Court in Boston. 142 In Seattle last August, an African American thirty-six year old, Earnest James Thompson, now known as James Uj aama, was accused of lending assistance to Al Qaeda by founding a training camp in Bly, Oregon in 1999.43 He was also alleged to have run a militant Islamic web site in Great Britain, and was allegedly linked to Abou Hamza Masri, a London Muslim and alleged recruiter for Bin Laden.'" Investigators hope to "squeeze some information out of him, "and he is being tried in a civilian court.145 In March 2003, the INS was dissolved and folded into the new Department of Homeland Security along with 21 other federal agencies. The implications are ominous, as one commentator has stated. "Placing all of the INS's functions into a department focused primarily on national security suggests that the United States no longer views immigrants as welcome contributors, but as potential threats viewed through a terrorist lens."'146 At the time of this writing, it is alleged that the U.S. government has drafted in secret Patriot II, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003.147 The proposed law would authorize secret arrests, overturning the federal court decision requiring the government to release the names of all those detained since September 11. 148 Additionally, the law would permit the U.S. to extradite even American citizens for trial to countries with which we do not have extradition treaties, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya, which are well known for torture. 149 International and current U.S. law prohibit sending a person to a country where there is likelihood of torture. 50 Constituting a new level of invasion of privacy, a proposed Terrorist Identification database would authorize the collection of DNA of any suspect and of all noncitizens suspected of having an association with a "terrorist organization."'' The most extraordinary proposal would possibly strip Americans of citizenship as a form of punishment for giving material support to terrorist groups.15 2

#### Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy—notions of western superiority are a critical tool to drum up support for militaristic and elitist interventions

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KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.

#### This dehumanization of foreign populations establishes horrific material conditions of violence—the way we conceive of and discuss foreign bodies matters

Collins and Glover 2 (John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

#### **This detention of Islamic bodies establishes a form of constant dehumanization and perpetual warfare—the deeming of people as “dangerous” creates a free license for capture that establishes detention sites as a space of perpetual warfare**

Judith Butler 6, Professor at UC Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” Ch. 3: Indefinite Detention, p. 50

If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of deciding whether criminal acts occurred. Indeed, "deeming" someone dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to preempt determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of thousands of Arab residents or Arab- American citizens, sometimes on the basis of last names alone; the harassment of any number of US and non-US citizens at the immi- gration borders because some official "perceives" a potential difficulty; the attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern descent on US streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. When Rumsfeld has sent the US into periodic panics or "alerts," he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark-skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani- Americans. Although "deeming" someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, has become targeted by this government mandate to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the US becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain "indefinite containment" takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag in the months following September Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless ruled public culture-and business interests\_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be proven to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo released by the Department of Defense. The DOD did not hide these photos, but published them openly. My speculation is that they published these photographs to make known that a certain vanquishing had taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication. These were not photographs leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international response was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European human rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge, cruelty, and a nationalist and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several countries asked that their citizens be returned home for trial. But there is something more in this degradation that calls to be read. There is a reduction of these human beings to animal status, where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of total restraint. It is important to remember that the bestialization of the human in this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined. Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these people have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with murderers under both criminal and international law. The language with which they are described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are exceptional, that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these. The treatment of these prisoners is considered as an extension of war itself, not as a postwar question of appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their detention stops the killing. If they were not detained, and forcibly so when any movement is required, they would appar- ently start killing on the spot; they are beings who are in a permanent and perpetual war. It may be that al-Qaeda representatives speak this way-some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those detained are centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative team in Guantanamo, suggest that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention the prison uprisings in Afghanistan in which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison. In this sense, the war is not, and cannot be, over; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and there is a warrant for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the continuing site of war. It would seem that the rules that govern combat are in place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners separated from the war itself. When General Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the street, even if you don't charge them?" he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my emphasis). | 1 If the war is against terrorism, and the definition of terrorism expands to include every questionable instance of global difficulty, how can the war end? Is it, by definition, a war without end, given the lability of the terms "terrorism" and "war"? Although the pictures were published as a sign of US triumph, and so apparently indicating a conclusion to the war effort, it was clear at the time that bombing and armed confiict were continuing in Afghanistan, the war was not over, and even the photographs, the degradation, and the indefinite detention were continuing acts of war. Indeed, war seems to have established a more or less permanent condition of national emergency, and the sovereign right to self-protection outfianks any and all recourse to law.

#### It is important to advocate for our praxis in this space is key—interrogating Islamophobia in educational settings is critical to establish a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects

Shirin Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Jan. 4, works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions behind Islamophobia is critical to establish a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

Jasmin Zine 4, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies, is a researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora. She teaches graduate courses in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto in the areas of race and ethnicity, anti-racism education and critical ethnography., “Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines”, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3

As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. ¶ Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

## 2AC

### AT: Global-Local

#### What happens in this community matters but using it as their starting point forgoes the ability to address the abroad than will inevitable effect the local

Graham ’10 STEPHEN GRAHAM is Professor of Cities and Society at Newcastle University and previously taught at Durham and MIT, among other universities. Cities Under Siege: the New Military Urbanism – p. xxvii

The book aims in particular to unite two very different, and usually separate, discourses on cities and urban life: the growing debate within security studies and international politics on the urbanization of security; and the generally more critical debates within urban studies, geography, architecture, anthropology and cultural studies as to how these changes are challenging the politics of cities and urban life in a time of rapid urbanization. The writing of this book is partly motivated by the absence of an accessible and critical analysis exploring how resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries.'• Such neglect is the result of the stark division of labour within the academy. This has meant that, broadly speaking, foreign policy, military, legal and international relations scholars have had the task of addressing the new imperial wars at the international scale. At the same time, an almost completely separate body of urban, legal and social scholars has worked to explore the new politics of Western cities which have surrounded the homeland security drive at the urban and national scales within Western nations. But these debates have remained stubbornly separated by their different theoretical traditions, and the geographical and scalar orientations, of the two. This analytical failure is in part explicable in terms of the way dominant, conservative, and realist investigations into the link between globalization and security split contemporary reality into the 'home' civilization of the rich, modern North and a separate civilization in the global South, characterized largely by backwardness, danger, pathology and anarchy. '5 Indeed, as we shall see, such Manichaean views of the world are themselves a driving force behind the new military urbanism. Such perspectives tend to demonize an Orientalized South as the source of all contemporary insecurity. They also actively work to deny the ways in which urban and economic life in the global North fundamentally relies on, and is constituted through, links to the postcolonial - and in some cases, newly colonial - South. In the process such discourses play a key role in producing the symbolic violence necessary to allow states to launch real violence and war.

### FW – Public Debate about War Powers Good

#### Academic, institutions-based debate regarding detention can reverse excessive presidential authority---college students key

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

### Narratives Bad---Exclusionary

#### Their identification of personal experiences with the exclusionary nature of the debate community disavows their investment in that very exclusion---they just shift the evaluative criteria to exclude any viewpoint that doesn’t result in them winning

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

Williams's decision to place the accusation in the foreground of her text determines the meaning and tone of The Alchemy of Race [\*1305] and Rights in ways that she probably did not intend. Immediately following the accusation, for example, we witness a conversation between Williams and her sister, in which Williams provides an energetic exposition of her plan for the book. The plan is ambitious: the book will institute a new genre of legal writing, even as it locates and deconstructs the cultural forces that influence a wide variety of complex legal issues. n303 The exposition is a helpful guide to the theoretical and methodological intentions underlying this sometimes opaque text, but with Harvard's accusation still ringing in our ears, the exposition also outlines the personal defense of Williams's intellectual temperament and professional attributes that the book as a whole will undertake. The speech announces that Williams was not formed to grind (or be ground in) the mill of conventional legal scholarship, over which ordinary academics must toil. Rather, she is intended for and capable of finer work, and she has chosen to focus her intellectual power on the practices of the academy itself, to lay bare the errors and biases that permeate its craft, to pierce and, in the end, to revise its governing paradigms.

Regrettably, the political implications of the role that Williams has selected for herself escape her examination; her apologetic project fixes her gaze too completely. Thus, she never notices that the intellectual traits that equip her to be the scourge of the academy are produced by and reinforce the academic culture she desires to revise. Williams is a shining example of the independent and ambitious intellect privileged by a liberal educational system; n304 hers is an intellect that has internalized the same commitment to scholarly freedom, adversarial opposition, and vocal dissent fostered by [\*1306] (among other cultural institutions) the legal academy. n305 Her dedication to intellectual autonomy n306 nominates her to be the instructor of the academy's instructors, just as Harvard is first among the most elite group of legal institutions.

<cont>

To be sure, The Alchemy of Race and Rights offers an explicit critique of the academy's evaluative standards. As that critique is unfolding, however, the text returns repeatedly to Williams's professional credentials. The accumulation of these references over the course of the book intrudes on and ultimately blunts the force of the critique by revealing the extent to which the standards have created Williams's identity, and, significantly, by emphasizing the desirability of that identity. More subtly, but no less than the mainstream academy, the text privileges a professional self who excels according to the evaluative standards enforced by Harvard Law School. For example, by the time we encounter Williams's pronouncement that academic standards are the "concrete monuments to socially accepted subjective preferences" n311 we have been told that she was a law student at Harvard. n312 Later, the importance of that credential is underscored by Williams' inclusion of a memorandum from an insecure colleague who did not attend Harvard or Yale but who wishes that he had. n313 The text's comparison of Williams's resume with that of her less well-credentialed colleague reveals the apology form at work, subverting Williams's critique of academic standards. The terms of the apologetic contract require the text to defend Williams's professional record, and the strategy understandably and, perhaps, inevitably, pursued by the apology is to demonstrate that she satisfies or, even, exceeds the standards. In this way, the autobiographical performance undercuts the critical rhetoric by insisting on the validity of the evaluations produced by the very standards that Williams intends to oppose.

The text further testifies to the desirability of evaluative standards by cataloging the material benefits and the psychological satisfactions bestowed on those whom the standards approve. The benefits include upward mobility within the academy and the per [\*1309] quisites that attend a bustling professional schedule. Though Harvard may not desire to retain Williams as a member of its law faculty, we are told that at least three other law schools have offered her a position; n314 among the schools that have "hired" Williams, the text names Stanford, whose reputation is considered by some to be as prestigious as that of Harvard. n315 Consistent with this evidence of Williams's prominence within the academy are the many references to her active professional calendar. Williams asserts that sometimes she feels "invisible," n316 but the book repeatedly undercuts that claim by reminding readers that she is a visible, sought-after and authoritative presence within the academy. We are told of the numerous speeches that she is invited to give, n317 the conferences that she attends, n318 and the papers that she writes and publishes. n319 Far from being "stupid" or otherwise unqualified by law school standards, this professional self is talented, hard-working and enormously productive. This is a self whose career has been remunerative, achieving a measure of professional recognition that most academics approach only in their dreams. n320 As I noted above, n321 the outsiders' professional success is an uneasy companion for their radical rhetoric. However, this text's complicity in upholding the standards does not reside solely in the benefits the standards have secured for Williams - the benefits are difficult, if not practically impossible, for her to avoid - but in its failure to confront, let alone criticize or interpret, the existence and nature of [\*1310] her personal stake in the continued existence of the standards. n322 Not only does the apologetic form appear to demand a defense of the self in the oppressor's terms, but it also inhibits any awareness of how the self is socially constituted by the forces it would oppose. The apology unfolds an identity captured by, even propitiating, the continued existence of those same standards that have supposedly erased the subject's racial distinctiveness. Hence, a tenacious circularity limits the scope of the social criticisms that may be embodied in the apologetic form.

Williams's employment of the apology form also thwarts the epistemological project that occupies The Alchemy of Race and Rights. Determined to dismantle the objective truth-finding mechanisms maintained by legal discourse, Williams endeavors to keep before readers the inevitable influence of subjective perspective on the production of meaning. n323 One of the devices she employs to this end deserves special mention here, because it captures perfectly a dilemma that the apology creates for the epistemological project. The device involves the use of what I call "interlocking narratives." That is, rather than simply telling readers a story about an event that she (or another person) experienced (the "experiential narrative") and then drawing out for us its meaning, Williams often embeds the experiential narrative within yet another narrative (the "framing narrative"). In the framing narrative, Williams describes herself recounting the experiential narrative and its meaning to another group of listeners (usually, her students or colleagues), and the framing narrative also reports those listeners' reactions to the experiential narrative. n324

At first glance, this elegant device promises to aid Williams's program. The device permits the author to recount the experience, [\*1311] her interpretation of it and her listeners' interpretation of it, and, at the same time, to notify readers that they must ponder for themselves not only the meaning of the experiential narrative but also the meaning of the framing narrative. In short, by inserting the framing narrative between the reader and the experiential narrative, the device could serve to remind readers of the distance separating them from the experience; in some texts, that space might be occupied by an interpretive process, in which the readers' subjectivity plays a significant role, that (re)produced the meaning of the experience.

When the interlocking narratives are located inside Williams's apology, however, they constrict, rather than expand, the readers' interpretive room. Ultimately, the content of the framing narratives has a potent coercive effect on readers. The framing narratives overshadow the experiential narratives, predispose readers to endorse Williams's interpretation of the experience, and silence any criticism they might offer. Enlisted by the apologetic program, the framing narratives emphasize Williams's professional authority by assigning her the role of teacher and critical scholar, one who is busy delivering invited lectures throughout the country, teaching classes at elite law schools, communicating to law school colleagues, and publishing scholarly articles. This evidence of Williams's authoritative presence and professional success attracts the readers' notice and inclines them to identify with the autobiographical protagonist and her interpretation of the events she reports.

Perhaps most significantly, the text's treatment of the other characters who populate the framing narratives further restricts the readers' range of interpretive options. These characters consist of those who listen to Williams's lectures about the legal, political, and cultural implications of everyday events. Unlike its favorable portrait of Williams, the text throws a harsh and unflattering light on the listeners. Virtually without exception, the listeners are flat, unreflective, ill-educated and bigoted characters. Invariably, the listeners disagree with Williams's interpretation of her experiences, but the comments and questions they put to her are impatient, insensitive and dull. n325 In other words, they are "stupid." At the [\*1312] end of these episodes, therefore, readers possess only one interpretive option, namely, to endorse Williams's meaning, since understandably they desire to avoid being numbered among the fools.

The apology flattens out, even strangles, the destabilizing effects that the interlocking narratives might inject into the interpretive process. Once they are embedded inside the framing narratives, the experiential narratives are demoted and derealized: they are straw tales, mere excuses for the authorial presence to display its intellectual power. Rather than implementing a dialectical exchange between the experiential narrative and the framing narrative - and between reader and author - the interlocking narratives are reduced to a rhetorical manipulation, whose purpose is to focus the readers' attention on the authoritative authorial self. Once again, we see how the apology has the tendency to represent its opposition only in terms of itself. Just as the apology aggrandizes and then appropriates to itself the authority it would depose, so it reduces its opponents to stock alazons against whom the authorial eiron may display her superior wits.

### 2AC Coalitions Good

#### The affirmative’s challenge to Islamophobic indefinite detention policies creates an ideal intersectional space to build coalitions against racial violence—general claims to racial injustice are insufficient—we must coalesce around particular projects where there is a commonality of interest LIKE THE ADVOCACY

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Because of the various problems with coalition building, several scholars do not endorse it. For example, Delgado advocates laboring within your own group for the social justice goals you support. "For some projects, justice turns out to be a solitary though heroic quest, and the road to justice is one that must be traveled alone, or with our deepest, most trusted companions."' 4 Haunani-Kay Trask states that real organizing of native Hawaiians takes place outside of coalitions.205 She supports Malcolm X's claims that whites need to tackle racism within their own communities, rather than in coalition." "Work in conjunction with us-each working among our own kind."207 Despite the frictions and problems between various traditional and nontraditional groups, coalition building can be a useful tool of critical race praxis in the current period. African Americans have been used to being the dominant minority in the United States, able to keep their concerns at the center of the civil rights movement. Latinos are now surpassing Blacks numerically,208 and are the majority in California already.2 They will be 25% of the U.S. population by 2050.210 Blacks will have to learn to work in coalition with Latinos to ensure that Black concerns are not lost in a new dispensation of "favored minority." While the Latinos are becoming the majority minority, they are not as politically organized as the Blacks yet, with many being recent immigrants or noncitizens, who may not speak English.21 ' Thus in some instances, Latinos will need to learn from African Americans, and with them, to achieve various goals. Coalition is good for Asians because although they score higher on standardized tests and have a higher income level than the other minority groups, history has already shown that they remain regarded as perpetual foreigners,1 2 once subject to internment. 3 Native Americans constitute only two million people," 4 and can benefit from linking with the larger groups, some of whom may resent those tribes, who now profit from gambling casino wealth." 5 Arabs and Muslims need to join in coalition with the other groups because they are too small and too recent as immigrants in comparison to the other groups to go it alone. As the current personification of evil of the moment, they need to draw upon the resources of other groups for support. Coalition building does not happen in a vacuum. It must coalesce around particular projects where there is commonality of interest. For instance, Frank Valdes has noted that Latinos and Asians share a common interest in legal issues that involve "immigration, family, citizenship, nationhood, language, expression, culture, and global economic restructuring."216 Racial profiling is a potential issue for cooperation as it affects all the major minority groups. I will use it for illustrative purposes in the remainder of this section, even though it is only one of various issues that could be the basis for coalition building. Asian scholars have noted how both the recent mistreatment of Chinese American scientist Dr. Wen Ho Lee 2 17 and the interning of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II could both be regarded as cases of racial profiling.218 Kevin Johnson has called for Asians and Latinos to form political coalitions to challenge arbitrary INS conduct . 21 He also wants Blacks and Latinos to form coalitions to work on issues of racial profiling, as well.22° In the war against terrorism, racial profiling is particularly affecting Blacks, Latinos and South Asians who look Arab, creating an ideal intersectional issue for coalition building.22 ' Coalescing around profiling in these times will not be easy. In his timely book, Justice at War: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in a Time of Crisis, Richard Delgado, a founder of CRT, queries, "Will the establishment insist on Americanism and toeing the line in the war on terrorism, and demand that minorities demonstrate loyalty, in return for a symbolic concession or two?.. .Will it choose one minority group for favored treatment, in hope of keeping the others in line."2'22 There are several foreseeable scenarios in this regard. For example, the Bush administration could reconfigure rather than terminate various federal affirmative action programs after an expected hostile Supreme Court decision in the upcoming Michigan cases,223 to attempt to ensure Black support for the war efforts. The administration's rejection of the pro-affirmative action position of the University of Michigan may have attracted some Asian support.224 The perpetuation of the forty year old blockade against Cuba despite U.S. business opposition ensures Cuban American loyalty,225 and the rumored appointment of a Hispanic for the next U.S. Supreme Court vacancy may attract other Latinos.22 ' Delgado wonders whether people of color will "be able to work together toward mutual goals--or [will] the current factionalism and distrust continue into the future, with various minority groups competing for crumbs while majoritarian rule continue[s] unabated? 22

### AT: Global-Local K

#### The perm is key --- micropolitics in isolation ensures political movements will fracture and cede politics to the hard right --- turns the K

Todd Gitlin 3 professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph. D. program in Communications at Columbia University, “The Left, lost in the politics of identity” www.harpers.org/archive/1993/09/0001380

The continuing dispute over “political correctness” in the academy is, in significant part, the consequence of a transformation in the core idea of the left: the weakening, even breakdown, of the ideals of a common humanity that have animated it for more than two centuries. Some, though not all, of the right’s attacks are disingenuous. For example, we hear much from the right about the dangerous “politicization” of English and women’s studies, but no complaint when it comes to economics or business. But this shouldn’t obscure a troubling irony: the right, traditionally the custodian of the privileges of the few, now speaks in an apparently general language of merit, reason, individual rights, and virtue that transcends politics, whereas much of the left is so preoccupied with debunking generalizations and affirming the differences among groups–real as they often are–that it has ceded the very language of universality that is its birthright.¶ Instead, the left in recent years has had trouble going beyond what has come to be called “identity politics”–a politics that is rooted more in group self-assertion than in attempts to create broad alliances. Of course, oppressed groups must always struggle to overcome their second-class status; equality demands no less. But what began in the late 1960s as an assertion of dignity by various groups, a remedy for exclusion and denigration and a demand by the voiceless for representation, has developed its own habits and methods of silencing. At the extreme, in the academy but also outside it, standards and traditions are now viewed as nothing more than camouflage for particular interests. Many a dispute is premised on the idea that there is a fundamental difference between X (women, say, or people of color) and Y (white males); that X has been oppressed or silenced by Y and should therefore be hired, promoted, and specially represented on reading lists and at conferences.¶ The precursors of today’s advocates of identity politics were those scholars who, in the 1960s, were active in the civil-rights and antiwar movements-movements predicated on the universal values of equality, justice, and peace. These political campaigns and their underlying universalist assumptions shaped the work of these scholars in the early 1970s–making women’s history and literature legitimate, bolstering labor studies, rethinking slavery and the slaughter of the Indians, opening up the canon to hitherto silenced traditions. But unlike this generation of professors, most of today’s young academics had **no political experience in mass movements for general change** and, for that matter, no contact with a successful left-of-center Democratic Party. For them, fighting over appropriate language, symbolic representation (whether in the syllabus, curriculum, or faculty), affirmative action, or even musical styles is an end in itself, the principal way of claiming their politics. These post-Sixties radicals found universalism empty or–worse–a cover for white, straight, male power.¶ The intensification of identity politics is inseparable from a fragmentation of what I will call “commonality politics”–a frame of understanding that acknowledges “difference” but sees it against the background of what is not different, what is shared among groups. In large measure, things fell apart for the left because **the center could not hold**. For chronologically, the breakup of commonality politics predates the thickening of identity politics. The centrifugal surge, on campus and off, is obviously, in part, a product of the last quarter century of American demographic trends: growing immigration from Latin America, Asia, and Africa; white flight from cities; the integration of campuses in the wake of civil-rights victories; growing competition for scarce resources. These upheavals have taken place within the longer history of emancipatory politics that has snaked forward through the West since the revolutions of 1776, 1789, and 1848.¶ During the last two centuries, believers in a common humanity clustered around the two great progressive ideals: the liberal ideal enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and, later, in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens; and the radical ideal that crystallized as Marxism. Such legitimacy as the left enjoyed in the West rested on its claim to a place in the story of universal human emancipation. Whatever its immense failures, defaults, and sins, the left aspired to address itself not to particular men and women but to all, in the name of their common standing. Whether liberals or socialists, reformers or revolutionaries, the men and women of the left aimed to persuade their listeners to see their common interest as citizens.¶ Liberals emphasized the “unalienable rights” to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”–ideals that, however trampled in practice by those who were white and male and propertied, nevertheless could at least in principle be appealed to by oppressed groups. Marx, too, framed his politics in universal terms, arguing that a universal class, the workers, were destined to overcome their particular differences and realize a common identity: the human being as maker, realizing his “species being” in the course of transforming nature.¶ From this point of view, the intellectual radicalism of the early 1960s can be seen as a search for a universalist politics that might take the place of a Marxism that by then had lost its legitimacy. The left turned to participatory democracy and civil rights. But participatory democracy, though theoretically available to everyone, was in practice tailored to students who had the time and energy to spend at endless meetings. And the civil-rights movement, initially framed in universalist terms, could unify the left only until legal segregation was defeated in 1964–65. Once integration and voting rights had been secured, at least on paper, the alliance between liberals and radicals, integrationists and separatists, was strained to the breaking point. Blacks began to insist on black leadership, even sometimes on exclusively black membership in the movement.¶ Soon, too, the pioneers of women’s liberation rose against male supremacy. One grouping after another demanded the recognition of its difference. ¶ Difference came to be felt more acutely than commonality.¶ The crack-up of the universalist new left was inevitable, though it was muted for a while by the exigencies of the Vietnam War and the commonalities of youth culture. If there seemed in the late 1960s to be one big movement, it was largely because there was one big war. But the divisions of race and then gender and sexual orientation proved far too deep to be overcome by any language of unification. There was a lingering rhetorical style of universalist radicalism, but the political passion broke up into separate caucuses.¶ The resulting identity politics deserves credit for inspiring powerful studies in history, literature, and all manner of ideas. It has also proved more exciting and more energizing to activists than the politics of commonality–especially in the 1980s, with fights over hiring, requirements, curricula, and so forth taking place during a time of increasingly scarce resources, For the participants in these post-Sixties movements, the benefits of identity politics have been manifold: they provide experiences of solidarity and belonging, and remedies for specific injustices, along with ready-made reservoirs of recruits. As advertising, marketing, cable TV, and popular music have grown more and more specialized, dividing the mass audience into progressively narrower segments, so has university politics.¶ The left’s attention is now paid to group self-assertion rather than, say, campaigns against poverty or the bankrupting of public education. As once-excluded territories have been recognized in the academy, any lingering aspiration for the universal has been largely abandoned. Whatever universalism now remains is based not so much on a common humanity as on a common enemy=-the notorious White Male. While defenses of group rights often have a powerful logic, the idea of a common America and the idea of a unified left, both great legacies of the Enlightenment, have lost their force.¶ As a result, we find ourselves today in a most peculiar situation: the left and right have traded places, at least with respect to the sort of universalist rhetoric that can still stir the general public. Unable to go beyond the logic of identity politics, the disparate constituencies of the cultural left have **ceded much political high ground to the right**. Today, here and there on the left, one hears a half-whispered recognition that, beyond necessary demands for racial representation, feminist principles, gay rights, and so on, some common ground must be found: in campaigns for more economic equality and against poverty, unemployment, ecological depredation, and educational erosion. Ronald Reagan’s genius lay in his ability to demarcate common ground on the right. Unless it learns to speak its own language of commonality, the shards of the left will be condemned to their separate sectors, sometimes glittering, sometimes smashed, and mostly marginal.

### 2AC Distancing

#### Their kritik doesn’t come to grips with the interaction between suffering in places like Guantanamo now and our relationship to that—their kritik mirrors acts of distancing that say we should only focus on what’s in our purview—indefinite detention has maintained its legitimacy precisely because we view it as out there and not affecting us—we must bring the voices of those who can’t speak for themselves here

James Park 10, “EFFECTUATING PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION: HISTORICAL REPETITION AND THE CASE OF THE UYGHURS”, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 785

George Orwell once wrote in The Road to Wigan Pier regarding empire and the complicity of a nation that enjoys its fruits: For in the last resort, the only important question is, Do you want the British Empire to hold together or do you want it to disintegrate?... For, apart from any other consideration, the high standard of life we enjoy in England depends upon our keeping a tight hold on the Empire, particularly the tropical portions of it such as India and Africa. Under the capitalist system, in order that England may live in comparative comfort, a hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation. 128 How the old British Empire relates to the detention of Haitians and Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay involves the very question of conscious awareness and the difficulties in piercing the veil of physical and metaphysical detachment. 129 Descriptions of events transcribed through the filter of media form a buffer to action due to its intangible nature-there is an unreality to the medium of television where elements of reality that play across the screen can take on the discursive properties of the imaginary. 130 As a result, there can be quiet and passive acquiescence when terms, such as, "exceptional," "unprecedented," and "the normal rules do not apply" are heard and used to form the exigencies and justifications for "intensive interrogation methods" and indefinite detention without charge. 131 Spatial separation and isolation also create impediments to rectifying injustice. In the case of the Haitian refugees, service organizations had to go through the judiciary and spend years in litigation to gain access to the refugees at Guantanamo Bay. 13 In the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees caught up in the "War on Terror," there were explicated policies against denying access. 133 For instance, "[a] confidential 2003 manual for operating the Guantanamo detention center shows that military officials had a policy of denying detainees access to independent monitors" from the Red Cross. 134 In other words, those who had done no wrong were denied access and, as a result, justice. The indefinite detention of the Haitians and Uyghurs and the years they have spent and are spending in extra-territorial detention can, similarly, be examined through the prism of "punishment" as there have been alterations to the order and methodology of punishment and incarceration over time. 135 Punishment has changed from something that was acutely visible to something that has become cloaked and secreted away. 136 At one time, the public spectacle of punishment took center stage as a gory spectacle of physical pain. 137 These dramatic displays of "justice" provided all concerned with a specific role: The criminal to be punished acted as the star, the innocent public witnesses supplied the captivated audience, and the government authority directed this macabre melodrama. 138 These displays were therefore meant to educate both the individual criminals living (or in some cases dying), as well as the watching public as to the concepts of justice and punishment. 139 These theatrics later gave way to a less sensational mode of education which focused less on physical torment in pursuit of justice and sought to internalize a sense of a moral code in all individuals. 140 Thus, what was once a passive group of mere voyeurs has been disbanded to become a cluster of individual productions-each person now internalizes and imagines the process of punishment through the censored lens of courtroom dramas and the scripted cinema of the prison yard in popular culture, rather than bear witness to the realities of society's retribution. This more sanitary, internal approach to punishment is particularly pronounced when examined in the context of the "War on Terror." In this instance, the institutions of punishment are not only removed from the public eye, but from the very soil of our nation. 141 In point of fact, Guantanamo Bay is based in a country where United States citizens cannot visit without obtaining a license through the United States government due to a long-existing trade embargo which has only recently been revisited. 142 Guantanamo Bay has been argued to be territory that is outside the bounds of United States' sovereignty, thereby, prohibiting detainees from invoking habeas corpus to challenge their detention. 143 Proponents of this argument used the United States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided in 1950, which held that those detained in territories beyond the borders of United States sovereignty are unable to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. 144 Thus, Guantanamo Bay was argued to be the sovereign territory of the nation of Cuba as a convenient fiction despite the years of isolation between the two nations. 145 This argument was shattered when the United States Supreme Court held that habeas corpus for "War on Terror" detainees was due in Boumediene v. Bush, decided in 2008. 146 Even further tucked away from the public eye are the secret prisons-socalled "black sites"-instituted by the Bush Administration, operating extra-judicially and containing the faceless "ghost detainee," subject to "intensive interrogation methods."' 147 As the form of punishment and detention shifts further afield, it takes on a profound dimension of separation. George Orwell, in the excerpt above, was alluding to the natural tendency to accept the conditions with which people are presented. The automatic supposition that what may be taking placing is unjust and perhaps beyond the constitutional limits can be seemingly driven from conscious awareness by the public's separation from events and the lack of information. As a consequence, justice has proceeded at a slow, aggravated plod in rectifying wrong where, oftentimes, individuals are simply "released" quietly after years of imprisonment without the subject of their innocence ever being addressed.

### AT: Prisons K (Detention Specific)

#### A unique focus on military detention is critical and exposes flawed in the legal system—military detention establishes an unprecedented and new manifestation of prison systems characterized by no end or bounds—the fixture of military prisons in a space of lawlessness demands an exposition otherwise the stories are forgotten

Michelle Brown 5, “"Setting the Conditions" for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad”, American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 973-997, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v057/57.3brown.html>

Abu Ghraib, like Guantánamo and other U.S. military prisons, marks the kind of penal expansion that takes place in the context of wars with no end: wars on drugs, crime, and terror. In the U.S., we imprison more than anyone in the world and more than any other society has ever imprisoned for the purposes of crime control, and we do so in a manner that is defined by race.57 This unprecedented use of imprisonment has largely taken place outside of democratic checks or public interest, in disregard of decades of work by penal scholars and activists who have introduced a vocabulary of warning through terms such as "penological crisis," "incarceration binge," "prison-industrial complex," and the "warehousing" of offenders. Such massive expansion has direct effects upon the private lives of prisoners, prison workers, their families, [End Page 990] and their communities. I have tried, at least, to point to the ways in which these effects may extend far beyond their immediate contexts into a potential reconfiguration of public life. Such unprecedented penal expenditures mark the global emergence of a new discourse of punishment, one whose racial divisions and abusive practices are revised into a technical, legal language of acceptability, one in which Americans are conveniently further distanced from the social realities of punishment through strategies of isolation and exclusion, all conducted in a manner and on a scale that exacerbates the fundamental class, race, and gender contradictions and divisions of democracy. In this respect, the "new war prison" is constituted by both material practices and a discursive language whose expansion and intensification need recognize no limits, no borders, no bounds. I have used punishment and torture interchangeably across this piece, not because I believe they are without distinction or difference, but because I believe, as history and social theory teach us, that they are grounded in the same fundamental practice: the infliction of pain. Because punishment carries pain, rupture, and trauma with it, its implementation will always be fundamentally tragic. Torture, then, is not incidental to punishment. It is at its core. Instead of accepting this reality, the history of the practice and study of punishment is marred by an assumption that intention matters, that explanations and justifications define punishment and its appropriate use, and that the law can control its violence. However, these kinds of assumptions conceal the presence of the law itself. When punishment is invoked, it is always intended to remind the people of the power and presence of the state. However, this is an invocation that is precisely meant to be avoided in democratic contexts, as strong governments have no need to rely upon force. According to both Nietzsche and Durkheim, it is a weak state that will resort to a display of force and violence. Any regime that decides to inflict pain and harm will inevitably find itself caught up in a unique social institution whose essence is violence and whose justifications are inherently problematic. Punishment is, thus, always most usefully understood at its most elemental level: as a bloodlust for revenge, one whose essence is passion, unreason, anger, and emotion, whose invocation is highly individualized, subjective, and personal, an insatiable urge that knows no limits. In such a setting, as sociolegal scholar Austin Sarat argues, a "wildness" is introduced into the "house of law," wherein "private becomes public and public becomes private; passion is introduced into the temple of reason, and yet passion itself is subject to the discipline of reason. Every effort to distinguish revenge and retribution nevertheless reveals that 'vengeance arrives among us in a judicious disguise.'"58 The vengeance that underlies [End Page 991] the implied calm reason of systematic, procedural, proportional retribution cannot be repressed and is evidenced in contemporary patterns of punishment in the United States that often defy a rational logic of any kind. Any solidarity or sociality gained at the price of such punishment, then, speaks not only to the end of democracy but of humanity as well. And so we went from September 11 to a war on terror, from Abu Ghraib to the summer of beheadings in an endless repetition whose limits are defined currently only in the possibility of sheer exhaustion. For American studies, this means that Abu Ghraib operates at a series of intersections and borders that have rendered the fundamental contradictions of imprisonment in a democratic context acutely visible, if only temporarily. As the impossible case for democracy, the "scandal" at Abu Ghraib reveals how an unmarked proliferation of penal discourses, technologies, and institutions not only "set the conditions" for the grossest violations of democratic values but revealed the normalcy and acceptability of these kinds of practices in spaces beyond and between the law. Consequently, Abu Ghraib falls within a distinct category of legal and territorial borders, those spaces that sociolegal scholar Susan Bibler Coutin observes "defy categories and paradigms, that 'don't fit,' and that therefore reveal the criteria that determine fittedness, spaces whose very existence is simultaneously denied and demanded by the socially powerful." Capturing the sense of doubleness that characterizes Abu Ghraib, she describes these "targets of repression and zones of militarization" as contradictory spaces that "are marginalized yet strategic, inviolate yet continually violated, forgotten yet significant."59 Many peoples exist at these borders, and all stories may be told there. But, and this is of crucial significance, there is no guarantee that these stories will be told. So much of the writing and thought surrounding the borderlands has been directed at the development of a new social vision, derived from the pain of history and experience, but grounded in the celebratory justice of the inevitable, vindicating arrival of the hybrid. As Gloria Anzaldúa insists, "En unas pocas centurias, the future will belong to the mestiza."60 Yet Abu Ghraib falls squarely into the kind of border zone that cannot be celebrated, a subaltern site where many stories and voices will never be told or heard, no matter how we reconstruct its history and its events. Judith Butler observes that the subject outside of the law "is neither alive nor dead, neither fully constituted as a subject nor fully deconstituted in death."61 Under Saddam Hussein's rule, numberless thousands were lost in the prison. Under American occupation, "ghost detainees" were a prevalent problem, unidentified, vanished inside the institution's own lost accountability. As Žižek points out, these individuals constitute the "living dead," those missed [End Page 992] by bombs in the battlefield, "their right to life forfeited by their having been the legitimate targets of murderous bombings." This positioning has direct impact upon the legal privilege of their captors: "And just as the Guantánamo prisoners are located, like homo sacer, in the space 'between two deaths,' but biologically are still alive, the U.S. authorities that treat them in this way also have an indeterminate legal status. They set themselves up as a legal power, but their acts are no longer covered and constrained by the law: they operate in an empty space which is, nevertheless, within the domain of the law."62 The spectacle of abuse at Abu Ghraib makes plain the consequences of putting prisoners and custodians in this space "between two deaths," a legal borderland filled with spectral violence, a space packed with people and yet profoundly empty of its humanity. Bibler Coutin writes, "I cannot celebrate the space of nonexistence. Even if this space is in some ways subversive, even if its boundaries are permeable, and even if it is sometimes irrelevant to individuals' everyday lives, nonexistence can be deadly."63 When writing of Abu Ghraib, I find myself in a similar space, peering in at a border whose history, purpose, and foundations prevent it from being redeemed or reclaimed, its terrorized inhabitants the essence of Anzaldúa's "zero, nothing, no one."64 Abu Ghraib reminds us then of the pains we had hoped to transcend, of the "intimate terrorism" we had hoped to end, of the bloody sovereignty we had hoped to eclipse in a postnational context.65 As Anzaldúa observed of "life in the borderlands" nearly two decades ago: The world is not a safe place to live in. We shiver in separate cells in enclosed cities, shoulders hunched, barely keeping the panic below the surface of the skin, daily drinking shock along with our morning coffee, fearing the torches being set to our buildings, the attacks in the street. Shutting down . . . The ability to respond is what is meant by responsibility, yet our cultures take away our ability to act—shackle us in the name of protection. Blocked, immobilized, we can't move forward, we can't move backwards. That writhing serpent movement, the very movement of life, swifter than lightning. Frozen.66 In the working vocabulary and memory of a penal culture, Abu Ghraib remains a border lost to us, accessible only through the fixed and frozen images that remind us of its irrevocableness. We find ourselves, in a sense, at a new border that is very old, caught at the crossroads, left alone with America, asking, and with considerable trepidation, what will our futures be?67

#### The starting point of military detention allows an interrogation of us notions of punishment

Michelle Brown 5, “"Setting the Conditions" for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad”, American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 973-997, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v057/57.3brown.html>

As a site of unseemly conjunctures between various kinds of competing law, Abu Ghraib is an unusually complex instance of American imprisonment. Its gates mark encounters with United States, Islamic, military, criminal, and international human rights law. Its walls mark not simply the contours of sovereignty and the boundaries of the nation/state but, more significantly, their violation as an immense superpower engages in a preemptive strike, invasion, occupation, and torture. Within this configuration of power, transnational exportations of punishment materialize in a variety of manifestations: (1) in the sociopolitical contexts that define the lives of the primary actors caught up in the prison/military-industrial complex and its increasingly global economies; (2) through the international implementation of U.S. penal technologies with unprecedented exclusionary capabilities, epitomized in President Bush's desire to raze Abu Ghraib and build a "state of the art" supermax prison in its place; and (3) in the unregulated use of force outside of the boundaries of law, a violence juxtaposed and conflated with the memory and backdrop of penal horror under the regime of Saddam Hussein. Abu Ghraib, then, is the kind of place always caught in a double gesture. Regimes and governments attempt to deny and erase the prison's existence. Yet we are simultaneously unable to turn away from its grotesqueness, a site that demands investigation and thus constitutes, as ordered by military judicial ruling, "the scene of the crime."6 Prisons have long served as liminal spaces both inside and outside the boundaries of constitutional law, belonging to (in fact, invented by) but not of the United States. The birth of the penitentiary, a form of punishment defined [End Page 974] entirely upon the denial of freedom, is culturally grounded in democratic values. As historian David Rothman points out, incarceration emerged "at the very moment when Americans began to pride themselves on the openness of their society, when the boundless frontier became the symbol of opportunity and equality . . . as principles of freedom became more celebrated in the outside society."7 Sociolegal scholar David Garland depicts the penitentiary as a regime constructed upon notably American value systems, including "the targeting of 'liberty' as the object of punishment" and the "intensive focusing upon the individual in prison cells."8 However, as an institution fundamentally constructed through the inverse of these values, the American penitentiary rests upon a crucial cultural contradiction, the removal of liberty in a nation that would seek to preserve it, the use of violence to counter violence. As Michael Ignatieff writes: "Outside was a scrambling and competitive egalitarianism; inside, an unprecedented carceral totalitarianism."9 The prison is built upon an interior secret, a union of antithetical ideas and values. Its invocation always risks disclosing the weakness not simply of the sovereign state but of American democracy, founded in distinctly penal terms, including genocide and slavery. Prisons, then, are strategic research sites, from which we may always uncover the contradictions of American power. For these reasons, special attention must be given to how recent assertions of sovereignty by the United States, coded in penal terms, set the conditions for what Judith Butler refers to as the "new war prison," where "the current configuration of state power, in relation both to the management of populations (the hallmark of governmentality) and the exercise of sovereignty in the acts that suspend and limit the jurisdiction of law itself, are reconfigured," a context rife with possibilities for the violation of human rights.10 This corruptibility is, in part, an intrinsic property of punishment. To borrow Ignatieff's terminology, prisons are inherently "lesser evil" institutions. Even as democratic defense, such institutions always risk, in any invocation, the violation of foundational commitments to democracy. Even when applied in the context of legislative deliberation, judicial review, and adversarial constraint, they remain necessarily tragic and ultimately evil.11 However, events at Abu Ghraib and other contemporary domestic and war prisons prove most disconcerting not simply because of the absence of open, adversarial justification, but because of the larger absence of any perceived need for justification. As evidence emerges that Abu Ghraib was simply one site of detainee abuse among many in the war against terror,12 we realize the fear, as expressed by Amy Kaplan in her 2003 presidential address to the American Studies Association, that Guantánamo would become a story of our future, a world where "this floating [End Page 975] colony will become the norm rather than an anomaly, that homeland security will increasingly depend on proliferating these mobile, ambiguous spaces between the domestic and foreign."13 Abu Ghraib is, consequently, the kind of "unanticipated event," dramatic, poignant, and ugly all at once, in which the "normality of the abnormal is shown for what it is"—terror as usual. For these reasons, it also marks a critical site from which to consider how what it means to do American studies is irrevocably bound up with the practice and conjugation of U.S. punishment, not simply at home but abroad, and especially in those "mobile, ambiguous spaces" lost somewhere in between in a time of empire.

### AT: Abolition Alt

#### Non-reformist reforms fail

Angela Davis 4, Interview with Dylan Rodriguez, Davis: The Challenges of Prison Abolition, illinoisprisonwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/davis-challenges-of-prison-abolition.html

Angela: The seemingly unbreakable link between prison reform and prison development -- referred to by Foucault in his analysis of prison history -- has created a situation in which progress in prison reform has tended to render the prison more impermeable to change and has resulted in bigger, and what are considered "better," prisons.¶ The most difficult question for advocates of prison abolition is how to establish a balance between reforms that are clearly necessary to safeguard the lives of prisoners and those strategies designed to promote the eventual abolition of prisons as the dominant mode of punishment. In other words, I do not think that there is a strict dividing line between reform and abolition.¶ For example, it would be utterly absurd for a radical prison activist to refuse to support the demand for better health care inside Valley State, California's largest women's prison, under the pretext that such reforms would make the prison a more viable institution. Demands for improved health care, including protection from sexual abuse and challenges to the myriad ways in which prisons violate prisoners' human rights, can be integrated into an abolitionist context that elaborates specific decarceration strategies and helps to develop a popular discourse on the need to shift resources from punishment to education, housing, health care, and other public resources and services.

#### Embrace non-reformist reforms---advocacy geared around specific abolitionist issues avoids the risks of co-option and is necessary to alleviate tangible suffering in the interim

Liat Ben-Moshe 11, PhD in Sociology, Syracuse University, candidate at time of this dissertation, Genealogies of Resistance to Incarceration: Abolition Politics within Deinstitutionalization and Anti-Prison Activism in the U.S., surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=soc\_etd

When a system is abolished there is a danger that other systems that fulfills the same functions would arise to fill in the void left by the abolished system. More specifically, within the U.S. prison archipelago there is a clear overrepresentation of poor people of color. Therefore, some penal abolitionists (Davis 2000; Gilmore 2000) position slavery, the convict lease system and the prison industrial complex on a continuum, as sites of warehousing the racialized underclass. Under this analysis it is clear that just “tearing down the walls” is insufficient as the state will find another mechanism by which to construct and contain its unwanted populations (Appel 2002). Famed sociologist W.E. B Du Bois, in his book Black Reconstruction (1935), discusses abolition not as a mere negative process, one of tearing down. It is ultimately about creating new institutions. Du Bois was very insistent that in order to abolish slavery in modern times, new democratic institutions have to be established and maintained. Because that did not occur, slavery found a new home in Jim Crow, convict lease systems, second class education and mass incarceration. Thus, the abolition of slavery was only successful in the negative aspect, but no new institutions were created to successfully incorporate black people into the existing social order. Prisons today have thrived precisely because of the lack of such resources that Du Bois was arguing for. Prisons today cannot be abolished until such equality ensuring mechanisms are in place (Davis 2005). Being free of chains is only the beginning. ¶ What is the connection between abolition and reform? ¶ In Instead of Prisons (1976) the earliest published attempt to conceptualize prison abolition in the U.S., the connection between abolition and reform is already being raised. Some of the questions this booklet is trying to answer are whether it is possible to work for prison reform without being co-opted and whether working towards abolition means that prisoners will be left in intolerable conditions in the meantime. The authors believe that many reforms can be achieved in an abolitionary context. Reform and abolition are not mutually exclusive if one remembers that the goal is to replace prison, not strengthen or improve it. A useful tool is to imagine the long term goal of prison abolition as a chain for shorter campaigns around specific issues- like jail diversion, restitution programs, or the move of those released to community placements (Knopp et al. 1976).¶ In his pioneering manuscript Politics of Abolition, Thomas Mathiesen (1974) follows Andre Gorz’s distinction between reformist and “non-reformist” reforms. Reformist reforms are situated in the discursive formation of the system as is, so that any changes are made within or against this existing framework. Non-reformist reforms imagine a different horizon that should be realizable for the improvement of humanity, and are not limited by a discussion of what is possible at present. Mathiesen expands this notion to state that non-reformist reforms that are effective need to be of the abolishing kind. He also creates a typology that distinguishes between positive and negative reforms. Positive reforms are changes that improve the system so it will act more effectively, so that the system gains strength and abolition becomes more difficult. Examples of positive reforms in the current penal system include probation and technological monitoring systems (such as ankle bracelets) that, although they ensure that those convicted could live outside of the prisons, further the reach of the penal regime to populations and actions that it has not dealt with before. Another example is attempts to change the overcrowded conditions of many jails and prisons nationwide, which often results in building more units or new jails or prisons. On the other hand, negative reforms are changes that abolish or remove parts of the system on which it is dependent (Mathiesen 1974). An example of negative reforms could be to demand better health care for prisoners in current prisons and jails, to a point where the prison system won’t be able to afford these conditions and will have to start decarcerating inmates who require medical attention30. Even if it makes the system look more responsive, from a public relations standpoint, such reforms do not contribute to the growth of the system as a whole. ¶ Longtime anti-psychiatry activist Bonnie Burstow suggests, in her keynote speech in the 2009 PsychOut conference, that anti-psychiatry as a movement could benefit from the insights of prison abolitionists, especially as formulated by Quakers in the 1970s. Following the recommendations of Honey Knopp et al. (1976), Burstow suggests that the short term goals of anti-psychiatry activists, such as reform efforts, should be kept as such, as steps on the road that is not yet fully formulated- the unfinished road of abolition. At any given time, the work should be aimed not at reform as one link in the long term goal of abolition, but with goals for concrete and direct partial abolitions on the road to long term change.¶ Angela Y. Davis (2000a) does not believe there is a strict line between reform and abolition. The question is what kinds of reforms are sought and whether they will strengthen the system in the long run. For instance, fighting for health care for prisoners is something activists should support, as integral to abolitionist and decarceration strategies. However, some health care initiatives are opposed by abolitionists, such as attempts to open prison hospitals or separate clinical wards, as these would only expand the scope of incarceration in the long haul. Many prison abolition and anti-psychiatry activists are insistent that the trend to develop mental health services within the prison only serves to criminalize women with psychiatric and cognitive disabilities further, as quality health services of this nature are sparse in the community, while funds go to operate them within an already oppressive system. The same critique can be stated in the case of forensic units that are constructed in institutions and psychiatric hospitals, of course.

## 1AR

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#### Our 1AC represents an attempt to forge a democratic world that we want to live in---making the debate about us as persons or forcing us to confess our privilege diverts attention from structural inequalities by misidentifying the conditions of their removal---the permutation is the best strategy

Andrea Smith 13, intellectual, feminist, and anti-violence activist, The Problem with “Privilege,” http://anarchalibrary.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-problem-with-privilege-2013.html

This kind of politics then challenges the notions of “safe space” often prevalent in many activist circles in the United States. The concept of safe space flows naturally from the logics of privilege. That is, once we have confessed our gender/race/settler/class privileges, we can then create a safe space where others will not be negatively impacted by these privileges. Of course because we have not dismantled heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, settler colonialism or capitalism, these confessed privileges never actually disappear in “safe spaces.” Consequently, when a person is found guilty of his/her privilege in these spaces, s/he is accused of making the space “unsafe.” This rhetorical strategy presumes that only certain privileged subjects can make the space “unsafe” as if everyone isn’t implicated in heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, settler colonialism and capitalism. Our focus is shifted from the larger systems that make the entire world unsafe, to interpersonal conduct. In addition, the accusation of “unsafe” is also levied against people of color who express anger about racism, only to find themselves accused of making the space “unsafe” because of their raised voices. The problem with safe space is the presumption that a safe space is even possible.¶ By contrast, instead of thinking of safe spaces as a refuge from colonialism, patriarchy, and white supremacy, Ruthie Gilmore suggests that safe space is not an escape from the real, but a place to practice the real we want to bring into being. “Making power” models follow this suggestion in that they do not purport to be free of oppression, only that they are trying to create the world they would like to live in now. To give one smaller example, when Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, organized, we questioned the assumption that “women of color” space is a safe space. In fact, participants began to articulate that women of color space may in fact be a very dangerous space. We realized that we could not assume alliances with each other, but we would actually have to create these alliances. One strategy that was helpful was rather than presume that we were acting “non-oppressively,” we built a structure that would presume that we were complicit in the structures of white supremacy/settler colonialism/heteropatriarchy etc. We then structured this presumption into our organizing by creating spaces where we would educate ourselves on issues in which our politics and praxis were particularly problematic. The issues we have covered include: disability, anti-Black racism, settler colonialism, Zionism and anti-Arab racism, transphobia, and many others. However, in this space, while we did not ignore our individual complicity in oppression, we developed action plans for how we would collectively try to transform our politics and praxis. Thus, this space did not create the dynamic of the confessor and the hearer of the confession. Instead, we presumed we are all implicated in these structures of oppression and that we would need to work together to undo them. Consequently, in my experience, this kind of space facilitated our ability to integrate personal and social transformation because no one had to anxiously worry about whether they were going to be targeted as a bad person with undue privilege who would need to publicly confess. The space became one that was based on principles of loving rather than punitive accountability.¶ Conclusion¶ The politics of privilege have made the important contribution of signaling how the structures of oppression constitute who we are as persons. However, as the rituals of confessing privilege have evolved, they have shifted our focus from building social movements for global transformation to individual self-improvement. Furthermore, they rest on a white supremacist/colonialist notion of a subject that can constitute itself over and against others through self-reflexivity. While trying to keep the key insight made in activist/academic circles that personal and social transformation are interconnected, alternative projects have developed that focus less on privilege and more the structures that create privilege. These new models do not hold the “answer,” because the genealogy of the politics of privilege also demonstrates that our activist/intellectual projects of liberation must be constantly changing. Our imaginations are limited by white supremacy, settler colonialism, etc., so all ideas we have will not be “perfect.” The ideas we develop today also do not have to be based on the complete disavowal of what we did yesterday because what we did yesterday teaches what we might do tomorrow. Thus, as we think not only beyond privilege, but beyond the sense of self that claims privilege, we open ourselves to new possibilities that we cannot imagine now for the future.