# 1NC

#### The speech act of the 1AC is grounded in a masculine economy—their critical approach fails to address the starting point of social relations—the subjugation of the feminine

Irigaray 2004 (Luce, An ethics of sexual difference pg. 10-11)

In order to distance oneself, must one be able to take? To speak? Which in a certain way comes to the same thing. Perhaps in order to take, one needs a fixed container or place? A soul? Or a spirit? Mourning nothing is the most difficult. Mourning the self in the other is almost impossible. I search myself, as if I had been assimilated into maleness. I ought to reconstitute myself on the basis of a disassimilation…. Rise again from the traces of a culture, of works already produced by the other. Searching through what is in them – for what is not there. What allowed them to be, for what is not there. Their conditions of possibility, for what is not there.  Woman ought to be to find herself, among other things, through the images of herself already deposited in history and the conditions of production of the work of man, and not on the basis of his work, his genealogy.  If traditionally, and as a mother, woman represents place for man, such a limit means that she becomes a thing, with some possibility of change from one historical period to another. She finds herself delineated as a thing. Moreover, the maternal-feminine also serves as an envelope, a container, the starting point from which man limits his things. The relationship between envelope and things constitutes one of the aporias, or the aporia, of Aristotelianism and of the philosophical systems derived from it.   In our terminologies, which derive from this economy of thought but are impregnated with a psychologism unaware of its sources, it is said, for example, that the woman-mother is castrating. Which means that, since her status as envelope and as thing(s) has not been interpreted, she remains inseparable from the work or act of an, notably insofar as he defines her and creates his identity with her as his starting point or, correlatively, with this determination of her being. If after this, she is still alive, she continuously undoes his work- distinguishing herself from both the envelope and the thing, ceaselessly creating there some interval, play, something in motion and un-limited which disturbs his perspective, his world, and his/its limits. But, because he fails to leave her a subjective life, and to be on occasion her place and her thing in an intersubjective dynamic, man remains within a master-slave dialectic. The slave, ultimately, of a God on whom he bestows the characteristics of an absolute master. Secretly or obscurely, a slave to the power of the maternal-feminie which he diminishes or destroys.

#### The invisible energy they forget grounds existence—only air can take the place of place—resisting the forgetting of air is essential to nourish our connection to earth and sky

Oliver 7Kelly, W. Alton Jones Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Women's Studies @ Vanderbilt, “Vision, Recognition, and a Passion for the Elements” Returning to Irigaray: feminist philosophy, politics, and the question of unity, ed Maria C. Cimitile and Elaine P Miller; p.124-128

Irigaray's insistence on the importance of the role of material elements in vision, perception, thought, and philosophy in general suggests a new direction for theories of recognition and intersubjective relations. Throughout her work, she is concerned to recall and re­member the material elements—water, earth, fire, and air—out of which we are born and through which we live, together. In Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche {Irigaray 1991 [1980]), she reminds us of the importance of water, fluids, especially those out of which we were born. In Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger (Irigaray 1999 11983]), she suggests that air has a special place among the elements: "Is not air the whole of our habitation as mortals? Is there a dwelling more vast, more spacious, or even more generally peaceful that that of air.' Can man live elsewhere than in air? Neither in earth, nor in fire, nor in water is any habitation possible for him" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 8). Can we expand Irigaray's theories of air and light to develop a new conception of vision that can give birth to a new conception of re­lationships beyond subject-object/other hierarchies? Although Irigaray is indebted to Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merlcau-Ponty in her attempts to reformulate the role of vision in relation to subjectivity, she takes us beyond their theories. For our purposes here, suffice it to say that, unlike Levinas, rather than favor­ing touch over vision because traditional theories of vision presuppose subjects dominating their objects, Irigaray also tries to reconceive of vision; and, unlike Merleau-Ponty, Irigaray refuses to fuse vision and touch, and instead insists that they cannot be reduced one to the other.' In her book Textures of Light (Vasseleu 1998), Cathryn Vasseleu argues that Irigaray goes further than either Merleau-Ponty or Levinas towards developing an alternative theory of vision by developing an alternative vision of light as textured. Rather than reduce vision to touch, which is one of her (debatable) criticisms of Merleau-Ponty, Irigaray emphasizes the touch of light on the eye. For Irigaray, it is not, then, that vision and touch are not separate senses, but rather that vision is dependent upon the sense of touch. Vasseleu argues that conceiving of light's texture challenges the traditional separation of the senses that serves the separation of sen­sible and intelligible- The separation between sensible and intelli­gible, between body and mind or soul, has been constructed around the notion of the mind's eye and an immaterial seeing cut off from the body and sensation, a more accurate seeing. The split between the mind's eye and the body's eye is interlaced with the split between objective theoretical knowledge and subjective personal feeling. Ob­jective theoretical knowledge requires a notion of vision as a distanc­ing sense that separates the mind's eye from the body and gives it a privileged perspective devoid of contaminating sentiment. Informa­tion gathered through touch and more proximal senses is thought to provide only subjective feeling and cannot be grounds for knowledge (Vasseleu 1998, 12).6 If, on Irigaray's theory, however, vision involves touching light, then we are touched by, and touching, everything around us even as we see the distance between ourselves and the world or other people in the world. The texture or fabric of vision is even more tightly woven than Mcrlcau-Ponty's reversible flesh (cf. Mcrlcau-Ponty, 1968). It is not just that the fabric of vision is reversible between subject and object, invisible and visible, ideal and material; rather, the texture of vision is the result of an interweaving of elements both distinct and intimately connected in their sensuous contact. The texture of light is what is between us and other people in the world. We are both connected and made distinct by the texture of light that wraps us in the luxury and excesses of the world. In addition to what Vasseleu calls the texture of light, Irigaray's insistence on material elements, especially air, provokes us to rethink vision in terms of its dependence upon the density of air, upon the elements. Irigaray concludes her Elemental Possums with an ode to the density of ain "1 opened my eyes and saw rhe cloud. And saw that nothing was perceptible unless I was held at a distance from it by an almost palpable density. And that I saw it and did not see it. Seeing it all the better for remembering the density of air remaining in between. But this resistance of air being revealed, I felt something akin to the possibility of a different discovery of myself (Irigaray 1992 [19811, 105; emphasis added). Space is not empty because it is filled with the density of air. And the density of air connects and separates every­thing on earth. Remembering air and the density of air reminds me that I am both connected to and different from those around me. Remembering what cannot be seen, the density of air, allows me to better see the difference and communion between myself and others. Seeing what is different from me and what is between me and differ­ence opens the possibility of a different discovery of myself, a discov­ery that is not the hostile Hegelian struggle for recognition and is not based on the paranoia of the Sartrian accusing look or the Lacanian evil eye.T Irigaray's most sustained reflections on air and the density of air are in Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger (Irigaray 1999 [1983]). There she takes Heidegger to task for forgetting the air that makes possible any clearing, being, or Being of being. Leaving behind the context of her criticisms of Heidegger, which is interesting in itself, I am interested in her descriptions of air and how they can help re con­ceive of vision. Throughout Forgetting of Air, Irigaray suggests that the philosopher has forgotten air and thereby forgotten that ~~he~~ is nour­ished and supported by air. By forgetting air, the philosopher imagines that he is thrown into an empty abyss where he confronts only noth­ingness (Irigaray 199911983], 98, 137, 147, 157, 162, 166, 169). The abyss, she reminds us, is not empty; it is full of air. And air is not nothing. The philosopher's supposition that we are alienated from the earth or others by an abyss is the product of what Irigaray calls the "forgetting of air" (Irigaray 1999 [1983]). She says that "the elementally of physis—air, water, earth, fire—is always already reduced to nothing­ness in and by his own element: his language" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 74). Irigaray asks what happens when the philosopher focuses on the things within air and forgets air itself: "And what becomes of air when the being appears within it? It is reduced to nothingness" (Irigaray 1999 [19831, 162). By forgetting the elements, the philosopher forgets that space is not empty. By forgetting that space is not empty, the space between us and others or our own image seems unbridgeable, empty, alienating- But what if space is full and not empty? Even light is dependent upon air. The texture of light cannot touch without the air that opens onto that touch. Vision, speech, and life itself require air. In response to Heidegger, Irigaray says "it is not light that creates the clearing, but light comes about only in virtue of the transparent levity of air. Light presupposes air. No sun without air to welcome and transmit its rays. Ho speech without air to convey it. Day and night, voice and silence, appear and disappear in air. The extent of space, the horizons of time, and all diat becomes present and absent within them are to be found gathered together in air as in some fundamental thing. The originary intuition of which recedes indefinitely. Free beyond all vision. Dwelling out of sight. -.. And thought attains the heart of this assembly only by assimilating itself to this serene spariality—air" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 166-67). The serene spatiality that is air cannot be seen and yet there is no seeing without it. It fills space with the plentitude of life. For Irigaray, air occupies a unique place among the elements in that it is place. She says that "[n]o other element can for him take the place of place. No other element carries with it—or lets itself be passed through by—light and shadow, voice or silence.... No other element is in this way space prior to all localization and a substratum both immobile and mobile, permanent and flowing, where multiple temporal divisions remain forever possible. Doubtless, no other ele­ment is as originarily constitutive of the whole of the world, without this generativity ever coming to completion in a primordial time, in a singular primacy, in an autarchy, in an autonomy, in a unique or exclusive property" (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 8). Air generates life but without hierarchy, genealogy, domination, or ownership. More than this, Irigaray marvels at the way that air gives without demanding anything in return: \*'But this element, irreducibly constitutive of the whole, compels neither the faculty of perception nor that of knowl­edge to recognize it. Always there, it allows itself to be forgotten" (Irigaray 1999 (1983], 8). The recognition of this giving without de­mand for recognition is what opens the possibility of a different dis­covery of myself in relation to what gives me life and nourishes me. Irigaray's discussion of gifts and indebtedness to the elements and mediums of perception adds an ethical dimension to vision. She sug­gests that because we see and live in and by air and light, we have an ethical obligation to the earth and sky. Our indebtedness is not the debt of some economic exchange that must be paid off in full or in kind; rather, our indebtedness can only be acknowledged through wonder, marvel, love, and care (Irigaray 1999 [1983], 28; cf. 1980, 1984, 1992, 1994).

#### But every kritik begins between two—that means it is relational and irreducible—the 1NC breathes life into the 1AC—the only question for this debate then is how we voice our dialogue with them, with you

#### The 1NC is an embodiment of an excluded possibility—we voice the gaps and fissues of their philosophy

Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is not One, 1985. 214-218

Why speak? you’ll ask me. We feel the same things at the same time. Aren’t my hands, my eyes, my mouth, my lips, my body enough for you? Isn’t what they are saying to you sufficient? I could answer “yes,” but that would be too easy. Too much a matter of reassuring you/us. If we don’t invent a language, if we don’t find our body’s language, it will have too few gestures to accompany our story. We shall tire of the same ones, and leave our desires unexpressed, unrealized. Asleep again, unsatisfied, we shall fall back upon the words of men‚ - who, for their part, have “known” for a long time. But not our body. Seduced, attracted, fascinated, ecstatic with our becoming, we shall remain paralyzed. Deprived of our movements. Rigid, whereas we are made for endless change. Without leaps or falls, and without repetition. Keep on going, without getting out of breath. Your body is not the same today as yesterday. Your body remembers. There’s no need for you to remember. No need to hold fast to yesterday, to store it up as capital in your head. Your memory? Your body expresses yesterday in what it wants today. If you think: yesterday I was, tomorrow I shall be, you are thinking: I have died a little. Be what you are becoming, without clinging to what you might have been, what you might yet be. Never settle. Let’s leave definitiveness to the undecided; we don’t need it. Our body, right here, right now, gives us a very different certainty. Truth is necessary for those who are so distanced from their body that they have forgotten it. But their “truth” immobilizes us, turns us into statues, if we can’t loose its hold on us. If we can’t defuse its power by trying to say, right here and now, how we are moved. You are moving. You never stay still. You never stay. You never ‘are.’ How can I say ‘you,’ when you are always other? How can I speak to you? You remain in flux, never congealing or solidifying. What will make that current flow into words? It is multiple, devoid of causes, meanings, simple qualities. Yet it cannot be decomposed. These movements cannot be described as the passage from a beginning to an end. These rivers flow into no single, definitive sea. These streams are without fixed banks, this body without fixed boundaries. This unceasing mobility. This life‚ - which will perhaps be called our restlessness, whims, pretenses, or lies. All this remains very strange to anyone claiming to stand on solid ground. Speak, all the same. Between us, ‘hardness’ isn’t necessary. We know the contours of our bodies well enough to love fluidity. Our density can do without trenchancy or rigidity. We are not drawn to dead bodies. But how can we stay alive when we are far apart? There’s the danger. How can I wait for you to return if when you’re far away from me you cannot also be near? If I have nothing palpable to help me recall in the here and now the touch of our bodies. Open to the infinity of our separation, wrapped up in the intangible sensation of absence, how can we continue to live as ourselves? How can we keep ourselves from becoming absorbed once again in their violating language? From being embodied as mourning. We must learn to speak to each other so that we can embrace from afar. When I touch myself, I am surely remembering you. But so much has been said, and said of us, that separates us. Let’s hurry and invent our own phrases. So that everywhere and always we can continue to embrace. We are so subtle that nothing can stand in our way, nothing can stop us from reaching each other, even fleetingly, if we can find means of communication that have our density. We shall pass imperceptibly through every barrier, unharmed, to find each other. No one will see a thing. Our strength lies in the very weakness of our resistance. For a long time now they have appreciated what our suppleness is worth for their own embraces and impressions. Why not enjoy it ourselves? Rather than letting ourselves be subjected to their branding. Rather than being fixed, stabilized, immobilized. Separated. Don’t cry. One day we’ll manage to say ourselves. And what we say will be even lovelier than our tears. Wholly fluent. Already, I carry you with me everywhere. Not like a child, a burden, a weight, however beloved and precious. You are not in me. I do not contain you or retain you in my stomach, my arms, my head. Nor in my memory, my mind, my language. You are there, like my skin. With you I am certain of existing beyond all appearances, all disguises, all designations. I am assured of living because you are duplicating my life. Which doesn’t mean that you give me yours, or subordinate it to mine. The fact that you live lets me know I am alive, so long as you are neither my counterpart nor my copy. How can I say it differently? We exist only as two? We live by twos beyond all mirages, images, and mirrors. Between us, one is not the ‘real’ and the other her imitation; one is not the original and the other her copy. Although we can dissimulate perfectly within their economy, we relate to one another without simulacrum. Our resemblance does without semblances: for in our bodies, we are already the same. Touch yourself, touch me, you’ll ‘see.’ No need to fashion a mirror image to be ‘doubled,’ to repeat ourselves‚ – a second time. Prior to any representation, we are two. Let those two‚ – made for you by your blood, evoked for you by my body‚ – come together alive. You will always have the touching beauty of a first time, if you aren’t congealed in reproductions. You will always be moved for the first time, if you aren’t immobilized in any form of repetition. We can do without models, standards, or examples. Let’s never give ourselves orders, commands, or prohibitions. Let our imperatives be only appeals to move, to be moved, together. Let’s never lay down the law to each other, or moralize, or make war. Let’s not claim to be right, or claim the right to criticize one another. If one of us sits in judgment, our existence comes to an end. And what I love in you, in myself, in us no longer takes place: the birth that is never accomplished, the body never created once and for all, the form never definitively completed, the face always still to be formed. The lips never opened or closed on a truth. Light, for us, is not violent. Not deadly. For us the sun does not simply rise or set. Day and night are mingled in our gazes. 14 Our gestures. Our bodies. Strictly speaking, we cast no shadow. There is no danger that one or the other may be a darker double. I want to remain nocturnal, and find my night softly luminous, in you. And don’t by any means imagine that I love you shining like a beacon, lording it over everything around you. If we divide light from night, we give up the lightness of our mixture, solidify those heterogeneities that make us so consistently whole. We put ourselves into watertight compartments, break ourselves up into parts, cut ourselves in two, and more. Whereas we are always one and the other, at the same time. If we separate ourselves that way, we ‘all’ stop being born. Without limits or borders, except those of our moving bodies. And only the limiting effect of time can make us stop speaking to each other. Don’t worry. I‚ - continue. Under all these artificial constraints of time and space, I embrace you endlessly. Others may make fetishes of us to separate us: that’s their business. Let’s not immobilize ourselves in these borrowed notions. And if I have so often insisted on negatives: not, nor, without… it has been to remind you, to remind us, that we only touch each other naked. And that, to find ourselves once again in that state, we have a lot to take off. So many representations, so many appearances separate us from each other. They have wrapped us for so long in their desires, we have adorned ourselves so often to please them, that we have come to forget the feel of our own skin. Removed from our skin, we remain distant. You and I, apart. You? I? That’s still saying too much. Dividing too sharply between us: all .

#### If you noticed the illocutionary act inherent in Irigaray’s text, you’re in good company—her very critique, while establishing the phallogocentric nature of philosophy espouses the possibility of the alternative—that the feminine has been colonized by Western philosophy suggests the possibility that the feminine can exist

Goodrich 2002 (Peter, FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES, Volume 10, Number 2, 159-176,  La Nouvelle Vague: Epiphanies, Encounters, Events)

The ghost of justice traverses Ahmed’s essay in the guise not only of invisibility but also as impossibility, madness, and the not yet. The ghost is in one sense the opposite of the epiphanic, it is a failed manifestation, a mere appearance, a chimera. The spectral, however, is also a mark. It serves to inscribe what Ahmed refers to as a “call” for the “re-animation” of encounters between women and specifically secret or intimate conversations (p. 70). Gayatri Spivak’s notion of “secret encounters” here plays the ambivalent role of the embodied yet deferred conflict in Bottomley’s essay. The secret encounter is what comes before both politics and law. It is a paradox, an attempt to bridge the unconjoinable chasm between the unique instance and the abstraction of the rule. The epiphany of theory, for Ahmed, takes the form of giving voice to those who have not found a place in the abstractions of law. It is a question of finding time and making space for face to face encounters with those outside the law, encounters whose secrecy marks the corporeality, the uniqueness, by means of which conversation or listening “moves” or “touches” upon the listener. The secrecy of the encounter is seemingly its embodiment, its intimate existence outside of the collectivity as currently constituted, its oppositional as well as its epiphanic status. Other essays in the collection interestingly and consistently use a similarly liminal language of impossibility, failure, and striving. Time and again the question is posed of how one gets before the law and the answer takes the form of various paradoxes of embodiment and nomination, of intimacy and affect on the margins of legality. The secret encounter necessitates both the acknowledgment of a secret and the exposure of encounter. Similarly, in a powerful interpretation of Irigaray’s theory of sexuate rights, Penelope Deutscher advances the thesis that impossible rights claims be understood in terms of the performativity of claiming the impossible. The rhetoric of sexuate rights should be understood politically as “acting now”, as forms of rhetorical effect, as illocutionary engagements that bear with them the epiphanic force of the body that speaks (p. 85).

#### This textual exclusion of sexual difference is inherent to the philosophy of the 1AC—the invisibility of the feminine sustains philosophy

Rachel Jones 2000 Transformations, Hypatia 15.2 (2000) 151-159

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Blindspots and elisions, fissures and omissions: feminist thinkers have often had an eye for the gaps in the western philosophical tradition. They have focused on what has gone missing from philosophy, not as a way of refusing philosophical thought, but to draw attention to the gendering of supposedly universal theories and to generate philosophies capable of thinking specificity and difference. Each of the papers in this section is concerned with a particular absence in the history of philosophy. Each thinker is involved in seeking out that which disappears from view when seen from the perspective of the western philosophical canon—or which appears there only in a carefully reduced and circumscribed form. Yet this focus on absences is far from generating a negative project. Instead, for these three thinkers, philosophical absences function as potentialities, sites of productive displacement and transformation that reconfigure the possible subject matter of philosophy. The nature of the transformations effected varies according to the specific lacunæ addressed by each author. Penelope Deutscher focuses on the mysterious disappearance of women from the history of modern philosophy, Zoë Sofia on the absence of containers from histories and philosophies of technology, and Barbara Bolt on the way the western enlightenment perspective both obliterates a generative materiality and is itself undone by the glare of the Australian sun. The topographical locatedness of Bolt’s argument indicates the importance of the specificity of each of these projects. Their grouping does not imply that they could be subsumed under one overarching framework any more than the papers in this volume could be combined to form a single new trajectory in feminist philosophy. Nonetheless, these three papers not only share a set of overlapping concerns, but also deploy a similar philosophical strategy. Each seeks to make visible that which has functioned as one of the necessary but invisible conditions sustaining western philosophical thought— be that the improperly philosophical work excluded from the canon so as to secure philosophy’s self-definition; the dark matter required by the reflections of enlightened speculation and the colonizing imagination; or the technolo- gies of sustaining and containing themselves, which silently facilitate—yet consistently fail to appear in—thinking and philosophizing about technology. Yet these philosophical absences are not recuperated within the terms of the tradition—Deutscher is not arguing that neglected women thinkers “really were” great philosophers, for example, nor does Bolt claim that it is possible to reveal a “really pure” or “unmediated” vision of matter beyond the confines of the European gaze. And none of the papers aims simply to reverse traditional hierarchies: as Sofia emphasizes, it is not a matter of privileging “good” (feminine) container technologies over “bad” (masculine/phallic) ones. Rather, each thinker foregrounds the ways in which that which has been excluded from the western philosophical tradition simultaneously refuses to be captured by, and incorporated within, that tradition. The women who cannot really do philosophy, the unobtrusive activities of containment, the glare of a light that does not render matter visible: western thought deems each to be either lacking or excessive—or both—and in any case unworthy of prolonged philosophical attention. For these three thinkers, however, each becomes a site of active resistance that prolongs philosophy itself by holding open paths beyond dominant and exclusive philosophical norms. Thus, while all three papers can be seen as mobilizing absences to destabilize the philosophical canon, this is instability become productive, rather than celebrated for its own sake. Indeed, Deutscher herself has argued in her previous work that the gendering of the history of philosophy is neither effected in spite of instabilities, nor weakened or mitigated by them; instead, “contradiction, tension and instability sustain phallocentric accounts of women and femininity” (Deutscher, 1997, 8). By way of subverting such masculinist accounts, in her paper for this volume Deutscher herself mobilizes the unstable status of texts by women thinkers to sustain new philosophical thought.

#### Suppression of sexual difference guarantees extinction and genocide

Irigaray, 1991, (Luce, Famous french scholar, The irigaray Reader, p.33)

Even a vaguely rigorous analysis of claims to equality shows that they are justified at the level of a superficial critique of culture, and Utopian as a means to women's liberation. The exploitation of women is based upon sexual difference, and can only be resolved through sexual difference. Certain tendencies of the day, certain contemporary feminists, are noisily demanding the neutralization of sex *[sexe].* That neutralization, if it were possible, would correspond to the end of the human race. The human race is divided into two genres which ensure its production and reproduction. Trying to suppress sexual differ­ence is to invite a genocide more radical than any destruction that has ever existed in History. What is important, on the other hand, is defining the values of belonging to a sex-specific *genre.* What is indispensable is elaborating a culture of the sexual which does not yet exist, whilst respecting both *genres.* Because of the historical time gaps between the gynocratic, matriarchal, patriarchal and phallocratic eras, we are in a sexual position which is bound up with generation and not with *genre* as sex. This means that, within the family, women must be mothers and men must be fathers, but that we have no positive and ethical values that allow two sexes of the same generation to form a creative, and not simply procreative, human couple. One of the major obstacles to the creation and recognition of such values is the more or less covert hold patriarchal and phallocratic roles have had on the whole of our civilization for centuries. It is social justice, pure and simple, to balance out the power of one sex over the other by giving, or restoring, cultural values to female sexuality. What is at stake is clearer today than it was when *The Second Sex* was written.

#### Our alternative is to reconceptualize Being starting with the fluidity of sexual difference as at least two

#### Starting with difference as at least two recognizes we can only encompass half of humanity at best—this disrupts the hegemony of the masculine economy while avoiding critiques of essentialism

Cohoon 11 (Christopher; Prof Philosophy @ Stony Brook University; “The Ecological Irigaray?” Ecocritical Theory)

Returning to and Reinterpreting Nature Given that women have traditionally been considered both inferior because of their proximity to nature and inferior by nature, many of Irigaray's interlocutors have prescribed the renunciation of nature, but Irigaray maintains that this very thing with which women's subordination is most closely associated is nevertheless also the source of their liberation. She calls for a "return to nature." insisting that "social justice has its roots in and takes its strength from nature."" The underlying injustice this return addresses is that, as she argues, our putatively neutral concept "human nature" has been revealed to be the product of "a culture constructed to respond to the requirements of . . . the masculine." a culture that masquerades as universal even while subordinating the feminine."' It is in order to disrupt the hegemony of the masculine "one." then, that Irigaray asserts sexual difference."4 the notion that "the natural, aside from the diversity of its incarnations or ways of appearing, is at least two: male and female."\*' Sexual difference implies a position for feminine subjectivity that cannot be determined by or in terms of the masculine economy. The appeal it makes to nature is intended to ground this position in "the real.™2\* However, as we have seen, this does not mean that sexual difference refers to the nature with which femininity has been traditionally associated or to the differences that are conventionally assumed to obtain naturally between men and women. Having thus far "served" only as the material support for man's privileged becoming, woman "has yet to spread roots and bloom.... to be born to her own growth, her own subjectivity."" It is for this reason, says Irigaray. that sexual difference "has not yet had its chance to develop"; it is a real that has yet to be realized.~s The return to nature required by the assertion of sexual difference is therefore a return to thinking about nature. Irigaray's hope is that this return will enable women to "discover a way to cultivate" a "natural belonging" that has yet to find expression.-5 Irigaray inverts Beauvoir's famous renunciation of nature accordingly: "It's not as Simone de Beauvoir said: one is not born. but rather becomes, a woman (through culture), but rather: I am born a woman, but I must still become this woman that I am by nature."30 Irigaray's allegiance to the natural commonly provokes charges of biological determinism, but her reinterpretation of nature reveals them to be misguided. As a type of essentialism. biological determinism is fundamentally conservative;'1 it holds that nature determines men and women to grow teleologically toward relatively fixed biological forms, that there exist an essential man and woman that individual men and women are destined to repeat. By contrast. Irigaray rethinks nature along the lines of Heidegger's pre-Socratic reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of physis (often translated as "nature"), that is. neither as a stock of static forms nor as passive material, but rather as a basic activity of self-emergence'" and growth without any ultimate telos. or end." "Nature does not repeat." says Irigaray. for "she grows, becomes. . . . [and] endlessly informs."''4 Irigaray does endorse a kind of natural determinism, but it is based upon her reinterpretation of nature as fundamentally unteleological. and. in contrast to biological determinism, it holds only that humans have naturally "given" modalities of becoming and that these modalities are naturally different for men and women. The forms men and women may come to adopt are fluid in character—open to further transformation—and potentially infinite in number. Thus, the Irigarayan imperative—that we cultivate our natural belonging'\*— makes no reference to any biological essence, actual or projected. Rather, it calls us (men and women)' to discover the natural modalities of our sexed bodies and their styles of perception, and to take up these modalities as the very source of our subjective becoming, a dynamic process Irigaray compares to plant growth.'5 Just as a blossoming flower "comes forth" by "constantly moving between the appearance of its forms and the earth's resources." we. too. are called to come forth precisely from the energies flowing from our natural rootedness.'s As we can now see. Irigaray's reinterpretation of nature involves both a rejection of the binary opposition between nature and culture (which both radical ecofeminists and social constructionists retain as a premise) and also a proposal for a new nature-culture relation wherein culture is understood not as a break from or triumph over nature but rather as something continuous with and responsive to it. What makes this proposal ecologically germane is that it asks us to give up thinking of nature as what must be transcended in order for us to become independent and "cultivated" subjects, and to begin allowing the nature that manifests itself in us to spark and motivate our political, artistic, and intellectual life, to be the gift to which culture is a response rather than the plight from which it is the escape. For Irigaray. then, the cultural task of subjective becoming is simultaneously an ecological task.

#### Being two is a transformation of binary thinking—the alt is not just two subjects, but two different and non-symmetrical subjects—means we solve your essentialism arguments

Rachel Jones 2011. Irigaray: Towards a Sexuate Philosophy, Key Contemporary Thinkers, Polity, p 230-232)

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One of Ingram's concerns about Irigaray's own position is that her conception of sexuate difference in terms of 'being two' is unneces­sarily limiting. Thus Ingram suggests that, while Irigaray is clear that the terms for both a female subject and an ethical relation between the sexes have yet to be adequately articulated, her empha­sis on being two means that: 'the theorization of such an ethics is firmly lodged in our present conceptions of a relation, albeit a future one, between male and female subjects." As Ingram's concern is shared by other feminist readers, I wish to conclude by suggest­ing that before coming to this judgement, we need to ensure we have fully taken on board just how transformed and transformative Irigaray's notion of the 'two' is. It is not just that as Ingram rightly says, this two 'is not binarized or hierarchized':3 it is not even 'two', in any recognizable sense. As we have seen, Irigaray's project involves working towards an account of sexuate difference in which there are not only two subjects, but two different and non-symmetrical processes of (self-) constitution. This is crucial if the sexuate subjects who articulate being (as) two are not simply to collapse back into two 'ones': two versions of the same kind of subject, each making the other into an 'other of the Same'. Hence Irigaray's suspicion of calls for the mul­tiple: if we multiply the number of different subjects we are pre­pared to recognize without multiplying their processes of constitution at the same time, we will end up reproducing further versions of the self-identical unity that constitutes the traditional male subject. For Irigaray, sexuate difference as ontological differ­ence structures an opening for thought, leading us to consider two necessarily different processes of constitution producing subjects with constitutively different ways of building relations to others. The significance of these differing processes of constitution is reflected in Irigaray's emphasis, throughout her elaboration of the terms for a female subject, on a 'two' that cannot be a duality or doubling in any simple sense: For the/a woman, two does not divide into ones. Relationships defy being cut into units' (S, 236). As we have seen, figures such as the two lips and the placental economy allow Irigaray to present woman in terms that escape a logic that pits one against its other. In contrast to such a logic, in which identity is secured via a split with the other that ensures the replication of the self-same, Irigaray writes of the way that: 'within herself, she is already two - but not divisible into one(s) - that caress each other.... Whence the mystery that woman represents in a culture claiming to count everything, to number everything by units ... *She is neither one nor two.* Rigorously speaking, she cannot be identified either as one person, or as two' *{TS,* 24, 26). As noted above, the space between men and women as sexuate subjects is not the same as the space between the two lips that figure woman in her sexuate specificity. Nonetheless, it is because women's lips cannot be simply divided, so that she is neither one nor two, that she cannot be simply added together with the male subject to make two 'ones'. Instead, she is 'without common measure with the one (of the subject)' (S, 238). In this way Irigaray escapes specular oppositions by turning duality (of lips and thus of subjects) into dis-symmetrical differ­ence that strictly speaking can no longer be counted as two at all: 'two syntaxes. Irreducible in their strangeness and eccentricity one to the other. ... In fact, of course, these terms cannot fittingly be designated by the number "two" and the adjective "different", if only because they are not susceptible to comparison' *(S,* 139). We need to take Irigaray seriously when she says that the number 'two' is inadequate to designate sexual difference, and when she reminds us, as she repeatedly does, that this difference is properly speaking incalculable: 'What does the difference between woma(e) n and ma(e)n consist of? The error has been to want to quantify or enumerate a difference which is of another nature than one which can be described, evaluated, counted' (DBT, 150). Unlike the indif­ferent logic that 'speak[s] of the "other" in a language already systematized by/for the same' (S, 139), an ontology founded on 'being two' remains attentive to the incalculable difference that makes it impossible to quantify beings as two, if 'two' denotes anything like two ones, or a binary, doubling, or duality. In the end, whether we are talking of two lips, two women, or a woman and a man, the 'two' marks an incalculable difference between beings who are irreducible both to each other, and to two times one: 'we are more than one. And two. The accounts overflow, cal­culation is lost. *If* neither I nor you arc appropriated by the one or the other' (£P, 58-9; my emphasis).

# 2NC

#### Be skeptical of their offense—the masculine bias inherent to philosophy protects its own self-image and remains blind to how philosophy is dependent on the suppression of difference

Rachel **Jones** 20**11**. Irigaray: Towards a Sexuate Philosophy, Key Contemporary Thinkers, Polity, p 21-22)

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In approaching Irigaray as a 'feminist philosopher', then, what matters is the transformative effect each of these terms has on the other, both the way Irigaray's feminist project transforms philoso­phy, and the way her path through philosophy inflects her femi­nism. This inflection is not just a result of the conceptual resources that Irigaray manages to steal away from western philosophers to aid her feminist project. It is also a result of the position she forges as a feminist who wants to keep doing philosophy, despite its patriarchal or masculinist history. In fact, Irigaray's negotiation of a critical yet non-oppositional relation to philosophy is indicative of the kind of feminism she espouses: one that seeks to make space for (sexual) difference without reinscribing a reductive logic of opposition and negation. Indeed, it is this logic itself that is the problem insofar as it gener­ates dichotomies that are governed by only one of their terms, and thus by what Irigaray calls a logic of the Same'. Accordingly, it is this logic which defines woman in terms of her difference from a male subject, and hence positions her as the other of the Same.? As Irigaray repeatedly insists, merely reversing the hierarchical oppo­sition between the sexes - defining man in terms of his failure to be a woman, for example, or replacing patriarchy with matriarchy - would not be a real solution, but merely a repetition of such oppositional structures of thought. **Irigaray's position is doubly risky: on the one hand, some femi­nists will be suspicious of the very act of engaging with the 'master discourse' of philosophy in anything but a thoroughly critical way**. From this perspective, Irigaray's desire to *'have a fling with the phi­losophers'* looks suspiciously like complicity with her oppressors (TS, 150). **On the other hand, Irigaray's explicitly feminist orienta­tion will tempt some philosophers to claim that her own approach is 'biased' in ways that distort the philosophical texts with which she engages. Irigaray thus runs the risk of being the doubly unduti-ful daughter: mistrusted by the philosophers, yet regarded with suspicion by her feminist sisters because of her passion for philosophy**.3 **I do not wish to deny that Irigaray's position is risky - but the stakes**, as she would be the first to concede, **are high**: **they concern nothing less than the question of being, and** thus, **the nature of human being**. The question, for Irigaray, is whether we think being in terms of any kind of oneness, unified essence or identity, or whether we allow that being - and thus, human being - is two. Moreover, **we should not presume we already know what this 'being-two' means**, for as I discuss in the Conclusion, **Irigaray sug­gests that it resists normal systems of calculation by being irreduc­ible to 'two times one'. Instead, the 'being' of 'being-two' is found in-between***.* **Rather than deny that Irigaray's thought is biased by her femi­nism, we should look more closely at what is at stake in that so-called bias. Irigaray interrogates philosophy from a critical feminist perspective because of a bias that she argues is already built in to the dominant forms philosophy has taken in the western tradition** since Plato; **thus, her bias is corrective. Moreover, the pre-existing masculinist bias she identifies is grounded on a series of blindspots and denials that protect philosophy's own self-image: thus it is hardly surprising that some philosophers respond to Irigaray defensively. By accusing her of introducing a biased perspective, they can continue to remain blind to the ways in which philosophy itself has been dependent on the denial of difference, and specifi­cally, the difference that woman embodies.** However, **there is another reason why Irigaray poses a genuinely disturbing challenge to the philosophers. Her 'corrective' feminist perspective docs not aim to cancel out a historically contingent but 'improper' masculinism in the name of establishing a 'proper' universal neutral, or objective mode of thought. Were this the case, her position really would be re-absorbed by a model of philosophy that is the product and symptom of the very perspective she cri­tiques. Rather, her aim is to challenge a masculinism that masquer­ades as universal, and an ideal of universality that masks an inadequate articulation of the nature of (human) being**. In response, Irigaray calls into question the very idea that a universal or 'neutral' way of thinking could properly do justice to human beings. Instead, what is required is 'an ontology founded on "being two"' (HEW, 101): an account of being that takes sexual difference as primary in ways that allow us to acknowledge two different (sexuate) subjects. Thus **her irreverent approach remains properly 'improper': not only does she reveal philosophy's own pre-existing bias, but she denies that philosophy has the resources to correct that bias, unless it is prepared to change its own nature and give up its commitment to an ideal universalism**

#### The Alt Solves the aff—The representations of Islamic threat and the fears that follow are based in a division between the sacred world of the mother that has been identified as the world of fundamentalism and the world of the west which is defined by reason and masculinity – this psychic division is the root of Western vs Eastern fundamentalist conflict.

Condren 2006(Mary; “War, Religion, Gender and Psyche: An Irish Perspective,” in Holy War and Gender: “Gotteskrieg‟ und Geschlecht”; <http://mywebgrrl.ca/ifr/000_Berlin_Paper_Final.pdf>)

The sacred world, the semiotic, is the psychic field of the Mother. Therefore, whereas killing or maiming the enemy is inevitable, terrorists usually uphold strict rules of sexual conduct. Terrorist legitimacy derives from their desperate efforts to establish their righteous relations within this field. Control of their women usually accompanies terrorism, underpinned by the most fundamentalist interpretations of religious texts. In terrorist warfare, underpinned by mythologies of self-sacrifice, especially where cultures have been subjected to colonial or imperial humiliation, masculinity is often damaged or much less secure. Establishing a high moral ground, or secure point of identity becomes the aim which is achieved effectively by controlling the bodies of women, and by denigrating and persecuting anyone (homosexuals) who threatens rigid gender boundaries. Sexual purity rather than sexual triumph is normative. In conventional warfare sexual triumph over women is the norm and is explicitly celebrated. But since the strategies of religious and political fundamentalists are essentially female, fundamentalist regimes usually enforce the subordination of women, and the denigration or persecution of anyone (homosexuals) who threatens rigid gender boundaries. Securing such boundaries by controlling female bodies both symbolises and establishes a grammar of fundamentalism that is inter-religious and international. Fundamentalist regimes often attempt to uphold their regressive practices toward women on the grounds of ethnicity, religious freedom or human rights. In addition, religions often enjoy immunity from equality legislation, probably because of the unconscious awareness of how such religions legitimate the patriarchal assumptions at the heart of statehood. Feminist legal scholars must now be assisted in their efforts to explore and deconstruct the connections. 52 6. The Question of Representation Melanie Klein spoke of reparative strategies typical of the mother/infant relationship. The infant engages in attacks, phantasied or otherwise, on the mother’s body, but, fears disintegration or retaliation. Unconscious guilt, and the strategies of reparation that accompany it play a major role in this dynamic, and often remain with us for the rest of our lives, feeding various religious fantasies. In Christian theology, according to Julia Kristeva, such reparation is directed toward God the Father, enabling the unconscious erasure of the mother from salvation history, and achieving the foundation of paternal law. 53 The strategy enables the paternal law to supersede the dangerous maternal semiotic energies, but also succeeds in permanently exiling women from culture, except insofar as they serve to uphold the status quo, preferably by becoming as men. Since the sacrificial dynamics and legitimating strategies of both conventional and terrorist warfare foster and depend on mythological religion, not surprisingly, in religious traditions based on sacrifice, women are not permitted to be religious officiaries. The exclusion of women from significant participation in all the major religions has widespread implications that go way beyond church practice. Political and religious agencies often work hand in hand. Furthermore the strategies outlined here point to a grammar of political relationships that is inter-religious and international. The presence or absence of women in systems of representation does not automatically correlate either with the liberation or denigration of women: the variables are extremely complex. Nonetheless, given the analysis here, the effects of exclusively male systems of representation (such as an all male Trinity) must be interrogated for their psychic effects as they impinge upon the possible agency of sexed subjects. 7. The Maternal Debt Patriarchal culture thrives on the defiance of death and on spurious means to transcend death. Meanwhile, the weapons of mass destruction threaten the future of civilisation itself

**We have a better sequencing argument—the alt is key to radical change in racial difference**

Florinda **Trani**, November 200**2** University of Lecce From the Same to the Other, Paragraph, 25

In conclusion, it is good to remember that the basic trait of each and every person is not banal sameness, but their difference. It is everywhere present, and it is the principle of life itself. **Since gender difference is the most particular and, at the same time, the most universal of real differences, it represents the key that can lead to a peaceful coexistence of all other differences. The desirable modifications in the relations between men and women are thus part of a programme of radical change which must involve and improve all social relationships. The man-woman duality can and must become the basis for every plurality. The acknowledgement of such a duality represents the gesture which will allow the respect for all the different ways in which otherness can manifest itself, be it in terms of race, culture or religion. This acknowledgement represents the path we must necessarily walk to get to a new community, and to humanize our entire society**.

**It’s also reverse causal—denial of sexual difference makes the disavowal of racial difference inevitable**

LUCE **IRIGARAY**, November 200**2** Why Cultivate Difference? Toward a Culture of Two Subjects, Paragraph, 25

**The question of difference between the sexes is often reduced to a biological difference, or a social difference** based on stereotypes. **Before attempting to show that this difference is not simply one or the other, I would recall that, considering sexual difference in this manner, we consider men and women as two separate entities whose characteristics or specific features are analysed in a comparative way. And generally in order to restore the one, the same. The ideal thus seems to reduce the human species to only one gender, furthermore to an individual that would become neutral with regard to sexual identity**. **What is removed, what is denied, is difference itself, difference between the two genders. But sexual difference is the most universal one and denial in this case risks becoming a denial of difference elsewhere**. If we look at sexual difference as composed of two separate entities that we could compare, then we forget that sexual difference corresponds first of all to a manner that human beings have of entering into relationship, the one(s) with the other(s).

#### The 1AC presents a rhetorical device known as an agony tale, where they highlight marginalization in real, specific instances to elicit affective response. This unwittingly reinforces worldviews that render mundane prejudice and privilege invisible. Vote neg to universalize the praxis of the 1ac absent the particular tale

Fan, 1997 [Copyright (c) 1997 The Columbia Law Review Columbia Law Review May, 1997 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1202 LENGTH: 17247 words SYMPOSIUM: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW: UNSCRAMBLING THE SIGNALS, UNBUNDLING THE LAW: NOTE: IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE PROMISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY: OPENING THE ACADEMY TO THE VOICES OF ALIENS AND IMMIGRANTS NAME: Stephen Shie-Wei Fan]

While the narratives of all critical race theorists bear the same purpose of bringing to the surface the perceptions of those outside of the societal mainstream, these narratives present themselves in a number of different formats. The most well-known narratives of critical race theorists fall into two primary types: the "agony tale" and the "counterstory." [n51](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n51) 1. Agony Tales. - The agony tale is often described as a "first-person account, usually of some outrage the author suffered," [n52](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n52) although these tales may also encompass experiences related by legal writers on behalf of [\*1213] third parties. [n53](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n53) While such narratives usually do not rise to the level of severity suggested by their name, they nevertheless describe occurrences that sufficiently deviate from socially-accepted norms to elicit disapproval, if not outright anger. Patricia Williams's "Benetton story" typifies the agony tale: I was shopping in Soho and saw in a store window a sweater that I wanted to buy for my mother. I pressed my round brown face to the window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance. A narrow-eyed, white teenager wearing running shoes and feasting on bubble gum glared out, evaluating me for signs that would pit me against the limits of his social understanding. After about five seconds, he mouthed "We're closed," and blew pink rubber at me. It was two Saturdays before Christmas, at one o'clock in the afternoon; there were several white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for things for their mothers. I was enraged... In the flicker of his judgmental gray eyes, that saleschild had transformed my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to a shambles. He snuffed my sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there was nothing I could do to snuff his ... [n54](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n54) Agony tales are often embraced by their readers for being "so poignant, so moving, so authentic, so true. [Readers] accept them immediately and call them poetic and soulful" [n55](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n55) by virtue of their immediate and vivid format. It is precisely because the subject matter of agony tales is frequently shocking that the tales can be accepted so completely: [n56](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n56) overt and obvious racial discrimination elicits easy empathy. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n57) Such discrimination fits comfortably into a majoritarian world view [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n58) in which discrimination still [\*1214] exists, but only in lingering, discrete, and highly specific harms to individuals, [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n59) which civil rights jurisprudence seeks to cure, at least whenever such discrimination falls within the purview of the law's corrective scope. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n60) The generally receptive reactions that greet this variety of agony tale often belie the very problems which, from the point of view of critical race theorists, pervade a societal understanding of race and race relations in the United States. Delgado has noted that an article of his - the subject matter of which rendered it in "some respects ... a classic agony tale" [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n61) - garnered expressions of sympathy from the academy, but little substantive support, precisely because it underscored, by contradistinction, the cherished order and sanctity of the American legal system: [Law professors] could empathize with the black subjected to the vicious racial slur. They could say how terrible it is that our legal system doesn't provide redress. They sincerely felt that way. Indeed, I think it allowed them to say to themselves how much they loved the First Amendment. They loved it so much that they had to sacrifice these unfortunate Negroes and Mexicans, for which they were genuinely sorry and apologetic. [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n62) Though frequently graphic enough to elicit genuine outrage, the agony tale often fails to go beyond merely engendering a passive sense of identification from sympathetic listeners.

#### Here is evidence so you don’t confuse the two

Luce **Irigaray**, This Sex Which is not One, 19**85**. 162-163

One cannot fail to have at least a sense that your first concern is to avoid a naive positioning of "the question of women." One that would be, for example, a pure and simple reversal of the masculine positioning of the question (a pure and simple reversal of "phallogocentrism," and so forth). To this question I think I have in fact already replied, both in answering the preceding questions and in writing **Speculum**. Which **is obviously not a book about woman**; and it is still less-whatever one may think about it, or even project from it as a hope for the reversal of values—a ''studied gynecocentrism," a "place of the monopolization of the symbolic" to the benefit of a woman, or of some women. **Such naive judgments overlook the fact that from a feminine locus nothing can be articulated without a questioning of the symbolic itself. But we do not escape so easily from reversal. We do not escape, in particular, by thinking we can dispense with a rigorous interpretation of phallogocentrism. There is no simple manageable way to leap to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any possible way to situate oneself there, that would result from the simple fact of being a woman**. And in Speculum, if I was attempting to move back through the "masculine" imaginary, that is, our cultural imaginary, it is because that move imposed itself, both in order to demarcate the possible "outside" of this imaginary and to allow me to situate myself with respect to it as a woman, implicated in it and at the same time exceeding its limits. But **I see this excess, of course, as what makes the sexual relation possible, and not as a reversal of phallic power**. And my "first" reaction to this excess is to laugh. Isn't laughter the first form of liberation from a secular oppression? Isn't the phallic tantamount to the seriousness of meaning? Perhaps woman, and the sexual relation, transcend it "first" in laughter?

#### Their liberation leaves women of color as passive object, neglected for the sake of a universal male truth

Ellen T **Armour, 1993**. (Deconstruction, Feminist Theology and the Problem of Difference: Subverting the Race/Gender Divide, Unuversity of Chicago Press, p 129)

Women's consignment to the passive role of beautiful object of con­templation within this economy affects women differently depending upon their race and class. This image calls to mind the pedestal of the Victorian ideal of womanhood; a piece of imaginary furniture that still graces the homes of many white, middle- and upper-class women. Many feminists and womanists contend that this pedestal rests on the backs of the domestic and sexual servitude of women of color and/or lower class. One would have to conclude that, whatever roles women of color might be consigned to, they are hardly that of an object of contemplation.4^ More often, women of color have served as exploited labor—sexual, manual, and domestic. Irigaray's analysis of women's status as commodities would need to be expanded to account for these differences in function.

However, because it serves as the ideal in western culture, woman as passive object of contemplation finds ways to insinuate itself into black culture. Paula Giddings's book, "When and Where I Enter, reports extensively on how the battle over this cultural ideal shaped relations between black men and women active in especially the more radical arms of the black liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the movement's male leaders believed strongly that black women should assume positions of passive submission in relation to black men.\* Needless to say, this caused a great deal of conflict within the movement.47 The shadows of this conflict often resurface in current events. One will still hear rhetoric occasionally that blames black women for the ongoing difficulties threatening black men's very sur­vival.48 Behind this rhetoric lies the cultural ideal that Irigaray exposes.

#### We control the Uniqueness—In the wake of Renisha McBride, we should embrace a methodology that is unique to the female subject

Earl Ofari Hutchinson, author and political analyst, MSNBC contributor, associate editor of New America Media “The Slaying of Renisha McBride Casts Another Ugly Glare on the Peril to Black Women” Huffington Post 11/10/2013

The slaying of unarmed and from reports distressed motorist Renisha McBride in Dearborn Heights near Detroit casts yet another ugly glare on the extreme peril to black women. In the past few years, the number of black women that have been slain by police, brutalized by officers, or as in the case of McBride, slain by a homeowner, in several cities has at times drawn headlines and protests. This is separate from the endless tales of black women who have been beaten, tasered and threatened during routine stops or street searches by police officers often with no charges filed against them, or whatever charges were filed were soon dismissed. The black women that have been victimized have had several things in common apart from their gender and race. They were unarmed, and in nearly all the cases were not committing a crime. Their victimizers were not charged in their assault or killing. The McBride case seems to fit all three of these categories with the sole exception of the still dangling possibility that a charge may be slapped on the homeowner. Even if the homeowner in the case is charged and justice demands that, it does not change the fact that the shooter initially wasn't. The perpetrator's attorneys claim and prosecutors seem to think there are circumstances that warrant either exoneration or for them to foot drag in making an arrest. The indisputable fact that McBride was unarmed, apparently was not in the home, and was looking for help, should have been more than enough to warrant some charge. Prosecutors have a plethora of lesser charges that they routinely slap on those who resort to gun play in highly questionable situations. If there were truly valid reasons why a homeowner feels they have to kill no matter whether deliberate or accidental, then they would come out at a trial or during preliminary legal proceedings. None of this initially happened in the McBride slaying. This then raises the always troubling suspicion the race played a role in her slaying. There's the horrid history of racial stereotyping, profiling if you will, that indelibly link crime and violence with African-Americans. This linkage isn't just confined to black men. There's the feminization of racial stereotyping too. While black men are frequently typed as violent, drug dealing "gangstas," black women are typed as sexually loose, conniving, and untrustworthy. In effect, many believe that black women offenders are menaces to society too. Much of the public and many in law enforcement are deeply trapped in the damaging cycle of myths, misconceptions and crime fear hysteria about crime-on-the-loose women. The stereotype when lethal force has been used against young blacks has in a grotesque way given even more deadly justification to the dubious use of the stand your ground defense in these cases. The McBride case is no different. The delay in bringing any charges almost certainly hinges on Michigan's stand your ground law. The key provision of the law states that individuals may shoot if the individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual. The operative words that virtually give anyone a license to use such force is "honestly and reasonably." That's a murky legal minefield that's wide open to individual interpretation and prosecutors know this. This is where racial bias rams its way in, and further muddies a highly suspect killing given the relentless, and deeply encoded negative typecasting of young blacks as inherent criminal menaces and threats. This was evident with brutal effect in the slaying of Trayvon Martin. Defense attorneys, a legion of supporters of Martin's killer, George Zimmerman, and some in the media, were more determined to put Martin and his alleged past misdeeds on trial than Zimmerman. In far too many cases where young black women have been victimized there were endless and predictable efforts to dig up any and every bit of damaging information about their history or lifestyle to in effect virtually blame them for their own unjustified killing. The disturbing underlying public narrative about them was that their slaying was more than justified not solely because of their alleged reckless acts, but because of their alleged past.

Whitford, 1991, (Margaret, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p 136-137)

In the wake of Derrida's exposure of the logic of identity as a logic of exclusion, it is tempting to conclude that the politics of identity has been rendered illegitimate.15 And in the light of Irigaray's exposure of the logic of identity as phallomorphic, one might infer that for Irigaray too, a politics of identity should be a contradiction in terms for women. However, current forms of 'identity politics' tend to be based upon elements in the social/symbolic order as it already exists, whereas Irigaray is positing an identity that still has to be created. The social order in its present form offers women no adequate mirror: 'Women lack a mirror for becoming women' (SP: 79). From the man's side it seems to be assumed that identity is 'the same' for women as previously it had been for men, that is, there is an assumption that a social identity for women will not change anything very much, but simply add to the existing state of affairs. I see this assumption, in practice, as being rather close to the liberal assumption, the idea that feminism is merely the extension to women of men's rights, so that women will be like men' (and the feminine will perhaps disappear). This is not at all what Irigaray has in mind. She argues that to give women an identity (however problematic the concept) will change our notion of what identity means. The existence of two 'kinds' would have an effect on mankind. If identity is formed by identification with elements in the social/symbolic order, then it means that social/symbolic formations will have to change for womankind to come into existence at all, and this will not leave mankind unaffected. (It means too that speaking (as) woman is something which still has to be created. If woman is a future identity rather than a biological or metaphysical determination, then we cannot yet give the phrase a clearly defined content. The condition of speaking (as) woman in Irigaray’s sense, it has become clear, is the social and symbolic existence of a maternal genealogy).

# 1NR

#### The aff is not mutually exclusive, the Ladson and Billings arg specifically shows how these stories result in interpretive structures that speaks for everyone - reducing all perspectives to one neatly packaged advocacy is the foundation of sexual indifference

Luce Irigaray and Carolyn Burke, When Our Lips Speak Together, Signs, Vol. 6, No. 1, Women: Sex and Sexuality, Part 2 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 69-79

If we continue to speak the same language to each other, we will re­produce the same story. Begin the same stories all over again. Don't you feel it? Listen: men and women around us all sound the same. Same arguments, same quarrels, same scenes. Same attractions and separa­tions. Same difficulties, the impossibility of reaching each other. Same . . . same. . . . Always the same. If we continue to speak this sameness,1 if we speak to each other as men have spoken for centuries, as they taught us to speak, we will fail each other. Again. . . . Words will pass through our bodies, above our heads, disappear, make us disappear. Far. Above. Absent from our­selves, we become machines that are spoken, machines that speak. Clean skins2 envelop us, but they are not our own. We have fled into proper names, we have been violated by them.3 Not yours, not mine. We don't have names. We change them as men exchange us, as they use us. It's frivolous to be so changeable so long as we are a medium of exchange. How can I touch you if you're not there? Your blood is translated into their senses.4 They can speak to each other and about us. But "us"? Get out of their language. Go back through all the names they gave you. I'm waiting for you, I'm waiting for myself. Come back. It's not so hard. Stay right here, and you won't be absorbed into the old scenarios, the re­dundant phrases, the familiar gestures, bodies already encoded in a system. Try to be attentive to yourself. To me. Don't be distracted by norms or habits.

#### It is not a matter of topping a phallocratic order to replace it—that amounts to the same thing—but to disrupt and modify it, starting from an outside that is exempt from phallocratic law—the feminine

Elizabeth Grosz, 1989, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists, p 228-229 online pdf

Le Doeuff's project of opening up philosophy to its own historicity, its contingencies, its historical and socio-cultural positioning, is not unrelated to Foucault's analysis of the power and desire operative in knowledges (especially in 'The Discourse on Language', in Foucault, 1972) , where Foucault asks not what discourses say but what they do, not as bodies of t ruth but as institutionally produced and supervised practices. Like Derrida, L e Doeuff is also interested in what texts say, and in particular how they articulate their positions. Yet unlike either Foucault or Derrida, she is unwilling to emphasise either a text's interior (its discursive means) or its exterior (its place as a practice and a n event) at the expense of the other. Like Irigaray, she is committed to revealing the elisions, repressions and disavowals of femininity within philosophical and other discourses; and like Kristeva, she is concerned with the literary devices, sites of multiple meaning and ambiguity within texts; yet unlike either, her project is not limited to the discursive realm but is also directed to the relations between discourses and social practices. Unlike Irigaray, she is not interested in constructing or speaking in a feminine voice; nor, like Kristeva, does she advocate the transgressive impetus of experimental and avant-garde forms of writing as part of a struggle for women's liberation. These French theorists may well mark out the intel- lectual space within which Le Doeuff works, but they do not cover the same issues nor share similar methods or general goals. A more interrogative project than Irigaray's or Kristeva's, Le Doeuff's aims a t a rigorous deconstruction of philosophy which may open it up to its own lacks and inadequacies, not as a source of weakness but as a site for its growth and development. She confronts philosophy with its own techniques of evasion and thus with its own concrete limits and spcificity. In doing so she forces the discipline to accept its partial access to the real, the true and the good such tha t the discipline may be able to accept from, and give more to, other disciplines, other knowledges, so that some sort of exchange relation becomes possible. This is an eminently fem- inist gesture insofar as only such a notion of philosophy will enable it to accept whatever contributions feminism may offer without pre-empting what either may find useful in the other. An open-ended philosophy heralds a future in which the contributions of men and women may change the discipline, reorient its funda- mental questions, inflect its paths of historical development, changing the way tha t the discipline is practised as well as the subjects who constitute the intellectual community producing and affected by philosophy.

#### Appropriation DA—the alt recognizies a place of enunciation for the feminine that cannot be reconciled by the aff—they become pimps for the alt

Whitford, 1991, (Margaret, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p 30)

In an article on women and/in philosophy called 'Ethics Revisited', Rosi Braidotti points out that (male) philosophers trying to think the feminine, and (female) feminists do not have the same place of enunciation (1986b: 60; see also Spivak 1983). Male philosophers situate themselves within the tradition of philosophy as speaking subjects. They diagnose the crisis of philosophy, the decentring of the subject, the problems of legitimation. Their interlocutor is the history of philosophy itself, and they attempt to deal with the crisis, 'their' crisis, by a kind of feminization of philosophy, in which the text becomes the unconscious or the feminine (often seen as synonymous). It is the male subject who is in crisis, Braidotti emphasizes, and he is dealing with it by turning towards a hitherto neglected aspect of his self— the previously repressed feminine - but not to women, although at the same historical moment, women are making themselves heard with unprecedented forcefulness, demanding their right to co-subjectivity. Women, on the other hand, have never had this relation to philosophy. In order to be the subject of philosophy, women have had to alienate themselves, to take on a male part; the subject of philosophy is male. Since they have never been by right the 'subjects' of philosophy, they are not, like male philosophers, trying to salvage a tradition, to stay in the driving seat. Their position is much more contestatory. From a feminist point of view, what male philosophers are at present engaged in can be seen as an attempt to continue by other means 'the age-long metaphorisation of women by the masculine subject of enunciation' (Braidotti 1986b: 59). The philosophers do not call into question their 'hegemonic model' (ibid.). In the feminization of philosophy, the feminine, as sign of unrepresentability, 'is not structurally different from all the other signs to which the feminine was confined in the classical mode (the irrational, the emotional, etc.)' (ibid.). Suzanne Moore, in a recent article, puts it even more strongly: such philosophers are the pimps of postmodernism. It's 'the new kind of gender tourism, whereby male theorists are able to take package trips into the world of femininity' (Moore 1988: 167).

#### Footnoting DA—The aff turns Irigaray into the “Best Supporting Actress”

Witt 2006 Feminist Interpretations of the Philosophical Canon Author(s): Charlotte Witt Reviewed work(s): Source: Signs, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Winter 2006), pp. 537-552

However, even if we become convinced that women philosophers really were omitted just because they were women and that therefore their inclusion as women is a necessary adjustment of the historical record, there still remains a question of how best to achieve this. How can they be rewoven into the history of philosophy so that they are an integral part of that history? In a recent essay, Lisa Shapiro (2004), considering the case of women philosophers in the early modern period, argues that it is not enough simply to add a woman philosopher or two to the reading list to rectify women’s past exclusion. Rather, according to Shapiro, we need to find a stronger thread that provides internal reasons (rather than an external, feminist motivation on the part of the teacher or editor) for the inclusion of women. One way to do this is to show how certain women philosophers made significant contributions to the work of male philosophers on central philosophical issues. We could call this the “Best Supporting Actress” approach in that the central cast remains male and the story line of philosophy is undisturbed. It is a good strategy for several reasons: it is relatively easy to accomplish, and it provides an internal anchor for women philosophers. On the other hand, it reinforces the secondary status of women thinkers, and if this were the only way of integrating women philosophers, that would be an unfortunate result. The wholly inadequate interpretation of Beauvoir’s philosophical thought as a mere application of Jean-Paul Sartre’s is a good example of the limitations of this strategy. Not only does it reinforce a secondary, handmaiden role for Beauvoir, but it also promotes a distorted understanding and appreciation of her thought (Simons 1995).

#### Thinking that we speak for the feminine body in the inclusion of other voices fails - Total rethinking key

Irigaray 1993 An Ethics of Sexual Difference, translated by Carolyn Burke and Gillian Gill, Cornell University Press: Ithica, p 6

A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret every­thing concerning the relations between the subject and dis­course, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral. Despite the fact that *man*—at least in French—rather than being neutral, is sexed.

#### The perm is a function of multiplicity—means it links

Cheah and Grosz, 1998. (Pheng and Elizabeth, Of Being-Two: Introduction, diacritics 28:1, spring jstor)

To this end, it might be useful to briefly summarize Irigaray's understanding of sexual difference, its political stakes, and its future, so that we can better position the different articles in this special issue. It is widely accepted that Irigaray's critique of phallogocentrism involves an exposure of the violent logic of the one, a Platonic monologic that reduces the other to a pale copy or deficient version of the same. It is correctly noted that Irigaray regards this logic of sameness as the theoretical underpinning of a variety of historical patriarchal social and cultural structures as well as phallocentric discourses on femininity and feminine sexuality, including the monosexual discourse of psychoanalysis. However, on the basis of a certain reading of her work in the 1970s (such as "When Our Lips Speak Together"), Irigaray is then characterized as a champion of multiplicity, which is enacted in/as ecriturefeminine orparler-femme. It will therefore be somewhat of a surprise to many of her readers that Irigaray regards multiplicity as complicit with the logic of the one. In her view the multiple is the one in its self-willed dispersal into unrelated atomistic singularities, many others of the same. The alternative model she offers is the paradigm of the two, a mode of original relationality or being-with-the-other in which the otherness of the other is respected. In her own words, Even in the reversal constituted by the privilege of the many over the one, a very current reversal often called democracy, even in the privilege of the other over the subject, of the you over the I (lam thinking ...of... a certain part of Levinas 's work...), we just end up with a stand-in for the model of the one and the many, of the one and the same, in which a singular subject inflects one meaning rather than another. In the same way, privileging concrete singularity over ideal singularity cannot decree an ideal valid for all men and all women, and, to ensure cohabitation between subjects, notably within the republic, only a minimum of universality is required. To get out from under this all-powerful model of the one and the many, we must move on to the model of the two, a two which is not a replication of the same, nor one large and the other small, but made up of two which are truly different. My first theoretical gesture was thus to extricate the two from the one, the two from the many, the other from the same, and to do so horizontally, suspending the authority of the One: of man, the father, the leader, the one god, the singular truth, etc. It involved making the other stand out from the same, refusing to be reduced to the other of the same, to the other. .. of the one, not by becoming him or becoming like him, but by inventing myself as an autono­mous and different subject. Clearly this gesture calls into question our entire theoretical and practical tradition, particularly Platonism, but without such a gesture we cannot speak ofwomen's liberation, nor of an ethical behavior with respect to the other, nor of democracy. ["QO" 11-12]

#### Perm still links—it’s founded on the logic of sameness [the Aff and the alt must be the same thing]—allows the Aff to evade critical formulation of difference

Florinda Trani, November 2002 University of Lecce From the Same to the Other, Paragraph, 25

In a multi-ethnic, multiracial and multicultural society like ours, we cannot but discuss the theme of difference, we cannot but talk about the other. The blending of races, of cultures and of customs has become an integral part of our daily lives. For this reason, it is necessary to learn to value differences, to learn that they must not be refused, negated or simply integrated but, on the contrary, they must be welcomed as an advantageous counterbalance to uniformity. Our Western tradition, however, is founded on the logic of identity, of similarity, of symmetry. What has always been favoured by the symbolic order characterizing our culture is sameness. And difference has invariably aroused fear; consequently, the issue of otherness has always been evaded. Even when it has been dealt with, it has not been correctly formulated, as the other has nonetheless remained other in relation to the omnipotent model of the one: it has not been seen as another being, different but possessing equal dignity. Therefore, diversities have often been thought of in a hierarchical way.

#### The perm absorbs the alt by making it similar with itself—means the perm CANNOT respect difference—doesn’t solve the links

Florinda Trani, November 2002 University of Lecce From the Same to the Other, Paragraph, 25

The most universal difference The most universal of differences is undoubtedly the sexual one. Humanity is in fact primarily made up of men and women. Gender duality crosses all races, all cultures and all traditions. It is therefore to be supposed that respect for gender difference may ultimately lead to respect for all other manifold, secondary differences. But, since the desire for the same has dominated and guided our culture, Luce Irigaray believes that it is impossible to tackle the issue of gender difference without also taking into account the question of sameness. Man, in fact, in his persistent longing for what is identical to himself, has finally included woman’s otherness, altering her identity in such a wanting. In his perennial quest for the same, he has raised himself as the model for mankind, and has reduced woman to being an image of his own self. The masculine has absorbed both in himself: the feminine has been annexed to the masculine universe. Woman thus has lost her own real and independent identity, or has anyway acquired an identity which is incompatible with her gender, because it is defined according to the masculine identity model At best, she has been simply considered as the other of the same, that is, an other only defined in relation to man. She has equally remained trapped within the range of the same, in her being hierarchically submitted to man. The logic of the same is then a system that negates differences. Luce Irigaray regards it as the most dangerous philosophical, cultural and symbolic construction man has ever contrived because it reduces the subject to one. This one appropriates the other by assimilating it and making it similar with itself. The other as such is no longer respected, particularly in its primary difference, the gender difference. It is therefore essential to define an identity for both woman and man, which is appropriate to their own gender: a sexuate identity. It is absolutely impossible to identify the female gender with the male one, nor must women passively accept such a destiny, if they do not want to lose or reduce their own identity. Man as well as woman must become aware of their gender identity. They must each identify with their own gender, and thus they must realize that they are partial. In particular, man must learn that he is not the whole, that he is not the model for humanity, because humanity is composed of two different beings: woman and man. He must remember that on his way, around him, he cannot always meet the same, that he shall often meet the other too. At the very least, he shall meet the other of gender difference, woman. Man and woman must thus start from being faithful to the gender they belong to. But they must also be able to recognize the other as irreducible to the same. Obstacles of fusion, of appropriation and of submission will then be overcome.