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#### mounting public pressure against drones in the status quo forces massive scaling-back of militaristic targeted killing. the affirmative’s cosmetic restriction saves the drone program by abating public anger. the negative’s pacifist demand rides a wave of public outcry to spark a larger opposition to militarism.

Zenko 13 – fellow @ CFR

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In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and inter- national humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 per- cent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gun- ships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forc- ing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making signifi- cant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allow- ing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resis- tance—such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attack- ing Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

#### The focus on transparency and accountability is a ruse that obscures broader militarism and legitimates the institutional defense of drones

Gregory 2014, Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver

Derek, “Drone geographies,” Radical Philosophy 183, Jan/Feb

My view is both narrow and wide. It is narrow because I discuss only the use of Predators and Reapers by the US Air Force in Afghanistan and Iraq, sometimes as part of Joint Special Operations Command, and their involvement in CIA-directed targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Other advanced militaries also operate drones, some of them armed and some for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as part of networked military violence, but it is even more difficult to detail their operations. The US Army and Marine Corps use drones too, but most of these are much smaller and limited to providing ISR for close combat and ground attack. Within these limits, my view is also wide, however, because I want to disclose the matrix of military violence that these remote platforms help to activate. Much of the critical response to drones is unduly preoccupied with the technical (or techno-cultural) object – the drone – and virtually ignores these wider dispositions and propensities. This is, I will argue, both an analytical and a political mistake.¶ Homeland insecurities¶ Fig. 1¶ Fig. 1¶ The first set of geographies is located within the United States, where the US Air Force describes its remote operations as ‘projecting power without vulnerability’. Its Predators and Reapers are based in or close to the conflict zone, where Launch and Recovery crews are stationed to handle take-off and landing via a C-band line-of-sight data link; given the technical problems that dog what Jordan Crandall calls ‘the wayward drone’, there are also large maintenance crews in-theatre to service the aircraft.3 Once airborne, however, control is usually handed to flight crews stationed in the continental United States via a Ku-band satellite link to a ground station at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a fibre-optic cable across the Atlantic. The network also includes senior officers and military lawyers who monitor operations from US Central Command’s Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and specialized image analysts in the United States who scrutinize the full-motion video feeds from the aircraft and are linked in via the Air Force’s Distributed Common Ground System. Taken together, the suite of four aircraft that constitutes a Combat Air Patrol capable of providing coverage twenty-four hours a day seven days a week involves 192 personnel, and most of them (133) are located outside the combat zone and beyond immediate danger (Figure 1). This is risk-transfer war with a vengeance, where virtually all the risks are transferred to populations overseas.4 Those who live in the attack zones often criticize drone strikes as cowardly, but the fact that most of those flying these online missions do not put their own lives on the line has also sparked a series of domestic debates about military ethics and codes of honour. These have traditionally invoked a reciprocity of risk that gave war what Clausewitz saw as its moral force: to kill with honour, the soldier must be prepared to die. Now the remote warrior remains the vector of violence but is no longer its potential victim.5¶ Indeed, some critics have ridiculed the drone crews as ‘cubicle warriors’ who merely ‘commute’ to war.6 The remotely piloted aircraft can remain in the air for at least 18 hours – some have recorded flights of more than 40 hours – and this requires crews to work in shifts of 10–12 hours and to alternate between home and work. Many of them report considerable difficulty in this interdigitation. As in previous wars, crews of conventional aircraft are forward deployed at varying distances from the conflict, and when they return to their bases at the end of a mission they remain within a military space that enables them to maintain focus and ‘psychic integrity’. The same is true for the Launch and Recovery crews, but it is much harder for crews of Predators and Reapers in the United States, who, as one of them put it, ‘commute to work in rush-hour traffic, slip into a seat in front of a bank of computers, fly a warplane to shoot missiles at an enemy thousands of miles away, and then pick up the kids from school or a gallon of milk at the grocery store on [their] way home for dinner’. He described it as living ‘a schizophrenic existence between two worlds’; the sign at the entrance to Creech Air Force Base announced ‘You are now entering CENTCOM AOR [Area of Operations]’, but ‘it could just as easily have read “You are now entering C.S. Lewis’s Narnia” for all that my two worlds intersected.’7 ‘The weirdest thing for me’, one pilot admitted, is ‘getting up in the morning, driving my kids to school and killing people’.8 Another confirms ‘the peculiar new disconnect of fighting a telewar’ from ‘a padded seat in American suburbia’ and commuting home ‘always alone with what he has done’.9¶ Remote crews are perhaps most vulnerable to this form of post-traumatic stress disorder – a product not so much of what they have seen as what they have done, though the two are of course connected – and it must be aggravated by the constant switching between worlds. In George Brant’s play Grounded a pilot describes the difficulty of maintaining the separation necessary for her to decompress, and gradually and ever more insistently one space keeps superimposing itself over the other; the fixed, precise sensor of the Gorgon Stare yields to a blurred vision in which she finds it virtually impossible to know where (or who) she is. The two worlds begin to become one: the desert on the night drive home from Creech starts to look like the greyed-out desert landscape in Afghanistan, and the face of a little girl on the screen, the daughter of a High Value Target, turns into the face of her own child.10 Brant’s play is all the more powerful because public attention has been artfully orchestrated so that it does not make that connection: it too is insulated by a ‘remote split’. When critics of CIA-directed drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere demand to know about their legal basis and the rules and procedures that are followed, they divert the public gaze from Waziristan to Washington. Madiha Tahir has noted how what she calls the Obama administration’s ‘theatrical performance of faux secrecy’ over its drone war in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – a teasing dance in which the veil of official secrecy is deliberately let slip once, twice, three times – functions to draw its audience’s eye towards the American body politic and away from the Pakistani bodies on the ground. It has been a hideously effective sideshow, in which Obama and an army of barkers and hucksters – unnamed spokesmen ‘speaking on condition of anonymity’ because they are ‘not authorized to speak on the record’, and front-of-house spielers like Harold Koh and John Brennan11 – induce not only a faux secrecy but its obverse, a faux intimacy in which public debate is focused on transparency and accountability as the only ‘games’ worth playing. Yet when you ask people who live under the drones what they want, Tahir continues,¶ They do not say ‘transparency and accountability’. They say they want the killing to stop. They want to stop dying. They want to stop going to funerals – and being bombed even as they mourn. Transparency and accountability, for them, are abstract problems that have little to do with the concrete fact of regular, systematic death.12

#### viewing peace as the means rather than the ends is key to break the cycle of violence- it’s the only ethical decision

**MLK**, Dr Martin Luther King, Jr., The Trumpet Of Conscience, 19**67**, p. 70-71

Now let me say, secondly, that if we are to have peace in the world, [people] men and nations must embrace the nonviolent affirmation that ends and means must cohere. One of the great philosophical debates of history has been over the whole question of means and ends. And there have always been those who argued that the end justifies the means, that the means really aren't important. The important thing is to get to the end, you see. So, if you're seeking to develop a just society, they say, the important thing is to get there, and the means are really unimportant; any means will do so long as they get you there‑they may be violent, they may be untruthful means; they may even be unjust means to a just end. There have been those who have argued this throughout history. But we will never have peace in the world until [people] men everywhere recognize that ends are not cut off from means, because the means represent the ideal in the making, and the end in process, and ultimately you can't reach good ends through evil means, because the means represent the seed and the end represents the tree. It's one of the strangest things that all the great military geniuses of the world have talked about peace. The conquerors of old who came killing in pursuit of peace, Alexander, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon, were akin in seeking a peaceful world order. If you will read *Mein Kampf* closely enough, you will discover that Hitler contended that everything he did in Germany was for peace. And the leaders of the world today talk eloquently about peace. Every time we drop our bombs in North Vietnam, President Johnson talks eloquently about peace. What is the problem? They are talking about peace as a distant goal, as an end we seek, but one day we must come to see that peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but that it is a means by which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue peaceful ends through peaceful means. All of this is saying that, in the final analysis, means and ends must cohere because the end is pre‑existent in the means, and ultimately destructive means cannot bring about constructive ends.

#### vote neg to endorse nonviolence as a response to the 1AC’s harms- it’s the only ethical decision

May 13—professor at Clemson

(Todd, “THE DIGNITY OF NONVIOLENCE”, On Violence 1:1, 7-12, dml)

It is in this beyond that that dignity of nonviolence lies. Not content to tread the same paths that always lead to the same impasses—my retaliation against your retaliation against my retaliation against….—those who engage in nonviolent resistance assume that there must be something more to being human than this. Nonviolence, true nonviolence, is creative. It seeks to open up new paths that may lead to new and better destinations. At the very least, it seeks to open people’s eyes anew, so they can see something they had not seen before. And in doing so, it works not only on the minds of those to whom it speaks, but also upon the speakers.

Those who engaged in the lunch-counter sit-ins or rode the busses or filled the jail cells during the civil rights movement flamed the conscience of a nation. But they did more than that. They crafted their own ordinary lives into something extraordinary. They elevated the struggle for equality and in the same gesture elevated themselves. They crafted themselves into something they would otherwise not have been, and in doing so brought us along part of the way with them.

The Danes who, when the Nazis invaded, spirited their fellow Jews across the straight to Sweden so that most of the Danish Jewish population survived; achieved a quiet grandeur that magnified them and continues to inspire us.

We all know that we have had enough of violence. We have had enough of the dying and mutilation that is the legacy of our advanced societies’ military technology. We have had enough of the anger that, in places like Rwanda, issued out in the form of machetes and hatchets. And, as the recent Occupation movement has shown, many of us have had enough of the social and economic conditions that are a more insidious, but not less effective, violence against so many. But we must go beyond “Basta!” We must think at once about what must be resisted and how, as is often said, we can be the change that is resistance. To do so is to pass to the other side of violence. It is not to glimpse a non-violence ready-made but instead to inaugurate it, to create something that was not there before. It is to envision and to improvise another context and other selves.

Michel Foucault once said that his writings were animated by the question of who else we might be. We have been given to ourselves as beings of violence. In most places and in most times, that is how we have been given to ourselves. To think and act nonviolently is precisely to ask the question of who else we might be. Not just what we might undergo or what we might suffer. But what, beyond the selves we have been told to be, we might create of our lives. That is at once our dignity and our task.

### CP

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority to use targeted killing as a first resort outside of armed conflict.

#### Restricting targeting killing outside of zones of active hostilities means the US can’t strike in Pakistan or Yemen.

JCSL 13 [Journal of Conﬂict & Security Law, Vol. 18 No. 1, p. 1-2, “Deterrence Revisited?” Oxford University Press Journals]

The other mentioned issue is that of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), not in the case of information gathering but when used for targeted killings. In reading the legal justifications, one comes to the conclusion that there remains much ambiguity regarding the applicable rules of international law. With regard to using drones outside a zone of armed conflict, with regard to Al Qai’da and its associates, the opinion within the Obama Administration appears to be that this is permitted under the President’s Authorization for Use of Military Force against al-Qa’ida—the 2001 authorization adopted after the 9/11 attack. The Department of Justice White Paper 1 argues that case. It is focused primarily on the targeted killing of a US citizen abroad who is regarded as an Al Qa’ida operative. The position taken is that the USA is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida. ‘Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities.’ Stretching this argument, it is put forth that the USA is allowed to defend itself whenever it concludes that individuals are part of al-Qa’ida, or associated with it, by targeting these individuals wherever they are found. This appears to be the current legal reasoning for the broad use of targeted killings by drones in places like Yemen or Pakistan. As in the case of cyber warfare, the criteria in making these decisions are secret. And, similar to the cyber weapons issue, this development is the result of technological advancements that have led to new types of weapons.

#### Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

#### Al Qaeda will attack Saudi Arabian oil assets. That collapses the global economy.

Gartenstein-Ross, 5/23/2011 (Daveed – author of Bin Laden’s Legacy, lecturer for the Naval Postgraduate School, trains members of the U.S. military preparing for deployments to the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization, above-average bowler, Osama’s Oil Obsession, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/23/osamas\_oil\_obsession)

The killing of Osama bin Laden has provided the U.S. public with a stark reminder of the risks posed by America's dependence on foreign sources of oil. On May 20, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new bulletin outlining al Qaeda's interest in targeting oil and natural gas infrastructure based on evidence unearthed after the Navy SEAL raid that killed the terrorist chief. "In 2010, there was continuing interest by members of al Qaeda in targeting oil tankers and commercial infrastructure at sea," said a DHS spokesman in a statement referencing the bulletin. He added that there was no information suggesting an imminent threat, but the department "wanted to make our partners aware of the alleged interest." Bin Laden long believed that undermining the U.S. economy was central to his war against the United States -- an outlook that has **permeated al Qaeda's ranks and will outlive him**. Al Qaeda views attacking the oil supply as a smart strategy for good reason: America's reliance on oil for its transportation needs makes it a commodity that, if disrupted or made unaffordable, will **cause the U.S. economy to collapse**. The United States holds only 3 percent of conventional global oil reserves, yet uses 25 percent of the world's daily production. It imports more than 66 percent of its oil, amounting to a daily purchase of 12 million barrels of imported oil. A significant rise in the price of oil due to a terrorist attack would deal al Qaeda's main enemy **a severe economic blow**. The threat that keeps counterterrorism officials up at night is a massive strike on Saudi oil installations, taking advantage of the limited number of production hubs to knock a significant amount of oil off the world market. The kingdom relies on its Abqaiq facility to process two-thirds of its crude oil, and on two primary terminals (Ras Tanura and Ras al-Ju'aymah) to export its oil to the world. The economic impact of a successful attack on one of these targets would be tremendous: Gal Luft and Anne Korin of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security estimate that, if a terrorist cell hijacked a plane and crashed it into either the Abqaiq or Ras Tanura facilities in a 9/11-style attack, it could "take up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six months and with it most of the world's spare capacity, sending oil prices through the ceiling." Former CIA case officer Robert Baer agrees, writing his 2004 book Sleeping with the Devil, "A single jumbo jet with a suicide bomber at the controls, hijacked during takeoff from Dubai and crashed into the heart of Ras Tanura, would be enough to bring the world's oil-addicted economies to their knees, America's along with them." The prospect of a terrorist strike is so worrying because of the critical role that Saudi oil production plays in the world economy. Saudi Arabia produces almost 10 million barrels of oil per day, and is the only country able to maintain excess daily production capacity of around 1.5 million barrels per day (a "swing reserve") to keep world prices stable. Al Qaeda has certainly tried to attack the kingdom's key oil targets. The threat of terrorist attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure first became a reality in September 2005, when a 48-hour shootout with Islamic militants at a villa in the Saudi seaport of al-Dammam ended with Saudi police introducing light artillery. When police entered the compound in the aftermath of the battle, they found not only what Newsweek described as "enough weapons for a couple of platoons of guerilla fighters," but also forged documents that would have given the terrorists access to the country's key oil and gas facilities. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz confirmed to the newspaper Okaz that the cell had planned to attack energy facilities, noting that "there isn't a place that they could reach that they didn't think about."[He continues…] Attacks on the oil supply can raise oil prices even when they don't succeed, something shown by the fact that prices immediately jumped by $2.37 a barrel following the 2006 attack on Abqaiq. As Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, notes, "Al Qaeda and its allies are well-placed throughout the Persian Gulf to attack oil facilities and officials."

#### The CP solves norms – armed conflict requirement is based on host-state consent and proportionality.

Lewis & Crawford 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1163-1165

, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF]

But the misconceptions concerning drones are not limited to the practical effects of U.S. drone policy. Legally, the United States’ position is not one of “ever-expanding entitlement for itself to target individuals across the globe.”162 The “entitlement” to use drones, just like the entitlement to engage in any other action on the sovereign territory of another state, is largely based upon the consent of the nation in which drones are being used. It is clear that Yemen consented to the strikes undertaken on its territory.163 This is supported by the WikiLeaks release of cables indicating Yemeni government consent for the actions taken there.164Likewise, there is evidence that the Pakistani government has privately consented to most of the strikes that the United States had conducted on its territory.165To the extent that the norm being shaped by U.S. behavior is limited to cases of consent, it is hard to see how the United States will one day be disadvantaged by that norm.¶ Outside of situations in which the host state consents to the strike, the United States has only asserted an “entitlement” to target al Qaeda in situations where the host state has proven itself to be unable or unwilling to incapacitate or expel al Qaeda from its territory.166 It has long been established that states not involved in armed conﬂicts have a responsibility not to aid either belligerent.167 The United States’ position that the law of armed conﬂict allows it to conduct proportional strikes against al Qaeda targets within states that have proven themselves to be unable or unwilling to incapacitate or expel those targets cannot be fairly characterized as creating an “ever-expanding entitlement for itself to target individuals across the globe.”168

### Da

#### The plan hinders the development of the Law of Armed Conflict

“daskals proposal”

**Blank, 13 –** professor of law at Emory (Laurie, “LEARNING TO LIVE WITH (A LITTLE) UNCERTAINTY: THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT DEBATE” <http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-347.pdf>)

B. Consequences for the Continued Development of LOAC

Uncertainty about the geographic scope of armed conflict leads to a variety of analytical and implementation challenges with regard to LOAC, human rights law, jus ad bellum, and other relevant legal regimes. The simple fact that within an armed conflict, a party to the conflict can use lethal force as a first resort, while outside an armed conflict, such deadly force may only be used as a last resort, is the starkest reminder of why such extensive attention has been focused on this question over the past few years. For the purpose of achieving LOAC’s central goal of “alleviating, as much as possible the calamities of war,”32 greater clarity regarding where an armed conflict is taking place and to where the concomitant authorities and obligations extend certainly would be a significant contribution. The international community—military lawyers, policymakers, international law scholars— should therefore address these issues head-on in a continuing effort to better understand how to apply the law most effectively and efficiently.33 Daskal’s proposal for a rules-driven new law of war framework is therefore a welcome and important contribution to the discussion and debate. At the same time, however, these efforts must stay true to the needs and goals of LOAC as a pragmatic, operationally focused body of law that is, above all, designed to work in the inherent chaos and uncertainty of armed conflict. As I have argued elsewhere, there are significant risks for the future implementation and development of LOAC as a result of conflating norms from LOAC with norms from human rights law, or of borrowing one from the other without careful delineation, including, in particular, the rules regarding surrender and capture and the different applications and purposes of proportionality in each legal regime.34 No place is this risk more profound than in relation to the legal authority to employ force against an enemy belligerent.

In the context of a specific legal framework for one particular type of conflict, the same concerns about blurring the lines between legal regimes remain. LOAC does not require an individualized threat assessment in the targeting of combatants, who are presumed hostile by dint of their status. Over time, however, the requirement for an individualized threat assessment in certain geographical zones in a new law of war framework for conflicts with transnational terrorist groups may well begin to bleed into the application of LOAC in more traditional conflicts. In essence, therefore, a carefully designed paradigm for one complex and difficult conflict scenario ultimately impacts LOAC writ large, even absent any perceived need or direct motivation for such change. Interpreting LOAC to require an individualized threat assessment for all targeting decisions—even those against the regular armed forces of the enemy state in an international armed conflict—introduces significant tactical and operational risk for soldiers not mandated or envisioned by the law.35 The same conflation problem holds true for other non-LOAC obligations that might be imported into LOAC depending on the analysis of where and how a new law of war framework were to apply. It is important to recognize, notwithstanding the focus on the operational effectiveness of LOAC in this Response, that conflation and “borrowing” offer the same challenges for the implementation of human rights law, to the extent that norms from LOAC begin to bleed into the application of human rights norms. Lastly, superimposing an artificially created framework detracts attention from—or even papers over—current challenges within LOAC, such as the identification of enemy operatives, the nature and amount of proof required for determinations of reasonableness or unreasonableness in targeting decisions, and other perennially tricky issues.

CONCLUSION

The procedural and legal protections proposed in the sort of rules-based, geographically differentiated law of war framework that Daskal proposes could certainly maximize protections for certain groups of people in certain areas during certain specific conflicts. To that end, such enhanced protections would indeed be an important contribution. However, the operational imperatives of conflict—all conflicts, not only the complex current conflict with al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups—suggest that such a framework would likely have more significant detrimental consequences through diminished clarity and predictability in the application of LOAC at all stages and unfortunate modifications in the future development of LOAC. Learning to accept some uncertainty in assessing the geography of conflict therefore helps to protect equally important LOAC goals and may well be a better option than it appears at first blush.

#### Uniquely turns the case

Corn, ’13 [Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 2013, Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2179720]

Seeking to identify some legally mandated geographic boundary for armed conflict of any type is, thus, a genuine Red Herring.23 Armed conflict is a threat driven concept, arising when the threat necessitates resort to combat power, and extending to wherever the operational and tactical opportunity to produce a militarily valuable effect on the enemy arises. There are examples of States choosing not to expand the scope of conflicts simply because such an opportunity arose. However, other factors impact such decisions, and it would be an error to equate decisions to refrain from exercising authority with an inherent legal prohibition against such exercise.

The scope of TAC—like that of any armed conflict—must be threat driven for a reason. Admittedly, there exists a perceived and actual risk of an overzealous and overbroad assertion of LOAC–based authority to attack and disable threat operatives inherent in the combined effect of TAC as a theory of armed conflict typology and a threat–driven scope interpretation. Nonetheless, States must avoid attempts to identify or impose some per se geographic limitations on this type of armed conflict. Any authority overreach (invoking the power to incapacitate through an application of LOAC principles), triggered by extending the concept of armed conflict to transnational non-State threats, will be more effectively mitigated by focusing on the traditional dynamics of lawful wartime action and tailoring or adjusting traditional sources of LOAC authority to meet the unique challenges of this type of armed conflict. Chief among these particular challenges are, one, ensuring that the targeting process adequately accounts for the complexity of threat identification in this inherently unconventional environment; and two, ensuring that preventive detention processes sufficiently address the unique scope and nature of this type of armed conflict. Focusing on these two practical challenges will produce a better balance between national security realities and the individual interests of potential objects of State action than would be achieved by attempting to confine that action to an arbitrary “hot zone.”

#### Loac key to regulate new military technology

Stewart, ‘11 [Darren M Stewart, Colonel, British Army; Director, Military Department, International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), “New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict”, International Law Studies, Volume 87]

Over the centuries LOAC, in its various guises, has always had as its focus the regulation of armed conflict so as to protect the victims of war.2 During the nineteenth century, in response to both the development of military technology and the prevailing social mores of the time, LOAC rules started to become formalized and began to reflect the format that we are familiar with today.

One of the notable features of LOAC has been its evolutionary flexibility. This flexibility has allowed LOAC to evolve in a manner that adapts to the developments in both technological capabilities (means) and tactics (methods) employed in armed conflict. This has included specific measures to ban weapons3 and tactics4 when seen as appropriate. More important, LOAC has demonstrated its flexibility through the defining principles underpinning its operation. These principles— military necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality—are of an enduring quality and provide a benchmark against which developments in technology and tactics can be assessed as to their lawfulness. When applied in the context of prevailing international mores, LOAC proves itself both flexible and responsive to changes in the armed conflict paradigm.

The changing character of weapons systems and their impact on the law is neither one-dimensional nor negative. In fact, technological advances in weaponry frequently work to enhance application of LOAC, particularly in the areas of distinction and proportionality. Challenges usually arise when such developments raise wider questions as to what are the acceptable ethical limits in the application of technology to military purposes. In this context LOAC, operating as a system regulating what is inherently a human activity within a prevailing set of international mores, becomes an important consideration.

#### Extinction

Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

### DA

#### US drones sustain power projection --- key to hegemony

Reynolds 6/26/13 (Michael A, PhD, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, “Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23269995.2013.807603>, CMR)

Technology and the dilemma of counter-insurgency¶ The United States, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim¶ gun, has successfully leveraged technology to extend its power and reach into foreign¶ societies in ways that would have been inconceivable to the empires of the high-imperial¶ age. American military personnel, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, have employed thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or¶ drones more popularly, to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals literally around the¶ globe, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through¶ 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500¶ people (Zenko 2012).¶ Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists have long protected themselves from the superior¶ firepower of regular armies and police forces by declining to wear uniforms or other open¶ markers of identity and by refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to do¶ one of the two things: either to curb their use of firepower and thereby neutralize their¶ own advantage, or to employ force indiscriminately and thereby risk alienating their¶ population and public opinion around the world with excessive violence. This is the¶ classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.¶ To American strategic planners, surveillance and attack drones hold out the promise¶ that they can, if not overcome this dilemma, at least mitigate it. By employing drones to¶ find, monitor, and track specific individuals, the United States can aspire to identify¶ whether or not those individuals are hostile and then seamlessly employ an attack drone¶ to destroy that individual. Thus, the United States government now routinely uses drones¶ to mount extended and even around-the-clock observation of foreign locales to identify¶ and kill suspected terrorists. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of¶ such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent¶ dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from¶ drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or¶ intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law¶ School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless, it seems¶ clear that drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma. In countries where they fly¶ they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies¶ significantly more difficult.¶ Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals, a¶ major appeal of drones is their cost. Drones pose no risk of death to highly trained and¶ valuable pilots and they are comparatively cheap. The Predator, the best-known armed¶ drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By¶ comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, drones will likely only grow cheaper as design improves, economies of scale¶ drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation¶ drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars.¶ When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the¶ United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, drones emerge as a potent tool for¶ monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers. The drone¶ is, in essence, a tool well-suited to imperial policing, on sea as well as on land.¶ Thus, the withdrawal of American military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere¶ in the greater Middle East due to war fatigue and financial constraints will not necessarily¶ equate to an equivalent reduction in America’s coercive capabilities. For better or for worse,¶ technology such as drones, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence provide¶ the world’s policeman with a more potent, if not bigger, baton for the buck. Further advances¶ in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be¶ translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. Technology makes many¶ things possible. Empire in an age of austerity might well be one of them.

#### Hegemony is sustainable

-econ/military dominance

-trade measures

-diffusion of tech

Michael **Beckley**, PhD, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” Dissertation, Columbia University, 20**12**, p. 4-6.

In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### American hegemony is necessary to prevent a multitude of conflicts in every region of the world – a multipolar world would not solve global problems, but would only increase the likelihood of war

Kagan 7 [Robert, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History, 6-19, <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html>]

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world 's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

**Hegemony solves conflicts that cause extinction**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett,** chief analyst, Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S. and Globalization, at Crossroads,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 3—7—**11**, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

Events in Libya are a further reminder for **Americans** that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the** world's sole full-service **superpower.** Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization,** the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics** that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no** identifiable **human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered** **the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down** that path of **perpetual war**. Instead**, America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was **the collapse of empires, an explosion of** **democracy**, the **persistent spread of** **human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivgered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war**. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Alt to heg is massive great power wars

Yuhan Zhang, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, “America’s Decline: A Harbinger of Conflcit and Rivalry,” EAST ASIA FORUM, 1—22—11, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

### Adv 1

#### U.S. drones policy complies with international law – key to prevent terrorism

**Groves 4/10** – Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation (Steven, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad>, CMR)

Targeted drone strikes by the United States against terrorists comply with international law, particularly with the law of war, both because the U.S. is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces and because the U.S. has an inherent right of self-defense. Armed drones are particularly well suited to target enemy belligerents while minimizing the harm to civilian populations—per the law of war. The United States should preserve its ability to use all of the tools in its arsenal, including armed drones, to ensure that terrorist organizations and their operatives do not successfully attack the U.S. homeland.¶The debate over the circumstances in which lethal force may be used against terrorist organizations operating from foreign territory is not new. Nor is it a new reality that the United States must confront armed, non-state actors that threaten its national security and the lives of its people.¶ Lethal force, including targeted drone strikes, may lawfully be used against an enemy belligerent during an armed conflict or under circumstances in which the belligerent constitutes an imminent threat to national security. Because the United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its associated forces, whose operatives continue to pose an imminent threat, U.S. armed forces may target them with lethal force wherever they may be found, whether on the “hot” battlefield of Afghanistan or operating from other nations, such as Pakistan and Yemen.¶ American targeted drone strikes comply with international law, in particular that part of international law known as the law of war, which requires belligerents to distinguish combatants from civilians and minimize harm to the civilian population. Based on the information available to the public, it appears that the United States takes great care to adhere to these principles by targeting only combatants and by taking care to avoid civilian casualties. Indeed, the evidence indicates that armed drones are particularly well suited to carry out targeted strikes that meet the standards of the law of war.

#### Drones strikes consistent with international law – multiple justifications

**Groves 4/10** – Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation (Steven, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad>, CMR)

In March 2010, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated regarding targeted killing: “[A]s a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.”[5]¶ In September 2011, White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan stated: “[W]e are at war with al-Qa’ida. In an indisputable act of aggression, al-Qa’ida attacked our nation and killed nearly 3,000 innocent people. And as we were reminded just last weekend, al-Qa’ida seeks to attack us again. Our ongoing armed conflict with al-Qa’ida stems from our right—recognized under international law—to self-defense.”[6]¶ In March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder stated: “Because the United States is in an armed conflict, we are authorized to take action against enemy belligerents under international law. The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense. None of this is changed by the fact that we are not in a conventional war.”[7]¶ In short, the United States may lawfully target al-Qaeda in multiple countries with lethal force under two related, but independent justifications:¶ The United States and al-Qaeda are two belligerents engaged in an armed conflict and¶ Even in the absence of an armed conflict, the United States has an inherent right to defend itself against the threat posed by al-Qaeda.

#### Other countries won’t model US legal standards or oversight

Saunders 13 (Paul J., executive director of the Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest, 3/4, “We Won’t Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177?page=1>)

That said, the United States has well-established rules for the use of lethal force in war and in law enforcement operations. There are extensive rules governing surveillance, too. From this perspective, drones represent a new way of doing things that the executive branch has done for some time and do not pose a radical challenge to existing policies and procedures—except, perhaps, for strains imposed by the sheer number of strikes. Ultimately, however, America has had the drone debate before in various guises and will eventually find a way forward that satisfies legal and oversight concerns.¶ A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.

#### No terrorism in Latin America – no influence or environment to develop

Weitz 11 – Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute. November 9, 2011, "Where are Latin America’s Terrorists?" http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-

Latin American countries generally are **not** a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. **No** Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials may tolerate some foreign terrorists’ activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their non-violent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters.

#### no theft or impact

Francis **Gavin**, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs, Univeristy of Texas at Austin, "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 34 n. 3, Winter 2009/20**10**, p. 19-20.

Experts disagree on whether nonstate actors have the scientiªc, engineering, ªnancial, natural resource, security, and logistical capacities to build a nuclear bomb from scratch. According to terrorism expert Robin Frost, the danger of a “nuclear black market” and loose nukes from Russia may be overstated**. Even if a terrorist** group **did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it** against a U.S. target **would present tremendous** technical and logistical **difficulties.**51 Finally**,** the feared nexus between terrorists and rogue regimes may be exaggerated.As nuclear proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione argues, states such as Iran and North Korea are **“not** the most **likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles, if any, are small** and exceedingly **precious, and hence well-guarded.”**52 Chubin states that there “is no reason to believe that Iran today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, would transfer WMD [weapons of mass destruction] technology to terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hezbollah.”53

#### No drone prolif – multiple checks

- narrow application – diplomatic and political costs – state defenses

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### drones make conflict less likely

Goure, 12

[Daniel, vice president of the Lexington Institute, Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses!, CATO Unbound, January 13, 2012, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses>, CMR] gender edited

Has the accelerated use of drones opened a new chapter in the history of warfare, as David Cortright asserts? If so, what is the title of that chapter? It certainly is not “Drones Make War More Likely, Indiscriminate or Bloodier.” As recent landmark studies by Goldstein and Pinker clearly document, societal violence in general and armed conflict in particular are on the decline.[1] The fact that we live in the historical shadow of the air raids on Dresden and Tokyo but are focused on a few hundred strikes by unmanned aerial systems in Pakistan underscores this dramatic change in the way air power is employed today. Drones are not new. The V-1 was a drone, but lacked a man-in-the-loop and precision guidance capabilities. Modern drones emerged from the overall revolution in precision navigation and networked communications which began more than two decades ago. This revolution centered on improvements in technologies for position location, remote sensing, automated flight controls, computer-based target designation, high bandwidth communications, high capacity computing and smart fusing. These technologies were combined to provide a capability for long-range precision strikes, as demonstrated in the first Gulf War. Most often this capability required both a platform/launcher and a “smart” weapon such as a laser-guided bomb or Joint Direct Attack Munition that would be flown to a release point, then fly to a specific target based either on laser illumination or pre-programmed GPS coordinates. Cruise missiles, which have been widely proliferated, are essentially drones. Modern drones provide many of the best features of both cruise missiles and manned aircraft. Most significantly, they provide the tactical and operational flexibility of manned platforms with the reduced risk to personnel associated with cruise missiles. Unlike the former, they allow for man-in-the-loop control and vehicle recovery. Unlike the latter, they can operate at altitudes and in environments unsuited to manned systems and, in some cases, for extended periods of time. Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence. Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system. Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation. It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone. The availability of un[staffed]manned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. I might go even farther than Goldstein and argue that Cortright should advocate the greater use of drones, armed and otherwise, precisely due to his interest in reducing the frequency, intensity, and costs of conflicts. Just as dash cameras in police cars and cell phone cameras have led to a decrease in police brutality and the ability to bring those who violate procedures to account, the electro-optical sensors on drones can be used to increase oversight over military forces in the field. In fact, cameras can reduce what Cortright calls “the psychological distance that separates the launching of a strike from its bloody impact.” It can also help reduce the alleged isolation of the American people from the use of force in their name. Unfortunately in view of its title, the primary focus of Cortright’s article is not on drones and warfare. Rather, it centers on the subset of the role of drones in current counterterrorism operations. A number of the issues he raises are frankly much more relevant to the rather murky legal and operational circumstances surrounding the global campaign against al Qaeda. Cortright is closer to the mark when, as the title of his article suggests, he connects the nature of drones, notably the lack of a person in the cockpit, to the sense that both the George W. Bush and, most particularly, the Obama Administration saw such systems as supporting if not promoting a “license to kill.” Critics of the use of drones against unlawful combatants in Pakistan and elsewhere would be on firmer ground by connecting the disembodied features of “Nintendo warfare” to our seeming tolerance for the weakening of legal safeguards for criminal terrorists. In conclusion, I would suggest that there is nothing in the current employment of drones or in plans for future unmanned aerial systems that poses the kinds of dangers suggested by Mr. Cortright. They will not make war easier or cheaper. There is no evidence that armed drones have reduced the political inhibitions against the use of deadly force. The use of drones in no way threatens to weaken the moral presumption against the inappropriate or excessive use of force that is at the heart of the just war doctrine—the emphasis is mine, but the qualifiers have always belonged to just war theory. Mr. Cortright’s problem is not with drones but the policies of those who employ them. I almost hate to say it, but we should remember that drones don’t kill terrorists, governments do.

### EU Rltns

Cooperation inevitable even if relations decline --shared values, economic ties, and issue specific coop

**McCormick 6** The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations James M. McCormick 1 1 Iowa State University ABSTRACT AU: James M. McCormick TI: The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations SO: Politics & Policy VL: 34 NO: 2 PG: 426-450 YR: 2006

Even if the conceptual gap were to narrow only slightly over U.S. foreign policy generally and terrorism particularly, powerful international and domestic constraints remain, which may motivate both the United States and Europe to close the action gap. In other words, certain existing constraints may actually serve as incentives to close the action gap between these two global actors in the near term. Some of these constraints result from the common ties that already exist, but others are unique to the United States and Europe.First, of course, the United States and Europe are still bound together by a set of underlying common values and beliefs that brought them together during the Cold War after World War II, albeit no longer with the Soviet Union acting as a lone star guiding policy formulation. Those common values and beliefs are hardly empty notions to the vast majority of Europeans and Americans, particularly not to the new European states that have escaped communist rule since the fall of the Berlin Wall. How those values should be advanced will surely remain as a source of disagreement both within and between Europe and America, but those values will undoubtedly continue to serve as incentives for all parties to seek some policy accommodations. Second, Europe and America are fundamentally tied by the significant economic links that serve as the "sticky power" (Mead 2004, 46-53; Mead 2005, 29-36) between them. Indeed, economic ties remain very strong, despite recent political differences and lingering disputes over access to both participants' markets (Drozdiak 2005). Third, the often unspoken levels of cooperation on terrorism—for example, in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence matters, or the tracking of financial matters—remain in place, even in the face of more visible political differences over Iraq and the wider war on terrorism. Moreover, the events of 3/11/04 in Madrid and 7/7/05 in London continue to provide very powerful incentives for this kind of transatlantic cooperation. In this sense, these different kinds of "ties that bind"—and continue to bind—should not be forgotten as important sources of momentum to seek common ground between America and Europe.

#### US-EU relations trade off with China-EU relations

Small 7 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund - previously worked as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office; as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and was an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Graduated from Oxford. “China-Eu: A Common Future” edited by Stanley Crossick (Founding Chairman, European Policy Centre, Brussels) & Etienne Reuter (European Commission, Belgium), World Scientific Publishing Co., Chapter 6, p. 73-80)

For Europe and China alike, the most important bilateral relationship is with the United States. Although often described as a ‘strategic triangle', neither the Chinese impact on the transatlantic relationship nor Europe's role in the Sino-US relationship is remotely comparable to the significance of the United States for the Sino-European relationship. Describing the United States as the elephant in the room does not even begin to do it justice: the size and shape of the room are themselves shaped by the US factor.¶ To start with the Sino-Europcan relationship and then look at the US influence is to look in the wrong place. It is the structure and dynamics of the other two relationships — the underlying tensions in the Sino-US relationship and the underlying strength of transatlantic ties — that provide the critical frame. The Primacy of the Transatlantic Relationship It is not much of an exaggeration to suggest that major developments in EU-China relations over the past few years have been a subsidiary consequence of the fraying and strengthening again of the transatlantic relationship. The 2003-2004 "honeymoon" period in EU-China relations, during which the two sides launched the "strategic partnership" concept and agreed, in principle, to lift the arms embargo, was substantially driven by a major transatlantic falling-out over Iraq. It was led, moreover, by two European political leaders — Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder — who were simultaneously burning their bridges with the Bush administration. The end or the honeymoon, in 2005. coincided with Schroeder's fading the scene, and the efforts of both Europe and the United States, largely successful at an elite (if not a popular) level, to put transatlantic relations back on track.

#### EU-China relations key to tech transfer and a global climate treaty—solves warming

Adam Matthews¶ Secretary-General of GLOBE International¶ “EU-China Relationship Could Hold Key to Global Climate Deal” Posted: 11/11/2013 12:09 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/adam-matthews/euchina-relationship-coul\_b\_4235229.html

The 19th United Nations annual Climate Change Conference begins in Poland on November 11. This will be an important step, although only a step, along the path toward securing by the end of 2015 a comprehensive global treaty that must set the world on a path to a low carbon future.¶ However, to achieve this goal there will need to be much closer bilateral and regional cooperation between two key economic powers -- China and Europe. This cooperation alone could hold the key to creating the conditions for an international agreement. But the key question is if European leaders are reading China's signals properly, and have the vision to develop and grasp the opportunity.¶ Fundamentally, both China and the EU share a vision of a prosperous, energy secure future in a stable climate. And great advances have been made in the relationship in recent years.¶ The China-EU Summits, initiated in 1998, are now an established annual event with the next to be held later this month. The EU is China's biggest trading partner, and China is the EU's fastest developing export market.¶ However, Europe risks squandering the opportunity to deepen this engagement if China is viewed more as a threat than a partner.¶ China's 12th Five Year Plan is the clearest signal yet to Europe. It sets the strategic direction for China's economy through to 2016, shows that Beijing decision makers are determined to change their development model from low-grade labour-intensive manufacturing towards a greater emphasis on services and innovation.¶ They want to design the next iPad, not just manufacture it. And, as resources become scarcer, the incorporation of the principles of sustainable development, green procurement, clean air and resource efficiency are increasingly moving up the priority list.¶ The EU has strengths in areas that China needs and, as China emerges as the world's largest economy in coming decades, there are substantial economic opportunities for the EU. As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, in no area is cooperation with China more important than on clean air, energy and climate change.¶ The Five Year Plan includes policies and measures designed to help China achieve a 40-45% reduction in the carbon intensity of GDP from 2005 levels by 2020. This is a significant commitment that will shortly be strengthened by China's first national climate change law.¶ The fact China is using the experience of its sub-national pilot emissions trading schemes to inform the development of a national scheme, probably by 2016, is another signal to Europe. It clearly shows that China is open and willing to learn from Europe's experiences and reinterpret these for their own domestic circumstances.¶ China has no obligation to pass a climate law and develop carbon markets. But it is pursuing these policies because there is a recognition at the heart of government that climate change is as likely to affect China's population and growth, if not more so, than anywhere else.¶ Importantly, an enhanced China-EU relationship will not just be one-way traffic; it is increasingly clear that technology transfer will be two-way. China is already the world's largest manufacturer, and user, of solar panels and the largest investor in renewable energy. The planet's fastest high-speed rail services are in China. Both sides thus have much to gain from a stronger, closer, broader and deeper partnership.¶ It is therefore frustrating when disputes, such as the recent spats over solar panels and aviation, escalate to a level that sets both sides back from the closer economic and political partnership that is ultimately in their respective interest.¶ As in all relationships there will be times that each side will do something that frustrates the other. But there must be a higher level objective of mutually beneficial cooperation underpinned by practical political mechanisms to address concerns as they arise. In effect a dispute clearing house.¶ Disputes should not be allowed to escalate to the detriment of the higher level objective of closer cooperation. To achieve this though requires commitment on both sides to develop such mechanisms.¶ As those that have invested time in the relationship with China over many years understand, megaphone diplomacy rarely works. There is a window of opportunity over the next decade to step up engagement of China.¶ But this window will not remain open indefinitely and Europe needs to read the signals being sent. So many of the policies China are testing and implementing are refinements of European policies and laws. They are applied differently but the path is one much closer to that of Europe than other major economic powers.¶ To be sure, there is still a way to go before China has a fully-fledged carbon market, or both parties develop new low carbon standards in key industrial sectors. But the potential is clear.¶ Co-operation could build low carbon industries in a range of sectors as well as align the EU to the world's future largest economy. This could only serve to improve political ties and strengthen respective economies.¶ And importantly as a dividend of such engagement Chinese and European cooperation would accelerate the transition to a global low carbon economy, lead others and magnify the benefits that, together, will help to create the political conditions that will enable a comprehensive, global agreement to be reached within the UN.¶ It is essential that we recognise that agreements within the UN process reflect national political conditions; they rarely define them. China and Europe hold the key, and European leaders need to better read Chinese signals.

#### successful 2015 talks solve warming- momentum and signalling

Jake Schmidt¶ international climate policy director at Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).¶ Posted May 2, 2013¶ “Countries Can Agree to More Global Action on Climate Change by 2015: Five Reasons (at least)” http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jschmidt/countries\_can\_act\_on\_climate.html

4. Need sufficient time for countries to follow through with concrete action at home¶ In Copenhagen, countries accounting for over 80 percent of the world’s emissions made specific commitments to reduce their pollution. Implementation of the actions to meet these commitments are still being implemented. It takes time in many countries to develop the appropriate policy for their specific context, secure national agreement amongst the public, and implement the necessary changes to laws and regulations. We need a clear political signal in 2015 to ensure that countries put in place sufficient policies by 2020.¶ We also need a global agreement in 2015 to ensure that countries are implementing the commitments that they set out in 2009 and that are supposed to be fully met in 2020. Put simply 2015 is a good midway check-in to see whether or not countries are on track to meet their previous commitments. If countries come to the meeting in 2015 with little or no action at home it will be obvious to the world.

#### decline Doesn’t cause war

**Miller 2k** – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

#### resilient

**Globe and Mail 2010** (5/31/10, BRIAN MILNER, "While gloom says bear, TIGER points to bull", lexis, WEA)

Even at the height of the remarkable rebound of 2009 that brought stocks back from the dead zone, the bears never retreated to their lairs. Negative sentiment among investors remained stubbornly high, no matter how promising the economic indicators looked. And then along came the Greeks and their little sovereign debt problem, the Chinese and their public hand-wringing over asset bubbles and the North Koreans and their latest idiotic sabre-ratting to remind nervous markets just how fragile the nascent global recovery could turn out to be. The latest survey of American investors last week showed bearish sentiment hovering close to 30 per cent, with plenty of room for an uptick in the months ahead, as the optimists come to realize that a V-shaped recovery was never in the cards after the worst global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The world's most overexposed permabear, Nouriel Roubini, is still grabbing headlines with his dire Greece-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg warnings. (Well, he does have a new book to sell.) And such high-profile Canadian bruins as gold-loving money manager Eric Sprott and eminent strategist and data miner David Rosenberg have never veered from their sombre outlooks. The fact that May turned into a particularly brutal month for just about everything but U.S. Treasuries - even after last week's modest rebound, the Dow posted its worst performance for the month in 70 years - only added fuel to arguments that worse, much worse, is yet to come. I mention all this to Eswar Prasad, when I reach the Cornell University economics professor at his hotel in Beijing. Prof. Prasad is a noted China watcher who once headed the IMF's China division and still keeps in close touch with top government finance officials. But on this call, I'm more interested in one of his other hats as a shrewd analyst of global economic and market trends. "My inclination also is to be a bear," the affable academic says. "But the data don't support my bearishness as much as I would like. One has to be a little cautious, because these are based on a variety of indicators. Some of them certainly show more strength than I had realized." The data he's talking about come out of his work on a new composite index derived from a broad set of economic, market and confidence measures in the G20 countries and designed to provide a quarterly snapshot of the global recovery. "All signs are that the recovery has some momentum," says Prof. Prasad, who developed the index at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank where he is also a senior fellow. "But I wouldn't call it solid enough momentum that we can consider it 'in the bag.'" The new index, cutely named TIGER (Tracking Indices for the Global Economic Recovery), is a joint effort by Brookings and the Financial Times. And TIGER shows that since the world began climbing out of the deep trough about the middle of last year, big emerging economies have roared ahead, while the developed world has experienced much more uneven results. Industrial production and trade have bounced back handsomely - total exports from the big emerging countries now exceed pre-crisis levels - but the employment picture remains cloudy and consumption has yet to develop a new head of steam. "It's much easier at this stage to list all the things that could derail the recovery," Prof. Prasad says. "But all of those things are still conjectural. The reality, and the data, is that things are looking better."

## 2NC

### OV

#### US military power and leadership is key to solve climate change.

Maybee 08 **(Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\_pages/i49.htm)**

For the purpose of this essay, national security is defined as the need to maintain the safety, prosperity, and survival of the nation-state through the use of instruments of national power: diplomatic, military, economic, and informational power will be the drivers of GCC responses as they provide the needed resources ideas and technology. It will be through invoking military and diplomatic power that resources are used and new ideas are implemented to overcome any GCC challenges. In addition to fighting and winning the nation’s wars, the US military has a long history of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but the potential impacts of GCC should lead national security policymakers to consider how environmental security will play a role in the future.

#### EU-China relations dampen global conflict and solve every impact

Geiger 3 (“China and the European Union:¶ A Strategic Partnership for the Future”¶ Presentation made by Henriette Geiger,¶ China Desk, DG External Relations, Unit H2 (China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Mongolia), European Commission¶ 5 September 2003 http://www.ceibs.edu/ase/Documents/EuroChinaForum/henriette.htm#i3

The spectre of international terrorism, as well as growing concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have brought new types of international security concerns to the top of the global agenda. The sluggish world economy and concomitant negative trends in protectionism and regionalism also loom as potential threats to global trade and development.¶ ¶ Faced with these common concerns, it is in the clear and ever-greater interest of the EU and China to work together as strategic partners on the international scene to safeguard and promote development, peace and stability.¶ ¶ Both EU and Chinese interests converge on many issues, particularly in their appreciation of the key role of multilateral organisations and systems in global governance. Through further reinforcement of their co-operation, the EU and China will be better able to promote these shared visions and interests, and to shore up their joint security and other interests, both in the Asian region and elsewhere in the world.¶ ¶ Given China’s rapid emergence as a key global player, it must be recognised that Europe has a major political and economic stake in supporting China’s successful transition process and full engagement in the international community. At the same time China has a considerable interest in strengthening its ties with a larger and stronger European Union.

### EU-China: Lk 2NC

#### the link is zero sum and reverse causal

Small 7 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund - previously worked as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office; as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and was an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Graduated from Oxford. “China-Eu: A Common Future” edited by Stanley Crossick (Founding Chairman, European Policy Centre, Brussels) & Etienne Reuter (European Commission, Belgium), World Scientific Publishing Co., Chapter 6, p. 73-80)

The debates over the arms embargo have already stimulated broader EU-US dialogue about policy in the region and this is only likely to intensity as the embargo question resurfaces, as it is likely to in the run-up to the agreement of the EU-China partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA). This coincides, moreover, with two other major drivers. First, the transatlantic military alliance, NATO, has been shifting its focus to deal with new global threats and take in new global partners. This has already brought European troops into combat in Afghanistan, Chinas neighbor, and seen the deepening of tics with East Asian security partners, Australia and Japan. Decisions are looming for the European side as this more global NATO moves into its next phase and the argument for a more closely integrated role for these new partners becomes harder to resist — however implausible it is to imagine the extension of Article 5 commitments. Second, China's economic rise has been transtorming East Asia into an ever more important region for European economic and commercial interests. As well as being by far Europe's largest regional trading relationship, it is now the major source of new growth for European companies and of inward investment flows to Europe. Europeans are increasingly conscious of how little influence they have over strategic questions, such as Sino-Japanese or cross-strait relations, in a region whose stability is vital to the European economy.¶ I he net effect of these developments will inevitably be to site Europe's China policy in a broader political and security context, with greater attention now being paid to its impact on key allies and to the regional picture.¶ But these are still early days and at the moment, European policy fluctuates between two relatively weak positions, cither of which could nevertheless persist:¶ (i) Absence of European strategic policy. It is possible that the European role will not develop at all. With no European strategic presence in East Asia, the United States had not previously treated the EU as a consideration in its thinking about the region and was only moved to do so when it appeared possible that Europe could start playing an actively negative role. Transatlantic discussion about East Asia may gradually wind down as Washington decides that the value ot the conversation came only from ensuring that the Europeans understood why certain lines should not be crossed. China, after observing both the European climb-down over the lifting of the arms embargo under pressure from Washington and then the failure of the constitutional reterendums, has concluded that it was probably too early to view the EU as an important and independent strategic actor. Divisions over China within the EU, whether on the degree to prioritize human rights or the differential impact of the Chinese economy across various countries and sectors in Europe, make it a difficult subject around which to agree on robust common policies. The net outcome could be a constrained EU role all round: easily leant on by Washington if Europe again appeared to be taking steps viewed as unhelpful, but easily leant on by Beijing too if transatlantic cooperation on East Asia appeared to be gathering pace.¶ (i!) Tacit European alignment with the United States. Another potential outcome is a European decision not to cause difficulties for US policy in East Asia, but not to lend it any active support cither. Without necessarily subscribing to the virtues of the US hedging policy, the Europeans could continue supporting the engagement dimensions of US strategy while opting out of the balancing dimensions, knowing that there will be few real objections from Washington as long as Europe does not take any steps viewed asdirectly harmful. Even if the Europeans agree with US policy, they may sec open support for it either as counterproductive ( ganging up") or simply harmful to European interests, creating risks for good relations with China that could damage economic and commercial ties. At one level, this would not differ significantly from the first scenario — choosing to play a modest role rather than doing so by default — but it would mean a far more stable and predictable policy framework than has existed over recent years, including a clear set of parameters for arms sales and technology transfer.¶ There arc two further plausible scenarios, however, both of which would largely be driven by the imperative of influence:¶ (iii) Active European cooperation with the United States. The Europeans could decide to align their policies more closely with the United States. Seeing rising Chinese power as a potentially destabilizing force in the region unless democratic allies are given due attention and support, Europe could step in to play a more active role. Such a move could be prompted not just by a spirit of transatlantic cooperation or belief in the correctness of US strategy, but by anxieties over waning US influence in the region. The steps this could involve range from European involvement in contingency planning for worst-case scenarios over Taiwan, to support for deeper partnerships with NA1 O tor countries such as Japan, as well as active efforts to strengthen political and economic relationships with other countries in the region to provide ballast to additional centers of power aside from China. Underpinning it would be a European decision that the risks involved in damaging commercial relations with China would be outweighed by the necessity of ensuring stability in the worlds most important economic region and the advantages of having a weightier European voice on the strategic situation in the region. The obvious fact that the United States is able to maintain a vibrant economic relationship and an increasingly cooperative diplomatic one at the same time as hedging against Chinese security threats may also overcome European caution, and it could reasonably be expected to coexist with a cooperative Sino-Europcan position on solving shared global problems.¶ (iv) European competition with the United States. Another potential outcome would be a situation where the Europeans decide that US policy in the region is ill-judged. Driven by many of the same motivations in the thirdscenario, Europeans may decide that stability in the region is important, that Europe should play an active role, but that US strategy is not the best way of achieving it. This decision would stem from a European analysis that balance of power politics goes against lessons from Europe's own history and that, for instance, the regional integration agenda should be the focal point for support, with the priority being to embed China in a network or consensual consultations, mutual obligations and pooled sovereignty. The degree to which this cuts against US strategy rather than complementing it will depend on the relative premium Europeans place on institutions and values. If the goal is to support the development of a regional architecture underpinned by democratic values and norms, this may be seen by the United States as a justifiable difference in emphasis but nevertheless consistent with US strategy. If the Europeans support institutionalization as a good in its own right even where the consequence is to squeeze the US role (creating, for instance, pressure for the United States to withdraw its military presence), exclude Taiwan and other such steps, this is liable to be seen as antithetical to US interests. Other steps that have been mooted, such as European cross-straits "mediation", would likely be viewed with a similar degree of suspicion. There is, of course, a hypothetical fifth scenario, in which Europe aligns more fully with China, but it is hard to see why such a provocative step would be taken unless there was a serious and sustained transatlantic rift.

#### structural tensions in US-China relationship ensures

Small 7 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund - previously worked as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office; as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and was an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Graduated from Oxford. “China-Eu: A Common Future” edited by Stanley Crossick (Founding Chairman, European Policy Centre, Brussels) & Etienne Reuter (European Commission, Belgium), World Scientific Publishing Co., Chapter 6, p. 73-80)

More important than these particular twists though is the basic structure of the two primary relationships. Despite their differences, Europe and the United States have a long tradition of strategic cooperation, a fully-flcdgcd military alliance, deeply integrated economics (not least in the defense sector), and shared commitments to a number of basic values. China and the United States have an increasingly integrated — if sometimes testy — economic relationship, but despite growing diplomatic coordination over issues such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, the broader political and security relationship is still characterized on both sides by hedging, mistrust over intentions and a perceived gap in values. Most obviously, the US security commitment to Taiwan and Chinese threats of force against the island ensure that the two sides are engaged in on-going preparations for the eventuality of war with each other. The net result is a mix of cooperative and competitive elements that amounts neither to full partnership nor to overt rivalry.¶ Deep transatlantic cooperation could not coexist with these structural tensions in the US-China relationship without there being certain implied constraints on the scope of Sino-Europcan relations. The United States expects that even it the Europeans arc not going to provide active support to US security policy in East Asia, there will at least be no serious moves to undermine it by selling arms or key technologies to China that could place US targets at greater risk during a war. A similar expectation is seen in the case of Israel, another key US ally without security responsibilities in East Asia, whose potential arms sales to China have been treated by the United States as inconsistent with the maintenance of strong US ties. Both Israel and Europe have faced the prospect of restricted transfers of US military technology, blocks on Pentagon purchases and other steps with serious repercussions for future military cooperation.

### Heg Good: Terror—1NC

#### Leadership is key to global stability-withdrawal would lead to terrorism and global conflicts

Peter Brooks, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation, "Why They Need Us: Imagine a World Without America,” NEW YORK POST, July 4, 2006. Available from the World Wide Web at: [www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070406a.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070406a.cfm), accessed 10/10/06.

For all the worldwide whining and bellyaching about the United States, today - America's 230th birthday - provides an opportune time for them to consider for just a moment what the world might be like without good ol' Uncle Sam. The picture isn't pretty. Absent U.S. leadership, diplomatic influence, military might, economic power and unprecedented generosity, life aboard planet earth would likely be pretty grim**,** indeed. Set aside the differences America made last century - just imagine a world where this country had vanished on Jan. 1, 2001. On security, the United States is the global balance of power. While it's not our preference, we are the world's "cop on the beat," providing critical stability in some of the planet's toughest neighborhoods. Without the U.S. "Globo-cop," rivals India and Pakistan might well find cause to unleash the dogs of war in South Asia - undoubtedly leading to history's first nuclear (weapons) exchange. Talk about Fourth of July fireworks . . . In Afghanistan, al Qaeda would still be an honored guest, scheming over a global caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia. It wouldn't be sending fighters to Iraq; instead, Osama's gang would be fighting them tooth and nail from Saudi Arabia to "Eurabia**."** In Asia, China would be the "Middle Kingdom," gobbling up democratic Taiwan and compelling pacifist Japan (reluctantly) to join the nuclear weapons club. The Koreas might fight another horrific war, resulting in millions of deaths. A resurgent Russia, meanwhile, would be breathing down the neck of its "near abroad" neighbors. Forget the democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Comrade! In Europe, they'd be taking orders from Paris or Berlin - if those rivals weren't at each other's throats again. In Africa, Liberia would still be under Charles Taylor's sway, and Sudan would have no peace agreement. And what other nation could or would provide freedom of the seas for commerce, including the shipment of oil and gas - all free of charge? Weapons of mass destruction would be everywhere. North Korea would be brandishing a solid nuclear arsenal. Libya would not have given up its weapons, and Pakistan's prodigious proliferator, A.Q. Khan, would still be going door to door, hawking his nuclear wares.

### Unipolarity Good: F/L

#### Unipolarity key to international peace—power advantage checks military competition, creates economic openness and increases international norms

**Griffiths**(School of Political and International Studies @ Flinders Univ) **03**

[Martin, Self-Inflicted Wounds: United States Grand Stategy and the War on Terror, Oct]

As long as a hegemon maintains a preponderance of power, other states are inclined to accept its leadership (though much also depends on the hegemon’s legitimacy, a concept which will be discussed later), since challenging a hegemon can be a risky venture. However, historical change dictates shifts in power preponderance over time. Other states begin to rise in power, due to uneven rates of economic growth and technological advance, and the hegemon declines, relatively or absolutely. When a rising power or powers sees an opportunity to challenge and displace an existing hegemon, the risk of major war is high (Gilpin 1981, 1994). Thus, when British hegemony declined in the face of the rising challenge from Germany, the stage was set for the First World War. The theory of hegemonic stability was developed in the 1970s and 1980s by American scholars from the realist tradition who identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in explaining the openness and stability of the international economy (Grunberg 1990). A powerful state with a technological advantage over other states will desire an open trading system as it seeks new export markets. Large states are less exposed to the international economy than small ones. A hegemonic state will allow other states to ‘free ride’ on the benefits that the hegemon provides to the international economy in the form of public goods (Conybeare 1984, Gowa 1989). These are the kind of goods where exclusion of consumers is impossible and consumption of the good by one actor does not exhaust its availability for others. In international economic affairs an open trading system, well-defined property rights, common standards of measures including international money, consistent macroeconomic policies, proper action in case of economic crisis, and stable exchange rates are said to be public goods. In international society, an established hegemony helps the cause of international peace in a number of ways. First, a hegemon deters renewed military competition and provides general security through its preponderant power. Second, a hegemon can, if it chooses, strengthen international norms of conduct. Third, a hegemon’s economic power serves as the basis of a global lending system and free trade regime, providing economic incentives for states to cooperate and forego wars for resources and markets. Such was the nature of British hegemony in the nineteenth century, hence the term *Pax Britannica.* After World War Two, the U.S. has performed the roles Britain once played, though with an even greater preponderance of power. Thus, much of the peace between democracies after World War Two can be explained by the fact that the political-military hegemony of the United States has helped to create a security structure in Europe and the Pacific conducive to peaceful interaction. Today, U.S. hegemony is tolerated by many states in Europe and Asia, not because the U.S. is particularly liked, but because of the perception that the absence of a U.S. presence might result in aggression by aspiring regional hegemons. However, Chalmers Johnson (2000) has argued that this is a false perception promoted from Washington to silence demands for its military withdrawal from Japan and South Korea.

### Multipolarity Bad: F/L

#### First, shifting towards multipolarity risks great power wars—distribution of power more easily shifts

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**[Aaron, International Security, Winter, p. 8, p. asp]**

The answer to these questions comes in two parts. First, at the level of structure, multipolar systems do seem prone to certain pathologies. Systems in which power is distributed at the outset more or less evenly among a substantial number of states do not remain indefinitely in peaceful equilibrium. As, inevitably, the distribution of power among states shifts, wars tend to break out. The history of the European state system before 1945 is a story of multipolarity; it is also a story of war, and not only small wars for limited ends, but big, system-shattering struggles. The mere existence of an assortment of potential alliance partners has not always guaranteed the prompt formation of countervailing coalitions, as advocates of multipolarity suggest that it should. In other words, the balance has not always balanced, or balanced quickly enough to deter an aggressive state or alliance.

## 1NR

### CP

#### The armed conflict framework authorizes targeted killings outside of zones of hostilities in a manner that’s consistent with international law – it’s key to deny safe havens.

Wittes 13 [Benjamin, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2/27, “Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?” p. 3-6, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Testimony/2013/02/27%20drones%20wittes/Feb%2027%20Drones%20Wittes%20Testimony.pdf]

First, the administration contends that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. President Obama himself made the point in a major address as early as May 2009 that warfare lay at the heart of the relationship between the United States and certain foreign terrorist organizations, saying, “Now let me be clear: we are indeed at war with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.”2 ¶ The administration has since consistently maintained that the United States’ use of force in the current conflict is authorized by Congress—specifically by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)3—and consistent with international law.4¶ The nature of this conflict, it bears emphasis, involves actual war—not war as a metaphor for policy seriousness, but armed conflict in the strict legal sense. This is the government’s position—including the Congress’s position—even though the enemy is not a state. In the parlance of international law, the United States considers itself as fighting a “non-international armed conflict”—that is, an armed conflict against something other than another sovereign state. Since many U.S. actions using lethal force would constitute murder or other crimes during peacetime, this is actually a pivotal point. ¶ Another important aspect of the government’s view of the conflict is that the war is not limited to Al Qaeda itself, but also includes its “affiliates,” at least when those affiliates qualify as “associated forces.” This is an intentional framing of the activity and identity of these groups so as to treat them within the framework of co-belligerency for purposes of international law. And while many commentators have asserted that the armed conflict is limited legally to particular theaters of conflict or hot battlefields, the administration has consistently rejected this notion as well. Attorney General Eric Holder addressed this point in a major address last March at Northwestern University:¶ Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts have limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, Al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks—fortunately, unsuccessful—against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.5¶ The notions that an armed conflict exists, that it is not limited to Afghanistan but extends at least to those places from which the enemy strikes, and that it includes Al Qaeda’s co-belligerent forces are all contested by advocacy groups, international organizations, and prominent figures in the legal academy. Importantly, as Holder noted, however, they have not been contested either by the Congress or by the courts. The AUMF did not specify a legal geography of the conflict and thereby create zones of impunity to which this country’s military enemies might flee and from which they might then attack—and Congress has never sought to impose geographic limits on the conflict after the fact either. In fact, Congress in 2012 specifically reaffirmed—as least as regards detention authority—that the AUMF was still a vital document and reached members and supporters of enemy groups, including associated forces. It did so, once again, without reference to geography.6 What’s more, the courts, in Guantánamo detention cases, have recognized both that the armed conflict extends beyond the hot battlefield of Afghanistan7 and that the executive branch’s authority to use force extends beyond core Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and includes “associated forces.”8 In other words, there is no dispute among the branches of government that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its cobelligerents, wherever they may be.¶ Second, in this armed conflict—as, indeed, in any armed conflict—the United States is lawfully entitled to target the enemy with lethal force. The existence of an ongoing armed conflict means that, legally speaking, the administration can strike, assuming the target is a lawful one, whenever it wants. As a matter of international law and domestic AUMF authority, it does not have to do a separate legal analysis of whether force can be used against each individual member of enemy forces or whether each individual member poses an imminent threat; a single conflict is, after all, already under way. Nor is there some general legal obligation to seek to capture a lawful target before attacking using lethal force where the target is not hors de combat. Similarly, there is no obligation to give warning or to offer surrender before launching an attack, though surrender must be accepted once completed. While the administration has made it clear that, as a policy matter, it does prefer to capture whenever possible—to reap the intelligence harvest of interrogations, to avoid unnecessary death, and to bring suspects to justice in the criminal justice system—this is generally not a legal requirement but a set of prudential, humanitarian, and tactical considerations.¶ Again, this point should engender no particular controversy—though it nonetheless does. The ability to target the enemy in an armed conflict with lethal force is a simple, and lawful, operational necessity in a world in which enemy organizations in countries and locations impossible to reach by law enforcement continue to threaten the United States. The fact of armed conflict—and the consequent availability of targeting—does not mean automatic recourse to hostilities, of course. There are many places in the world where the United States can and does pursue terrorists through law enforcement, interdiction of terrorist financing, and other non-hostilities-based tools of counterterrorism. But there are other places in the world that are weakly governed, ungoverned, or simply hostile to the United States, where terrorist groups responsible for September 11 have fled, or in which associated terrorist groups or cells have arisen and joined the conflict against the United States. The armed conflict framework, and the inherently-tied authority to target the enemy with lethal force, is essential to reaching these actors and denying them sanctuary from which to attack this country.

#### Armed conflict requirement is key to solve terror.

Groves 13 [Steven, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 4/10, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad]

While U.S. drone strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan have garnered little attention by comparison, human rights activists and international legal academics have criticized strikes on the territory of countries outside that “hot” battlefield for several years. However, the ongoing armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda is not confined to the territory where the September 11 plot was hatched. Nor is the U.S. right to defend itself against imminent threats posed by al-Qaeda restricted to only Afghanistan. While al-Qaeda and its associated forces have metastasized to different parts of the world, they have maintained their intent to strike the United States and kill its citizens wherever they may be. The United States must continue to deter and eliminate that threat with drone strikes and any other means at its disposal.¶ Congressional Authorization. As an initial matter, it should be noted that U.S. armed forces possess the domestic authority to use force against al-Qaeda wherever its operatives may be located and found to pose a threat to U.S. national security. Days after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force.[28] The AUMF’s stated purpose is “to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States” by any person, organization, or nation that the President determines to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks. To achieve that end, the President may “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons.”¶ Congress attached no temporal or geographic limitations to its authorization. Nothing in the AUMF limits U.S. forces from pursuing al-Qaeda outside the borders of Afghanistan or requires U.S. forces to cease hostilities upon achieving a particular military objective. As long as a person, organization, or nation is found to have planned, authorized, committed, or aided the September 11 attacks, the President may use all force he deems necessary and appropriate against that person, organization, or nation to prevent any future act of terrorism against the United States.¶ Neither the U.N. Charter nor Security Council Resolution 1368 places geographic limitations on the right of self-defense. When elements of al-Qaeda and the Taliban plan and launch attacks against the United States or Afghan forces from Pakistan, Yemen, or elsewhere, the United States has the right to target those elements on Pakistani and Yemeni soil. The fact that al-Qaeda and its associated forces currently operate from bases in Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel does not somehow extinguish the right of the United States to defend itself.

#### Means X and turns the environment impact

#### Starr 12 [Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,” <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/>]

In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke. This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block most sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth . The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict 40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death. A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be a mass extinction event that would wipe out many animals living at the top of the food chains - including human beings.

#### This turns the econ impx as well

Owen B. **Toon 7**, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, **people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals**. At the same time, **advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car**, small plane or boat **to the heart of a city**. We demonstrate here that **a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million** in some cases, **and casualties exceeding one million**. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, **even a single surface nuclear explosion**, or an air burst in rainy conditions, **in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades** owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, **the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences**. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and **terrorists would be most likely to strike there**. Accordingly, an organized **attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists** supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to those** once **predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict**. Remarkably, the **estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### CP avoids this and solves norms – host states consent and US justifications are perceived as valid.

Lewis & Crawford 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1166,

, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF]

Lastly, the legal justiﬁcation advanced by the United States for its drone use does not seek an “ever-expanding entitlement” to use drones around the world, nor is it likely to result in the use of drones against the United States. While states must always be wary of conducting themselves in a manner that serves their short-term security interests while creating a damaging long-term precedent, it does not appear that the United States’ legal justiﬁcation does that. Because the justiﬁcation is largely based upon the consent of the state in which force is employed, there are minimal sovereignty concerns related to drone use. Those concerns do arise when a state is unable or unwilling to prevent non-state actors within its borders from engaging in an armed conﬂict with another state. These concerns should be addressed by showing proper deference to the targeted state in arriving at an “unable or unwilling” determination. As long as proper deference is shown to the target state, an emerging legal norm allowing for selfdefense targeting of non-state actors on the territory of a third state if that “host” state is either unable or unwilling to detain or expel the non-state actors does not threaten the stability and cohesion of the international order, nor is it likely to “haunt” the United States in the future.169

### LOAC

#### Plan will be circumvented on the operational level – turns the case and undermines the credibility of LOAC

**Blank, 13 –** professor of law at Emory (Laurie, “LEARNING TO LIVE WITH (A LITTLE) UNCERTAINTY: THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT DEBATE” <http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-347.pdf>)

Third, the enforcement and accountability stage of conflict introduces similar challenges as a result of the interaction of a new law of war framework with operational needs during conflict. Accountability for legal violations during armed conflict is an essential component of ensuring LOAC compliance, thus maximizing the law’s ability to protect civilians and others hors de combat and to ensure humane treatment, among other goals. Over the past few decades, the remarkable development of an international criminal jurisprudence—through the work of ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and the International Criminal Court, among other mechanisms—has demonstrated the vital role that accountability plays in enforcing the law, in bringing justice to the victims, and, in some cases, in helping to promote reconciliation. The application of the law in the courtroom, however, must be operationally relevant in order to serve as a useful guide for commanders in future military operations. If it is not, the likelihood that the law will be seen as irrelevant or too hard to follow is unfortunately far too great and is a serious concern.30

In the specific context of a law of war framework designed to incorporate additional procedural guarantees and legal regimes in addressing targeting and detention issues across a range of geographic spaces in a transnational conflict, these accountability challenges will loom even larger. First, the relevant legal obligations will be based not only on LOAC but on additional legal regimes as well, such as human rights law or domestic constitutional law, for example. Second, the nature of those obligations and the way in which the various legal regimes relate to each other within this new law of war paradigm will change depending on where, geographically, the relevant conduct takes place. And, as noted above, , the lines between geographic areas that drive different legal obligations are not fixed during a conflict with a transnational actor but rather will shift in accordance with the nature of the threat, the state’s response, and other factors. Current cases before the military commissions in the United States already demonstrate the jurisdictional hurdles posed by a conflict whose geographic and temporal parameters are difficult to identify; 31 these challenges will be magnified exponentially if different components of the same conflict trigger different legal obligations as a result of a new framework based on a sliding scale of procedural obligations relative to geographical location and other factors. Furthermore, enforcement of LOAC always helps to guide future decisionmaking by commanders, judge advocates, and others, but the nature of an accountability process in this new law of war framework will unfortunately not foster greater clarity and predictability. Which precedents would apply in which areas, and for how long? Military commanders and other decisionmakers would be left with the unenviable task of sorting through the uncertainty of the legal precedents and judgments or might simply disregard these precedents as not applicable, an equally problematic outcome. As a result, even when a new framework offers the apparent potential for greater procedural protections or other metrics of effectiveness, if it divorces the decisionmaking and, later, the enforcement process from the operational realities of military operations, it is likely to be viewed as irrelevant or, still worse, as doing more harm than good.

#### AND, our impact is 100 million times greater than nuclear war

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The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face evengreater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics “fade out” by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore’s Law.

Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society’s ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, “Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”

Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction:

A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, **the stakes are** one million times greater **for extinction than for** the more modest **nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions** of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

Human rights constraints on LOAC cause global war

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Not everybody likes the down-to-earth attitude that LOAC takes vis-à-vis warfare. Indeed, in recent years, a new major problem has arisen. The clear and present danger of the barbarians in front remains unabated. But, in the meantime, another menace has evolved in the back. This menace comes from the human rights zealots and do-goodniks, whom I shall call “human rights–niks” for short. Far be it from me to suggest that every human rights scholar or activist necessarily comes under this rubric. In fact, we have in our midst some genuine scholars in the arena of human rights (preeminently, Françoise Hampson) for whom I have the greatest respect. But all too often today we encounter the unpleasant phenomenon of human rights–niks who, hoisting the banner of human rights law, are attempting to bring about a hostile takeover of LOAC. This is an encroachment that we must stoutly resist.

The human rights–niks in the back are by no means to be confused with the barbarians in front: far from endorsing methods of barbarism, the human rights–niks would prefer a non-violent solution to every conflict. Nevertheless, the danger that the human rights–niks pose is equally acute, since they threaten to pull the legal rug from under our feet. They thus aid and abet the lawfare of the enemy by leaving the civil society with the impression that we are acting (or reacting) in a manner that is incompatible with the loftier aspirations of the law.

Inter alia, human rights–niks would like to revolutionize the field by introducing a normative system of warfare characterized by zero collateral damage to civilians. To accomplish that, they would like to disallow attacks against lawful military targets, if these entail some collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects. Since (as indicated) such collateral damage is bound to happen, this would imply the banning of almost all attacks against enemy combatants and military objectives.

The legal revolution that human rights–niks wish to engender relates to the broad spectrum of norms that govern the conduct of hostilities. Human rights– niks tacitly accuse us of applying the wrong legal system by following LOAC instead of human rights law. They would like to see human rights law applicable in wartime as much as in peacetime: not side by side with, but in lieu of, LOAC. This kind of approach often resonates with the lay (and basically uninformed) public at large, if only because lots of people cannot tell “human” apart from “humanitarian” when LOAC is referred to (as it recurrently is) as “international humanitarian law.” After all, it is the humanitarian impulse that propels both human rights law and international humanitarian law (aka LOAC). The trouble is that, if we were to do what the human rights–niks want us to do, hostilities would become impracticable. That is to say, all forms of warfare would be beyond the pale. Many human rights–niks do not hide that this is what they truly—and ultimately—want. They are animated by genuine motives of pacifism (echoed even in one of the questions posed during the questions-and-answers time in our own conference), and they believe that LOAC stands in their way. What they fail to grasp is that, while war may be nobly wished away, it is not a phenomenon that is likely to disappear as long as there are barbarians who force it on the civilized world. And it is impossible to fight a war if we are not ready to shed blood. LOAC is doing what it can to ensure that bloodletting is confined to combatants, leaving innocent civilians out of the circle of fire. Still, zero collateral damage to civilians (or civilian objects) is not a hardheaded scenario in war, and LOAC recognizes that naked truth.

When the position is examined objectively, it becomes obvious that LOAC is the only effective dike against “total war.” Without LOAC, civilian casualties in wartime will not be reduced: they will escalate. If human rights law were to replace LOAC—if no feasible options of conducting hostilities were left to belligerent parties in war—ultimately no rules would survive, inasmuch as the legal paper-constraints would simply be ignored by the clashing armies. Therefore, the genuine option that must be exercised is not between LOAC (characterized by pragmatism and common sense) and human rights law (untainted in its pristine purity). It is between LOAC and lawlessness. And just as we strenuously reject lawlessness as practiced by the barbarians, we must not allow lawlessness to be inflicted on our own side out of a misguided belief in some notional primacy—in the wrong context— of human rights precepts.

Many people think that the best solution to the problem is a compromise of sorts, reflected in the dual application of both LOAC and human rights law (side by side with one another) in an armed conflict. This may sound ideal, except that, for several reasons, such duality is neither necessary nor even possible in multiple contexts.