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#### We control the Uniqueness—In the wake of Renisha McBride, we must take steps towards addressing the violence against the black female body

Earl Ofari Hutchinson, author and political analyst, MSNBC contributor, associate editor of New America Media “The Slaying of Renisha McBride Casts Another Ugly Glare on the Peril to Black Women” Huffington Post 11/10/2013

The slaying of unarmed and from reports distressed motorist Renisha McBride in Dearborn Heights near Detroit casts yet another ugly glare on the extreme peril to black women. In the past few years, the number of black women that have been slain by police, brutalized by officers, or as in the case of McBride, slain by a homeowner, in several cities has at times drawn headlines and protests. This is separate from the endless tales of black women who have been beaten, tasered and threatened during routine stops or street searches by police officers often with no charges filed against them, or whatever charges were filed were soon dismissed. The black women that have been victimized have had several things in common apart from their gender and race. They were unarmed, and in nearly all the cases were not committing a crime. Their victimizers were not charged in their assault or killing. The McBride case seems to fit all three of these categories with the sole exception of the still dangling possibility that a charge may be slapped on the homeowner. Even if the homeowner in the case is charged and justice demands that, it does not change the fact that the shooter initially wasn't. The perpetrator's attorneys claim and prosecutors seem to think there are circumstances that warrant either exoneration or for them to foot drag in making an arrest. The indisputable fact that McBride was unarmed, apparently was not in the home, and was looking for help, should have been more than enough to warrant some charge. Prosecutors have a plethora of lesser charges that they routinely slap on those who resort to gun play in highly questionable situations. If there were truly valid reasons why a homeowner feels they have to kill no matter whether deliberate or accidental, then they would come out at a trial or during preliminary legal proceedings. None of this initially happened in the McBride slaying. This then raises the always troubling suspicion the race played a role in her slaying. There's the horrid history of racial stereotyping, profiling if you will, that indelibly link crime and violence with African-Americans. This linkage isn't just confined to black men. There's the feminization of racial stereotyping too. While black men are frequently typed as violent, drug dealing "gangstas," black women are typed as sexually loose, conniving, and untrustworthy. In effect, many believe that black women offenders are menaces to society too. Much of the public and many in law enforcement are deeply trapped in the damaging cycle of myths, misconceptions and crime fear hysteria about crime-on-the-loose women. The stereotype when lethal force has been used against young blacks has in a grotesque way given even more deadly justification to the dubious use of the stand your ground defense in these cases. The McBride case is no different. The delay in bringing any charges almost certainly hinges on Michigan's stand your ground law. The key provision of the law states that individuals may shoot if the individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual. The operative words that virtually give anyone a license to use such force is "honestly and reasonably." That's a murky legal minefield that's wide open to individual interpretation and prosecutors know this. This is where racial bias rams its way in, and further muddies a highly suspect killing given the relentless, and deeply encoded negative typecasting of young blacks as inherent criminal menaces and threats. This was evident with brutal effect in the slaying of Trayvon Martin. Defense attorneys, a legion of supporters of Martin's killer, George Zimmerman, and some in the media, were more determined to put Martin and his alleged past misdeeds on trial than Zimmerman. In far too many cases where young black women have been victimized there were endless and predictable efforts to dig up any and every bit of damaging information about their history or lifestyle to in effect virtually blame them for their own unjustified killing. The disturbing underlying public narrative about them was that their slaying was more than justified not solely because of their alleged reckless acts, but because of their alleged past.

#### A criticism of drone policy may seem to be a step forward, but really just highlight the problems of US violence and white supremacy

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This Week In Blackness "Drone Policy Is the Most Important Racism," http://thisweekinblackness.com/2013/07/25/drone-policy-is-the-most-important-racism/)

There are several incidents of privilege-blindness among the mostly white male drone-obsessed elite. First, their public anger over the drone program seemed to begin when Eric Holder made statements extending the legal justification for the program to killing U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. That implies that these critics think that the U.S. government killing U.S. citizens is new or unusual, when a simple surface-level review of this country’s history shows that the government has always committed sustained and fatal violence against brown people, women, gay people, transpeople, disabled people, and poor people among others. People who insist on talking about drones as an ultimate evil ignore this history of violence, which is well-known in communities not their own. And, the likelihood that white men personally will be targeted by a drone is absurdly small, compared to the likelihood that a member of a marginalized community will continue to suffer from the government’s active and passive violence. So, hearing these critics air their feelings of being “targets” for the first time is offensive to those from communities that have lived under the gun for generations, especially because these feelings exclude points of view from those communities. If you are privileged enough to suddenly feel scared of the government, you are complicit in denying the violence against marginalized people that has always existed. The other part of white male critics’ anxiety comes from recognition that the world order is changing. Traditionally, the American president has been a white man who identifies and legitimizes white men’s problems as American Problems. Now, President Obama is the public face of America, and when he identifies a traditionally invisible Black People’s Problem, it becomes, for the first time, an American Problem. By stubbornly forcing Obama’s statements about Trayvon Martin into the framework of opposition to drone strikes, white male public intellectuals are attempting to return to white men the power to define American Problems. White critics insist that Obama addresses drone strikes above all other expressions of white supremacy, while claiming that they are the “true” soldiers against racism. They apparently believe that they get to decide which policies are “important-racist” and which ones are “unimportant-racist.” It must be a coincidence that the “unimportant-racist” policies are the ones that most directly validate white upper-class male privilege. Also, by arguing that drones exhibit “important racism,” these critics reinforce the narrative that killing Black people is “unimportant racism,” and not as valuable as executing white men’s philosophical priorities.

#### Masculine views of militarism are essentialist and ignore violence against the black woman while maintaining oppressive structures

bell hooks Feminism and Militarism: A Comment Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3/4, Rethinking Women's Peace Studies Fall -Winter, 1995, pp. 58-64

Many women who advocate feminism see militarism as exemplifying patriarchal concepts of masculinity and the right of males to dominate others. To these women, struggling against militarism is to struggle against patriarchy. Rena Patterson argues in her essay" Militarism and the Tradition of Radical Feminism"": To prevent war is to fight male power, to expose and defy the pretensions of masculinity, and to recognize and act against the basic principles operating in all domains of patriarchal-capitalist society." Introducing her book of essays Ain't Nowhere We Can Run: A Handbook for Women on the Nuclear Mentality, Susan Koen writes: It is our belief that the tyranny created by nuclear activities is merely the latest and most serious manifestation of a culture characterized in every shape by domination and exploitation. For this reason, the presence of the nuclear mentality in the world can only be viewed as , one part of the whole, not as an isolated issue. We urge the realization that separating the issue of nuclear power plants and weapons from the dominant cultural, social, and political perspective of our society results in a limited understanding of the problem, and in turn limits the range of possible solutions. We offer then, the argument that those male-defined constructs which control our social structure and relationships are directly responsible for the proliferation of nuclear plants and weapons. Patriarchy is the root of the problem, and the imminent dangers created by the nuclear mentality serve to call our attention to the basic problem of patriarchy. By equating militarism and patriarchy, these feminists often structure their arguments in such a way as to suggest that to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression, and the will to dominate and do violence to others and that to be female is synonymous with weakness, passivity, and the will to nourish and affirm the lives of others. While these maybe stereotypical norms that many people live out, such dualistic thinking is dangerous; it is a basic ideological component of the logic that informs and promotes domination in Western society. Even when inverted and employed for a meaningful purpose, like nuclear disarmament, it is nevertheless risky, for it reinforces the cultural basis of sexism and other forms of group oppression. Suggesting as it does that women and men are inherently different in some fixed and absolute way, it implies that women by virtue of our sex have played no crucial role in supporting and upholding imperialism (and the militarism that serves to maintain imperialist rule) or other systems of domination. Often the women who make such assertions are white. Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism.

#### The AFF’s observation and attempts to solve violence is false – it posits a world in which individuals have no responsibility and can do nothing to alter violence and fails to understand the way that the individual shapes war and everyday violence

**Kappeler 95**(Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.10-11)

Yet **our insight that** indeed **we are not responsible for the decisions of a** Serbian **general or a** Croatian **president tends to mislead us into thinking that** therefore **we have no responsibility** at all, not even **for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we** do **have within our** own **sphere of action**. In particular, **it seems to absolve us from having to** try to **see any relation between our own actions and those events**, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions**. It** not only **shows that we participate in** what Beck calls **‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between** bureaucratically, institutionally**, nationally, and** also **individually organized separate competences. It** also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned **alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of** the major **power mongers**. For **we**tend to **think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made.**Which is why **many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics** tend to **engage in** a form of **mental deputy politics**, in the style of ‘**what would I do if I were** the general, the prime minister, **the president**, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?’ Since **we** seem to **regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses** tend to **dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’**: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN – finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution. **‘We are this war’,** however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says**, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’**- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others.’ **We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.**

#### Alt is black feminist love politics, we can transcend status quo politics by the rebellion of loving ourselves in the face of antiblack, anti feminist capitalism

Jennifer Nash, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Women's Studies at George Washington University, “Practicing Love: Black Feminism, Love-Politics, and Post-Intersectionality” Meridians, Vol. 11, No. 2 2011

Although black feminist love-politics has been expressed in distinctive ways in different periods, this paper focuses on a “second-wave”3 black moment when pleas for love were consolidated into a sustained call for a black feminist love-politics, a moment that set the stage for later women of color feminist scholarship—including work by hooks, Traci West, Chela Sandoval, and Patricia Hill Collins—grappling with love. This particular moment has long been celebrated for its advocacy of love as a resistant ethic of self-care. If “bein alive & bein a woman & bein colored is a metaphysical dilemma”—to borrow Ntozake Shange’s oft-quoted lines—then black feminism’s insistence on love, particularly self-love, might be read as a practice of self-valuation (Shange 1977, 45). Collins captures this reading of black self-love, arguing that, “Loving Black people . . . in a society that is so dependent on hating Blackness constitutes a highly rebellious act” (Collins 2004, 250). According to this scholarly tradition, love is a politics of claiming, embracing, and restoring the wounded black female self. My interest in black feminist love-politics departs from interpretations of love as simply a practice of self-valuation. Instead, I analyze “second-wave” black feminism’s pleas for love as a significant call for ordering the self and transcending the self, a strategy for remaking the self and for moving beyond the limitations of selfhood. Moreover, this paper reads black feminist love-politics’ insistence on transcending the self and producing new forms of political communities as a kind of affective politics. My use of the term affective politics draws on work by scholars including Sara Ahmed, Lauren Berlant, Jose Muñoz, and Ann Cvetkovich, who invite us to ask: “how do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and against other others? How do emotions move between bodies?” (Ahmed 2004, 118). I use the term affective politics to describe how bodies are organized around intensities, longings, desires, temporalities, repulsions, curiosities, fatigues, optimism, and how these affects produce political movements (or sometimes inertias). I am particularly interested in reading black feminism’s affective love politics as a departure from the kind of political work that black feminism is often associated with: identity politics.

#### That is necessary to disrupt the american economy of fear created post-9/11, where public attitudes are determined by the constant fear of “could-be” terrorists. This climate allows the policing of all bodies and the extension of warfare

Sara Ahmed, 2004- “Affective Economies”. Social Text, 79 (Volume 22, Number 2), Summer 2004, pp. 117-139. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London. <http://ericastanleydotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/ahmed-affective-economies.pdf>

Furthermore, the fear of degeneration as a mechanism for preserving social forms becomes associated more with some bodies than others. The threat of such others to social forms (which are the materialization of norms) is represented as the threat of turning away from the values that will guarantee survival. These various others come to embody the failure of the norm to take form; it is the proximity of such other bodies that “causes” the fear that the forms of civilization (the family, the community, the nation, and international civil society) have degenerated. Those who speak out against the “truth” of this world become aligned then with the terrorists as seeking to cause the “ruin” of the world. What is important, then, is that the narratives that seek to preserve the present through working on anxieties of death as the necessary consequence of the demise of social forms also seek to locate that anxiety in some bodies, which then take on fetish qualities as objects of fear. Such bodies engender even more fear, as they cannot be held in place as objects, and threaten to pass by. That is, we may fail to see those forms that have failed to be; it is always possible that we might not be able to tell the difference. The present hence becomes preserved by defending the community against the imagined others, who may take form in ways that cannot be anticipated, a “not-yetness” that means the work of defense is never over. Such a defense is generated by anxiety and fear for the future, and justifies the elimination or exclusion of that which fails to materialize in the form of the norm as a struggle for survival. Insofar as we do not know what forms other others may take, those who fail to materialize in the forms that are lived as norms, the policies of continual surveillance of emergent forms is sustained as an ongoing project of survival. It is here that we can deepen our reflections on the role of the figure of the international terrorist within the economies of fear. Crucially, the narrative that justifies the expansion of the powers to detain others within the nation and the potential expansion of the war itself to other nations relies on the structural possibility that the terrorist “could be” anyone and anywhere. The narrative of the “could be” terrorist, in which the terrorist is the one who “hides in the shadows,”35 has a double edge. On the one hand, the figure of the terrorist is detached from particular bodies, as a shadowy figure, “an unspecifiable may-come-to-pass.”36 But it is this could-be-ness, this detachment, which also allows the restriction on the mobility of those bodies who are read as associated with terrorism: Islam, Arab, Asian, East. Fear sticks to these bodies (and to the bodies of “rogue states”) that “could be” terrorist, where the “could be” opens up the power to detain. Although such fear sticks, it also slides across such bodies; it is the structural possibility that the terrorist may pass us by that justifies the expansion of these forms of intelligence, surveillance, and the rights of detention. Fear works here to expand the mobility of some bodies and contain others precisely insofar as it does not reside positively in any one body. As Samuel Weber puts it, “When terrorism is defined as international it becomes difficult to locate, situate, personify and identify,”37 and it is this difficulty that justifies the expansion of the powers of the state. It is important to recognize that the figure of the international terror-ist has been mobilized in close proximity to the figure of the asylum seeker. The slide between these two figures does an enormous amount of work: it assumes that those who seek asylum, who flee from terror and persecution, may be bogus insofar as they could be the very agents of terror and persecution. They, like terrorists, are identified as potential burglars: as unlawful intruders into the nation. In Australia, for example, the refusal to allow the boat Tampa into its waters (with its cargo of 433 asylum seekers, many of whom were from Afghanistan) was retrospectively justified on the grounds that those on board could be linked to Osama bin Laden. The sticking together of the figure of the asylum seeker and the international terrorist, which already evokes other figures (the burglar, the bogeyman), constructs those who are “without home” as sources of “our fear” and as reasons for new forms of border policing, whereby the future is always a threat posed by others who may pass by and pass their way into the community. The slide of metonymy works to generate or make likeness: the asylum seeker is “like” the terrorist, an agent of fear, who may destroy “our home.” The slide between figures involves the containment of others, who henceforth become the objects of fear. The containment of the bodies of others affected by this economy of fear is most chillingly and violently revealed in the literal deaths of those seeking asylum in containers, deaths that remain unmourned by the very nations who embody the hope of a future for those seeking asylum. This is a chilling reminder of what is at stake in the affective economies of fear.

#### The unique black female perspective is an epistemological necessity for political decisions

Assata Zerai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and Zakia Salime, Michigan State University “A Black Feminist Analysis of Responses to War, Racism, and Repression”. Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 Mar 1, 2006

2. Black feminism highlights the importance of integrated analysis in political organizing “As long as Black women’s subordination within intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, sexuality, and nation persists, Black feminism as an activist response to that oppression will remain needed” (Collins 2000a:22). Black feminism promotes structural analysis (Zerai and Banks 2002). This perspective provides an important focus for political organizing. Within black feminist thought, oppressive social structures are understood to be a matrix of domination representing the convergence of nationalism, racism, class oppression, sexism, homophobia, and other spheres of inequality (Collins 1991; Kuumba 1994; Lorde 1984; Zerai 2000). Black feminist organizers self-consciously employ integrated analysis in their organizational strategies and political discussions (Kuumba 1999; Smith 1999). 3. Black feminist organizing recognizes relational difference Audre Lorde showed how examining difference as relational is an effective method for inspiring praxis (1984). Elsa Barkley Brown (1995) explains that acknowledging difference between unequal groups in society is only the beginning. Looking at how difference is relational helps us to see the common basis of privilege and oppression in a system that awards some while punishing others. The example Brown provides is that white, middle-class women’s exit from the domestic sphere and entry into the labor force during WWII was facilitated by poor white, black, Latina, and immigrant women’s work in the formal and informal service sector. Examining the relations between experiences of elite and dominated groups uncovers the ways in which race, class, gender, nation, sexuality, and other spheres of domination are interconnected and mutually reinforce one another. Helping potential supporters and recruits recognize relational differences is a tool for mobilization.

#### Women of color are disproportionately affected by the use and manufacturing of weapons

Assata Zerai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and Zakia Salime, Michigan State University “A Black Feminist Analysis of Responses to War, Racism, and Repression”. Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 Mar 1, 2006

Feature 2: Black feminism highlights the importance of integrated analysis in political organizing Black feminism considers multiplicative oppressions to be addressed in communities of color. Black feminist organizing seeks to understand domination in order to equip people to resist oppression and affect social change. Integrated analysis informs the points delineated in the leaflet, “10 Reasons Why Women Should Oppose the US ‘War on Terrorism’” developed by the Women of Color Resource Center. For an example, see point 3: “Weapons of mass destruction, produced, used and sold by the US worldwide, poison the environment, causing miscarriages, birth defects and cancers.” They argue that class interests that promote the sale of weaponry by US corporations to the US military and to other military interests around the world not only contribute to the further disparity in income and wealth in US society and between the USA and other countries, but also directly affect the health status of residents in countries and communities in which such weapons are produced and used. Women generally – poor women, women of color, and poor women of color in particular – are disproportionately affected by the income and wealth disparities generated by weapons sales and by the ill-health effects of these weapons. The organization, INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence further develops this point in their leaflet “The ‘War of Terror’ Intensifies Violence Against Women of Color, Third World Women and our Communities.” It states, “Women in the countries under attack search for clean water because poisons from weapons pollute the soil and water, leading to starvation, cancers, and birth disabilities.” An integrated analysis is employed when the observer is examining the simultaneous operation of global racism, class oppression, and sexism. The same perspective informs point 5 of the WCRC’s “10 Reasons Women Should Oppose War.” It states, “The ‘war on terrorism’ is a cover for US economic, political, and military domination, which increases women’s poverty worldwide.” In INCITE’s integrated analysis, they delineate several issues related to this point: a. Third-world women who survive invasion will live in a . . . colony that has been devastated and impoverished and has little or no access to jobs and education. b. The excuse of a wartime economy and national security are used to cut tens of thousands of jobs from women of color and thirdworld women and our communities . . . c. The Department of Homeland Security can decertify any union operating or prevent any union forming if the union is seen as a threat to “national security.” Without unions, working conditions and salaries for poor folks and people of color will get worse. Point a looks beyond US borders to bring in nations as a sphere of the intersectional framework. In points b and c, women of color observe ways the “war on terror” has directly affected earnings of family and community members.

#### The president will circumvent the plan

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**In an observation more often repeated than defended, we are told that the attacks of September 11 “changed everything.” Whatever merit there is in this notion, it is certainly true that 9/11—and in particular the legal response set in motion by the administration of President George W. Bush—left its mark on the academy. Nine years after 9/11, it is time to step back and assess these developments and to offer thoughts on their meaning. In Part II of this essay, we analyze the post-9/11 scholarship produced by this “emergency” framing. We argue that legal scholars writing in the aftermath of 9/11 generally fell into one of three groups: unilateralists, interventionists, and proceduralists. Unilateralists argued in favor of tilting the allocation of government power toward the executive because the state’s interest in survival is superior to any individual liberty interest, and because the executive is best able to understand and address threats to the state. Interventionists, by contrast, argued in favor of restraining the executive (principally through the judiciary) precisely to prevent the erosion of civil liberties. Proceduralists took a middle road, informed by what they perceived as a central lesson of American history.1 Because at least some overreaction by the state is an inevitable feature of a national crisis, the most one can reasonably hope for is to build in structural and procedural protections to preserve the essential U.S. constitutional framework, and, perhaps, to minimize the damage done to American legal and moral traditions. Despite profound differences between and within these groups, legal scholars in** all three camps **(as well as litigants and clinicians, including the authors)** shared a common perspective**—viz., that repressive legal policies adopted by wartime governments are** temporary departures **from hypothesized peacetime norms. In this narrative, metaphors of bewilderment, wandering, and confusion predominate. The country “loses its bearings” and “goes astray.” Bad things happen until at last the nation “finds itself” or “comes to its senses,” recovers its “values,” and fixes the problem.** Internment ends, habeas is restored, prisoners are pardoned, repression passes**. In a show of regret, we change direction, “get back on course,” and vow it will never happen again.** Until the next time, when it does**. This view, popularized in treatments like All the Laws but One, by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,2 or the more thoughtful and thorough discussion in Perilous Times by Chicago’s Geoffrey Stone,3 quickly became the dominant narrative in American society and the legal academy. This narrative also figured heavily in the many challenges to Bush-era policies, including by the authors. The narrative permitted litigators and legal scholars to draw upon what elsewhere has been referred to as America’s “civic religion”4 and to** cast the courts in the role of hero-judges**5 whom we hoped would restore legal order.6 But by framing the Bush Administration’s response as the latest in a series of regrettable but temporary deviations from a hypothesized liberal norm, the legal academy ignored the more persistent, and decidedly illiberal, authoritarian tendency in American thought to demonize communal “others” during moments of perceived threat. Viewed in this light, what the dominant narrative identified as a brief departure caused by a military crisis is more accurately seen as part of a recurring process of intense stigmatization tied to periods of social upheaval, of which war and its accompanying repressions are simply representative (and particularly acute) illustrations. It is worth recalling, for instance, that the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan in this country, when the organization could claim upwards of 3 million members, was the early-1920s, and that the period of greatest Klan expansion began in the summer of 1920, almost immediately after the nation had “recovered” from the Red Scare of 1919–20.7 Klan activity during this period, unlike its earlier and later iterations, focused mainly on the scourge of the immigrant Jew and Catholic, and flowed effortlessly from the anti-alien, anti-radical hysteria of the Red Scare. Yet this period is almost entirely unaccounted for in the dominant post-9/11 narrative of deviation and redemption, which in most versions glides seamlessly from the madness of the Red Scare to the internment of the Japanese during World War II.8 And because we were studying the elephant with the wrong end of the telescope,** we came to a flawed understanding of the beast**. In Part IV, we argue that the interventionists and unilateralists came to an incomplete understanding by focusing almost exclusively on what Stuart Scheingold called “the myth of rights”—the belief that if we can identify, elaborate, and secure judicial recognition of the legal “right,” political structures and policies will adapt their behavior to the requirements of the law and change will follow more or less automatically.9 Scholars struggled to define the relationship between law and security primarily through exploration of structural10 and procedural questions, and, to a lesser extent, to substantive rights. And they examined the almost limitless number of subsidiary questions clustered within these issues. Questions about the right to habeas review, for instance, generated a great deal of scholarship about the handful of World War II-era cases that the Bush Administration relied upon, including most prominently Johnson v. Eisentrager and Ex Parte Quirin. 11 Regardless of political viewpoint, a common notion among most unilateralist and interventionist scholars was that when law legitimized or delegitimized a particular policy, this would have a direct and observable effect on actual behavior. The premise of this scholarship, in other words, was that policies “struck down” by the courts, or credibly condemned as lawless by the academy, would inevitably be changed—**and that this should be the focus of reform efforts. **Even when disagreement existed about the substance of rights or even which branch should decide their parameters, it reflected shared acceptance of the** primacy **of law,** often to the exclusion of underlying social or political dynamics**. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, may have thought, unlike the great majority of their colleagues, that the torture memo was “standard fare.”12 But their position nonetheless accepted the notion that if the prisoners had a legal right to be treated otherwise, then the torture memo authorized illegal behavior and must be given no effect.13 Recent developments, however, cast doubt on two grounding ideas of interventionist and unilateralist scholarship—viz., that post-9/11 policies were best explained as responses to a national crisis (and therefore limited in time and scope), and that the problem was essentially legal (and therefore responsive to condemnation by the judiciary and legal academy). One might have reasonably predicted that in the wake of a string of Supreme Court decisions limiting executive power, apparently widespread and bipartisan support for the closure of Guantánamo during the 2008 presidential campaign, and the election of President Barack Obama, which itself heralded a series of executive orders that attempted to dismantle many Bush-era policies, the nation would be “returning” to a period of respect for individual rights and the rule of law. Yet the period following Obama’s election has been marked by an increasingly retributive and venomous narrative surrounding Islam and national security. Precisely when the dominant narrative would have predicted change and redemption,** we have seen retreat and retrenchment. **This conundrum is not adequately addressed by dominant strands of post-9/11 legal scholarship. In retrospect, it is surprising that much post-9/11 scholarship appears to have set aside critical lessons from previous decades as to the relationship among law, society and politics.14 Many scholars have long argued in other contexts that rights—or at least the experience of rights—are subject to political and social constraints, particularly for groups subject to historic marginalization. Rather than self-executing, rights are better viewed as contingent political resources, capable of mobilizing public sentiment and generating social expectations.15 From that view, a victory in Rasul or Boumediene no more guaranteed that prisoners at Guantánamo would enjoy the right to habeas corpus than a victory in Brown v. Board16 guaranteed that schools in the South would be desegregated.17 Rasul and Boumediene, therefore, should be seen as part (and probably only a small part) of a varied and complex collection of events, including the fiasco in Iraq, the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, and the use of warrantless wiretaps, as well as seemingly unrelated episodes like the official response to Hurricane Katrina. These and other events during the Bush years merged to give rise to a powerful social narrative critiquing an administration committed to lawlessness, content with incompetence, and engaged in behavior that was contrary to perceived “American values.”18 Yet the very success of this narrative, culminating in the election of Barack Obama in 2008, produced quiescence on the Left, even as it stimulated massive opposition on the Right. The result has been the emergence of a counter-narrative about national security that has produced a vigorous social backlash such that most of the Bush-era policies will continue largely unchanged, at least for the foreseeable future.19 Just as we see a widening gap between judicial** recognition **of rights in the abstract and the** observation **of those rights as a matter of fact, there appears to be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given that rights dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by basic procedural measures. But that stance falls short in its seeming readiness to trade away rights in the face of political tension. First, it accepts the tropes du jour surrounding radical Islam—namely, that it is a unique, and uniquely apocalyptic, threat to U.S. security. In this, proceduralists do not pay adequate heed to the lessons of American history and sociology. And second, it endorses too easily the idea that procedural and structural protections will protect against substantive injustice in the face of popular and/or political demands for an outcome-determinative system that cannot tolerate acquittals. Procedures only provide protection, however, if there is sufficient** political support **for the underlying right.** Since **the premise of the proceduralist scholarship is** that such support does not exist, it is folly to expect the political branches to create meaningful and robust protections**. In short, a witch hunt does not become less a mockery of justice when the accused is given the right to confront witnesses. And a separate system (especially when designed for demonized “others,” such as Muslims) cannot, by definition, be equal. In the end, we urge a fuller embrace of what Scheingold called “the politics of rights,” which recognizes the contingent character of rights in American society. We agree with Mari Matsuda, who observed more than two decades ago that rights are a necessary but not sufficient resource for marginalized people with little political capital.20 To be effective, therefore, we must look** beyond the courts **and grapple with the hard work of long-term change with, through and, perhaps,** in spite of law**. These are by no means new dilemmas, but the post-9/11 context raises difficult and perplexing questions that deserve study and careful thought as our nation settles into what appears to be a permanent emergency.**

#### The U.S. is committed to counterterrorism – absent drones they would find alternatives

Wittes and Singh 12

Benjamin Wittes Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he is the Research Director in Public Law, and Co-Director of the Harvard Law School - Brookings Project on Law and Security, and Ritika Singh project coordinator at the Brookings Institution where she focuses on national security law and policy, 1/24/12, “The Droneless Counterfactual”, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/24/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/droneless-counterfactual>

Cortright’s example, the use of drones along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, is a case in point. He notes Defense Secretary Panetta’s argument that drones are the “only game in town” and explains why this is: They are more precise than conventional air strikes, and “Ground operations by commando units … would entail severe risks to our troops” (emphasis added). The result is that the availability of drones creates a military option where none would otherwise exist.

Just to be clear, I prefer that American troops be deployed with a minimum of “severe risks.” And Cortright’s confidence that absent drones, policymakers would not perceive “severe risks to our troops” as risks worth taking to confront al Qaeda seems misplaced to me. One cannot assume that because major troop commitments are politically unthinkable given the availability of lesser uses of force that they would be similarly unthinkable in the absence of these alternative military means. Cortright assumes that absent drones, the United States would simply not be engaged militarily in Pakistan. His assumption is naive. Absent drones, American involvement in Pakistan would probably be militarily messier, greater, and bloodier on both sides. It is a mistake that colors his entire argument.

#### Asking for rewards – such as the ballot – for speaking for Others serves to reinscribe hierarchies

Linda Alcoff, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies and the Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence at Syracuse University, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Cultural Critique, No. 20, Winter 1991-92, p. 5-32, UK: Fisher

In conclusion, I would stress that **the practice of speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about another's situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise. And the effect of the practice of speaking for others is often, though not always, erasure and a reinscription of sexual, national, and other kinds of hierarchies.** I hope that this analysis will contribute to rather than diminish the important discussion going on today about how to develop strategies for a more equitable, just distribution of the ability to speak and be heard. But this development should not be taken as an absolute dis-authorization of all practices of speaking for. It is not always the case that when others unlike me speak for me I have ended up worse off, or that when we speak for others they end up worse off. Sometimes, as Loyce Stewart has argued, we do need a "messenge

### Block

Huma Dar, PhD candidate, South and South East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley “Veil in the Time of War” or “Veilin’ the Time of War” http://pulsemedia.org/ April 20, 2010

What is the calculus of grief that makes some lives more valuable and grievable and others just “collateral damage” and not even worthy of counting? Why are some issues of sartorial choice or even the lack thereof more worthy of spilling tears, ink, or blood than issues of life, justice, and the crucial freedom from wars, occupation, and torture? Why is it so easily, so liberally assumed that struggles of gender and sexual justice are completely distinct and separable from struggles against racism, Islamophobia, class exploitation, and imminent or current wars? The insistence on the separation of these entwined and intersecting struggles is not innocent but entirely complicit in manipulating the former struggles against the equally vital latter ones. Don’t we all remember the proliferation of Afghani burqas on the hallowed pages of the New York Times in the days leading up to the war to “rescue” the Muslim women? What about the abominable flogging video purportedly from Swat that went viral in the days leading up to the US-directed Pakistani military action there, and which was later exposed to be a fake? In a war justified at least partly to “liberate” Muslim women, the fact that rapes and murders of women in Afghanistan have increased exponentially since the US occupation goes mostly unreported and thus veiled in the mainstream global media. This disastrous back-story is always missing, always veiled in a setting that facilitates insistent and cultivated amnesia. I hope it is now clear why the prima facie innocent “What do Muslim women want?” is as or more irksome than “What do women want?” especially when the debate obsessively and facetiously revolves around the veil or the sexuality “obscured” or “revealed” beneath the veil. The question betrays a lack of bona fide intentions at its very core. In the set of multiple choice responses “generously” and “liberally” made available to us, one choice is conspicuous in its absence: End all wars and occupations right now, and offer reparations and justice to the ones whose countries have been destroyed, who have been wronged and have survived genocidal wars

#### Turn: Essentialism bad—marginalizes oppressed groups and perpetuates domination

Bell Hooks Essentialism and Experience American Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 172-183

According to Fuss, issues of "essence, identity, and experience" erupt in the classroom primarily because of the critical input from marginalized groups. Throughout her chapter, whenever she offers an example of individuals who use essentialist standpoints to dominate discussion, to silence others via their invocation of the "authority of experience," they are members of groups who historically have been and are oppressed and exploited in this society. Fuss does not address how systems of domination already at work in the academy and the classroom silence the voices of individuals from marginalized groups and give space only when on the basis of experience it is demanded. She does not suggest that the very discursive practices that allow for the assertion of the "authority of experience" have already been determined by politics of race, sex, and class domination. **Fuss does not aggressively suggest that dominant groups-men, white people, heterosexuals-perpetuate essentialism**. In her narrative **it is always a marginal "other" who is essentialist. Yet the politics of essentialist exclusion as a means of asserting presence, identity, is a cultural practice that does not emerge solely from marginalized groups**. And **when those groups do employ essentialism as a way to dominate in institutional settings, they are often imitating paradigms for asserting subjectivity that are part of the controlling apparatus in structures of domination**. Certainly many white male students have brought to my classroom an insistence on the authority of experience, one that enables them to feel that anything they have to say is worth hearing, that indeed their ideas and experience should be the central focus of classroom discussion. **The politics of race and gender within white supremacist patriarchy grants them this "authority" without their having to name the desire for it.** They do not attend class and say, "I think that I am superior intellectually to my classmates because I am white and male and that my experiences are much more important than any other group's." And yet their behavior often announces this way of thinking about identity, essence, subjectivity.

#### Solves the aff impacts and connects to global movements

Assata Zerai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and Zakia Salime, Michigan State University “A Black Feminist Analysis of Responses to War, Racism, and Repression”. Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 Mar 1, 2006

4. Black feminism connects local struggles to the international humanist struggle Black feminist organizing suggests that international connections should be articulated by local organizers to demonstrate to their constituency that local struggles are tied to the worldwide humanist movement. The interconnections between gender oppression, racism, heterosexism, and class oppression – including imperialism – as interlocking systems of domination on a world scale are basic to this analysis. Participants in the US Black Freedom struggle are inspired by scholar/activists and revolutionary thinkers as part and parcel of the world humanist struggle. Currently, Africana women such as Ifi Amadiume (see Amadiume 1987), Amina Mama (see Mama 1995, 1998, 2000), Ayesha Imam (Imam and Mama 1994), Patricia McFadden (1992, 1997, 2001) and others inspire new generations of progressive scholars, generally including feminists, and black studies scholars (see Guy-Sheftall 2004; Kuumba 1994, 1996; Zerai and Campbell 2005). Black feminists’ integrated perspectives opened up the movement to more inclusive notions of humanism. Connecting to the worldwide humanist struggle is a crucial resource to women who work as “minorities” in the American context. They realize in the global context that they are part of a critical majority (Lorde 1984). As organizers struggle in what feels like an uphill battle and in isolated locations “in the belly of the beast,” African-American women take solace and gain inspiration by remembering that they indeed are not alone, that their sisters in Soweto, Ibadan, Cape Town, Gaborone, Fez, Montréal, and Kingston are fighting similar battles (Guy-Sheftall 2004; Kuumba 1994, 1996; Zerai and Campbell 2005).

#### And this debate over war powers skirts over the war at home - white supremacy fuels white nation building that always focuses on the subjugation of the black body

Rodriguez 10 (Dylan Rodriguez, University of California, Riverside, “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology, Crit Sociol January 2010 vol. 36 no. 1 151-173)

The state’ is fundamentally a conceptual term that refers to a mind-boggling array of geographic, political, and institutional relations of power and domination. It is a term of abstraction: certainly the state is ‘real’, but it is so massive and institutionally stretched that it simply cannot be understood and ‘seen’ in its totality. Thus, the way a given public comes to comprehend the state’s realness – or more accurately, the way the state makes itselfcomprehensible, intelligible, and materially identifiable to ordinary people – is through its own self-narrations and institutional mobilizations. By way of example, consider the narrative and institutional dimensions of the ‘war on drugs’ during its most heightened period of political currency: New York City mayor Edward Koch, in a gesture of masculine challenge to the Reagan-era federal government, offers a prime example of such a narration in a 1986 op-ed piece published in the pages of The New York Times: \*\*QUOTE\*\*I propose the following steps as a coordinated Federal response to [the war on drugs]: Use the full resources of the military for drug interdiction. The Posse Comitatus doctrine, which restricts participation of the military in civilian law enforcement, must be modified so that the military can be used for narcotics control … Enact a Federal death penalty for drug wholesalers. Life sentences, harsh fines, forfeitures of assets, billions spent on education and therapy all have failed to deter the drug wholesaler. The death penalty would. Capital punishment is an extraordinary remedy, but we are facing an extraordinary peril … Designate United States narcotics prisons. The Bureau of Prisons should designate separate facilities for drug offenders. Segregating such prisoners from others, preferably in remote locations such as the Yukon or desert areas, might motivate drug offenders to abandon their trade. Enhance the Federal agencies combating the drug problem. The Attorney General should greatly increase the number of drug enforcement agents in New York and other cities. He should direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to devote substantial manpower against the cocaine trade and should see to it that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is capable of detecting and deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes in far better numbers than it now does. Enact the state and local narcotics control assistance act of 1986. This bill provides $750 million annually for five years to assist state and local jurisdictions increase their capacities for enforcement, corrections, education and prosecution. These proposals offer no certainty for success in the fight against drugs, of course. If we are to succeed, however, it is essential that we persuade the Federal Government to recognize its responsibility to lead the way. \*\*END QUOTE\*\* (Koch 1986, emphasis added) Koch’s manifesto builds a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politically willing corporate media. This storytelling – which through repetition and saturation assembles the popular ‘common sense’ of domestic warfare – is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, militarized struggle against its declared internal enemies, structurally embodied in the nationalist animus that epidermally 3 (Fanon 1967) criminalizes black and indigenous populations and distends into localized racist state violence waged on differently racially and ethnically pathologized brown populations, from Puerto Ricans and Filipinos to Mexicans and Iranians. Consider, for example, how pronouncements like Koch’s are consistently accompanied by the operational innovation of different varieties of covert ops, urban guerilla war, and counterintelligence warfare that specifically emerge through the state’s declared domestic wars on crime/drugs/gangs/etc. (Parenti 2000) Hence, it is no coincidence that Mayor Koch’s editorial makes the stunning appeal to withdraw (‘modify’) the Posse Comitatus principle (tantamount to a call for martial law), in order to facilitate the federal government’s formal mobilization of its global war apparatus for battle in the domestic urban theater of the war on drugs. To reference our example even more closely, we can begin to see how the ramped-up policing and massive incarceration of Black and Latino youth in Koch’s 1980s New York was enabled and normalized by his and others’ attempts to storytell the legal empowerment and cultural valorization of the police, such that the nuts-and-bolts operation of the criminal justice system was lubricated by the multiple moral parables of domestic warfare. It is useful here to further illustrate the lineage of the self-narrating state through a tracing of a few of its own pronouncements of domestic war. The first three articulations arrive courtesy of President Ronald Reagan, the last through Asa Hutchinson, an administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). While the selection of the following passages is somewhat arbitrary (there are literally thousands of similar tone and content that are easily discovered with the most casual perusal), they have been chosen for illustration precisely because they are symptomatic of the state formation in which they are situated: \*\*QUOTE As I’ve said before, we’ve taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we’re going to win the war on drugs. (Reagan 1982) My generation will remember how America swung into action when we were attacked in World War II. The war was not just fought by the fellows flying the planes or driving the tanks. It was fought at home by a mobilized nation – men and women alike – building planes and ships, clothing sailors and soldiers, feeding marines and airmen; and it was fought by children planting victory gardens and collecting cans. Well, now we’re in another war for our freedom, and it’s time for all of us to pull together again. In this crusade, let us not forget who we are. Drug abuse is a repudiation of everything America is. The destructiveness and human wreckage mock our heritage. Think for a moment how special it is to be an American. Can we doubt that only a divine providence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people on the world who yearn to breathe free? (Reagan 1986) This war is not yet won, not by a long shot. When we say zero tolerance, we mean, simply, that we’ve had it. We will no longer tolerate those who sell drugs and those who buy drugs. All Americans of good will are determined to stamp out those parasites who survive and even prosper by feeding off the energy and vitality and humanity of others. They must pay. That’s why the administration … has advocated tougher measures than ever before to combat the drug runners and the drug dealers. We’re doing this by seizing the ill-gotten possessions of drug dealers and their accomplices. Those fancy cars and fancy houses and bank accounts full of dirty money aren’t really theirs. They were bought from the sale of illegal blood pollutants. We do not tolerate companies that poison our harbors and rivers, and we won’t let people who are poisoning the blood of our children get away with it either. Those who have the gall to use federally subsidized housing to peddle their toxins must get the message as well. We will not tolerate those who think they can do their dirty work in the same quarters where disadvantaged Americans struggle to build a better life. We want to kick the vermin out and keep them out. (Reagan 1988) We give up freedom when we addict ourselves to drugs. This fact is not lost on the terrorists. (Hutchinson 2001) Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to both its anticipated and unexpected publics through such definitive moments of crafting: the state identifies itself as a series of active rhetorical, political, and institutional projects and mobilizations, many of which hinge on the marshalling of capacities for racist state violence (war).The state’s self-narration inundates and hails multiple publics with its discourse of policing and jurisprudence as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars, whether the ‘war on drugs’, ‘war on crime’, ‘war on gangs’, ‘war on illegal immigration’, or ‘war on terror’. By extension, it is the material processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponization of the police, that commonly represents the practical existence of the state as we come to normally ‘know’ it. Domestic warfare has thus become both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mounting with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD ChiefWilliam Bratton on the strength of his own words, the primary work of the police is to engage aggressively in ‘the internal war on terrorism’ (Garvey and Winton 2002), which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces (McGreevy 2007), to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against criminalized populations of choice (Rau 2007) and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to facilitate the state’s various localized ‘wars on gangs’ (McGreevy and Winton 2007). This modality of domestic warmaking also, crucially, entails the discursive innovations of an emergent multiculturalist white supremacy, wherein authoritative embodiments of the ‘new’ post-civil rights racist state smoothly recapitulate the a priori of the nation-building project. Barack Obama’s now notorious 2008 Father’s Day speech at the Apostolic Church of God in Chicago, in which he scolded and cajoled ‘black fathers’ for ‘acting like boys instead of men’ and rendering ‘the foundations of our families … weaker’, also encompassed a back-door (and largely unnoticed) pledge of allegiance to the law-and-order state: ‘Yes, we need more cops on the street. Yes, we need fewer guns in the hands of people who shouldn’t have them.’ (Obama 2008) Crucially, Obama obtained an enthusiastic round of applause from his ostensibly progressive black audience on all rhetorical counts.

#### Leave the bad white allies out, our movement only succeeds without them

Mia McKenzie, “No More “Allies”” Black Girl Dangerous September 30, 2013

I’m kinda over the term “ally.” Between Tim Wise’s recent (but not new) bullshit, a recent visit to a college where some so-called allies don’t even understand basic racism 101, and the constant cookie-seeking of people who just can’t do the right thing unless they are sure they’re gonna get some kind of credit for it, I’m done. Allyship is not supposed to look like this, folks. It’s not supposed to be about you. It’s not supposed to be about your feelings. It’s not supposed to be a way of glorifying yourself at the expense of the folks you claim to be an ally to. It’s not supposed to be a performance. It’s supposed to be a way of living your life that doesn’t reinforce the same oppressive behaviors you’re claiming to be against. It’s supposed to be about you doing the following things: shutting up and listening educating yourself (you could start with the thousands of books and websites that already exist and are chock full of damn near everything anyone needs to know about most systems and practices of oppression) when it’s time to talk, not talking over the people you claim to be in solidarity with accepting feedback/criticism about how your “allyship” is causing more harm than good without whitesplaining/mansplaining/whateversplaining shutting up and listening some more supporting groups, projects, orgs, etc. run by and for marginalized people so our voices get to be the loudest on the issues that effect us not expecting marginalized people to provide emotional labor for you This is by no means a comprehensive list. But most “allies” aren’t even getting these things right.

#### The perm is an interruption into the alternative that excludes the black female body

Audre Lorde, “Sister Outsider: essays and speeches.” The Crossing Press 1984

Once you start to speak, people will yell at you. They will interrupt you, put you down and suggest it’s personal. And the world won’t end. And the speaking will get easier and easier. And you will find you have fallen in love with your own vision, which you may never have realized you had. And you will lose some friends and lovers, and realize you don’t miss them. And new ones will find you and cherish you. And you will still flirt and paint your nails, dress up and party, because, as I think Emma Goldman said, “If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be part of your revolution.” And at last you’ll know with surpassing certainty that only one thing is more frightening than speaking your truth. And that is not speaking.”

#### The perm is an appropriation, risks killing black feminisms anti colonialist practices

bell hooks, “Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black” pg 15 1989

Appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be over determined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in. It becomes easy to speak about what that group wants to hear, to describe and define experience in a language compatible with existing images and ways of knowing, constructed within social frameworks that reinforce domination. Within any situation of colonization, of domination, the oppressed, the exploited develop various styles of relating, talking one way to one another, talking another way to those who have power to oppress and dominate, talking in a way that allows one be understood by someone who does not know your way of speaking, your language. The struggle to end domination, the individual struggle to 'resist colonization, to move from object to subject, is expressed in the effort to establish the liberatory voice—that way of speaking that is no longer determined by one's status as object—as oppressed being..

#### A2 perm: the perm coopts our activism and is a form of violent domination that should be rejected

Assata Zerai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and Zakia Salime, Michigan State University “A Black Feminist Analysis of Responses to War, Racism, and Repression”. Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 Mar 1, 2006

Black feminism’s analytic power manifests itself in its ability to help us change society. Remaining true to the promise of a perspective that incorporates an analysis of race, class, and gender means using it to liberate, because this is where its genesis lies. To stop short of liberatory activity is to stop short of duly and properly utilizing the black feminist framework (Zerai 2000). So it becomes appropriate to ask: What are the contributions of black feminism to methods of organizing to end oppression, and specifically against war, racism, and repression? The ideas that create the body of thought labeled “Black feminism” come not only from scholars but activists as well. Collins (1991, 1998, 2000 [2000a]) and others (Giddings 1984; Hooks and West 1991; Kuumba 1999; Kuumba and Ajanaku 1998; Steady 1981) argue that we need to pay attention to the writings of women outside academia because many black women never made it into academic spaces and most of those who gained entry were not allowed to remain. Others chose to engage in direct activism, recognizing that academic priorities could thwart their efforts to effect social change. A wider scope incorporating activists and scholars helps address the problem of the missing and faulty examination of Black women’s lives within academia (Collins 1998:98). From the work of black feminist scholars and activists, we can derive several tenets of black feminist thought that provide guidance to political organizing. A black feminist perspective on organizing is depicted by figure 1. The five axes of black feminist organizing are described in detail below. They include the practice and analytic (praxis) dimensions of (a) integrated analysis, (b) analysis of relational difference, (c) rooted-ness in everyday people’s experiences and desires, (d) the spatial and temporal dimensions of recognizing the local and global connections, and (e) promoting dynamic organizing strategies. The pie design suggests that aspects of black feminist organizing intersect, and can occur simultaneously.

#### Cooption DA - must push away from the 1AC to solve – independent reason to vote Neg

Alfred 99 [Taiaiake, U of Victoria dir. of Indigenous Governance Program, Peace, Power, Righteousness, p79]

Freeing ourselves from co-optation comes down to acknowledging the unbalanced power relation that we exist within (and not making excuses for its continuation); and holding ourselves apart from the institutions and people that actually constitute colonialism. Colonialism is not an abstract notion, but a set of real people and relationships and structures that can be resisted and combated by placing our respect and trust where it belongs: in indigenous people, relationships, and structures.

#### A2 Perm: essentialism footing noting DA—the permutation marginalizes the black female body

Bell Hooks Essentialism and Experience American Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 172-183

Ironically, even though Fuss praises the work of Carby and Spillers, it is not their work that is given extensive critical reading in this chapter. Indeed, she treats black women's subjectivity as a secondary issue. Such scholarship is permissible in an academic context that consistently marginalizes black women critics. I am always amazed by the complete absence of references to work by black women in contemporary critical works claiming to address in an inclusive way issues of gender, race, feminism, postcolonialism, etc. Confronting colleagues about such absences, I, along with other black women critics, am often told that they were simply unaware that such material exists, that they were often working from their knowledge of available sources. Reading Essentially Speaking, I assumed Diana Fuss is either unfamiliar with the growing body of work by black feminist critics, particularly literary criticism, or that she excludes that work because she considers it unimportant. Clearly, she bases her assessment on the work she knows, rooting her analysis in experience. In the concluding chapter to her book, Fuss particularly criticizes using experience in the classroom as a base from which to espouse totalizing truths. Many of the limitations she points out could be easily applied to the way experience informs not only what we write about, but how we write about it, the judgments we make.

#### Limiting drone and detention flexibility causes a shift to ground operations which increases civilian casualties

MARK BOWDEN 8/14/13 (national correspondent for The Atlantic, graduate of Loyola University Maryland, where he also taught from 2001-2010. A reporter and columnist for The Philadelphia Inquirer for more than 30 years, Bowden is now an adjunct professor at The University of Delaware, the atlantic, “The Killing Machines” <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/the-killing-machines-how-to-think-about-drones/309434/3/>)

No civilian death is acceptable, of course. Each one is tragic. But any assessment of civilian deaths from drone strikes needs to be compared with the potential damage from alternative tactics. Unless we are to forgo the pursuit of al-Qaeda terrorists entirely, U.S. forces must confront them either from the air or on the ground, in some of the remotest places on Earth. As aerial attacks go, drones are far more precise than manned bombers or missiles. That narrows the choice to drone strikes or ground assaults. Sometimes ground assaults go smoothly. Take the one that killed Osama bin Laden. It was executed by the best-trained, most-experienced soldiers in the world. Killed were bin Laden; his adult son Khalid; his primary protectors, the brothers Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and Abrar al-Kuwaiti; and Abrar’s wife Bushra. Assuming Bushra qualifies as a civilian, even though she was helping to shelter the world’s most notorious terrorist, civilian deaths in the raid amounted to 20 percent of the casualties. In other words, even a near-perfect special-ops raid produced only a slight improvement over the worst estimates of those counting drone casualties. Many assaults are not that clean. In fact, ground combat almost always kills more civilians than drone strikes do. Avery Plaw, a political scientist at the University of Massachusetts, estimates that in Pakistani ground offensives against extremists in that country’s tribal areas, 46 percent of those killed are civilians. Plaw says that ratios of civilian deaths from conventional military conflicts over the past 20 years range from 33 percent to more than 80 percent. “A fair-minded evaluation of the best data we have available suggests that the drone program compares favorably with similar operations and contemporary armed conflict more generally,” he told The New York Times. When you consider the alternatives—even, and perhaps especially, if you are deeply concerned with sparing civilians—you are led, as Obama was, to the logic of the drone.

#### Also shift to ground operations—those are worse too

Bowden, 13 --- national correspondent for The Atlantic (8/14/2013, Mark, “The Killing Machines; How to think about drones,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/the-killing-machines-how-to-think-about-drones/309434/?single_page=true>)

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