**The textual exclusion of sexual difference is inherent to the philosophy of the 1AC—the invisibility of the feminine sustains philosophy**

Rachel **Jones** **2000** Transformations, Hypatia 15.2 (2000) 151-159

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**Blindspots and elisions, fissures and omissions: feminist thinkers have often had an eye for the gaps in the western philosophical tradition. They have focused on what has gone missing from philosophy, not as a way of refusing philosophical thought, but to draw attention to the gendering of supposedly universal theories and to generate philosophies capable of thinking specificity and difference**. Each of the papers in this section is concerned with a particular absence in the history of philosophy. **Each thinker is involved in seeking out that which disappears from view when seen from the perspective of the western philosophical canon**—or which appears there only in a carefully reduced and circumscribed form. **Yet this focus on absences is far from generating a negative project. Instead, for these three thinkers, philosophical absences function as potentialities, sites of productive displacement and transformation that reconfigure the possible subject matter of philosophy**. The nature of the transformations effected varies according to the specific lacunæ addressed by each author. Penelope Deutscher focuses on the mysterious disappearance of women from the history of modern philosophy, Zoë Sofia on the absence of containers from histories and philosophies of technology, and Barbara Bolt on the way the western enlightenment perspective both obliterates a generative materiality and is itself undone by the glare of the Australian sun. The topographical locatedness of Bolt’s argument indicates the importance of the specificity of each of these projects. Their grouping does not imply that they could be subsumed under one overarching framework any more than the papers in this volume could be combined to form a single new trajectory in feminist philosophy. Nonetheless, these three papers not only share a set of overlapping concerns, but also deploy a similar philosophical strategy. **Each seeks to make visible that which has functioned as one of the necessary but invisible conditions sustaining western philosophical thought— be that the improperly philosophical work excluded from the canon so as to secure philosophy’s self-definition**; the dark matter required by the reflections of enlightened speculation and the colonizing imagination; or the technolo- gies of sustaining and containing themselves, which silently facilitate—yet consistently fail to appear in—thinking and philosophizing about technology. Yet **these philosophical absences are not recuperated within the terms of the tradition**.

#### The 1AC preaches the immediacy of violence against women—this reinforces masculinist forms of power that preclude attention to difference

Renee Heberle, Prof. of Politcal Science at the UNiversity of Toldeo, 1996
["Deconstructive Stratagies and the movement against sexual violence" Hypatia 11.4]

Scarry's theory of the inversions of pain and power which invest the reality of pain in the reality of power encourages us to take note of the fragility of the edifice of masculine power. It has been shown that sexual violence escalates to murderous proportions when batterers fear a woman's imminent withdrawal or separation. Women who are battered risk death when they become pregnant, attempt to leave, or file for divorce. In these situations, batterers experience a lack of control and try, through violence, to gain it back-to establish the certainty of "their woman's" commitment. Violence often manifests itself in blows to the woman's stomach to cause a miscarriage. Pregnancy appears as a form of separation and therefore a threat to male power (Jones 1994; Schneider 1992; Walker 1984, 1989). In response to this, the movement often advocates further protectionist strategies in alliance with a masculinist state. The question I raise is not whether those are necessary in the moment for individual women in danger, but whether the habit of continually pointing to the immediacy and "reality" of the problem as the grounds for creating global social and political policy further shores up masculinist forms of social power and its ability to define the limits of women's lives. Remembering the reasons for earlier feminist insistence upon autonomy from the state and inventing alternatives may point us in a direction of isolating sexual violence as a cultural phenomenon due to its inability to affect the terms on which women live their lives (Schechter 1982). Further, self-consciously performative narratives that represent diverse experiences of sexual violence to the social world can emerge if we take seriously the significance of the multiple sites from which women experience sexual violence and include stories of resistance which subvert the images of women as vulnerable. The insistence on commonality and identity among women given their experiences of sexual violence precludes attention to what differences among women can tell us about the terms on which sexual violence is possible. The deconstructive narrative exposes the naturalized social truths about gender and victimization that are embedded in the events of sexual violence itself rather than sees only the immutable and singular "reality" of sexual violence for all women in common.

#### Refusal of fixed identity

Dustin Bradley Goltz, Assistant Professor of Performance Studies at DePaul, 2013 (Text and Performance Quarterly Vol. 33, No. 3, July 2013, pp. 236-237 What "We" Do (or This Is Not the Text))

\*\*\*E. Patrick Johnson and I questioned the implications of our positioning, positions, presenting, and presence on Villanova University's campus.

What did our presence, our bodies, enable? Excuse? Did it change who we are? What we do? It mast, for performance work traces those resistant, sneaky potentials pumping revolution/recuperation through the unmappable veins of embodied aesthetics that whisper possibilities of hope into being, yet always alongside threats of danger, risk, and hegemonic doings. Performance refuses fixed assertions of who "we" are, rewriting a processual "we" that is navigated moment by moment in questions of "stand or not stand," "speak or not speak," and "attend or not attend." We are what we do, and our doings must be situated and contextualized within complex, shifting, competing, and layered discursive fields of meaning. Performance stands for and calls attention to the sexy, the ambivalent, the contradictory, the political, the relational, the historical, the aesthetic, the tugging of air, the affective, and all the risks and potentials that we negotiate (and that negotiate who we are) moment by moment.

#### Strategic resistance gets instrumentalized—their narratives are reduced to data consumption for the judge to reward with their ballot

Ziarek 2007. (Krzysztof, Maria Cimitile & Elaine Miller, eds, Returning to Irigaray “A New Economy of Relations” 53-56)

Etymologically, the word "economy" describes the rules of ordering, organizing. and maintaining a household. "Economy" thus indicates the system of the various correlated practices of production and con­sumption constitutive of the economic activity today, but, when thought in broad terms, it refers also to the order or the organization of a house. And the house in question here is, to allude to Heidegger, the house of being, comprising a complex, historically evolving sys­tem of relations and operations which organize and transform onto-logical, economic, political, and cultural relations. What is clear at the beginning of the twenty-first century is that the language of this house is techno-economic: it is the language which formats reality as information, thus precipitating its calculability and opening it to multiple and complex operations of processing. To put it in the con­text of Heidegger's reflection on the history of metaphysics and its technological determinations of being, the essence of being today is information, and its primary characteristic is its availability: every­thing is constituted as a standing reserve of information, which means that it becomes readily convertible into data and is iluis at once rendered pliant and processable. Revealed in its "true" texture as information, reality, from its material components to its human ener­gies and desires, becomes instantly and thoroughly available. For ex­ample, musical sampling, so characteristic of recent developments in popular, noise-based, and even some classical music, shows not only that music can be manipulated but that it is, in essence, manipulable sound. Ekkhard Ehlers impressive CD *lictricb,1* composed from the samplings ol the music of Ives and Schoenberg, is a creation based on the principle of transformative reprogramming, as it weaves sampled sounds into loops and repetitive patterns. This creation becomes possible only when the "reality" of music is disclosed as consisting of sound bytes, of digitizable information, which, with appropriate techno­logical equipment, can be processed and resequenced into a new mu­sical form. In sum, Ehlers's creation is not only an example of creative musical transformation, but an indicator that music has become, or has come to be revealed, like other sectors of culture, and even more broadly reality in general, as reprogrammable in its essence. This disclosure of reality as information means that cultural, political, and social relations are undergoing a similar process of informatization. While not only economic but also cultural and po­litical relations are described nowadays in terms of production and consumption, these very notions, that is, production and consump­tion, appear to have an informational structure or texture today. Both political campaigns and cultural products have become a matter of properly construed informational content. Cultural products and rela­tions, including works of art, are not only a matter of consumption and production, but also work as information. The relations through which artworks arc produced and which they themselves in turn con­struct with regard to the "consuming" public have informational struc­ture. To be discernible, to become an "object" of public discussion, what artworks (are supposed to) evoke in the audience has to be compressible into a marketing statement, into a book blurb or a film synopsis, susceptible in its very structure to infinite repetition and reprocessing for the benefit of dissemination—and, of course, antici­pated profit. The merit of works is calculable in terms of the number of copies or tickets sold, or reflected in the number of awards, which count precisely because they help to increase sales. When works resist such categorizations, when they are not translatable into information or go further and call into question the hegemonic "informational standard" of reality, they become classified as obscure, difficult, or elitist, and thus disqualified to the margins of existence- At issue here, in addition to the often discussed commercialization of" art and cul­ture, is a deeper "informating" of modem reality, which underlies and makes possible such phenomena as commercialization and mass cul­ture. Informating here describes the prevalent formating of reality with its constitutive relations in(to) the terms of information. In (post)modernity, reality is of the order of information, which means that the economy of relations constitutive of such reality is informa­tional. Thus, today we have not only the rapidly expanding informa­tion economy, with the Internet and telecommunications industries as its flagships, but, on a more fundamental level, the economy of information, in which beings and relations come to be constituted as or formatted into information. To be real today is to be convertible into and processable as information, since the metaphysical "proof of existence is info-technical. This "informating" of contemporary1 being is epitomized in the project of Virtual Reality (VR), in which reality would be manufac­tured and regulated as a master computer program. The fascination with the idea of a technological facility capable of producing an al­ternative, fully controllable, reality reveals a deep-seated desire for mastery, mastery that would culminate in the ability to (re)produce a reality as a matter of total transparency and complete manipulability, where possibilities, accidents, and even contingencies would be pro­grammed in advance. In short, what would be experienced as unpre­dictable would in fact be, within the informational spectrum of being, as it were, perfectly envisioned, manipulable, and reprogrammable. After all, isn't everything information? In a way, VR is the latest technological incarnation of the long-standing dream of comprehend­ing reality to the utmost degree, a form of comprehension that would allow for the full transparency of everything precisely to the extent to which it can all be rendered manifest as information. Such manifestness of all that is, that is, of reality as such, would be tantamount to making this reality not simply knowable but, and perhaps more im­portant, controllable and programmable in its very essence. VR ap­pears thus to be an offshoot of the dream of power over the real, in which power, comprehension, and manipulation become thoroughly technological and informational in character. The fascination with VR, which is clearly part of its commercial appeal as both a source of entertainment and a facility of telematic manipulation, can he traced back to the prevalent intoxication with power, in which power oper­ates as technological manipulation, as the super ability to (re)program what happens and also what could happen. Such a techno-informa-tional approach to reality is not just warranted but also induced by the fact that reality itself has become disclosed as informational in essence, as a kind of an information code or a computer program.

#### Their form of inclusion is a deception—the feminine is included without any specific claim to a feminine identity—the denial of invisible material is the denial of sexual difference that occurs to support a fantasy of masculine autogenesis

Cathryn **Vasseleu** is a Vice Chancellor’s Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of New South Wales, **1998**. (Textures of Light: Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, Routledge: London and New York, p 9-10)

**Irigaray’s analysis of photology is of a metaphoricity which ensures that any engendering of maternal origin never comes to light. The continuous** forgetting of sexual difference **in the erasure of the materiality of reproduction** is the very condition of possibility of metaphysics**. With the re-origination of discourse through the metaphorical displacement of maternal origin the representation of feminine participation in reproduction is subsumed within an exclusively patrilineal economy, where it remains supplementary to a fantasy of masculine autogenesis. The exclusion is achieved in the differentiation between form and matter, in which matter remains the site of an unthematizable materiality. While masculine identity is formulated in opposition to matter, the feminine as matter cannot be thought. As** Judith **Butler explains: ‘For Irigaray, the “feminine” which cannot be said to be anything, to participate in ontology at all, is – and here grammar fails us – set under erasure as the impossible necessity that enables any ontology’** (1993: 39). **Irigaray pursues the trail of an invisible materiality which is systematically ignored in the adoption of a metaphysics of presence. Irigaray extends this assessment of the workings of heliocentrism to Derrida’s naming of woman as writing or différance, where the identity of ‘woman’ is fixed as nothing but a trope for the undecidability of meaning. Irigaray argues that, just as the sun is metaphorically incorporated into philosophy, woman as trope of différance** incorporates femininity while excluding any claim to a feminine identity **by women. The trope of woman is an endless deferral of identity, independent of any material referent. In the idealist rationality of heliocentrism, ‘woman’ cannot refer to any woman in particular.** There is no nostalgia in Irigaray’s assertion that **the re-origination of discourse occurs through the metaphorical displacement of a maternal origin**. Longing is a symptom of the interval between language and experience, or the crisis of the sign in which the gap between signifier and signified is expressed as nostalgia in modern Western culture. **Derrida and others have diagnosed this crisis as the myth of presence of Western metaphysics**.18 **By way of contrast the original claim which Irigaray articulates through her analysis of photology is that in essence logos is materially conceived, or reproduced. However, in the history of metaphysics the expression of any maternal participation in this reproduction becomes invisible or immaterial within the metaphorical reproduction of likeness**: No proper sense, proper noun, proper signifier expresses the matrix of any discourse, or any text, even the legal text. **The necessity of its (re)production is absent from what it lays out**. Eclipse of the mother, of the place (of) becoming, whose non-representation or even disavowal upholds the absolute being attributed to the father. He no longer has any foundation, he is beyond all beginnings. Between these two abysses – nothing/being – language makes its way, morphology takes shape, once the mother has been emptied out. (Irigaray, 1985a: 307)

#### The invisible energy they forget grounds existence—only air can take the place of place—resisting the forgetting of air is essential to nourish our connection to earth and sky

Oliver 7Kelly, W. Alton Jones Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Women's Studies @ Vanderbilt, “Vision, Recognition, and a Passion for the Elements” Returning to Irigaray: feminist philosophy, politics, and the question of unity, ed Maria C. Cimitile and Elaine P Miller; p.124-128

Irigaray's insistence on the importance of the role of material elements in vision, perception, thought, and philosophy in general suggests a new direction for theories of recognition and intersubjective relations. Throughout her work, she is concerned to recall and re­member the material elements—water, earth, fire, and air—out of which we are born and through which we live, together. In Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche {Irigaray 1991 [1980]), she reminds us of the importance of water, fluids, especially those out of which we were born. In Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger (Irigaray 1999 11983]), she suggests that air has a special place among the elements: "Is not air the whole of our habitation as mortals? Is there a dwelling more vast, more spacious, or even more generally peaceful that that of air.' Can man live elsewhere than in air? Neither in earth, nor in fire, nor in water is any habitation possible for him" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 8). Can we expand Irigaray's theories of air and light to develop a new conception of vision that can give birth to a new conception of re­lationships beyond subject-object/other hierarchies? Although Irigaray is indebted to Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merlcau-Ponty in her attempts to reformulate the role of vision in relation to subjectivity, she takes us beyond their theories. For our purposes here, suffice it to say that, unlike Levinas, rather than favor­ing touch over vision because traditional theories of vision presuppose subjects dominating their objects, Irigaray also tries to reconceive of vision; and, unlike Merleau-Ponty, Irigaray refuses to fuse vision and touch, and instead insists that they cannot be reduced one to the other.' In her book Textures of Light (Vasseleu 1998), Cathryn Vasseleu argues that Irigaray goes further than either Merleau-Ponty or Levinas towards developing an alternative theory of vision by developing an alternative vision of light as textured. Rather than reduce vision to touch, which is one of her (debatable) criticisms of Merleau-Ponty, Irigaray emphasizes the touch of light on the eye. For Irigaray, it is not, then, that vision and touch are not separate senses, but rather that vision is dependent upon the sense of touch. Vasseleu argues that conceiving of light's texture challenges the traditional separation of the senses that serves the separation of sen­sible and intelligible- The separation between sensible and intelli­gible, between body and mind or soul, has been constructed around the notion of the mind's eye and an immaterial seeing cut off from the body and sensation, a more accurate seeing. The split between the mind's eye and the body's eye is interlaced with the split between objective theoretical knowledge and subjective personal feeling. Ob­jective theoretical knowledge requires a notion of vision as a distanc­ing sense that separates the mind's eye from the body and gives it a privileged perspective devoid of contaminating sentiment. Informa­tion gathered through touch and more proximal senses is thought to provide only subjective feeling and cannot be grounds for knowledge (Vasseleu 1998, 12).6 If, on Irigaray's theory, however, vision involves touching light, then we are touched by, and touching, everything around us even as we see the distance between ourselves and the world or other people in the world. The texture or fabric of vision is even more tightly woven than Mcrlcau-Ponty's reversible flesh (cf. Mcrlcau-Ponty, 1968). It is not just that the fabric of vision is reversible between subject and object, invisible and visible, ideal and material; rather, the texture of vision is the result of an interweaving of elements both distinct and intimately connected in their sensuous contact. The texture of light is what is between us and other people in the world. We are both connected and made distinct by the texture of light that wraps us in the luxury and excesses of the world. In addition to what Vasseleu calls the texture of light, Irigaray's insistence on material elements, especially air, provokes us to rethink vision in terms of its dependence upon the density of air, upon the elements. Irigaray concludes her Elemental Possums with an ode to the density of ain "1 opened my eyes and saw rhe cloud. And saw that nothing was perceptible unless I was held at a distance from it by an almost palpable density. And that I saw it and did not see it. Seeing it all the better for remembering the density of air remaining in between. But this resistance of air being revealed, I felt something akin to the possibility of a different discovery of myself (Irigaray 1992 [19811, 105; emphasis added). Space is not empty because it is filled with the density of air. And the density of air connects and separates every­thing on earth. Remembering air and the density of air reminds me that I am both connected to and different from those around me. Remembering what cannot be seen, the density of air, allows me to better see the difference and communion between myself and others. Seeing what is different from me and what is between me and differ­ence opens the possibility of a different discovery of myself, a discov­ery that is not the hostile Hegelian struggle for recognition and is not based on the paranoia of the Sartrian accusing look or the Lacanian evil eye.T Irigaray's most sustained reflections on air and the density of air are in Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger (Irigaray 1999 [1983]). There she takes Heidegger to task for forgetting the air that makes possible any clearing, being, or Being of being. Leaving behind the context of her criticisms of Heidegger, which is interesting in itself, I am interested in her descriptions of air and how they can help re con­ceive of vision. Throughout Forgetting of Air, Irigaray suggests that the philosopher has forgotten air and thereby forgotten that ~~he~~ is nour­ished and supported by air. By forgetting air, the philosopher imagines that he is thrown into an empty abyss where he confronts only noth­ingness (Irigaray 199911983], 98, 137, 147, 157, 162, 166, 169). The abyss, she reminds us, is not empty; it is full of air. And air is not nothing. The philosopher's supposition that we are alienated from the earth or others by an abyss is the product of what Irigaray calls the "forgetting of air" (Irigaray 1999 [1983]). She says that "the elementally of physis—air, water, earth, fire—is always already reduced to nothing­ness in and by his own element: his language" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 74). Irigaray asks what happens when the philosopher focuses on the things within air and forgets air itself: "And what becomes of air when the being appears within it? It is reduced to nothingness" (Irigaray 1999 [19831, 162). By forgetting the elements, the philosopher forgets that space is not empty. By forgetting that space is not empty, the space between us and others or our own image seems unbridgeable, empty, alienating- But what if space is full and not empty? Even light is dependent upon air. The texture of light cannot touch without the air that opens onto that touch. Vision, speech, and life itself require air. In response to Heidegger, Irigaray says "it is not light that creates the clearing, but light comes about only in virtue of the transparent levity of air. Light presupposes air. No sun without air to welcome and transmit its rays. Ho speech without air to convey it. Day and night, voice and silence, appear and disappear in air. The extent of space, the horizons of time, and all diat becomes present and absent within them are to be found gathered together in air as in some fundamental thing. The originary intuition of which recedes indefinitely. Free beyond all vision. Dwelling out of sight. -.. And thought attains the heart of this assembly only by assimilating itself to this serene spariality—air" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 166-67). The serene spatiality that is air cannot be seen and yet there is no seeing without it. It fills space with the plentitude of life. For Irigaray, air occupies a unique place among the elements in that it is place. She says that "[n]o other element can for him take the place of place. No other element carries with it—or lets itself be passed through by—light and shadow, voice or silence.... No other element is in this way space prior to all localization and a substratum both immobile and mobile, permanent and flowing, where multiple temporal divisions remain forever possible. Doubtless, no other ele­ment is as originarily constitutive of the whole of the world, without this generativity ever coming to completion in a primordial time, in a singular primacy, in an autarchy, in an autonomy, in a unique or exclusive property" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 8). Air generates life but without hierarchy, genealogy, domination, or ownership. More than this, Irigaray marvels at the way that air gives without demanding anything in return: \*'But this element, irreducibly constitutive of the whole, compels neither the faculty of perception nor that of knowl­edge to recognize it. Always there, it allows itself to be forgotten" (Irigaray 1999 (1983], 8). The recognition of this giving without de­mand for recognition is what opens the possibility of a different dis­covery of myself in relation to what gives me life and nourishes me. Irigaray's discussion of gifts and indebtedness to the elements and mediums of perception adds an ethical dimension to vision. She sug­gests that because we see and live in and by air and light, we have an ethical obligation to the earth and sky. Our indebtedness is not the debt of some economic exchange that must be paid off in full or in kind; rather, our indebtedness can only be acknowledged through wonder, marvel, love, and care (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 28; cf. 1980, 1984, 1992, 1994).

**Every kritik begins between two—that means it is relational and irreducible—the 1NC breathes life into the 1AC—the reintroduction of air into their philosophy**

**The 1NC is an embodiment of an excluded possibility—we voice the gaps and fissures of their philosophy**

Luce **Irigaray**, This Sex Which is not One, 19**85**. 214-218

**Why speak? you’ll ask me. We feel the same things at the same time. Aren’t my hands, my eyes, my mouth, my lips, my body enough for you**? Isn’t what they are saying to you sufficient? **I could answer “yes,” but that would be too easy. Too much a matter of reassuring you/us. If we don’t invent a language**, if we don’t find our body’s language, **it will have too few gestures to accompany our story. We shall tire of the same ones, and leave our desires unexpressed, unrealized. Asleep again, unsatisfied, we shall fall back upon the words of men‚ - who**, for their part, **have “known” for a long time. But not our body**. Seduced, attracted, fascinated, ecstatic with our becoming, **we shall remain paralyzed. Deprived of our movements. Rigid, whereas we are made for endless change. Without leaps or falls, and without repetition**. Keep on going, without getting out of breath. **Your body is not the same today as yesterday. Your body remembers. There’s no need for you to remember. No need to hold fast to yesterday, to store it up as capital in your head. Your memory? Your body expresses yesterday in what it wants today**. If you think: yesterday I was, tomorrow I shall be, you are thinking: I have died a little. **Be what you are becoming, without clinging to what you might have been, what you might yet be. Never settle. Let’s leave definitiveness to the undecided; we don’t need it. Our body, right here, right now, gives us a very different certainty. Truth is necessary for those who are so distanced from their body that they have forgotten it. But their “truth” immobilizes us, turns us into statues, if we can’t loose its hold on us. If we can’t defuse its power by trying to say**, right here and now, **how we are moved. You are moving. You never stay still. You never stay. You never ‘are.’ How can I say ‘you,’ when you are always other? How can I speak to you? You remain in flux, never congealing or solidifying**. What will make that current flow into words? It is multiple, devoid of causes, meanings, simple qualities. Yet it cannot be decomposed. **These movements cannot be described as the passage from a beginning to an end. These rivers flow into no single, definitive sea. These streams are without fixed banks, this body without fixed boundaries**. This unceasing mobility. This life‚ - which will perhaps be called our restlessness, whims, pretenses, or lies. **All this remains very strange to anyone claiming to stand on solid ground. Speak, all the same. Between us, ‘hardness’ isn’t necessary. We know the contours of our bodies well enough to love fluidity. Our density can do without** trenchancy or **rigidity. We are not drawn to dead bodies. But how can we stay alive when we are far apart? There’s the danger. How can I wait for you to return if when you’re far away from me you cannot also be near**? If I have nothing palpable to help me recall in the here and now the touch of our bodies. **Open to the infinity of our separation, wrapped up in the intangible sensation of absence, how can we continue to live as ourselves? How can we keep ourselves from becoming absorbed once again in their violating language**? From being embodied as mourning. **We must learn to speak to each other so that we can embrace from afar**. When I touch myself, I am surely remembering you. But so much has been said, and said of us, that separates us. **Let’s hurry and invent our own phrases. So that everywhere and always we can continue to embrace. We are so subtle that nothing can stand in our way, nothing can stop us from reaching each other, even fleetingly, if we can find means of communication that have our density. We shall pass imperceptibly through every barrier, unharmed, to find each other. No one will see a thing. Our strength lies in the very weakness of our resistance. For a long time now they have appreciated what our suppleness is worth for their own embraces and impressions. Why not enjoy it ourselves? Rather than letting ourselves be subjected to their branding. Rather than being fixed, stabilized, immobilized. Separated. Don’t cry. One day we’ll manage to say ourselves**. And what we say will be even lovelier than our tears. **Wholly fluent. Already, I carry you with me everywhere**. Not like a child, a burden, a weight, however beloved and precious**. You are not in me. I do not contain you or retain you in my stomach, my arms, my head. Nor in my memory, my mind, my language. You are there, like my skin. With you I am certain of existing beyond all appearances, all disguises, all designations. I am assured of living because you are duplicating my life. Which doesn’t mean that you give me yours, or subordinate it to mine. The fact that you live lets me know I am alive, so long as you are neither my counterpart nor my copy. How can I say it differently? We exist only as two**? We live by twos beyond all mirages, images, and mirrors. **Between us, one is not the ‘real’ and the other her imitation; one is not the original and the other her copy. Although we can dissimulate perfectly within their economy, we relate to one another without simulacrum**. Our resemblance does without semblances: for in our bodies, we are already the same. Touch yourself, touch me, you’ll ‘see.’ **No need to fashion a mirror image to be ‘doubled,’ to repeat ourselves‚ – a second time. Prior to any representation, we are two**. Let those two‚ – made for you by your blood, evoked for you by my body‚ – come together alive. **You will always have the touching beauty of a first time, if you aren’t congealed in reproductions. You will always be moved for the first time, if you aren’t immobilized in any form of repetition. We can do without models, standards, or examples. Let’s never give ourselves orders, commands, or prohibitions. Let our imperatives be only appeals to move, to be moved, together.** Let’s never lay down the law to each other, or moralize, or make war. Let’s not claim to be right, or claim the right to criticize one another. If one of us sits in judgment, our existence comes to an end. And what I love in you, in myself, in us no longer takes place: the birth that is never accomplished, the body never created once and for all, the form never definitively completed, the face always still to be formed. The lips never opened or closed on a truth. Light, for us, is not violent. Not deadly. For us the sun does not simply rise or set. Day and night are mingled in our gazes. 14 Our gestures. Our bodies. Strictly speaking, we cast no shadow. **There is no danger that one or the other may be a darker double**. I want to remain nocturnal, and find my night softly luminous, in you. And don’t by any means imagine that I love you shining like a beacon, lording it over everything around you. **If we divide light from night, we give up the lightness of our mixture, solidify those heterogeneities that make us so consistently whole**. We put ourselves into watertight compartments, break ourselves up into parts, cut ourselves in two, and more. **Whereas we are always one and the other, at the same time. If we separate ourselves that way, we ‘all’ stop being born. Without limits or borders, except those of our moving bodies**. And only the limiting effect of time can make us stop speaking to each other. **Don’t worry. I‚ - continue**. Under all these artificial constraints of time and space, **I embrace you endlessly. Others may make fetishes of us to separate us: that’s their business. Let’s not immobilize ourselves in these borrowed notions**. And if I have so often insisted on negatives: not, nor, without… it has been to remind you, to remind us, that we only touch each other naked. And that, to find ourselves once again in that state, we have a lot to take off. So many representations, so many appearances separate us from each other. They have wrapped us for so long in their desires, we have adorned ourselves so often to please them, that we have come to forget the feel of our own skin. **Removed from our skin, we remain distant. You and I, apart. You? I? That’s still saying too much. Dividing too sharply between us: all** .

**The impact is extinction**

**Irigaray, 1991**, (Luce, Famous french scholar, The irigaray Reader, p.33)

Even a vaguely rigorous analysis of **claims to equality shows that they are justified at the level of a superficial critique of culture, and Utopian as a means to women's liberation**. **The exploitation of women is based upon sexual difference, and can only be resolved through sexual difference**. Certain tendencies of the day, certain contemporary feminists, are noisily demanding **the neutralization of sex** *[sexe].* That neutralization, if it were possible, **would correspond to the end of the human race**. **The human race is divided into two genres which ensure its production and reproduction. Trying to suppress sexual differ­ence is to invite a genocide more radical than any destruction that has ever existed in History**. What is important, on the other hand, is defining the values of belonging to a sex-specific *genre.* What is indispensable is elaborating a culture of the sexual which does not yet exist, whilst respecting both *genres.* Because of the historical time gaps between the gynocratic, matriarchal, patriarchal and phallocratic eras, we are in a sexual position which is bound up with generation and not with *genre* as sex. This means that, within the family, women must be mothers and men must be fathers, but that we have no positive and ethical values that allow two sexes of the same generation to form a creative, and not simply procreative, human couple. One of the major obstacles to the creation and recognition of such values is the more or less covert hold patriarchal and phallocratic roles have had on the whole of our civilization for centuries. It is social justice, pure and simple, to balance out the power of one sex over the other by giving, or restoring, cultural values to female sexuality. What is at stake is clearer today than it was when *The Second Sex* was written.

#### The role of the ballot is to answer the question “What does it mean to be human?” The Aff answered that question in terms of visibility—the ballot is the bounty—ballots for them are a form of momentum

#### The alternative answers that question as being open to relations of invisibility—only that affirmation can break down the infotechnical visibility that encodes all existence as standing reserve

**Ziarek** 20**07**. (Krzysztof, Maria Cimitile & Elaine Miller, eds, Returning to Irigaray “A New Economy of Relations” 57-63)

**While Heidegger does not venture explicitly into the analysis of either economy or capital, his notion of the enframing does not sim­ply specify the powers operating in technology**, as Eldred's argument seems to imply, **but delineates a certain general economy of relations, according to which all that exists does so only to the extent to which it is always "challenged" to be available for technological fashioning, that is, enframed and posited** (stelkn) **as part of the overall reserve of resources, available tor production** (hersteilen) **and ordering** (bestellen). **This economy is a certain technics precisely because it defines exist­ence as the potentiality to be measured, calculated, produced, or manipulated. Technicity here means that beings are constantly chal­lenged to coincide with their technological calculus, and if they do not fit it or exceed its criteria of measurement, their "reality" is called into question. As a result, today, beings, events, and relations come to be characterized in terms of their intrinsic availability as "informa­tion," always close to hand, ready to be instantly processed, com­puted, or stored as data**. If capital reveals being as the potentiality for production, value, and profit, then what makes possible the opera­tions and growth of capital is the underlying technicity of being en­gaged, brought out, and amplified by the enframing, which renders being into a resource, that is, lays it open in terms of its open-ended availability for.... There would be no capital without a prior "capitalization" of being, that is, without the disclosure of being as the potentiality for production and profit, the potentiality linked to the general constitution of being in modernity in terms of being available, amenable, even more, intrinsically disposed, to technological remak­ing. While capital grounds and powers economic activity, it does so to the extent that it itself functions as part of a deeper info-technical disposition of relations in modernity. **And it is because this technic economy of relations engages and mobilizes being as, in its essence, available for technological refashioning, that capital historically comes into existence and determines economic relations in their narrow sense of production and consumption. Hence, the very idea of production, and its corollary, consumption, is grounded in availability, and today, specifically in the availability of beings and relations as information**. In historical terms, it is the rapid intensification of economic activity as­sociated with the information and telecommunications industries that has made visible the underlying disclosure of being in its potentiality as information. The analysis of capital in the age of information becomes therefore even more important, provided it sharpens our attention to its own grounding in die fluid "info-technicity" of modern relations, which determines the shape of social praxis today. In her most recent texts and lectures, Luce Irigaray continuously emphasizes the necessity of a new culture or economy of energy, one that is missing from the technological civilization of the West- Irigaray associates this energy with a different understanding of the relation to the other, in which the other's alterity is not a source of trauma but an enabling difference which contributes both to one's becoming and to the transformation of relations with others. While Irigaray does not explicitly develop the implications that this new economy of energy might have for the techno-informational character of relations in the information age, the terms "culture" and "economy," which she re­peatedly employs, suggest an important connection between the en­ergy she writes about and the informational economy of relations sketched in the first part of this essay. To formulate this link more explicitly, we have to understand what kind of energy and economy of relations is at stake in Irigaray’s thought and, above all, to flesh out how her refashioning of the relation to alterity can evolve a disposi­tion of forces and relations alternative to the dominant techno-informational paradigm of being in modernity. My suggestion here is that the enabling energy lrigaray associates with the difference marked by otherness is not simply supplementary to production and technol­ogy, but makes possible a recasting of the technic dynamics of relating constitutive of contemporary social praxis. Irigaray introduces the idea of a new economy of energy in order to supplement her conception of the working of the negative, necessary to the critical reformulation of the relations to others in the context of sexual and gender differences: "And if, in my book I Love to You, 1 explain that, to recognize the other as other, I must use negativity with respect to myself—and in another way to the other— to this new dialectical process I have to add a culture of energy that the occidental tradition lacks" (Irigaray 2001 [2000], 15).3 What Irigaray acknowledges here is that the (dialectical) workings of nega­tivity, while indispensable to the opening of a difference or an other­ness within the self, and, dialectically, within the other, does not capture the "positive" energy of the encounter. Negativity makes it possible to reconstitute the subject, and the other, as intrinsically open to difference, but it does not account for the transformative potential which Irigaray ascribes to otherness. For the "culture" or the "economy" of the energy Irigaray describes in "Being Two, How Many Eyes Have We?" (Irigaray 2001 [2000]) does not operate in terms of negation or positing. Part of the difference and the alternative charac­ter of this economy comes from the fact that it does not explain itself in either positive or negative terms, that, in short, it eschews, or better, transcends and transforms, the dialectical operations of difference. To suggest how the dialectical negativity of difference needs to be supplemented with a new culture of energy, Irigaray redraws the relationship between visibility and invisibility constitutive of the Western metaphysical optics of being. In a move to substantially recast the understanding of the human, Irigaray complicates the dialectics of the visible and the invisible, on which the ideas of knowing, difference, and otherness are based. Thus, a characteristic mark of being human is, for Irigaray, not the capacity for making visible and knowable, but, on the contrary, the ability to open up invisibility: "What distinguishes a human being from other living beings rather is his ability to create invisibility more than to make appear, to render visible" (Irigaray 2001 [2000], 13 E). When the human being is traditionally defined in terms of the capacity to see and to know, that is, in terms of a certain reading of logos, then, within the dialectics of the visible and die invisible, the visible becomes the positive term, to be extracted and won from die "nega­tivity" of the invisible. The faculty of sight thus becomes tanta­mount to the ability to translate the invisible into the visible, to bring the unknown into the horizon of intelligibility. Irigaray’s revi­sion consists in recasting invisibility as a source of a different seeing: the invisible is not a lack in seeing, not a failure of the human sight to appropriate what presents itself negatively to it, that is, as absent from the field of the visible or lacking in clarity, but a potential for transformation in the very parameters of visibility. It is this transformation In the very optics of being that opens up the possibility of a new culture of invisibility, which dramatically revises the signification of alterity: "... the invisibility of the other is no longer felt as a lack of seeing but as an invisible source of seeing. To contemplate the invisibility of the other gives or gives us again life ..(Irigaray 2001 12000], 21 E). What becomes transformed in this flip between the visible and the invisible are the parameters of seeing, the optics within which otherness and difference signify. Thus, what is also modified in the same gesture is the very modality- in which the other's difference, his or her invisibility, signifies. To "see" the invisibility in the other, that is, the other's alterity, either as a lack of seeing or as a lack in being, is to always already operate within a metaphysics of visibility which associates positivity (seeing, knowl­edge, order) with the idea of the visible, with the movement of ap­propriating and forming the invisible into visibility, whether we think here of rendering something knowable or fashioning something in the process of production. Thus, the very term "lack" reveals the economy which regulates relations within the optics of visibility: it is an economy which consists in making appear, in rendering visible, and thus, to echo Heidegger here, in procuring or making available: for knowl­edge, manipulation, production, mastery, and so on. Within this economy, invisibility signifies negatively, that is, as a lack or a gap which needs to be either redeemed or covered over, either appropri­ated and rendered visible or marginalized and excluded. Invisibility functions here as a disturbance or a threat to the stability of the economy of the visible, a disruption which has to be mended, woven back into the texture of visibility. The dominant economy of visibility assures that all the resources for growth and development are associated with the terms of visibility, that is, that only what explains itself in terms of the visible, what can itself be seen and known, merits the potential for change. Logically, what resists visibility or fails to manifest itself within the parameters dictated by the optics of the visible, be­comes an obstacle in the expanding field of visibility and knowledge. Irigaray reverses this relation by investing invisibility with the energy of enabling and transformation. As she emphatically states, "the invisibility of the other gives or gives us again life" (Irigaray 2001 [20001, 21E). Life and becoming are associated here not with the steady increase in visibility, with the progressive rendering of being into a "visible" and available resource, but with a radical requalification of invisibility. As a result, it is the invisible that becomes the source of another energy, the third ground, as Irigaray calls it, namely, the ground of transformation and becoming. She calls invisibility the third ground in order to differentiate it from the two modalities of energy, vital and cultural, in terms of which the dialectics of visibility oper­ates. "To succeed in transforming one's vital energy and one's cultural energy into a free energy, available, not already determined nor final­ized, would be for me the characteristic of a human being" (Irigaray 2001 12000], 17 E). To be human thus means to be capable of the third kind of energy, an energy without ends or finality which supplements the physiologically, materially-based vital energy and the intellectual, cultural energy of the spirit, Irigaray invokes breath as the figure for this third energy, because it is breath that ensures the junction of body and soul, the material and the spiritual (Irigaray 2001 (2000], 19 E), and suggests that the disappearance or lack of importance of this kind of energy in Western culture is related to the dominance of one gender, with "the other one being constrained to conform to so called universal norms or forms" (Irigaray 2001 [2000], 17 E). Thus, the new economy Irigaray suggests in her writings would be one of breath, where breath constitutes "the third ground" from which human beings become: 'The breath, as vital or spiritual matter of a human being, corresponds to this third ground from which we can appear as humans and relate between us" (Irigaray 2001 [2000], 20 E).