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#### The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

#### “Statutory restrictions” are enacted by congress

**Mortenson 11** (Julian Davis Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School, “Review: Executive Power and the Discipline of History Crisis and Command: The History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush John Yoo. Kaplan, 2009. Pp vii, 524,” Winter 2011, University of Chicago Law Review 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377)

At least two of Yoo's main examples of presidential power are actually instances of presidential deference to statutory restrictions during times of great national peril. The earliest is Washington's military suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion (III, pp 66-72), a domestic disturbance that Americans viewed as implicating adventurism by European powers and threatening to dismember the new nation. n60 The Calling Forth Act of 1792 n61 allowed the President to mobilize state militias under federal control, but included a series of mandatory procedural checks--including judicial [\*399] approval--that restricted his ability to do so. n62 Far from defying these comprehensive restrictions at a moment of grave crisis, Washington satisfied their every requirement in scrupulous detail. He issued a proclamation ordering the Whiskey Rebels to disperse. n63 When they refused to do so, he submitted a statement to Justice James Wilson of the Supreme Court describing the situation in Pennsylvania and requesting statutory certification. n64 Only when Wilson issued a letter precisely reciting the requisite statutory language (after first requiring the President to come back with authentication of underlying reports and verification of their handwriting n65) did Washington muster the troops. n66 Washington's compliance with statutory restrictions on his use of force continued even after his forces were in the field. Because Congress was not in session when he issued the call-up order, Washington was authorized by statute to mobilize militias from other states besides Pennsylvania--but only "until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing [congressional] session." n67 When it became clear that the Pennsylvania campaign would take longer than that, Washington went back to Congress to petition for extension of the statutory time limit that would otherwise have required him to [\*400] disband his troops. n68 Far from serving as an archetypal example of presidential defiance, the Whiskey Rebellion demonstrates exactly the opposite. FDR's efforts to supply the United Kingdom's war effort before Pearl Harbor teach a similar lesson. During the run-up to America's entry into the war, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts that supplemented longstanding statutory restrictions on providing assistance to foreign belligerents. Despite these restrictions, FDR sent a range of military assistance to the future Allies. n69 Yoo makes two important claims about the administration's actions during this period. First, he claims the administration asserted that "[a]ny statutory effort by Congress to prevent the President from transferring military equipment to help American national security would be of 'questionable constitutionality'" (III, p 300). Second, he suggests that American military assistance in fact violated the neutrality statutes (III, pp 295-301, 310, 327-28).

#### B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.

#### C. Vote negative

#### A. Decision-making—having a limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Creativity—thinking “inside the box” forces teams to be creative about their positions and come up with innovative solutions. Absent constraints, debate becomes boring and stale—we link turn all of their offense.

**Intrator 10** (Intrator, David, President of The Creative Organization and musical composer, October 22, 2010, “Thinking Inside The Box: A Professional Creative Dispels A Popular Myth”, Training, http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box) FS

**One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”** As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, **nothing could be further from the truth. This** a **is** view **shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed** famously **by** the **modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from** a fundamental misconception **of what creativity is**, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is **something weird and wacky.** The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s **about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint**, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of **photographers**. They **create by excluding the great mass what’s before them**, choosing a small frame in which to work. **Within that tiny frame**, literally a box, **they uncover relationships and establish priorities**. **What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem.** You’re the one choosing the frame. And **you alone determine what’s an effective solution**. **This can be quite demanding,** both intellectually and emotionally. **Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities**, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. **But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful**, something **that actually works**. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. **You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.** You can always change the rules, but that also comes with an emotional price. Unlike many other kinds of problems, with creative problems there is no external authority to which you can appeal to determine whether you’re on the right track, whether one set of rules should have priority over another, or whether one box is better than another. There is no correct answer. Better said: There might be a number of correct answers. Or none at all. The responsibility of deciding the right path to take is entirely upon you. That’s a lot of responsibility, and it can be paralyzing. So it’s no wonder that the creative process often stalls after the brainstorming in many organizations. Whereas generating ideas is open-ended, and, in a sense, infinitely hopeful, having to pare those ideas down is restrictive, tedious, and, at times, scary. The good news, however, is that understanding the creative process as problem-solving is ultimately liberating. For one, all of **those** left-brainers **with well-honed rational skills will find themselves** far more creative **than they ever thoug**ht. They’ll discover their talents for organization, abstraction, and clarity are very much what’s required to be a true creative thinker. **Viewing creativity as problem-solving also makes the whole process far less intimidating**, even though it might lose some of its glamour and mystery. Moreover, **since creative problems are open to rational analysis, they can be broken down into smaller components that are easier to address.** Best of all, **the very act of problem-solving, of organizing and trying making sense of things, helps generate new ideas.** Paradoxically, thinking within a box may be one of the most effective brainstorming techniques **there** is. That may be what Charles Eames meant when he added, “I welcome constraints.” **Without some sort of structure to your creative thinking**, you’re just flailing about. For a while you might feel like you’re making progress, generating a great mess of ideas that might hold some potential. But **to turn** those **ideas into something truly innovative, your best bet is to** build your box and **play by the rules** of your own creation.

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#### SECOND – the war on terror is good

**Mcinerney and Vallely**, 2k**4**- (Thomas and Paul, Lt. General USAF (Retired) and Maj. General US Army (Retired), both analysts for Fox News, Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror, p. 167-8)

After the axis powers declared war on the United States in December 1941, the United States did not limit its response to fortifying the Hawaiian Islands, increasing antisubmarine patrols along the Atlantic Coast, and upgrading the efforts of the FBI to crack rings of domestic Axis sympathizers and capture saboteurs. Osama bin Laden has openly and repeatedly declared war on the United States. The radical Islamists see themselves in jihad against the West, and they see the United States as the leading “Crusader” power. They see moderate Muslims who wish live in peace as traitors. Backed by state sponsors of terror like Iran they have become a global threat just as much as the National Socialists were. Though militarily puny their dreams and their potential danger are grandiose: inflaming a billion Muslims worldwide and creating a radical Islamist empire. To that end they will cooperate with rogue states like North Korea. They will do everything they can to acquire weapons of massdestruction. The bottom line is that they must be stopped. End their state sponsorship, and they wither. Buttress the forces of moderate Islam, encourage freedom and tolerance in Islamic societies grant Muslims in Iraq and Iran the opportunity to vote against tyranny and the mullahs, then the radicals do more than wither, they disappear to the fringes of Muslim society. If we are to stop the spread of radical Islam we cannot be satisfied with the conviction of a failed terrorist bomber, dismantling a terrorist cell, or freezing the bank account of a terrorist front – however necessary all these things are. To rely purely on defensive measures cedes the initiative to the radical Islamists. Instead, we need to take the battle to them. The counteroffensives in Afghanistan and Iraq were first steps to the endgame, they are not the endgame itself.The endgame is taking down the Web of Terror entirely so that the global terror threat dissolves. We have laid out the broad parameters of an active strategy for this war. Despite the best wishes of some, the Web of Terror cannot be talked to death, no “peace process” will work, no foreign aid will suffice unless the countries involved make a commitment – as Libya has apparently done – to forgo jihad, forgo terrorism, forgo weapons of mass destruction. Countries that will not do this willingly must be compelled to do it. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are not something we have to live with; they are something that the rogue states of the Web of Terror have to live without.

#### THIRD, terrorists are evil and want to kill us

**Peters**, 2k**4** - (Ralph, Retired Army Officer, “In Praise of Attrition,” Parameters, Summer)

Trust me. We don’t need discourses. We need plain talk, honest answers, and the will to close with the enemy and kill ~~him~~. And to keep on killing ~~him~~ until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won. When military officers start speaking in academic gobbledygook, it means they have nothing to contribute to the effectiveness of our forces. They badly need an assignment to Fallujah. Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe, literally, that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. You must find them, no matter how long it takes, then kill them. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, left-wing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender. We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb—and cheap—example of “net-war,” look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters. It isn’t a question of whether or not we want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re in a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies. We have the technical capabilities to deploy globally, but, for now, we are forced to watch as Pakistani forces fumble efforts to surround and destroy concentrations of terrorists; we cannot enter any country (except, temporarily, Iraq) without the permission of its government. We have many tools—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement, and so on—but we have less freedom of maneuver than our enemies. But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is superpower. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition),we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly. We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs. Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution. The truth is that even if you can’t kill yourself out of the problem, you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting. And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothingof substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groupsmetastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond. Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you. Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law Iraq. On the contrary, anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters.

#### FOURTH, Terrorism risks extinction

Harvey **Gordon,** Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, “The ‘Suicide’ Bomber: Is It a Psychiatric Phenomenon?” PSYCHIATRIC BULLETIN v. 26**,** 20**02,** pp. 285-287. Available from the Wrold Wide Web at: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285

Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life (Hoge & Rose, 2001). Such potential global destruction, or globicide as one might call it, supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life, including their own.

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#### The 1AC participates in the myth of heteronormativity—heterosexism does not exist because culture is hom(m)o-normative—the privileging of sexual relations above social relations leaves intact the culture of a universal male subject—that destroys the possibility for the feminine

Rachel Jones 2011. Irigaray: Towards a Sexuate Philosophy, Key Contemporary Thinkers, Polity, p 183-188)

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Irigaray does sometimes make comments in her later writings which seem to give heterosexual relations a certain kind of privi­lege: these comments are problematic not only in themselves, but because they are out of keeping with the philosophy of sexuate difference that her work unfolds. Thus, in what follows, I will argue that we need to hold the notion of sexuate difference apart from both heterosexual relations and from sexual difference where this is understood as a question of sexual orientation. It is sexuate dif­ference, not heterosexuality, which has ontological (and, as we will see in the next chapter, ethical) priority in Irigaray's thought. This priority raises questions of its own, particularly with regard to the relation between sexuate difference and race, to which I will also return in the next chapter. However, here I want to show why I think the charge of heterosexism is misplaced insofar as Irigaray's notion of sexuate difference is not necessarily or inherently hetero-sexist. I will do so partly by insisting on the continuity between her earlier and later texts and the importance of reading the latter firmly in light of the former. Broadly speaking, I agree with Gail Schwab on this issue when she notes that 'what Irigaray is talking about is not heterosexuality, but sexual difference', and that this is 'not at all the same thing'/5 Nonetheless, I think there are important lessons to be learned from this debate, partly because responding to it helps clarify some key aspects of Irigaray's thought; and partly because it serves as a humbling reminder of the risks we inevitably take - of generating new exclusions, or inadvertently reinforcing old blindspots - whenever we seek to address questions of difference. In some ways, the attention which Irigaray pays to heterosexual relations throughout her work is completely understandable, and indeed, necessary. Precisely because heterosexual relations have operated as the most intense (and destructive) site for the repro­duction of patriarchal norms, it is not only legitimate but impera­tive that we make every effort to reframe these relations in terms of an encounter between two (sexuate) subjects, instead of one (male) subject and his 'other'.7f' Thus, while criticizing what she sees as an (unnecessary) hardening of the sexuate into more fixed (heterosexual) relations in some of Irigaray's later writings, Penel­ope Deutscher observes that: Irigaray's ideal for the reconstruction of relations between the sexes should not be decontextualized. Because the feminine has been accorded the position of lack and atrophy in relation to the mascu­line, she considers that male-female relations must be reconceived as a cultural imperative. The imperative for this reshaping derives from this historical context, rather than from a global privileging of heterosexual and heterosocial interrelations in an Irigarayan politics.77 The claim that Irigaray goes beyond refraining male-female rela­tions in non-oppressive ways, to become oppressively heterosexist herself, is not only troubling but surprising, given that, as Grosz notes, Irigaray's work repeatedly affirms 'the necessity of women exploring their sexualities, bodies, and desires through their cor­poreal and affective relations with other women.'78 Such an affir­mation is found in Irigaray's response to Freud on female homosexuality: 'what exhilarating pleasure it is to be partnered with someone like oneself. With a sister, in everyday terms. What need, attraction, passion, one feels for someone, for some woman, like oneself (S, 103). This positive emphasis on relations between women continues throughout her later works, including those most associated with the heterosexist charge: in J love to you, for example, Irigaray foregrounds the urgency of articulating 'woman's relationship to herself, women's relationships among themselves, and especially the relationship between mother and daughter' (66). As we have seen, the cultivation of such relations is vital to effect a shift from a horizon in which women are reduced to the 'other' of the male subject (and hence to the other of the Same), to one in which they can see themselves as similar yet different to other women, and hence as belonging to their sex without losing their singularity. Perhaps the most famous essay in which Irigaray explores such female-female relations is 'When Our Lips Speak Together', exam­ined earlier in this chapter. Of all Irigaray's works, this is the one that is usually seen as the most explicit celebration of erotic rela­tions between women. In its images of sensuous touch and 'two lips kissing two lips', its rhetoric affirms the fecundity of lesbian pleasure and desire (TS, 210). Nonetheless, as indicated above, I would still read this essay in terms of a more general affirmation of female auto-affection, and hence as primarily concerned with woman's relation to her own sex: whether that sex is manifest in her own body, that of the mother, or the loving bodies of other women. While these bodies are always uniquely different from one another, what matters here is that a woman can take up a relation to her own sex - to the many different ways of being female -without having to define herself against a male norm. Thus, Iriga­ray seeks figures for a distinctive female morphology while recognizing that no two women will embody that morphology in exactly the same way.79 The affirmation of lesbian erotics takes place within this wider project of forging figures for an autono­mous female subjectivity and desire. Conversely, such a figuring of female specificity is essential for erotic relations between women to be articulated in ways that do not involve mimicking the hetero­sexual norms that have hitherto been governed by male subjectivity and desire. As Grosz puts it, Irigaray's explorations of female inti­macy imply 'the possibility of women loving each other as women, not as male substitutes'.80 This brings us to a crucial point brought out by Grosz's essay, 'The Hetero and the Homo: the Sexual Ethics of Luce Irigaray'.81 For Irigaray, our existing culture is not hetero-normative: on the contrary, the problem is that the hetero-geneity of hetero-sexual relations has yet to be adequately thought. Instead, male-female relations are firmly embedded in a hom(m)osocial order that takes the male subject (le homme) as norm and ideal. As Whitford sums up, pointing to a critical difference between Irigaray and Butler, 'what Judith Butler identifies as a heterosexual matrix, Irigaray sees as a patriarchal hom(m)osexuality'.32 And as Irigaray herself notes, 'it's essential not to confuse ... this ideological and cultural hom(m)osexualite with the practice of homosexuality'.83 As we have seen in previous chapters, for Irigaray, western culture is typified by the ways in which woman's 'otherness' is recognized not in terms of an autonomous female specificity but only insofar as she is 'other' to the male subject, reducing her to an other of the Same. This hom(m)osocial order is of course not particularly welcoming of male homosexuality - as Grosz notes, from an Irigarayan perspective: 'the oppression of gay men may well be a consequence of the male homosexual openly avowing what is in fact implicit, and a social norm, for all patriarchal forms of exchange. The male homosexual says and does what remains unspoken, a disavowed condition of social functioning.'64 But within a hom(m)osocial culture, the position of the lesbian is doubly disavowed: not only because she breaks with the patriarchal norms which define women according to their sexual and reproductive relations with men, but because this culture lacks the resources to articulate women's love for other women in terms of their female specificity (see 5, 101-4). Insofar as the call for a culture of two is a call for women to be recognized as subjects in their own terms, it is the condition for women to love one another as women - whether this involves lesbian eroticism, sisterly friendships, collegial support, or mother-daughter relations. Cultivating the difference between the sexes makes it possible for there to be female/female relations that are not based on male/female ones. This is why it Ls crucial to read Irigaray's later work on relations between the sexes in terms of her earlier and primary demand for the cultural recognition of female autonomy and specificity. For Irigaray, the possibility of any posi­tive relation between the sexes - where 'positive' implies a relation which allows for genuine difference between them - is conditional upon woman finding the terms with which to relate to herself and to articulate her (female) specificity in ways that no longer define her against man. As Whitford summarizes: 'For exchange to take place between the two terms of sexual difference, there must first be two terms.'35 Irigaray's later investigations into the question of how two sexuate subjects might listen and speak to each other are thus centrally informed by the answers she has already begun to develop to her earlier question, 'what if the "object" [woman] started to speak?' Far from reinserting an existing heterosexual norm, Irigaray's demand for a culture of two seeks to displace an existing hom(m)osociality in favour of a heterosexuality (and het-erosociality) that has not yet existed, and that would allow for two, different but non-opposed, subjects. Such a culture would make space for the heterogeneity of female and male homosexuality, such that both could be cultivated without either being modelled on the other, and without either coming to constitute the violently repressed 'other' that is always required when one subject seeks to attain the status of the universal. A further key point which needs to be added here is that, as others have noted, for Irigaray, the sexuate is not the same as the sexual,86 where the latter is understood as referring to one's sexual 'object' choice (and which Irigaray is seeking to reconfigure as erotic relations between desiring subjects). Thus she insists that: 'it's important not to confuse sexual choice with sexual difference. For me sexual difference is a fundamental parameter of the socio-cul-tural order; sexual choice is secondary. Even if one chooses to remain among women, it's necessary to resolve the problem of sexual difference. And likewise if one remains among men.'87 By prioritizing our existence as sexual (in the sense of sexuate) subjects, Irigaray is in no way seeking to prescribe our sexuality, that is, whether we are hetero-/homo-/bi-sexual, though a philosophy of being as two would require a rethinking of all of these categories (as well as their intersections with transgendered, transsexual, and intersexed individuals). As we have seen, there are a number of texts in which Irigaray does focus specifically on refiguring woman's sexuality; but as we have also seen, this refiguring of woman's pleasure is never separable from the wider project of rethinking woman's relation to herself as well as the processes through which she is constituted as a woman, that is, as a sexuate female subject. Irigaray's main concern is not with sexual orienta­tion, but with releasing woman from the phallocentric tradition in which all modes of sexuality are defined in relation to one and the same sex. A culture of two sexuate (male and female) subjects leaves it entirely open what the sexual preferences of these subjects might be - as long as they are no longer modelled in ways that take a male body and subject as the universal norm. Thus, while one way in which sexuate subjects can relate to one another is in sexual

 (i.e. erotic) relations, the call for a culture of sexual - in the sense of sexuate - difference is much broader than this and involves the recognition of two different kinds of beings - male and female - regardless of their sexual preferences. As Heidi Bostic argues, one of the reasons Irigaray's project is sometimes misconstrued is because of 'a misunderstanding of this privileging of the relation between men and women': Nowhere does Luce Irigaray make the claim that someone of the other sex must be my life partner. Love between men and women need not mean a sexual relationship.... In fact, Irigaray encourages us to theorize love 'within social relations and with cultural media­tions' instead of simply within the 'immediacy' of genital sex. ... Irigaray suggests that we all, regardless of sexual orientation, must learn to love across the lines of gender in order to build a new social Order\* While I think that the privileging of the male-female couple in texts such as I love to you is sometimes more problematic than this sug­gests, nonetheless, I agree with Bostic that Irigaray situates the necessity of reworking the male-female relation within a much wider project. The relations between men and women that need to be transformed are not merely sexual, but also civic, legal, cultural, familial, political and professional. For this to happen, the relations between public and private, particular and universal, nature and culture will also need to be transformed: for men and - differently - for women. Only then will women be able to participate actively in a social order in which they are fully recognized as both desiring and political subjects.

#### Takes out the revolutionary potential of the Aff—queer theory undermines efforts at material change and denies agency

Weedon 1999 Chris, (she's) the Chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff University, Feminism, theory, and the politics of difference, p.123-124

Butler's focus on gender as performance and citation has, however, provoked strong criticism from radical feminists. Radical lesbian feminist Sheila Jeffreys, for example, interprets much recent postmodern feminism as part of what she terms a 'return to gender' exemplified in the 'lesbianandgay' theory of Judith Butler, Diana Fuss and others. She argues that these postmodern theorists have invented 'a harmless version of gender as an idea which lesbians and gay men can endlessly play with and be revolutionary at the same time' (Jeffreys 1996: 359). For Jeffreys this marks a dangerous depoliticization. She argues that feminists of the 1970s and 1980s were 'engaged in the task of eliminating gender and phallocentric sexuality' (p. 362). This involved moving beyond the power relations of patriarchy. Not only does postmodernism declare this project impossible, it reinstates a version of gender which Jeffreys sees as 'depoliticised, sanitised and something difficult to associate with sexual violence, economic inequality [and] women dying from backstreet abortions' (p. 359). In lesbian culture, Jeffreys suggests, the postmodern return to gender is evident in the 1980s rehabilitation of 'role playing and lipstick lesbianism' which Jeffreys sees as far from subversive, as helping 'to shore up the facade of femininity' (p. 366). Rather than constituting a political challenge to heterosexist patriarchy, Jeffreys sees ideas of performative gender, celebrated by feminist queer theory, as a form of liberal individualism: Post-modernist lesbian and gay theory performs the useful function of permitting those who simply wish to employ the tools and trappings of sexism and racism to feel not only justified but even revolutionary. Lesbian role-playing, sadomasochism, male gay masculinity, drag, Madonna's mimicry, her use of black men and black iconography, Mapplethorpe's racist sexual stereotyping, can be milked for all the pleasure and profit that they offer in a male supremacist culture in which inequality of power is seen as all that sex is or could be. The enjoyment of the status quo is then called 'parody' so that it can be retrieved by intellectuals who might otherwise feel anxious about the excitement they experience. For those post-modern lesbianandgay theorists who have no interest in taking their pleasures in these ways, the ideas of radical uncertainty, of the utopian or essentialist nature of any project for social change, provide a theoretical support for a gentlemanly liberalism and individualism. (p. 374) This reading of queer theory draws attention to the dangers inherent in postmodern approaches to difference that do not pay due attention to the hierarchical relations of power which produce it. Feminist Critiques of Poststructuralism and Postmodernism – Post-modernism is intent on all these things, in particular in disengagement from the self (so that we will enjoy abuse of the body and not object to sadomasochism in all its forms); in a denial of our shared experience (so that we will not experience the joy of solidarity, of sisterhood, of community – all of which are enhanced by diversity); in disengagement from political practice (so that we will become fragmented communities, committed to nothing but violence and the same old abusive uses of power, crossdressed or not); to the fragmentation of society (so that we will not assume any commonality with women from other countries or cultures or other times; again we will lose our history); to the silencing of all peoples because of the erection of artificial centres (so that we in the southern hemisphere, on the rim of the Pacific or anywhere not deemed the centre, will never be able to assume others know anything about us at all; or those of us called epileptic, schizophrenic, or whatever newly invented label, will feel the same). (Hawthorne 1996: 496)

#### Suppression of sexual difference guarantees extinction and genocide

Irigaray, 1991, (Luce, Famous french scholar, The irigaray Reader, p.33)

Even a vaguely rigorous analysis of claims to equality shows that they are justified at the level of a superficial critique of culture, and Utopian as a means to women's liberation. The exploitation of women is based upon sexual difference, and can only be resolved through sexual difference. Certain tendencies of the day, certain contemporary feminists, are noisily demanding the neutralization of sex *[sexe].* That neutralization, if it were possible, would correspond to the end of the human race. The human race is divided into two genres which ensure its production and reproduction. Trying to suppress sexual differ­ence is to invite a genocide more radical than any destruction that has ever existed in History. What is important, on the other hand, is defining the values of belonging to a sex-specific *genre.* What is indispensable is elaborating a culture of the sexual which does not yet exist, whilst respecting both *genres.* Because of the historical time gaps between the gynocratic, matriarchal, patriarchal and phallocratic eras, we are in a sexual position which is bound up with generation and not with *genre* as sex. This means that, within the family, women must be mothers and men must be fathers, but that we have no positive and ethical values that allow two sexes of the same generation to form a creative, and not simply procreative, human couple. One of the major obstacles to the creation and recognition of such values is the more or less covert hold patriarchal and phallocratic roles have had on the whole of our civilization for centuries. It is social justice, pure and simple, to balance out the power of one sex over the other by giving, or restoring, cultural values to female sexuality. What is at stake is clearer today than it was when *The Second Sex* was written.

#### Our alternative is to reconceptualize Being starting with the fluidity of sexual difference as at least two

#### Starting with difference as at least two recognizes we can only encompass half of humanity at best—this disrupts the hegemony of the masculine economy while avoiding critiques of essentialism

Cohoon 11 (Christopher; Prof Philosophy @ Stony Brook University; “The Ecological Irigaray?” Ecocritical Theory)

Returning to and Reinterpreting Nature Given that women have traditionally been considered both inferior because of their proximity to nature and inferior by nature, many of Irigaray's interlocutors have prescribed the renunciation of nature, but Irigaray maintains that this very thing with which women's subordination is most closely associated is nevertheless also the source of their liberation. She calls for a "return to nature." insisting that "social justice has its roots in and takes its strength from nature."" The underlying injustice this return addresses is that, as she argues, our putatively neutral concept "human nature" has been revealed to be the product of "a culture constructed to respond to the requirements of . . . the masculine." a culture that masquerades as universal even while subordinating the feminine."' It is in order to disrupt the hegemony of the masculine "one." then, that Irigaray asserts sexual difference."4 the notion that "the natural, aside from the diversity of its incarnations or ways of appearing, is at least two: male and female."\*' Sexual difference implies a position for feminine subjectivity that cannot be determined by or in terms of the masculine economy. The appeal it makes to nature is intended to ground this position in "the real.™2\* However, as we have seen, this does not mean that sexual difference refers to the nature with which femininity has been traditionally associated or to the differences that are conventionally assumed to obtain naturally between men and women. Having thus far "served" only as the material support for man's privileged becoming, woman "has yet to spread roots and bloom.... to be born to her own growth, her own subjectivity."" It is for this reason, says Irigaray. that sexual difference "has not yet had its chance to develop"; it is a real that has yet to be realized.~s The return to nature required by the assertion of sexual difference is therefore a return to thinking about nature. Irigaray's hope is that this return will enable women to "discover a way to cultivate" a "natural belonging" that has yet to find expression.-5 Irigaray inverts Beauvoir's famous renunciation of nature accordingly: "It's not as Simone de Beauvoir said: one is not born. but rather becomes, a woman (through culture), but rather: I am born a woman, but I must still become this woman that I am by nature."30 Irigaray's allegiance to the natural commonly provokes charges of biological determinism, but her reinterpretation of nature reveals them to be misguided. As a type of essentialism. biological determinism is fundamentally conservative;'1 it holds that nature determines men and women to grow teleologically toward relatively fixed biological forms, that there exist an essential man and woman that individual men and women are destined to repeat. By contrast. Irigaray rethinks nature along the lines of Heidegger's pre-Socratic reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of physis (often translated as "nature"), that is. neither as a stock of static forms nor as passive material, but rather as a basic activity of self-emergence'" and growth without any ultimate telos.

or end." "Nature does not repeat." says Irigaray. for "she grows, becomes. . . . [and] endlessly informs."''4 Irigaray does endorse a kind of natural determinism, but it is based upon her reinterpretation of nature as fundamentally unteleological. and. in contrast to biological determinism, it holds only that humans have naturally "given" modalities of becoming and that these modalities are naturally different for men and women. The forms men and women may come to adopt are fluid in character—open to further transformation—and potentially infinite in number. Thus, the Irigarayan imperative—that we cultivate our natural belonging'\*— makes no reference to any biological essence, actual or projected. Rather, it calls us (men and women)' to discover the natural modalities of our sexed bodies and their styles of perception, and to take up these modalities as the very source of our subjective becoming, a dynamic process Irigaray compares to plant growth.'5 Just as a blossoming flower "comes forth" by "constantly moving between the appearance of its forms and the earth's resources." we. too. are called to come forth precisely from the energies flowing from our natural rootedness.'s As we can now see. Irigaray's reinterpretation of nature involves both a rejection of the binary opposition between nature and culture (which both radical ecofeminists and social constructionists retain as a premise) and also a proposal for a new nature-culture relation wherein culture is understood not as a break from or triumph over nature but rather as something continuous with and responsive to it. What makes this proposal ecologically germane is that it asks us to give up thinking of nature as what must be transcended in order for us to become independent and "cultivated" subjects, and to begin allowing the nature that manifests itself in us to spark and motivate our political, artistic, and intellectual life, to be the gift to which culture is a response rather than the plight from which it is the escape. For Irigaray. then, the cultural task of subjective becoming is simultaneously an ecological task.

### Contention 1

#### Imperialistic actions are inevitable — the only question is whether or not we embrace the new imperial moment to make our strategy effective.

**Mallaby, 2002** (Sebastian, columnist for The Washington Post, "The Reluctant Imperialist" FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 2002, Vol. 81. Issue 2, Academic Search Premier/Ebscohost)

Empires are not always planned. The original American colonies began as the unintended byproduct of British religious strife. The British political class was not so sure it wanted to rule India, but commercial interests dragged it in there anyway. The United States today will be an even more reluctant imperialist. But a new imperial moment has arrived, and by virtue of its power America is bound to play the leading role. The question is not whether the United States will seek to fill the void created by the demise of European empires but whether it will acknowledge that this is what it is doing. Only if Washington acknowledges this task will its response be coherent.

#### US imperialism is comparatively better than the alternatives

**Ferguson 4** niall, — By Nonna Gorilovskaya “Imperial Denial” MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business School <http://motherjones.com/politics/2004/05/imperial-denial>

The Oxford historian Niall Ferguson says the United States is in imperial denial. In his latest book, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire, Ferguson argues that America, with its unrivaled political, military, and economic might, is, de facto, an empire -- a "liberal empire." Rather than deny the obvious, he says, the U.S. should embrace its imperial status and work to set up free-market democracies in states stunted by tyranny and anarchy. Sounds like something Paul Wolfowitz could live with. And, indeed, the London Guardian last year called Ferguson, who strongly supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq, “the new-found darling of the American right.” But these days, from his latest perch at New York University, Ferguson has been sharply critical of the Bush administration's prewar planning and its failure, as he sees it, to learn from history. He says that for the American campaign to succeed in Iraq -- that is, for Iraq to become a functioning liberal democracy -- the U.S. has to commit troops and money there for at least a decade, as did Britain in the early 20th century. Advertise on MotherJones.com In this interview with MotherJones.com, Ferguson talks about Iraq and the lessons of empires past, and why he fears a future where there is no American empire. MotherJones.com: You call the U.S. an empire. Most Americans don’t think of their country that way. What makes it an empire? Niall Ferguson: Well, it functions like an empire, in the sense that it projects its military power globally, its economic interests are global, its cultural reach is global. In many ways it’s a more impressive empire than any empire has ever been. The only strange thing about it is that its citizens don’t recognize the fact. That’s odd, because the Founding Fathers quite openly called the United States an empire. Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Washington all used the e-word to describe the United States. MJ.com: You say denial prevents America from running its empire effectively. NF: Well, I think the condition of imperial denial is a handicap because if you do not recognize that you are essentially performing the functions of an empire, you are incapable of learning from the mistakes of past empires. And most Americans, policymakers, and commentators are trapped in this tunnel of American historical experience and the assumption of American Exceptionalism. So when they occupy Iraq or Afghanistan, they don’t say to themselves: “I wonder how the British got on? Or I wonder what the lessons of Ottoman rule in Mesopotamia might be?” They think the only thing that they have to learn from is the Vietnam War, and that is, of course, a completely irrelevant precedent for what’s going on at the moment. I think that’s one reason why the United States has quite a bad record of making its interventions and its attempts at nation building successful. Why is that President Bush can only think of two good examples of past success -- West Germany and Japan after 1945 -- whereas I, in my book, can think of at least 10 notable U.S. failures, from the Philippines through Haiti. MJ.com: Why does the U.S. have such a bad record? NF: One of the things I argue in the book is that compared with the British Empire a century ago, the United States is afflicted by three deficits. One of them is economic. The current account deficit of 5 percent of GDP translates into a huge reliance on foreign capital. Whereas a hundred years ago, Britain was the world’s banker -- it exported capital in net terms on a colossal scale and was in a position to underwrite its imperial activities with serious investment. The United States is struggling to find the money for the reconstruction of Iraq. Most of that 125 billion dollars -- which is the current price tag -- is going straight toward their military occupation costs. Quite a small fraction of it is going on reconstruction. You really struggle to be a successful empire if you are also the world’s biggest debtor. The second deficit is a manpower deficit. There are no colonists, no settlers willing to leave the United States and go out and Americanize the Middle East, the way that a hundred years ago there were people pouring out of the British Isles, ready and willing to live on the imperial periphery -- Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, but also India and the Middle East. The only people out there are military and there aren't that many of them. The current occupation force in Iraq is about the same size as the British occupation force in 1920, and the population of Iraq of course is much, much larger today. But the biggest problem, I think, goes back to this issue of imperial denial. Americans want to believe that you can invade, depose the bad guys, hold elections, and come home. They think that it can all be done in maybe 24 months? And this is just fantasy. It’s probably going to take ten years at the basic minimum to make Iraq a stable, functioning market economy with something resembling democracy. And I just think that there is a complete lack of realism about that here because people think, "Oh, this isn’t empire, this is just liberation. And we will be greeted with sweets and flowers when we arrive in Baghdad and they will be so happy to see us, they’ll hold elections, and we can home, you know, for November 2 and vote." Dream on. MJ.com: You supported the war in Iraq, but you’ve been critical of the occupation. What went wrong? NF: I did support the war. It seemed to me, back in the later Clinton years, that just firing the odd cruise missile wasn’t going to change anything. And the flyovers and the policy of containment and the weapons inspections -- none of this was working. And I think it was obvious, before 2003, that the existing policy toward Iraq was a failure and was impoverishing Iraqis. It was not undermining Saddam, and the U.N. turns out simply to have been funding his regime with the oil-for-food program. So I was in favor of the change of policy and I was in favor of using American military power to overthrow Saddam. But things have gone wrong, and I have been pointing them out for more than a year now. The first of them was the unrealism about how easy the peace would be. This time last year -- in fact, right at the very beginning of the war -- I said: “The war will be easy, the regime will collapse, but the peace will be really difficult.” And there was this strong constituency in Washington that did not want to hear that -- that had persuaded itself that there would be a very easy peace; so easy that it did not need to be planned for. The State Department had a complex plan for post-war Iraq. It was burned in the bin by the Defense Department. I think that’s inexcusable.

#### Prez flexibility solves alliances, heg, indo-pak/china war- extinction

Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002. His latest book, Coup D’Etat, has just been released. “The disease of a weak president” Read more: http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/#ixzz2cqY7Y7e0

Unfortunately, President Obama’s weakness in his response to Israel and Iran is a cause for real concern, not only for our Israeli allies, but for other American allies as well. A weak U.S. president emboldens our enemies. A good example of this is what happened the last time we had a weak president, namely Jimmy Carter. The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike. In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons. If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device. Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world. In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone [strength] and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

### Contention 2

#### SECOND, calculation is inevitable—all actions involve choice and an assessment of costs and benefits… any obligation to one other comes at the expense of an obligation to infinite others… our finitude as beings means we cannot always already be fore everything… we have evidence on this—their ethical stance recreates the worst atrocities

Jacques **Derrida 92** “The Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed: Cornell, Rosenfeld, and Carlson, p. 28-29

That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or state or between institutions or states and others. Left to itself, the incalculable and giving idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reapportioned by the most perverse calculation. It’s always possible. And so incalculable justice requires us to calculate. And first, closest to what we associate with justice, namely law, the juridicial field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers, but also in all the fields from which we cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: ethics, politics, economics, psycho-sociology, philosophy, literature, etc. Not only must we calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and incalculable, and negotiate without the sort of tule that wouldn’t have to reinvented there where we are cast, there where we find ourselves; but we must take it as far as possible, beyond the place where we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on. This requirement doesn’t properly belong to either justice or law. It only belongs to either of those two domains by exceeding each one in the direction of the other. Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we must recognize in it the following consequence: each advancement in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so reinterpret, the very foundations of law such as they had been previously calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all emanicipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women.

#### THIRD, Every life is an end in and of itself – All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

Cummisky **96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.8

#### FOURTH, calculation is key to ethics—is the only way we can fight injustice

Santilli 03

[Paul C., Siena College, “Radical Evil, Subjection, and Alain Badiou’s Ethic of the Truth Event,” *World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue*, May 18-22, [www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf](http://www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf)]

From the standpoint of an ethics of subjection there is even something unnecessary or superfluous about the void of suffering in the subject bearers of evil. For Levinas, the return to being from the ethical encounter with the face and its infinite depths is fraught with the danger the subject will reduce the other to a "like-me," totalizing and violating the space of absolute alterity. As Chalier puts it, "Levinas conceives of the moral subject's awakening, or the emergence of the human in being, as a response to that pre-originary subjection which is not a happenstance of being." But if there really is something inaccessible about suffering itself, about the 'other' side of what is manifestly finite, subjected, and damaged, then to a certain extent it is irrelevant to ethics, as irrelevant as the judgment of moral progress in the subject-agent. Let me take the parent-child relation again as an example. Suppose the child to exhibit the symptoms of an illness. Are not the proper "ethical" questions for the parent to ask questions of measure and mathematical multiples: How high is the fever? How long has it lasted? How far is the hospital? Can she get out of bed? Has this happened before? These are the questions of the doctor, the rescue squads and the police. They are questions about being, about detail, causes and effects. Ethically our response to the needs of must be reduced to a positivity simply because we have access to nothing but the symptoms, which are like mine. Our primary moral responsibility is to treat the symptoms that show up in being, not the radically other with whom I cannot identify. Say we observe someone whose hands have been chopped off with a machete. How would we characterize this? Would it not be slightly absurd to say, "He had his limbs severed and he suffered," as though the cruel amputation were not horror enough. Think of the idiocy in the common platitude: "She died of cancer, but thank God, she did not suffer", as though the devastating annihilation of the human by a tumor were not evil itself. For ethics, then, the only suffering that matters are the visible effects of the onslaught of the world. All other suffering is excessive and inaccessible. Therefore, it is in being, indeed in the midst of the most elemental facts about ourselves and other people, that we ethically encounter others by responding to their needs and helping them as best we can It is precisely by identifying being and not pretending that we know any thing about suffering, other than it is a hollow in the midst of being, that we can act responsibly. What worries me about Levinas is that by going beyond being to what he regards as the ethics of absolute alterity, he risks allowing the sheer, almost banal facticity of suffering to be swallowed in the infinite depths of transcendence. Indeed, it seems to me that Levinas too often over emphasizes the importance of the emergence of the subject and the inner good in the ethical encounter, as though the point of meeting the suffering human being was to come to an awareness of the good within oneself and not to heal and repair. I agree with Chalier's observation that Levinas's "analyses adopt the point of view of the moral subject, not that of a person who might be the object of its solicitude." Ethics has limits; there are situations like the Holocaust where to speak of a moral responsibility to heal and repair seems pathetic. But an ethics that would be oriented to the vulnerabilities of the subjected (which are others, of course, but also myself) needs to address the mutilation, dismemberment, the chronology of torture, the numbers incarcerated, the look of the bodies, the narratives, the blood counts, the mines knives, machetes, and poisons. Evil really is all that. When the mind does its work, it plunges into being, into mathematical multiples and starts counting the cells, the graveyards, and bullet wounds. Rational practical

#### 1. You have to assess consequences—they outweigh intent:

#### This moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize

Jeffrey **Issac** (professor of political science at Indiana University) 20**02** Dissent, Spring, ebsco

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### 2. In a nuclear world we have to weigh consequences.

Sissela **Bok** (Professor of Philosophy) 19**98** Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

# 2NC

## Terror DA

### Terror Real

#### And terrorists are real – Al Quada takes credit for killing people

Lara **Jakes** et. All, 4/9/**10**, “Looking to spur civil war in Iraq, al-Qaida tries to reassert strength in Baghdad”, Associated Press, http://news.therecord.com/article/696029, umn-rks

BAGHDAD - An al-Qaida front group claimed Friday that it carried out triple suicide bombings outside foreign embassies, underscoring U.S. and Iraqi fears the terror group is attempting to make a comeback. The bombings were part of a wave of attacks over the last week that claimed about 120 lives in and around Baghdad, which al-Qaida in Iraq appears to have designated its battleground to drag the country into civil war. National security officials in Baghdad and Washington said the terror network is looking to exploit political chaos left by the disputed March 7 parliamentary elections to regroup. The unrelenting violence also has cast doubt on the abilities of Iraqi security forces that are responsible for protecting the country while American forces begin to head home.

### Link

#### Indefinite detention is necessary to prevent attacks—multiple scenarios

Walen 11(Alec, Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law, June 22, "A Unified Theory of Detention, With Application to Preventitive Detention for Suspected Terrorists", Maryland Law Review, No. 4, V 70, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3466&context=mlr, Newton: NOTE: ST=Suspected Terrorist, LTPD=long-term preventive detention)

Because the jurisdictional limitations would not apply to most cases going forward, Waxman’s second concern—that the conditions of capture would make it difficult to use normal evidentiary rules to prosecute STs—is the primary obstacle to prosecuting STs domestically in the future. But, that concern would not apply to domestic prosecutions of terrorists captured in the United States. This is not to deny that prosecuting domestic terrorism cases is difficult; it is only to say that prosecuting domestic STs is not so distinctly difficult that there is reason to use LTPD instead. 78 These distinctive difficulties seem likely to arise only with regard to STs who are captured abroad or who are captured domestically but whose prosecution would depend on evidence obtained from abroad. 79 To deal with those cases in which prosecution of STs might be distinctly more difficult than prosecution of normal criminals, President Obama has agreed to use Military Commissions (“MCs”) for the prosecution of some Guantanamo detainees. 80 These MCs allow the prosecution, for example, to use different evidentiary rules that admit more hearsay than would be allowed in a civilian trial. 81 Use of these different evidentiary rules should not be automatically disqualifying. What matters is that criminal trials preserve fundamental procedural fairness. If trials do not preserve fundamental fairness, however—if the trial system is corrupted by reliance on unreliable hearsay; if the defendant is prevented from seeing secret evidence, such that he does not have a fair opportunity to respond to it, or even to advise his counsel (who might be allowed to see it) how best to respond to it; 82 or if the standard for conviction is allowed to slip below proof beyond a reasonable doubt 83 —then the State might as well admit that its concern is not so much with punishing past crimes as it is with preventing future ones. For if the State uses such unreliable procedures, then it is implicitly admitting that it does not really care about proving that the detainee committed a crime; it is simply using the facade of the criminal law in order to lock up someone considered to be a future threat. In that case, pretending to use criminal law is pointless; it would be more honest and more effective simply to move into a regime that uses LTPD. But if MCs can maintain basic procedural fairness, they can provide a meaningful alternative forum that accommodates the special problems that arise in dealing with evidence obtained abroad. 84 In sum, there is actually not much reason to think prosecutions of STs captured in the United States are beyond the capacity of U.S. courts. Nor are STs typically super-villains capable of wreaking the kind of destruction on the United States that some authors presuppose they are. The real problems, instead, are these: First many STs who could be prosecuted in the United States are captured abroad in conditions where evidentiary issues complicate the prospects of obtaining a successful prosecution. Second, as in any criminal case, there is always a chance the prosecution will fail to obtain a conviction. And, finally, if there is strong—perhaps clear and convincing— evidence that an ST is a significant terrorist capable of contributing in a distinctive and nontrivial way to the kinds of terrorist attacks that do cause harm at the very high end of the criminal spectrum, then there is good reason to question whether such a person should simply be released if he is not convicted of a crime. Jack Goldsmith, a former Assistant Attorney General in the George W. Bush administration, made this last point when he wrote that, in criticism of the Obama administration’s drive to prosecute STs, “high-stakes terrorism trials” are problematic in part because “the government cannot afford to let the defendant go.” 85 While I would disagree with this position if it was applied to U.S. citizens, Goldsmith is, I believe, correct with regard to STs from other countries. If these STs were released abroad into countries where the policing capacity could not adequately ensure that they did not return to terrorist activities—including activities that would affect U.S. citizens abroad, our allies, and the United States itself—then there is good reason to consider using LTPD in those cases.

#### Killing in the short-term is necessary to win the war against terror. Softer solutions will embolden the enemy.

**Peters**, 2k**4** - (Ralph, Retired Army Officer, “In Praise of Attrition,” Parameters, Summer)

It cannot be repeated often enough: Whatever else you aim to do in wartime, never lose your focus on killing the enemy. A number of the problems we have faced in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom arose because we tried to moderate the amount of destruction we inflicted on the Iraqi military. The only result was the rise of an Iraqi Dolchstosslegende, the notion that they weren’t really defeated, but betrayed. Combined with insufficient numbers of Coalition troops to blanket the country—especially the Sunni triangle—in the weeks immediately following the toppling of the regime, crucial portions of the population never really felt America’s power. It is not enough to materially defeat your enemy. You must convince your enemy that he [OR SHE] has been defeated. You cannot do that by bombing empty buildings. You must be willing to kill in the short term to save lives and foster peace in the long term. This essay does not suppose that warfare is simple: “Just go out and kill ’em.” Of course, incisive attacks on command networks and control capabilities, well-considered psychological operations, and humane treatment of civilians and prisoners matter profoundly, along with many other complex factors. But at a time when huckster contractors and “experts” who never served in uniform prophesize bloodless wars and sterile victories through technology, it’s essential that those who actually must fight our nation’s wars not succumb to the facile theories or shimmering vocabulary of those who wish to explain war to our soldiers from comfortable offices. It is not a matter of whether attrition is good or bad. It’s necessary. Only the shedding of their blood defeats resolute enemies. Especially in our struggle with God-obsessed terrorists—the most implacable enemies our nation has ever faced—there is no economical solution. Unquestionably, our long-term strategy must include a wide range of efforts to do what we, as outsiders, can to address the environmental conditions in which terrorism arises and thrives (often disappointingly little—it’s a self-help world). But, for now, all we can do is to impress our enemies, our allies, and all the populations in between that we are winning and will continue to win. The only way to do that is through killing. The fifth edition of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines to “attrit” as to “wear down in quality or quantity by military attrition.” That sounds like the next several years, at least, of the War on Terror. The same dictionary defines “attrition” as “the gradual wearing down of an enemy’s forces in sustained warfare.” Indeed, that is exactly what we shall have to do against religious terrorists. There is no magic maneuver waiting to be plotted on a map. While sharp tactical movements that bring firepower to bear will bring us important successes along the way, this war is going to be a long, hard slog. The new trenches are ideological and civilizational, involving the most fundamental differences human beings can have—those over the intentions of God and the roles of men and women. In the short term, we shall have to wear down the enemy’s forces; in the longer term, we shall have to wear down the appeal of ~~his~~ ideas. Our military wars of attrition in the 21st century will be only one aspect of a vast metaphysical war of attrition, in which the differences between the sides are so profound they prohibit compromise. As a result of our recent wars and lesser operations, we have the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped, and most experienced ground forces in the world in our Army and Marine Corps. Potential competitors and even most of our traditional allies have only the knowledge of the classroom and the training range, while we have experience of war and related operations unparalleled in our time. We have the most impressive military establishment, overall, in military history. Now, if only we could steel ourselves to think clearly and speak plainly: There is no shame in calling reality by its proper name. We are fighting, and will fight, wars of attrition. And we are going to win them.

### Impact

#### Our impact is about more than just body counts. Terrorism inflicts a toll on the spirit as well. In a world of terrorism, there can be no value to life.

**Beres and Messing** 0**2** - Louis Rene, Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University. Ph.D., Princeton University; Michael, a radiologist studying the medical effects of terrorism, “In Maiming Israeli Bodies, Bombers Maim the Soul,” Los Angeles Times May 21, 2002 L/N]

What, exactly, does the Palestinian suicide bomber really seek? Above all, ~~he~~ wants to transform Jewish pain into Arab power. In maiming and burning Jewish men, women and children, this terrorist reasons that pain, to be purposeful, must point convincingly toward the victim's death but that even survivors must suffer terribly. In the fashion of the torturer, the Palestinian suicide bomber takes what is usually private and incommunicable--the pain contained within the boundaries of the sufferer's body--and exploits it to affect the behavior of others.  Consider the personal horror. During the routine rotation of a radiologist in a busy city hospital, a broad variety of patient problems is seen. But things are now very different in Israeli hospitals. With the wave of suicide bombings, unique and hideous trauma has become a regular part of the Israeli physician's daily practice. X-rays of suicide bombing victims often show hundreds of metallic fragments, ranging in size from millimeters to whole nails, grotesquely embedded in the victims' bodies--literally from head to foot. Like so many others across history's killing fields, Arab terrorists have transformed simple devices created for constructive purposes--in this case, nails--into the deadliest of destructive projectiles. Nails, screws, nuts and ball bearings are packed by the suicide bombers into their explosive vests to maximize lethal effects and to inflict unimaginable pain and suffering on innocent Jewish bodies. These maliciously transformed objects are propelled with the force of bullets, penetrating skin, flesh and bone with a furious indifference to civilized human behavior. The nails fly head first, presenting themselves in a strangely surreal yet orderly arrangement within the victims' bodies. Many are embedded shallowly. Others burrow their way in more deeply and lodge under the skin, where the examining physician can actually touch and feel their alien presence. Some take hours of meticulous exploration to remove. Still others violate the body deeper, perforating and lacerating vital organs. CT scans of these victims' heads show blood, air, metal and bone fragments displacing normal brain tissue. The "lucky" patient who survives the initial explosive insult may often require extensive surgery to repair damaged organs. Others may sustain fractures, burns, amputations, vascular injuries, paralysis, blindness or brain damage. A collapsed lung or perforated colon-- ordinarily considered a major injury--is taken as a blessing for such victims of terrorism. Although some of the victims recover physically and return to a "normal" life, many more require a lifetime of rehabilitation. Some are impaired permanently. And all suffer serious psychological harm that needs to be treated. Post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety affect not only the victims of the attack but all of Israeli society. Anecdotal reports have indicated a dramatic rise in the use of prescription antidepressants and sedatives. How could it be otherwise, in a society living under constant attack by those who cry out, "When the martyr dies a martyr's death, he attains the height of bliss ... "? The Palestinian "martyr's" unheroic weapon has now literally and figuratively penetrated the hearts and souls as well as the bodies of an entire nation. Too often, unfortunately, television and print media are unable or unwilling to transmit the full human measure of such penetration to viewers and readers. The result is that too few people around the world are able to understand the true horror of the Palestinian suicide bomber. For them, Israeli "wounded" are little more than an anesthetized statistic, an abstract list of numbers that elicits barely a nodding sigh of concern.

#### Terrorism is highly probable and causes extinction

**Rhodes 09** (Terrorism is highly probable- it will cause extinction Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety By Richard Rhodes | 14 December 2009 Rhodes is the author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. It was the first of four volumes he has written on the history of the nuclear age. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (1995), Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (2007), and The Twilight of the Bombs (forthcoming in autumn 2010) are the others. He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and currently he is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

### A2 Terror Rhet

**The war on terrorism is not constructed, nor can it be deterred. Our criticisms of the government won’t deter those who are ready to strike us.**

Jean Bethke **Elshtain** and Laura- Rockefeller Spelman (Professor of Social and Political Ethics, University of Chicago Divinity School) **03** “Just War Against Terrorism”

Certain critical events in the past remind us of this mordant fact. Looking back on twentieth-century fascism, we do not wring our hands and blame everyone but the Nazis for their murderous policies. Of course, it is important for historians and political analysts to take account of the political, social, and economic milieu out of which National Socialism emerged. But the difficulty and desperation of post— World War I conditions—runaway inflation, a war-torn economy, and war reparations, all of which Germany faced—do not add up to the inevitability of the evil that was Nazism. To claim such is to set in motion an exculpatory strategy that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, rationalizes political pathology. The overriding truth and most salient fact of National Socialism is simply stated: A group of people took over state power, aimed to expand an Aryan Empire through ruthless force, and, as dictated by their ideology of biological racism, murdered whole categories of people not because of anything they had done but because of who they were. **Why**, then, i**n the context of America's war against terrorism, do so many tick off a list of American "failures**" or even insist that America brought the horrors of September 11, 2001, on herself? Let me be clear that I exempt from this mode of argument the ludicrous claims that have arisen since that day, such as the slander that Israel carried out the attacks after having first warned Jews who worked in New York's World Trade Center towers to stay home that day, or the preposterous charge that American officials, up to and including the president of the United States, engineered the attacks to bolster their popularity. **This sort of in- lammatory madness exists outside the boundary of political debate** and festers instead in the fever swamps of conspiracy theory. Conducted within the boundary of reasonable political debate, however, are those arguments that an international "war on poverty and despair," or a change in the direction of U.S. Middle Eastern policy, or a different U.S. policy toward Iraq will stay the hands of murderous terrorists in the future. Certainly these arguments deserve a hearing. **Pushing more programs that deal with** poverty and despair or **rethinking American foreign policy**, including our approach to Iraq**, may have desirable outcomes. But no such change**, either singly or together, **will deter Osama bin Laden and those like him.** To believe such is to plunge headfirst into the strategy of denial characteristic of the citizens of Oran in Camus's novel. **We could do everything demanded of us by those who are critical of America**, both inside and outside our boundaries, **but Islamist fundamentalism and the threat it poses would not be deterred**.

**Creation and identification of the “terrorist” enemy is key to prevent even more violent lash-outs**

Kenneth **Reinhard** (professor at UCLA) **04** “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor” http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/jewishst/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of **the political is defined**, as Carl Schmitt does, **in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition**, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. **A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War** **is one subject to radical instability**, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; **it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles**; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, **the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility**, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, **the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia**. Hence, for Schmitt, **a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies**; as Derrida writes, the **disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence,** the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

**Terror discourse is key to an effective response to terrorism**

**Albrechtsen, 09** (Janet, writer @ The Australian, 7/9/9, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/07/29/language\_police\_terrorize\_common\_sense.html)

Would someone kindly lock up these language police for crimes against the English language? **An attack is what happened in Jakarta** when innocent hotel guests were murdered at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. And **it is**, quite literally, the bleeding **obvious to point out that the perpetrators of the carnage are a group of Islamist militants** who twist the tenets of Islam to suit their ideological purposes. **They seek** **to** bring down democracy in Indonesia and **punish Western nations** for fighting the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, with the ultimate aim of creating an Islamic caliphate. Yet while these terrorists go to great lengths to promote their Muslim identity and their militant Islamist ideology, it seems we are not allowed to mention that now. **There is nothing wrong with crafting careful language when dealing with terrorism.** For years political leaders have used terms such as Islamist terrorist or Islamo-fascist to carefully distinguish militants from the vast majority of peace-loving Muslims. But **there is a difference between being careful and being cowardly. The kind of zealous language policing** endorsed by the Victoria Police and the Multicultural Foundation **encourages us to hide from the truth. Their new whitewash language is** not just daft, it's **dangerous. Clarity of language is a critical tool if we are serious about** uncovering and **understanding militant Islam.** After so many attacks and the murder of so many innocent people, why would we cower from identifying the drivers of their Islamist extremism? Yet there was too much cowering and not enough clarity from Attorney-General Robert McClelland when he addressed the Australian Strategic Policy Institute last week. Endorsing the language police's Lexicon of Terrorism project, the A-G's speech was littered with references to "violent extremism", "violent extremists", "violent extremist messages", "extremist beliefs" and "extremist ideology". McClelland was too frightened to construct a sentence that included the word Islamism. Instead he quoted from Ed Husain, in his book The Islamist, who has no problem referring to "Islamist extremists". **Apparently the A-G believes it is acceptable for a Muslim to speak with factual accuracy but the rest of us must resort to meaningless generalities for fear of radicalising Muslim youth**.

## Contention 1

### Heg Good

#### Dissenting against American imperialism collapses current US hegemony

Robert Kagan (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is director of its U.S. Leadership Project) Spring 98 “The Benevolent Empire” http://fparchive.ceip.org/Ning/archive/archiv+++e/111/empire.pdf

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did dur- ing the Cold War, lest the entire intemational system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by con- servatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget--even ff most of the rest of the world does not-- just how important continued American dominance is to the preserva- tion of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling

#### No alternative to imperialism—history proves violence erupts in power vacuums

**Ferguson 4** niall, — By Nonna Gorilovskaya “Imperial Denial” MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business School <http://motherjones.com/politics/2004/05/imperial-denial>

Those of my critics who say “empire is always bad, we should never have empire,” have not looked at the historical alternatives to empire. Throughout most of recorded history there have been empires. Empires, essentially, create order. In their absence, you don’t end up with lots of happy, little nation-states full of people sitting around campfires singing John Lennon’s “Imagine.” What you end up with is civil war, anarchy. You end up with -- say in the 9th century -- the Vikings who were quintessential beneficiaries of the collapse of empire. They were able simply rampage around Europe looting and pillaging cities. But that scenario -- what I would call the “Dark Age” scenario -- is a much scarier one in the 21st century than in the 9th century. Technology gives the Vikings of our time the possibility of dirty bombs. In that sense, empire is to be preferred to the available alternatives. That’s why I want the United States to keep its nerve, to go the distance, to recognize that the alternatives to empire are worst, not better. And in that sense, my arguments for liberal empire or whatever you want to call it -- hegemony, primacy, you name it – are really activated by a sense that the alternatives involve more violence, more repression, more hardship, especially for the people of the Middle East.

**More ev human nature—psychology proves**

 Will **Wilkinson**, Jan/Feb 20**05**. Policy Analyst, Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html

We are Hierarchical Like many animals and all primates, **humans form hierarchies of dominance**. It is easy to recognize social hierarchies in modern life. Corporations, government, chess clubs, and churches all have formal hierarchical structures of officers. Informal structures of dominance and status may be the leading cause of tears in junior high students. The dynamics of dominance hierarchies in the EEA was complex. Hierarchies play an important role in guiding collective efforts and distributing scarce resources without having to resort to violence. Daily affairs run more smoothly if everyone knows what is expected of him. However, **space at the top of the hierarchy is scarce and a source of conflict and competition. Those who command higher status in social hierarchies have better access to material resources and mating opportunities**. Thus, evolution favors the **psychology of males and females who are able successfully to compete for positions of dominance**. Living at the bottom of the dominance heap is a raw deal, and we are not built to take it lying down. There is evidence that lower status males naturally form coalitions to check the power of more dominant males and to achieve relatively egalitarian distribution of resources. In his book Hierarchy in the Forest, anthropologist Christopher Boehm calls these coalitions against the powerful "reverse dominance hierarchies." Emory professor of economics and law Paul Rubin usefully distinguishes between "productive" and "allocative" hierarchies. **Productive hierarchies are those that organize cooperative efforts to achieve otherwise unattainable mutually advantageous gains**. Business organizations are a prime example. Allocative hierarchies, on the other hand, exist mainly to transfer resources to the top. Aristocracies and dictatorships are extreme examples. Although the nation-state can perform productive functions, there is the constant risk that it becomes dominated by allocative hierarchies. Rubin warns that our natural wariness of zero-sum allocative hierarchies, which helps us to guard against the concentration of power in too few hands, is often directed at modern positive-sum productive hierarchies, like corporations, thereby threatening the viability of enterprises that tend to make everyone better off. **There is no way to stop dominance-seeking behavior. We may hope only to channel it to non-harmful uses. A free society therefore requires that positions of dominance and status be widely available in a multitude of productive hierarchies, and that opportunities for greater status and dominance through predation are limited by the constant vigilance of "the people"—the ultimate reverse dominance hierarchy**. A flourishing civil society permits almost everyone to be the leader of something, whether the local Star Trek fan club or the city council, thereby somewhat satisfying the human taste for hierarchical status, but to no one's serious detriment. We are Envious Zero-sum Thinkers Perhaps the most depressing lesson of evolutionary psychology for politics is found in its account of the deep-seated human capacity for envy and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and increases in productivity—the idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth.There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. More for you was less for me. Therefore, if anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of ill-gotten gains, acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass power. Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system. These features of human nature—that we are coalitional, hierarchical, and envious zero-sum thinkers—would seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, the benefits of a liberal market order can be seen in a few further features of the human mind and social organization in the EEA. Property Rights are Natural **The problem of distributing scarce resources can be handled in part by implicitly coercive allocative hierarchies.** An alternative solution to the problem of distribution is the recognition and enforcement of property rights**.** Property rights are prefigured in nature by the way animals mark out territories for their exclusive use in foraging, hunting, and mating. Recognition of such rudimentary claims to control and exclude minimizes costly conflict, which by itself provides a strong evolutionary reason to look for innate tendencies to recognize **and respect norms of property.** New scientific research provides even stronger evidence for the existence of such property "instincts." For example, recent experimental work by Oliver Goodenough, a legal theorist, and Christine Prehn, a neuroscientist, suggests that **the human mind evolved specialized modules for making judgments about moral transgressions, and transgressions against property in particular.** Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand that **property rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator's pen.** Mutually Beneficial Exchange is Natural Trade and mutually beneficial exchange are human universals, as is the division of labor. In their groundbreaking paper, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," Cosmides and Tooby point out that, contrary to widespread belief, hunter-gatherer life is not "a kind of retro-utopia" of "indiscriminate, egalitarian cooperation and sharing." **The archeological and ethnographic evidence shows that hunter-gatherers were involved in numerous forms of trade and exchange.** Some forms of hunter-gatherer trading can involve quite complex specialization and the interaction of supply and demand. Most impressive, Cosmides and Tooby have shown through a series of experiments that human beings are able easily to solve complex logical puzzles involving reciprocity, the accounting of costs and benefits, and the detection of people who have cheated on agreements. However, we are unable to solve formally identical puzzles that do not deal with questions of social exchange. That, they argue, points to the existence of "functionally specialized, content-dependent cognitive adaptations for social exchange." In other words, the human mind is "built" to trade. Trust and Hayek's Two Orders It is easy to see a kind of in vitro capitalism in the evolved human **propensity to recognize property rights, specialize in productive endeavors, and engage in fairly complex forms of social exchange**. However, the kind of freedom and wealth we enjoy in the United States remains a chimera to billions. While our evolved capacities are the scaffolding upon which advanced liberal capitalism has been built, they are, quite plainly, not enough, as the hundreds of millions who live on less than a dollar a day can attest. The path from the EEA to laptops and lattes requires a great cultural leap. In recent work, Nobel Prize-winning economists Douglass North and Vernon Smith have stressed that the crucial juncture is the transition from personal to impersonal exchange. Economic life in the EEA was based on repeated face-to-face interactions with well-known members of the community. Agreements were policed mainly by public knowledge of reputation. If you cheated or shirked, your stock of reputation would decline, and so would your prospects. **Our evolutionary endowment prepared us to navigate skillfully through that world of personal exchange**. However, it did not prepare us to cooperate and trade with total strangers whom we had never met and might never see again. The road to prosperity must cross a chasm of uncertainty and mistrust. The transition to extended, impersonal market order requires the emergence of "institutions that make human beings willing to treat strangers as honorary friends" as Paul Seabright puts it. The exciting story of the way these institutions piggybacked on an evolved psychology designed to solve quite different ecological problems is the topic of Seabright's book, The Company of Strangers, as well as an important part of forthcoming works by Douglass North and Vernon Smith. As he so often did, F. A. Hayek anticipated contemporary trends. Hayek understood that our kind of economy and society, which he called an extended order, or "macro-cosmos," is in many ways alien to our basic psychological constitution, which is geared to deal with life in small groups, the "micro-cosmos." We live in two worlds, the face-to-face world of the tribe, family, school, and firm, and the impersonal, anonymous world of huge cities, hyper-specialization, and trans-world trade. Each world has its own set of rules, and we confuse them at our peril. As Hayek writes in The Fatal Conceit: If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed, rules of the micro-cosmos (i.e., of the small band or troop, or of, say, our families) to the macro-cosmos (our wider civilization), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were always to apply the rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. So we must learn to live in two sorts of worlds at once. The balance is delicate. Once we appreciate the improbability and fragility of our wealth and freedom, it becomes clear just how much respect and gratitude we owe to the belief systems, social institutions, and personal virtues that allowed for the emergence of our "wider civilization" and that allow us to move between our two worlds without destroying or crushing either. Evolutionary Psychology and Political Humility **The key political lesson of evolutionary psychology is simply that there is a universal human nature. The human mind comprises many distinct, specialized functions, and is not an all-purpose learning machine that can be reformatted at will to realize political dreams. The shape of society is constrained by our evolved nature. Remaking humanity through politics is a biological impossibility on the order of curing cancer with pine needle tea**. We can, however,work with human nature—and we have. We have, through culture, enhanced those traits that facilitate trust and cooperation, channeled our coalitional and status-seeking instincts toward productive uses, and built upon our natural suspicion of power to preserve our freedom. We can, of course, do better.

### Prez Powers

#### Specifically external criticism and oversight cause the link

Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, ‘13

[Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, Military Review, March-April 2013, RSR]

Indeed, others have argued that such an ¶ approach jeopardizes counterterrorism efforts ¶ and that oversight would be best located within ¶ the executive branch. Former solicitor general ¶ Neal Kaytal, for example, has argued that federal ¶ judges lack expertise and could delay counterterrorist operations, as they are unused to operating on ¶ fast timetables or making the sort of pre-emptive ¶ judgments that would be required of a court that ¶ oversees drones.36 Rather, he argues that a better ¶ review process would be one that takes place within ¶ the executive branch, with the most senior national ¶ security advisors adjudicating cases argued by ¶ expert lawyers.37

#### Nuke winter is real and causes extinction

Starr 12 [Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,” <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/>]

In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke. This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block most sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth . The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict 40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death. A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be a mass extinction event that would wipe out many animals living at the top of the food chains - including human beings.

## Contention 2

### Util

#### And, utilitarianism is inevitable even in deontological frameworks

Green 02 – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

# 1NR

## FW

### FW: Limits—Decision-Making 2NC

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

**Lundberg 10** - Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### FW: Limits—Creativity 2NC

#### Constraints comparatively inspire greater creativity—rules create specific challenges that must be overcome, improving the overall feat

**Mayer 6** – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effortthat leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained. But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change. A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Framing the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

#### Restrictions are enabling, not inhibiting—they create the possibility for interactions that cannot be completely predicted in advance

**Armstrong 2K** (Paul B., Dean and Professor of Literature at Brown University, New Literary History, 31: 211–223, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory”)

The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . **Since** these **rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion,** and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). **Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance**. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codiﬁed as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more ﬂexible and open- ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but **they** too **are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability,** discipline and spontaneity. **As a rule-governed but open-ended activity, play provides a model for deploying power in a nonrepressive manner that makes creativity and innovation possible not in spite of disciplinary constraints but because of them**. Not all power is playful, of course, and some restrictions are more coercive than enabling. **But thinking about the power of constraints on the model of rules governing play helps to explain the paradox that restrictions can be productive rather than merely repressive.** Seeing constraints as structures for establishing a play-space and as guides for practices of exchange within it envisions power not necessarily and always as a force to be resisted in the interests of freedom; **it allows** imagining the **potential for power to become a constructive social energy that can animate games of to-and-fro exchange between participants whose possibilities for self-discovery and self-expansion are enhanced by** the **limits shaping their interactions.**

### FW: SSD Good—Activism 2NC

Empirically proven—the **best** advocates learned to debate **both sides first**

**Dybvig and Iverson 2K** (Kristin and Joel, Arizona State U., “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy”, http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html)

**Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy** and challenge peoples' assumptions. **Debaters must switch sides**, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. **While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides** of an argument **actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides** of an argument, **so that they could defend their positions** against attack, **they also learned** the **nuances** of each position. **Learning** and the intricate nature of various policy proposals **helps debaters** to **strengthen their own stance** on issues.

### FW: Topic Good – Policy 2NC

#### Policy relevance is key and turns their impacts—engaging the state is key

**Gunning 7** (Government and Opposition Volume 42 Issue 3, Pages 363 - 393 Published Online: 21 Jun 2007 A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?1 Jeroen Gunning.

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a 'critical' field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining 'critical' and 'problem-solving' approaches, it does not fulfil its 'emancipatory' potential.94 One of the temptations of 'critical' approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.95 Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and 'terrorists'– and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of 'immanent critique' that has historically underpinned the 'critical' project and which, in Booth's words, involves 'the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress', as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, 'this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air' and asking 'what it means for real people in real places'.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a 'critical' approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that 'the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life', and in particular to 'the place of violence in political life'. Even while 'de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security', it must concern itself with 'howsecurity is to be redefined', and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many 'critical' scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with 'traditional' scholars, the role of 'expert adviser' is more often than not filled by 'traditional' scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both 'traditional' and 'critical' scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term 'terrorism' or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the 'critical turn' implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the zh these fragmented voices can converge, there are two further reasons for retaining the term 'terrorism'. One of the key tasks of a critically constituted field is to investigate the political usage of this term. For that reason alone, it should be retained as a central marker. But, even more compellingly, the term 'terrorism' is currently so dominant that a critically constituted field cannot afford to abandon it. Academia does not exist outside the power structures of its day. However problematic the term, it dominates public discourse and as such needs to be engaged with, deconstructed and challenged, rather than abandoned and left to those who use it without problematization or purely for political ends. Using the term also increases the currency and relevance of one's research in both funding and policy circles, as well as among the wider public. It is because of this particular constellation of power structures that a 'critical' field cannot afford, either morally or pragmatically, to abandon the term 'terrorism'. This leads to the twin problems of policy relevance and cultural sensitivity. A critically conceived field cannot afford to be policy irrelevant while remaining true to the 'emancipatory' agenda implicit in the term 'critical', nor can it be uncritically universalist without betraying its 'critical' commitment.

#### Focus on a policy option is best for decision-making skills and is a prerequisite to education

Strait and Wallace 7

(Strait, L. Paul, George Mason University and Wallace, Brett, George Washington University, “The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making”, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide)FS

Negative claims that excluding critical alternatives is detrimental to education fail to be persuasive when decision-making logic is taken into account. Critical intellectuals and policymakers both take into account the probability that their actions will be successful. Fiating that individuals alter their method of thinking circumvents these questions of probability and thus not only destroys education about policymaking, but offers a flawed approach to activism (or any other purview of action/ philosophy the negative is advocating). Intellectuals and activists have many important considerations relating to resources, press coverage, political clout and method. These questions all are directly related to who is taking action. Alternative debates thus often become frustrating because they do a poor job of explaining who the subject is. Consider the popular Nietzschean alternative, ‘do nothing.” Who is it that the negative wants to do nothing? Does the USFG de nothing? Is it the debaters? Is it the judge who does nothing? Is it every individual, or just individuals in Africa that have to do with the affirmative harm area? All of these questions directly implicate the desirability of the alternative, and thus the education that we can receive from this mode of debate. Alternatives like “vote negative to reject capitalism,” “detach truth from power.” or ‘embrace an infinite responsibility to the other" fall prey to similar concerns. This inability to pin the negative down to a course of action allows them to be shifty in their second rebuttal, and sculpt their alternative in a way that avoids the affirmative’s offense. Rather than increasing education, critical frameworks are often a ruse that allows the negative to inflate their importance and ignore crucial decision-making considerations. Several other offensive arguments can be leveraged by the affirmative in order to insulate them from negative claims that critical debate is a unique and important type of education that the affirmative excludes. The first is discussed above, that the most important benefit to participation in policy debate is not the content of our arguments, but the skills we learn from debating. As was just explained, since the ability to make decisions is a skill activists and intellectuals must use as well, decision- making is a prerequisite to effective education about any subject. The strength of this argument is enhanced when we realize that debate is a game. Since debaters are forced to switch sides they go into each debate knowing that a non-personal mindset will be necessary at some point because they will inevitably be forced to argue against their own convictions. Members of the activity are all smart enough to realize that a vote for an argument in a debate does not reflect an absolute truth, but merely that a team making that argument did the better debating. When it comes to education about content, the number of times someone will change their personal convictions because of something that happens in a debate round is extremely low, because everyone knows it is a game. On the other hand with cognitive skills like the decision-making process which is taught through argument and debate, repetition is vital .The best way to strengthen decision-making’s cognitive thinking skills is to have students practice them in social settings like debate rounds. Moreover, a lot of the decision-making process happens in strategy sessions and during research periods — debaters hear about a particular affirmative plan and are tasked with developing the best response. If they are conditioned to believe that alternate agent counterplans or utopian philosophical alternatives are legitimate responses, a vital teaching opportunity will have been lost.

### FW: State Good

#### Using coercive power of the state key to solve collective action problems and demands on the state are necessary

**Mansbridge 11** -Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45\_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97

Let me suggestanother approach, based on two premises. First,¶ we need coercion to solve collective action problems. Second, there¶ can be no such thing as fully legitimate coercion. Therefore we¶ need theories that can guide public action and help improve democratic legitimacy incrementally.We can move toward the ideal of¶ democratic legitimacy without discrediting every state that falls can work through the simple capacity to act (I turn on the light¶ switch—my preferences cause the outcome). When the outcome¶ requires other human beings, the causal relation can work through¶ genuine persuasion on the merits. Neither of these is coercive¶ power.¶By “coercion” or “coercive power” I mean the threat of sanction or the use of force. I do not view the words “coercion” or¶ “coercive” as inherently negative. It is true that both coercion and¶ the threat of sanction will always have a negative valence. Punishment would not be punishment if those being punished did¶ not want to avoid it. But a relationship, for example between two¶ people, may be better when the partners have equal capacity to¶ sanction each other than when neither has that capacity. When¶ you care for someone, you give that person the capacity to sanction you and to threaten sanctions. Deeply interdependent social¶ relations are, I believe, all built in part on mutual coercion.¶ In short, by coercive power I mean “power over,” not the nicer¶ forms of power such as “power to” (that is, capacity) or “power¶ with” (cooperative power). Although Arendt (1970) described¶ power as the human ability to act in concert, this is not what I¶ mean. Those forms of power are admirable in their place. But to¶ solve collective action problems we also need coercive power, based¶ on the threat of sanction or the actual use of force.¶ 10¶Why is this the case? The answer has to do with the nature of¶ goods that are non-excludable. Their character is such that everyone can use them without in any way contributing to providing¶ them. Examples include law and order, common defense, roads¶ without tolls, an educated workforce, clean rivers, and breathable¶ air. Collective action problems arise whenever we want to produce such goods. All of these things, and thousands of other desirable collective outcomes, are nonexcludable, or largely so. By their¶ nature, goods like these cannot be parceled out only to those who¶ work or pay to bring them into being. It is only goods like these—¶nonexcludable goods—that produce the collective action problem, which is, at bottom, a problem of non-contribution.¶ Coercion is not always necessary to solve collective action problems and get people to contribute to producing a nonexcludable¶ good. Sometimes we can produce such goods through voluntary acts of solidarity. Everyone can voluntarily chip in to build a road,¶ defend the country, produce schooling for the poor, or abstain¶ from overﬁshing. But in most cases we also need coercion around¶ the edges to give those who are tempted to free ride on the contributions of others an external incentive to contribute. The need¶ for coercion to solve collective action problems is, in my view, the¶ primary reason for government. Coercion also helps human beings¶ achieve justice together through government.¶My second premise is that no actual instance of coercion can¶ fully meet the criteria of democratic legitimacy. Over the years,¶ democratic theorists have worked out democratic criteria for¶ moments of both genuine commonality and genuine conﬂict. The¶ criteria for moments of commonality specify, among other things,¶ that deliberations leading to consensus should ideally take place¶ in conditions free from coercive power (free, that is, from the threat¶ of sanction and the use of force).¶ 11¶ In reality, however, the conditions for deliberation are never fully free from coercive power. As¶ for conﬂict, the democratic criteria for moments of conﬂict specify, among other things, that ideally, decisions should be based on¶ the equal power of each participant.¶ 12¶ In reality, however, power¶ is never fully equal in democratic negotiation or even in majority rule, where the agenda always derives from an unequal process.¶ Therefore the coercion that actually existing democracies deploy¶ to implement their decisions will never be completely legitimate.¶ In short, a political theory of democratic action demands a¶ corresponding theory of imperfect legitimacy. Legitimacy is not a¶ dichotomy—a thing you either have or do not have. It is a continuum from more to less.¶A political theory of democratic action should not neglect the¶ goals of resistance theory. Every means of approximating relatively legitimate coercion has its underside. Every exercise of coercive power puts those on the receiving end of that power at risk.¶ But simply blocking the exercise of power is often a bad solution.¶ One version of resistance theory, attractive to the framers of the¶ American constitution and to many since then, holds that if you¶ put enough institutional veto points in place, the little that gets¶ through is bound to promote the common good.¶ 13¶ This approach¶ privileges stopping the work of the government. It may have been¶ appropriate in a simpler world, where it might reasonably be said¶ that the government is best which governs least, and in a more¶ decentralized world, where the scope of government action did¶ not need to be as great. In a more heavily interdependent world, a¶ democracy needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective action problems. It can safely allow more collective power through the grid if it reduces the worst eﬀects of that¶ power in other ways.¶ Starting with the aims of the power itself, a democracy can¶ organize itself to make the power that surges through the system¶ more likely to promote the common good—for example, by reforming campaign ﬁnance, reducing corruption, attracting more public spirited individuals to oﬃce, and bringing stakeholders into constructive negotiation with one another. Democracies can also¶ devise targeted safeguards for the vulnerable—for example, by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1964. Democracies can¶ encourage both constructive and critical organization in civil¶ society—for example, by facilitating unionization, subsidizing¶ investigative journalism, and protecting internet access—so that¶ new ideas feed into state power and people can organize eﬀectively when resistance is necessary.¶ More generally, when a good has mixed positive and negative¶ features—and I consider coercion such a mixed good—one should¶ not always block or automatically resist the good, but rather look¶ for practices and institutions that reduce its undesirable eﬀects,¶ protect the vulnerable, compensate the losers, and facilitate ongoing changes for the better.¶ In the tension between resistance and action, context is critical.Tyrannical regimes demand resistance. Deeply corrupt regimes¶ cannot justly claim legitimacy. But when the threat of tyranny is¶ relatively weak and corruption relatively limited, the need for collective action is often greater than the need for resistance. I do not¶ pretend here to oﬀer guidance to political movements on their¶ choice of tactics, many of which are appropriately aimed at resist ing particular injustices or at drawing attention to unsolved problems, such as rising inequality or global warming, even when the¶ protesters do not agree on a plan of action (think “Occupy Wall¶ Street”). I am arguing instead for something deeper: a shift in¶ emphasis within democratic theory, from a long-standing promotion of resistance to the greater embrace of coercion, even while¶ recognizing that the coercion can never be more than partially¶ legitimate. Where might a democratic theory that recognizes the central role¶ of coercive action turn its analytic gaze?Two promising and underexplored areas are negotiation and uncorrupt delegation supplemented by citizen deliberation. Theorists trying to make headway¶ on these problems could beneﬁt from working closely with empirical scholars of conﬂict resolution, comparative government, and¶ perhaps other ﬁelds.¶ To explore the normative complexity of negotiations, we could¶ begin with Denmark. In 2002, two development economists coined¶ the phrase “getting to ‘Denmark’” to describe the goal of helping¶ impoverished countries deliver key public services.¶ 14¶ Francis Fukuyama adopted “getting to Denmark” to describe the historical paths¶ for acquiring an eﬀectively functioning, accountable state under¶ the rule of law (Fukuyama 2011, 14 ﬀ, 431 ﬀ.). Denmark is small,¶ homogeneous, and defended primarily by the armies of others.¶ Like many Nordic states it has a culture that may not be duplicable. Its social welfare model has the inevitable imperfection of¶ requiring signiﬁcant barriers to entry. Yet Denmark could nevertheless serve as one model in an exploration of negotiation—¶ speciﬁcally the contribution of diﬀerent forms of democratic negotiation to relatively legitimate coercion. The outcomes of¶ the Danish political process match what its citizens want relatively closely, and the process itself, although not based on the¶ majority rule of alternating parties, has strong claims to democratic legitimacy.¶Regarding outcomes, Denmark has the most equal income distribution of any advanced industrialized country. Robert Kuttner¶ reported in 2008 that “Denmark’s ﬁnancial markets are clean and¶ transparent, its barriers to imports minimal, its labor markets the¶ most ﬂexible in Europe, its multinational corporations dynamic¶ and largely unmolested by industrial policies, and its unemployment rate of 2.8 percent the second lowest in the OECD” (Kuttner¶ 2008, 78). In its Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation gives Denmark a score of 78.6 out of 100, or eighth place in¶ the world, better than the United States in ninth place. Denmark¶ has universal health insurance, good child-care and generous¶ unemployment compensation. It has the world’s second highest¶ tax rate and spends 50% of its GDP on public services.¶ 15¶How did Denmark’s democracy become capable of such eﬀective action? First, after a series of reforms in the early and midnineteenth century, Denmark is now tied with New Zealand and¶ Singapore for the distinction of being the least corrupt country¶ on earth in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions¶ Index.¶ 16¶ Second, because its list system of proportional representation currently produces eight parties in parliament and no single party has had a parliamentary majority since 1909, passing¶ laws requires negotiation and compromise among parties. This¶ system generates a more cooperative form of negotiation than in¶ the US Congress. Third, Danish democracy has little separation¶ of powers on the national level (although we cannot be sure this¶ is related to its eﬀectiveness). It has a parliamentary system with¶ a unicameral legislature and extremely limited judicial review.¶Finally, Denmark has evolved a form of eﬀective and far-reaching¶ decentralization in which local elected bodies serve as responsive¶ service-deliverers but not powerful veto points.¶ 17¶ The result of this noncorrupt and negotiated system? Denmark’s citizens have, according to the Eurobarometer, greater¶ trust in their national parliament and their national parties than¶ the citizens of any other country in Europe. They are more “satis-¶ﬁed with the way democracy works” in their country than the citizens of any other country in Europe. Staggeringly, 94% of the¶ Danish citizens are at least “fairly satisﬁed” with the way democracy works in their country.¶ 18¶To this sociological legitimacy, add¶ some normativelegitimacy from two features. First, Denmark’s citizens are actively engaged in their politics. Without any compulsory voting, the turnout in the general elections since 1960 has¶ averaged 85%. In The Economist’s 2010 Democracy Index, Denmark has the third highest score in the world, after Norway and¶ Iceland.¶ 19¶ Second, the very process of negotiation adds democratic¶ value by drawing out the reasons and justiﬁcations advanced by¶ the diﬀerent parties.¶ 20¶ Danes have also shown their capacity for resistance when¶ needed. In 1943, when the German army occupied Denmark, the¶ public denunciation of the German plan for deporting the Jews¶ involved the King, the universities, students, the Danish state¶ church, the Supreme Court, the trade unions, the employers’ confederation, the farmers’ organizations, the heads of ministries,¶ and all of the political parties except the small pro-Nazi National¶SocialistWorkers’ Party of Denmark (Kirchhoﬀ 1995). Denmark’s¶ corporate entities were actually the foci for resistance. I am not saying that the United States can model itself on Denmark. That would be absurd. Nor am I saying that Denmark is a¶ perfect polity. Its protections forits own citizensarearguably related¶toits relative homogeneity andits barriers toimmigration. Finally,¶ I do not have suﬃcient empirical data to judge the relative merits¶ of the diﬀerent systems that are less prone to deadlock, whether¶ majority-rule Westminster systems or well-structured systems of¶ negotiation, or the roles of diﬀerent kinds of veto points, which in¶ some contexts may promote, rather than hinder, common democratic action (Birchﬁeld and Crepaz 1998). I am saying that these¶ questions need entwined empirical and normative attention. In the¶ future I hope that comparativists will readmore democratic theory¶ and theorists more comparative work, to the point where each can,¶ with the help of their colleagues, contribute productively to the¶ development of bothﬁelds. In particular, Iamurginghere that political theorists can proﬁtably ally with comparativists and other¶ empirical political scientists to investigate the sources of democratic legitimacy in countries other than our own and Great Britain. In Denmark, we might concentrate on the strengths and¶ weaknesses of their forms of negotiation. These forms of negotiation, developed historically not only by Denmark but also by other¶ relatively neocorporatist states in Europe, have heavily inﬂuenced¶ the relatively successful processes of the EU bureaucracies, which¶ unlike Denmark have highly heterogeneous constituencies.¶ Just as one size does not ﬁt all in economic development, so¶ too one size does not ﬁt all in the building of legitimate democratic action.The new ﬁeld of comparative political theory is investigating, among other things, the sources for democratically¶ legitimate action in the cultures and philosophies of nonwestern¶ countries. My point is that as thiswork goes forward, the focus¶ should be as much on the sources of coordinated, intelligent¶ action—and relatively legitimate coercion—as on resistance.¶ If we think about problems of global scale, like climate change¶ and weapons of mass destruction, the focus on action becomes¶ even more necessary. Decisions at the global level cannot be as¶ democratically legitimate as those at a national scale. In the foreseeable future, decisions at the global level will be even less likely¶ than those at the national level to be discussed, much less resolved,¶in an arena governed only by the “forceless force of the better¶ argument.” Nor will decisions be made in a way that even approximates the equal power of each individual or the proportionate¶ power of those aﬀected. To achieve action capable of addressing¶ collective action problems on a global level, we will have to accept¶ ongoing coercion that is far less democratically legitimate than¶ the coercion we accept at the level of the nation state.Yet we must¶ take action, as soon as is humanly possible, for the sake of unborn¶ generations.

#### Focus on institutional power is the only method that can develop true emancipatory change

Lawrence **Grossburg**, University of Illinois, We Gotta Get Outta This Place, **92**, p. 391-393

The Left needs institutions which can operate within the systems of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left has assumed from some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making and power. Otherwise, the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act within organizations, and within the system of organizations which in fact have the capacity(as well as the moral responsibility) to fight them. Without such organizations, the only models of political commit­ment are self-interest and charity. Charity suggests that we act on behalf of others who cannot act on their own behalf. But we are all precariously caught in the circuits of global capitalism, and every­one’s position is increasingly precarious and uncertain. It will not take much to change the position of any individual in the United States, as the experience of many of the homeless, the elderly and the “fallen” middle class demonstrates. Nor are there any guarantees about the future of any single nation. We can imagine ourselves involved in a politics where acting for another is always acting for oneself as well, a politics in which everyone struggles with the resources they have to make their lives (and the world) better, since the two are so intimately tied together! For example, we need to think of affirmation action as in everyone’s best interests, because of the possibilities it opens. We need to think with what Axelos has described as a “planetary thought” which “would be a coherent thought—but not a rationalizing and ‘rationalist’ inflection; it would be a fragmentary thought of the open totality—for what we can grasp are fragments unveiled on the horizon of the totality. Such a politics will not begin by distinguishing between the local and the global (and certainly not by valorizing one over the other) for the ways in which the former are incorporated into the latter preclude the luxury of such choices. Resistance is always a local struggle///, even when (as in parts of the ecology movement) it is imagined to connect into its global structures of articulation: Think globally, act locally. Opposition is predicated precisely on locating the points of articulation between them, the points at which the global becomes local, and the local opens up onto the global. Since the meaning of these terms has to be understood in the context of any particular struggle, one is always acting both globally and locally: Think globally, act appropriately! Fight locally because that is the scene of action, but aim for the global because that is the scene of agency. “Local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion into the field of imma­nence. This requires the imagination and construction of forms of unity, commonality and social agency which do not deny differences. Without such commonality, politics is too easily reduced to a ques­tion of individual rights (i.e., in the terms of classical utility theory); difference ends up “trumping” politics, bringing it to an end. The struggle against the disciplined mobilization of everyday life can only be built on affective commonalities, a shared “responsible yearning: a yearning out towards something more and something better than this and this place now.” The Left, after all, is defined by its common commitment to principles of justice, equality and democ­racy (although these might conflict) in economic, political and cultural life. It is based on the hope, perhaps even the illusion, that such things are possible. The construction of an affective commonal­ity attempts to mobilize people in a common struggle, despite the fact that they have no common identity or character, recognizing that they are the only force capable of providing a new historical and oppositional agency. It strives to organize minorities into a new majority.