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### 1AC---LEGITIMACY

#### CONTENTION 1 IS LEGITIMACY:

#### Current US detention policies are collapsing US legitimacy in the rule of law

Katherine L. Vaughns 8/12/13, JD from Berkley, professor of Law at the University of Maryland, "Of Civil Wrongs and Rights: Kiyemba v. Obama¶ and the Meaning of Freedom, Separation of¶ Powers, and the Rule of Law Ten Years After 9/11," Asian American Law Journal, Vol 20.1

As history will recall, in May 1977, former President Richard M. ¶ Nixon famously told British interviewer David Frost that “when the ¶ President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”163 The Bush ¶ administration, taking a page out of Nixon’s playbook, used various tactics, ¶ apparently effectively, to “dismantle constitutional checks and balances and ¶ to circumvent the rule of law.”164 In so doing, the administration took ¶ advantage of 9/11 to assert “the most staggering view of unlimited ¶ presidential power since Nixon’s assertion of imperial prerogatives.”165¶ The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Kiyemba III, reinstating as modified its ¶ opinion in Kiyemba I, is, as I have noted, now governing precedent. That ¶ earlier opinion, adopting a view that the government had argued all along, ¶ re-characterizes the law pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay as a ¶ matter of immigration. Immigration is an area of law where the sovereign ¶ prerogative on which an individual is admitted or excluded from entry into ¶ the United States is virtually immune from judicial review.166 The Bush ¶ administration long ago adopted the position that judicial review of its ¶ detention policies would frustrate its war efforts and its Commander-in Chief authority, so that efforts to fit Kiyemba within the immigration ¶ framework worked to the government’s benefit. But, as the Boumediene ¶ Court explained, “the exercise of [the Executive’s Commander-in-Chief] ¶ powers is vindicated, not eroded, when [or if] confirmed” by the ¶ judiciary.167¶ In 2007, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima observed that the ¶ rule of law—touted by the United States throughout the world since the end ¶ of World War II—has been “steadily undermined . . . since we began the ¶ so-called ‘War on Terror.’”168 “The American legal messenger,” Tashima notes, “has been regarded throughout the world as a trusted figure of ¶ goodwill, mainly by virtue of close identification with the message borne: ¶ that the rule of law is fundamental to a free, open, and pluralistic society,” ¶ that the United States represents “a government of laws and not of ¶ persons,” and that “no one—not even the President—is above the law.”169¶ But, according to Tashima, the actions that the United States has “taken in ¶ the War on Terror, especially [through] our detention policies, have belied our commitment to the rule of law and caused [a] dramatic shift in world opinion,” so that the War on Terror has been greeted internationally with ¶ “increasing skepticism and even hostility.”170 Put differently, the United ¶ States has shot the messenger—and with it, goes the message, the ¶ commitment to the rule of law, and our international credibility.¶ The primary assassin in this “assault on the role of law” is the ¶ argument “that the President is not bound by law—that he can flout the ¶ Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States as Commander-inChief during times of war.”171 Also wreaking havoc on the rule of law is ¶ the notion, described above, that the President’s actions in times of war are ¶ unreviewable, and that the judiciary has no role to play in checking ¶ wartime policies—a notion perpetuated by placement of issues like those ¶ raised in Kiyemba within the immigration framework.

#### First, military courts hamper US credibility---the plan’s key

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As these examples reveal, many propositions have been advanced to provide for a solution to these detainees with no particular success. Meanwhile, human rights advocates have their eyes centered on our nation. The Human Rights Watch has recently expressed its concerns with respect to the MCA. It advanced that the military commissions "fall far short of international due process standards." n156 It has been articulated that U.S. "artificial" derogation from the Geneva Conventions by virtue [\*440] of the MCA leaves open the door for other States to "opt-out" as well. In other words, any step back from the Geneva Conventions could also provoke mistreatment of captured U.S. military personnel. In addition, scholars of international jurisprudence claim there have been over 50 years since Geneva was entered into force and it has been applied in every conflict. n157 However, U.S. current policies undercut the overarching principles under international law to strive for uniform human rights policies around the World. In the current state of affairs, the Executive branch becomes three branches in one: legislator, executive enforcer, and judge of its own actions. The lack of independent judicial oversight deprives detainees from the opportunity of impartial judicial review of verdicts, regardless of their arbitrariness or lack of legal soundness.¶ In response to the consequences of this expansive executive power, the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that the use of military courts could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial, independent administration of justice is concerned. As detainees have increasingly been deemed non-enemy-combatants, it is possible to assess how the Executive, now Congressional actions, captures civilians who had no connection to the armed conflict. In other words, as a consequence of the disparate overreaching power of the political branches and a rather weakened Judiciary, the U.S. is substantially regarded by the international community with complete disapproval.¶ Thus, the impact of U.S. current polities in the International Community is, at the very least, alarming. If entitling the detainees to a unified due process approach seems unrealistic, at minimum, they should be treated in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Relevant provisions in the Third Convention provide that detainees are entitled to a presumption of protection thereunder, "until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." The detainees must first be designated as civilians, combatant, or criminals rather than lumped into a single composite group of unlawful combatants by presidential fiat. Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and those deprived of liberty shall be entitled [\*441] to take proceedings before a court." n158 The meaning of "court" within the Covenant was aimed at civilian courts, not military, in the sense that the preoccupation was to provide them with a fair adjudication with respect to the detainees' status. Yet, the U.S. Government chose to ignore the requirements under international law despite apparently false claims that it would be followed. n159 Instead, as previously discussed in Part II of this Article, Congress made sure that international law does not provide a substantive basis of relief for these detainees' claims by virtue of the MCA.¶ The vast cultural, economic and political differences among signatory States were deemed as plausible justification for permitting reservations treaties. By this mechanism, the States are provided the opportunity to somewhat "tailor" multilateral treaties to their realities. It is evident that the U.S. Government has granted itself the right not to be entirely bound by international law. How wise the use of this mechanism was undertaken by U.S. may be reflected by the current the impact of U.S. policies toward international law mandates. As the detainees' situation develops, however, the U.S. image within the international community is in serious jeopardy. As a result a widespread criticism of the U.S. policies generated an atmosphere of wariness of U.S's ability and willingness to preserve individuals' fundamental rights at any time a situation is categorized as "emergency."¶ [\*442] V. CONCLUSION¶ All the problems outlined in this Article can be corrected. It would not take more than going back to the Constitution and reconstituting the Framers' intent in promoting the leadership of the country as an integral body composed by the three branches of Government. The U.S. Government should ensure that the wide gap between domestic law and the law of armed conflict is minimized by allowing those tried before military commissions to receive trials up to the level of American justice. If no action is taken, the American justice once internationally admired will give space to a stain in the American history. Congress should be more active in undertaking its role of making the law rather than merely voting on proposals based on their political agenda or the Executive's wishes. The Judiciary should step up and actively "say what the law is" rather than handing down amorphous rulings stigmatizing detainees on the basis of their citizenship status. Under basic constitutional principles, doing justice means equal protections of the laws. Using the claim of times of emergency to justify abusive treatment does not foster a democratic society. If the military is not able to advance legal grounds to hold these detainees, they should be released. The Judiciary should be eager to have a case challenging the MCA sooner rather than later and take the opportunity to lay down a clearly ruling on how these detainees should be accorded equal safeguards regardless of their race, national origin, or status. In other words, the Judiciary should take back what Congress has taken away, through implementing major modifications to the Executive's ill-conceived policies regarding commissions. In terms of meaningful separation of powers mandates, what the Constitution has given, Congress cannot take away.

#### Second, current US policy conveys xenophobia---independently decks legitimacy

Neal K. Katyal 07, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Equality in the War on Terror," Stanford Law Review, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1365-1394, scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1408&context=facpub

There is simply no reason why the government must subject aliens who are alleged to have participated in acts of terrorism to military commissions, but need not do so for citizens suspected of the same crimes. If it is truly necessary to treat aliens this way to combat terrorism effectively, then the very same need would exist for citizens as well. A citizen who commits a terrorist act is just as culpable as the alien who commits that act. Indeed, there is an argument that the citizen’s actions are worse—since he is guilty of treason in addition to whatever else he has perpetrated.¶ The breakdown in parity between citizen and alien post-9/11 is a new, and disturbing, trend. Even the horrendous internment of Japanese Americans in World War II applied symmetrically to citizens and aliens. 98 The policy was memorably defended by Lieutenant General John DeWit before Congress: “A Jap’s a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not.” 99 Some, such as former Chief Justice Rehnquist, have disagreed, arguing that the problem in World War II was applying these exclusion orders to citizens. His argument was grounded entirely upon the Alien Enemy Act, which he recognized permitted only the “‘summary arrest, internment and deportation wherever a declared war exists.’” 100 Entirely missing from this account was any discussion of whether a disparity between alien and citizen might have made matters worse, instead of better. After all, the one positive thing that can be said in the policy’s favor was that at least it affected a few people who could vote. 101¶ To say this is not to argue that liberty concerns are always inappropriate and that the government has carte blanch e when it acts evenhandedly. There are some substantive constitutional principles—such as prohibiting the mass detention of an entire race of people without any individualized basis—that properly should be frozen into constitutional law. But when the boundaries of liberty are uncertain, as they tend to be today, equality arguments offer a mechanism to prompt legislative reconsideration and democratic accountability.¶ Laws of general applicability are not only preferable, they also keep us safer. In affording the same process to alien and citizen detainees, we maintain the superiority of our judicial system. The federal courts have a tried and true record of discerning the guilty from the innocent without turning to arbitrary distinctions such as alienage. Our civilian courts have handled a variety of challenges and complicated cases—from the trial of the Oklahoma City bombers to the awful spying of Aldrich Ames and others. They have tried the 1993 World Trade Center bombers, Manuel Noriega, and dozens of other cases. They have prosecuted cases where the crimes were committed abroad. Indeed, the Justice Department has recently extolled its resounding success in terrorism cases in federal civilian court—where it has proceeded to charge nearly 500 individuals with crimes of terrorism. 102 Our national security policy requires adherence to a judicial process that works for all terrorist suspects. A two- tiered justice system jeopardizes not only the rights of alien suspects, but also the safety of American citizens.¶ As the world becomes even smaller, and the movement of people across borders becomes even more fluid, we need a unitary legal system that is capable of embracing all those in our jurisdiction: one that does not pick and choose who gets fundamental protections. Only then can we be assured that the real terrorists are brought to justice.¶ Moreover, legislation should not play on post-9/11 xenophobia. In the wake of terrorism, fears are heightened, rationality is muted, and it is the government’s responsibility to be the source of reason amidst the chaos, not to fan fears and stimulate even greater hatred. In pointing toward alien detainees as the sole source of danger, however, legislation such as the MCA fails to provide actual solutions to the threat of terrorism. Our policy cannot afford to dally under any delusions that foreigners are the sole source of terrorist impulses. The threat of terrorism permeates all borders, and only fair and evenhanded laws can effectively ferret out that threat. Allowing rank discrimination to drive policy takes attention away from national security and focuses on meaningless distinctions of “us” versus “them.” 103¶ Finally, in the wake of international disdain for the military tribunals authorized by President Bush, our country is already under global scrutiny for its disparate treatment of non-U.S. citizens. We must be careful not to further the perception that, in matters of justice, the U.S. government adopts special rules that single out foreigners for disfavor. Otherwise, the result will be more international condemnation and increased enmity about Americans worldwide. The predictable result will be less cooperation and intelligence sharing, and fewer extraditions to boot.¶ In this respect, the laws of war have changed markedly in recent years, and now reflect the basic equality principle. The Geneva Conventions, for example, require a signatory to treat enemy prisoners of war the same way as it treats its own soldiers. 104 Even for non-prisoners of war, the minimum requirements of Common Article 3 require trials to take place in a “regularly constituted court.” 105 As the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary puts it:¶ [C]ourt proceedings should be carried out in a uniform manner, whatever the nationality of the accused. Nationals, friends, enemies, all should be subject to the same rules of procedure and judged by the same courts. There is therefore no question of setting up special tribunals to try war criminals of enemy nationality. 106¶ Again, the logic of such provisions is best understood as creating virtual representation—ensuring that the interests of accused enemies will be vindicated by the application of longstanding procedural rules for the trial of the signatory power’s own troops.¶ Fidelity to these precepts, far from undermining the war on terror, is the best way to win it. By demonstrating that America is not being unfair—and by subjecting those from other lands to the same justice Americans face for the same crimes—America projects not only benevolence, but strength. America’s soft power depends, in no small part, on being able to rise above pettiness and to highlight the vitality of our system. Carving out special rules for “them” and reserving different rules for “us” is no way to win respect internationally. ¶ The British experience provides a useful contrast. The House of Lords in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 107 struck down the terrorist detention policy on equality grounds. They found that there was no reasonable or objective justification why a non-U.K. national suspected of being a terrorist could be detained while a U.K. national would be allowed to go free. The Lords rejected the Attorney General’s arguments that immigration law and international law justified differential treatment, including detention, of aliens in times of war or public emergency. 108 As Lord Nicholls put it, “The principal weakness in the Government’s case lies in the different treatment accorded to nationals and non-nationals. . . . The Government has vouchsafed no persuasive explanation of why national security calls for a power of indefinite detention in one case but not the other.” 109 The upshot was that it was “difficult to see how the extreme circumstances, which alone would justify such detention, can exist when lesser protective steps apparently suffice in the case of British citizens suspected of being international terrorists.” 110¶ Sadly, the experience of Britain under the European Convention on Human Rights is far truer to our backbone of equality than that of our own politicians under our own Constitution, who conveniently forget about equality even on fundamental decisions such as who would face a military trial with the death penalty at stake. Indeed, the United Kingdom reacted to the decision by adopting laws that treated citizens and foreigners alike. 111 Although our Founders broke away from Britain in part because of the King’s refusal to adhere to the basic proposition that “all men are created equal,” it is now Britain that is teaching us about the meaning of those words.¶ In sum, by splitting our legal standards on the basis of alienage, we are in effect jeopardizing our own safety and national interest. When terror policy is driven by anti-alien sentiment, the result is only our own isolation. It will not only chill relations with key allies abroad and disrupt extraditions, it will also alienate many of our own citizens who have relied on our country’s longstanding commitment to equal justice for all.

#### The plan’s external oversight on detention maintains heg---legitimacy is the vital internal link to global stability

Robert Knowles 9, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring, “Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, Lexis

The hegemonic model also reduces the need for executive branch flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the courts. The stability of the current U.S.-led international system depends on the ability of the U.S. to govern effectively. Effective governance depends on, among other things, predictability. n422 G. John Ikenberry analogizes America's hegemonic position to that of a "giant corporation" seeking foreign investors: "The rule of law and the institutions of policy making in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and [\*155] accountability." n423 Stable interpretation of the law bolsters the stability of the system because other nations will know that they can rely on those interpretations and that there will be at least some degree of enforcement by the United States. At the same time, the separation of powers serves the global-governance function by reducing the ability of the executive branch to make "abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states." n424¶ The Bush Administration's detainee policy, for all of its virtues and faults, was an exceedingly aggressive departure from existing norms, and was therefore bound to generate intense controversy. It was formulated quickly, by a small group of policy-makers and legal advisors without consulting Congress and over the objections of even some within the executive branch. n425 Although the Administration invoked the law of armed conflict to justify its detention of enemy combatants, it did not seem to recognize limits imposed by that law. n426 Most significantly, it designed the detention scheme around interrogation rather than incapacitation and excluded the detainees from all legal protections of the Geneva Conventions. n427 It declared all detainees at Guantanamo to be "enemy combatants" without establishing a regularized process for making an individual determination for each detainee. n428 And when it established the military commissions, also without consulting Congress, the Administration denied defendants important procedural protections. n429¶ In an anarchic world characterized by great power conflict, one could make the argument that the executive branch requires maximum flexibility to defeat the enemy, who may not adhere to international law. Indeed, the precedents relied on most heavily by the Administration in the enemy combatant cases date from the 1930s and 1940s - a period when the international system was radically unstable, and the United States was one of several great powers vying for advantage. n430 But during that time, the executive branch faced much more exogenous pressure from other great powers to comply with international law in the treatment of captured enemies. If the United States strayed too far from established norms, it would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or other consequences from [\*156] powerful rivals. Today, there are no such constraints: enemies such as al Qaeda are not great powers and are not likely to obey international law anyway. Instead, the danger is that American rule-breaking will set a pattern of rule-breaking for the world, leading to instability. n431 America's military predominance enables it to set the rules of the game. When the U.S. breaks its own rules, it loses legitimacy.¶ The Supreme Court's response to the detainee policy enabled the U.S. government as a whole to hew more closely to established procedures and norms, and to regularize the process for departing from them. After Hamdi, n432 the Department of Defense established a process, the CSRTs, for making an individual determination about the enemy combatant status of all detainees at Guantanamo. After the Court recognized habeas jurisdiction at Guantanamo, Congress passed the DTA, n433 establishing direct judicial review of CSRT determinations in lieu of habeas. Similarly, after the Court declared the military commissions unlawful in Hamdan, n434 this forced the Administration to seek congressional approval for commissions that restored some of the rights afforded at courts martial. n435 In Boumediene, the Court rejected the executive branch's foreign policy arguments, and bucked Congress as well, to restore the norm of habeas review. n436¶ Throughout this enemy combatant litigation, it has been the courts' relative insulation from politics that has enabled them to take the long view. In contrast, the President's (and Congress's) responsiveness to political concerns in the wake of 9/11 has encouraged them to depart from established norms for the nation's perceived short-term advantage, even at the expense of the nation's long-term interests. n437 As Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal have observed, "treaties are part of [a] system of time-tested standards, and this feature makes the wisdom of their judicial interpretation manifest." n438¶ At the same time, the enemy combatant cases make allowances for the executive branch's superior speed. The care that the Court took to limit the issues it decided in each case gave the executive branch plenty of time to [\*157] arrive at an effective detainee policy. n439 Hamdi, Rasul, and Boumediene recognized that the availability of habeas would depend on the distance from the battlefield and the length of detention. n440¶ The enemy combatant litigation also underscores the extent to which the classic realist assumptions about courts' legitimacy in foreign affairs have been turned on their head. In an anarchic world, legitimacy derives largely from brute force. The courts have no armies at their disposal and look weak when they issue decisions that cannot be enforced. n441 But in a hegemonic system, where governance depends on voluntary acquiescence, the courts have a greater role to play. Rather than hobbling the exercise of foreign policy, the courts are a key form of "soft power." n442 As Justice Kennedy's majority opinion observed in Boumediene, courts can bestow external legitimacy on the acts of the political branches. n443 Acts having a basis in law are almost universally regarded as more legitimate than merely political acts. Most foreign policy experts believe that the Bush Administration's detention scheme "hurt America's image and standing in the world." n444 The restoration of habeas corpus in Boumediene may help begin to counteract this loss of prestige.¶ Finally, the enemy combatant cases are striking in that they embrace a role for representation-reinforcement in the international realm. n445 Although defenders of special deference acknowledge that courts' strengths lie in protecting the rights of minorities, it has been very difficult for courts to protect these rights in the face of exigencies asserted by the executive branch in foreign affairs matters. This is especially difficult when the minorities are alleged enemy aliens being held outside the sovereign territory of the United States in wartime. In the infamous Korematsu decision, another World War II-era case, the Court bowed to the President's factual assessment of the emergency justifying detention of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry living in the United States. n446 In Boumediene, the Court [\*158] pointedly declined to defer to the executive branch's factual assessments of military necessity. n447 The court may have recognized that a more aggressive role in protecting the rights of non-citizens was required by American hegemony. In fact, the arguments for deference with respect to the rights of non-citizens are even weaker because aliens lack a political constituency in the United States. n448 This outward-looking form of representation-reinforcement serves important functions. It strengthens the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony by establishing equality as a benchmark and reinforces the sense that our constitutional values reflect universal human rights. n449¶ Conclusion¶ When it comes to the constitutional regime of foreign affairs, geopolitics has always mattered. Understandings about America's role in the world have shaped foreign affairs doctrines. But the classic realist assumptions that support special deference do not reflect the world as it is today. A better, more realist, approach looks to the ways that the courts can reinforce and legitimize America's leadership role. The Supreme Court's rejection of the government's claimed exigencies in the enemy combatant cases strongly indicates that the Judiciary is becoming reconciled to the current world order and is asserting its prerogatives in response to the fewer constraints imposed on the executive branch. In other words, the courts are moving toward the hegemonic model. In the great dismal swamp that is the judicial treatment of foreign affairs, this transformation offers hope for clarity: the positive reality of the international system, despite terrorism and other serious challenges, permits the courts to reduce the "deference gap" between foreign and domestic cases.

#### Nuclear war

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This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Material power’s irrelevant---lack of legitimacy makes heg ineffective

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Going against common conceptions, I argue that the United States sought to advance more than what it viewed as simply its own interest. The United States stands behind multiple collaborative enterprises and should be credited for that. Nevertheless, sometimes it has overreached, sought to gain special rights other states do not have, or presented strategies that were not compatible with the general design of the war on terrorism, to which most states subscribed. When it went too far, the United States found that, while secondary powers could not stop it from taking action, they could deny it legitimacy and make the achievement of its objectives unattainable. Thus, despite the common narrative, U.S. power was successfully checked, and the United States found the limitations of its power, even under the Bush administration. Defining Hegemony Let me begin with my conception of hegemony. While the definition of hegemony is based on its material aspects—the preponderance of power—hegemony should be understood as a part of a social web comprised of states. A hegemon relates to the other states in the system not merely through the prism of power balances, but through shared norms and a system of rules providing an umbrella for interstate relations. Although interstate conflict is ubiquitous in international society and the pursuit of particularistic interests is common, the international society provides a normative framework that restricts and moderates the hegemon's actions. This normative framework accounts for the hegemon's inclination toward orderly and peaceful interstate relations and minimizes its reliance on power. A hegemon’s role in the international community relies on legitimacy. Legitimacy is associated with external recognition of the hegemon’s right of primacy, not just the fact of this primacy. States recognize the hegemon’s power, but they develop expectations that go beyond the idea that the hegemon will act as it wishes because it has the capabilities to do so. Instead, the primacy of the hegemon is manifested in the belief that, while it has special rights that other members of the international society lack, it also has a set of duties to the members of the international society. As long as the hegemon realizes its commitment to the collective, its position will be deemed legitimate. International cooperation is hard to achieve. And, in general, international relations is not a story of harmony. A state’s first inclination is to think about its own interests, and states always prefer doing less over doing more. The inclination to pass the buck or to free ride on the efforts of others is always in the background. If a hegemon is willing to lead in pursuit of collective interests and to shoulder most of the burden, it can improve the prospects of international cooperation. However, even when there is a hegemon willing to lead a collective action and when states accept that action is needed, obstacles may still arise. These difficulties can be attributed to various factors, but especially prominent is the disagreement over the particular strategy that the hegemon promotes in pursuing the general interest. When states think that the strategy and policies offered by the hegemon are not compatible with the accepted rules of “rightful conduct” and break established norms, many will disapprove and resist. Indeed, while acceptance of a hegemon’s leadership in international society may result in broad willingness to cooperate with the hegemon in pursuit of shared interests it does not guarantee immediate and unconditional compliance with all the policies the hegemon articulates. While its legitimacy does transfer to its actions and grants some leeway, that legitimacy does not justify every policy the hegemon pursues—particularly those policies that are not seen as naturally deriving from the existing order. As a result, specific policies must be legitimated before cooperation takes place. This process constrains the hegemon’s actions and prevents the uninhibited exercise of power.

#### Independently, absent renewal of rule of law principles, multilateral cooperation to solve warming and disease is impossible

John G. Ikenberry 11, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, Spring, “A World of Our Making”, http://www.democracyjournal.org/20/a-world-of-our-making.php?page=all

Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful? Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long-term threats and opportunities that lie beyond the country’s shores. Given the great shifts in the global system and the crisis of liberal hegemonic order, how should the United States pursue grand strategy in the coming years? The answer is that the United States should work with others to rebuild and renew the institutional foundations of the liberal international order and along the way re-establish its own authority as a global leader. The United States is going to need to invest in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities. That is, the United States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu oriented. With a positional grand strategy, a great power seeks to diminish the power or threat embodied in a specific challenger state or group of states. Examples are Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet bloc, and perhaps—in the future—Greater China. With a milieu-oriented grand strategy, a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security. This might entail building the infrastructure of international cooperation, promoting trade and democracy in various regions of the world, and establishing partnerships that might be useful for various contingencies. My point is that under conditions of unipolarity, in a world of diffuse threats, and with pervasive uncertainty over what the specific security challenges will be in the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did with the fascist and communist powers of the last century. Indeed, compared with the dark days of the 1930s or the Cold War, America lives in an extraordinarily benign security environment. Rather than a single overriding threat, the United States and other countries face a host of diffuse and evolving threats. Global warming, nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy security, health pandemics—these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats could endanger Americans’ lives and way of life either directly or indirectly by destabilizing the global system upon which American security and prosperity depends. What is more, these threats are interconnected—and it is their interactive effects that represent the most acute danger. And if several of these threats materialize at the same time and interact to generate greater violence and instability, then the global order itself, as well as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk. What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security interdependence. More and more of what goes on in other countries matters for the health and safety of the United States and the rest of the world. Many of the new dangers—such as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violence—stem from the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, technologies of violence are evolving, providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at a greater distance. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and protections. The United States can-not hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action against this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from threats. To engage in liberal order building is to invest in international cooperative frameworks—that is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc.—in which the United States operates. To build international order is to increase the global stock of “social capital”—which is the term Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and other social scientists have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems. If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are the specific objectives and what is the policy agenda? There are five such objectives. First, the United States needs to lead in the building of an enhanced protective infrastructure that helps prevent the emergence of threats and limits the damage if they do materialize. Many of the threats mentioned above are manifest as socioeconomic backwardness and failure that cause regional and international instability and conflict. These are the sorts of threats that are likely to arise with the coming of global warming and epidemic disease. What is needed here is institutional cooperation to strengthen the capacity of governments and the international com-munity to prevent epidemics or food shortages or mass migrations that create global upheaval—and mitigate the effects of these upheavals if they occur. The international system already has a great deal of this protective infrastructure—institutions and networks that pro-mote cooperation over public health, refugees, and emergency aid. But as the scale and scope of potential problems grow in the twenty-first century, investments in these preventive and management capacities will also need to grow. Early warning systems, protocols for emergency operations, standby capacities, etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The idea is to update the old bargains that lie behind these security pacts. In NATO, but also in the East Asia bilateral partner-ships, the United States agrees to provide security protection to the other states and brings its partners into the process of decision-making over the use of force. In return, these partners agree to work with the United States—providing manpower, logistics, and other types of support—in wider theaters of action. The United States gives up some autonomy in strategic decision-making, although it is more an informal restraint than a legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and legitimate collective action. The first move here should be to reform the United Nations, starting with the expansion of the permanent membership on the Security Council. Several plans have been proposed. All of them entail adding new members—such as Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others—and reforming the voting procedures. Almost all of the candidates for permanent membership are mature or rising democracies. The goal, of course, is to make them stakeholders in the United Nations and thereby strengthen the primacy of the UN as a vehicle for global collective action. There really is no substitute for the legitimacy that the United Nations can offer to emergency actions—humanitarian interventions, economic sanctions, uses of force against terrorists, and so forth. Public support in advanced democracies grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action. Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China will most likely be a dominant state, and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The United States should respond to the rise of China by strengthening the rules and institutions of the liberal international order—deepening their roots, integrating rising capitalist democracies, sharing authority and functional roles. The United States should also intensify cooperation with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliances and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global system—one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East Asia that can provide a framework for managing the coming shifts. The idea is not to block China’s entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region. Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American officials after World War II championed the building of a rule-based postwar order, they articulated a distinctive internationalist vision of order that has faded in recent decades. It was a vision that entailed a synthesis of liberal and realist ideas about economic and national security, and the sources of stable and peaceful order. These ideas—drawn from the experiences with the New Deal and the previous decades of war and depression—led American leaders to associate the national interest with the building of a managed and institutionalized global system. What is needed today is a renewed public philosophy of liberal internationalism—a shift away from neoliberal-ism—that can inform American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with rules rather than dominate with power; provide public goods and connect their provision to cooperative and accommodative policies of others; build and renew international rules and institutions that work to reinforce the capacities of states to govern and achieve security and economic success; keep the other liberal democracies close; and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. As it navigates this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security. It will not be able to depend on unipolar power or airtight borders. It will need, above all else, authority and respect as a global leader. The United States has lost some of that authority and respect in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.

#### Warming causes extinction

Don Flournoy 12, Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center and Don is a PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 ).

#### Diseases end civilization

David Quammen 12, award-winning science writer, long-time columnist for Outside magazine for fifteen years, with work in National Geographic, Harper's, Rolling Stone, the New York Times Book Review and other periodicals, 9/29, “Could the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?,” The Guardian, pg. 29, Lexis

Infectious disease is all around us. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can seem grisly and dreadful, under ordinary conditions, it's every bit as natural as what lions do to wildebeests and zebras. But conditions aren't always ordinary. Just as predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new target. Aberrations occur. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a zoonosis. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic. It's a word of the future, destined for heavy use in the 21st century. Ebola and Marburg are zoonoses. So is bubonic plague. So was the so-called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox, bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia. Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of a pathogen that can "spillover", crossing into people from other animals. Aids is a disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their effects. Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years. Zoonotic pathogens can hide. The least conspicuous strategy is to lurk within what's called a reservoir host: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat? To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening 2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of Sars, the scenario could have been very much worse. Apart from the 2003 outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto. If the virus had arrived in a different sort of big city - more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical institutions - it might have burned through a much larger segment of humanity. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the 1918-1919 influenza. And that infamous global pandemic occurred in the era before globalisation. Everything nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses. When the Next Big One comes, it will likely conform to the same perverse pattern as the 1918 influenza: high infectivity preceding notable symptoms. That will help it move through cities and airports like an angel of death. The Next Big One is a subject that disease scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately, not every virus goes airborne from one host to another. If HIV-1 could, you and I might already be dead. If the rabies virus could, it would be the most horrific pathogen on the planet. The influenzas are well adapted for airborne transmission, which is why a new strain can circle the world within days. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary in 2003 to the people who understood it best. Human-to-human transmission is the crux. That capacity is what separates a bizarre, awful, localised, intermittent and mysterious disease (such as Ebola) from a global pandemic. Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing possibility. It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe: with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "As long as H5N1 is out there in the world," Webster told me, "there is the possibility of disaster. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God help us." We're unique in the history of mammals. No other primate has ever weighed upon the planet to anything like the degree we do. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant. We are an outbreak. And here's the thing about outbreaks: they end. In some cases they end after many years, in others they end rather soon. In some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again. Populations of tent caterpillars, for example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could account for such sudden and recurrent collapses? One possible factor is infectious disease, and viruses in particular.

#### Judicial involvement is key to the credibility of detention decisions

Matthew C Waxman 9, Professor of Law; Faculty Chair, Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security, “Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform”, November 3, Book

Judicial review can help safeguard liberty and enhance the credibility at home and abroad of administrative detention decisions by ensuring the neutrality of the decisionmaker and publicly certifying the legality of the detention in question. Most calls for reform of existing detention laws start with a 47 strong role for courts. Some commentators believe that a special court is needed, perhaps a “national security court” made up of designated judges who would build expertise in terrorism cases over time. 16 Others suggest that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court already has judges with expertise in handling sensitive intelligence matters and mechanisms in place to ensure secrecy, so its jurisdiction ought to be expanded to handle detention cases. 17 Still others insist that specialized terrorism courts are dangerous; the legitimacy of a detention system can best be ensured by giving regular, generalist judges a say in each decision. ¶ Adversarial process and access to attorneys can help further protect liberty and enhance the perceived legitimacy of detention systems. As with judicial review, however, proposals tend to split over how best to organize and ensure that process. Some argue that habeas corpus suits are the best check on administrative detention. 18 Others argue that administrative detention decisions should be contested at an early stage by a lawyer of the detainee’s choosing. 19 Still others recognize an imperative need for secrecy and deep expertise in terrorism and intelligence matters that calls for designating a special “defense bar” operated by the government on detainees’ behalf.¶ The issue of secrecy runs in tension with a third common element of procedural and institutional reform proposals: openness and transparency. The Bush administration’s approach was considered by some to be prone to error in part because of its excessive secrecy and hostility to the prying courts and Congress as well as to the press and advocacy groups. Critics and reformists argue that hearings should be open or at least partially open and that judgments should be written so that they can be scrutinized later by the public or congressional oversight committees; that, they claim, would help put pressure on the executive branch to exercise greater care in deciding which detention cases to pursue and put pressure on adjudicators to act in good faith and with more diligence.¶ These three elements of procedural design reform— judicial review, adversarial process, and transparency— may help reduce the likelihood of mistakes and restore the credibility of detention decisionmaking. Rarely, though, do the discussions pause long on the antecedent question of what it is that the courts— however constituted— will evaluate. Judicial review of what? A meaningful opportunity to contest what with the assistance of counsel? Transparent determinations of what?

### 1AC---DEMOCRACY

#### CONTENTION 2 IS DEMOCRACY

#### Democratic liberalism is backsliding now---the US model of an unrestrained executive causes collapse

Larry Diamond 9, Professor of Political Science and Sociology @ Stanford, “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Democracy”, Presented to the SAIS-CGD Conference on New Ideas in Development after the Financial Crisis, Conference Paper that can be found on his Vita

Concern about the future of democracy is further warranted by the gathering signs of a democratic recession, even before the onset of the global economic recession. During the past decade, the global expansion of democracy has essentially leveled off and hit an equilibrium While freedom (political rights and civil liberties) continued to expand throughout the post-Cold War era, that progress also halted in 2006, and 2007 and 2008 were the worst consecutive years for freedom since the end of the Cold War, with the number of countries declining in freedom greatly outstripping the number that improved. Two-thirds of all the breakdowns of democracy since the third wave began in 1974 have occurred in the last nine years, and in a number of strategically important states like Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan and Thailand. Many of these countries have not really returned to democracy. And a number of countries linger in a twilight zone between democracy and authoritarianism. While normative support for democracy has grown around the world, it remains in many countries, tentative and uneven, or is even eroding under the weight of growing public cynicism about corruption and the self-interested behavior of parties and politicians. Only about half of the public, on average, in Africa and Asia meets a rigorous, multidimensional test of support for democracy. Levels of distrust for political institutions—particularly political parties and legislatures, and politicians in general—are very high in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and in parts of Asia. In many countries, 30-50 percent of the public or more is willing to consider some authoritarian alternative to democracy, such as military or one-man rule. And where governance is bad or elections are rigged and the public cannot rotate leaders out of power, skepticism and defection from democracy grow. Of the roughly 80 new democracies that have emerged during the third wave and are still standing, probably close to three-quarters are insecure and could run some risk of reversal during adverse global and domestic circumstances. Less at risk—and probably mostly consolidated—are the more established developing country democracies (India, Costa Rica, Botswana, Mauritius), and the more liberal democracies of this group: the ten postcommunist states that have been admitted to the EU; Korea and Taiwan; Chile, Uruguay, Panama, Brazil, probably Argentina; a number of liberal island states in the Caribbean and Pacific. This leaves about 50 democracies and near democracies—including such big and strategically important states as Turkey, Ukraine, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, certainly Pakistan and Bangladesh, and possibly even Mexico—where the survival of constitutional rule cannot be taken for granted. In some of these countries, like South Africa, the demise of democracy would probably come, if it happened, not as a result of a blatant overthrow of the current system, but rather via a gradual executive strangling of political pluralism and freedom, or a steady decline in state capacity and political order due to rising criminal and ethnic violence. Such circumstances would also swallow whatever hopes exist for the emergence of genuine democracy in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and for the effective restoration of democracy in countries like Thailand and Nepal.

#### Democratic transitions are hanging in the balance---only empowering checks on executive power through rule of law can tip the scales

CJA 4 The Center for Justice and Accountability, Amici Curiae in support of petitioners in Al Odah et al. v USA, "Brief of the Center for Justice and Accountability, the International League for Human Rights, and Individual Advocates for the Independence of the Judiciary in Emerging Democracies," 3-10, Lexis

Many of the newly independent governments that have proliferated over the past five decades have adopted these ideals. They have emerged from a variety of less-than-free contexts, including the end of European colonial rule in the 1950's and 1960's, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union in the late 1980's and 1990's, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the continuing turmoil in parts of Africa, Latin America and southern Asia. Some countries have successfully transitioned to stable and democratic forms of government that protect individual freedoms and human rights by means of judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary. Others have suffered the rise of tyrannical and oppressive rulers who consolidated their hold on power in part by diminishing or abolishing the role of the judiciary. And still others hang in the balance, struggling against the onslaught of tyrants to establish stable, democratic governments. In their attempts to shed their tyrannical pasts and to ensure the protection of individual rights, emerging democracies have consistently looked to the United States and its Constitution in fashioning frameworks that safeguard the independence of their judiciaries . See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 91, 92 (2000) (stating that of the “[m]any countries . . . [that] have engaged in fundamental constitutional reform over the past three decades,” nearly all adopted “a bill of rights and establishe[d] some form of active judicial review”). Establishing judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary is a critical step in stabilizing and protecting these new democracies. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 605-06 (1996) (describing the judicial branch as having "a uniquely important role" in transitional countries, not only to "mediate conflicts between political actors but also [to] prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power; see also Daniel C. Prefontaine and Joanne Lee, The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (1998) ("There is increasing acknowledgment that an independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law in a free society . . . . Most countries in transition from dictatorships and/or statist economies recognize the need to create a more stable system of governance, based on the rule of law."), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/RuleofLaw. pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). Although the precise form of government differs among countries, “they ultimately constitute variations within, not from, the American model of constitutionalism . . . [a] specific set of fundamental rights and liberties has the status of supreme law, is entrenched against amendment or repeal . . . and is enforced by an independent court . . . .” Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707, 718 (2001). This phenomenon became most notable worldwide after World War II when certain countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, embraced independent judiciaries following their bitter experiences under totalitarian regimes. See id. at 714- 15; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of judicial review, which — though different from ours in many particulars — unmistakably draw their origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and practice. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).”). It is a trend that continues to this day. It bears mention that the United States has consistently affirmed and encouraged the establishment of independent judiciaries in emerging democracies. In September 2000, President Clinton observed that "[w]ithout the rule of law, elections simply offer a choice of dictators. . . . America's experience should be put to use to advance the rule of law, where democracy's roots are looking for room and strength to grow." Remarks at Georgetown University Law School, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2218 (September 26, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-26- remarks-by-president-at-georgetown-international-lawcenter. html. The United States acts on these principles in part through the assistance it provides to developing nations. For example, the United States requires that any country seeking assistance through the Millenium Challenge Account, a development assistance program instituted in 2002, must demonstrate, among other criteria, an "adherence to the rule of law." The White House noted that the rule of law is one of the "essential conditions for successful development" of these countries. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).12

#### US detention policy is key---it has justified democratic backsliding globally

CJA 4 The Center for Justice and Accountability, Amici Curiae in support of petitioners in Al Odah et al. v USA, "Brief of the Center for Justice and Accountability, the International League for Human Rights, and Individual Advocates for the Independence of the Judiciary in Emerging Democracies," 3-10, Lexis

While much of the world is moving to adopt the institutions necessary to secure individual rights, many still regularly abuse these rights. One of the hallmarks of tyranny is the lack of a strong and independent judiciary. Not surprisingly, where countries make the sad transition to tyranny, one of the first victims is the judiciary. Many of the rulers that go down that road justify their actions on the basis of national security and the fight against terrorism, and, disturbingly, many claim to be modeling their actions on the United States. Again, a few examples illustrate this trend. In Peru, one of former President Alberto Fujimori’s first acts in seizing control was to assume direct executive control of the judiciary, claiming that it was justified by the threat of domestic terrorism. He then imprisoned thousands, refusing the right of the judiciary to intervene. International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2000-Peru, August 13, 2001, available at ttp://www.icj.org/news.php3?id\_article=2587&lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe’s rise to dictatorship has been punctuated by threats of violence to and the co-opting of the judiciary. He now enjoys virtually total control over Zimbabweans' individual rights and the entire political system. R.W. Johnson, Mugabe’s Agents in Plot to Kill Opposition Chief, Sunday Times (London), June 10, 2001; International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2002— Zimbabwe, August 27, 2002, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id\_article=2695〈=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). While Peru and Zimbabwe represent an extreme, the independence of the judiciary is under assault in less brazen ways in a variety of countries today. A highly troubling aspect of this trend is the fact that in many of these instances those perpetuating the assaults on the judiciary have pointed to the United States’ model to justify their actions. Indeed, many have specifically referenced the United States’ actions in detaining persons in Guantánamo Bay. For example, Rais Yatim, Malaysia's "de facto law minister" explicitly relied on the detentions at Guantánamo to justify Malaysia's detention of more than 70 suspected Islamic militants for over two years. Rais stated that Malyasia's detentions were "just like the process in Guantánamo," adding, "I put the equation with Guantánamo just to make it graphic to you that this is not simply a Malaysian style of doing things." Sean Yoong, "Malaysia Slams Criticism of Security Law Allowing Detention Without Trial," Associated Press, September 9, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 9/9/03 APWIRES 09 :34:00). Similarly, when responding to a United States Government human rights report that listed rights violations in Namibia, Namibia's Information Permanent Secretary Mocks Shivute cited the Guantánamo Bay detentions, claiming that "the US government was the worst human rights violator in the world." BBC Monitoring, March 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15938703. Nor is this disturbing trend limited to these specific examples. At a recent conference held at the Carter Center in Atlanta, President Carter, specifically citing the Guantánamo Bay detentions, noted that the erosion of civil liberties in the United States has "given a blank check to nations who are inclined to violate human rights already." Doug Gross, "Carter: U.S. human rights missteps embolden foreign dictators," Associated Press Newswires, November 12, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 11/12/03 APWIRES 00:30:26). At the same conference, Professor Saad Ibrahim of the American University in Cairo (who was jailed for seven years after exposing fraud in the Egyptian election process) said, "Every dictator in the world is using what the United States has done under the Patriot Act . . . to justify their past violations of human rights and to declare a license to continue to violate human rights." Id. Likewise, Shehu Sani, president of the Kaduna, Nigeriabased Civil Rights Congress, wrote in the International Herald Tribune on September 15, 2003 that "[t]he insistence by the Bush administration on keeping Taliban and Al Quaeda captives in indefinite detention in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, instead of in jails in the United States — and the White House's preference for military tribunals over regular courts — helps create a free license for tyranny in Africa. It helps justify Egypt's move to detain human rights campaigners as threats to national security and does the same for similar measures by the governments of Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Burkina Faso." Available at http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=109927&owner=(IHT)&dat e=20030121123259. In our uni-polar world, the United States obviously sets an important example on these issues. As reflected in the foundational documents of the United Nations and many other such agreements, the international community has consistently affirmed the value of an independent judiciary to the defense of universally recognized human rights. In the crucible of actual practice within nations, many have looked to the United States model when developing independent judiciaries with the ability to check executive power in the defense of individual rights. Yet others have justified abuses by reference to the conduct of the United States. Far more influential than the words of Montesquieu and Madison are the actions of the United States. This case starkly presents the question of which model this Court will set for the world.

#### The plan reaffirms US commitment to the rule of law---modeled

Charles Swift 08, Navy's Lt. Commander and JAG lawyer in the Hamdan vs Rumsfeld, November 25, "The American Way of Justice," Esquire, www.esquire.com/features/ESQ0307swift-5

If we are to be a great nation, then we must be willing to be a nation bound by the rule of law in our treatment of all people. That means we have to be willing to be held accountable for our past actions. That means giving each detainee the fair and neutral hearing that was set out by the Supreme Court in another recent decision (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). That means holding regular criminal trials as required by the Supreme Court in Hamdan. That means using something other than coerced confessions to convict our enemies. That means closing Guantánamo Bay, because in a nation dedicated to the rule of law, there is no need for a legal black hole.¶ Both Guantánamo Bay and the Military Commissions Act were deemed necessary because of a decision to interrogate prisoners in violation of both domestic and international law. To interrogate a handful of religious fanatics, we created this legal black hole and turned our back on 250 years of our jurisprudence. This is not a problem that can be fixed by trying to change the law after the fact in an effort to cover up what we did. This is not a problem that can be fixed by cutting off access to the courts so that we will not be held accountable. This is not a problem that can be fixed by building a $125 million court complex in an effort to create an illusion of justice. None of those things will solve the problem, because it is not a problem at all. As Dr. Kissinger might say, it is a dilemma. The question is not, Will we survive Guantánamo, because of course we will survive Guantánamo. The question is: Will we survive Guantánamo as a great nation?¶ When I was a kid, my father was a forest scientist, and we began to have a scientific exchange with Russia under Nixon, and these Russian scientists would come and stay with us. They were fascinated with toasters. They didn't have toasters. My mom had one. She pushed it down, the bread popped up toasted. They liked toast. They wanted a toaster, badly. They wanted a better life. It's what every human being wants for his children.¶ When I was in Yemen, I went to Hamdan's house with a female attorney. On the next-to-last night the grandmother called all the little girls living in the house together. There had to have been at least ten of them. They all had on blue jeans and tennis shoes and little T-shirts with Care Bears. It's not a rich family, but they're clean and they're dressed well and they look like little girls the world over. Their faces are shining and their eyes are bright and so full of promise. The grandmother pointed at my colleague and said, "She went to school and studied very, very hard and she got very good grades, and now she's a lawyer." And then she looked at them and said, "If you go to school and study very, very hard, you can be anything."¶ The toaster in my mother's kitchen was tangible evidence to the Soviet scientists that democracy and capitalism created a better life. Ultimately, the people of the Soviet Union saw what we had and rejected communism. The grandmother in Yemen wants her granddaughters to be treated not as rightless, faceless women but as people. If we are about equal rights, then the grandmother is with us.¶ President Ronald Reagan was right: In our best moments we are the shining city on the hill. The world is angry with us because they think we've failed in that promise. But if we are committed to the rule of law and remain faithful to our principles, then America will be a beacon to that grandmother, and her promise will have a chance of coming true.

#### Global democratic transitions are inevitable---the only way for the US to bolster democracies is constitutionalism---prevents war

Fareed Zakaria 97, PhD Poli Sci @ Harvard, Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, 1997, Lexis

Of course cultures vary, and different societies will require different frameworks of government. This is not a plea for the wholesale adoption of the American way but rather for a more variegated conception of liberal democracy, one that emphasizes both parts of that phrase. Before new policies can be adopted, there lies an intellectual task of recovering the constitutional liberal tradition, central to the Western experience and to the development of good government throughout the world. Political progress in Western history has been the result of a growing recognition over the centuries that, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, human beings have "certain inalienable rights" and that "it is to secure these rights that governments are instituted." If a democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that it is a democracy is a small consolation. LIBERALIZING FOREIGN POLICY A proper appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain humility. While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step. Without appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step. Recognizing this, governments and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide array of measures designed to bolster constitutional liberalism in developing countries. The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements, and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. In the end, however, elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin, Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there. Conversely, the absence of free and fair elections should be viewed as one flaw, not the definition of tyranny. Elections are an important virtue of governance, but they are not the only virtue. Governments should be judged by yardsticks related to constitutional liberalism as well. Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy steadily expands these freedoms, it should not be branded a dictatorship. Despite the limited political choice they offer, countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand provide a better environment for the life, liberty, and happiness of their citizens than do either dictatorships like Iraq and Libya or illiberal democracies like Slovakia or Ghana. And the pressures of global capitalism can push the process of liberalization forward. Markets and morals can work together. Even China, which remains a deeply repressive regime, has given its citizens more autonomy and economic liberty than they have had in generations. Much more needs to change before China can even be called a liberalizing autocracy, but that should not mask the fact that much has changed. Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the overemphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries. Constitutionalism, as it was understood by its greatest eighteenth century exponents, such as Montesquieu and Madison, is a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is done not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights. Various groups must be included and empowered because, as Madison explained, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition." Constitutions were also meant to tame the passions of the public, creating not simply democratic but also deliberative government. Unfortunately, the rich variety of unelected bodies, indirect voting, federal arrangements, and checks and balances that characterized so many of the formal and informal constitutions of Europe are now regarded with suspicion. What could be called the Weimar syndrome -- named after interwar Germany's beautifully constructed constitution, which failed to avert fascism -- has made people regard constitutions as simply paperwork that cannot make much difference. (As if any political system in Germany would have easily weathered military defeat, social revolution, the Great Depression, and hyperinflation.) Procedures that inhibit direct democracy are seen as inauthentic, muzzling the voice of the people. Today around the world we see variations on the same majoritarian theme. But the trouble with these winner-take-all systems is that, in most democratizing countries, the winner really does take all. DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS We live in a democratic age. Through much of human history the danger to an individual's life, liberty and happiness came from the absolutism of monarchies, the dogma of churches, the terror of dictatorships, and the iron grip of totalitarianism. Dictators and a few straggling totalitarian regimes still persist, but increasingly they are anachronisms in a world of global markets, information, and media. There are no longer respectable alternatives to democracy; it is part of the fashionable attire of modernity. Thus the problems of governance in the 21st century will likely be **problems within democracy**. This makes them more difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in the mantle of legitimacy. Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably democratic. Conversely, the greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses -- other than to its own people -- is that it will discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance. This would not be unprecedented. Every wave of democracy has been followed by setbacks in which the system was seen as inadequate and new alternatives were sought by ambitious leaders and restless masses. The last such period of disenchantment, in Europe during the interwar years, was seized upon by demagogues, many of whom were initially popular and even elected. Today, in the face of a spreading virus of illiberalism, the most useful role that the international community, and most importantly the United States, can play is -- instead of searching for new lands to democratize and new places to hold elections -- to consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took America into the twentieth century with a challenge, to make the world safe for democracy. As we approach the next century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world.

#### Democratic backsliding causes great power war

Azar Gat 11, the Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University, 2011, “The Changing Character of War,” in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, p. 30-32

Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear weapons have concentrated the minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade, but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always sufﬁciently large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a ‘zone of peace’. War now seems to be conﬁned to the less-developed parts of the globe, the world’s ‘zone of war’, where countries that have so far failed to embrace modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be engaged in wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries.¶ While the trend is very real, one wonders if the near disappearance of armed conﬂict within the developed world is likely to remain as stark as it has been since the collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a ﬂeeting one. The probability of major wars within the developed world remains low—because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy; and that in an afﬂuent and democratic world, major conﬂict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for. This notion, however, is fast eroding with the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been absent from the international system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents the greatest change in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character.¶ Authoritarian capitalism may be more viable than people tend to assume. 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the democracies, because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efﬁcient economically as, and if anything more successful militarily than, their democratic counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the exceptional continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the new non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is showing spectacular economic growth that within a generation or two is likely to make it a true non-democratic superpower.¶ Although the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers does not necessarily imply open conﬂict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony since the Soviet Union’s collapse could be short-lived and that a universal ‘democratic peace’ may still be far off. The new capitalist authoritarian powers are deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic cause. Thus, it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and conﬂict during the ﬁrst part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes.¶ With the possible exception of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially conﬁned Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be more problematic. However, as China grows in power, it is likely to become more assertive, ﬂex its muscles, and behave like a superpower, even if it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may coexist more or less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called ‘security dilemma’, and against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic relations, accentuated ideological rivalry, potential and actual conﬂict, intensiﬁed arms races, and even new cold wars, with spheres of inﬂuence and opposing coalitions. Although great power relations will probably vary from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conﬂicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.

#### Independently, the plan prevents eroding checks on executive power that creates global dissident crack-down

Matthew C Waxman 9, Professor of Law; Faculty Chair, Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security, Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform”, November 3, Book, p. 58

Opponents and skeptics of administrative detention rightly point out that creating new mechanisms for detention with procedural protections that are diluted compared with those granted criminal suspects may put liberty at risk. The most obvious concern is that innocent individuals will get swept up and imprisoned— the “false positive” problem. Civil libertarians rightly worry too that aside from the specific risk to particular individuals, any expansion of administrative detention— and I say “expansion” because, as noted earlier, it already exists in some nonterrorist contexts in U.S. law— risks eroding the checks on state power more generally. To some, the idea of administrative detention of suspected terrorists is the kind of “loaded weapon” that Justice Robert Jackson worried about at the time of Japanese internment. 52 Even if critics are satisfied that the U.S. government can use administrative detention responsibly, there are many unsavory foreign regimes that will not. The United States therefore needs to be cautious about justifying principles that might be used by less democratic regimes as a pretext to crack down, for example, on dissidents that they label “terrorists” or “national security threats.”

#### Chinese crackdowns on Uighurs make them stronger and cause Asian war

Dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis 8, division director and professor of liberal arts and international studies at Colorado School of Mines, 2008, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China," Asian Affairs: An American Review, 2008, Vol. 35, Issue 1, pg. 15-30, ebsco

Alternative Futures¶ The scenario most worrisome to the Chinese would be the Uyghur Muslim movement in Xinjiang externally joining with international Muslim movements throughout Asia and the Middle East, bringing an influx of Islamic extremism and a desire to challenge the central government. The Chinese also fear the Uyghur movement could internally radicalize other minorities, whether the ethnic Tibetans or the Muslim Hui. Beijing is currently successfully managing the separatist movements in China, but the possibility of increased difficulty is linked partly to elements outside Chinese control, such as political instability or increased Islamic extremism in neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Chinese policies and reactions, however, will largely determine the progress of separatist movements in China. If “strike hard” campaigns are seen to discriminate against nonviolent Uyghurs and if the perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the expense of Uyghurs, the separatist movements will be fueled.¶ The whole region has concerns about growing Uyghur violence. Central Asian countries, especially those with sizable Uyghur minorities, already worry about Uyghur violence and agitation. Many of the regional governments, especially secular authoritarian governments in South Asia and Central Asia, are worried about the contagion of increasing Muslim radicalization. The governments of Southeast Asia are also worried about growing radical networks and training camps, but they also fear the idea of a fragmenting China. Political instability in China would impact all of Asia.

#### Asian war goes nuclear---no defense---interdependence and institutions don’t check

C. Raja Mohan 13, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, March 2013, Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the People’s Republic of China, and India (ACI) Region,” background paper for the Asian Development Bank Institute study on the Role of Key Emerging Economies, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/10737.pdf>

Three broad types of conventional conflict confront Asia. The first is the prospect of war between great powers. Until a rising PRC grabbed the attention of the region, there had been little fear of great power rivalry in the region. The fact that all major powers interested in Asia are armed with nuclear weapons, and the fact that there is growing economic interdependence between them, has led many to argue that great power conflict is not likely to occur. Economic interdependence, as historians might say by citing the experience of the First World War, is not a guarantee for peace in Asia. Europe saw great power conflict despite growing interdependence in the first half of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons are surely a larger inhibitor of great power wars. Yet we have seen military tensions build up between the PRC and the US in the waters of the Western Pacific in recent years. The contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to limit and constrain the presence of other powers in its maritime periphery and the US commitment to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific is real and can only deepen over time.29 We also know from the Cold War that while nuclear weapons did help to reduce the impulses for a conventional war between great powers, they did not prevent geopolitical competition. Great power rivalry expressed itself in two other forms of conflict during the Cold War: inter-state wars and intra-state conflict. If the outcomes in these conflicts are seen as threatening to one or other great power, they are likely to influence the outcome. This can be done either through support for one of the parties in the inter-state conflicts or civil wars. When a great power decides to become directly involved in a conflict the stakes are often very high. In the coming years, it is possible to envisage conflicts of all these types in the ACI region. ¶ Asia has barely begun the work of creating an institutional framework to resolve regional security challenges. Asia has traditionally been averse to involving the United Nations (UN) in regional security arrangements. Major powers like the PRC and India are not interested in “internationalizing” their security problems—whether Tibet; Taipei,China; the South China Sea; or Kashmir—and give other powers a handle. Even lesser powers have had a tradition of rejecting UN interference in their conflicts. North Korea, for example, prefers dealing with the United States directly rather than resolve its nuclear issues through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN. Since its founding, the involvement of the UN in regional security problems has been rare and occasional.¶ The burden of securing Asia, then, falls squarely on the region itself. There are three broad ways in which a security system in Asia might evolve: collective security, a concert of major powers, and a balance of power system.30 Collective security involves a system where all stand for one and each stands for all, in the event of an aggression. While collective security systems are the best in a normative sense, achieving them in the real world has always been difficult. A more achievable goal is “cooperative security” that seeks to develop mechanisms for reducing mutual suspicion, building confidence, promoting transparency, and mitigating if not resolving the sources of conflict. The ARF and EAS were largely conceived within this framework, but the former has disappointed while the latter has yet to demonstrate its full potential. ¶ A second, quite different, approach emphasizes the importance of power, especially military power, to deter one’s adversaries and the building of countervailing coalitions against a threatening state. A balance of power system, as many critics of the idea point out, promotes arms races, is inherently unstable, and breaks down frequently leading to systemic wars. There is growing concern in Asia that amidst the rise of Chinese military power and the perception of American decline, many large and small states are stepping up their expenditure on acquiring advanced weapons systems. Some analysts see this as a structural condition of the new Asia that must be addressed through deliberate diplomatic action. 31 A third approach involves cooperation among the great powers to act in concert to enforce a broad set of norms—falling in between the idealistic notions of collective security and the atavistic forms of balance of power. However, acting in concert involves a minimum level of understanding between the major powers. The greatest example of a concert is the one formed by major European powers in the early 18th century through the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleonic France. The problem of adapting such a system to Asia is the fact that there are many medium-sized powers who would resent any attempt by a few great powers to impose order in the region.32 In the end, the system that emerges in Asia is likely to have elements of all the three models. In the interim, though, there are substantive disputes on the geographic scope and the normative basis for a future security order in Asia.

### 1AC---Plan

**The United States Federal Government should grant jurisdiction to Article III criminal courts over individuals detained by the United States under its war powers detention policy as described in the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and the relevant National Defense Authorization Acts.**

###  1AC---SOLVENCY

#### CONTENTION 3 IS SOLVENCY

#### Federal courts are critical to resolving US legitimacy abroad

Hathaway et al 13, Oona Hathaway, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School, Samuel Adelsberg, Spencer Amdur, and Freya Pitts, J.D. candidates at Yale Law School, Philip Levitz and Sirine Shebaya J.D.s Yale Law School (2012), Winter, "Article: The Power To Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," The Yale Journal of International Law, 38 Yale J. Int'l L. 123, Lexis

2. Legitimacy ¶ Federal courts are also generally considered more legitimate than military commissions. The stringent procedural protections reduce the risk of error and generate trust and legitimacy. n245 The federal courts, for example, provide more robust hearsay protections than the commissions. n246 In addition, jurors are [\*165] ordinary citizens, not U.S. military personnel. Indeed, some of the weakest procedural protections in the military commission system have been successfully challenged as unconstitutional. n247 Congress and the Executive have responded to these legal challenges - and to criticism of the commissions from around the globe - by significantly strengthening the commissions' procedural protections. Yet the remaining gaps - along with what many regard as a tainted history - continue to raise doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the commissions. The current commissions, moreover, have been active for only a short period - too brief a period for doubts to be confirmed or put to rest. n248 Federal criminal procedure, on the other hand, is well-established and widely regarded as legitimate.¶ Legitimacy of the trial process is important not only to the individuals charged but also to the fight against terrorism. As several successful habeas corpus petitions have demonstrated, insufficient procedural protections create a real danger of erroneous imprisonment for extended periods. n249 Such errors can generate resentment and distrust of the United States that undermine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, evidence suggests that populations are more likely to cooperate in policing when they believe they have been treated fairly. n250 The understanding that a more legitimate detention regime will be a more effective one is reflected in recent statements from the Department of Defense and the White House. n251¶ 3. Strategic Advantages¶ ¶ There is clear evidence that other countries recognize and respond to the difference in legitimacy between civilian and military courts and that they are, indeed, more willing to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts when terrorism suspects are tried in the criminal justice system. Increased international cooperation is therefore another advantage of criminal prosecution.¶ Many key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving law-of-war detention or prosecution but have cooperated in criminal [\*166] prosecutions. In fact, many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies such as India and Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be tried in a criminal court. n252 This issue has played out in practice several times. An al-Shabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after assurances from the United States that he would be prosecuted in criminal court. n253 Two similar cases arose in 2007. n254 In perhaps the most striking example, five terrorism suspects - including Abu Hamza al-Masr, who is accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by trying to set up a training camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan - were extradited to the United States by the United Kingdom in October 2012. n255 The extradition was made on the express condition that they would be tried in civilian federal criminal courts rather than in the military commissions. n256 And, indeed, both the European Court of Human Rights and the British courts allowed the extradition to proceed after assessing the protections offered by the U.S. federal criminal justice system and finding they fully met all relevant standards. n257 An insistence on using military commissions may thus hinder extradition and other kinds of international prosecutorial cooperation, such as the sharing of testimony and evidence.

#### Federal courts are the most effective method---critics are fear-mongers

Dianne Feinstein 10, U.S. Senator from California and former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, April 5, "Civilian Courts Can Prosecute Terrorists," The Wall Street Journal, ProQuest

Anyone who says America's federal courts can't bring terrorists to justice is overlooking the facts. In the Dirksen U.S. Courthouse in Chicago on March 18, David Headley pleaded guilty to a dozen terror-related felonies, including helping plan the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, that killed 164 people. He is also providing authorities with valuable intelligence about terrorist activities, according to the Justice Department.¶ Wearing leg shackles and heavily guarded by U.S. marshals, Headley admitted to scouting sites in Mumbai for the Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and to plotting to attack a Danish newspaper. He faces life imprisonment when he is eventually sentenced for his crimes.¶ His guilty plea and his cooperation are significant victories for justice and our intelligence agencies. They demonstrate that federal criminal courts -- also called Article III courts in reference to the article of the Constitution establishing the federal judiciary -- can effectively prosecute terrorists and gather intelligence.¶ Some of the most well-known terrorists of the past decade -- "Shoe Bomber" Richard Reid, "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel Rahman and the "20th Hijacker" Zacarias Moussaoui -- are serving life sentences after being tried in Article III criminal courts. Military commissions have prosecuted just three Guantanamo detainees since 9/11. Two of these terrorists served light sentences and are free.¶ This contrast between life sentences and light sentences leaves no doubt that federal criminal courts effectively punish terrorists.¶ There may be times when a military commission is the best venue for a trial. But the president should have the flexibility to choose which system in which to prosecute. The decision should hinge on which system is most likely to produce actionable intelligence, protect our national security, bring terrorists to justice quickly, and keep them behind bars for good. Prosecutions in Article III courts can achieve all of these objectives.¶ For example, Najibullah Zazi, accused of plotting to bomb New York City's subway system, pleaded guilty in federal court on Feb. 22 and is reported to be cooperating. In the case of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the attorney general is confident that prosecutors can secure a conviction and a death sentence in federal court.¶ Hundreds of international terrorists have been convicted in our federal courts since 9/11 and are locked away in heavily fortified federal prisons. Federal courts are tried, tested and capable of dealing with extremely dangerous defendants and classified intelligence. In contrast, military commissions are slow, untested and have not yet overseen a death penalty trial since 9/11.¶ President Obama's fear-mongering critics make three false accusations in their bid to discredit America's federal courts:¶ -- First, they claim terrorists will have access to classified evidence. But the Classified Information Procedures Act sets up a process for federal judges to protect classified information during terrorist trials. The rules for how military commissions treat classified information are based on the rules used in federal criminal courts.¶ -- Second, they claim federal prosecutors can't properly try terrorists. Yet federal prosecutors have more experience handling terrorists than anyone else. According to a Bush-era Department of Justice document, "Since September 11, 2001, the Department has charged 512 individuals with terrorism or terrorism-related crimes and convicted or obtained guilty pleas in 319 terrorism-related and anti-terrorism cases." That's far more than the three convictions in military commissions.¶ -- Finally, they claim federal courts allow terrorists to take advantage of constitutional requirements for Miranda warnings and search warrants. But it is simply wrong to claim that a search warrant is required to obtain physical evidence from overseas, or that a criminal prosecution requires that detainees be immediately given Miranda warnings.¶ The record speaks for itself: Our criminal justice system is very effective at punishing terrorists. Headley's guilty plea in an Article III court has provided the most recent evidence of this. Headley admitted his crimes, is providing intelligence, and is likely to spend the rest of his life in federal prison. Case closed.

#### Comprehensive research proves federal courts solve

Richard B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin, Jr. 08, Deputy U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York AND partner in the New York office of Akin Gump Strause Hauer & Feld LLP, May, "In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts," Human Rights First, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf

In preparing this White Paper, we have relied not only on legal authorities such as judicial decisions and statutes, but also on docket sheets, indictments, and motion papers filed in numerous terrorism prosecutions around the country. We have also studied the views of academics and journalists and have sought out the personal perspectives of people who have firsthand experience in the litigation of international terrorism cases. 5 Our conclusion, based on the data we have examined and our review of the key legal and practical issues, is that the criminal justice system is reasonably well- equipped to handle most international terrorism cases. Specifically, prosecuting terrorism defendants in the court system appears as a general matter to lead to just, reliable results and not to cause serious security breaches or other problems that threaten the nation’s security. Of course, challenges arise from time to time—sometimes serious ones— but most of these challenges are not unique to international terrorism cases. One implication of our conclusion that the criminal justice system serves as an effective means of convicting and incapacitating terrorists is that the need for a “national security court” that would displace the criminal justice system is not apparent. However, there are several important qualifications on our conclusion. ¶ First, we firmly agree with those who say that the criminal justice system, by itself, is not “the answer” to the problem of international terrorism. Given the magnitude and complexity of the international terrorism threat, it is plain that the government must employ a multifaceted approach involving the use of military, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and law enforcement resources in order to address the threat of international terrorism. Managing these different efforts is a challenging task that requires flexibility and creativity on the part of the government.¶ Second, we also agree with those who note that major terrorism cases pose strains and burdens on the criminal justice system. Some of the cases have presented challenges—both legal and practical—that are virtually unprecedented. The blockbuster international terrorism cases are extraordinarily complex. Managing them successfully requires navigating through thorny legal issues as well as challenging practical problems.¶ Third, we agree with those who argue that the criminal justice system sometimes stumbles. It is susceptible to errors of all kinds and may fairly be criticized, in different cases, as being too slow, too fast, too harsh, too lenient, too subtle, too blunt, too opaque, and too transparent. Yet for all of these well-justified criticisms, experience has shown that the justice system has generally remained a workable and credible system. Indeed, the justice system has shown a key characteristic in dealing with criminal terrorism cases: adaptability. The evolution of statutes, courtroom procedures, and efforts to balance security issues with the rights of the parties reveals a challenged but flexible justice system that generally has been able to address its shortcomings. Where appropriate, we have offered our constructive criticisms of the court system and our views on still-unsettled legal questions.

#### The plan is comparatively the best method

Eric Montalvo 10, J.D. Temple University School of Law, former US Marine Corps Major and JAG Officer, Partner at Puckett and Faraj, February 26, "US can restore legitimacy with federal trials of terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay," Jurist, jurist.org/hotline/2010/02/us-can-restore-legitimacy-with-federal.php#

"The careless approach to the issues surrounding all things Guantanamo Bay is an affront to the Constitution and the credibility of our legal institutions. As the most recent "flip flop" by Attorney General Holder regarding the prosecution of Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) demonstrates, the original quick and forceful end of Guantanamo has not, by association, led to the end of "indefinite detention." The apparent conundrum is fractured into two basic issues which are the venue of the trial and the forum to be used. While the decision of where and how to prosecute is one of the most hotly contested contemporary political issues, there is a way ahead that will restore legitimacy to our broken system.¶ In a perfect world the conventional wisdom among legal scholars is that the United States should use the federal court system to prosecute KSM and do so in a location that provides for security while containing costs. The Obama administration spent close to a year figuring out that the federal court system provided the most credible and effective option for prosecution, however, they failed to foresee the incredibly high security costs, political backlash, and emotional anguish brought upon New York's citizens once again. This is where the plan derailed and now the Attorney General is contemplating the placement of KSM back into military commissions system. The answer lies in the fusion of these two ideas — holding federal court at Guantanamo Bay where a virtually brand new multimillion dollar state of the art court room awaits usage.¶ The legitimacy of federal courts compared to other prevailing options is truly without question. Federal courts have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to prosecute and successfully convict numerous alleged "terrorists" such as the "shoe bomber" Richard Reid, the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh, Jose Padilla, the Lackawanna Six, and Zacarias Moussaoui. These examples demonstrate the capacity of our federal courts to handle the unique and complex issues latent in prosecuting alleged terrorists ranging from the pursuit of capital punishment to the national security legal morass.

#### Independently, the plan reinvigorates due process in detention

Amos N. Guiora 12, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, "Due Process and Counterterrorism", Emory International Law Review, Vol. 26, www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/eilr/26/26.1/Guiora.pdf

While some have suggested that the Iraqi and Afghan judiciaries are appropriate forums for adjudicating guilt of detainees presently detained in both countries, significant and sufficient doubt has been raised regarding objectivity and judicial fairness. 126 Precisely because the Bush Administrations have ordered the American military to engage in Iraq and Afghanistan in accordance with the Authorization to Use Military Force resolution passed by Congress, the United States bears direct responsibility for ensuring adjudication in a court of law premised on the “rule of law.” 127 Simply put: core principles of due process and fundamental fairness demand the United States ensure resolution of individual accountability.¶ While imposing American judicial norms on Iraq and Afghanistan raise legitimate international law questions regarding violations of national sovereignty, the continued denial of due process raises questions and concerns no less legitimate. History suggests there is no perfect answer to this question; similarly, both basic legal principles and fundamental moral considerations suggest that in a balancing analysis the scale must tip in favor of trial, regardless of valid sovereignty and constitutional concerns. While justice is arguably not blind, continued detention of thousands of suspects without hope of trial is a blight on society that violates core due process principles.¶ Regardless of which proposal above is adopted, the fundamental responsibility is to articulate and implement a judicial policy facilitating trial before an impartial court of law. That is the minimum due process obligation owed the detainee. ¶ VI. MOVING FORWARD¶ Due process is the essence of a proper judicial process; denial of due process, whether in interrogation or trial, violates both the Constitution and moral norms. Denying suspects and defendants due process protections results in counterterrorism measures antithetical to the essence of democracies. While threats posed by terrorism must not be ignored, there is extraordinary danger in failing to carefully distinguish between real and perceived threats. Casting an extraordinarily wide net results in denying the individual rights; similarly, there is no guarantee that such an appr oach contributes to effective operational counterterrorism. Extending constitutional privileges and protections to non- citizens does not threaten the nation-state; rather, it illustrates the already slippery slope. In proposing that due process be an inherent aspect of counterterrorism, I am in full accordance with Judge Bates’ holding. The time has come to implement his words in spirit and law alike; habeas hearings are an important beginning but do not ensure adjudication of individual accountability. Determining innocence or guilt is essential to effective counterterrorism predicated on the rule of law.

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#### Ontology not first

Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of our impacts—refusing consequentialism allows atrocity in the name of ethical purity

Nikolas Gvosdev 5 (Nikolas, Exec Editor of The National Interest, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, Muse)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it’s the only impact you can’t recover from.

Zygmunt **Bauman,** University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being‑for is like living towards‑the‑future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching‑toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not‑yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an‑other Other, that life can be lived ‑ not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all‑too‑familiar unsure‑of‑itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' ‑ both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being‑for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self‑defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being‑for‑the‑Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view ‑ makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place ‑ but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being‑for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery ‑ noted Max Frisch ‑ (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed ‑ soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical‑chairs game of the real and the potential ‑ it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being‑for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition ‑ an end to itself. Without knowing ‑ without being capable of knowing ‑ that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness ( the being‑for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre‑empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being‑for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being‑for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being‑for ‑ the reason why it cannot but be death‑bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not‑yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being‑with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

#### Too late: intervention has irreparably altered the environment. Managerialism key to save both humans and all other species

**Levy 99** (Neil, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature and Critical Theory – Monash University, and Currently Tutor, Centre for Critical Theory – Monash University, Discourses of the Environment edited by Eric Darier, p. 214-215)

If our current situation can really be accurately characterized as the extension of bio-power from the realm of population to that of all life, does that entail that the strategies we should be adopting are those of management of the non-human world, as well as that of the human? I believe that **it does**. But I do not believe that this necessitates, or even makes possible, the genetically engineered, artificial world which McKibben and many others who have advocated non-anthropocentric ethics have feared, the replacement of the natural world with `a space station' (McKibben 1989: 170). And not just for the reason that, after the end of nature, the artificial/natural distinction is impossible to maintain. The world McKibben fears, in which forests are replaced by trees designed by us for maximum efficiency at absorbing carbon, and new strains of genetically engineered corn flourish in the new conditions brought about by global warming, seems to me unlikely in the extreme. The systems with which we are dealing, the imbrication of a huge variety of forms of life with chemical processes, with meteorological and geographic processes, are so complex, and occur on such scale, that I can see no way in which they could be replaced by artificial systems which would fulfil the same functions. Every intervention we make in' that direction has consequences which are so far-reaching, and involve so many variables and as yet undetected connections between relatively independent systems, that they are practically unforeseeable. To replace non-human systems with mechanisms of our own devising would involve thousands of such interventions, each of which would then require follow-up interventions in order to reverse or control their unintended consequences. Even when, and if, our knowledge of the environment were to reach a stage at which we were able to predict the consequences of our interventions, it would be likely to be far easier, and, in the long run, cheaper, simply to turn the already functioning, `natural' systems to our advantage. No method of reducing the amount of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere is likely to be more effective than preserving the Amazonian rain forest. For this reason, I believe, environmentalists have nothing to fear fromsuchan apparently instrumental approach**.** If the `technological fix' is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is.There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have **already set in train** will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to **develop** real, **concrete proposals for action**, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also **preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources** and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, **we risk exacerbating** these **inequalities**. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current green-house gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault's specific intellectual**,** the one who works `within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them' (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as `the strategists of life and death' than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man's `politics places his existence as a living being in question' (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the **fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided**.

#### American power solves poverty, violence, and extinction

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Alt doesn’t solve---if it does, it’s worse for non-humans

Machan 4 (Tibor, Distinguished Fellow and Prof. @ Leatherby Center for Entrepreneurship & Business Ethics @ Chapman U., “Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature’s Favorite”, p. 11-13)

Now, one can dispute Hospers, but only by averting one's gaze from the facts. If animals in fact did have rights as you and I understand the concept of rights—rights that entail and mandate a hands-off policy toward other rights possessors—most of the creatures now lurking in lawns and jungles, at the very least all the carnivores, would have to be brought up on murder charges. This is what all the animal rights champions fail to heed, including Ingrid Newkirk, radical leader of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), who holds that it is unacceptable for us to use animals in any way at all.13 This is why they allow themselves such vile thoughts as that "the world would be an infinitely better place without humans **in it at all**."'4¶ If the scenario is absurd, it's so not because the concept of animal rights has been unfairly reduced to absurdity but because there is nowhere else to go. The idea of animal rights is impracticable to begin with; any attempt to visualize the denizens of the animal world benefiting from and respecting rights must collapse into fantasy willy-nilly.¶ The concept of rights emerged with the rise of human civilization precisely because it is needed by and applicable to human beings, given the specifically moral nature of human beings and their ambition to live with each other in mutual harmony and to mutual benefit. Rights have nothing to do with the lives of wolves and turtles because of what animal rights champions themselves admit, namely, the amoral nature of at least the bulk of the animal world.15¶ Advocates of animal rights in at least one way do admit the vast gulf between animals and humans and that humans alone are equipped to deal with moral issues. When they address us alone about these matters—when they accept all the carnage that is perpetrated by other living things, including what would be infanticide and worse if human beings were to engage in it—they clearly imply that human beings are indeed special. They imply, first and foremost, that people are indeed the only living beings capable of understanding a moral appeal. Only human beings can be implored to do right rather than wrong. Other animals just don't have the capacity for this. And so the environmentalists don't confront them with any moral arguments no matter how politically incorrect the animals may be toward one another.

Omission is not exclusion; NO discursive act can include everything; this doesn't mean we reject or marginalize these concerns

Rorty, Professor of Comparative Literature @ Stanford, `02 (Richard, Peace Review, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 152-153)

I have no quarrel with Cornell's and pivak's claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simply to say that any text will presupospe the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer **all possible questions** about its own background and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. S.ivak has her own fish to and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not alwa s be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways.

#### The alt fails—it gets coopted by violent animal rights terrorists and causes more speciesism

Campbell 10 (Colleen Carroll, March 4, author, television and radio host and St. Louis-based fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "In defense of 'speciesism'", St. Louis Post-Dispatch, www.colleen-campbell.com/P-D\_Columns/PD100304Rat.htm)

An attorney and author of a new expose on the animal-rights movement, Smith promotes what was once an uncontroversial idea: the belief that "human beings stand at the pinnacle of the moral hierarchy of life." He thinks humans have a duty to treat animals humanely. He also thinks we have a right to use animals to promote human flourishing and alleviate human suffering. In short, Smith loves animals but values humans more.

According to animal-rights activists, that makes him guilty of "speciesism:" a form of discrimination as arbitrary and pernicious as racism, and one that some believe must be eradicated by any means necessary. After all, "animals are people and people are animals," as self-described "eco-anarcha-feminist animal" Pattrice Jones puts it. Or, to quote People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals president Ingrid Newkirk, "A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. They are all mammals."

Newkirk's non-sequitur serves as the title for Smith's meticulously documented book, "A Rat Is a Pig Is a Dog Is a Boy: The Human Cost of the Animal Rights Movement." His research reveals the muddled, misanthropic thinking behind a movement that has gained mainstream acceptance in America, even as most Americans remain ignorant about its true goals.

Those goals include the elevation of animals to the moral and legal status of people and the eradication of virtually all uses of animals — for food, companionship and even medical research. If animal-rights activists have their way, we will see the abolition of everything from recreational fishing and visits to the zoo to the use of guide dogs for the blind and household pets of any kind. Forget about eating meat or sushi or strapping on leather shoes and wool sweaters. And don't even think about donning a silk scarf or drizzling honey on your dairy-free dessert. Animal-rights activists object to beekeeping because it subjects hive queens to "rape racks," and PETA opposes the use of silkworms because they are "feeling beings."

It's easy to snicker at the sort of people who berated Barack Obama last year for smacking a fly. (PETA denounced his televised swat as an "execution.") Yet Smith told me in a recent interview that he found surprisingly little distance between the views of the movement's violent radicals and those who serve as its more moderate public face. Animal-rights terrorists — those who plant bombs in the cars and target the children of medical researchers who experiment on animals — often operate with the sympathy and tacit approval of more peaceable protestors.

Even more troubling, animal-rights activists have succeeded in confusing the public about the difference between animal rights and animal welfare. The latter is a noble cause supported by the vast majority of Americans who want to protect animals from cruelty, even though they do not consider animals their moral equals — a caveat that runs counter to animal-rights ideology. Despite this distinction, "animal rights" has "become the catchall term for virtually any effort to protect animals," Smith says, and the resulting confusion has allowed the animal-rights movement to gain legitimacy it does not deserve.

That legitimacy threatens universal human rights, which are grounded in the principle that all humans are equal simply because we are human. If we reject that principle and argue that our rights are based on something other than our shared human nature — that it is a creature's apparent rationality or self-awareness, for instance, that entitles it to rights — we can wind up elevating the rights of chimps and pigs above those of profoundly disabled or demented humans. Indeed, some animal-rights advocates have done just that.

Animals do not have rights or the moral responsibilities that accompany rights. That's why we prosecuted Michael Vick, not his pit bulls, for dog-fighting. That's why executives at Sea World, not its orcas, are facing public scrutiny for a whale trainer's death last week. And that's why we ponder our moral obligations to animals — who are, after all, the ultimate speciesists — even though animals do not do the same for us. We do so because we are human, endowed with exceptional dignity that deserves singular defense.

#### Representing human impacts is necessary to environmental ethics

Plumwood 2 (Val, PF PHILOSOPHY - UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason, PG. 138-40)

Recognition, prudence and survival But by providing reasons for considering nature based on human prudence, are we not perpetuating the verv human-centredness and instrumentalism we should seek to combat, considering nature only in relation to our own needs and as means to meet those needs? This issue reveals another major area of difference between the cosmic model implying elimination of human bearings and the liberation model of human-cent redness of the sort I have given. Only in the confused account of anthropocentrismas cosmic anthropocentrism is it essential to avoid anything which smacks of human bearings and preferences in the interests of pursuing superhuman detachment. On the liberation account of human-centred ness, there is no problem or inconsistency in introducing some prudential considerations to motivate change, or to show why, for example, human-centredness is not benign and must lead to damaging consequences for humankind. To gain a better understanding of the role of prudence in the kinds of changes that might be required, let us return to the marital example of Bruce and Ann. Let us suppose that instead of leaving right away, Ann persuades Bruce to try a visit to a marriage counsellor to see if Bruce can change enough to save their relationship. (We will have to assume that Bruce has some redeeming features I have not described here to explain why Ann considers it worthwhile going to all this trouble). After listening to their stories, the counsellor diagnoses Bruce as a textbook case of egocentrism, an individual version of the centredness structure set out above. Bruce seems to view his interests as somehow radically separate from Ann's, so that he is prepared to act on her request for more consideration only if she can show he will get more pleasure if he does so, that is, for instrumental reasons which appeal to a self-contained conception of his interests. He seems to see Ann in instrumental terms not as an independent person but as someone defined in tenus of his own needs, and claims it is her problem if she is dissatistied or miserable. Bruce sees Ann as there to service his needs, lacks sensitivity to her needs and does not respect her independence or agency. 24 Bruce, let us suppose, also devalues the importance of the relationship, denies his real dependency on Ann, backgrounds her services and contribution to his lite, and seems to be completely unaware of the extent to which he might suffer when the relationship he is abusing breaks down. Bruce, despite Ann's warnings, does not imagine that it will, and is sure that it will all blow over: after a few tears and tantrums Ann will come to her senses, as she has always done before, according to Bruce. Now the counsellor, June, takes on the task of pointing out to Bruce that his continued self-centredness and instrumental treatment of Ann is likely to lead in short order to the breakdown and loss of his relationship. The counsellor tries to show Bruce that he has underestimated both Ann's determination to leave unless there is change, as well as the sustaining character of the relationship. June points out that he may, like many similar people the counsellor has seen, sutler much more severe emotional stress than he realises when Ann leaves, as she surely will unless Bruce changes. Notice that June's initial appeal to Bruce is a prudential one; June tries to point out to Bruce that he has misconceived the relationship and to make him understand where his real interests lie. There is no inconsistency here; the counsellor can point out these damaging consequences of instrumental relationship for Bruce without in any way using, endorsing or encouraging instrumental relationships. In the same way, the critic of human-centredness can say with perfect consistency, to a society trapped in the centric logic ofthe One and the Other in relation to nature, that unless it is willing to give enough consideration to nature's needs, it too could lose a relationship whose importance it has failed to understand, has systematically devalued and denied - with, perhaps, more serious consequences for survival than in Bruce's case. The account of human-centredness I have given, then, unlike the cosmic account demanding self-transcendence and self-detachment, does not prohibit the use of certain forms of prudential ecological argument, although it does suggest certain contexts and qualifications for their use. In the case of Ann and Bruce, June the counsellor might particularly advance these prudential reasons as the main reasons for treating Ann with more care and respect at the initial stages of the task of convincing Bruce of the need for change. Prudential arguments need not just concern the danger of losing the relationship. June may also try to show Bruce how the structure of egocentrism distorts and limits his character and cuts him off from the main benefits of a caring relationship, such as the sense of the limitations ofth~ self and its perspectives obtained by an intimate encounter with someone else's needs and reality. Prddential arguments of all kinds for respect are the kinds of arguments that are especially useful in an initial context of denial, while there is still no realisation of that there is a serious problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking work for change. In the same way, the appeal to prudential considerations of ecological damage to humans is especially appropriate in the initial context of ecological denial. where there is still no systematic acknowledgement of human attitudes as a problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking substantial social change. Although reasons of advantage or disadvantage to the self cannot be the only kinds of considerations in a framework which exhibits genuine respect for the other, the needs of the self do not have to be excluded at any stage from this process, as the fallacious view of prudence as always instrumental and egocentric suggests.

#### Humans are critical to save the universe from the big chill or big crunch.

Michael Zey 1 (executive director of the expansionary institute, The Futurist n3 v35 p28, May 21, http://www.zey.com/Featured\_1.htm)

Our species is guided by a sense of higher purpose, a destiny, as it were, of which we are only now becoming aware. This new vision synthesizes a century of scientific and theoretic re search into the nature of the **human species** and our ultimate place and role in the evolving universe.

The emergence of human consciousness and human intelligence is a unique historical event—the human race's capacity to vitalize, bring life, order, creativity, and novelty to everything it touches, sets the world on a completely new evolutionary trajectory. Moreover, the world now possesses an entity, the human species, that could develop tools to save the universe from the Big Chill or the Big Crunch**, the demise augured by the Big Bang theory**.

Hence, human will is the ultimate determinant of the shape and direction of the universe. It will not be left to the universe to determine its ultimate fate—it has no concept of where it is going. At best, it will settle into a moribund chaos, at worst it will teeter on the edge of dissolution and destruction. The human being has a different destiny in mind for the cosmos—we are actively engaged in creating a Humaniverse of our own.

Such ruminations are hardly esoteric or "philosophical." Government and business leaders, if they are to make correct long- and short-term decisions regarding technological development and the economy, must understand the powerful role that the human species will play in the future. Indeed, speculation about such "cosmic" issues is becoming commonplace. Scientific discoveries by the Hubble Space Telescope and the Mars Pathfinder mission only fuel the debate over the place of man in the cosmos. Moreover, NASA has created an Astrobiology Program to study the origin, evolution, distribution, and purpose of life in the universe.

This new vision provides startling answers to the questions: Why us? Why here? Why now?

We are entering a human future, in which the very shape and direction of all aspects of the universe will be deeply influenced by the actions of the human race and its descendants. For example, the proposed terraformation of Mars—the creation of an earthlike environment on the Red Planet—encompasses more than a planetary facelift. It will represent a thorough "humanization" of that currently lifeless sphere.

The vitalized future will be a humane future, reflective of our core values—growth, progress, optimism, hope, and altruism. The very act of vitalization, the bringing of life to other worlds, implies that we are acting through exclusively human values—the desire to improve our surroundings, to enrich, embellish, and make the world a better place. While human imagination and energy will build this new world, our values will shape it.

We are now about to begin a journey into the future, to be challenged in ways we have never imagined

#### Total rejection fails- their Turner says we need to push a reformulated discourse publically- pure rejection of discourse devolves into deconstruction without concrete means of re-representing

Kidner, professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University and internationally renowned scholar on nature-culture relationships. 00 (nature and psyche p. 65-7)

In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious conceptual assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

#### Uniquely key for the K – metaphysical wrangling crushes coalitions necessary for change

Hicham-Stéphane **Afeissa**, Académie de Dijon, **2008**, The Transformative value of Ecological Pragmatism, Sapiens 1.1

The first of these puts forward the necessarily militant component of environmental ethics in its role as an emerging field of research. In this respect, there are only two possible outcomes: either environmental ethicists genuinely aim to guide policies by subjecting them to relatively rational rules, in which case their failure to achieve this objective so far should encourage them to consider, firstly, what it is in their way of expressing and dealing with problems that has prevented them from succeeding, and secondly, **to adapt their discursive strategy to the** **realities of politics**; or else the theorists of environmental ethics choose to pursue their metaphysical wrangles over the status of the intrinsic value of natural entities, over the possibility of considering ecosystems from a moral standpoint and other issues such as the number of angels who can dance on the head of a pin, in which case they need to decide once and for all whether they really care about the current ecological crisis.

5According to Norton, what actually matters as regards the environment, is not so much taking principled stances, but rather **developing rational aids to decision-making,** so that the various actors can agree on what should be done and develop the **concrete policy measures** which need to be implemented. In this sense, petty in-fighting between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists, humanists and ecocentrists, "shallow" and "deep ecologists", etc., are all the more damaging that they **divide environmental ethicists and stifle efforts for concerted and effective action.**

#### Human life outweighs – we're the only ones who can protect the Earth from threats and technology will solve their impact anyway

Matheny 9 (Jason Gaverick, research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment - particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks, Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University, March 14, “Ought we worry about human extinction? [1]”, http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm)

At the same time, we’re probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstrates compassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know too little, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possible without any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman animals, though it will take some time.

Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with inefficient technologies that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely (Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised.

This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would **outweigh any sins humanity** has committed or **is** **likely to commit**. Even if it takes a century for animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 10^12 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 10^21 animal life-years humanity could save by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years.

The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. **To accept human extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch.** If human life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.

#### Abandoning human values leaves us unable to act and causes extinction

Ketels 96 (Violet B, Associate Professor of English at Temple University, “‘Havel to the Castle!’ The Power of the Word,” 548 Annals 45, November, Sage)

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.¶ We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," **though death may be the end of it—**only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual**, of genuine peace for mankind at large**.2¶ In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.¶ "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills,"3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content,"\* monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge.5¶ Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the humanist soul,"6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts."7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.¶ Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now.¶ The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face.8¶ Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. ¶ Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety?¶ Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [hasj Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvokc as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389!9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle—by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo.... Kosovo is the Serbian-ized history of the Flood—the Serbian New Testament."10¶ A cover of Siiddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited."¶ We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and appa-rat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity."12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

**No global war impact---waged because of LACK OF SECURITY goals, not because of them**

David **Chandler 9**, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War', Security Dialogue 2009; 40; 243

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. ¶ Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global.¶ Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire¶ The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. ¶ There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:¶ war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. ¶ The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

#### The alt fails- academic positions on moral issues don’t translate into action

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POLITICAL THEORY AS A METAPRACTICE We often fail to recognise how much contemporary political theory bears the genetic imprint of its nineteenth-century origins. Political science and political theory in the United States originated as a surrogate for religion and moral philosophy, but what scholars have failed to figure out is exactly how this academic community can have practical significance. Michael Walzer, for example, has advanced the idea of the theorist as a `connected critic' who, while seeking necessary `critical distance', enters the `mainstream' and pursues criticism as `interpretation' and `opposition' and seeks to mediate between `specialists and commoners' or `elite and mass' (1987; 1988). Walzer acknowledges the conflict between the claim of philosophy to `objective truths' and the authority of the political community but, as with so many conceptual solutions, he fails to situate this image. None of Walzer's many historical examples, from the Hebrew prophets to Michel Foucault, touch directly upon the circumstances of contemporary institutionalised academic metapractices. Charles Lindblom has grappled intensively with the problem of whether social science can provide `usable knowledge' (Cohen and Lindblom 1979) and how social scientific inquiry can contribute to social change (1990), with what might be called the problem of relating knowing about to knowing how, but in the end, the issue seems to come down to the place and role of the university in contemporary society. Russell Jacoby has argued that the American university has come to function as a sort of `brain drain' which has attracted but also absorbed and neutralised the potential public intellectual, particularly on the Left (1988). This is a provocative claim, but it is based on a romanticised image of the [14] existence and impact of public intellectuals in American political life. Thomas Bender, for example, has more carefully explored the impact of the modern university on the participation of academics in public life (1993). Those attracted to the university seldom really had a stomach for political life and dirty hands. Jacoby's more recent analysis, in The Chronicle of Higher Education, probably hits close to the mark. He suggests that the university is at once politicised and apolitical (1996). Academicians take positions on a variety of political and moral issues but in a universe and language that is quite disconnected from practical politics. In the academy there is a kind of virtual politics represented in discussions of feminism, liberalism, citizen identity and the like, but **this seldom reaches the political world.** Allan Bloom's claim, and lament, that Leftist ideology has taken over the university assumes that the university (1988) is a staging zone for political education, but this would be difficult to sustain empirically. And despite abstractly voiced concerns about, and attestations to, political relevance, most scholarly activity is generated and propelled by academic concerns and professionalism. A dominant theme in many humanistic fields such as literary criticism is that they are, in one way or another, a form of political action or that they can exercise significant influence on public life (Lentrecchia 1983; Norris 1985). Most of these claims are advanced by individuals who fancy themselves radical and oppositional thinkers. At the same time conservatives, such as Bloom, Roger Kimball (1990), Dinesh D'Sousa (1991), Martin Anderson (1992) and Lynne Cheney (1995), protest the influence of these individuals in the American academy and warn of their corrosive impact on public life and morals. What these commentators have in common, however, is the belief that what takes place in the university really has consequences, but specifying, or determining, the exact nature of these consequences is another matter. Claims, such as those of Isaac and myself, about the alienation of political theory from politics as well as arguments, such as Jacoby's, about the apolitical character of the academy are countered in a number of ways. One response is to point to what is sometimes called the `cross-over' phenomenon, that is, instances of academics entering political life or politicians moving to the academy, but this fails to take account of what the metapractical dream has been all about, that is, to have authority over practice without joining it. And it has other difficulties attached to it. While `crossover' may seem intuitively significant - cases like those of Woodrow Wilson, Henry Kissinger, Hubert Humphrey in one direction, and those of Jimmy Carter and similar instances in the other direction -- these are exceptions that do not prove the rule. What these classic cases, as well as instances of Straussians joining the Reagan and Bush administration or the influence of communitarian liberals and academic advocates of strong democracy in the Clinton White House, tell us about the general relationship between political theory and politics is that for the most part these realms are actually quite disparate. They represent more choices between vocations than articulation. We [15] note these incidents because they are so unusual, not because they represent the manner in which political theorists are characteristically involved in politics. And even though we might wish to think that these are examples of theory leading practice, they probably are closer to instances of practice using theory. Another line of argument is based on the `trickle-down' hypothesis that the university can and does play, through education and other processes of cultural diffusion, a major role in shaping the public consciousness. Some also subscribe to the view that there are many individual theorists who are actually talking about politics and confronting pressing political problems, both by dealing with the philosophical dimension of these issues and by speaking to and for various concrete and sometimes marginalised constituencies. And there is the further claim that many do not simply give at the office but take their work home and through their individual efforts carry it into the relevant communities. While these are interesting theses, they remain largely at the level of professional folklore. To the extent that they can be demonstrated, they may indicate something about a few individuals but do not tell us very much about the general structural relationship between political theory and politics. **Although it would be interesting to know if and to what extent and in what manner academic discourse does reverberate in the world of social practices, claims about such influence remain largely matters of faith, rhetoric and metapractical fantasy.** There is, however, a more significant point. In instances as diverse as nineteenth-century social science, various images of political science as a policy analysis, critical theory, and Wolin's account of political theory as a vocation, the vision involved transcending the vagaries and unpredictability of individual action and establishing a professional cadre as an institutional social force that would carry authority and inform practice on a systematic basis. What received short-shrift in Isaac's analysis, however, was a consideration of whether political theory actually had anything to say about the events of 1989. I happened to be in Berlin, at an academic conference dealing with the historical origins of modern social science, the day that the `wall' came down. It was a profoundly moving event and, as usual, theorists were in awe at being so proximate to actual politics. What was most striking, however, was the general lack of any sense of the imminence of the event and the inability to provide more that the most mundane explanation of its occurrence.

#### Anthropocentrism is inevitable – history proves

**Sowers ’02** [George F. Sowers Jr., Lockheed Martin Astronautics, April 2002, The Transhumanist Case for Space, pgs. 6-7)

Man is a prodigious consumer of resources. From energy to minerals, from food to living space, the great bounty of our home planet is being depleted at ever increasing rates. Yet, this trend represents more than mere wastefulness. The history of humanity is one of ever increasing physical power. That we seek ever increasing power is one of the fundamental features of our species, and one of the keys to our success. Unfortunately, increasing power as it is utilized, generally leads to increasing demands for resources. After all, in a Newtonian sense, power is simply the rate of energy expenditure. The trends toward ever increasing resource utilization are easy to recognize, especially in the modern world where such statistics are actually recorded. For example, per capita energy consumption in America has increased many-fold in the last 100 years even though enhancements in energy efficiency have slowed that increase in over the last 20 years or so. The standard of living enjoyed by a country can generally be related to per capita energy consumption and by this measure America has the highest standard of living in the world. Now I take it as given that higher standards of living are more desirable, and indeed, higher standards of living are consistent with transhumanist objectives. As I have argued above, we desire not just longer life, but better life.

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#### Predictions and scenario building are valuable for decision-making, even if they’re not perfect

**Garrett 12**

Banning, In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

http://www.acus.org/disruptive\_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies

 “Disruptive change” that produces “strategic shocks” has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the “Arab Spring.” These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence. This “failure” to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not “come out of the blue.” We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change. We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. We can also identify potential opportunities or at least more desirable futures that we seek to seize through policy course corrections. We should distinguish “strategic shocks” that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen. But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the “sand piles” that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional “grain of sand” and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of “butterflies” that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the “force multiplier” of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly’s delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen. Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China’s aging and India’s youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world’s largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale. Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The “rise” of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy. Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the “rules of the game” and global governance as the West’s influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors. Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a “hard ceiling” on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from “failure” of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East. Thus, looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur. Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events “catch us by surprise.” But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, “prediction is very hard, especially about the future.” One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision. With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, “prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome.” One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to “predict” what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. More broadly, the human future is not predetermined but rather depends on human choices at every turning point, cumulatively leading to different alternative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future also means the future is amenable to human choice and leadership. Trends analyses—including foreseeing trends leading to disruptive change—are thus essential to provide individuals, organizations and political leaders with the strategic foresight to take steps mitigate the dangers ahead and seize the opportunities for shaping the human destiny. Peter Schwartz nearly a decade ago characterized the convergence of trends and disruptive change as “inevitable surprises.” He wrote in Inevitable Surprises that “in the coming decades we face many more inevitable surprises: major discontinuities in the economic, political and social spheres of our world, each one changing the ‘rules of the game’ as its played today. If anything, there will be more, no fewer, surprises in the future, and they will all be interconnected. Together, they will lead us into a world, ten to fifteen years hence, that is fundamentally different from the one we know today. Understanding these inevitable surprises in our future is critical for the decisions we have to make today …. We may not be able to prevent catastrophe (although sometimes we can), but we can certainly increase our ability to respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss.

#### Accept all ontologies. These questions are unresolvable.

**Arnd-Caddigan and Puzzuto ‘6** (Margaret, Assistant Prof. Soc. – East Carolina U. , and Richard, Associate Prof. Soc. – ECU, Qualitative Social Work, “Truth in Our Time”, 5:4, Sage)

From the authors’ perspective, **the problem is not which ontology a researcher embraces**. Rather, problems arise based on two practices; the first of these is the call for orthodoxy. Such homogeneity is neither necessary nor even desirable. Ontological and epistemological questions are not empirical questions. They are neither subject to resolution via empirical analysis nor is it necessary that there be a single answer to the question, though continued reflection and discussion is desirable. This difference or ‘otherness’ in ontological and epistemological perspectives is not a deficit. Bakhtin (1986) and Levinas (1996) have emphasized that it is through the ‘other’ that the self becomes knowable. This ‘self ’ can be either individual or culture. For our purposes we are envisioning ‘research cultures’ populated by adherents of various perspectives. Bakhtin (1986: 7) stated, ‘it is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly’. The contact between cultures and resulting dialogue raises new questions, reveals new aspects, and new depths of meaning. Further, Bakhtin (1986: 7) stated that ‘such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched’. From this perspective the elimination of the other lessens the possibility of the self. Each of the perspectives is enhanced by the others. For the profession of social work, there is a stated mission. For practice within the USA, it is elaborated as such: The primary mission of the social work profession is to enhance human wellbeing and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty. (National Association of Social Workers [NASW], 1996: para. 1) This mission is approached by the application of knowledge, skill and technique in practice. The context of the practice will change over time as can be seen by even the most cursory glance at social work history. The type of knowledge necessary to address the mission has changed and is likely to change again in the future. As Bookchin (1990) has pointed out, it is diversity that enables successful adaptation in times of transformation. The broad seeking of singular answers including the seeking of a singular research method may not, and from the authors’ perspective is not, in the interest of social work. The second problem with rigid stances concerning ontology is the practice of critiquing others’ research from a position that is ultimately, even if covertly, ontologically different. **If ontologies are ultimately beliefs, rejecting a method or technique from a different ontology solely due to its difference is analogous to declaring that a Jewish person is not religious because he or she does not observe Christmas**, or declaring a Christian non-religious because he or she does not observe Yom Kippur. Judaism and Christianity are closely related belief systems but dialogue across the division of beliefs has proven quite difficult. The self-understanding of a research approach is guided by its ontology. In turn, the research act, as seen by the researcher, is quite different depending on the assumed philosophical perspective. The resolution of the qualitative–quantitative debate may have been achieved by acknowledging only some forms of qualitative research and designating other forms as ‘not research’. This appears to be tactic employed by evidence-based practice advocates.Perhaps the way that the critical realist-constructionist debate is being handled is parallel: a blanket rejection of some kinds of research as ‘not methodologically rigorous’ or ‘not research’. Blanket dismissal of alternate perspectives is not a new event. It can be found in Hudson’s (1982/1995) and Brekke’s (1986/1995) challenge to Heineman [Pieper] (1981), and Rosen’s (1994) critique of Kondrat (1992). Hudson decried the abandonment of research when Heineman Pieper suggested that research could arise from a post positivist perspective. Brekke labeled nonpositivist research as being equal to a ‘hallucination’. Rosen viewed Kondrat’s suggestion of a non-technical rational approach as a challenge to ‘scientifically based knowledge’ and ‘extra-scientific’. In each case, for the logical positivists ‘science’ is the ‘discovery’ of the regularities and qualities of an independently existent world. As Heineman Pieper so eloquently argued, that is not the only possible self identity of a researcher. Similarly, if one assumes the ‘truth’ of critical realism, that person will reject contructionist/hermeneutic based research as well as logical-positivist research for not adopting the methods and techniques that are consistent with the former ontology. Heineman-Pieper et al. (2002: 22) stated that people who adopt a social constructionist ontology ‘undermine . . . the scientific quality and value of social work research’. Their argument against research from a different ontological position thus parallels exactly the dismissal Heineman [Peiper]’s (1981) work received from logical positivists. Our plea is for the acceptance of difference. Accepting different ontological stances means that we must also accept as ‘legitimate research’ designs, techniques or methods that are consistent with the ontology and epistemology of the researcher. The research may be of varying quality. This can be addressed from within the perspective. The utility of the research can be addressed from a broader perspective. We have suggested two divides, qualitative–quantitative and belief in or rejection of a mind-independent reality. These divides provide four quadrants. To borrow from Nietzsche (1998), none of these quadrants have a ‘God’s eye’ perspective.

#### Empirics are good- especially for intl politics

David Patrick Houghton 8, **Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida**, Positivism ‘vs’ Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a Difference?, International Politics (2008) 45, 115–128

As long ago as 1981, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach effectively laid the influence of the dogmatic behaviouralism of the 1960s to rest in their book The Elusive Quest, signaling the profound disillusionment of mainstream IR with the idea that a cumulative science of IR would ever be possible (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1988). The popularity of the ‘naïve’ form of positivism, wed to a view of inexorable scientific progress and supposedly practiced by wide-eyed scholars during the 1960s, has long been a thing of the past. Postmodernists hence do the discipline a disservice when they continue to attack the overly optimistic and dogmatic form of positivism as if it still represented a dominant orthodoxy, which must somehow be overthrown. Equally, supporters of the contemporary or ‘neo-’ version of positivism perform a similar disservice when they fail to articulate their epistemological assumptions clearly or at all. Indeed, the first error is greatly encouraged by the second, since by failing to state what they stand for, neo-positivists have allowed postmodernists to fashion a series of straw men who burn rapidly at the slightest touch. Articulating a full list of these assumptions lies beyond the scope of this article, but contemporary neo-positivists are, I would suggest, committed to the following five assumptions, none of which are especially radical or hard to defend: (1) That explaining the social and political world ought to be our central objective, (2) That — subjective though our perceptions of the world may be — many features of the political world are at least potentially explainable. What remains is a conviction that there are at least some empirical propositions, which can be demonstrably shown to be ‘true’ or ‘false’, some underlying regularities that clearly give shape to IR (such as the proposition that democracies do not fight one another), (3) That careful use of appropriate methodological techniques **can establish what patterns exist in the political world**, (4) That positive and normative questions, though related, are ultimately separable, although both constitute valid and interesting forms of enquiry. There is also a general conviction (5) that careful use of research design may help researchers avoid logical pitfalls in their work. Doubtless, there are some who would not wish to use the term ‘positivism’ as an umbrella term for these five assumptions, in which case we probably require a new term to cover them. But to the extent that there exists an ‘orthodoxy’ in the field of IR today, this is surely it.

Writing in 1989, Thomas Biersteker noted that ‘the vast majority of scholarship in international relations (and the social sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious reflection on the philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, consideration of these core issues is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of required concepts and methods courses, as we socialize students into the profession’ (Biersteker, 1989). This observation — while accurate at the time — would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today. Even some scholars who profess regret at the philosophically self-regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory, nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instance Wendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually practice IR. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do, and our retreat into philosophical self-doubt, is ironic given the roots of the field in very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is not that IR scholars should ignore philosophical questions, or that such ‘navel gazing’ is always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of IR that ever existed. Rather, I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of thought have much more in common than they suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much more in common than they would like to think with the positivists they seek to condemn. Consequently, to the extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to epistemological questions, it has no real impact on what we do as scholars when we look at the world ‘out there’. Rather than focusing on epistemology, it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive claims made by positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. My own view, as the reader may have gathered already, is that the empirical claims of scholars like Der Derian and Campbell will not often stand up to such harsh scrutiny given the inattention to careful evidence gathering betrayed by both, but this is a side issue here; the point is that substantive theoretical and empirical claims, rather than metatheoretical or epistemological ones, ought to be what divides the international relations scene today.