**Heg: A2 “Heg Bad”**

**Heg solves nuclear indo-pak war**

**Brezezinski**(Former Sect. Of State) **04**

[Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York // wyo-tjc]

For the time being. **the key US. interest is to prevent a nuclear war from erupting between Pakistan and India and to discourage any further regional proliferation**, especially since there can he little doubt that the once-imperial and nationally ambitious Iran looks with under­standable envy at its nuclear-armed neighbors. Of the two goals, the prevention of a nuclear war may be somewhat easier to pursue because the very possession of nuclear weaponry is forcing both the Indian and the Pakistani militaries to calculate more cautiously the potential con­sequences of their periodic border clashes. Nonetheless, **the unresolved issue of Kashmir is bound to pro­duce repeated collisions, each of which inflames the volatile and reli­giously conflicted Muslim and Hindu masses. Pakistan could then even become a fundamentalist Muslim state (**thus probably determin­ing Afghanistan’s fate as well), while India might be seized by fanatical Hindu passions**. Irrationality might then overwhelm the strategic restraint inherent in the nuclear calculus. Just as the West for years has been relatively indifferent to the unresolved Palestinian issue, so it has also neglected Kashmir**. India has been able to insist formally that there is no Kashmir issue, either between India and Pakistan or for the international community as a whole—that it is an internal matter. Pakistan in turn has relied on thinly camouflaged official support for guerrilla and terrorist actions against India’s control of the province as a way of keeping the issue alive—thereby also precipitating increasingly heavy-handed Indian repression of Kashmiris suspected of disloyalty. Once both countries acquired nuclear weapons, the Kashmir issue inevitably gained wider international significance. The question of Kashmir has now become part of the larger problem of instability in the Global Balkans**. Its peaceful resolution is likely to he at least as difficult as that of the Arab-Israeli conflict**. The conflict involves two major states that jointly have a population approaching 1.2 billion people—roughly one-fifth of the world—and much of that population is still pre-modern, semiliterate, and suscep­tible (even among the elites) to demagogic appeals. **Fostering a compromise in that setting will require sustained outside engagement, considerable international pressure, major political and financial inducements, and a great deal of patience. Here again, political solidarity between the United States and the European Union**, perhaps tangibly backed by Japan, **would make even­tual success more likely. Great Britain,** for historical reasons, **can play an important diplomatic role, especially in concert with the United States**. Both Russia and China may be supportive, since neither would benefit from a nuclear war in its immediate proximity, and each can subtly influence the major purchaser of its arms exports (India in the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of China). The reality, however, is that a major collective international effort is likely only in the face of an imminent threat of war, with international concern rapidly fading once the threat recedes [P. 76-77]

**Extinction**

**Caldicott** (Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility) **02**

[Helen, The New Nuclear Danger, 2002, p. xii // wyo-tjc]

 **The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India**, an ancient enemy, **could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2, 250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth**.

**Leadership impact—Laundry list**

James Goldgeier, Dean, School of Internationla Service, American University and Kurt Volker, Executive Director, McCain Institute for International Leadership, ASU, co-chairs, SETTING PRIORITIES FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP: A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES, Project for a United and Strong America, 3--13, p. 3-5.

More people today live under systems that are democratic, market-driven, and respect human freedom than in any previous period in human history. **Millions have been lifted out of poverty, and the number of people dying in conflicts worldwide is at a historic low.** In these crucial respects, **human living conditions have improved, and the United States remains** in an extraordinarily **strong** position globally. Nevertheless, the challenges confronting US interests and values in the world remain substantial and complex. These challenges range from a full spectrum of security threats to economic, environmental, ideological, political, and humanitarian challenges. Actors who seek to undermine a cooperative international system—from ideologically driven extremists to corrupt authoritarian leaders—challenge the efforts of states seeking to expand liberal norms and values. In addition, **the widespread perception of a war weary and economically weakened United States increases the propensity of those with alternative agendas to pursue such agendas aggressively.** Three fundamental shifts are serving to transform the geopolitical landscape: ■ Impacts of globalization. **The age of the internet has ushered in an unprecedented empowerment of individuals and small actors.** Whereas in the past, power was concentrated in the hands of governments, militaries, and large corporations, today **power is dispersed among individuals, startups, movements, NGOs, groups, and rising powers.** Increased movement of people, information, and resources has empowered transnational organizations seeking to gain power in weak and failing states. These **new actors, interconnected on a national and global level, can often mobilize faster and have greater impact than traditional actors**. This massive redistribution of relative power has great potential for good, but has simultaneously introduced unprecedented risk. ■ The unfolding legacy of the Arab Spring. **Developments in the Arab** world are among the most significant geopolitical changes since the fall of the Soviet Union. The demand for change has **unleashed a historic struggle: authoritarian dictators seeking to cling to domination; militant and extremist groups seeking to replace democratic systems of law with their own ideological tyranny**; and a new generation of Arab citizens demanding greater freedom, justice, and accountability in the face of these two unpalatable alternatives. The results of this struggle will have a profound effect on regional and global security, on democracy and human development in the Arab world, and on US values and interests for generations. ■ The rise of Asia. Both in terms of its increasing economic influence and its nexus of important strategic challenges, **the rise of Asia constitutes a fundamental global shift. Global trade and economic flows are increasingly growing with respect to Asia.** Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty and now drive Asia’s burgeoning middle class societies. But **while China’s embrace of market-oriented capitalism has propelled its economic rise, its autocratic regime and increasingly assertive military posture have raised consternation across the region**. India’s dynamic and growing middle class holds great promise, while a nucleararmed North Korea continues to fuel regional tensions. At the same time, **the United States faces a broad and diffuse set of strategic challenges that include:** ■ **A full spectrum of security threats:** ◗ ideological extremists, **including terrorists operating out of the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, often with regional or global ambitions;** ◗ **proliferation of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction to state and non-state actors; ◗ **cybersecurity threats** from major powers and networked groups and individuals; ◗ fragile and failed states creating conditions for threats to American interests and humanitarian crises; and ◗ **drug-fueled crime and violence** in Latin America. ■ **Political violence and suppression of human rights**. Despite positive longterm trends, democratization efforts have suffered real setbacks in recent years, and **regimes around the world continue to abuse human rights with little accountability**. This includes the many still functioning dictatorships (in open conflict, as in Syria) or in the tyranny of armed groups acting in largely ungoverned territories (such as in parts of Africa and Asia). **This repression of basic rights sows the seeds for future instability and conflict and for further challenges to American long-term values and interests**. ■ Fragilities and disparities in the international economic order. While the United States faces mounting fiscal debt challenges and an uncertain economic recovery, **America’s allies in Europe and Asia are** also **struggling from their own serious economic problems. Economic power is shifting rapidly to Asia, including to non-democratic societies and stateowned mega-enterprises**. The growing global economy has produced an unprecedented demand for scarce resources including water, energy, and certain raw materials. New technologies contribute to major movements in productivity, jobs, and wealth. The ability of the major democratic, market economies to sustain a level, rules-based global economic playing field is under strain. ■ Energy and climate. **The growing global economy has also led to massive growth in energy consumption. One consequence is that increasing CO2 emissions,** particularly among developing countries, **far outweigh any potential for moderation in emissions in Europe and the United States**. Clean energy technologies are currently unable to compete effectively against low-cost, high-emission fuels. The prospect of long-term changes in climate that this can introduce has the potential to significantly increase global economic and security challenges and undermine the stability of some governments and societies. In addition, growing demand for fossil fuels has empowered hostile regimes in Iran, Venezuela, and elsewhere.

**U.S. leadership is necessary to solve warming, water scarcity, disease**

Michael Beckley, PhD, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” Dissertation, Columbia University, 2012, p. 196.

The other potential reaction is retrenchment – the divestment of all foreign policy obligations save those linked to vital interests, defined in a narrow and national manner. **Advocates of retrenchment assume**, or hope, **that the world will sort itself out** on its own; that **whatever replaces American hegemony**, whether it be a return to balance-­‐of-­‐power politics or a transition to a post-­‐power paradise, **will naturally maintain international order** and prosperity. **But order and prosperity are unnatural**. They can never be presumed. **When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and,** in particular, **by the most powerful actor, which is,** and will be for some time, **the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-­‐lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease,** which may fester without a leader to rally collective action.

**US pursuit of hegemony inevitable**

**Kagan**, 1/24/20**11**, (Robert Kagan, [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States)historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the[Brookings Institution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookings_Institution)) ‘The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs’, VOL. 16, NO. 18, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3>

In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet **the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898**:Cuba, 1898The Philippines, 1898-1902China, 1900Cuba, 1906Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912Mexico, 1914Haiti, 1915Dominican Republic, 1916Mexico, 1917World War I, 1917-1918Nicaragua, 1927World War II, 1941-1945Korea, 1950-1953Lebanon, 1958Vietnam, 1963-1973Dominican Republic, 1965Grenada, 1983Panama, 1989First Persian Gulf war, 1991Somalia, 1992Haiti, 1994Bosnia, 1995Kosovo, 1999Afghanistan, 2001-presentIraq, 2003-presentThat is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, **the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War**, it is true, **the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time**, since the fall of the Berlin Wall.The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” **Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues**. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit**.Many don’t want to admit it, and **the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions.** The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But **whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains.It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure.**Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at **all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history**.So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression.Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, **it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it**.Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. **Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid.** The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners?Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

### Heg Good – stats

**Statistically proven that heg prevents war**

**Owen ‘11**

John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew **Mack and his colleagues** at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they **present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias**, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. **Social scientists** really are not supposed to do that. Our j**ob** is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least **to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers**. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhas they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. **I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better**. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. **Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the dat**a. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But **the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities**—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; **and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational**. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear **states are** not **deterred from fighting nuclear states** is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. **Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace”** (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); **the interdependence or “commercial peace”** (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and **interdependence has increased**, hence less war); **and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth** (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). **These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end.** That would be somewhat puzzling, however. **Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time**, when such a magical array was absent in the past? **The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing**. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. **We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony.** A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called **hegemonic stability theory**. The theory **emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “**taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to** raise trade barriers or **withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both**. **The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon.** The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. **There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping** (UN or otherwise), and so on. **What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.**How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, **a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history**. **The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. **Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which** (so say some theories) **render violence irrational**. **American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First**, at least since the 1940s **Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course**: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. **Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development**—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—**and left market capitalism the best model.** The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (**It also**, as Professor Mack notes, **eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World**.) **What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon**. **The same case can be made**, with somewhat more difficulty, **concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement** in the target state—**but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism**. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. **Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.**

**Global violence decreasing – civilization has become more moral**

**Pinker**, Johnstone Family Professor at Harvard University, **‘7** (Steven, March 19, “A History of Violence” The New Republic, lexis)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the most important and most underappreciated trend in the human saga: **Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history,** and today **we are** probably **living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth**. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, **the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem** somewhere between **hallucinatory** and obscene. **Yet recent studies** that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence **point to exactly that conclusion**. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, **we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition**, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, **genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment**, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, **assassination as** the mechanism of **political succession, rape as the spoils of war**, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution--**all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be**, concealed when they do occur, **and widely condemned when they are brought to light.** At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, **those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places,** license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage--the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions--pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like Jose Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: **Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler**. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. **The decline of violence is** a fractal phenomenon, **visible at the scale of** millennia, centuries, decades, and **years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals**. And it appears to be a worldwide trend, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, **quantitative body-counts--such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads** or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men--**suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own.** It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But**, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher.** According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations--namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. **The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath.** The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." **Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on.** Meanwhile, for another kind of violence--homicide--the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. **In every country** he **analyzed, murder rates declined steeply**--for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: **Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century**. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, **the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000** per year in the 1950s **to less than 2,000** per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, **the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots**. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. **After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements** rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent. The decline of killing and cruelty poses several challenges to our ability to make sense of the world. To begin with, **how could so many people be so wrong** about something so important? Partly, it's because of a cognitive illusion: We estimate the probability of an event from how easy it is to recall examples. Scenes of carnage are more likely to be relayed to our living rooms and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. Partly, **it's an intellectual culture that is loath to admit that there could be anything good about the institutions of civilization and Western society**. Partly, it's the incentive structure of the activism and opinion markets: **No one ever attracted followers** and donations **by announcing that things keep getting better.** And part of the explanation lies in the phenomenon itself. **The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence,** and often the attitudes are in the lead. As deplorable as they are, **the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the lethal injections of a few murderers in Texas are mild by the standards of atrocities in human history. But, from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen.** The other major challenge posed by the decline of violence is how to explain it. A force that pushes in the same direction across many epochs, continents, and scales of social organization mocks our standard tools of causal explanation. The usual suspects--guns, drugs, the press, American culture--aren't nearly up to the job. Nor could it possibly be explained by evolution in the biologist's sense: Even if the meek could inherit the earth, natural selection could not favor the genes for meekness quickly enough. In any case, **human nature has** not changed so much as to have **lost its taste for violence.** Social psychologists find that at least 80 percent of people have fantasized about killing someone they don't like. And modern humans still take pleasure in viewing violence, if we are to judge by the popularity of murder mysteries, Shakespearean dramas, Mel Gibson movies, video games, and hockey. What has changed, of course, is people's willingness to act on these fantasies. The sociologist Norbert Elias suggested that **European modernity accelerated a "civilizing process" marked by increases in self-control, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others.** These are precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex. But this only raises the question of why humans have increasingly exercised that part of their brains. No one knows why our behavior has come under the control of the better angels of our nature, but there are four plausible suggestions. The first is that Hobbes got it right. Life in a state of nature is nasty, brutish, and short, not because of a primal thirst for blood but because of the inescapable logic of anarchy. Any beings with a modicum of self-interest may be tempted to invade their neighbors to steal their resources. The resulting fear of attack will tempt the neighbors to strike first in preemptive self-defense, which will in turn tempt the first group to strike against them preemptively, and so on. This danger can be defused by a policy of deterrence--don't strike first, retaliate if struck--but, to guarantee its credibility, parties must avenge all insults and settle all scores, leading to cycles of bloody vendetta. These **tragedies can be averted by a state with a monopoly on violence, because it can inflict disinterested penalties that eliminate the incentives for aggression, thereby defusing anxieties about preemptive attack and obviating the need to maintain a hair-trigger propensity for retaliation.** Indeed, Eisner and Elias attribute the decline in European homicide to the transition from knightly warrior societies to the centralized governments of early modernity. And, today**, violence continues to fester in zones of anarchy**, such as frontier regions, failed states, collapsed empires, and territories contested by mafias, gangs, and other dealers of contraband. Payne suggests another possibility: that the critical variable in the indulgence of violence is an overarching sense that life is cheap. When pain and early death are everyday features of one's own life, one feels fewer compunctions about inflicting them on others. As technology and economic efficiency lengthen and improve our lives, we place a higher value on life in general. A third theory, championed by Robert Wright, invokes the logic of **non-zero-sum games**: scenarios **in which two agents can each come out ahead if they cooperate, such as trading goods,** dividing up labor, or sharing the peace dividend that **comes from laying down** their **arms**. As people acquire know-how that they can share cheaply with others and develop technologies that allow them to spread their goods and ideas over larger territories at lower cost, their incentive to cooperate steadily increases, because other people become more valuable alive than dead. Then there is the scenario sketched by philosopher Peter Singer. Evolution, he suggests, bequeathed people a small kernel of empathy, which by default they apply only within a narrow circle of friends and relations. Over the millennia, people's moral circles have expanded to encompass larger and larger polities: the clan, the tribe, the nation, both sexes, other races, and even animals. The circle may have been pushed outward by expanding networks of reciprocity, a la Wright, but it might also be inflated by the inexorable logic of the golden rule: **The more one knows and thinks about other living things, the harder it is to privilege one's own interests over theirs.** The empathy escalator may also be powered by cosmopolitanism, in which journalism, memoir, and realistic fiction make the inner lives of other people, and the contingent nature of one's own station, more palpable--the feeling that "there but for fortune go I." Whatever its causes, **the decline of violence has profound implications. It is not a license for complacency**: We enjoy the peace we find today because people in past generations were appalled by the violence in their time and worked to end it, and so we should work to end the appalling violence in our time. Nor is it necessarily grounds for optimism about the immediate future, since the world has never before had national leaders who combine pre-modern sensibilities with modern weapons. But **the phenomenon does force us to rethink our understanding of violence.** Man's inhumanity to man has long been a subject for moralization. With the knowledge that something has driven it dramatically down, we can also treat it as a matter of cause and effect**. Instead of asking, "Why is there war?" we might ask, "Why is there peace?" From the likelihood that states will commit genocide to the way that people treat cats, we must have been doing something right.** And it would be nice to know what, exactly, it is.

### Heg good – ethics

#### Heg is ethical and not utopian

Christian Reus-Smit 4 IR @ Australian Nat’l, American Power and World Order p. 109-115

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is equally unsatisfying. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is utterly undiscriminating. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a deeply impoverished ethical posture, as it raises the critique of power above all other human values. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.

**Evil and violence are inevitable – critique of the US dominance and violence ensures worse violence**

**Brooks 1** [David Brooks, Senior Editor of the Weekly Standard, “The Age of Conflict; Politics and culture after September 11,” *Weekly Standard*, Volume 7, Number 8, November 5, 2001, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis]

Obviously nobody knows what the future years will feel like, but we do know that the next decade will have a central feature that was lacking in the last one: The next few years will be defined by conflict. And it's possible to speculate about what that means. The institutions that fight for us and defend us against disorder -- the military, the FBI, the CIA -- will seem more important and more admirable. The fundamental arguments won't be over economic or social issues, they will be over how to wield power -- whether to use American power aggressively or circumspectly. We will care a lot more about ends -- winning the war -- than we will about means. We will debate whether it is necessary to torture prisoners who have information about future biological attacks. We will destroy innocent villages by accident, shrug our shoulders, and continue fighting. In an age of conflict, bourgeois virtues like compassion, tolerance, and industriousness are valued less than the classical virtues of courage, steadfastness, and a ruthless desire for victory. Looking back, the striking thing about the 1990s zeitgeist was the presumption of harmony. The era was shaped by the idea that there were no fundamental conflicts anymore. The Cold War was over, and while the ensuing wars -- like those in Bosnia and Rwanda -- were nettle-some, they were restricted to global backwaters. Meanwhile, technology was building bridges across cultures. The Internet, Microsoft ads reminded us, fostered communication and global harmony. All around the world there were people casting off old systems so they could embrace a future of peace and prosperity. Chinese Communists were supposedly being domesticated by the balm of capitalist success. Peace seemed in the offing in Northern Ireland and, thanks to the Oslo process, in the Middle East. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were elected president of the United States. Neither had performed much in the way of military service. Neither was particularly knowledgeable about foreign affairs. Both promised to be domestic-policy presidents. In that age of peace and prosperity, the top sitcom was Seinfeld, a show about nothing. Books appeared with titles like All Connected Now: Life in the First Global Civilization. Academics analyzed the twilight of national sovereignty. Commerce and communications seemed much more important than politics. Defense spending was drastically cut, by Republicans as well as Democrats, because there didn't seem to be any clear and present danger to justify huge budgets. The army tried to recruit volunteers by emphasizing its educational benefits, with narcissistic slogans like "An Army of One." Conservatives, of all people, felt so safe that they became suspicious of the forces of law and order. Conservative activists were heard referring to police as "bureaucrats with badges"; right-wing talk radio dwelt on the atrocities committed by the FBI, the DEA, and other agencies at places like Ruby Ridge and Waco. Meanwhile, all across the political spectrum, interest in public life waned, along with the percentage of adults who bothered to vote. An easy cynicism settled across the land, as more people came to believe that national politics didn't really matter. What mattered instead, it seemed, were local affairs, community, intimate relations, and the construction of private paradises. When on rare occasions people talked about bitter conflict, they usually meant the fights they were having with their kitchen renovators. Historians who want to grasp the style of morality that prevailed in the 1990s should go back to the work of sociologist Alan Wolfe. In books like One Nation, After All and Moral Freedom, Wolfe called the prevailing ethos "small scale morality." Be moderate in your beliefs, and tolerant toward people who have other beliefs. This is a moral code for people who are not threatened by any hostile belief system, who don't think it is worth it to stir up unpleasantness. "What I heard as I talked to Americans," Wolfe wrote of his research, "was a distaste for conflict, a sense that ideas should never be taken so seriously that they lead people into uncivil, let alone violent, courses of action." But now violence has come calling. Now it is no longer possible to live so comfortably in one's own private paradise. Shocked out of the illusion of self-reliance, most of us realize that we, as individuals, simply cannot protect ourselves. Private life requires public protection. Now it is not possible to ignore foreign affairs, because foreign affairs have not ignored us. It has become clear that we are living in a world in which hundreds of millions of people hate us, and some small percentage of them want to destroy us. That realization is bound to have cultural effects. In the first place, we will probably become more conscious of our American-ness. During the blitz in 1940, George Orwell sat in his bomb shelter and wrote an essay called "England Your England." It opened with this sentence: "As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me." What struck him at that moment of danger was that it really does matter whether you are English or German. The nation is a nursemaid that breeds certain values and a certain ethos. Orwell went on to describe what it meant to be English. Now Americans are being killed simply because they are Americans. Like Orwell, Americans are once again becoming aware of themselves as a nationality, not just as members of some ethnic community or globalized Internet chat group. Americans have been reminded that, despite what the multiculturalists have been preaching, not all cultures are wonderfully equal hues in the great rainbow of humanity. Some national cultures, the ones that have inherited certain ideas -- about freedom and democracy, the limits of the political claims of religion, the importance of tolerance and dissent -- are more humane than other civilizations, which reject those ideas. As criticism of our war effort grows in Europe, in hostile Arab countries, and in two-faced countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which dislike our principles but love our dollars, Americans will have to articulate a defense of our national principles and practices. That debate in itself will shape American culture. We will begin to see ourselves against the backdrop of the Taliban. During the Cold War, we saw ourselves in contrast to the Soviet Union. Back then, we faced a godless foe; now we are facing a god-crazed foe. As we recoil from the Islamic extremists, we may be less willing to integrate religion into political life. That would mean trouble for faith-based initiatives and religion in the public square. On the other hand, democracies tend to become patriotic during wartime, if history is any guide, and this will drive an even deeper wedge between regular Americans and the intellectual class. Literary critic Paul Fussell, a great student of American culture in times of war, wrote a book, Wartime, on the cultural effects of World War II. Surveying the culture of that period, he endorsed the view of historian Eileen Sullivan, who wrote, "There was no room in this war culture for individual opinions or personalities, no freedom of dissent or approval; the culture was homogeneous, shallow and boring." The earnest conformity that does prevail in wartime drives intellectuals -- who like to think of themselves as witty, skeptical, iconoclastic dissidents -- batty. They grow sour, and alienated from mainstream life. For every regular Joe who follows the Humphrey Bogart path in Casablanca, from cynicism to idealism, there is an intellectual like Fussell, whose war experiences moved him from idealism to lifetime cynicism. There are other cultural effects. For example, commercial life seems less important than public life, and economic reasoning seems less germane than cultural analysis. When life or death fighting is going on, it's hard to think of Bill Gates or Jack Welch as particularly heroic. Moreover, the cost-benefit analysis dear to economists doesn't really explain much in times of war. Osama bin Laden is not motivated by economic self-interest, and neither are our men and women who are risking their lives to defeat him. To understand such actions, you need to study history, religion, and ethics. The people who try to explain events via economic reasoning begin to look silly. Here is the otherwise intelligent economist Steve Hanke, in Forbes, analyzing bin Laden: Don't make the mistake of interpreting the events of Sept. 11 purely in terms of terrorism and murder. . . . The terrorists are a virulent subset of a much larger group of anticapitalists, one that includes many politicians, bureaucrats, writers, media types, academics, entertainers, trade unionists and, at times, church leaders. The barbarians at the gates are more numerous than you thought. But the most important cultural effect of conflict is that it breeds a certain bloody-mindedness or, to put it more grandly, a tragic view of life. Life in times of war and recession reminds us of certain hard truths that were easy to ignore during the decade of peace and prosperity. Evil exists. Difficulties, even tragedies, are inevitable. Human beings are flawed creatures capable of monstrosity. Not all cultures are compatible. To preserve order, good people must exercise power over destructive people. That means that it's no longer sufficient to deconstruct ideas and texts and signifiers. You have to be able to construct hard principles so you can move from one idea to the next, because when you are faced with the problem of repelling evil, you absolutely must be able to reach a conclusion on serious moral issues. This means you need to think in moral terms about force -- and to be tough-minded. During the Cold War, Reinhold Niebuhr was a major intellectual figure. In 1952, he wrote The Irony of American History. The tragedy of the conflict with communism, he argued, was that, "though confident of its virtue, [America] must yet hold atomic bombs ready for use so as to prevent a possible world conflagration." The irony of our history, he continued, is that we are an idealistic nation that dreams of creating a world of pure virtue, yet in defeating our enemies we sometimes have to act in ways that are not pure. "We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous action to preserve our civilization," Niebuhr wrote. "We must exercise our power." We have to do so while realizing that we will not be capable of perfect disinterestedness when deciding which actions are just. We will be influenced by dark passions. But we still have to act forcefully because our enemies are trying to destroy the basis of civilization: "We are drawn into an historic situation in which the paradise of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity." Niebuhr's prescription was humble hawkishness. He believed the United States should forcefully defend freedom and destroy its enemies. But while doing so, it should seek forgiveness for the horrible things it might have to do in a worthy cause. To reach this graduate-school level of sophistication, you have to have passed through elementary courses in moral reasoning. It will be interesting to see whether we Americans, who sometimes seem unsure of even the fundamental moral categories, can educate ourselves sufficiently to engage in the kind of moral reasoning that Niebuhr did. The greatest political effect of this period of conflict will probably be to relegitimize central institutions. Since we can't defend ourselves as individuals against terrorism, we have to rely on the institutions of government: the armed forces, the FBI, the CIA, the CDC, and so on. We are now only beginning to surrender some freedoms, but we will trade in more, and willingly. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. . . . To be more safe, [people] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free." Moreover, we will see power migrate from the states and Capitol Hill to the White House. "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority," Hamilton continued. This creates rifts on both left and right, because both movements contain anti-establishment elements hostile to any effort to relegitimize central authorities. The splits have been most spectacular on the left. Liberals who work in politics -- Democrats on Capitol Hill, liberal activists, academics who are interested in day-to-day politics -- almost all support President Bush and the war effort. But many academic and literary leftists, ranging from Eric Foner to Susan Sontag to Noam Chomsky, have been sour, critical, and contemptuous of America's response to September 11. The central difference is that the political liberals are comfortable with power. They want power themselves and do not object to the central institutions of government, even the military, exercising power on our behalf. Many literary and academic liberals, on the other hand, have built a whole moral system around powerlessness. They champion the outgroups. They stand with the victims of hegemony, patriarchy, colonialism, and all the other manifestations of central authority. Sitting on their campuses, they are powerless themselves, and have embraced a delicious, self-glorifying identity as the out-manned sages who alone can see through the veils of propaganda in which the powerful hide their oppressive schemes. For these thinkers, virtue inheres in the powerless. The weak are sanctified, not least because they are voiceless and allegedly need academics to give them voices. These outgroup leftists dislike the Taliban, but to ally themselves with American power would be to annihilate everything they have stood for and the role they have assigned themselves in society.

**Global war does not result from a Western desire for control---it results from lack of clearly defined strategic imperatives---the aff is necessary to reclaim the political**

David **Chandler 9**, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War', Security Dialogue 2009; 40; 243

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. ¶ Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global.¶ Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire¶ The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. ¶ There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:¶ war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. ¶ The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

**Other imperial powers are worse—turns the alt**

Victor Davis **Hanson 2**, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial?” National Review Online, November 27, 2002, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson112702.html,

It is popular now to talk of the American "empire." In Europe particularly there are comparisons of Mr. Bush to Caesar — and worse — and invocations all sorts of pretentious poli-sci jargon like "hegemon," "imperium," and "subject states," along with neologisms like "hyperpower" and "overdogs." But **if we really are imperial, we rule over a very funny sort of empire.** We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations — costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul. **Athenians, Romans, Ottomans, and the British wanted land and treasure and grabbed all they could ge**t when they could. **The United States hasn't annexed anyone's soil since the Spanish-American War** — a checkered period in American history that still makes us, not them, out as villains in our own history books. Most Americans are far more interested in carving up the Nevada desert for monster homes than in getting their hands on Karachi or the Amazon basin. **Puerto Ricans are free to vote themselves independence anytime they wish. Imperial powers order and subjects obey. But in our case, we offer the Turks strategic guarantees, political support** — and money — for their allegiance. France and Russia go along in the U.N. — but only after we ensure them the traffic of oil and security for outstanding accounts. **Pakistan gets debt relief that ruined dot-coms could only dream of; Jordan reels in more aid than our own bankrupt municipalities. If acrimony and invective arise, it's usually one-way: the Europeans, the Arabs, and the South Americans all say worse things about us than we do about them, not privately and in hurt, but publicly and proudly**. Boasting that you hate Americans — or calling our supposed imperator "moron" or "Hitler" — won't get you censured by our Senate or earn a tongue-lashing from our president, but is more likely to get you ten minutes on CNN. We are considered haughty by Berlin not because we send a Germanicus with four legions across the Rhine, but because Mr. Bush snubs Mr. Schroeder by not phoning him as frequently as the German press would like. **Empires usually have contenders that check their power and through rivalry drive their ambitions.** Athens worried about Sparta and Persia. Rome found its limits when it butted up against Germany and Parthia. The Ottomans never could bully too well the Venetians or the Spanish. Britain worried about France and Spain at sea and the Germanic peoples by land. In contrast, **the restraint on American power is not China, Russia, or the European Union, but rather the American electorate itself — whose reluctant worries are chronicled weekly by polls that are eyed with fear by our politicians. We**, not them, **stop us from becoming what we could.** The Athenian ekklesia, the Roman senate, and the British Parliament alike were eager for empire and reflected the energy of their people. In contrast, America went to war late and reluctantly in World Wars I and II, and never finished the job in either Korea or Vietnam. We were likely to sigh in relief when we were kicked out of the Philippines, and really have no desire to return. Should the Greeks tell us to leave Crete — promises, promises — we would be more likely to count the money saved than the influence lost. Take away all our troops from Germany and polls would show relief, not anger, among Americans. **Isolationism, parochialism, and self-absorption are far stronger in the American character than desire for overseas adventurism. Our critics may slur us for "overreaching," but our elites in the military and government worry that they have to coax a reluctant populace, not constrain a blood-drunk rabble.**

**Focusing on international institutions is key to transition to a new democratic liberal order—the alt causes genocide and nuclear war**

**Shaw**, Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex, **’99** (Martin, November 9, “The unfinished global revolution: Intellectuals and the new politics of international relations”

**The new politics of international relations require us**, therefore, **to go beyond** the **antiimperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline**. We need to recognise three **fundamental** truths: First, in the twenty-first century **people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity**. Courageous academics, **students and** other **intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements**. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals **in the West**. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. **The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people**. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, **global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power**, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. **The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends** first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, **on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West**. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, **democratic movements cannot regard** non-governmental organisations and **civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise** local **states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power**. Second, **democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global** and often Western-centred **networks**. **Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.** **Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence**. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. **We need** these **power networks, but we need to tame them**, too, **to make their** messy **bureaucracies** enormously **more accountable and sensitive to** the needs of **society** worldwide. **This will involve** the kind of ‘**cosmopolitan democracy’** argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. **It will** also **require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address** the literally catastrophic scale of **world social inequalities**. Fourth, **if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid**. Likewise, **the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics**. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. **As political intellectuals in the West**, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. **We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state**, as well as between state and state. **We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority**. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but **the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens**, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for **students of international relations and politics, are intertwined**.

### FW: Tech Good—Line by Line

#### 3. Flowing is good – teaches students how to outline and structure arguments, which hones logic and speaking skills.

Patrick **Speice and** Jim **Lyle,** “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever,” OCEAN POLICY ADRIFT, DRG, 20**03**, www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

The second set of academic skills that **policy debate helps develop** is **logic skills**. Debate teaches how to structure thoughts and argument. It teaches students how to structure thoughts about identifying and addressing problems. The structure of policy debates, and their reliance on evidence, teaches the significance of general argumentative concepts such as claims and warrants. The use of outlining in presenting and **flowing arguments teaches students how to apply and understand the role of claims and warrants. Once debaters develop these skills they are better prepared to structure a speech or write an argumentative paper. They understand where to place specific arguments and use evidence within the overall structure of the argument** being presented. While critique debating also teaches these concepts, there is a very different understanding, and use of, these concepts between the policy focused and non-policy focused debate camps. By not advocating an alternative, or failing to define the solvency components of the nebulous “rethink” policy (if it is a policy) or absolutist “vote neg” approach, this approach to the activity de-emphasizes the role of warrants in proving the validity of the claims, rendering these discussions shallow.

### FW: Tech Good—Plans

#### Gotta have a plan—without one, their goals will never be achieved

**Silverstein 02** (Marc, Anarchist Communitarian Network, “Breaking Free of the Protest Mentality”, 4-25,

http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/Discus/2002-04-25Silverstein.htm)

But it seems that if a "movement" is going to be built, it needs a rational, comprehensive, holistic analysis of the current situation, and a fleshed-out, detailed, practical strategy to achieve whatever it is that happens to be its goals. The means must be consistent with the ends. This analysis and strategy would give direction to a movement and would act as a vehicle for personal and social transformation. What is alarming is the complete lack of any serious analysis or strategy, or even any concern over a lack of analysis or strategy, and the crowd's willingness, even eagerness to shout slogans, hold signs, and regurgitate the rhetoric of the speakers. Estimates for this march were put at 10-15,000 by the mainstream media and 75-100,000 by the independent media (both of whom exaggerate numbers to serve their particular agenda). Regardless, the march was in the tens of thousands. It seems that 50,000 people would be able to gather together and deliberate on a grassroots level, based on free association, through networks of affinity groups and spokes-councils, their strategic and organizational plan of action. Instead, those same 50,000 people chose to walk around as an amorphous mass, chanting, holding signs, letting the government know how bad and inhuman it is and how it should stop funding murderous states, and basically putting themselves in a humiliating position of powerlessness. Protestors are in the classic role of "protestors", people with no real power over their lives so they must demand it from the ruling class. Demonstrations also point to a lack of creativity; the only thing we can come up with is playing the song and dance of our rulers. How much longer will these protests go on for? If we could only get a few more tens of thousands to protest, will we be successful in overthrowing capitalism, the state and wage-slavery? Why do the state, capitalism and wage-slavery exist, why do the governments of the U.S. and Israel do what they do, and what are we actually going to do about it? One of the speakers, from a Muslim rights group, appealed to President Bush to warn Ariel Sharon that if he doesn't stop his war crimes, then immediate action will be taken. It is unbearably painful to witness such utter naivety. It is quite apparent that genocide and "war crimes" are normal functions of any state, that they are not doing anything irresponsible. The state will do anything to maintain its power, whether legal or illegal. Leftists and progressives point out that Israel has violated the Geneva Convention, and that their activity is "illegal". By accepting the false dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal" we are accepting their frame of reference and their world-view. We are viewing the situation from a liberal, idealistic perspective, of how the state is supposed to behave. Radicals and revolutionaries over a hundred years ago recognized the essential purpose of the state and capitalism, they weren't fooled by it, and they weren't sucked in by reformism. It seems we are a long way to go to reach the same logical conclusions that were reached in the 1870s! There seems to be a lack of prefigurative politics, or even an understanding of what that means. Prefigurative politics is based on the notion that the "future society" is how we act in the present, what kinds of interactions, processes, structures, institutions, and associations we create right now, and how we live our lives. The notion that we just need more people, more resources, and more money to be channeled into these protests is utterly naïve, because it mistakes the problem as being quantitative, when in fact it is qualitative. The qualitative component deals with how we treat each other, the quality of people's lives, meeting individual wants and preferences, strengthening our ability to clearly and honestly communicate with each other our concerns, needs, feelings, and requests, in the context of a small-scale face-to-face environment. On the other hand, protests are mostly concerned with numbers, masses, and large, bureaucratized organizations, concerns which all too often ignore the crucial individual and inter-personal aspects. The protests against the G-8 conference last July in Genoa, Italy included up to 200,000 demonstrators, yet the only outcomes of the protest were a militarized police state bordering on fascism (or perhaps fascist), one dead, and many imprisoned and seriously injured .The strategy of protest doesn't seem to be getting us anywhere, so it is a wonder why people continue to engage in this failed tactic. If a methodology is proven time and time again of not being successful, then the rational response would be to critically examine the inadequacies of the unsuccessful methodology, and creatively and collectively think up and experiment with new methodologies. The few instances when these mass demonstrations are critiqued, they are rarely ever rejected in toto; instead the solution is to have protests on the level of local communities and neighborhoods, rather than mass convergences to large cities. Their argument is that this would bridge the gap between activists and "regular people" and get more people active and radicalized in their local communities, and to have a more secure base of resistance. But the size of the protests are not the real problem, the real problem is the protest mentality itself, which remains qualitatively the same whether it's in a working-class neighborhood or in a major city. Most of the corporate media reported that the protests were overwhelmingly "peaceful", and many of the protestors were quite content with this. Both sides accept the dichotomy of "peaceful"/"violent", just as they accept the dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal". This traps them into a moralistic, Statist mindset. Even the militant black bloc in past protests has never failed to mention that "property destruction is not violence", which indicates that they still accept this basic duality. The media are our enemy, their interests are antithetical to ours, and to hope for any kind of "positive coverage" is pie in the sky. We should not be surprised if the police beat and arrest us, if the media defame us, and if the general public hate us. That is to be expected, and we should start to recognize this and move on. There doesn't seem to be so much a "movement" as there is a collection of divergent tendencies and ideologies, many of them incompatible with each other. With every protest, there has been very little attention to what we hope to achieve, and the claim that all protests, demonstrations, marches and rallies are useless and counter-productive is a new and shocking concept for most activists. The reason that the vast majority of "ordinary people" view us with fear and contempt is because we have nothing to offer them. The power of capitalism and the State does not exist in the streets, in blocking and shutting down major intersections. It exists in the everyday lives of people, more specifically: in their homes, workplaces, and communities. If we don't work on creating practical alternatives to the capitalist system, then it is no wonder most people won't join us - we don't offer them anything, and our petty squabbles are totally irrelevant to their lives. The strategy I propose is of creating spheres of autonomy and self-sufficiency based on free association and common preference finding: bolos, temporary and permanent autonomous zones, counter-institutions, popular assemblies (see: http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=8614 for a contemporary example), small-scale decentralized agriculture, community gardens en masse, guilds, kibbutzes, worker-owned cooperatives, squats, local barter clubs (which have been popping up throughout parts of Argentina, see: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php? story=02/03/02/5676701, communist stores (based on the principle of "take what you need, donate what you can"), co-housing, urban and rural intentional communities, alternative and sustainable technology, computer-linked networks for co-ordinating and making decisions on a large-scale basis. Computer-linked networks may in fact supercede entirely the need for popular assemblies. The reason that creating these types of anti-authoritarian structures is a much more worthwhile strategy than protest and direct confrontation with the State is because it hits the State and capitalism where it hurts. Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, micro-radio and the like are also important, but they don't provide people with food, clothing, and housing - that is, the real necessities of life. The Black Panthers' Party in the 1960s and 70s set up free breakfast and lunch programs for neighborhood kids, community medical clinics, and self-defense classes. The fact that these counter-institutions triggered so much State repression, sometimes more so than armed struggle, shows how effective and threatening they were to the State. Keith Preston, in "Anarchism or Anarcho-Social Democracy?", writes: "Strategically, we need to follow the example of the most successful anarchist forces of all time- the Spanish anarchist revolutionaries. Our revolutionary agenda should be to develop an alliance of community organizations, unions, cooperatives, enterprises, service organizations, youth clubs, study groups and other popular associations". What I've sketched above are just a few outlines of a strategy, described abstractly, which embodies the kind of direction I think we should be going in. The protest mentality is getting us nowhere, it is a strategy of powerlessness - it is not "what democracy looks like". If we are serious about doing away with this rotten system and living in a new way, we have to know what it is that we don't want, what it is we do want, and how to go about getting what we want. What we need is a new, radical, concrete, utopian praxis, free of the failed methodologies of Leftism, activism and protest.

### FW: Debate as a Laboratory Good

#### Empiricism is the most useful method

**Walt 05** annu rev polit sci 8 23-48 (“the relationship between theory and policy in international relations”)

Policy decisions can be influenced by several types of knowledge. First, policy makers invariably rely on purely factual knowledge (e.g., how large are the opponent's forces? What is the current balance of payments?). Second, decision makers sometimes employ “rules of thumb”: simple decision rules acquired through experience rather than via systematic study (Mearsheimer 1989).3A third type of knowledge consists of typologies, which classify phenomena based on sets of specific traits. Policy makers can also rely on empirical laws**. An empirical law is an observed correspondence between two or more phenomena** that systematic inquiry has shown to be reliable. **Such laws** (e.g., “democracies do not fight each other” or “human beings are more risk averse with respect to losses than to gains”) **can be useful guides even if we do not know why they occur, or if our explanations for them are incorrect**. Finally, policy makers can also use theories. A theory is a causal explanation—it identifies recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains. **By providing us with a picture of the central forces that determine real-world behavior, theories invariably simplify reality in order to render it comprehensible.** At the most general level, theoretical IR work consists of “efforts by social scientists…to account for interstate and trans-state processes, issues, and outcomes in general causal terms” (Lepgold & Nincic 2001, p. 5; Viotti & Kauppi 1993). IR theories offer explanations for the level of security competition between states (including both the likelihood of war among particular states and the war-proneness of specific countries); the level and forms of international cooperation (e.g., alliances, regimes, openness to trade and investment); the spread of ideas, norms, and institutions; and the transformation of particular international systems, among other topics. In constructing these theories, IR scholars employ an equally diverse set of explanatory variables. Some of these theories operate at the level of the international system, using variables such as the distribution of power among states (Waltz 1979, Copeland 2000, Mearsheimer 2001), the volume of trade, financial flows, and interstate communications (Deutsch 1969, Ruggie 1983, Rosecrance 1986); or the degree of institutionalization among states (Keohane 1984, Keohane & Martin 2003). Other theories emphasize different national characteristics, such as regime type (Andreski 1980, Doyle 1986, Fearon 1994, Russett 1995), bureaucratic and organizational politics (Allison & Halperin 1972, Halperin 1972), or domestic cohesion (Levy 1989); or the content of particular ideas or doctrines (Van Evera 1984, Hall 1989, Goldstein & Keohane 1993, Snyder 1993). Yet another family of theories operates at the individual level, focusing on individual or group psychology, gender differences, and other human traits (De Rivera 1968, Jervis 1976, Mercer 1996, Byman & Pollock 2001, Goldgeier & Tetlock 2001, Tickner 2001, Goldstein 2003), while a fourth body of theory focuses on collective ideas, identities, and social discourse (e.g., Finnemore 1996, Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999). To develop these ideas, **IR theorists employ the full range of social science methods**: comparative case studies, formal theory, large-N statistical analysis, and hermeneutical or interpretivist approaches.

### SSD

#### A. Critical thinking—switching sides forces debaters to assess all possible outcomes of a policy and sharpens their analysis of complex situations

**Harrigan 8** NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/207/1/harrigancd052008, p. 57-59)

Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1987, p. 10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are “issues of unsurpassed importance in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people…being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking” (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that “the next Pearl Harbor could be ‘compounded by hydrogen’” (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007).In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, “with such learning, we Americans could prepare…not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet” (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called “the highest educational goal of the activity” (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate’s critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches “conceptual flexibility,” where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p. 290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by the preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz)

#### B. Tolerance—switching sides makes debaters more tolerant of arguments and ideas that are the opposite of their own—their one-sided approach promotes dogmatism

**Muir 93** (Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 288-289)

The role of **switch-side debate is especially important in the** oral **defense of arguments that foster tolerance** without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. **The forum is** therefore **unique in providing debaters with** attitudes of **tolerance** without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, **debaters are** indeed **exposed to a multivalued world**, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, **the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be** seen as **a means of gaining perspective** without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.'s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— **tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate**. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. **The willingness to recognize** the existence of **other views, and to grant alternative positions** a degree of **credibility, is** a value **fostered by switch-side debate**: Alternately **debating both sides** of the same question . . . **inculcates a deep-seated** attitude of **tolerance** toward differing points of view. **To** be forced to **debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side**. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .**Promoting** this kind of **tolerance is** perhaps **one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer**. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because **debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this** fact who **become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted**.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

#### C. Activism—only switching sides teaches students to anticipate counter-arguments and build coalitions effectively, which is necessary for sustained activism

**Harrigan 8** - Casey Harrigan, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications, Wake Forest U., 2008, “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.49-50

Third, there is an important question of means. Even the best activist intentions have little practical utility as long as they remain purely cordoned off in the realm of theoretical abstractions. Creating programs of action that seek to produce material changes in the quality of life for suffering people, not mere wishful thinking in the ivory towers of academia, should be the goal of any revolutionary project. Frequently, for strategies for change, the devil lies in the details. It is not possible to simply click one’s ruby red slippers together and wish for alternatives to come into being. Lacking a plausible mechanism to enact reforms, many have criticized critical theory as being a “fatally flawed enterprise” (Jones 1999). For activists, learning the skills to successfully negotiate hazardous political terrain is crucial. They must know when to and when not to compromise, negotiate, and strike political alliances in order to be successful. The pure number of failed movements in the past several decades demonstrates the severity of the risk assumed by groups who do not focus on refining their preferred means of change. Given the importance of strategies for change, SSD is even more crucial. Debaters trained by debating both sides are substantially more likely to be effective advocates than those experienced only in arguing on behalf of their own convictions. For several reasons, SSD instills a series of practices that are essential for a successful activist agenda. First, SSD creates more knowledgeable advocates for public policy issues. As part of the process of learning to argue both sides, debaters are forced to understand the intricacies of multiple sides of the argument considered. Debaters must not only know how to research and speak on behalf of their own personal convictions, but also for the opposite side in order to defend against attacks of that position. Thus, when placed in the position of being required to publicly defend an argument, students trained via SSD are more likely to be able to present and persuasively defend their positions. Second, learning the nuances of all sides of a position greatly strengthens the resulting convictions of debaters, their ability to anticipate opposing arguments, and the effectiveness of their attempts to locate the crux, nexus and loci of arguments. As is noted earlier, conviction is a result, not a prerequisite of debate. Switching sides and experimenting with possible arguments for and against controversial issues, in the end, makes students more likely to ground their beliefs in a reasoned form of critical thinking that is durable and unsusceptible to knee-jerk criticisms. As a result, even though it may appear to be inconsistent with advocacy, SSD “actually created stronger advocates” that are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals (Dybvig and Iverson 2000). Proponents of abandoning SSD and returning to debating from conviction should take note. Undoubtedly, many of their ideas would be beneficial if enacted and deserve the support of activist energies. However, anti-SSD critics seem to have given little thought to the important question of how to translate good ideas into practice. By teaching students to privilege their own personal beliefs prior to a thorough engagement with all sides of an issue, debating from conviction produces activists that are more likely to be politically impotent. By positing that debaters should bring prior beliefs to the table in a rigid manner and assuming that compromising is tantamount to giving in to cooptation, the case of debating from conviction undercuts the tactics necessary for forging effective coalitional politics. Without such broad-based alliances, sustainable political changes will likely be impossible (Best & Kellner 2001).