#### We begin with a passage from Jean Toomer’s Cane:

#### Portrait in Georgia

#### Hair—braided chestnut,

#### Coiled like a lyncher’s rope,

#### Eyes—fagots,

#### Lips—old scars, or the first red blisters,

#### Breath—the last sweet scent of cane,

#### And her slim body, white as the ash

#### of black flesh after flame.

#### Pay attention, I'm about to interrupt our space by calling attention to something that’s obvious to everyone except the other team. They just presented you with the kind of scholarship that maintains oppression. Let us call attention to the anti-black, sexist oppression they reveal.

#### **Their critique of the outlaw and its violence is premised on anti-blackness. The presumption that anyone can become an outlaw ignores that the crisis of law, citizenship and nativity they describe is constitutively foreclosed for the slave who has been natally alienated. The consequence is their critique parasitically appropriates examples of black oppression to describe the impact while insulating the sphere of their “outlaw” status form the real psychological jeopardy faced by blacks. The implication si the absolute dismissal of black intellectual achievement and reproduction of antiblackness. Only the alternative solves because blackness is the originary nonorigin with no possibility of reclamation of the social order purely existing as a status of criminality.**

Jared Sexton, badass, “People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery,” Social Text, 10, 2, Summer, 2010 40-43

Agamben is correct to identify the permanent crisis of the political system of the modern nation-state with “the original biopolitical fracture” of the third term of its conceptual trinity: birth.44 The malfunction of “the traditional mechanisms that used to regulate” the transformation of “birth into *nation,”* the failure of the inscription of nativity upon which is founded the “functional nexus between a determinate localization (territory) and a determinate order (state)” is remedied, as it were, by the state’s increasingly direct “management of the biological life of the nation.”45 The camp — “a space in which, for all intents and purposes, the normal rule of law is sus- pended and in which the fact that atrocities may or may not be committed does not depend on the law but rather on the civility and ethical sense of the police” — reinscribes naked life in the order of the nation-state by *force.46* The violence of this reinscription is meant both to arrest and remove the “people of the excluded” (the “minority” slated for indefinite isolation, expulsion, elimination, etc., even when in the numerical majority) and to ensure the properly political existence of the remainder of the population, the People as an “integral body politic” (the “majority” whose integrity is nonetheless reduced to a remainder by virtue of their constitutive exclusion from the space of the camp, even when in the numerical minority).47 Agamben is incorrect to date the onset of this crisis and the advent of the paradigm of the camp with the “new laws on citizenship and on the denationalization of citizens” in Europe of the interwar years, that is, the rise of martial law in the first half of the twentieth century.48 The general failure of the inscription of nativity in the order of the nation-state and the state’s management of the biological life of the nation is pre- dated and prepared by the strict prohibition of nativity under the regime of racial slavery and the state’s management of the biological life of the enslaved throughout the Atlantic world, most pointedly through the sexual regulation of race in the British North American colonies and the United States.49 And the racial circumscription of political life (bios) under slavery predates and prepares the rise of the modern democratic state, providing the central counterpoint and condition of possibility for the symbolic and material articulation of its form and function.50 If in Agamben’s analysis the inscription of nativity in Euro-America is disquieted in the twentieth century by postcolonial immigration, the native-born black population in the United States — known in the historic instance as “the descendants of slaves”—suffers the status of being neither the native nor the foreigner, neither the colonizer nor the colonized.51 The nativity of the slave is not inscribed elsewhere in some other (even subordinated) jurisdiction, but rather nowhere at all. The nativity of the slave is foreclosed, undermining from within the potential for citizenship, but also opening the possibility of a truly nonoriginal origin, a political existence that signifies “the pres- ence of an absence that discloses the absence inherent in all presence and every present.”52 Agamben overestimates the extent to which the question of nativity is displaced by the figure of the refugee. It is perhaps better to say that it is disturbed by the presence of strangers in a strange land. More simply, we might say to the refugee that you may lose your motherland, but you will not “lose your mother.”53 The latter condition, the “social death” in which one is denied kinship entirely by the force of law, is reserved for the “natal alienation” and “genealogical isolation” characterizing slavery. Here is Orlando Patterson, from his encyclopedic 1982 study: I prefer the term “natal alienation” because it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of “blood,” and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master. The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished. And this was true, at least in theory, of all slaves, no matter how elevated.54 True, even if one attains the income and educational levels of the mythic American middle class, the celebrity of a Hollywood icon, or the political position of the so-called leader of the free world. The alienation and isolation of the slave is not just vertical, canceling out ties to past and future generations (“the descendants of slaves” now understood as a strict oxymoron). It is also horizontal, canceling out ties to the slave’s contemporaries as well. The deracination of the slave, reduced to a tool, is total, more fundamental than the displacement of the refugee, whose status obtains in a network of persecuted human relations in exile rather than in a collection or dispersal of a class of things. Crucially, deracina- tion is strictly correlative to the “absolute submission mandated by law” discussed by Hartman above, the most perfect example of the space of purely formal obedience defining the jurisdictional field of sovereignty. Because the forced submission of the slave is absolute, any signs whatso- ever of “reasoning . . . intent and rationality” are recognized “solely in the context of criminal liability.” That is, “the slave’s will [is] acknowl- edged only as it [is] prohibited or punished.”55 A criminal will, a criminal reasoning, a criminal intent, a criminal rationality: with these erstwhile human capacities construed as indices of culpability before the law, even the potentiality of slave resistance is rendered illegitimate and illegible a priori. Again, this is true not only for the slave’s resistance to submission to this or that slaveholder but to the whole of the free population, what I called earlier the unequally arrayed category of nonblackness. The disqualification of black resistance is not unrelated to the peculiar and long-standing cross-racial phenomenon in which the white bourgeois and proletarian revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic can allegorize themselves as revolts against slavery, while the hemispheric black struggle against actually existing slavery and its afterlife cannot authorize itself literally in those same terms. The latter must code itself as the apotheosis of the French and American revolutions (with their themes of Judeo-Christian deliverance) or, later, the Russian and Chinese revolutions (with their themes of secular messianic transformation) or, still later, the broad anticolonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America of the mid-twentieth century (with their themes of indigenous reclamation and renaissance).56 The metaphoric transfer that dismisses the legitimacy of black struggles against racial slavery (and what Wacquant calls its “functional surrogates”) while it appropriates black suffering as the template for nonblack grievances remains one of the defining features of contemporary political culture. That notable black academics, artists, and activists participate in this gesture is nothing new, of course, but their increasing degrees of self-consciousness and virulence in so doing signal the hegemony it presently enjoys.

#### Their approach assumes we can have a universal understanding of the world. This inherently ignores the black female subject.

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

This approach, while usefully demonstrating the omnipresence of raced and gendered intersections, assumes that intersectionality operates in the same way across cultural spaces, rather than studying the particular articulations of intersectionality in distinct social locations. More than that, it presumes that intersectionality is the normatively desirable method for studying all cultural practices, rather than one of the many tools scholars could use to study how race and gender interact. To prove the operation of the matrix of domination, Collins turns to black women's collective experiences, arguing that "[k]nowledge without wisdom is adequate for the powerful, but wisdom is essential to the survival of the subordinate. "6 The fact that (some) oppressed people experience the matrix of domination validates that the matrix exists, and forecloses any questions about the varieties of ways that the matrix is created, replicated, or even variously experienced. In some ways, the move from theory to thought is unsurprising. Black feminist critiques of conventional notions of theory are long-standing; while the conventional academy has posited theory as objective, black feminist scholars have crafted theory from experiential knowledge and from the realities of daily life.65 By collapsing the distinction between theory and experience, black feminism contests the idea that theory need be-or could ever be-a neutral and detached enterprise. Moreover, theory has long been thought to be abstract, esoteric, and inaccessible to the general population, something that black feminism has contested by crafting theory both rooted in experiential realities and written in accessible ways. Collins suggests that theory's abstractness often serves a social purpose: "Educated elites typically claim that only they are qualified to produce theory and believe that only they can interpret not only their own but everyone else's experiences."66 Instead, Collins endeavors to "examine the complexity of ideas that exist . . . and present those ideas in a way that made them not less powerful or rigorous but accessible."67 To that end, black feminist projects often reference theoretical traditions-postmodemism, queer theory, feminism, sociological theory, Marxism-without deploying the jargon of those traditions, in an attempt to reveal how subjects are engaged in theory-making all the time.

#### We control the Uniqueness—In the wake of Renisha McBride, we must take steps towards addressing the violence against the black female body

Earl Ofari Hutchinson, author and political analyst, MSNBC contributor, associate editor of New America Media “The Slaying of Renisha McBride Casts Another Ugly Glare on the Peril to Black Women” Huffington Post 11/10/2013

The slaying of unarmed and from reports distressed motorist Renisha McBride in Dearborn Heights near Detroit casts yet another ugly glare on the extreme peril to black women. In the past few years, the number of black women that have been slain by police, brutalized by officers, or as in the case of McBride, slain by a homeowner, in several cities has at times drawn headlines and protests. This is separate from the endless tales of black women who have been beaten, tasered and threatened during routine stops or street searches by police officers often with no charges filed against them, or whatever charges were filed were soon dismissed. The black women that have been victimized have had several things in common apart from their gender and race. They were unarmed, and in nearly all the cases were not committing a crime. Their victimizers were not charged in their assault or killing. The McBride case seems to fit all three of these categories with the sole exception of the still dangling possibility that a charge may be slapped on the homeowner. Even if the homeowner in the case is charged and justice demands that, it does not change the fact that the shooter initially wasn't. The perpetrator's attorneys claim and prosecutors seem to think there are circumstances that warrant either exoneration or for them to foot drag in making an arrest. The indisputable fact that McBride was unarmed, apparently was not in the home, and was looking for help, should have been more than enough to warrant some charge. Prosecutors have a plethora of lesser charges that they routinely slap on those who resort to gun play in highly questionable situations. If there were truly valid reasons why a homeowner feels they have to kill no matter whether deliberate or accidental, then they would come out at a trial or during preliminary legal proceedings. None of this initially happened in the McBride slaying. This then raises the always troubling suspicion the race played a role in her slaying. There's the horrid history of racial stereotyping, profiling if you will, that indelibly link crime and violence with African-Americans. This linkage isn't just confined to black men. There's the feminization of racial stereotyping too. While black men are frequently typed as violent, drug dealing "gangstas," black women are typed as sexually loose, conniving, and untrustworthy. In effect, many believe that black women offenders are menaces to society too. Much of the public and many in law enforcement are deeply trapped in the damaging cycle of myths, misconceptions and crime fear hysteria about crime-on-the-loose women. The stereotype when lethal force has been used against young blacks has in a grotesque way given even more deadly justification to the dubious use of the stand your ground defense in these cases. The McBride case is no different. The delay in bringing any charges almost certainly hinges on Michigan's stand your ground law. The key provision of the law states that individuals may shoot if the individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual. The operative words that virtually give anyone a license to use such force is "honestly and reasonably." That's a murky legal minefield that's wide open to individual interpretation and prosecutors know this. This is where racial bias rams its way in, and further muddies a highly suspect killing given the relentless, and deeply encoded negative typecasting of young blacks as inherent criminal menaces and threats. This was evident with brutal effect in the slaying of Trayvon Martin. Defense attorneys, a legion of supporters of Martin's killer, George Zimmerman, and some in the media, were more determined to put Martin and his alleged past misdeeds on trial than Zimmerman. In far too many cases where young black women have been victimized there were endless and predictable efforts to dig up any and every bit of damaging information about their history or lifestyle to in effect virtually blame them for their own unjustified killing. The disturbing underlying public narrative about them was that their slaying was more than justified not solely because of their alleged reckless acts, but because of their alleged past.

#### This is perpetuated by willful thoughtlessness—The adoption of certain epistemologies is not an innocent choice, it is the fundamental justification for allowing a male-centered view of politics that justifies the oppression of marginalized groups

Pandey 2006 (Anupam, thesis submitted to faculty of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctorate of philosophy department of political science Carleton university, forgin bonds with women, nature and the third world: an ecofeminist critique of international relations, proquest) <103-105>

Both traditional IR theory and its positivist basis have been soundly criticized for their shortcomingsby post-positivist approaches such as feminist, post-modern, poststructuralist and critical approaches. This research aims to extend and deepen the existing critique by developing an ecofeminist perspective. A short summation of the post- positivist critique of the neo-realist agenda in this regard lies in the fact that the problem is inherent in the epistemological premises of the school itself. The subject-object dichotomy is responsible for the divorce of ethics from theory. That theorizing helps to construct the reality and the need for epistemological self-consciousness cannot be emphasized enough**.** “We don’t see things as they are, we see them as we are” (Ken Booth quoting Anais, 1995: 334). As discussed earlier, the most critical aspect with respect to epistemology and methodology is the hidden element of power associated with it. Robert Cox’s famous statement that theory is always to benefit someone or for some purpose (1986: 207) is equally true for epistemology. The adoption of a particular epistemological choice(which we discussed leads to serious ontological consequences for the discipline which in turn, in constitutive of reality) cannot be an innocent exercise. Thus,the fundamental question that arises is just whose perspective is reflected in the choice of method or even epistemology or quite simply, who is the “knower”?

The answer to this question with respect to International Relations and its scientific methods and positivistic methodology is that the subject is clearly the male who represents the White, western, Bourgeois masculinity. Alternately, an ecofeminist epistemology is reflective of the subjectivity or perspective of the epistemology of the voiceless, the dispossessed and the marginalized, specifically, women and natureand it explores the relationship between the two. As discussed in detail in chapter 2, in this regard,much of what an ecofeminist critique promises is already covered by a feminist standpoint epistemology. Not only does the latter help to reveal the element of power in the construction of knowledge by specifying exactly who stands to benefit from such knowledge but it also helps to reverse the hierarchical order by developing an epistemology from the standpoint of the oppressed, namely, women. However, an ecofeminist perspective serves to expand the existing body of knowledge by shifting the focus away not only from androcentricism but even anthropocentricism. This shift in focus is the key to understanding hierarchization, inegalitarianism and exploitation in relationships between humans.

#### The concept of fluidity only benefits the white subject

Wise 2009, TIM WISE 2009 (HEY DUDE, WHERE'S MY PRIVILEGE? RACE AND LAWBREAKING IN BLACK AND WHITE MAY 19, 2009 [HTTP://WWW.ZMAG.ORG/ZNET/VIEWARTICLE/21490](http://WWW.ZMAG.ORG/ZNET/VIEWARTICLE/21490))

This is perhaps the most blatant example of white privilege imaginable: the ability to do what you want, when you want, without fear of consequence, and then to have that behavior deemed largely harmless, even when, for others, it would be viewed as dysfunctional, destructive, and evidence of a profound cultural flaw. Well it's time to flip the script on all that; time to note that it isn't the culture of black and brown youth, or working class youth (of whatever color), that needs changing. They aren't the problem**.** They aren't the ones with inverted value systems. They aren't the ones whose presence on campus is the problem. It's some among the ones with money and insufficient melanin who are the problem. And it's time we treated them like one, especially when, by their behavior, they literally beg us to do so.

#### Alt is black feminist love politics, we can transcend status quo politics by the rebellion of loving ourselves in the face of antiblack, anti feminist capitalism

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Practicing Love: Black Feminism, Love-Politics, and Post-Intersectionality” Meridians, Vol. 11, No. 2 2011

Although black feminist love-politics has been expressed in distinctive ways in different periods, this paper focuses on a “second-wave”3 black moment when pleas for love were consolidated into a sustained call for a black feminist love-politics, a moment that set the stage for later women of color feminist scholarship—including work by hooks, Traci West, Chela Sandoval, and Patricia Hill Collins—grappling with love. This particular moment has long been celebrated for its advocacy of love as a resistant ethic of self-care. If “bein alive & bein a woman & bein colored is a metaphysical dilemma”—to borrow Ntozake Shange’s oft-quoted lines—then black feminism’s insistence on love, particularly self-love, might be read as a practice of self-valuation (Shange 1977, 45). Collins captures this reading of black self-love, arguing that, “Loving Black people . . . in a society that is so dependent on hating Blackness constitutes a highly rebellious act” (Collins 2004, 250). According to this scholarly tradition, love is a politics of claiming, embracing, and restoring the wounded black female self. My interest in black feminist love-politics departs from interpretations of love as simply a practice of self-valuation. Instead, I analyze “second-wave” black feminism’s pleas for love as a significant call for ordering the self and transcending the self, a strategy for remaking the self and for moving beyond the limitations of selfhood. Moreover, this paper reads black feminist love-politics’ insistence on transcending the self and producing new forms of political communities as a kind of affective politics. My use of the term affective politics draws on work by scholars including Sara Ahmed, Lauren Berlant, Jose Muñoz, and Ann Cvetkovich, who invite us to ask: “how do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and against other others? How do emotions move between bodies?” (Ahmed 2004, 118). I use the term affective politics to describe how bodies are organized around intensities, longings, desires, temporalities, repulsions, curiosities, fatigues, optimism, and how these affects produce political movements (or sometimes inertias). I am particularly interested in reading black feminism’s affective love politics as a departure from the kind of political work that black feminism is often associated with: identity politics.

#### The Role of the ballot is to defer to Brittany on questions of black female subjectivity

#### The unique black female perspective is an epistemological necessity for political decisions

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

If black feminism was moving from "outsider" knowledge to academic practice, intersectionality was becoming central to black feminism's institutionalization. Crenshaw's and Collins's interventions were essential to intersectionality's prominent theoretical place in black feminism studies, and contributed to black feminism's installation in the academy. I underscore the centrality of institutionalization to this moment because it is a crucial turning point in the history of both intersectionality and black feminism; the shift from activist organizations to academic departments as loci of black feminist intellectual production meant that intersectionality was no longer simply a "survival theory" insisting on black women's place in feminism and anti-racist projects. Suddenly, intersectionality was also an intellectual product, one that began to move across disciplinary borders, and that was celebrated as "the most important theoretical contribution that women's studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far."4 7 Crenshaw's and Collins's respective projects share a set of aims: to include black women in feminist and anti-racist conversations that all too often ignored black women (Crenshaw in legal doctrine and Collins in Sociology and Women's Studies), and to demonstrate how existing epistemological frameworks are complicated by black women's intersectional experiences. Both advance the ethical and political utility of adopting black women's vantage points, suggesting that black women's intersectional experiences reveal something significant-and otherwise unknown-about power's workings. Importantly, the temporal convergence of their respective projects fundamentally shifted intersectionality away from the multiple marginalization approach of the early era. For both Crenshaw and Collins, the race/gender intersection is the centerpiece of intersectional analysis; even as both gesture to the significance of other intersections, sexuality, class, nation, ethnicity, and a host of other structures of domination are under-theorized, if not entirely ignored, by their works. Indeed, both Crenshaw and Collins envision exposing black women's marginalization as the normative and political goal of intersectionality. Race and gender are imagined to intersect in ways that render black women multiply marginalized subjects whose experiences of the social world are marked by particular forms of subordination. This theoretical move places oppression at the center of black feminist understandings of black female subjectivity, and reifies the view that black women are the quintessential marginalized subjects. Of course, the early years were also interested in black women's "multiple jeopardy," their social location as multiply marginalized subjects; yet, what distinguishes the watershed years is that black women's experiences become emblematic of the worst forms of marginalization. Rather than attempting to stake out the complexities of black women's lives, black women's experiences become symbolic of the very worst forms of oppression.

#### The black woman is never visible, legal structures prove the black female subject is always excluded

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

Intersectionality's "early years" were marked by the study of how multiple structures of domination shaped black women's lived experiences; Crenshaw's and Collins's work shifted the study of multiple marginalizations from an investigation of race, class, gender, and sexuality to a rigorous exploration of how race and gender collude to constrain black women's lives. For both Crenshaw and Collins, placing black women at the center of an analytical framework was quite significant, particularly in light of mainstream feminist and anti-racist traditions which neglected, and often explicitly ignored, the particularity of black women's gendered and racialized injuries. Crenshaw's work sought to render visible black women's legal injuries, revealing that black female plaintiffs struggle to make discrimination complaints legible to a legal regime structured around race-based injuries or gender-based injuries precisely because their experiences of discrimination are often rooted in the interplay of race and gender. Crenshaw illustrated how race and gender discrimination coincide in her intersection analogy: Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination.48 Crenshaw's traffic metaphor aspired to dramatically shift legal doctrine, insisting on a way of conceptualizing discrimination that accounts for injuries "in the intersection." As Peter Kwan notes, "what is distinctive about intersectionality is not so much the recognition of multiple identities in specific loci, but the separate political claim that this multiplicity calls for separate theoretical consideration against the grain of cultural and legal orthodoxy." 4 9 Ultimately, Crenshaw's work rendered legible black women's intersectional injuries, injuries so often relegated to the legal periphery, and made those injuries legally cognizable.

#### In light of capitalisms disproportionate effect on the black female body we should be focused on these populations

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

For some black feminists, capitalism was seen as the linchpin in the system of domination that oppressed black women. Frances Beale imagined black women's social positions as fundamentally linked to capitalism's unrelenting "attempt[s] by many devious ways and means to destroy the humanity of all people, and particularly the humanity of black people." 33 Most significantly, capitalism remade black family life, producing conditions where black men were unable to locate sufficient paid work in the conventional labor force, and required black women to serve as the family's primary, and sometimes sole, wage-earner. While capitalism forced black women to participate in a racist and sexist paid labor force, it also relegated them to the least desirable work. June Jordan spoke of black women's collective position, "huddle[d] together miserably on the very lowest levels of the economic pyramid. We Black women subsist in the most tenuous economic conditions."34 For some black feminists, it was this subversion of the conventional gendered division of labor and relegation of black women to the worst work that was thought to lie at the heart of the "turmoil that we find in the black family structure." Beale's work both suggested that the structure of the economy fundamentally shapes black sexual politics and made a critique of capitalism central to black feminist activism.

### A2: Perm

#### The footnoting link is a also a DA to the the perms – the thinking that we can simply add black self love to the advocacy of the 1AC is directly contradictory to their epistemological approach focus on being outlaws.

#### The perm is an interruption into the alternative that excludes the black female body

Audre Lorde, “Sister Outsider: essays and speeches.” The Crossing Press 1984

Once you start to speak, people will yell at you. They will interrupt you, put you down and suggest it’s personal. And the world won’t end. And the speaking will get easier and easier. And you will find you have fallen in love with your own vision, which you may never have realized you had. And you will lose some friends and lovers, and realize you don’t miss them. And new ones will find you and cherish you. And you will still flirt and paint your nails, dress up and party, because, as I think Emma Goldman said, “If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be part of your revolution.” And at last you’ll know with surpassing certainty that only one thing is more frightening than speaking your truth. And that is not speaking.”

#### The perm is an appropriation, risks killing black feminisms anti colonialist practices

bell hooks, “Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black” pg 15 1989

Appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be over determined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in. It becomes easy to speak about what that group wants to hear, to describe and define experience in a language compatible with existing images and ways of knowing, constructed within social frameworks that reinforce domination. Within any situation of colonization, of domination, the oppressed, the exploited develop various styles of relating, talking one way to one another, talking another way to those who have power to oppress and dominate, talking in a way that allows one be understood by someone who does not know your way of speaking, your language. The struggle to end domination, the individual struggle to 'resist colonization, to move from object to subject, is expressed in the effort to establish the liberatory voice—that way of speaking that is no longer determined by one's status as object—as oppressed being..

#### We need to interrupt the historical continuation of anti black violence, true resistance is the freedom of self love, we need to move away from constraints

Jared Sexton “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” InTensions Journal Fall/Winter 2011

[4] If there is a leitmotif to George C. Wolfe’s 1985 masterpiece, The Colored Museum, then this just might be it. Normal Jean tells us, for instance, in a late scene entitled, “Permutations,” that “nuthin’ really ever ends” and certainly not the past, not this past. Indeed, we learn in advance of the script proper, right there in the stage direction, that this education in black life that everyone must learn is an experience for which “there is no intermission.” Benjamin’s famous “time of the now” signifies peculiarly in this memorial venue. In place of the interval, or the break, or the mark of punctuation, there is a tenacious continuity, a historical continuum, across eleven moving exhibits, a dirty dozen; not cessation or interruption of historical flow but persistence of historical force, persistence in and as permutation. But how, then, does one mark time and think historicity, how does one engage the iterability of the performative, if nothing ends? How to orient or make sense of lived experience, the lived experience of the black no less, without break or interval or punctuation in the fact of (anti)blackness?

 Dance to “the music of the madness,” declares Topsy in the final number, for there is freedom and freedom is there, a mad freedom there where there is none, in our unending, uninterrupted captivity in the colored museum, in the baggage we do claim, in the pain we can’t live inside of and can’t live without. The ultimate refrain, then: “THERE’S MADNESS IN ME AND THAT MADNESS SETS ME FREE.” Altogether, the ensemble repeats and recites and recounts. But what is this madness within, and from whence, and what is the “me” it sets free? It is undoubtedly true that the worst kind of time in jail you can do is colored time. But perhaps, as Topsy et al. testify, “freedom is in unfreedom as the trace of the resistance that constitutes constraint” (Moten 2007: 318). Perhaps Mr. Tibbs is only half right.

#### Perm is severance: what they justify matters for our wellbeing in debates and what becomes possible in the debate community.

Leonardo 04 “The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the discourse of ‘white privilege’” California State University Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004 Zeus Leonardo Associate Professor Language and Literacy, Society and Culture zeus Leonardo has published numerous articles and book chapters on critical social thought in education

When it comes to official history, there is no paucity of representation of whites as its creator. From civil society, to science, to art, whites represent the subject for what Matthew Arnold once called the best that a culture has produced. In other words, white imprint is everywhere. However, when it concerns domination, whites suddenly disappear, as if history were purely a positive sense of contribution. Their previous omnipresence becomes a position of nowhere, a certain politics of un-detectability. When it comes to culture, our students learn a benign form of multiculturalism, as if culture were a purely constructive notion free of imperialist histories and examples of imposition. Encouraging white students to reinsert themselves into the underbelly of history does not always have to occur in a self-destructive context. There are ways to address domination that require very little from people who benefit from it

#### The perm is an intrusion into the body of the black female, creates conditioned hospitality

Sara Ahmed, 2004- “Affective Economies”. Social Text, 79 (Volume 22, Number 2), Summer 2004, pp. 117-139. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London. <http://ericastanleydotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/ahmed-affective-economies.pdf>

We could hence ask how the circulation of signs of affect shapes the materialization of collective bodies, for example the “body of the nation.” We have already seen how hate slides across different figures and constitutes them as a “common threat” in what we can call “hate speech.” But the slippery work of emotion cannot allow us to presume any opposition between extremist discourses and the “ordinary” work of reproducing the nation. We can take as an example the speeches on asylum seekers by the previous leader of the British Conservative Party, William Hague. Between April and June 2000, other speeches were in circulation that became “stuck” to the “asylum seekers” speech through this temporal proximity, but also through the repetition with a difference, of some sticky words and language. In the case of the asylum speeches, Hague’s narrative is somewhat predictable. Words like flood and swamped are used, which create associations between asylum and the loss of control, as well as dirt and sewage, and hence work by mobilizing fear, or the anxiety of being “overwhelmed” by the actual or potential proximity of others. These words have recently been repeated by the current British Home Secretary, David Blunkett, who used the word swamped to describe the effect that children of asylum seekers would have if they were taught by local schools. When criticized, he replaced the word swamped with overwhelmed. The assumption here is that overwhelmed resolves the implication of swamped, but as we can see, it still evokes the sensation of being overtaken or taken over by others. It constructs the nation as if it was a subject, one who “could not cope” with the presence of others. Here words generate effects: they create impressions of others as those who have invaded the space of the nation, threatening its existence. Typically, Hague in the earlier speeches differentiates between those others who are welcome and those who are not by differentiating between genuine and bogus asylum seekers. Partly, this enables the national subject to imagine its own generosity in welcoming some others. The nation is hospitable, as it allows those genuine ones to stay. And yet at the same time, it constructs some others as already hateful (as bogus) in order to define the limits or the conditions of this hospitality. The construction of the bogus asylum seeker as a figure of hate also involves a narrative of uncertainty and crisis, but an uncertainty and crisis that make that figure do more work. How can we tell the difference between a bogus and a genuine asylum seeker? According to the logic of this discourse, it is always possible that we might not be able to tell the difference, and that they may pass into our community. Passing functions here as a technology, which relates physical movement with identity formation: to pass through a space requires passing as a particular kind of subject, one whose difference is unmarked and unremarkable.11 The double possibility of passing commands the nation’s Right and will to keep looking for signs of difference and justifies violent forms of intrusion into the bodies of others.

### A2: Perm – Hospitality DA

#### The perm is merely conditioned hospitality, that re-creates the colonialist master slave relation.

Derrida, 1990

(Jacques, “A discussion with Jacques Derrida’”, Theory and Event Issue 5.1 Pg. 16-17)

That's conditional hospitality, in a colonial structure in which there is a master, there is someone who is the host. As you will recall, the word host means hospes, means the master, sometimes the husband, the male master of the house, and in that case we have conditional hospitality. To which I -- I won't say 'oppose' -- but in contrast to which I try to think pure and unconditional hospitality, the idea of a pure welcoming of the unexpected guest, the unexpected arriving one. From that point of view I would distinguish between the hospitality of the invitation and the hospitality of the visitation. In the invitation, the master remains master at home, chez soi, and the host remains the host and the guest remains the guest, the invited guest -- 'Please, come in, you're invited' -- but of course as invited guest you won't disturb too seriously the order of the house, you're going to speak our language, eat the way we eat ... et cetera et cetera. To this invitation, to this hospitality of invitation, I would oppose -- or not oppose but rather distinguish from it -- the hospitality of visitation. The visitor is not an invited guest, the visitor is the unexpected one who arrives and to whom a pure host should open his house without asking questions such as: who are you? what are you coming for? will you work with us? do you have a passport? do you have a visa? and so on and so forth -- that's unconditional hospitality.

#### Conditioned hospitality enacts the death of other. The certification of immigrant as welcome or unwelcome performatively enacts the masters right to choose life or death for other.

Derrida 1994

(Jacques, "Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International", Trans. Peggy Kamuf, Routledge: New York, NY)

But effective exorcism pretends to declare the death only in order to put to death. As a coroner might do, it certifies the death but here it is in order to inflict it. This is a familiar tactic. The constative form tends to reassure. The certification is effective. It wants to be and it must be in Oct It is effectively a performative. But here effectivity phantomalizes itself. It is in fact [en eget] a matter of a performative that seeks to reassure but first of all to reassure itself by assuring itself, for nothing is less sure, that what one would like to see dead is indeed dead. It speaks in the name of life, it claims to know what that is. Who knows better than someone who is alive? it seems to say with a straight face. It seeks to convince (itself) there where it makes (itself) afraid:' now, it says (to itself), what used to be living is no longer alive, it does not remain effective in death itself, don't worry. (What is going on here is a way of not wanting to know what everyone alive knows without learning and without knowing, namely, that the dead can often be more powerful than the living; and that is why to interpret a philosophy as philosophy or ontology of life is never a simple matter, which means that it is always too simple, incontestable, like what goes without saying, but finally so unconvincing, as unconvincing as a tautology, a rather heterological tauto-ontology, that of Marx or whomever, which relates everything back to life only on the condition of including there death and the alterity of its other without which it would not be what it is.) In short, it is often a matter of pretending to certify death there where the death certificate is still the performative of an act of war or the impotent gesticulation, the restless dream, of an execution.

### A2: A2: Perm Cooption DA

#### Cooption DA - must push away from the 1AC to solve – independent reason to vote Neg

Alfred 99 [Taiaiake, U of Victoria dir. of Indigenous Governance Program, Peace, Power, Righteousness, p79]

Freeing ourselves from co-optation comes down to acknowledging the unbalanced power relation that we exist within (and not making excuses for its continuation); and holding ourselves apart from the institutions and people that actually constitute colonialism. Colonialism is not an abstract notion, but a set of real people and relationships and structures that can be resisted and combated by placing our respect and trust where it belongs: in indigenous people, relationships, and structures.

### A2: Perm – Universalism DA

#### The permutation is merely another form of Western “Universalism”. This is a desire to destroy singularities. The impact is racism and bare life.

Lander 2k

Edgardo, Sociologist, “Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought” Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 1, Issue 3, pg. 527-528

Neoliberalism and postmodernism are two of the prevailing theoretical influences in contemporary Latin American social sciences. From the point of view of the tensions referred to earlier, neoliberalism has an unequivocal content. It is a dogmatic reaffirmation of lineal conceptions of universal progress and the “imaginary of development.” It assumes the central countries as models toward which all must inexorably turn. Neoliberalism reaffirms a colonial perspective in which the only significant subjects are those with roles in the modernizing project: entrepreneurs, technocrats, middle-class neighborhood associations, and other members of a mythological civil society. The indifference toward “others” who cannot find a place in this utopia of market and liberal democracy suggests the presence of vestiges of the fundamental racism characteristic of all colonial thought. The most deplorable assumptions on the sociology of modernization have been taken up with renewed devotion. From the perspective of the imaginary of modernity, all differences are redefined as obstacles to be overcome. On the other hand, such modern values as equity and autonomy become archaic, obsolete. In this radicalization of Western “universalism,” all historical singularity disappears. International financial experts can jump from country to country and indistinctly advise Russia, Poland, or Bolivia on the virtues of the market. Economics is a science; the places, people, and customs with which it operates are accidents of minor importance compared to the universality of its objective laws.

#### They will try to win claims that we are harmful but that is inherently flawed, the black female is always just the footnote

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

Both Collins and Crenshaw centered their projects on exploring how race and gender interact to shape black women's lives, even as they rhetorically gestured to the importance of other structures of domination. Crenshaw, for example, insisted that interest in race/gender was not meant to foreclose the importance of other axes of domination. She noted, Nor do I mean to suggest that violence against women of color can be explained only through the specific frameworks of race and gender considered here. Indeed, factors I address only in part or not at all, such as class or sexuality, are often as critical in shaping the experiences of women of color.54 Though she observed the importance of multiple intersections to black women's experiences of identity and oppression, Crenshaw's work effectively neglected other intersections, mentioning them only to relegate them to the analytical periphery. This "bracketing" strategy-even if undertaken for the purpose of theoretical simplicity-is not unlike a pattern that critical race feminists (including Crenshaw) observed in mainstream feminist legal thought. Angela Harris's persuasive critique of mainstream feminist legal theory, particularly the work of Catharine MacKinnon, revealed that feminist legal theorists routinely evoked race, only to neglect it later. Harris termed this tradition "nuance theory," a strategy that mentions difference to complicate the fundamental position that gender is the best analytic for understanding women's subordination.5 5 "Nuance theory" uses black women who are "trotted onto the page (mostly in footnotes) as the ultimate example of how bad things are," the symbol of just how bad gender oppression can be.56 Similarly, Crenshaw's intersectional account used class and sexuality instrumentally, to gesture to a nuanced intersectionality, only to curtail any examination of class and sexuality, effectively reducing black women's experiences to race/gender.57

#### Essentialism used to silence oppressed groups

Bell Hooks Essentialism and Experience American Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 172-183

According to Fuss, issues of "essence, identity, and experience" erupt in the classroom primarily because of the critical input from marginalized groups. Throughout her chapter, whenever she offers an example of individuals who use essentialist standpoints to dominate discussion, to silence others via their invocation of the "authority of experience," they are members of groups who historically have been and are oppressed and exploited in this society. Fuss does not address how systems of domination already at work in the academy and the classroom silence the voices of individuals from marginalized groups and give space only when on the basis of experience it is demanded. She does not suggest that the very discursive practices that allow for the assertion of the "authority of experience" have already been determined by politics of race, sex, and class domination. **Fuss does not aggressively suggest that dominant groups-men, white people, heterosexuals-perpetuate essentialism**. In her narrative **it is always a marginal "other" who is essentialist. Yet the politics of essentialist exclusion as a means of asserting presence, identity, is a cultural practice that does not emerge solely from marginalized groups**. And **when those groups do employ essentialism as a way to dominate in institutional settings, they are often imitating paradigms for asserting subjectivity that are part of the controlling apparatus in structures of domination**. Certainly many white male students have brought to my classroom an insistence on the authority of experience, one that enables them to feel that anything they have to say is worth hearing, that indeed their ideas and experience should be the central focus of classroom discussion. **The politics of race and gender within white supremacist patriarchy grants them this "authority" without their having to name the desire for it.** They do not attend class and say, "I think that I am superior intellectually to my classmates because I am white and male and that my experiences are much more important than any other group's." And yet their behavior often announces this way of thinking about identity, essence, subjectivity.

### method

#### good comparative method card

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

While Crenshaw challenged "legal orthodoxy," Collins confronted both feminist orthodoxy and conventional sociology. Collins asserted that while black feminist epistemology overlaps with other feminist intellectual formations, it acts as a unique form of knowledge production because "[i]nstead of starting with gender and then adding in other variables such as age, sexual orientation, race, social class, and religion, Black feminist thought sees these distinctive systems of oppression as being part of one overarching structure of domination."5' Like Crenshaw, Collins viewed her intervention as a kind of visibility and recovery project, arguing that knowing "that the minds and talents of our grandmothers, mothers, and sisters have been suppressed [means that] the task of reclaiming Black women's subjugated knowledge takes on special meaning."52 Ultimately, for Collins, black feminism aspires to recover black women's "subjugated knowledge" and to use it as a basis for studying how structures of domination reinforce each other.53

### Wise

#### This is the same unethical relationship the makes the black body a slave, fungible object in and out of the debate community. Any representational politics that seek to be free of this burden is claiming to be free in the face of the slave. Produces violence especially amongst the resolved. Freedom always comes at a price.

Yancy 05**,** *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 19.4 (2005) 215-241

The “View from Nowhere” that most philosophical discourse fosters cannot theorize for the black body or hope to solve for the harms of white supremacy

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body**.** Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity**.** Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:

Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.

(1998, 6)

**To theorize the Black body one must "turn to the [Black] body as the radix for interpreting racial experience"** (Johnson [1993, 600]).[1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v019/19.4yancy.html#FOOT1) **It is important to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body.** However, **there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection.** In this paper, **my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body's subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body.** T**hese instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people.** These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, **"Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value"** (Snead 1994, 4).