**1**

**A. Interpretation**

**“Statutory restrictions” require congressional action**

**Kershner 10** (Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

**The process by which the President fills an Executive Branch position is governed by the Appointments Clause:**

[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. n81

**This process is divided into three phases: (1) Congress creates an Executive Branch position by statute**; n82 (2) the President nominates an individual to fill the position; n83 and (3) the Senate confirms the nominee. n84 The Clause covers a specified list of positions and the generic "other Officers of the United States." n85 **The Clause controls who nominates, appoints, and confirms an individual for such a position**. n86 Finally, the Clause defines a separate process for inferior officers. n87 It should be noted, however, that the Appointments Clause limits but does not empower Congress to create positions. n88 That power comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause. n89

**The House of Representatives has no role in the process of nomination and appointment and is specifically not mentioned in the [\*626] Appointments Clause**. All of **the powers contained in the Appointments Clause are reserved to the President, the Senate, or both**. n90 The Appointments Clause makes a distinction between the power to nominate and the separate power to appoint. **The power of nomination is textually reserved to the President of the United States, n91 whereas the power of appointment is shared by the President and the Senate**. n92 **Statutory restrictions violate the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the very act of passing a statute requires the involvement of the House of Representatives.** n93

**Statutory restrictions on the appointments process are further problematic because the Appointments Clause's power to nominate is vested solely in the President**. n94 Those statutory restrictions that limit the President's power to nominate violate the plain text of the Clause. n95 **Where the Constitution provides a clear procedural process, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict principles of formalism,** construing the text so as to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the various branches of government. n96

The Senate's role in the appointments process is the final confirmation of a nominee. n97 The "advice and consent" of the Senate applies only to the appointment power. n98 The President and the Senate have interpreted advice as non-binding guidance, and have interpreted [\*627] consent as the act of confirmation. n99 Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the Senate only the narrow function of confirming nominees. n100

**Judicial restrictions” are imposed by the court**

**Singer 7** (Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (**noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs**"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (**discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs**); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, **Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era**, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (**discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force**).

**B. Violation—the aff does not advocate an increase in statuatory or judicial restrictions**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. Limits—by arbitrarily choosing to not defend parts of the topic, they explode the possible number of affs—makes neg research prep impossible**

**A limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash**

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, **Argumentation and** Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate:** the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered.** For example**, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take jobs** from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.** To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions,** frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate** during the summer of 2007. **Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. **Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad,** too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

**2. Topic education—they avoid the core question of the resolution, which is how authority can be limited—allows them to spike out of circumvention arguments which kills negative ground**

**Debating about policy details is key to influence the political process and create change**

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "**the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high**." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. **Not many top-ranked scholars** of international relations **are going into government**, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). **The fault** for this growing gap **lies** not with the government but **with** the **academics**. **Scholars** are **pay**ing **less attention to** questions about **how their work relates to the policy world**, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, **academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can**. Moreover, **such engagement can enhance** and enrich **academic work, and** thus **the ability of academics to teach the next generation**. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "**the** growing **withdrawal of** university **scholars behind curtains of theory** and modeling **would** not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. **Some** academics **say that while the** growing **gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy**, **it** has **produced better social science theory**, and that **this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant**. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But **the danger is** that **academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less**. Even when **academics** supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they **face** many **competitors for attention**. More than 1,200 **think tanks** in the United States **provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment** or consult **at a moment's notice**. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but **many add a bias** provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, **the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community**. **The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself**. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

**Academic, institutions-based debate regarding war powers is critical to check excessive presidential authority---college students key**

Kelly Michael **Young 13**, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

**Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope** and techniques **of presidential war making**. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. **Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents** have frequently **ignore**s **the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations.** After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, **many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions**, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, **a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on** the status of **democratic checks and national security** of the United States.¶ Lastly, **debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers**. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, **an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public**. **As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government”** (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, **this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is** potential **affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.**

**2**

**The aff’s reliance on race and gender as the site of political contestation is not an accidental instance of ignoring class. The demand arises out of the crisis of liberalism—such politics particularizes the oppressions of capitalism to the point that the universal system is naturalized. Attaining white, male bourgeoisse privilege becomes the bench-mark of success, re-entrenching the foundation of the system**

Wendy **Brown**, Professor & genuis, “Wounded Attachments,” POLITICAL THEORY, August 19**93**, ASP.

Although **this détente between universal and particular within liberalism** is potted with volatile conceits**, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity**, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. **On** **one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests**, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 **On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive** nation-state **identification:** deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. **These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes**, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "**disciplinary power" produces social identifies** (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) **that crosscut juridical identities based on** abstract **righ**t. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, **the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal**-the transparent fiction of state universality-**combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion** from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, **liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices**. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Th**us disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities**. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that **what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism** and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. **In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will** appear **not** as a **supplement** to **class politics**, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, **not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations** of power and persons-all of which they also are-**but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribe**s **a bour- geois ideal as its measure.**

**If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that** can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that **identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire.** From this perspective**, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through** **race**, **gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that** **when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism** (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) **are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight.** **Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.**

**the aff’s appeal to personal experience and portraying class as one of a laundry list of oppressions naturalizes inequality and precludes a universal starting point to challenge capitalism**

**Gimenez (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 01 [Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html]**

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This **pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge**. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9).

**I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression a**nd exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. **Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites**; it is, at the same time, **unique, personal, insightful** and revealing **and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about** (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it **is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered."**

**In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression** with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). **Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental** than gender or racial oppression; it **simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the** researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, **however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even** though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). **While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites;** both a site of exploitation and, objectively, **a site where the potential agents of social change are forged**. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. **The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth**, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are **nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class**" in RGC **remains a neutral concept**, open to any and all theoretical meanings, **just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential**.

Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). **The assumption of the simultaneity of experience** (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) **together with the ambiguity inherent** in the interactions themselves**, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue** that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But **the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others**. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. **Class relations** -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- **are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them.** Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. **Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.**

**Materialism explains reality…focus on the discursive/symbolic obfuscates that relation and makes oppression inevitable**

The affirmatives focus on the discursive/symbolic reveals the extent to which they have given up on actually challenging the structures of oppression. But far from being a post-capitalist age in which all social experience is textually or discursively produced, it is a material world. Only a materialist method can account for the ways in which certain classes create and deploy rhetoric to legitimize a capitalist mode of social relations

**Cloud** (Prof of Comm at Texas) **01**

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm]

 At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). **We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomen**a. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them**. In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure** at the level of the economy and the state. **It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformatio**n even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. **At the core of the issue is a debate** across the humanities and social sciences with regard to **whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment** in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, **there is a great deal of evidence against claims** that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, **both class polarization** (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) **and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism** (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) **still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts**. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in **the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor** in the U.S. (as well as **around the world) continued to grow,** **in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates**. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8**). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation** and progressive critical practice **in fact encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and** perhaps **revolutionary potential. Instead**, on their arguments, **we must** recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and **settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism.** Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn**: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases** they themselves **are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world**" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. **The point**, though, **is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other**. Marxist ideology critique, understands that **classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics** wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. **Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.** [cont’d] [cont;d] Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). **Within this understanding**, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: **Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said,** into the silences and the suppressed or missing, **in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details** and representations **of our lives**. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, **materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--**specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges**. (p. 7)

**\*Racism is a byproduct of the violent history of capital accumulation- understanding the historical basis is essential to effective anti-racist and anti-capitalist politics**

Tom **Keefer**, member of Facing Reality, in New Socialist Magazine, January **2003**. <http://www.newsocialist.org/magazine/39/article03.html> **ableism-edited**

The brutality and viciousness of capitalism is well known to the oppressed and exploited of this world. Billions of people throughout the world spend their lives incessantly toiling to enrich the already wealthy, while throughout history any serious attempts to build alternatives to capitalism have been met with bombings, invasions, and blockades by imperialist nation states. Although the modern day ideologues of the mass media and of institutions such as the World Bank and IMF never cease to inveigh against scattered acts of violence perpetrated against their system, they always neglect to mention that the capitalist system they lord over was called into existence and has only been able to maintain itself by the sustained application of systematic violence. It should come as no surprise that **this capitalist system**, which we can only hope is now reaching the era of its final demise, **was just as rapacious** and vicious **in its youth as it is now. The "rosy dawn" of capitalist production was inaugurated by the process of slavery and genocide in the western hemisphere**, and this "primitive accumulation of capital" resulted in the largest systematic murder of human beings ever seen. However, **the rulers of society have found that naked force is often most economically used in conjunction with ideologies of domination and control which provide a legitimizing explanation for the oppressive nature of society. Racism is such a construct** and it came into being as a social relation which condoned and secured the initial genocidal processes of capitalist accumulation--the founding stones of contemporary bourgeois society. While it is widely accepted that the embryonic capitalist class came to power in the great bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, what is comparatively less well known is the crucial role that chattel slavery and the plunder of the "New World" played in calling this class into being and providing the "primitive accumulation of capital" necessary to launch and sustain industrialization in Europe. The accidental "discovery" of the Western Hemisphere by the mass murderer Christopher Columbus in 1492 changed everything for the rival economic and political interests of the European states. The looting and pillaging of the "New World" destabilized the European social order, as Spain raised huge armies and built armadas with the unending streams of gold and silver coming from the "New World", the spending of which devalued the currency reserves of its rivals. The only way Portugal, England, Holland, and France could stay ahead in the regional power games of Europe was to embark on their own colonial ventures. **In addition to the extraction of precious minerals and the looting** and pillaging **of indigenous societies, European merchant-adventurers realized that substantial profits could also be made through the production of cash crops on the fertile lands surrounding the Caribbean sea. The only problem was that as the indigenous population either fled from enslavement or perished** from the diseases and deprivations of the Europeans, **there was no one left to raise the** sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and other **tropical cash crops that were so profitable. A system of waged labour would not work for the simple reason that with plentiful land and easy means of subsistence surrounding them, colonists would naturally prefer small scale homesteading instead of labouring for their masters**. As the planter Emanuel Downing of Massachusetts put it in 1645: "I do not see how we can thrive until we get a stock of slaves sufficient to do all our business, for our children's children will hardly see this great continent filled with people so that our servants will still desire freedom to plant for themselves, and not stay but for very great wages." **Capitalistic social relations have always been based on compulsion, and they require as a precondition that workers possess nothing but their capacity to labour**. The would-be developers of the wealth of the "New World" thus turned to forced labour in complete contradiction to all the theories of bourgeois economists because unfree labour was the only kind of labour applicable to the concrete situation in the Americas. **Although slavery is now**, and has almost always been **equated with unfree Black labour, it was not always**, or even **predominantly so. Capitalists looked first to their own societies in order to find the population to labour in servitude on the large-scale plantations necessary for tropical cash crop production**. Eric Williams, in his groundbreaking work Capitalism and Slavery, noted that in the early stages of **colonialism "white slavery was the historic base upon which Negro [sic] slavery was constructed." Between 1607 and 1783 over a quarter million "white" indentured servants arrived in the British colonies alone where they were set to work in the agricultural and industrial processes of the time. The shipping companies, ports, and trading routes established for the transport of the poor, "criminal", and lumpen elements of European society were to form the [core]**backbone **of the future slave trade of Africans. `**

**Slavery became an exclusively Black institution due to the dynamics of class struggle as repeated multi-ethnic rebellions of African slaves and indentured European servants led the slaveholders to seek strategies to divide and conquer. The fact that an African slave could be purchased for life with the same amount of money that it would cost to buy an indentured servant for 10 years, and that the African's skin color would function as an instrument of social control by making it easier to track down runaway slaves** in a land where all whites were free wage labourers and all Black people slaves, **provided further incentives for this system of racial classification**. In the **colonies where there was an insufficient free white population to provide a counterbalance to potential slave insurgencies, such as on the Caribbean islands, an elaborate hierarchy of racial privilege was built up, with the lighter skinned "mulattos" admitted to the ranks of free men where they often owned slaves themselves.** **The concept of a "white race" never really existed before the economic systems of early capitalism made it a necessary social construct to aid in the repression of enslaved Africans. Xenophobia and hostility towards those who were different than one's own immediate family, clan, or tribe were certainly evident, and discrimination based on religious status was also widespread but the development of modern "scientific" racism with its view that there are physically distinct "races" within humanity, with distinct attributes and characteristics is peculiar to the conquest of the Americas, the rise of slavery, and the imperialist domination of the entire world. Racism provided a convenient way to explain the subordinate position of Africans and other victims** of Euro-colonialism**, while at the same time providing an apparatus upon which to structure the granting of special privileges to sectors of the working class admitted as members of the "white race".** As David McNally has noted, one of the key component of modern racism was its utility in **resolving the contradiction as to how the modern European societies in which the bourgeoisie had come to power through promising "freedom" and "equality" were so reliant on slave labour and murderous, yet highly profitable colonial adventures.** **The development of** a concept like **racism allowed whole sections of the world's population to be "excommunicated" from humankind, and then be murdered or worked to death with a clear conscience for the profit of the capitalist class**. To get a sense of the scale of slavery and its economic importance, and thus an understanding of the material incentives for the creation of ideological constructs such as "race", a few statistics regarding the English slave trade from Eric Williams' book Capitalism and Slavery help to put things in context. The Royal African Company, a monopolistic crown corporation, transported an average of 5 000 slaves a year between 1680 and 1686. When the ability to engage in the free trade of slaves was recognized as a "fundamental and natural right" of the Englishman, one port city alone, Bristol, shipped 160 950 slaves from 1698-1707. In 1760, 146 slave ships with a capacity for 36 000 slaves sailed from British ports, while in 1771 that number had increased to 190 ships with a capacity for 47 000 slaves. Between 1700 and 1786 over 610 000 slaves were imported to Jamaica alone, and conservative estimates for the total import of slaves into all British colonies between 1680 and 1786 are put at over two million. All told, many historians place the total number of Africans displaced by the Atlantic slave trade as being between twelve and thirty million people--a massive historical event and forced migration of unprecedented proportions. These large numbers of slaves and the success of the slave trade as jump starter for capitalist industrialization came from what has been called the "triangular trade"--an intensely profitable economic relationship which built up European industry while systematically deforming and underdeveloping the other economic regions involved. The Europeans would produce manufactured goods that would then be traded to ruling elites in the various African kingdoms. They in turn would use the firearms and trading goods of the Europeans to enrich themselves by capturing members of rival tribes, or the less fortunate of their own society, to sell them as slaves to the European merchants who would fill their now empty ships with slaves destined to work in the colonial plantations. On the plantations, the slaves would toil to produce expensive cash crops that could not be grown in Europe. These raw materials were then refined and sold at fantastic profit in Europe. In 1697, the tiny island of Barbados with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania combined, while by 1798, the income accruing to the British from the West Indian plantations alone was four million pounds a year, as opposed to one million pounds from the whole rest of the world. Capitalist economists of the day recognized the super profitability of slavery by noting the ease of making 100% profit on the trade, and by noting that one African slave was as profitable as seven workers in the mainland. Even more importantly, the profits of the slave trade were plowed back into further economic growth. Capital from the slave trade financed James Watt and the invention and production of the steam engine, while the shipping, insurance, banking, mining, and textile industries were all thoroughly integrated into the slave trade. **What an analysis of the origins of modern capitalism shows is just how far the capitalist class will go** to make a profit**. The development of a pernicious racist ideology, spread to justify the uprooting and enslavement of millions of people to transport them across the world to fill a land whose indigenous population was massacred or worked to death, represents the beginnings of the system** that George W. Bush defends as "our way of life". **For revolutionaries today who seek to understand and transform capitalism and the racism encoded into its very being, it is essential to understand how and why these systems of domination and exploitation came into being before we can hope to successfully overthrow them.**

**The alternative has two parts**

**The first is about debate- our idea of the debate space is one which recognizes that the ballot isn’t imbued with power and doesn’t have a significant effect on the debate community writ large – the first step towards rejecting the commodity fetishism of the ballot is to refuse to give it power over us . We think debate should be a question of competing methods for changing politics. The alt is “base communism”- which works towards dedicating our labor to caring for community over abstract economies of value.**

**the second is disrupting “common sense”- Even in absence of a blueprint for an alternative – endorsing a politics of labor based on communal relations rather than surplus value is essential to avoid ecological devastation, extinction and fight those things. Decision calculus should not be to expect things to change overnight but be open to the possibility of revolution.**

**Graeber 13** (contributing editor of the Baffler, “A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse”¶ DAVID GRAEBER¶ [from The Baffler No. 22, 2013] http://www.thebaffler.com/past/practical\_utopians\_guide

What is a revolution? We used to think we knew. Revolutions were seizures of power by popular forces aiming to transform the very nature of the political, social, and economic system in the country in which the revolution took place, usually according to some visionary dream of a just society. Nowadays, we live in an age when, if rebel armies do come sweeping into a city, or mass uprisings overthrow a dictator, it’s unlikely to have any such implications; when profound social transformation does occur—as with, say, the rise of feminism—it’s likely to take an entirely different form. It’s not that revolutionary dreams aren’t out there. But **contemporary revolutionaries rarely think they can bring them into being by some modern-day equivalent of storming the Bastille.¶** ¶ At moments like this, it generally pays to go back to the history one already knows and ask: Were revolutions ever really what we thought them to be? For me, the person who has asked this most effectively is the great world historian Immanuel Wallerstein. He argues that for the last quarter millennium or so, revolutions have consisted above all of planetwide transformations of political common sense.¶ Already by the time of the French Revolution, Wallerstein notes, there was a single world market, and increasingly a single world political system as well, dominated by the huge colonial empires. As a result, the storming of the Bastille in Paris could well end up having effects on Denmark, or even Egypt, just as profound as on France itself—in some cases, even more so. Hence he speaks of the “world revolution of 1789,” followed by the “world revolution of 1848,” which saw revolutions break out almost simultaneously in fifty countries, from Wallachia to Brazil. In no case did the revolutionaries succeed in taking power, but afterward, institutions inspired by the French Revolution—notably, universal systems of primary education—were put in place pretty much everywhere. Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a world revolution ultimately responsible for the New Deal and European welfare states as much as for Soviet communism. The last in the series was the world revolution of 1968—which, much like 1848, broke out almost everywhere, from China to Mexico, seized power nowhere, but nonetheless changed everything. This was a revolution against state bureaucracies, and for the inseparability of personal and political liberation, whose most lasting legacy will likely be the birth of modern feminism.¶ A quarter of the American population is now engaged in “guard labor”—defending property, supervising work, or otherwise keeping their fellow Americans in line.¶ **Revolutions are** thus **planetary phenomena**. But there is more. What **they** really do is **transform basic assumptions about what politics is ultimately about. In the wake of a revolution, ideas that had been considered veritably lunatic fringe quickly become the accepted currency of debate. Before the French Revolution, the ideas that change is good, that government policy is the proper way to manage it, and that governments derive their authority from an entity called “the people” were considered the sorts of things one might hear from crackpots and demagogues**, or at best a handful of freethinking intellectuals who spend their time debating in cafés. A generation later, even the stuffiest magistrates, priests, and headmasters had to at least pay lip service to these ideas. Before long, we had reached the situation we are in today: that it’s necessary to lay out the terms for anyone to even notice they are there. They’ve become common sense, the very grounds of political discussion.¶ Until 1968, most world revolutions really just introduced practical refinements: an expanded franchise, universal primary education, the welfare state. The world revolution of 1968, in contrast—whether it took the form it did in China, of a revolt by students and young cadres supporting Mao’s call for a Cultural Revolution; or in Berkeley and New York, where it marked an alliance of students, dropouts, and cultural rebels; or even in Paris, where it was an alliance of students and workers—was a rebellion against bureaucracy, conformity, or anything that fettered the human imagination, a project for the revolutionizing of not just political or economic life, but every aspect of human existence. As a result, in most cases, the rebels didn’t even try to take over the apparatus of state; they saw that apparatus as itself the problem.¶ **It’s fashionable nowadays to view the social movements of the late sixties as an embarrassing failure**. A case can be made for that view. It’s certainly true that in the political sphere, the immediate beneficiary of any widespread change in political common sense—a prioritizing of ideals of individual liberty, imagination, and desire; a hatred of bureaucracy; and suspicions about the role of government—was the political Right. Above all, the movements of the sixties allowed for the mass revival of free market doctrines that had largely been abandoned since the nineteenth century. It’s no coincidence that the same generation who, as teenagers, made the Cultural Revolution in China was the one who, as forty-year-olds, presided over the introduction of capitalism. Since the eighties, “freedom” has come to mean “the market,” and “the market” has come to be seen as identical with capitalism—even, ironically, in places like China, which had known sophisticated markets for thousands of years, but rarely anything that could be described as capitalism.¶ The ironies are endless. While the new free market ideology has framed itself above all as a rejection of bureaucracy, it has, in fact, been responsible for the first administrative system that has operated on a planetary scale, with its endless layering of public and private bureaucracies: the IMF, World Bank, WTO, trade organizations, financial institutions, transnational corporations, NGOs. This is precisely the system that has imposed free market orthodoxy, and opened the world to financial pillage, under the watchful aegis of American arms. It only made sense that the first attempt to recreate a global revolutionary movement, the Global Justice Movement that peaked between 1998 and 2003, was effectively a rebellion against the rule of that very planetary bureaucracy.¶ Future Stop¶ In retrospect, though, I think that later historians will conclude that **the legacy of the sixties revolution was deeper than we now imagine, and that the triumph of capitalist markets and their various planetary administrators and enforcers—which seemed so epochal and permanent in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—was, in fact, far shallower.¶** I’ll take an obvious example. One often hears that antiwar protests in the late sixties and early seventies were ultimately failures, since they did not appreciably speed up the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. But afterward, those controlling U.S. foreign policy were so anxious about being met with similar popular unrest—and even more, with unrest within the military itself, which was genuinely falling apart by the early seventies—that they refused to commit U.S. forces to any major ground conflict for almost thirty years. It took 9/11, an attack that led to thousands of civilian deaths on U.S. soil, to fully overcome the notorious “Vietnam syndrome”—and even then, the war planners made an almost obsessive effort to ensure the wars were effectively protest-proof. Propaganda was incessant, the media was brought on board, experts provided exact calculations on body bag counts (how many U.S. casualties it would take to stir mass opposition), and the rules of engagement were carefully written to keep the count below that.¶ The problem was that since those rules of engagement ensured that thousands of women, children, and old people would end up “collateral damage” in order to minimize deaths and injuries to U.S. soldiers, this meant that in Iraq and Afghanistan, intense hatred for the occupying forces would pretty much guarantee that the United States couldn’t obtain its military objectives. And remarkably, the war planners seemed to be aware of this. It didn’t matter. They considered it far more important to prevent effective opposition at home than to actually win the war. It’s as if American forces in Iraq were ultimately defeated by the ghost of Abbie Hoffman.¶ Clearly, an antiwar movement in the sixties that is still tying the hands of U.S. military planners in 2012 can hardly be considered a failure. But it raises an intriguing question: **What happens when the creation of that sense of failure, of the complete ineffectiveness of political action against the system, becomes the chief objective of those in power?¶** ¶ The thought first occurred to me when participating in the IMF actions in Washington, D.C., in 2002. Coming on the heels of 9/11, we were relatively few and ineffective, the number of police overwhelming. There was no sense that we could succeed in shutting down the meetings. Most of us left feeling vaguely depressed. It was only a few days later, when I talked to someone who had friends attending the meetings, that I learned we had in fact shut them down: the police had introduced such stringent security measures, canceling half the events, that most of the actual meetings had been carried out online. In other words, the government had decided it was more important for protesters to walk away feeling like failures than for the IMF meetings to take place. If you think about it, they afforded protesters extraordinary importance.¶ **Is it possible that this preemptive attitude toward social movements**, the designing of wars and trade summits in such a way that preventing effective opposition is considered more of a priority than the success of the war or summit itself, really reflects a more general principle? **What if** **those currently running the system**, most of whom witnessed the unrest of the sixties firsthand as impressionable youngsters, **are—consciously or unconsciously** (and I suspect it’s more conscious than not)—**obsessed by the prospect of revolutionary social movements once again challenging prevailing common sense?¶** It would explain a lot. **In most of the world, the last thirty years has come to be known as the age of neoliberalism**—one dominated by a revival of the long-since-abandoned nineteenth-century creed that held that free markets and human freedom in general were ultimately the same thing. Neoliberalism has always been wracked by a central paradox. It declares that economic imperatives are to take priority over all others. Politics itself is just a matter of creating the conditions for growing the economy by allowing the magic of the marketplace to do its work. All other hopes and dreams—of equality, of security—are to be sacrificed for the primary goal of economic productivity. **But global economic performance over the last thirty years has been decidedly mediocre**. With one or two spectacular exceptions (notably China, which significantly ignored most neoliberal prescriptions), growth rates have been far below what they were in the days of the old-fashioned, state-directed, welfare-state-oriented capitalism of the fifties, sixties, and even seventies. By its own standards, then, the project was already a colossal failure even before the 2008 collapse.¶ **If, on the other hand, we stop taking world leaders at their word and instead think of neoliberalism as a political project, it suddenly looks spectacularly effective**. The politicians, CEOs, trade bureaucrats, and so forth who regularly meet at summits like Davos or the G20 may have done a miserable job in creating a world capitalist economy that meets the needs of a majority of the world’s inhabitants (let alone produces hope, happiness, security, or meaning), but they have succeeded magnificently **in convincing the world that capitalism—and not just capitalism, but exactly the financialized, semifeudal capitalism we happen to have right now—is the only viable economic system.** If you think about it, this is a remarkable accomplishment.¶ Debt cancellation would make the perfect revolutionary demand.¶ How did they pull it off? The preemptive attitude toward social movements is clearly a part of it; under no conditions can alternatives, or anyone proposing alternatives, be seen to experience success. This helps explain the almost unimaginable investment in “security systems” of one sort or another: the fact that the United States, which lacks any major rival, spends more on its military and intelligence than it did during the Cold War, along with the almost dazzling accumulation of private security agencies, intelligence agencies, militarized police, guards, and mercenaries. Then there are the propaganda organs, including a massive media industry that did not even exist before the sixties, celebrating police. Mostly these systems do not so much attack dissidents directly as contribute to a pervasive climate of fear, jingoistic conformity, life insecurity, and simple despair that makes any thought of changing the world seem an idle fantasy. Yet these security systems are also extremely expensive. Some economists estimate that a quarter of the American population is now engaged in “guard labor” of one sort or another—defending property, supervising work, or otherwise keeping their fellow Americans in line. Economically, most of this disciplinary apparatus is pure deadweight.¶ In fact, **most of the economic innovations of the last thirty years make more sense politically than economically. Eliminating guaranteed life employment for precarious contracts doesn’t really create a more effective workforce, but it is extraordinarily effective in destroying unions and otherwise depoliticizing labor. The same can be said of endlessly increasing working hours. No one has much time for political activity if they’re working sixty-hour weeks.¶** It does often seem that, **whenever there is a choice between one option that makes capitalism seem the only possible economic system, and another that would actually make capitalism a more viable economic system, neoliberalism means always choosing the former.** The combined result is a relentless campaign against the human imagination. Or, to be more precise: imagination, desire, individual creativity, all those things that were to be liberated in the last great world revolution, were to be contained strictly in the domain of consumerism, or perhaps in the virtual realities of the Internet. In all other realms they were to be strictly banished. We are talking about the murdering of dreams, the imposition of an apparatus of hopelessness, designed to squelch any sense of an alternative future. Yet **as a result of putting virtually all their efforts in one political basket, we are left in the bizarre situation of watching the capitalist system crumbling before our very eyes, at just the moment everyone had finally concluded no other system would be possible.¶** Work It Out, Slow It Down¶ **Normally, when you challenge the conventional wisdom—that the current economic and political system is the only possible one—the first reaction you are likely to get is a demand for a detailed architectural blueprint of how an alternative system would work, down to the nature of its financial instruments, energy supplies, and policies of sewer maintenance. Next, you are likely to be asked for a detailed program of how this system will be brought into existence**. **Historically, this is ridiculous. When has social change ever happened according to someone’s blueprint? It’s not as if a small circle of visionaries in Renaissance Florence conceived of something they called “capitalism,” figured out the details of how the stock exchange and factories would someday work, and then put in place a program to bring their visions into reality.** In fact, **the idea is so absurd we might well ask ourselves how it ever occurred to us to imagine this is how change happens to begin**.¶ This is not to say there’s anything wrong with utopian visions. Or even blueprints. They just need to be kept in their place. The theorist Michael Albert has worked out a detailed plan for how a modern economy could run without money on a democratic, participatory basis. I think this is an important achievement—not because I think that exact model could ever be instituted, in exactly the form in which he describes it, but because it makes it impossible to say that such a thing is inconceivable. Still, such models can be only thought experiments. **We cannot really conceive of the problems that will arise when we start trying to build a free society.** What now seem likely to be the thorniest problems might not be problems at all; others that never even occurred to us might prove devilishly difficult. **There are innumerable X-factors.¶ The most obvious is technology.** This is the reason **it’s** so **absurd to imagine activists in Renaissance Italy coming up with a model for a stock exchange and factories—what happened was based on all sorts of technologies that they couldn’t have anticipated, but which in part only emerged because society began to move in the direction that it did.** This might explain, for instance, why so many of the more compelling visions of an anarchist society have been produced by science fiction writers (Ursula K. Le Guin, Starhawk, Kim Stanley Robinson). In fiction, you are at least admitting the technological aspect is guesswork.¶ Myself, **I am less interested in deciding what sort of economic system we should have in a free society than in creating the means by which people can make such decisions for themselves. What might a revolution in common sense actually look like?** I don’t know, but I can think of any number of pieces of conventional wisdom that surely need challenging if we are to create any sort of viable free society. I’ve already explored one—the nature of money and debt—in some detail in a recent book. I even suggested a debt jubilee, a general cancellation, in part just to bring home that money is really just a human product, a set of promises, that by its nature can always be renegotiated.¶ ¶ **Labor**, similarly, **should be renegotiated. Submitting oneself to labor discipline**—supervision, control, even the self-control of the ambitious self-employed—**does not make one a better person.** In most really important ways, it probably makes one worse. To undergo it is a misfortune that at best is sometimes necessary. Yet **it’s only when we reject the idea that such labor is virtuous in itself that we can start to ask what is virtuous about labor**. To which the answer is obvious. Labor is virtuous if it helps others. **A renegotiated definition of productivity should make it easier to reimagine the very nature of what work is**, since, among other things, it will mean that technological development will be redirected less toward creating ever more consumer products and ever more disciplined labor, and more toward eliminating those forms of labor entirely.¶ **What would remain is the kind of work only human beings will ever be able to do: those forms of caring and helping labor** that are at the very center of the crisis that brought about Occupy Wall Street to begin with. **What would happen if we stopped acting as if the primordial form of work is laboring at a production line, or wheat field, or iron foundry, or even in an office cubicle, and instead started from a mother, a teacher, or a caregiver? We might be forced to conclude that the real business of human life is not contributing toward something called “the economy”** (a concept that didn’t even exist three hundred years ago), **but the fact that we are all, and have always been, projects of mutual creation.¶** It’s as if American forces in Iraq were ultimately defeated by the ghost of Abbie Hoffman.¶ **At the moment, probably the most pressing need is simply to slow down the engines of productivity**. This might seem a strange thing to say—our knee-jerk reaction to every crisis is to assume the solution is for everyone to work even more, though of course, this kind of reaction is really precisely the problem—but if **you consider the overall state of the world, the conclusion becomes obvious. We seem to be facing two insoluble problems. On the one hand, we have witnessed an endless series of global debt crises, which have grown only more and more severe since the seventies, to the point where the overall burden of debt—sovereign, municipal, corporate, personal—is obviously unsustainable. On the other, we have an ecological crisis, a galloping process of climate change that is threatening to throw the entire planet into drought, floods, chaos, starvation, and war. The two might** seem unrelated. But **ultimately** they **are the same**. What is debt, after all, but the promise of future productivity? Saying that global debt levels keep rising is simply another way of saying that, as a collectivity, human beings are promising each other to produce an even greater volume of goods and services in the future than they are creating now. But **even current levels are clearly unsustainable. They are precisely what’s destroying the planet, at an ever-increasing pace.¶** Even those running the system are reluctantly beginning to conclude that some kind of mass debt cancellation—some kind of jubilee—is inevitable. The real political struggle is going to be over the form that it takes. Well, isn’t the obvious thing to address both problems simultaneously? Why not a planetary debt cancellation, as broad as practically possible, followed by a mass reduction in working hours: a four-hour day, perhaps, or a guaranteed five-month vacation? This might not only save the planet but also (since it’s not like everyone would just be sitting around in their newfound hours of freedom) begin to change our basic conceptions of what value-creating labor might actually be.¶ Occupy was surely right not to make demands, but if I were to have to formulate one, that would be it. After all, this would be an attack on the dominant ideology at its very strongest points. The morality of debt and the morality of work are the most powerful ideological weapons in the hands of those running the current system. That’s why they cling to them even as they are effectively destroying everything else. It’s also why debt cancellation would make the perfect revolutionary demand.¶ All this might still seem very distant. **At the moment, the planet might seem poised more for a series of unprecedented catastrophes than for the kind of broad moral and political transformation that would open the way to such a world. But if we are going to have any chance of heading off those catastrophes, we’re going to have to change our** accustomed **ways of thinking**. And **as the events of 2011 reveal, the age of revolutions is by no means over. The human imagination stubbornly refuses to die. And the moment any significant number of people simultaneously shake off the shackles that have been placed on that collective imagination, even our most deeply inculcated assumptions about what is and is not politically possible have been known to crumble overnight.**

**Historical materialism is key: you must understand the world before you can change it- grounding sites of political contestation outside of labor humanizes capital and forcloses upon the possibility of revolution.**

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01** [Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any **effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue **that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that **the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (**which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all **determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism** which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. **All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois** left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable,** more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced** by the human mind and is thus free from the **actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.**

**3**

**Capture over drones now**

David **Corn**, “Obama's Counterterrorism Speech: A Pivot Point on Drones and More?,” MOTHER JONES, 5—23—**13**,

http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/05/obama-speech-drones-civil-liberties

So **Obama's speech Thursday on counterterrorism policies**—which follows his administration's acknowledgment yesterday that it had killed four Americans (including Anwar al-Awlaki, an Al Qaeda leader in Yemen)—**is a big deal, for** with this address, **Obama is self-restricting his use of drones and shifting control of them** from the CIA to the military. And the president has approved making public the rules governing drone strikes.¶ The New York Times received the customary pre-speech leak and reported:¶ **A new classified policy guidance** signed by Mr. Obama **will sharply curtail the instances when unmanned aircraft can be used to attack in places that are not overt war zones,** countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The rules will impose the same standard for strikes on foreign enemies now used only for American citizens deemed to be terrorists.¶ Lethal force will be used only against targets who pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans" and cannot feasibly be captured, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said in a letter to Congress, suggesting that threats to a partner like Afghanistan or Yemen alone would not be enough to justify being targeted.¶ These moves may not satisfy civil-liberties-minded critics on sthe right and the left**. Obama is not declaring an end to indefinite detention or announcing the closing of Gitmo—though** he is echoing his State of the Union vow to revive efforts to shut down that prison. Still, these moves would be unimaginable in the Bush years. Bush and Cheney essentially believed the commander in chief had unchallenged power during wartime, and the United States, as they saw it, remained at war against terrorism. Yet here **is Obama subjecting the drone program to a more restrictive set of rules—and doing so publicly.** This is very un-Cheney-like. (How soon before the ex-veep arises from his undisclosed location to accuse Obama of placing the nation at risk yet again?)¶ Despite Obama's embrace of certain Bush-Cheney practices and his robust use of drones, the president has tried since taking office to shift US foreign policy from a fixation on terrorism. During his first days in office, he shied away from using the "war on terrorism" phrase. And his national security advisers have long talked of Obama's desire to reorient US foreign policy toward challenges in the Pacific region. By handing responsibility for drone strikes to the military, Obama is helping CIA chief John Brennan, who would like to see his agency move out of the paramilitary business and devote more resources to its traditional tasks of intelligence gathering and analysis.¶ With this speech, Obama is not renouncing his administration's claim that it possesses the authority to kill an American overseas without full due process. The target, as Holder noted in that letter to Congress, must be a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or an associated group who poses an "imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and who cannot be captured, and **Holder stated that foreign suspects now can only be targeted if they pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans."** (Certainly, **there will be debates over the meaning of "imminent,"** especially given that the Obama administration has previously used an elastic definition of imminence.) And **Obama is not declaring an end to the dicey practice of indefinite detention or a conclusion to the fight against terrorism.**

**Plan spurs shift towards drones**

Robert **Chesney**, Professor, Law, University of Texas, “Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens,” BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW v. 52, 20**11**, LN.

The convergence thesis describes one manner in which **law might respond to** the **cross-cutting pressures associated with** the **asymmetric warfare** phenomenon—i.e., **the pressure to** reduce false positives (targeting, capture, or detention of the wrong individual) while also **ensur**ing an **adequate capacity to neutralize the non-state actors in question**. One must bear in mind, however, that **detention** itself **is not the only system of government action that can satisfy that latter interest. Other options exist, including the use of lethal force**; the use of rendition to place individuals in detention at the hands of some other state; the use of persuasion to induce some other state to take custody of an individual through its own means; and perhaps also the use of various forms of surveillance to establish a sort of constructive, loose control over a person (though for persons located outside the United States it is unlikely that surveillance could be much more than episodic, and thus any resulting element of “control” may be quite weak).210¶ From the point of view of the individual involved, all but the last of **these options are likely to be far worse experiences than** U.S.-administered **detention**. In addition, **all** but the last **are** also likely to be far **less useful for** purposes of **intelligence-gathering** from the point of view of the U.S. government.211 Nonetheless, these **alternatives may** **grow attractive to the government in circumstances where the detention alternative becomes unduly restricted, yet the pressure for intervention remains. The situation is** rather **like squeezing a balloon: the result is not to shrink the balloon, but instead to displace the pressure from one side to another, causing the balloon to distend along the unconstrained side**. So too here: when one of these coercive powers becomes constrained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative mechanisms. On this view it is no surprise that lethal drone strikes have increased dramatically over the past two years, that the Obama administration has refused to foreswear rendition, that in Iraq we have largely (though not entirely) outsourced our detention operations to the Iraqis, and that we now are progressing along the same path in Afghanistan.212¶ Decisions regarding the calibration of a detention system—the¶ management of the convergence process, if you will—thus take place in the shadow of this balloon-squeezing phenomenon A thorough policy review would take this into account, as should any formal lawmaking process. For the moment, however, our formal law-making process is not directed at the detention-scope question. Instead, clarification and development with respect to the substantive grounds for detention takes place through the lens of habeas corpus litigation.

**Drone strikes cause thousands of civilian deaths and psychological violence**

**Stanford Human Rights Clinic**, “Living under Drones: death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) and Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of 9—**12**, http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf

First, while civilian casualties are rarely acknowledged by the US government, there is significant evidence that US **drone strikes have injured and killed civilians**. In public statements, the US states that there have been “no” or “single digit” civilian casualties.”2 **It is difficult to obtain data on strike casualties because of US efforts to shield the drone program from democratic accountability**, compounded by the obstacles to independent investigation of strikes in North Waziristan. The best currently available public aggregate data on drone strikes are provided by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organization. TBIJ reports that **from June 2004 through midSeptember 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan**, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children.3 TBIJ reports that these **strikes also injured an additional 1,228-1,362 individuals**. **Where media accounts do report civilian casualties, rarely is any information provided about the victims or the communities they leave behind**. This report includes the harrowing narratives of many survivors, witnesses, and family members who provided evidence of civilian injuries and deaths in drone strikes to our research team. It also presents detailed accounts of three separate strikes, for which there is evidence of civilian deaths and injuries, including a March 2011 strike on a meeting of tribal elders that killed some 40 individuals. Second, **US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury**. **Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning**. **Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities**. **Those living under drones have to face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims**. **Some community members shy away from gathering in groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution bodies, out of fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school.** Waziris told our researchers that the **strikes have undermined cultural and religious practices related to burial, and made family members afraid to attend funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in drone strikes now struggle to support themselves**.

**Case**

**1. Turn – homogenization: assuming all African American culture is based on resisting white supremacy ignores the role of class in shaping racial consciousness, which is crucial to resistance**

**McClendon 4** [John H, associate professor of African American and American Cultural Studies @ Bates College and editor of the American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience, “Philosophy of Language and the African American Experience: Are There Metaphilosophical Implications?”, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 18.4, pp. 305-10]

Here I do want to give a cautionary suggestion. **Yancy must stay alert to the fact that a common culture, or shared experiences** and even the enduring heritage of having the same language, **is not a *sufficient* condition for claiming there exists, among African Americans, some kind of spontaneously arrived at common ontology**, where ontology is taken as philosophical in substance. Furthermore, it seems this very premise—about the actual existence of a common African American ontology—subsequently grounds Yancy's notion about how African American language is foundational to the construction of a new conception of metaphilosophy. Now when we take into account the fact that theory is always distinct from experience, we must accordingly recognize the differentia specifica is none other than the matter of the distinction between the *inquiries* into experience vis-à-vis the lived experience. The determinate theoretical responses to common experience (and I take philosophy to be the most abstract form of theory) are always critical reflections adjoined to an inquiry about collective existence; thus, theory remains mediated and distanced from the immediacy of experience. The mediated relationship of the theoretical (ontology) to the empirical (lived experience) means there is room for a conceptual space, which allows for the description, definition, and interpretation of experience. This necessary space between the theoretical and the empirical is why common experiences are not a sufficient condition for sharing a common ontology. Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—**especially the impact of class contradictions**—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in *The German Ideology,* I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly be argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of Yancy's (and Smitherman's) vindicationism, where he argues that *resistance* to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language. When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African American **[End Page 308]** culture, viz. that African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance. There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression, for, by way of example, not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in "heaben" and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one "as white as the snow." Or that loyalty to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest folly. The modern day connotation for "Uncle Tom" did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing "Toms." It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence "Tom-to-us" is mentioned among African American political speakers. After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser's, Denmark Vesey's, and Nat Turner's slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loyal to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. **The idea that social ontology and identity among African Americans, past and present, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of *reductionism* that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture.** Albeit, resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture, nonetheless, it is not exhaustive of its actualities and even of its future possibilities. **African American culture in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance**. Rather, African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able, for analytical purposes, to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of *accommodation*. This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support via vindicationism. In conclusion, the Yancy/Smitherman thesis about the importance of African American language is a needed corrective to the hegemonic perspective that relegates African American language to a form of substandard speech and African American culture to the dismal state of pathology. In providing this service, they present to us what are new avenues for the philosophy of language to creatively explore. Alternatively, Yancy's accent on the African American collective lived experience as the source for a common ontology affixed with the vindicationist conception of African American culture, where resistance becomes the only viable cultural/political tradition, is problematic. Moreover, I think it is precisely the common ontology and vindicationist theses that function as the twin pillars on which Yancy builds his case for not only viewing African American language **[End Page 309]** as a viable object of philosophical inquiry but also making the stronger claim that African American language can act as the basis for the construction of metaphilosophy. Here, I would only say that given my aforesaid arguments concerning the lack of evidential and logical support for a distinctive African American ontology and along my charges about the inherent weaknesses with vindicationism, the matter and manner of how African American language would serve in the reconceptualization of metaphilosophy remain open questions

**2. Turn – appropriation: introducing white people to a different language and giving them the opportunity to begin to understand it results in appropriation of the language for corporate domination**

**Sullivan 4** [Shannon, professor of philosophy, women’s studies, and African American studies @ Penn State, “White World-Traveling”, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 18.4, pp. 300-04]

While a white/Anglo person’s learning Spanish can begin to balance the relationship of power and knowledge between white/Anglo and Latino worlds, it also can have the opposite effect of increasing the hegemony of the white world. This occurs when white people learn a language other than Standard American Language—Spanish, African American Language, or otherwise—precisely to dominate the world that speaks that language. Certainly this happened during times of colonialist conquest, but it also continues today as business corporations and advertising firms in the United States learn (bits of) African American Language and Spanish to better market products that promise the “exoticism” of Blackness and the “spiciness” of Latino culture. (Standard, middleclass whiteness is so unhip nowadays, as Yancy notes [Yancy 2004, 276].) It also can happen in less insidious ways, however, such as when white people learn another language to (try to) break out of their white solipsism. Even in these well-intentioned instances, the protection provided to minority races by white people’s ignorance of their languages can be eroded once white people begin to understand and speak them.

**This destroys resistance – there’s no longer a starting point that’s outside of white hegemony**

**Sullivan 4** [Shannon, professor of philosophy, women’s studies, and African American studies @ Penn State, “White World-Traveling”, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 18.4, pp. 300-04]

This point was brought home to me when a Latina friend and philosopher explained that she did not want white/Anglo people to learn Spanish because their knowledge would intrude on the Spanish/Latina world that she and other Spanish-speaking philosophers are able to create in the midst of white/Anglodominated conferences.2 Opening up her world to white/Anglo philosophers tends to result in the destruction of a valuable point of resistance to white racism. Because of the dominance of white people in philosophy in the United States, she frequently is forced to travel to white worlds and wants to preserve a small space that is relatively free of white people and the issues of race and racism that their presence inevitably (though not necessarily deliberately) produces.

## 2NC

**Historical materialism is key: you must understand the world before you can change it- grounding sites of political contestation outside of labor humanizes capital and forcloses upon the possibility of revolution.**

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01** [Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any **effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue **that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that **the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (**which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all **determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism** which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. **All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois** left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable,** more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced** by the human mind and is thus free from the **actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.**

#### 4th, praxis DA: This is why you can’t perm a method…They strip all of the conceptual theory that allows us to understand the world—worse than the aff or the alt alone. Perm will become like occupy wall street—it’s also a rejection of capitalism but doesn’t have a praxis because the movement is fractured, no one knows what they are fighting for—this is why it will never catch on.

Tumino (Prof. English @ Pitt) 01

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science**"** (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology**"** (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution o**f** the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

**Attempts to control speech acts trade off with efforts to provide political solutions**

Wendy **Brown**, Professor of Political Theory, UC Berkeley, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY, 20**01**, p. 35.

**“speech codes kill critique**,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gate was referring to what happens when hate **speech regulations**, and the debates about them ,**usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantative political response** to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But **turning political questions into moralistic ones** – as speech codes of any sort do – not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also **expresses a profound hostility toward political life** insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with legislated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convet emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Wegberian forces of rati9onalization and bureaucratication are quite likely to be demesticationg them for another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic ddefense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thuse gates might have said, “speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers.

**Turn: forcing silence locks the power of the speech into place**

**Butler 1997.** (Judith, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge February, page 38]

This story underscores the limits and risks of resignification as a strategy of opposition. **I will not propose that the pedagogical recirculation of examples of hate speech always defeats the project of opposing and defusing such speech, but** I want to underscore the fact that **such terms carry connotations that exceed the purposes for which they may be intended and can thus work to afflict and defeat discursive efforts to oppose such speech. Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition**. It may be that trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument After all, to be named by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, 1 have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose [and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.

## 1NR

### A2 “CI”

**Critical thinking skills are crucial to solve world problems—the training debate provides is uniquely key. It’s a pre-requisite to applying their aff in the real world**

**Lundberg 10** - Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But **the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech**—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making, and better public judgment**. **If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid** scientific and technological **change** outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, **and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy** such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems **place such a high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them**, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that **debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity**. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, **the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice** in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including**: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; **wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in § Marked 18:30 § the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; **and increasing challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. **More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with** the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

**C. Switch Side – obvi don’t switch over everything – but method good**

#### B. Tolerance—switching sides makes debaters more tolerant of arguments and ideas that are the opposite of their own—their one-sided approach promotes dogmatism

**Muir 93** (Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 288-289)

The role of **switch-side debate is especially important in the** oral **defense of arguments that foster tolerance** without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. **The forum is** therefore **unique in providing debaters with** attitudes of **tolerance** without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, **debaters are** indeed **exposed to a multivalued world**, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, **the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be** seen as **a means of gaining perspective** without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.'s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— **tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate**. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. **The willingness to recognize** the existence of **other views, and to grant alternative positions** a degree of **credibility, is** a value **fostered by switch-side debate**: Alternately **debating both sides** of the same question . . . **inculcates a deep-seated** attitude of **tolerance** toward differing points of view. **To** be forced to **debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side**. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .**Promoting** this kind of **tolerance is** perhaps **one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer**. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because **debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this** fact who **become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted**.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

### A2 “Master’s Tools”

**Working from within the system can produce change – best method to break down ontological exclusion and master/slave binaries.**

Robin M. **James**, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, UNC-Charlotte, “Autonomy, Universality, and Playing the Guitar: On the Politics and Aesthetics of Contemporary Feminist Deployments of the ‘Master's Tools’, April 14, 20**09**.

Norma Coates expresses here an ethical and aesthetic quandary we might term a “feminist guilty pleasure”: liking something one knows one just shouldn't like, since one considers its politics problematic, if not disgusting. Why would an avowed feminist like this clearly misogynistic work? How can one have an aesthetic taste for something that is politically disgusting? This is not a new question by any means, but it is still a contested one. Indeed, Audre Lorde has famously argued that the “the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house,” just as Laura Mulvey has equally famously called for the necessity for feminists to abandon mainstream cinematic pleasure as coercive (Mulvey 1975; Lorde 1983). I contend, however, that **we should not be too quick to dismiss either the “master's tools”** or some of the “pleasures” we might experience from them. Indeed, **when appropriately hacked, the master's tools in certain situations and under certain criteria might even be very effective tools for feminist, anti-racist work.** Examining two cases—one political, one aesthetic—from the perspective of non-ideal theory, I will demonstrate concrete instances in which multiply-underprivileged individuals have utilized, for liberatory ends, the concepts, rhetoric, and methodologies characteristic of what bell hooks terms “the white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.”1 Judith Butler's recent appeals for “autonomy” and “universality,” and indie-electro artist Peaches's use of conventionally racist and sexist art forms are all instances in which “**the master's tools” have been productively reappropriated for progressive ends**. I argue that non-ideal theory also helps clarify two conditions that help to distinguish a successful resignification from a hegemonic rearticulation: first, **reappropriation is successful when**, as Butler argues, **the very process of an “outsider's” appropriation of “insider” privilege collapses the insider/outsider or master/marginalized distinction, so the procedure is itself transformative**; second, **success is achieved in instances where nothing else does quite what the master's tools “do,” when nothing is as accessible, effective, affective**—or, as in the case of Coates and the Stones, as “sexy”—**as mainstream/conventional discourse**.