#### The black woman is never visible, legal structures exclude the black female subject

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

Intersectionality's "early years" were marked by the study of how multiple structures of domination shaped black women's lived experiences; Crenshaw's and Collins's work shifted the study of multiple marginalizations from an investigation of race, class, gender, and sexuality to a rigorous exploration of how race and gender collude to constrain black women's lives. For both Crenshaw and Collins, placing black women at the center of an analytical framework was quite significant, particularly in light of mainstream feminist and anti-racist traditions which neglected, and often explicitly ignored, the particularity of black women's gendered and racialized injuries. Crenshaw's work sought to render visible black women's legal injuries, revealing that black female plaintiffs struggle to make discrimination complaints legible to a legal regime structured around race-based injuries or gender-based injuries precisely because their experiences of discrimination are often rooted in the interplay of race and gender. Crenshaw illustrated how race and gender discrimination coincide in her intersection analogy: Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination.48 Crenshaw's traffic metaphor aspired to dramatically shift legal doctrine, insisting on a way of conceptualizing discrimination that accounts for injuries "in the intersection." As Peter Kwan notes, "what is distinctive about intersectionality is not so much the recognition of multiple identities in specific loci, but the separate political claim that this multiplicity calls for separate theoretical consideration against the grain of cultural and legal orthodoxy." 4 9 Ultimately, Crenshaw's work rendered legible black women's intersectional injuries, injuries so often relegated to the legal periphery, and made those injuries legally cognizable.

#### We control the Uniqueness—In the wake of Renisha McBride, we must take steps towards addressing the violence against the black female body

Earl Ofari Hutchinson, author and political analyst, MSNBC contributor, associate editor of New America Media “The Slaying of Renisha McBride Casts Another Ugly Glare on the Peril to Black Women” Huffington Post 11/10/2013

The slaying of unarmed and from reports distressed motorist Renisha McBride in Dearborn Heights near Detroit casts yet another ugly glare on the extreme peril to black women. In the past few years, the number of black women that have been slain by police, brutalized by officers, or as in the case of McBride, slain by a homeowner, in several cities has at times drawn headlines and protests. This is separate from the endless tales of black women who have been beaten, tasered and threatened during routine stops or street searches by police officers often with no charges filed against them, or whatever charges were filed were soon dismissed. The black women that have been victimized have had several things in common apart from their gender and race. They were unarmed, and in nearly all the cases were not committing a crime. Their victimizers were not charged in their assault or killing. The McBride case seems to fit all three of these categories with the sole exception of the still dangling possibility that a charge may be slapped on the homeowner. Even if the homeowner in the case is charged and justice demands that, it does not change the fact that the shooter initially wasn't. The perpetrator's attorneys claim and prosecutors seem to think there are circumstances that warrant either exoneration or for them to foot drag in making an arrest. The indisputable fact that McBride was unarmed, apparently was not in the home, and was looking for help, should have been more than enough to warrant some charge. Prosecutors have a plethora of lesser charges that they routinely slap on those who resort to gun play in highly questionable situations. If there were truly valid reasons why a homeowner feels they have to kill no matter whether deliberate or accidental, then they would come out at a trial or during preliminary legal proceedings. None of this initially happened in the McBride slaying. This then raises the always troubling suspicion the race played a role in her slaying. There's the horrid history of racial stereotyping, profiling if you will, that indelibly link crime and violence with African-Americans. This linkage isn't just confined to black men. There's the feminization of racial stereotyping too. While black men are frequently typed as violent, drug dealing "gangstas," black women are typed as sexually loose, conniving, and untrustworthy. In effect, many believe that black women offenders are menaces to society too. Much of the public and many in law enforcement are deeply trapped in the damaging cycle of myths, misconceptions and crime fear hysteria about crime-on-the-loose women. The stereotype when lethal force has been used against young blacks has in a grotesque way given even more deadly justification to the dubious use of the stand your ground defense in these cases. The McBride case is no different. The delay in bringing any charges almost certainly hinges on Michigan's stand your ground law. The key provision of the law states that individuals may shoot if the individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual. The operative words that virtually give anyone a license to use such force is "honestly and reasonably." That's a murky legal minefield that's wide open to individual interpretation and prosecutors know this. This is where racial bias rams its way in, and further muddies a highly suspect killing given the relentless, and deeply encoded negative typecasting of young blacks as inherent criminal menaces and threats. This was evident with brutal effect in the slaying of Trayvon Martin. Defense attorneys, a legion of supporters of Martin's killer, George Zimmerman, and some in the media, were more determined to put Martin and his alleged past misdeeds on trial than Zimmerman. In far too many cases where young black women have been victimized there were endless and predictable efforts to dig up any and every bit of damaging information about their history or lifestyle to in effect virtually blame them for their own unjustified killing. The disturbing underlying public narrative about them was that their slaying was more than justified not solely because of their alleged reckless acts, but because of their alleged past.

#### This is perpetuated by willful thoughtlessness—The adoption of certain epistemologies is not an innocent choice, it is the fundamental justification for allowing a male-centered view of politics that justifies the oppression of marginalized groups

Pandey 2006 (Anupam, thesis submitted to faculty of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctorate of philosophy department of political science Carleton university, forgin bonds with women, nature and the third world: an ecofeminist critique of international relations, proquest) <103-105>

Both traditional IR theory and its positivist basis have been soundly criticized for their shortcomingsby post-positivist approaches such as feminist, post-modern, poststructuralist and critical approaches. This research aims to extend and deepen the existing critique by developing an ecofeminist perspective. A short summation of the post- positivist critique of the neo-realist agenda in this regard lies in the fact that the problem is inherent in the epistemological premises of the school itself. The subject-object dichotomy is responsible for the divorce of ethics from theory. That theorizing helps to construct the reality and the need for epistemological self-consciousness cannot be emphasized enough**.** “We don’t see things as they are, we see them as we are” (Ken Booth quoting Anais, 1995: 334). As discussed earlier, the most critical aspect with respect to epistemology and methodology is the hidden element of power associated with it. Robert Cox’s famous statement that theory is always to benefit someone or for some purpose (1986: 207) is equally true for epistemology. The adoption of a particular epistemological choice(which we discussed leads to serious ontological consequences for the discipline which in turn, in constitutive of reality) cannot be an innocent exercise. Thus,the fundamental question that arises is just whose perspective is reflected in the choice of method or even epistemology or quite simply, who is the “knower”? The answer to this question with respect to International Relations and its scientific methods and positivistic methodology is that the subject is clearly the male who represents the White, western, Bourgeois masculinity. Alternately, an ecofeminist epistemology is reflective of the subjectivity or perspective of the epistemology of the voiceless, the dispossessed and the marginalized, specifically, women and natureand it explores the relationship between the two. As discussed in detail in chapter 2, in this regard,much of what an ecofeminist critique promises is already covered by a feminist standpoint epistemology. Not only does the latter help to reveal the element of power in the construction of knowledge by specifying exactly who stands to benefit from such knowledge but it also helps to reverse the hierarchical order by developing an epistemology from the standpoint of the oppressed, namely, women. However, an ecofeminist perspective serves to expand the existing body of knowledge by shifting the focus away not only from androcentricism but even anthropocentricism. This shift in focus is the key to understanding hierarchization, inegalitarianism and exploitation in relationships between humans.

#### A criticism of targeted killing policy may seem to be a step forward, but really just highlight the problems of US violence and white supremacy

TWIB 13

This Week In Blackness "Drone Policy Is the Most Important Racism," http://thisweekinblackness.com/2013/07/25/drone-policy-is-the-most-important-racism/)

There are several incidents of privilege-blindness among the mostly white male drone-obsessed elite. First, their public anger over the drone program seemed to begin when Eric Holder made statements extending the legal justification for the program to killing U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. That implies that these critics think that the U.S. government killing U.S. citizens is new or unusual, when a simple surface-level review of this country’s history shows that the government has always committed sustained and fatal violence against brown people, women, gay people, transpeople, disabled people, and poor people among others. People who insist on talking about drones as an ultimate evil ignore this history of violence, which is well-known in communities not their own. And, the likelihood that white men personally will be targeted by a drone is absurdly small, compared to the likelihood that a member of a marginalized community will continue to suffer from the government’s active and passive violence. So, hearing these critics air their feelings of being “targets” for the first time is offensive to those from communities that have lived under the gun for generations, especially because these feelings exclude points of view from those communities. If you are privileged enough to suddenly feel scared of the government, you are complicit in denying the violence against marginalized people that has always existed. The other part of white male critics’ anxiety comes from recognition that the world order is changing. Traditionally, the American president has been a white man who identifies and legitimizes white men’s problems as American Problems. Now, President Obama is the public face of America, and when he identifies a traditionally invisible Black People’s Problem, it becomes, for the first time, an American Problem. By stubbornly forcing Obama’s statements about Trayvon Martin into the framework of opposition to drone strikes, white male public intellectuals are attempting to return to white men the power to define American Problems. White critics insist that Obama addresses drone strikes above all other expressions of white supremacy, while claiming that they are the “true” soldiers against racism. They apparently believe that they get to decide which policies are “important-racist” and which ones are “unimportant-racist.” It must be a coincidence that the “unimportant-racist” policies are the ones that most directly validate white upper-class male privilege. Also, by arguing that drones exhibit “important racism,” these critics reinforce the narrative that killing Black people is “unimportant racism,” and not as valuable as executing white men’s philosophical priorities.

#### Alt is black feminist love politics, we can transcend status quo politics by the rebellion of loving ourselves in the face of antiblack, anti feminist capitalism

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Practicing Love: Black Feminism, Love-Politics, and Post-Intersectionality” Meridians, Vol. 11, No. 2 2011

Although black feminist love-politics has been expressed in distinctive ways in different periods, this paper focuses on a “second-wave”3 black moment when pleas for love were consolidated into a sustained call for a black feminist love-politics, a moment that set the stage for later women of color feminist scholarship—including work by hooks, Traci West, Chela Sandoval, and Patricia Hill Collins—grappling with love. This particular moment has long been celebrated for its advocacy of love as a resistant ethic of self-care. If “bein alive & bein a woman & bein colored is a metaphysical dilemma”—to borrow Ntozake Shange’s oft-quoted lines—then black feminism’s insistence on love, particularly self-love, might be read as a practice of self-valuation (Shange 1977, 45). Collins captures this reading of black self-love, arguing that, “Loving Black people . . . in a society that is so dependent on hating Blackness constitutes a highly rebellious act” (Collins 2004, 250). According to this scholarly tradition, love is a politics of claiming, embracing, and restoring the wounded black female self. My interest in black feminist love-politics departs from interpretations of love as simply a practice of self-valuation. Instead, I analyze “second-wave” black feminism’s pleas for love as a significant call for ordering the self and transcending the self, a strategy for remaking the self and for moving beyond the limitations of selfhood. Moreover, this paper reads black feminist love-politics’ insistence on transcending the self and producing new forms of political communities as a kind of affective politics. My use of the term affective politics draws on work by scholars including Sara Ahmed, Lauren Berlant, Jose Muñoz, and Ann Cvetkovich, who invite us to ask: “how do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and against other others? How do emotions move between bodies?” (Ahmed 2004, 118). I use the term affective politics to describe how bodies are organized around intensities, longings, desires, temporalities, repulsions, curiosities, fatigues, optimism, and how these affects produce political movements (or sometimes inertias). I am particularly interested in reading black feminism’s affective love politics as a departure from the kind of political work that black feminism is often associated with: identity politics.

#### That is necessary to disrupt the american economy of fear created post-9/11, where public attitudes are determined by the constant fear of “could-be” terrorists. This climate allows the policing of all bodies and the extension of warfare

Sara Ahmed, 2004- “Affective Economies”. Social Text, 79 (Volume 22, Number 2), Summer 2004, pp. 117-139. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London. <http://ericastanleydotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/ahmed-affective-economies.pdf>

Furthermore, the fear of degeneration as a mechanism for preserving social forms becomes associated more with some bodies than others. The threat of such others to social forms (which are the materialization of norms) is represented as the threat of turning away from the values that will guarantee survival. These various others come to embody the failure of the norm to take form; it is the proximity of such other bodies that “causes” the fear that the forms of civilization (the family, the community, the nation, and international civil society) have degenerated. Those who speak out against the “truth” of this world become aligned then with the terrorists as seeking to cause the “ruin” of the world. What is important, then, is that the narratives that seek to preserve the present through working on anxieties of death as the necessary consequence of the demise of social forms also seek to locate that anxiety in some bodies, which then take on fetish qualities as objects of fear. Such bodies engender even more fear, as they cannot be held in place as objects, and threaten to pass by. That is, we may fail to see those forms that have failed to be; it is always possible that we might not be able to tell the difference. The present hence becomes preserved by defending the community against the imagined others, who may take form in ways that cannot be anticipated, a “not-yetness” that means the work of defense is never over. Such a defense is generated by anxiety and fear for the future, and justifies the elimination or exclusion of that which fails to materialize in the form of the norm as a struggle for survival. Insofar as we do not know what forms other others may take, those who fail to materialize in the forms that are lived as norms, the policies of continual surveillance of emergent forms is sustained as an ongoing project of survival. It is here that we can deepen our reflections on the role of the figure of the international terrorist within the economies of fear. Crucially, the narrative that justifies the expansion of the powers to detain others within the nation and the potential expansion of the war itself to other nations relies on the structural possibility that the terrorist “could be” anyone and anywhere. The narrative of the “could be” terrorist, in which the terrorist is the one who “hides in the shadows,”35 has a double edge. On the one hand, the figure of the terrorist is detached from particular bodies, as a shadowy figure, “an unspecifiable may-come-to-pass.”36 But it is this could-be-ness, this detachment, which also allows the restriction on the mobility of those bodies who are read as associated with terrorism: Islam, Arab, Asian, East. Fear sticks to these bodies (and to the bodies of “rogue states”) that “could be” terrorist, where the “could be” opens up the power to detain. Although such fear sticks, it also slides across such bodies; it is the structural possibility that the terrorist may pass us by that justifies the expansion of these forms of intelligence, surveillance, and the rights of detention. Fear works here to expand the mobility of some bodies and contain others precisely insofar as it does not reside positively in any one body. As Samuel Weber puts it, “When terrorism is defined as international it becomes difficult to locate, situate, personify and identify,”37 and it is this difficulty that justifies the expansion of the powers of the state. It is important to recognize that the figure of the international terror-ist has been mobilized in close proximity to the figure of the asylum seeker. The slide between these two figures does an enormous amount of work: it assumes that those who seek asylum, who flee from terror and persecution, may be bogus insofar as they could be the very agents of terror and persecution. They, like terrorists, are identified as potential burglars: as unlawful intruders into the nation. In Australia, for example, the refusal to allow the boat Tampa into its waters (with its cargo of 433 asylum seekers, many of whom were from Afghanistan) was retrospectively justified on the grounds that those on board could be linked to Osama bin Laden. The sticking together of the figure of the asylum seeker and the international terrorist, which already evokes other figures (the burglar, the bogeyman), constructs those who are “without home” as sources of “our fear” and as reasons for new forms of border policing, whereby the future is always a threat posed by others who may pass by and pass their way into the community. The slide of metonymy works to generate or make likeness: the asylum seeker is “like” the terrorist, an agent of fear, who may destroy “our home.” The slide between figures involves the containment of others, who henceforth become the objects of fear. The containment of the bodies of others affected by this economy of fear is most chillingly and violently revealed in the literal deaths of those seeking asylum in containers, deaths that remain unmourned by the very nations who embody the hope of a future for those seeking asylum. This is a chilling reminder of what is at stake in the affective economies of fear.

#### The unique black female perspective is an epistemological necessity for political decisions

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Home Truths' on Intersectionality” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 2011

If black feminism was moving from "outsider" knowledge to academic practice, intersectionality was becoming central to black feminism's institutionalization. Crenshaw's and Collins's interventions were essential to intersectionality's prominent theoretical place in black feminism studies, and contributed to black feminism's installation in the academy. I underscore the centrality of institutionalization to this moment because it is a crucial turning point in the history of both intersectionality and black feminism; the shift from activist organizations to academic departments as loci of black feminist intellectual production meant that intersectionality was no longer simply a "survival theory" insisting on black women's place in feminism and anti-racist projects. Suddenly, intersectionality was also an intellectual product, one that began to move across disciplinary borders, and that was celebrated as "the most important theoretical contribution that women's studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far."4 7 Crenshaw's and Collins's respective projects share a set of aims: to include black women in feminist and anti-racist conversations that all too often ignored black women (Crenshaw in legal doctrine and Collins in Sociology and Women's Studies), and to demonstrate how existing epistemological frameworks are complicated by black women's intersectional experiences. Both advance the ethical and political utility of adopting black women's vantage points, suggesting that black women's intersectional experiences reveal something significant-and otherwise unknown-about power's workings. Importantly, the temporal convergence of their respective projects fundamentally shifted intersectionality away from the multiple marginalization approach of the early era. For both Crenshaw and Collins, the race/gender intersection is the centerpiece of intersectional analysis; even as both gesture to the significance of other intersections, sexuality, class, nation, ethnicity, and a host of other structures of domination are under-theorized, if not entirely ignored, by their works. Indeed, both Crenshaw and Collins envision exposing black women's marginalization as the normative and political goal of intersectionality. Race and gender are imagined to intersect in ways that render black women multiply marginalized subjects whose experiences of the social world are marked by particular forms of subordination. This theoretical move places oppression at the center of black feminist understandings of black female subjectivity, and reifies the view that black women are the quintessential marginalized subjects. Of course, the early years were also interested in black women's "multiple jeopardy," their social location as multiply marginalized subjects; yet, what distinguishes the watershed years is that black women's experiences become emblematic of the worst forms of marginalization. Rather than attempting to stake out the complexities of black women's lives, black women's experiences become symbolic of the very worst forms of oppression.

#### Women of color are disproportionately affected by the use and manufacturing of weapons

Assata Zerai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and Zakia Salime, Michigan State University “A Black Feminist Analysis of Responses to War, Racism, and Repression”. Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 Mar 1, 2006

Feature 2: Black feminism highlights the importance of integrated analysis in political organizing Black feminism considers multiplicative oppressions to be addressed in communities of color. Black feminist organizing seeks to understand domination in order to equip people to resist oppression and affect social change. Integrated analysis informs the points delineated in the leaflet, “10 Reasons Why Women Should Oppose the US ‘War on Terrorism’” developed by the Women of Color Resource Center. For an example, see point 3: “Weapons of mass destruction, produced, used and sold by the US worldwide, poison the environment, causing miscarriages, birth defects and cancers.” They argue that class interests that promote the sale of weaponry by US corporations to the US military and to other military interests around the world not only contribute to the further disparity in income and wealth in US society and between the USA and other countries, but also directly affect the health status of residents in countries and communities in which such weapons are produced and used. Women generally – poor women, women of color, and poor women of color in particular – are disproportionately affected by the income and wealth disparities generated by weapons sales and by the ill-health effects of these weapons. The organization, INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence further develops this point in their leaflet “The ‘War of Terror’ Intensifies Violence Against Women of Color, Third World Women and our Communities.” It states, “Women in the countries under attack search for clean water because poisons from weapons pollute the soil and water, leading to starvation, cancers, and birth disabilities.” An integrated analysis is employed when the observer is examining the simultaneous operation of global racism, class oppression, and sexism. The same perspective informs point 5 of the WCRC’s “10 Reasons Women Should Oppose War.” It states, “The ‘war on terrorism’ is a cover for US economic, political, and military domination, which increases women’s poverty worldwide.” In INCITE’s integrated analysis, they delineate several issues related to this point: a. Third-world women who survive invasion will live in a . . . colony that has been devastated and impoverished and has little or no access to jobs and education. b. The excuse of a wartime economy and national security are used to cut tens of thousands of jobs from women of color and thirdworld women and our communities . . . c. The Department of Homeland Security can decertify any union operating or prevent any union forming if the union is seen as a threat to “national security.” Without unions, working conditions and salaries for poor folks and people of color will get worse. Point a looks beyond US borders to bring in nations as a sphere of the intersectional framework. In points b and c, women of color observe ways the “war on terror” has directly affected earnings of family and community members.

#### Ethics in international relations must start from the viewpoint of the excluded rather than universal humanity in order to address the structural causes of conflict and subordination

Robinson, 1997 [Fiona, School of Social Sciences – University of Sussex, Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1997), pp. 113-133]

In our understanding of the obstacles to moral responsiveness among distant strangers, we must avoid the temptation to see an apparent lack of caring simply in terms of ignorance, egoism, or individual prejudice. That sort of methodological individualism obscures both the "institutionalization of exclusion" that occurs not only within political communities but between them and the recognition that what is required for genuine moral responsiveness is an understanding of "the viewpoint of the excluded" - that is, a recognition that one is oneself different from the standpoint of the excluded others - rather than simply the collapsing of subjectivities into the sameness of universal humanity.49 I mentioned, at the beginning of this article, the traditional methodological bias in ethics toward agent-centeredness or individualism. At first sight, this bias seems to be upheld, even reinforced, in care ethics. Alison Jaggar has argued that care's emphasis on the quality of individual relations seems to preclude its addressing the structural oppositions between the interests of social groups that make caring difficult or unlikely between members of those groups. She also suggests that care thinking seems unable to focus on the social causes of many individual problems, such as widespread homelessness and hunger, both of which, she notes, have disproportionately severe effects on women.50 I would agree with Jaggar's first claim; certainly, any approach to ethics that claims to address the moral problems of international relations cannot overlook the structural causes of patterns of moral inclusion and exclusion on a global scale. Indeed, a global ethic of care will be as useless as its cosmopolitan or contractarian counter- part unless it is aware of the structures of exclusion and oppression that characterize the contemporary global system. But there is no reason why the special nature of care ethics should preclude its ability to address such global moral problems. Indeed, when we situate relationships within a global context, relational ethics may be seen to relate not only to "personalized" moral relations among concrete persons, but to all kinds of institutional and structural relations in societies and the international system. Understood in this way, then, it becomes possible to construct a global picture of care that, while it does concentrate on particular persons and their relations with others, does not ignore the structural conditions in which those relations are situated. The challenge of relational thinking is not just to deepen an interest in care, but to recast issues of difference and exclusion as problems of dominance or subordination in order to disclose the social relationships of power within which difference is named and enforced.51 Seen in this way, then, the relational turn (in feminist ethics) thus represents not a denial of or lack of interest in conflict and disunity but "a focus on the interpersonal and social contexts in which these and all other human relations occur."52



#### State representations distance us from real world representations of politics – the policymaking paradigm guarantees imperialism

Reid-Brinkley 8

Shanara Reid-Brinkley, Rhetoric PhD & Prof @ Pitt, “The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black:” How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style”

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks:

“…the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116

The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona**.** The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance isintegrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression**.** In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony**.**

#### Real deliberation is tied to the material and the everyday.

(MattStannard, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, 2006, <http://legalcommunication.blogspot.com/2006/08/deliberation-debate-and-democracy-in.html>)

We tend to think reason will prevail—or that if it doesn’t, we can explain its failure discursively. This blindness concerning materiality is precisely why deliberative politics must include the voices of the materially disadvantaged. It is why the "perspective of the oppressed" is not only morally necessary, but epistemologically necessary**.** Within Habermas’s communicative ethics is found both the classic Rawlsian test of how policies and arrangements affect the least advantaged members of society, and the Marxian imperative for emancipation from the artificial and enforced scarcity and silence of economics. This is vital to making what we do relevant—because even if democratic legitimacy depends on discursive justification, such justification occurs in a "dirty" material world, the "excrement" of which Marx wrote as a metaphor for the day-to-day material challenges of ordinary people. The aggregate of those material challenges constitutes the very conditions of humanity itself, and awareness of those conditions in their totality requires a commitment to deliberation in all levels of the social world.
The complexity and interdependence of human society, combined with the control of political decision making—and political conversation itself—in the hands of fewer and fewer technological "experts," the gradual exhaustion of material resources and the organized circumvention of newer and more innovative resource development, places humanity, and perhaps all life on earth, in a precarious position.

#### The perm is an interruption into the alternative that excludes the black female body

Audre Lorde, “Sister Outsider: essays and speeches.” The Crossing Press 1984

Once you start to speak, people will yell at you. They will interrupt you, put you down and suggest it’s personal. And the world won’t end. And the speaking will get easier and easier. And you will find you have fallen in love with your own vision, which you may never have realized you had. And you will lose some friends and lovers, and realize you don’t miss them. And new ones will find you and cherish you. And you will still flirt and paint your nails, dress up and party, because, as I think Emma Goldman said, “If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be part of your revolution.” And at last you’ll know with surpassing certainty that only one thing is more frightening than speaking your truth. And that is not speaking.”

#### The perm is an appropriation, risks killing black feminisms anti colonialist practices

bell hooks, “Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black” pg 15 1989

Appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be over determined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in. It becomes easy to speak about what that group wants to hear, to describe and define experience in a language compatible with existing images and ways of knowing, constructed within social frameworks that reinforce domination. Within any situation of colonization, of domination, the oppressed, the exploited develop various styles of relating, talking one way to one another, talking another way to those who have power to oppress and dominate, talking in a way that allows one be understood by someone who does not know your way of speaking, your language. The struggle to end domination, the individual struggle to 'resist colonization, to move from object to subject, is expressed in the effort to establish the liberatory voice—that way of speaking that is no longer determined by one's status as object—as oppressed being..

#### We need to interrupt the historical continuation of anti black violence, true resistance is the freedom of self love, we need to move away from constraints

Jared Sexton “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” InTensions Journal Fall/Winter 2011

[4] If there is a leitmotif to George C. Wolfe’s 1985 masterpiece, The Colored Museum, then this just might be it. Normal Jean tells us, for instance, in a late scene entitled, “Permutations,” that “nuthin’ really ever ends” and certainly not the past, not this past. Indeed, we learn in advance of the script proper, right there in the stage direction, that this education in black life that everyone must learn is an experience for which “there is no intermission.” Benjamin’s famous “time of the now” signifies peculiarly in this memorial venue. In place of the interval, or the break, or the mark of punctuation, there is a tenacious continuity, a historical continuum, across eleven moving exhibits, a dirty dozen; not cessation or interruption of historical flow but persistence of historical force, persistence in and as permutation. But how, then, does one mark time and think historicity, how does one engage the iterability of the performative, if nothing ends? How to orient or make sense of lived experience, the lived experience of the black no less, without break or interval or punctuation in the fact of (anti)blackness? Dance to “the music of the madness,” declares Topsy in the final number, for there is freedom and freedom is there, a mad freedom there where there is none, in our unending, uninterrupted captivity in the colored museum, in the baggage we do claim, in the pain we can’t live inside of and can’t live without. The ultimate refrain, then: “THERE’S MADNESS IN ME AND THAT MADNESS SETS ME FREE.” Altogether, the ensemble repeats and recites and recounts. But what is this madness within, and from whence, and what is the “me” it sets free? It is undoubtedly true that the worst kind of time in jail you can do is colored time. But perhaps, as Topsy et al. testify, “freedom is in unfreedom as the trace of the resistance that constitutes constraint” (Moten 2007: 318). Perhaps Mr. Tibbs is only half right.