## 1NC

**No link between drones and resentment – alt causes inevitable, alternatives worse**

**Etizoni 4/30** – director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies and a professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University (Amitai, “Drones: Say it with figures”, 2013, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/>, CMR)

Attacking **drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the U**nited **S**tates **has** found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media.¶ Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims.¶ **One argument** that is repeated again and again **is** that **killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen**, thereby **breeding** many **more terrorists** than are killed. For example, Akbar **Ahmed**, a distinguished professor at American University, **told** the BBC on April 9 **that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result**."¶ **The key word is "perhaps";** **Ahmed cites no data to support his contention**.¶ Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians.¶ At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans.¶ **No** such **self-serving statements** **can be taken as evidence in themselves**.¶ And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, **Mazzetti presents no evidence**.¶ One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish.¶ In reality, **ample evidence** **shows** that **large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the U**nited **S**tates **for numerous** and profound **reasons**, **unrelated to drone attacks**.¶ These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.¶ **These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred**, **were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place**, **and continue unabated**, **even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back**.¶ As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs:¶ "A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... **It is now clear that even major changes**, **such as Bush's departure**, **Obama's support for** some of **the Arab revolts** of 2011, **the death of** Osama **bin Laden**, **and** the U.S. **withdrawal from Iraq**, **have had** surprisingly **little effect** **on** Arab **attitudes towards the U**nited **S**tates. **Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily**, **but it is once again flowing freely**."¶ **The Pew Global Attitudes Project says anti-American sentiments were high and on the rise in countries where drone strikes weren't employed**. In Jordan, for example, U.S. unfavorability rose from 78 percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2012 while Egypt saw a rise from 78 percent to 79 percent over the same period.¶ Notably, the percentage of respondents reporting an "unfavorable" view of the United States in these countries is as high, or higher, than in drone-targeted Pakistan.¶ **In Pakistan**, a country that has been subjected to a barrage of strikes over the last five years, the United States' **unfavorability** held steady at 68 percent from 2007-10 (dropping briefly to 63 percent in 2008), but then **began to increase**, rising to 73 percent **in 2011 and** 80 percent in **2012** -- **a two-year period in which the number of drone strikes was actually dropping significantly.**¶ It is also worth noting that **these critics attribute resentment to drones rather than military strikes.**¶ **Do they really think that resentment would be lower if the U**nited **S**tates **were using cruise missiles? Or bombers? Or Special Forces?**

### 1

#### Restrictions on authority prohibit- the aff is a condition

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Vote neglimits - anything can indirectly affect war powers--also makes the topic bidirectional because conditions can enhance executive power

### 2

#### Status quo target vetting is carefully calibrated to avoid every aff impact in balance with CT--- there’s only a risk that restrictions destroy it

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Target vetting is the process by which the government integrates the opinions of subject matter experts from throughout the intelligence community.180 The United States has developed a formal voting process which allows members of agencies from across the government to comment on the validity of the target intelligence and any concerns related to targeting an individual. At a minimum, the vetting considers the following factors: target identification, significance, collateral damage estimates, location issues, impact on the enemy, environmental concerns, and intelligence gain/loss concerns.181 An important part of the analysis also includes assessing the impact of not conducting operations against the target.182 Vetting occurs at multiple points in the kill-list creation process, as targets are progressively refined within particular agencies and at interagency meetings.

A validation step follows the vetting step. It is intended to ensure that all proposed targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in strategic guidance.183 The term strategic is a reference to national level objectives—the assessment is not just whether the strike will succeed tactically (i.e. will it eliminate the targeted individual) but also whether it advances broader national policy goals.184 Accordingly, at this stage there is also a reassessment of whether the killing will comport with domestic legal authorities such as the AUMF or a particular covert action finding.185 At this stage, participants will also resolve whether the agency that will be tasked with the strike has the authority to do so.186 Individuals participating at this stage analyze the mix of military, political, diplomatic, informational, and economic consequences that flow from killing an individual. Other questions addressed at this stage are whether killing an individual will comply with the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement (including theater specific rules of engagement). Further bolstering the evidence that these are the key questions that the U.S. government asks is the clearly articulated target validation considerations found in military doctrine (and there is little evidence to suggest they are not considered in current operations). Some of the questions asked are:

• Is attacking the target lawful? What are the law of war and rules of engagement considerations?

• Does the target contribute to the adversary's capability and will to wage war?

• Is the target (still) operational? Is it (still) a viable element of a target system? Where is the target located?

• Will striking the target arouse political or cultural “sensitivities”?

• How will striking the target affect public opinion? (Enemy, friendly, and neutral)?

• What is the relative potential for collateral damage or collateral effects, to include casualties?

• What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the adversary, friendly forces, or multinational partners?

• What would be the impact of not conducting operations against the target?187

As the preceding criteria highlight, many of the concerns that critics say should be weighed in the targeted killing process are considered prior to nominating a target for inclusion on a kill-list.188 For example, bureaucrats in the kill-list development process will weigh whether striking a particular individual will improve world standing and whether the strike is worth it in terms of weakening the adversary's power.189 They will analyze the possibility that a strike will adversely affect diplomatic relations, and they will consider whether there would be an intelligence loss that outweighs the value of the target.190 During this process, the intelligence community may also make an estimate regarding the likely success of achieving objectives (e.g. degraded enemy leadership, diminished capacity to conduct certain types of attacks, etc.) associated with the strike. Importantly, they will also consider the risk of blowback (e.g. creating more terrorists as a result of the killing).191

**Signature strikes critical to contain low-level operatives and prevent major attacks**

**Mudd** 5/24/**13** (Philip, senior official at the CIA and the FBI, now director of global risk at SouthernSun Asset Management, “Fear Factor”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear_factor_signature_strikes?page=full>, CMR)

**The impact of armed drones** during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign **is hard to overestimate**: **Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups** decay into locally focused threats, or **disappear altogether**. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike**.** But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough.¶ So-called **signature strikes** -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- **accelerated this decline** for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but **developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike**, in a no-man's land half a world away, **is time-consuming and difficult**. **And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn** over time **how to operate** more **securely**. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision.¶ **Signature strikes have pulled out** these **lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and** that of **its global affiliates** -- **rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them**. **Western conceptions of how organizations work**, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, **do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are** instead **conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups**. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. **Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly** -- **so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience**. **The tempo of the strikes**, in other words, **adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover**.

#### Constraining targeted killing’s role in the war on terror causes extinction

Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

### 3

#### Text: The President of the United States should establish a national security drone court as per our Katyal evidence.

#### The Executive branch of the United States should make necessary adjustments to its targeted killing policy to ensure compliance with relevant domestic and international law, including principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality. The Executive branch should publicly articulate its legal rationale for its targeted killing policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection.

**CP solves better than the drone court – avoids *terrorism* and *collapse of deference* while preserving oversight and accountability**

**Katyal 13** – former acting solicitor general, professor of national security law at Georgetown and a partner at the law firm Hogan Lovells (Neal K, Who Will Mind the Drones?”, Feb 20, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/an-executive-branch-drone-court.html, CMR)

IN the wake of revelations about the Obama administration’s drone program, politicians from both parties have taken up the idea of creating a “drone court” within the federal judiciary, which would review executive decisions to target and kill individuals.¶ But the drone court idea is a mistake. It is hard to think of something less suitable for a federal judge to rule on than the fast-moving and protean nature of targeting decisions.¶ Fortunately, a better solution exists: a “national security court” housed within the executive branch itself. Experts, not generalists, would rule; pressing concerns about classified information would be minimized; and speedy decisions would be easier to reach.¶ There is, of course, a role for federal courts in national security. In 2006, I argued and won Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a Supreme Court case that struck down President George W. Bush’s use of military tribunals at Guantánamo Bay. But military trials are a far cry from wartime targeting decisions.¶ And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which reviews administration requests to collect intelligence involving foreign agents inside the country and which some have advocated as a model for the drone court, is likewise appropriately housed within the judicial system — it rules on surveillance operations that raise questions much like those in Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” cases, a subject federal judges know well.¶ But there is no true precedent for interposing courts into military decisions about who, what and when to strike militarily. Putting aside the serious constitutional implications of such a proposal, courts are simply not institutionally equipped to play such a role.¶ There are many reasons a drone court composed of generalist federal judges will not work. They lack national security expertise, they are not accustomed to ruling on lightning-fast timetables, they are used to being in absolute control, their primary work is on domestic matters and they usually rule on matters after the fact, not beforehand.¶ Even the questions placed before the FISA Court aren’t comparable to what a drone court would face; they involve more traditional constitutional issues — not rapidly developing questions about whether to target an individual for assassination by a drone strike.¶ Imagine instead that the president had an internal court, staffed by expert lawyers to represent both sides. Those lawyers, like the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the military, would switch sides every few years, to develop both expertise as repeat players and the ability to understand the other point of view.¶ The adjudicator would be a panel of the president’s most senior national security advisers, who would issue decisions in writing if at all possible. Those decisions would later be given to the Congressional intelligence committees for review. Crucially, the president would be able to overrule this court, and take whatever action he thought appropriate, but would have to explain himself afterward to Congress.¶ Such a court would embed accountability and expertise into the drone program. With a federal drone court, it would simply be too easy for a president or other executive-branch official to point his finger at a federal judge for the failure to act. With an internal court, it would be impossible to avoid blame.¶ It’s true that a court housed within the executive branch might sound nefarious in today’s “Homeland” culture — if Alexander Hamilton celebrated the executive, in Federalist No. 70, for its “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch,” some now look at those same qualities with skepticism, if not fear.¶ In contrast, advocates of a drone court say it would bring independent, constitutional values of reasoned decision making to a process that is inherently murky.¶ But simply placing a drone court in the judicial branch is not a guaranteed check. The FISA Court’s record is instructive: between 1979 and 2011 it rejected only 11 out of more than 32,000 requests — making the odds of getting a request rejected, around 1 in 3,000, approximately the same as those of being struck by lightning in one’s lifetime. What reason does the FISA Court give us to think that judges are better than specialists at keeping executive power in check?¶ The written decisions of an internal national security court, in contrast, would be products of an adversarial system (unlike the FISA Court), and later reviewed by Congressional intelligence committees. If members of Congress saw troublesome trends developing, it could push legislation to constrain the executive. That is something a federal judge cannot do.¶ One of our Constitution’s greatest virtues is that it looks to judges as a source of reasoned, practical, rights-minded decision making. But judges should be left to what they know. A national security court inside the executive branch may not be a perfect solution, but it is a better way to balance the demands of secrecy and speed with those of liberty and justice.

#### The impact is heg and readiness

Hudson 99 Walter Hudson, Major, US Army, Military Law Review, March 1999 (159 Mil. L. Rev. 1)

By granting the elected branches plenary and command power over the military, the Constitution links military control to the democratic will and the democratic process. Because the people will feel the burden of war, the elected branches can best respond to that will. n223 Furthermore, in granting power to the elected branches to control the military, the Constitution acknowledges that the elected branches grant a degree of legitimacy to military policy that courts cannot. These elected branches can best reflect and respond to the societal consensus, a particularly relevant and important concern when dealing with national security. n224 Of the three branches, the judiciary has the least competence to evaluate the military's formation, training, or command. It has, as one court stated, "no Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, Department of Defense, or Department of State" nor does it have the same access to intelligence and testimony on military readiness as does Congress or the President. n225 The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly cited its own lack of competence to evaluate military affairs. n226

### 4

#### TPP will pass now – vote coming soon

Greg Hinz, “Fight Builds to Give Obama Fast-Track Trade Authority,” CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, 1—2—14, <http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140102/BLOGS02/140109985>, accessed 1-2-14.

Big Illinois exporters could get a vote very early this new year on something they've wanted for a long time: fast-track authority for President Barack Obama to negotiate new international trade deals. But the issue in the House now is "very close."¶ So says North Side congressman Mike Quigley, who unlike many Democratic House members says action is needed despite concerns from labor and some other groups.¶ Like it or not, "this is a global economy," said Mr. Quigley in an interview earlier this week. "If you're not at the bargaining table, if you don't get an agreement, someone else does," he said, referring specifically to China, which has been building ties rapidly with some of America's traditionally strong trading partners in Asia. "You'll be left in the dust."¶ Many top Illinois businesses already are lobbying to extend Trade Promotion Authority, as fast-track formally is known.¶ "From the 1930s until 2007, Congress has authorized every president to pursue trade agreements that open markets for U.S. goods and services," Caterpillar Inc. Chairman and CEO Doug Oberhelman wrote in a recent guest editorial.¶ "Today, trade supports more than one in five American jobs. U.S. exports have grown more than twice as fast as GDP since 2002, accounting for 14 percent of GDP in 2012. And workers in U.S. companies that export goods earn on average up to 18 percent more than those in similar jobs in non-exporting companies," he added. "Updated TPA legislation would provide clear guidance on Congress' requirements for trade agreements. It would also provide our trade negotiating partners with a degree of comfort that the United States is committed to the international trade negotiating process and the trade agreements we negotiate."¶ But Democrats in particular have been leery to renew the authority because of concerns that workers elsewhere are underpaid, putting Americans at a disadvantage. Many environmental groups express similar concerns stemming from low standards abroad. Even some Republicans are withholding support in highly partisan Washington.¶ But given international realities, the solution is not to ignore what competing countries are doing but "get the best deal possible" at the table for both labor and the environment. "It's tough being in the middle in this Congress . . . (But) this is important for Chicago and Illinois. We can't live in isolation."¶ Though the Obama White House has not signaled action, Mr. Quigley says he expects fast-track legislation to hit the House floor in January. And another Chicagoan, former U.S. Commerce Secretary Bill Daley, says some momentum indeed has begun to build on behalf of the measure.¶ "I think they have a compromise," Mr. Daley said. "Until the bill is on the floor, you never know for sure. But right now, they're talking as if they have a deal."¶ If so, a long-pending proposed Asian trade deal could follow shortly thereafter. Look for Penny Pritzker, commerce secretary from Chicago, to play a role too.

#### Drone court fights drain capital

Carlos Munoz, “Turf Battle Builds Quietly in Congress over Control of Armed Drone Program,” THE HILL, 4—9—13,

<http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/292501-turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-of-armed-drone-program>

A turf war is quietly building between congressional defense and intelligence committees over who will oversee the Obama administration’s controversial armed drone program. Lawmakers are scrambling to make their case for or against a White House proposal that would hand control of the drones to the Pentagon. Gordon Adams, a senior defense analyst at the Stimson Center, called the looming battle a “turf fight in the [disguise] of a policy debate.” The Pentagon and CIA operate their own armed drone programs, which are both geared toward eliminating senior al Qaeda leaders and other high-level terror targets around the world. Under the Obama administration’s proposal, the CIA would continue to supply intelligence on possible targets, but actual control over the drone strikes would fall to the Pentagon. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) publicly questioned whether the Defense Department (DOD) would be able to shoulder the program alone. “We’ve watched the intelligence aspect of the drone program, how they function, the quality of the intelligence, watching the agency exercise patience and discretion,” Feinstein told reporters in March. “The military [armed drone] program has not done that nearly as well.” Sen. John McCain and other defense lawmakers say the drone program would be better off being run by the Pentagon. “It’s not the job of the Central Intelligence Agency. ... It’s the military’s job,” the Arizona Republican said in March. The fight is a typical battle over who on Capitol Hill will retain power over the program, according to several analysts, who described it as predictable. “There is always going to be a turf battle” when dealing with congressional oversight, said Lawrence Korb, a former DOD official and defense analyst at the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress. But that battle could become particularly heated, given the high-profile nature of the drone program, which since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has become a huge factor in shaping counterterrorism policy, given its success, Korb said. For congressional panels, the fight over who will control the drone program will have a say in the relevancy of the two committees. Korb, for example, noted that national security spending on unmanned aircraft and special operations forces will likely increase, even as the budget for defense spending overall is expected to trend downward. Ironically, Pentagon officials pushed back against using armed drones in the late 1990s, fearing they would replace fighter jets as the weapon of choice in future wars, Korb said. That decision essentially handed control of the armed drone program to the CIA, he said. Early versions of the unmanned aircraft flown during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan belonged to the agency, not the Defense Department, according to Korb. Taking that influence away from Langley and intelligence lawmakers was bound to spark a fight, he said.

#### Capital is key to TPP—vital to economy, leadership

Bryan Riley, senior analyst and Anthony B. Kim, senior policy analyst, “Advancing Trade Freedom: Key Objective of Trade Promotion Authority Renewal,” ISSUE BRIEF n. 3912, Heritage Foundation, 4—16—13, [www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal)

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been a critical tool for advancing free trade and spreading its benefits to a greater number of Americans. TPA, also known as “fast track” authority, is the legislative power Congress grants to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. Provided the President observes certain statutory obligations under TPA, Congress agrees to consider implementing those trade pacts without amending them.¶ More than a decade has passed since TPA was last renewed in 2002, and its authority expired in 2007. Reinstituting TPA may well be the most important legislative action on trade for both Congress and the President in 2013 given the urgency of restoring America’s credibility in advancing open markets and securing greater benefits of two-way trade for Americans. As the case for timely reinstallation of an effective and practical TPA is stronger than ever, the quest for renewing TPA should be guided by principles that enhance trade freedom, a vital component of America’s economic freedom.¶ Both House Ways and Means Committee chairman David Camp (R–MI) and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D–MT) have announced plans to pursue TPA legislation. However, many lawmakers have correctly pointed out that a proactive push from President Obama is critical, given that trade bills have been a thorny issue for many Democrats in recent years.¶ Historically, it has been common practice, although not formally required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA. In fact, except for President Obama, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has either requested or received trade negotiating authority.[1]¶ After four years of informing Congress it would seek TPA at “the appropriate time,” early this year the Obama Administration finally indicated its interest in working with Congress to get TPA done. The President’s 2013 trade agenda offered the Administration’s most forward-leaning language yet, specifying that “to facilitate the conclusion, approval, and implementation of market-opening negotiating efforts, we will also work with Congress on Trade Promotion Authority.”[2]¶ In the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Congress—whose role in formulating U.S. trade policy includes defining trade negotiation objectives—made it clear that¶ [t]he expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity.… Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world.

#### Nuclear war

Kerpen ‘8 [National Review Online, October 28, 2008 Phil Kerpen, policy director for Americans for Prosperity From Panic to Depression?, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OWQ3ZGYzZTQyZGY4ZWFiZWUxNmYwZTJiNWVkMTIxMmU=]

It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors — not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale

## adv 2

### pakistan 1NC

#### Pakistan stable

Pakistan Today 12-28 “SAARC predicts regional peace and stability in region”

Saturday, 28 Dec 2013 11:57 pm | Comments (0) http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/12/28/news/profit/saarc-predicts-regional-peace-and-stability-in-region/

SCCI President Vikramjit Singh said the resolve and commitment to continue efforts for ensuring peace on the LoC was good for normalisation of relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's goodwill gesture and initiative to normalise relations with neighbouring countries, especially India, would have far-reaching effects in maintaining peace, ensuring political stability and economic boom in the entire SAARC region.¶ Vikramjit said: "The Pakistani premier's initiative is a good omen and we welcome it. The step will not only help realise the dream of a peaceful and prosperous subcontinent but also bring together the business community and private sectors of regional countries. The enhanced trade ties will ultimately jack up exports among the SAARC states in general and Pak-India in particular."

#### drones key to Pakistan stability—blowback inevitable because of government policies

Vira 12 – (10/12, Varun, researcher and anayst, Small Wars Journal, author of an extensive report on Pakistan by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Anti-Drone Hysteria in Pakistan Obscures Governance Failures,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12415/anti-drone-hysteria-in-pakistan-obscures-governance-failures)

Though drones are not ideal, they are the best means of achieving a specific tactical task: **killing** high-value **terrorists** in areas beyond the reach of the Pakistani state in ways that are more precise than the available alternatives. Many of those killed by drone strikes were indeed al-Qaida operatives. Others were senior militants of the Haqqani, Nazir and Bahadur networks that kill American troops in Afghanistan, yet are protected by the Pakistani state for their strategic value as "good Taliban" in post-2014 Afghanistan. Others, such as Baitullah Mehsud, Nek Mohammed and Ilyas Kashmiri, were notorious for the amount of Pakistani blood they had spilled, but were for years beyond the reach of Pakistani security services.

The alternatives to drones are either American special operations raids that might still cause the same level of collateral damage, or to have the Pakistanis root out their own problems. The best-case scenario in the latter case would be large-scale Pakistani military offensives designed to clear territory of militants and restore credible government rule. Whatever one may think of drones, past Pakistani military campaigns came with far higher costs. Operation Rah-e-Rast in early 2009 displaced almost 2 million people, perhaps the worst refugee exodus since Rwanda. Shortly afterward, operation Rah-e-Nijat displaced nearly another 500,000 people, more than 40 percent of the population of the entire district. Pakistani operations in the FATA have evolved from the days when the military simply bombed entire villages. But despite updated counterinsurgency tactics, many innocents still die. Evidence over the years has shown army executions, torture, rape and extra-judicial deaths.

Today there is little to indicate that militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas have been contained, nor is there any assurance that they will be after U.S. troops leave Afghanistan in 2014. Certainly the Afghan Taliban will return across the border at that time, taking with them much of the legitimacy for a popular Pashtun uprising. But the Pakistani Taliban and their terrorist affiliates that have killed nearly 40,000 Pakistani civilians and security personnel since Sept. 11, 2001, and that continue to control entire tribal agencies will remain.

Pakistan cannot deal with this threat alone. The insurgency is now mature, and its ideology has hardened. A distinct anti-Pakistani jihad has been joined by sectarian militants churned out by the radical madrassas, as well as by most of the ex-Kashmiri jihadi groups that were trained over decades by the Pakistani military to serve as anti-Indian guerrilla forces. These affiliates bring with them broader access to Pakistan’s extensive madrassa and jihadi fundraising networks in the more prosperous Punjab as well as the knowledge of how to attack deep into Pakistan. Despite setbacks in the past few years, notably under the withering drone campaign, insurgents remain highly capable, as illustrated most recently in August 2012, when they breached the highly sensitive Minhas air base, which is tied to Pakistan's nuclear program.

Neither do Pakistan's generals want to fight them alone. For years, U.S. drones flew from Pakistani airbases, and Pakistan’s army chief is on record in leaked diplomatic cables as being eager to step up the drone campaign. Allowing the U.S. to operate drones over Pakistani territory has kept the U.S. military aid that sustains the Pakistani military flowing. But the campaign is also in sync with Pakistan’s preference for a military-centric approach to tackling the root causes of the insurgency.

The military has ruled the FATA since independence, and on every human welfare metric it today ranks below mainstream Pakistan. Laws left over from British colonialism still apply; collective tribal punishment -- often financial, sometimes the razing of villages -- is still used, with impunity for the army and its partnered bureaucrats. Integrating this tribal periphery into the Pakistani mainstream for the first time in its history is a task Pakistan is not prepared to undertake, especially not when the military still sees the region as crucial to projecting its strategic goals in Afghanistan.

Drones fly not just because Pakistan’s military shields some militants while targeting others, but because it refuses to risk its power and enact the reforms that tackling militancy across Pakistan requires. By encouraging and legitimizing the narrative that drones lie at the heart of the FATA’s problems, it is Pakistanis themselves that continue to suffer.

#### Militant rise in Pakistan causes nuclear war

**Pitt 9** William, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence", 5/8, "Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World," http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article%26cat=commentary%26article=2183

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.

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Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

### Yemen Stability 1NC

#### yemen stable- GCC support

Mohammed Al Ghasra 12-24 ¶ Mohammed Al Ghasra is a Bahraini writer and journalis “Debate: Yemen does not constitute a GCC security concern” http://www.aawsat.net/2013/12/article55325748

On the other hand, many politicians have linked the stability of the GCC states to the stability and prosperity of Yemen, which has one of the poorest economies in the world. This is not only because of the length of the borders, which it shares with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Yemen’s geographic position, which overlooks Bab-el-Mandeb and the coastal area opposite Somalia. This is also because of Yemen’s vast territory and deserts which have become military bases for terrorist groups that spread terrorism to these countries.¶ The GCC succeeded in defusing the crisis in Yemen, and the Gulf Initiative removed former President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in favor of his deputy, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, which led to political dialogue to achieve conciliation. The weakness of the Yemeni Central Government, however, allowed Al-Qaeda to grow in Yemen’s cities and vast deserts. The GCC states became involved, not only in trying to resolve the problems caused by the Arab Spring, but also the rehabilitation of Yemen, politically and economically, to turn it into a country which would be able to rely on itself and its own resources, and achieve sustainable development.

#### Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

#### No Link between drones and AQAP – alt causes are overwhelming

**Swift 12** – adjunct professor of national security studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a fellow at the University of Virginia's Center for National Security Law (Christopher, THE DRONE BLOWBACK FALLACY STRIKES IN YEMEN AREN'T PUSHING PEOPLE TO AL-QAEDA, July 5, <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1587/opinion/1097/The-d-rone-blowback-fallacy-Strikes-in-Yemen-aren%27t-pushing-people-to-Al-Qaeda.htm>, CMR)

Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen's 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects' names to protect their safety -- a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats.¶ These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and Al-Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping Al-Qaeda more than they were hurting it.¶ Al-Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as Al-Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic. ¶ From Al-Hodeida in the west to Hadramaut in the east, AQAP is building complex webs of dependency within Yemen's rural population. It gives idle teenagers cars, qat, and rifles -- the symbols of Yemeni manhood. It pays salaries (up to $400 per month) that lift families out of poverty. It supports weak and marginalized sheikhs by digging wells, distributing patronage to tribesmen and punishing local criminals. As the leader of one Yemeni tribal confederation told me, “Al-Qaeda attracts those who can't afford to turn away.”¶ Religious figures echoed these words. Although critical of the U.S. drone campaign, none of the Islamists and Salafists I interviewed believed that drone strikes explain Al-Qaeda's burgeoning numbers. “The driving issue is development,” an Islamist parliamentarian from Hadramout province said. “Some districts are so poor that joining al Qaeda represents the best of several bad options." (Other options include criminality, migration, and even starvation.) A Salafi scholar engaged in hostage negotiations with AQAP agreed. "Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country," he explained. "A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption." Despite Yemenis' antipathy toward drones, my conversations also revealed a surprising degree of pragmatism. Those living in active conflict zones drew clear distinctions between earlier U.S. operations, such as the Majala bombing, and more recent strikes on senior al Qaeda figures. "Things were very bad in 2009," a tribal militia commander from Abyan province told me, "but now the drones are seen as helping us." He explained that Yemenis could "accept [drones] as long as there are no more civilian casualties." An Islamist member of the separatist al-Harak movement offered a similar assessment. "Ordinary people have become very practical about drones," he said. "If the United States focuses on the leaders and civilians aren't killed, then drone strikes will hurt al Qaeda more than they help them."

**No risk of great power conflict over Africa**

**Barrett ‘5** Robert Barrett, PhD student Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, June 1, 2005,

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN\_ID726162\_code327511.pdf?abstractid=726162&mirid=1

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, **the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars**, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, **the U**nited **S**tates, **recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict** (in September of 2004), **has** only **proclaimed sanctions** against Sudan, **while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention** (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that **traditional military and diplomatic approaches** at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires **have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win** – **especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.**

### a2 “Accountability”

**No link between drones and resentment – alt causes inevitable, alternatives worse**

**Etizoni 4/30** – director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies and a professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University (Amitai, “Drones: Say it with figures”, 2013, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/>, CMR)

Attacking **drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the U**nited **S**tates **has** found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media.¶ Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims.¶ **One argument** that is repeated again and again **is** that **killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen**, thereby **breeding** many **more terrorists** than are killed. For example, Akbar **Ahmed**, a distinguished professor at American University, **told** the BBC on April 9 **that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result**."¶ **The key word is "perhaps";** **Ahmed cites no data to support his contention**.¶ Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians.¶ At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans.¶ **No** such **self-serving statements** **can be taken as evidence in themselves**.¶ And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, **Mazzetti presents no evidence**.¶ One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish.¶ In reality, **ample evidence** **shows** that **large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the U**nited **S**tates **for numerous** and profound **reasons**, **unrelated to drone attacks**.¶ These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.¶ **These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred**, **were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place**, **and continue unabated**, **even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back**.¶ As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs:¶ "A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... **It is now clear that even major changes**, **such as Bush's departure**, **Obama's support for** some of **the Arab revolts** of 2011, **the death of** Osama **bin Laden**, **and** the U.S. **withdrawal from Iraq**, **have had** surprisingly **little effect** **on** Arab **attitudes towards the U**nited **S**tates. **Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily**, **but it is once again flowing freely**."¶ **The Pew Global Attitudes Project says anti-American sentiments were high and on the rise in countries where drone strikes weren't employed**. In Jordan, for example, U.S. unfavorability rose from 78 percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2012 while Egypt saw a rise from 78 percent to 79 percent over the same period.¶ Notably, the percentage of respondents reporting an "unfavorable" view of the United States in these countries is as high, or higher, than in drone-targeted Pakistan.¶ **In Pakistan**, a country that has been subjected to a barrage of strikes over the last five years, the United States' **unfavorability** held steady at 68 percent from 2007-10 (dropping briefly to 63 percent in 2008), but then **began to increase**, rising to 73 percent **in 2011 and** 80 percent in **2012** -- **a two-year period in which the number of drone strikes was actually dropping significantly.**¶ It is also worth noting that **these critics attribute resentment to drones rather than military strikes.**¶ **Do they really think that resentment would be lower if the U**nited **S**tates **were using cruise missiles? Or bombers? Or Special Forces?**

### SoPo/Cred: Legitimacy Inev 2NC

#### Legitimacy is inevitable and isn’t key to cooperation anyway

Wohlforth 9— Daniel Webster Professor of Government,  Dartmouth.  BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in  pol sci, Yale (William and Stephen Brooks, Reshaping the World Order, March / April 2009, Foreign Affairs Vol. 88, Iss. 2; pg. 49, 15 pgs)

FOR ANALYSTS such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the key reason for skepticism about the United States' ability to spearhead global institutional change is not a lack of power but a lack of legitimacy. Other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy has been squandered under the Bush administration; in this view, the legitimacy to lead is a fixed resource that can be obtained only under special circumstances. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues in After Victory that states have been well positioned to reshape the institutional order only after emerging victorious from some titanic struggle, such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War I or II. For the neoconservative Robert Kagan, the legitimacy to lead came naturally to the United States during the Cold War, when it was providing the signal service of balancing the Soviet Union. The implication is that today, in the absence of such salient sources of legitimacy, the wellsprings of support for U.S. leadership have dried up for good. But this view is mistaken. For one thing, it overstates how accepted U.S. leadership was during the Cold War: anyone who recalls the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s, for example, will recognize that mass opposition to U.S. policy (in that case, over stationing intermediaterange nuclear missiles in Europe) is not a recent phenomenon. For another, it understates how dynamic and malleable legitimacy is. Legitimacy is based on the belief that an action, an actor, or a political order is proper, acceptable, or natural. An action - such as the Vietnam War or the invasion of Iraq - may come to be seen as illegitimate without sparking an irreversible crisis of legitimacy for the actor or the order. When the actor concerned has disproportionately more material resources than other states, the sources of its legitimacy can be refreshed repeatedly. After all, this is hardly the first time Americans have worried about a crisis of legitimacy. Tides of skepticism concerning U.S. leadership arguably rose as high or higher after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and during Ronald Reagan's first term, when he called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Even George W. Bush, a globally unpopular U.S. president with deeply controversial policies, oversaw a marked improvement in relations with France, Germany, and India in recent years - even before the elections of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy in France. Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration's approach to diplomacy and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United States continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public goods that reinforce the benefits of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with Washington's. And largely because of the power position the United States still occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system's leader hinges on whether the system's members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can be expected. Moreover, history provides abundant evidence that past leading states - such as Spain, France, and the United Kingdom - were able to revise the international institutions of their day without the special circumstances Ikenberry and Kagan cite. Spain fashioned both normative and positive laws to legitimize its conquest of indigenous Americans in the early seventeenth century; France instituted modern concepts of state borders to meet its needs as Europe's preeminent land power in the eighteenth century; and the United Kingdom fostered rules on piracy, neutral shipping, and colonialism to suit its interests as a developing maritime empire in the nineteenth century. As Wilhelm Grewe documents in his magisterial The Epochs of International Law, these states accomplished such feats partly through the unsubtle use of power: bribes, coercion, and the allure oflucrative long-term cooperation. Less obvious but often more important, the bargaining hands of the leading states were often strengthened by the general perception that they could pursue their interests in even less palatable ways - notably, through the naked use of force. Invariably, too, leading states have had the power to set the international agenda, indirectly affecting the development of new rules by defining the problems they were developed to address. Given its naval primacy and global trading interests, the United Kingdom was able to propel the slave trade to the forefront of the world's agenda for several decades after it had itself abolished slavery at home, in 1833. The bottom line is that the United States today has the necessary legitimacy to shepherd reform of the international system.

**Heg 1NC (short)**

**Data disproves heg impacts**

**Fettweis, 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially**. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990**.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, **if** the pacific **trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but** **a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.** The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited **S**tates **cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U**nited **S**tates **military**, or at least **none took any action that would suggest** **such a belief**. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished**. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, **even if it is true that either U.S. commitments** or relative spending **account for global** pacific **trends**, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that **there is in fact a level of engagement below which the U**nited **S**tates **cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined**. **Grand strategic decisions are never final**; continual **adjustments can** and must **be made** as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled**. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should** at least **pose a problem**. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending**. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite **effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

## adv 1

### Modeling 1NC (:40

#### US action irrelevant to international norms on drones – other tech proves

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other critics contend that by the United States ¶ using drones, it leads other countries into making and ¶using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK ¶ and author of a book about drones argues that, “The ¶ proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the ¶ precedent that the United States is setting by killing ¶ anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of ¶ secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in ¶ a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are ¶ now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can ¶ be little doubt that the fact that drones have served ¶ the United States well has helped to popularize them. ¶ However, it does not follow that United States ¶ should not have employed drones in the hope that ¶such a show of restraint would deter others. First ¶ of all, this would have meant that either the United ¶ States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either ¶ roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use ¶ bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. ¶ Further, the record shows that even when the ¶United States did not develop a particular weapon, ¶others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the ¶ development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly ¶ cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind ¶ that the international environment is a hostile ¶ one. Countries—and especially non-state actors—¶ most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ ¶whatever weapons they can obtain that will further ¶their interests. The United States correctly does ¶ not assume that it can rely on some non-existent ¶ implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the ¶ avoidance of new military technology by nation X ¶ or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains ¶ from employing that technology¶ I am not arguing that there are no natural norms ¶ that restrain behavior. There are certainly some ¶ that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of ¶ diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of ¶ mass destruction). However drones are but one ¶step—following bombers and missiles—in the ¶development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. ¶ (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines—¶ are next in line). In such circumstances, the role ¶ of norms is much more limited.

#### No drones arms race – multiple checks

- narrow application – diplomatic and political costs – state defenses

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### Realist theory disproves the advantage

JM Greico- professor of political science at Duke University, 1993 “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

Realism has dominated international relations theory at least since World War II.' For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶ Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶ Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors. According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, states must give serious attention to the gains of partners. Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.

### Modeling: China 1NC

#### No Chinese drone aggression – political constraints

**Erickson 13** 5/23 – associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center (Andrew, and Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a graduate student at Zhejiang University, “China Has Drones. Now What?”, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139405/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what?page=show>, CMR)

Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle -- and its behavior will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing’s opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the program, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, by 2011 China’s air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States’; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian (“sharp sword” in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Burmese drug trafficker, Naw Kham, made clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a nonstate actor. Meanwhile, as China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines, and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese Major General Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China’s rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China’s Defense Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Burmese drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the antidrug bureau in China’s Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham’s mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham’s capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorization is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorization, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries’ sovereignty -- something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.¶ The limitations on China’s drone use are reflected in the country’s academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -- such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier -- which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China’s contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China’s horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China’s leaders understand that they would damage the country’s image abroad, but they prioritize internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world’s most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorization if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military’s tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing’s overarching approach remains one of caution -- something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone program.

### Russia 1NC

#### The Russian military-industrial complex will never successfully field combat drones

Alex Olesker 12, Technology Research Analyst at Crucial Point LLC, 9/10/12, “The Russian and Chinese Drone Programs,” http://www.oodaloop.com/technology/2012/09/10/the-russian-and-chinese-drone-programs/

Russia does not currently possess strike drones, though the Russian Defense Ministry stated in April that they are in the process of acquiring combat drones and have finalized their requirements. According to the Russian Air Force Commander Alexander Zelin, the drones are slated to enter service in 2020 and prototypes will be ready by 2016. Though few details have been released, all signs seem to indicate the Russian combat drone will be comparable to the American MQ-9 Reaper, with a greater weight and hence payload than the MQ-1 predator. Other sources, however, dispute these predictions. Industry sources have suggested that the first domestically produced combat drone will be ready next year but would be closer in size and capabilities to the MQ-1 Predator. Russia also intends to build unmanned, jet-powered long-range bombers to replace their aging fleet of Tupolevs, but, according to the Russian long-range aviation commander Lt. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, these drones will not be ready until 2040, 20 years after the U.S. plans to field similar aircraft. In light of this as well as the failures of Russia’s past attempts at combat drones such as the MiG “Scat” or “Manta Ray”, an RQ-170 Sentinel clone, which was cancelled over difficulty finding a sufficiently light yet powerful domestic engine, it’s likely that the Russian military-industrial complex will have difficulty delivering their strike drone on deadline if at all.

### Modeling: War Threshold

#### Drones don’t lower the threshold for war because decisions to intervene aren’t driven by technological capabilities

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Another, more general, criticism of drones is that, by offering the absence of personal and political risk, they ‘lower the bar to war’.8 By inducing a ‘false faith in the efficacy and morality of armed attack’, unmanned systems could ‘weaken the moral presumption against the use of force’.9

These, too, are critiques that must be taken seriously. The decision to take military action must always be made heavily. If the object of war is to make a better peace, then it must be waged with due regard not just for one’s own cost in blood and treasure, but also for that of the adversary.

Yet it is a mistake to ascribe too much to technology as a dynamo of intervention itself. It is true that major Western militaries now prepare for an era of ‘light-footprint’ intervention born of budget austerity and war exhaustion from the protracted counter-insurgencies of the post-9/11 era. But the Western record of intervention has not been linear. For the Libya intervention, there is the Syria non-intervention; the West intervened firmly in Bosnia in 1995, but only after the earlier failures resulted in the worst massacre in Europe since the Second World War at Srebrenica; the withdrawal from Somalia and the shameful inaction over Rwanda sits in the historical record alongside the determined, forceful, sustained military action in Kosovo of 1999 and the preventative diplomacy in Macedonia of 2001. Technological capabilities can shape the form of intervention, but ultimately its drivers and determinants are political and moral. President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron, for instance, pushed for intervention in Libya on moral grounds despite serious equipment deficiencies that meant reliance on American assets – and, in the case of Cameron, much against the counsel of his own military.10

#### Drones don’t make it ‘too easy’ to use force, and even if they do, the net impact is less than that of the conventional wars they replace

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

Then there a further idea that drones make it “too easy” to reach across borders and that is the difference today; a long-standing legal doctrine suddenly made far too powerful by reason of new technology. I am not convinced. That drones – precisely because they are accepted as both more sparing of civilians and more sparing of one’s own forces – makes it “too easy” to use force, reduces the disincentive against using force, has proven irresistible to many as a criticism of drones and targeted killing. I address some of the questions in this draft article. Still, one consideration is simply that the number of “resorts to force” is not enough to damn drones and targeted killing. One must also consider the intensity of the fighting that ensues by comparison to conventional war, as well as the question of whether they increase or diminish the damage that might otherwise arise from conventional wars that take place in lieu of these more discrete uses of force.

### asia war/Senkaku D 1NC

#### No Senkaku or Asian conflict- empirically denied, economic interdependence checks, and China avoids nationalism.

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At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. Yet, months later, nothing has happened. And despite their aggressive posturing in the disputed territory, both sides now show glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability. Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, China cannot afford military conflict with any of its Asian neighbors. It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing's two most fundamental national interests -- economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China's new leader, from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, Beijing has promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate conditions amenable to China's economic development. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, although often seen as a promoter of conflict, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. Ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

## 2NC

### Paki DA: Stability 2NC

#### -psychological effects ensure- blowback is isolated and overstated

blowback is from people in cities who are already radicalized- the people affected by drone strikes don’t care

Nadim 12 (Hussain Nadim, visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, August 8, 2012, "How Drones Changed the Game in Pakistan," National Interest, nationalinterest.org/how-drones-changed-the-game-pakistan-7290)

Regardless of what the news agencies in Pakistan claim about the negative effects of drone strikes, the weapon is proving to be a game changer for the U.S. war on terrorism. And surprisingly, the Pakistani Army quietly admits to this fact. Just the way Stinger missiles shifted the balance of power in favor of the United States in the 1980s, drones are producing the same results.¶ The critics of unmanned strikes, who claim that drones are contributing to growing radicalization in Pakistan, haven’t looked around enough—or they would realize that much of the radicalization already was established by the Taliban in the 1990s. The real tragedy is that it is acceptable for the Taliban to radicalize and kill, but it is considered a breach of sovereignty for the United States, in pursuit of those radicalizing Pakistan’s people, to do the same.¶ There is so much protest over the drones because the media reports about them are biased. Although people on ground in war zones contend that the drone strikes have very few civilian casualties and, with time, have become extremely precise, the media presents quite a different story to boost its ratings.¶ Many in Pakistan, especially in the army, understand the positive impact of this weapon. Drones are coming in handy for two reasons: their precision and psychological effect. Many analysts of this subject have been concerned only with the military aspect, such as whether or not drones are precise enough and the casualties they incur. But part of what works in favor of the United States is the psychological impact—the fear that drones have instilled in the militants. The fact that the United States might strike day or night, inside the militant compound or outside while traveling in the convoys, works to deter militants and restrict their operations. This tilts the balance of power in favor of the United States.¶ Most of the people in the Pakistani Army whom I interviewed on the subject were positive about the drone strikes and their direct correlation with a decrease in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The majority focused on the psychological impact of the drones and how they have put militants on the run, forcing them to sleep under trees at night, though it must be said that army officials showed some concern about cases in which the same psychological impact is experienced by civilians.¶ Locals I talked to are frustrated over the fear that they might get hit by a drone if the militants are hiding in their neighborhood. But this frustration may have a positive impact as it motivates civilians to flush out and close doors to militants who seek refuge in their areas.¶ Surprisingly, there isn’t as much anti-Americanism as one would suspect in areas where the United States is conducting drone strikes, largely because the locals are fed up with the influx of militants in their areas and have suffered because of terrorism. However, urban centers, which have suffered the least from terrorism, are far more radicalized and anti-American. Hence, we see large anti-drone rallies in the cities of Punjab, where people have little first-hand experience with drones. The anti-American lot in these places will start a rally for any reason at all as long as they get to burn a few American flags.

#### -displaces destabilizing Pakistani military interventions and US ground forces- negotiations are a farce and won’t create stability

Ahmad 12 (Adam Ahmad is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security and a reporting assistant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His work focuses on South Asia and U.S. covert action., 11/7/2012, Drones: Here to Stay", ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/07/drones\_here\_to\_stay)

But a constant focus on the positives and negatives of the drone program in Pakistan does little to address the real issues surrounding its use. The more compelling issue is: what's the alternative? Yes, the drone program has sapped much of al Qaeda's energy in the tribal areas, but it has also sparked torrents of anti-Americanism. Is there any other way for the U.S. and Pakistan to dismantle terrorist organizations without provoking wider violence for Pakistan?

One approach is for Pakistani military forces to suit up and prepare for another invasion of the tribal areas. But past incursions have ended dreadfully. During Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan in 2008, homes were razed, villages were leveled and thousands of FATA residents were displaced. The operation was so devastating that it created new grievances for FATA's local population and led Baitullah Meshud's al Qaeda inspired Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) to double-down in violence and suicide bombings, wreaking havoc across the Pakistani landscape.

This is not to say that the Pakistani military should shy away from conducting operations in Pakistan proper to claw back militant gains. The military offensive in 2009 to vanquish Mullah Fazlula's Taliban faction-responsible for the assassination attempt on Malala Yousafzai-from the Swat Valley was much needed. But the Pakistani military should steer clear of orchestrating incursions into the tribal areas where the writ of Islamabad runs thin in order to avoid wider devastation.

A more hazardous alternative to drones is to have U.S. forces conduct cross-border raids into FATA. With the U.S. drawing down in Afghanistan, this option is not on the table in Washington and for good reason. If the Pakistani public is outraged at remote controlled bombers hovering over their country, hostility towards the U.S. would certainly hit a fever pitch at western boots on the ground. A U.S. military presence in FATA would also serve a propaganda bonanza for violent extremist groups. Indeed, there remains little appetite in Washington to turn that into a reality. Pakistan's leadership will also never give the green light for such a move.

In another approach, Pakistani authorities could also turn to forging political settlements with militant groups in hopes that they cease their assistance in planning and executing terror attacks with foreign and homegrown terrorist organizations. But if history is any lesson, peace deals with extremist groups have a very short lifespan. The 24-year-old Waziri militant leader Nek Mohammed back in June 2004 failed to up hold his end of the Shakai Peace Agreement with Islamabad, jolting the Pakistani military into South Waziristan again to clear out Pakistani and foreign militant groups from the area.

What's more, recent utterances from TTP vanguard Hakimullah Meshud suggests that the group is not interested at all in signing peace deals with the government. Meshud even sacked one of his deputies -- Maulvi Faqir Muhammad -- for entertaining the idea.

Pakistan has historically neg

otiated these peace deals when the Pakistani government was in a relatively weak position, forcing the state to make significant concessions to the militants. The deals failed to serve their purpose and only strengthened the resolve of the extremists.

None of these alternatives can wipe out terror groups in Pakistan without causing wider destruction in the tribal areas or in Pakistan proper. Drones not only allow for the swift incineration of terrorist operatives, but they also make it more difficult for terror groups to meet and plan attacks. The program may have its faults, but it has also kept Pakistan safer by neutralizing the groups that seek nothing more than to break the government in Islamabad and harm activists for speaking out for a woman's right to education. For better or for worse, blemishes and all, drones are here to stay.

### A2 “We Don’t Ban Drones”

#### Their middle ground is terrible – unrestrained is key – anything else causes militant rise and attacks on the US

Cilluffo 12 (Frank Cilluffo directs the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University. He is co-author of "Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones" and previously served as special assistant to the president for homeland security under George W. Bush., 2/15/2012, "Open Relationship", www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/15/open\_relationship)

Are Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) still the prime destination for jihad-minded foreign fighters from the West? The short answer is that we really don't know because empirical data is hard to find. Anecdotal evidence referenced by Western security officials, researchers, and even jihadists does suggest, however, that the FATA just might have lost its magnetic appeal. If so, we need to ensure that this positive development is not a fleeting one. And to determine the best way forward, we need to look at how and why it came to be.

But first, let's remember why this phenomenon matters. Foreign fighters, especially those emanating from the West, bolster terrorist and insurgent factions within conflict zones. Foreign fighters, as well as the bridge figures who recruit them, inspire, radicalize, and motivate individuals to the jihadi cause. Foreign fighters serve key operational and propaganda functions -- in essence, they provide both effect and affect. Their role makes them a threat to Western policy objectives. Together, their ability to return home, their Western passports, and their familiarity with potential targets they may select to attack make them a direct threat to Western security.

There is no shortage of examples of Westerners who trained in the FATA and then went on to execute (or attempt to execute) attacks against the West. Consider Najibullah Zazi, who planned to bomb the New York City subway but was thwarted by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials. Or Faisal Shahzad, the so-called Times Square bomber, whose car bomb fortunately fizzled. Or Mohammad Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the 7/7 homicide/suicide bombings that killed more than 50 and wounded over 700 in London in 2005. Or Eric Breininger, a young German national featured in propaganda videos of the Islamic Jihad Union, who was ultimately killed in Waziristan. And the list goes on.

It's definitely good news that there may be a drop in the number of Western foreign fighters traveling to the FATA, but it should come as no surprise. First and foremost, military actions -- including the use of drones -- have made the environment less hospitable for those traveling to it. These military activities have had significant operational effects on al Qaeda (and associated entities) by disrupting pipelines to the region, activities of key facilitators, and training camps. The challenge now is to continue, consolidate, and solidify these gains.

Recent U.S. and allied military successes undoubtedly serve also as a strong deterrent. Think of it as suppressive fire: The more time al Qaeda and its ilk spend looking over their shoulders, the less time they have to train, plot, and execute terrorist attacks. And with al Qaeda senior leaders on their back heels, now is the time to exploit this unique window of counterterrorism opportunity by maintaining, if not accelerating, the operational tempo.

Yet there's reason to be concerned that the net effect and impact of suppressive fire may be dwindling: U.S. and International Security Assistance Force operations in the region are expected to be scaled back soon -- a casualty of the triple whammy of U.S. political fatigue, economic austerity, and Pakistani protests. Let's not forget that, whatever the extent of recent success in deterring foreign fighters, it did not happen in a vacuum. Now is not the time to buckle under pressure, Pakistani or otherwise. Al Qaeda is a resilient organization, and the FATA is a complex and fluid environment. We must not allow al Qaeda the means to regroup there or relocate from FATA to another safe haven.

The foreign-fighter phenomenon in the FATA is also just one piece of a much bigger and more ominous picture, which underscores the significance of ungoverned and undergoverned spaces across the globe. History shows that the threat will gravitate and metastasize to the areas that will best support its nefarious activities and ideology. This is precisely why al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations operate out of the FATA, Somalia, the Sahel, Yemen -- and even the Internet. Localized counterterrorism successes must therefore be woven into a larger, sustained, and strategic effort -- one that continues to apply targeted pressure to deny adversaries the time and space to maneuver.

The terrorism threat today comes in various shapes, sizes, and forms, ranging from al Qaeda's senior leadership (Ayman al-Zawahiri and his top deputies), to its principal franchises al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (based in Yemen), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (operating in southern Algeria, northern Mali, and eastern Mauritania and spreading elsewhere in the Sahel), and al Qaeda in Iraq, to its affiliates al-Shabab in Somalia (also the newest official franchise) and Boko Haram in Nigeria, to individuals inspired by (if not directly connected to) al Qaeda's ideology -- which includes the "homegrown" threat.

Pakistan is especially complex -- and dangerous. Groups that were once regionally focused now increasingly subscribe to al Qaeda's goals and the broader global jihad. This toxic blend includes the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (often dubbed the "Pakistani Taliban"), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan -- all of which cooperate with al Qaeda on a tactical and sometimes strategic basis, linked by an affinity for militant Islamist ideology -- with U.S., Indian, Israeli, and Western targets increasingly in their cross-hairs.

Historically, collaborative efforts among such groups were primarily limited to covert logistical support, including the provision of money, safe havens, and arms, as well as the movement back and forth of key personnel from one entity to another. For instance, al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah was captured in an LeT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in 2002. Jemaah Islamiyah's Umar Patek, currently on trial for the 2002 Bali bombings, received training from al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s before returning back to Indonesia in the early 2000s. When he was arrested in January 2011, Patek was back in Pakistan -- where, according to West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, he was apprehended in Abbottabad by authorities who followed a known al Qaeda operative to the safe house where Patek and his wife were staying. Patek was subsequently extradited to Indonesia in August 2011.

Today, the relationships between terrorist groups are becoming more overt and strategic in nature. On Feb. 12, LeT, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan held a rally in Karachi to support their Difa-e-Pakistan Council and its anti-American, anti-Western political agenda. Jamaat-e-Islami is reportedly moving to partner with former members of Pervez Musharraf's regime. These open relationships are unlikely to be a sign of decreased tactical collaboration; they are a warning of deepening strategic ties. Prior to his reported demise in a June 2011 drone strike in Pakistan, HuJI's military commander, Ilyas Kashmiri, built strong operational ties between myriad Islamist terrorist groups. Among other things, Kashmiri served as a coordinator between these groups and radicals in the West, as demonstrated by his linking up David Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana with LeT for the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

So let's not get complacent. There will be no shortage of opportunities for foreign fighters who wish to travel to jihadi conflict zones. The threat landscape is dynamic and ever evolving. Even if we were to succeed in draining the swamp (a big "if") that is the FATA, further challenges and dangers abound in Africa, especially Somalia (where recent reporting indicates a spike, not dip, in the numbers of Western foreign fighters), and beyond, including in areas not yet on the public's radar screen such as Kenya, Nigeria, and the Caucasus. Compounding the situation, current events on the ground in Syria, including al Qaeda's bid to leverage the crisis by calling for foreign fighters to exploit the revolt, may reshuffle and intensify foreign-fighter pipelines. Against this backdrop, determination and focus will be needed, especially because the pool of indigenous fighters is plenty deep. As for the FATA, it's a good start -- and now is the time to double down by ramping up the counterterrorism and military actions that got us this far.

### Yemen Stability 2NC

#### Drones in Yemen now – key to prevent AQAP resurgence and Yemen government collapse

Terrill 13

W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Studies Institute, SSI’s Middle East specialist, served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the Inter- national Assessments Division of the Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory, PhD in international relations from Claremont, “The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, June 2013 //jchen

In his February 2012 inauguration speech, Hadi called for, “the continuation of the war against al- Qaeda as a religious and national duty.” AQAP re- sponded to his assertiveness with considerable fe- rocity by striking Yemeni government targets with suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism. These strikes were made in order to further challenge the government before Hadi could consolidate his author- ity. Even more significantly, AQAP won a major battle in southern Yemen during this time frame by attack- ing unprepared troops, most of whom appear to have been asleep after posting inadequate security. Despite this defeat, the government launched an offensive in the summer of 2012 to remove AQAP and Ansar al- Shariah from the territory they had seized in southern Yemen. The Yemeni offensive was conducted with a force of around 20,000 regular army soldiers, support- ed by significant numbers of paid local tribal auxilia- ries. Saudi Arabia provided considerable financial as- sistance to support the operation, and it appears that a large share of the Saudi funds may have been used to hire the tribal militia auxiliaries requested to sup- port the army. These types of fighters have often been highly effective in the kinds of combat that take place in Yemen. In the face of this attack, AQAP fought back proficiently and also conducted several spectacular terrorist attacks in Sanaa. Fortunately, the military pre- vailed against this resistance, and AQAP forces were ultimately driven from the urban areas that they had previously occupied.

In the 2012 government offensive, the internation- al press reported the widespread use of U.S. drones, which, according to those same reports, may have tipped the tide of battle by gathering intelligence and serving to eliminate key insurgent leaders at impor- tant points in the campaign. While drone use has many political drawbacks, the possibility that it helped de- termine the outcome of the summer offensive is worth considering. If the Yemeni military had been defeated by AQAP in this effort, the government might have collapsed at an excruciatingly sensitive time, possibly leaving the country in anarchy. Such a defeat would also create the conditions for an even more deeply rooted AQAP presence in southern Yemen, with no countervailing Yemeni authority capable of moving against it. The success of the government’s southern offensive would therefore seem to have been vitally important to U.S. national interests in the region. If Yemeni forces had failed, and particularly if they had failed ignominiously, a newly energized terror- ist movement could have plagued the region and the world.

Unfortunately, despite the 2012 victory, the struggle for control of Yemen is still subject to uncertainty, and an AQAP insurgent comeback there remains a disturbing possibility. Moreover, the use of U.S. drones to ensure Yemeni security has already been seen to be deeply unpopular among many Yemeni citizens. Consequently, drones should not be treated as a long- term solution to that country’s security problems. A more optimal long-term solution is a Yemeni military that is capable of maintaining national security with- out the direct involvement of foreign forces. Military reform, therefore, remains a vital aspect of dealing with Yemen’s security issues. Yemeni forces are cur- rently making some progress in this regard, and Presi- dent Hadi has made a strong effort to modernize the military’s structure and eliminate the warlord-style leadership of some Yemeni commanders.

**Targeted killings are key to prevent terror plots that cause U.S. intervention into Yemen**

Alan W. **Dowd 13**, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

In considering the examples described in this article, it is clear that drones have played an important role in preventing the emergence of an AQAP state in southern Yemen and heading off a spectacular terrorist strike, either of which could create intense US domestic pressure for a risky and expensive military intervention in Yemen. Under these circumstances, drone use seems like an option that should be kept open, at least for the near term. Nevertheless, US leaders cannot become complacent. Yemeni domestic politics are volatile, and President Hadi does not have the political power to ignore this volatility. The Yemeni public’s distrust of drones and the potential for serious backlash over any drone-related disaster suggests that it is unwise to assume that the drone option will always be present to meet future national security requirements.

### AQAP: Alt Causes 2NC

no link- studies- blowback isolated

#### Alternative causalities to AQAP – poverty, instability, power vacuum

TheWeek 8/7/13 [The Week Magazine, “Yemen terror threat – why the West is so worried by AQAP,” The Week Magazine with the First Post, <http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/54494/yemen-terror-threat-al-qaeda-aqap-west-worried>]

Yemen is poor and unstable: The country was only formed in 1990 when the independent north and south were united, but it remains deeply tribal and civil war broke out in 2004. It is also one of the least developed countries in the Arab world and has very small oil reserves. "After years of civil war, Yemen's central government under President Abd Rabbuh Mansour al-Hadi has little control over much of the country," notes the Daily Telegraph.

The Arab spring made things worse: Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled the country since unification, was one of the leaders to be overthrown in 2011. Although his regime was unpopular and corrupt, his overthrow created a power vaccuum that helped radicals establish themselves in the country. Geopolitical Monitor reports that "as the Arab Spring intensified in Yemen... al-Qaeda significantly expanded its operations, particularly against the Yemeni armed forces".

**--Ext1A—Alt Causes (Top) 2NC**

#### Drones strikes don’t fuel resentment – alt causes outweigh

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other critics argue that drones strikes engender ¶ much resentment among the local population and¶ serve as a major recruitment tool for the terrorists, ¶ possibly radicalizing more individuals than they ¶ neutralize. This argument has been made especially in reference to Pakistan, where there were ¶ anti-American demonstrations following drones ¶ strikes, as well as in Yemen.44 However, such ¶ arguments do not take into account the fact that ¶ anti-American sentiment in these areas ran high ¶ before drone strikes took place and remained so ¶ during periods in which strikes were signiﬁcantly ¶ scaled back. Moreover, other developments—such ¶ as the release of an anti-Muslim movie trailer by an ¶ Egyptian Copt from California or the publication of ¶ incendiary cartoons by a Danish newspaper—led ¶ to much larger demonstrations. Hence stopping ¶ drone strikes—if they are otherwise justiﬁed, and ¶ especially given that they are a very effective and ¶ low-cost way to neutralize terrorist violence on ¶ the ground45—merely for public relations purposes ¶ seems imprudent.

#### There’s no impact to anti-drones backlash

Stephen Holmes 13, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, July 2013, “What’s in it for Obama?,” The London Review of Books, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/stephen-holmes/whats-in-it-for-obama>

This is the crux of the problem. We stand at the beginning of the Drone Age and the genie is not going to climb back into the bottle. The chances that this way of war will, over time, reduce the amount of random violence in the world are essentially nil. Obama’s drone policy has set an ominous precedent, and not only for future residents of the White House. It promises, over the long term, to engender more violence than it prevents because it excites no public backlash. That, for the permanent national security apparatus that has deftly moulded the worldview of a novice president, is its irresistible allure. It doesn’t provoke significant protest even on the part of people who condemn hit-jobs done with sticky bombs, radioactive isotopes or a bullet between the eyes – in the style of Mossad or Putin’s FSB. That America appears to be laidback about drones has made it possible for the CIA to resume the assassination programme it was compelled to shut down in the 1970s without, this time, awakening any politically significant outrage. It has also allowed the Pentagon to wage a war against which antiwar forces are apparently unable to rally even modest public support.

**--Ext1C—Alt Causes (Global) 2NC**

**Alt causes to lack of trust in the US**

**Tomei 2012** (September 17, Lizzy, “Anti-US protests and Arab public opinion: Q&A” <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/120917/anti-us-protests-and-public-sentiment-qa>)

**Surveys have shown** than **Muslims abroad believe that Americans do not respect Muslims or Islamic traditions.** Several polls have found this pattern, including Gallup polls across the Muslim world. The video played right into this way of thinking. **The protests may also reflect dissatisfaction with US/western foreign policies**. Various **survey research has shown that anti-American sentiment is usually based primarily on anger at US foreign policy** rather than a clash of cultures or values, **including**: Muslims’ **longstanding perceptions of a pro-Israel bias in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, the US handling of the war in Afghanistan**, and actions the US has taken to combat terrorism, including drone strikes. A recent Pew survey found that about nine in ten in Egypt and Jordan, eight in ten in Turkey and seven in ten in Tunisia oppose the use of drone strikes (as do majorities in several non-Muslim countries).

#### Detention is an alt cause to resentment.

Roberts, Associate Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University, ‘11

[Rodney, “Utilitarianism and the Morality of Indefinite Detention”, Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 1, RSR]

Finally, ‘‘there is no evidence that preventive detention works. Comparative studies of terrorism stretching back more than 20 years have concluded that draconian measures\* such as prolonged detention without trial\*are not proven to reduce violence, and can actually be counterproductive.’’ 30 Since it may contribute to the ‘‘underlying factors [that] are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement,’’ namely, ‘‘injustice and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness,’’ there is a sense in which indefinite detention can be selfdefeating\*it may increase the likelihood of future attacks.31

### **econ**

#### Economics spurs recruiting

**Swift 12** – adjunct professor of national security studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a fellow at the University of Virginia's Center for National Security Law (Christopher, THE DRONE BLOWBACK FALLACY STRIKES IN YEMEN AREN'T PUSHING PEOPLE TO AL-QAEDA, July 5, <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1587/opinion/1097/The-d-rone-blowback-fallacy-Strikes-in-Yemen-aren%27t-pushing-people-to-Al-Qaeda.htm>, CMR)

Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen's 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects' names to protect their safety -- a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats.¶ These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and Al-Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping Al-Qaeda m

ore than they were hurting it.¶ Al-Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as Al-Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic. ¶ From Al-Hodeida in the west to Hadramaut in the east, AQAP is building complex webs of dependency within Yemen's rural population. It gives idle teenagers cars, qat, and rifles -- the symbols of Yemeni manhood. It pays salaries (up to $400 per month) that lift families out of poverty. It supports weak and marginalized sheikhs by digging wells, distributing patronage to tribesmen and punishing local criminals. As the leader of one Yemeni tribal confederation told me, “Al-Qaeda attracts those who can't afford to turn away.”¶ Religious figures echoed these words. Although critical of the U.S. drone campaign, none of the Islamists and Salafists I interviewed believed that drone strikes explain Al-Qaeda's burgeoning numbers. “The driving issue is development,” an Islamist parliamentarian from Hadramout province said. “Some districts are so poor that joining al Qaeda represents the best of several bad options." (Other options include criminality, migration, and even starvation.) A Salafi scholar engaged in hostage negotiations with AQAP agreed. "Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country," he explained. "A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption." Despite Yemenis' antipathy toward drones, my conversations also revealed a surprising degree of pragmatism. Those living in active conflict zones drew clear distinctions between earlier U.S. operations, such as the Majala bombing, and more recent strikes on senior al Qaeda figures. "Things were very bad in 2009," a tribal militia commander from Abyan province told me, "but now the drones are seen as helping us." He explained that Yemenis could "accept [drones] as long as there are no more civilian casualties." An Islamist member of the separatist al-Harak movement offered a similar assessment. "Ordinary people have become very practical about drones," he said. "If the United States focuses on the leaders and civilians aren't killed, then drone strikes will hurt al Qaeda more than they help them."

### **accountability**

#### \*\*Internal and external accountability mechanisms are effective now---and they’ll stay that way as drone missions increase

Jack Goldsmith 12, Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, 3/19/12, “Fire When Ready,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire\_when\_ready

In this new age of drone warfare, probing the constitutional legitimacy of targeted killings has never been more vital. The Obama administration has carried out well over 200 drone strikes in its first three years, and the practice promises to ramp up even more in the next few years as the United States decreases its footprint in Afghanistan and relies even more heavily on special operations and covert actions centered around the use of drones. There are contested legal issues surrounding drone strikes, and -- in contrast to issues like military detention and military commissions -- courts have not pushed back against the presidency on this issue. But judicial review is not the only constitutional check on the presidency, especially during war. Awlaki's killing and others like it have solid legal support and are embedded in an unprecedentedly robust system of legal and political accountability that includes courts but also includes other institutions and actors as well.

When the Obama administration made the decision to kill Awlaki, it did not rely on the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief. Rather, it relied on authority that Congress gave it, and on guidance from the courts. In September 2001, Congress authorized the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines" were responsible for 9/11. Whatever else the term "force" may mean, it clearly includes authorization from Congress to kill enemy soldiers who fall within the statute. Unlike some prior authorizations of force in American history, the 2001 authorization contains no geographical limitation. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the detention context, has ruled that the "force" authorized by Congress in the 2001 law could be applied against a U.S. citizen. Lower courts have interpreted the same law to include within its scope co-belligerent enemy forces "associated" with al Qaeda who are "engaged in hostilities against the United States."

International law is also relevant to targeting decisions. Targeted killings are lawful under the international laws of war only if they comply with basic requirements like distinguishing enemy soldiers from civilians and avoiding excessive collateral damage. And they are consistent with the U.N. Charter's ban on using force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" only if the targeted nation consents or the United States properly acts in self-defense. There are reports that Yemen consented to the strike on Awlaki. But even if it did not, the strike would still have been consistent with the Charter to the extent that Yemen was "unwilling or unable" to suppress the threat he posed. This standard is not settled in international law, but it is sufficiently grounded in law and practice that no American president charged with keeping the country safe could refuse to exercise international self-defense rights when presented with a concrete security threat in this situation. The "unwilling or unable" standard was almost certainly the one the United States relied on in the Osama bin Laden raid inside Pakistan.

These legal principles are backed by a system of internal and external checks and balances that, in this context, are without equal in American wartime history. Until a few decades ago, targeting decisions were not subject to meaningful legal scrutiny. Presidents or commanders typically ordered a strike based on effec

tiveness and, sometimes, moral or political considerations. President Harry Truman, for example, received a great deal of advice about whether and how to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it didn't come from lawyers advising him on the laws of war. Today, all major military targets are vetted by a bevy of executive branch lawyers who can and do rule out operations and targets on legal grounds, and by commanders who are more sensitive than ever to legal considerations and collateral damage. Decisions to kill high-level terrorists outside of Afghanistan (like Awlaki) are considered and approved by lawyers and policymakers at the highest levels of the government.

### legit

#### Soft power is useless and impossible – hard power benefits of drones outweigh

Sheridan 12 (Greg, Foreign Editor @ the Australian, “Soft power reaps only a hard fall”, Sept 22, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/soft-power-reaps-only-a-hard-fall/story-e6frg76f-1226479045323>, CMR)

The US's standing in the Middle East, and the Muslim world more widely, is just as bad as it ever was under Bush.¶ Here is a hard truth. Islamist extremists didn't hate America because of Bush. They hated Bush because of America. And now they hate Obama, because of America.¶ On the upside, Obama has given us almost everything we might have hoped for in a McCain presidency in terms of the Asia Pacific and a renewed emphasis on alliances. Indeed, although Asian political elites tend to be more comfortable with Republicans, most of them broadly, if relatively lukewarmly, want Obama to win re-election.¶ Asians are worried about the departure of Hillary Clinton and the Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, who have been extremely good for Asia.¶ Obama's successes in national security have come almost entirely from the use of hard power, drone strikes on specific terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Navy Seal mission that killed Osama bin Laden.¶ The failure, however, of his soft power in the Middle East is extraordinary. It is not necessarily a fatal setback, but it holds some important lessons.¶ If ever a US president was going to garner goodwill in the Muslim world it was surely going to be Barack Hussein Obama, with his Kenyan father, his post-colonial consciousness, his years of childhood in Muslim Indonesia, his eloquence on racial issues, the global pop star vibe he generated.¶ It wasn't only his identity and global media adulation that Obama had going for him. He made every conceivable effort in making overtures to the Muslim world. He tiptoed around Iranian sensibilities, extended an open hand to the ayatollahs, refrained even from voicing any early criticism when they stole an election. In Cairo Obama made an eloquent plea for reconciliation between the Muslim world and America. He beat up on Israel, even at one point refusing to be seen in public with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and he made an elaborate bow to a Saudi royal.¶ But none of it has won anything from the Middle East. It may be that Bush overestimated what hard power could achieve. But in his first year in office, Obama certainly overestimated what soft power, and his own personality and eloquence, could achieve.¶ After a pretty dismal first year, Obama got much tougher and much more effective. On the Middle East, his policy has been pretty ineffective but I am at a loss to imagine what a more effective policy might have looked like.

###  heg

#### AND – The best statistical evidence proves – prefer statistics because its easy to write overly rhetorical cards but hard to cite facts

**Montiero 12** [Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states and create incentives for them to side with it. 39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains....second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail.” 40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identified in the previous section? Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 1 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace. How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. 48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

### Modeling: Ext3--Realism 2NC

#### Biology proves

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

#### 1000 years of history prove

John J. **Mearsheimer**, Realism Heavyweight Champion, “A Realist Reply,” International Security, v 20 n 1, Summer 19**95**, p. 82-93.

Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system. Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction.Critical theorists, on the other hand, focus on the social structure of the international system. They believe that "world politics is socially constructed," which is another way of saying that shared discourse, or how communities of individuals think and talk about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that "material resources like gold and tanks exist," but he argues that "such capabilities . . . only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded." Significantly for critical theorists, discourse can change, which means that realism is not forever,and that therefore it might be possible to move beyond realism to a world where institutionalized norms cause states to behave in more communitarian and peaceful ways. The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charges leveled against critical theory in "False Promise." The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant, and others fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised this question in "False Promise" (p. 42). Moreover, he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions.

### Modeling: Ext1A—US Not Key 2NC

#### All their “precedent” evidence relies on the assertion that there’s a causal link between U.S. drone doctrine and other’ countries choices---that’s not true---no tangible evidence

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

#### The idea that China wouldn’t have realized it could use drones to carry out strikes internationally absent the U.S. doing so, is stupid

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

It is indeed likely that the future will see more instances of uses of force at a much smaller, often less attributable, more discrete level than conventional war. Those uses will be most easily undertaken against non-state actors, rather than states, though the difference is likely to erode. The idea that it would not have occurred to China or Russia that drones could be used to target non-state actors across borders in safe havens, or that they would not do so because the United States had not done so is far-fetched. That is so not least because the United States has long held that it, or other states threatened by terrorist non-state actors in safe havens across sovereign borders, can be targeted if the sovereign is unable or unwilling to deal with them. There’s nothing new in this as a US view of international law; it goes back decades, and the US has not thought it some special rule benefiting the US alone. So the idea that the US has somehow developed this technology and then changed the rules regarding cross-border attack on terrorists is just wrong; the US has believed this for a long time and thinks it is legally and morally right.

### Modeling: Ext2—No Arms Race 2NC

#### No Impact - Checks in place now.

**Roberts, 13**

[Kristin, News Editor, National Journal, March 21, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>]

The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules to govern the program. Most members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees say they are confident the defense and intelligence communities have set an adequate evidentiary bar for determining when a member of al-Qaida or an affiliated group may be added to the target list, for example, and say that the rigor of the process gives them comfort in the level of program oversight within the executive branch. “They’re not drawing names out of a hat here,” Rogers said. “It is very specific intel-gathering and other things that would lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government.”

### Modeling: A2 “Boyle Ev”

#### Your Boyle av prove prolif is inevitable without binding international rules to govern it

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

A final, and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences of drones¶ would be to develop internationally recognized standards and norms for their use¶ and sale. It is not realistic to suggest that the US stop using its drones altogether,¶ or to assume that other countries will accept a moratorium on buying and using¶ drones. The genie is out of the bottle: drones will be a fact of life for years to¶ come. What remains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent,¶ regulated and consistent with internationally recognized human rights¶ standards. The Obama administration has already begun to show some awareness¶ that drones are dangerous if placed in the wrong hands. A recent New York Times¶ report revealed that the Obama administration began to develop a secret drones¶ ‘rulebook’ to govern their use if Mitt Romney were to be elected president.157¶ The same logic operates on the international level. Lethal drones will eventually¶ be in the hands of those who will use them with fewer scruples than President¶ Obama has. Without a set of internationally recognized standards or norms¶ governing their sale and use, drones will proliferate without control, be misused¶ by governments and non-state actors, and become an instrument of repression¶ for the strong. One remedy might be an international convention on the sale and¶ use of drones which could establish guidelines and norms for their use, perhaps¶ along the lines of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)¶ treaty, which attempted to spell out rules on the use of incendiary devices and¶ fragment-based weapons.158 While enforcement of these guidelines and adherence¶ to rules on their use will be imperfect and marked by derogations, exceptions and violations, the presence of a convention¶ may reinforce norms against the flagrant¶ misuse of drones and induce more restraint in their use than might otherwise be¶ seen. Similarly, a UN investigatory body on drones would help to hold states¶ accountable for their use of drones and begin to build a gradual consensus on the¶ types of activities for which drones can, and cannot, be used.159 As the progenitor¶ and leading user of drone technology, the US now has an opportunity to show¶ leadership in developing an international legal architecture which might avert¶ some of the worst consequences of their use.

### Russia 2NC

#### US isn’t key to Russian or Chinese drone use AND low risk that drones will be used against local separatists

Lewis 11 (Michael, teaches international law and the law of war at Ohio Northern University School of Law, "Unfounded drone fears," http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/17/opinion/la-oe--lewis-drones-20111017)

Myth 3: The U.S. use of drones in cases such as the Awlaki killing in Yemen serves to legitimize their use by China or Russia. International law places the same restrictions on the use of drones that it places on any other use of military force. The U.S. used a drone on Yemeni territory to kill Awlaki because it was given permission to do so by the Yemeni government, and because Awlaki was an active member of an Al Qaeda affiliate who had repeatedly been involved in operations designed to kill Americans at home and abroad. With such permission, the U.S. could instead have employed special forces or a conventional airstrike.¶ Numerous commentators have suggested that U.S. drone use legitimizes Russian drone use in Chechnya or Chinese drone use against the Uighurs. If China or Russia were facing genuine threats from Chechen or Uighur separatists, they might be allowed under international law to use drones in neighboring states if those states gave them permission to do so. However, given the fact that Chechen separatists declared an end to armed resistance in 2009, and that the greatest concern Russians currently have with Chechnya is with the lavish subsidies that Russia is currently providing it, the likelihood of armed Russian drones over Chechnya seems remote at best.¶ Likewise, there is no Uighur separatist organization that even remotely resembles Al Qaeda. Uighur unrest has taken the form of uprisings in Urumqi and other areas, similar to the Tibetan unrest of a few years ago. The Chinese eliminated such unrest with widespread arrests and disappearances, which raised serious human rights concerns. But there has been no time in which Uighur opposition has met the threshold established by international law that would allow for the use of armed drones in response to Uighur actions.

### Senkaku D 2NC

#### TWO, No war—economic and political constraints

**Park 12** International Affairs Review By Sungtae “Jacky” Park Contributor Sungtae Park is a M.A. Security Policy Studies student at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He has also written articles for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and Brandeis International Journal.http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/434

There is a growing fear among many Asia observers and pundits that the on-going territorial dispute could become a spark for a destructive, general war in Asia. The reality, however, is that there are several economic, political, as well as logistical (in military terms) constraints that make a war highly unlikely. In economic terms, trade between the two countries is at historic high levels. A war would have devastating human as well as material costs. While economic interests and interdependence do not necessarily lead to peace, as history has proven with World War I, the current situation is different. Both political and military leaders before World War I believed that a war would be quick with small costs. Each side also believed that it would win. Leaders of both China and Japan today understand that the costs of a war would be astronomical and understand that victory is no certainty. The CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) has a strong interest in making sure that the conflict does not turn into a war. One of the key pillars of the CCP’s legitimacy is economic growth. The Chinese economy is already slowing. A war would certainly put a halt to the so-called Chinese miracle. In the beginning of the dispute this year, Beijing actually discreetly encouraged protests in hope that they would divert the Chinese people’s attention away from China’s slowing economic growth and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. As of now, however, Beijing is attempting to restrain the protests, fearing that they could pressure the government into an actual war. Despite constitutional constraints, Japan's military has continued to evolve over the past half century, but the pacifist sentiment among the Japanese public still remains very strong. The Japanese who are inflaming the tension between the two countries do not represent the majority. At the official level, Japan’s decision to purchase the disputed islands is in fact a way for the Japanese government to be able to exercise more control and restraint over the entire situation by taking the islands out of private hands.

## 1NR

**Central Asia 1NC**

**No great power draw in**

**Richard Weitz 06, senior fellow and associate director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute, Summer, 2006 [Washington Quarterly, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia”]**

Fortunately, **the fact that** **Central Asia does not represent the most important geographic region for any external great power** also **works against** the revival of **a** traditional, geopolitical great-game **conflict**. **Russia, China, and the United States have strong reasons to cooperate in the region. Although each country has extensive goals in Central Asia, the resources they have available to pursue them are limited,** given other priorities. **As long as their general relations remain non-confrontational, Moscow, Beijing, and Washington are unlikely to pursue policies in a lower priority region such as Central Asia that could disrupt their overall ties**. Most often, **they will find it more efficient and effective to collaborate to diminish redundancies, exploit synergies, and pool funding and other scarce assets in the pursuit of common objectives.** Unfounded fears or overtly competitive policies could undermine these opportunities for cooperation and should be avoided.

### AQ: Yes Threat—F/L

#### DA Outweighs

#### Magnitude - Extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### B. Probability – Brink —without strong US counterterrorism actions, al Qaeda could attack again

Mead 13 (Walter Russell, professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College and editor-at-large of the American Interest, 3-4-13, “The Evolving Terror Threat” Wall Street Journal) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323829504578272033024365110.html

As France announces plans to stand down in Mali and the United States builds a new drone base in neighboring Niger, the conflict formerly known as the global war on terror is spreading and intensifying. Many in Washington would like to talk about other things, but while the West might be tired of the war on terror, the war on terror isn't tired of the West. America and its allies face an "existential threat," as British Prime Minister David Cameron recently said, and the conflict may last for decades. So it is worth stepping back to see where matters stand. On 9/11, it became clear that all was not well in the post-Cold War, post-historical world. The war on terror has since gone through several phases. The first was Osama bin Laden's attempt to launch a true "clash of civilizations" between the West and the world of Islam. His strategy for achieving this goal was a series of spectacular blows against the citadels of Western power that would weaken the West and vest his movement with the prestige to draw Muslims world-wide to his banner. Bin Laden failed. In phase two of the war, effective counterterrorism blocked his efforts to mount repeated attacks on the scale of 9/11. The war in Iraq (however misguided some consider it) forced al Qaeda in Iraq into a contest that it lost politically as much as militarily. When the chips were down, Iraq's Sunni Muslims chose the Americans over al Qaeda. The awakening in Iraq was part of a much larger tide of opinion among Muslims around the world: The more they saw of al Qaeda, the less they liked it, and the less they thought it had anything to do with the Islam they learned from the Quran. By the end of the George W. Bush administration, the effort to launch a grand war against the West under the flag of al Qaeda had decisively failed. The Obama administration hoped to complete the marginalization and destruction of al Qaeda, extending Mr. Bush's military strategy and developing a more effective political counterstrategy that would further sideline radicalism by building deeper ties between the U.S. and the moderate Muslim majority. The military strategy worked reasonably well. The campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan that included the death of bin Laden continues to degrade the capabilities and prestige of the original al Qaeda network, even if the American exit strategy from this difficult conflict remains unclear. The political strategy to reach out to Muslims has had less success. Failed American attempts to broker a peace between Israel and Palestinians undermined many Muslims' faith in the Obama administration's intentions (or capacity). The Arab Spring caught the administration off balance, and Washington has struggled to maintain its priorities as the Middle East has drifted away from liberal democratic protest toward a darker agenda. American efforts to build bridges to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood have alienated Egyptian liberals without establishing strong bonds with the Islamists. The U.S. failure to support effective humanitarian intervention in Syria (even if prudent in terms of American domestic politics) has dramatically undermined the administration's effort to portray the new U.S. as a pro-democracy, humanitarian power guided by the responsibility to protect. Meanwhile, even a weakened and ideologically marginalized al Qaeda has found ways to assert itself as a credible and sometimes powerful force. The emerging sectarian war in the Middle East between Muslim Sunnis and Shiites makes al Qaeda's fanatical fighters valuable once again to the powers of the Persian Gulf. The ultramilitants are emerging as significant forces on the Sunni side in Syria and Iraq, and as a result they are regaining lost credibility and access to funding from affluent sympathizers in the region. They have also found fertile ground in the weak states of North Africa. The question that confronts the U.S. and its allies now is twofold. How to counter the explosive growth of radical jihadist organizations and networks in Libya's post-Gadhafi vacuum and in surrounding states? And what to do about the integration of terrorist groups into the sectarian Sunni-Shiite war that spans the region and to some degree overlaps with America's own struggle to stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon? At this stage, the terrain favors America's enemies. In places like the wide swath of Africa's Sahel region, and in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, it is difficult to establish strong states that can keep the extremists in check. The free-floating nature of the new jihadist movement also poses problems: At any given moment, from Afghanistan to Mauritania, dozens of groups are competing for funds and followers, moving swiftly in response to perceived opportunities. Yet this is war: One side makes a move, the other counters it, and so it goes until one side finds a strategy that the other cannot overcome—or until the exhausted combatants accept a compromise peace. In the first phase of the war, al Qaeda tried to lead the world's Muslims on a grand jihad. In the second phase the U.S. and its allies (including Muslim religious and civic leaders around the world) dealt effectively with that threat. Now al Qaeda has developed a way to remain relevant even without the broad support it once hoped for. The fourth stage of war, one hopes, will see the U.S. and its allies once again push al Qaeda and its allies to the margins, relegating them permanently to the nuisance fringe. At present al Qaeda appears to have only a limited capacity to attack the U.S. and its principal European allies. But that could change quickly if the terrorists succeed in establishing havens in North Africa. This war isn't over, and the danger isn't past.

### a2 “low risk”

**Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now**

**Matthew, et al, 10/2/13** [ Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998.<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html>]

I. Introduction **In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center** for Science and International Affairs **and the Russian Academy** **of Sciences’** Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies **published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat** **Assessment** on Nuclear Terrorism.” **The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists**, **and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real**. **The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated** a **consensus** **among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses** **a serious threat to the peace**, security, and prosperity **of our planet**. **For any country, a terrorist** **attack** **with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster**, **and** the negative effects **would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation.** Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest//xperience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): • **Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat**. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. **The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam**; **by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons**; **by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world.** • **Making a crude nuclear bomb** would not be easy, but **is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group**, **as numerous government studies have confirmed**. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). **Terrorists could**, however, **cut open a stolen** **nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own**. • **The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen**. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • **Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades**. **The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise**. **Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan**. The group’s nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. **Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use.** While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, **there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions.** On the contrary, **leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.**

#### Consensus of experts goes neg

Rhodes 9 Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” 12-14, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety>, CMR

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

### A2 “Mueller”

**Mueller’s wrong—Cherry Picks his arguments**

Hugh **Gusterson**, February 20**11**, Anthropologist on Nuclear Culture, International Security and Anthropology of Science at George Mason University “Atomic Escapism” American Scientist, Volume 99, Number 1, pg.72 Lexis

**Reading John Mueller’s Atomic Obsession is like going through the looking glass with Alice.** Examining the conventional wisdom about nuclear weapons from the other side of the looking glass, Mueller tells us that their destructiveness has been exaggerated; that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of marginal importance in ending World War II; that “nuclear weapons have been of little historic consequence,” and that the United States and the Soviet Union would not have gone to war even in the absence of nuclear deterrence; that arms-control treaties are usually a waste of time and effort; that the dangers of nuclear proliferation are greatly exaggerated; that sanctions aimed at stopping countries from seeking nuclear weapons make it more likely that they will pursue them; and, finally, that “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.”¶ **In arguing against atomic “alarmism” and the inclination “to wallow in a false sense of insecurity,” Mueller has something to annoy everyone**. Conservatives can take umbrage at his arguments that the bombing of Hiroshima was unnecessary to end World War II and that the Cold War nuclear buildup was not needed to deter the Soviets. Liberals can be upset by the claim that arms-control treaties are pointless and sometimes even counterproductive.¶ The challenge in reading Mueller’s book is to separate insights that are deviant but useful (some of his deconstructions of the conventional wisdom are genuinely insightful) from arguments that are deviant because they are exaggerated, misshapen or just plain wrong. Many of Mueller’s sharp-edged points about the hyping of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and terrorism fall into the first (insightful) category, but his critiques of arms control and his apparent smugness about all nuclear dangers belong in the latter.¶ Mueller argues that liberals and conservatives have joined in exaggerating the danger and importance of nuclear weapons; they have used our fears over the years to justify unnecessary weapons programs and arms-control negotiations, a counterproductive invasion of Iraq, and now bloated counterterrorism initiatives. **He builds his argument atop an exercise in counterfactual history, maintaining that nuclear weapons were unnecessary to keep the peace during the Cold War, because both superpowers would have been deterred from war anyway by memories of the carnage of World War II, and because the Soviet Union was too risk-averse to chance an invasion of Europe**. (**He does not ask whether Soviet nuclear weapons might have deterred the United States from starting a war with the Soviets**.) **Those who know Cold War history in its rich complexity will be infuriated by the simplifications, omissions and blithe assumptions in this exercise in intellectual casuistry, which brings to mind not the work of a scholar seriously weighing evidence, but the efforts of a high-school debate team to push a contrived point of view as far as possible.¶** The most original, incisive and interesting part of the book is the last third, in which Mueller slashes through the hype that guides much public discourse and policymaking about the risk of nuclear terrorism. He points out that a foreign government is unlikely to give a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group because of the danger that, as supplier, that country would invite retaliation against itself. He also uses the writings of several nuclear scientists, including the former Los Alamos division leaders Carson Mark and Steve Younger, to argue that it would be prohibitively difficult for a small terrorist group that lacked state sponsorship to acquire the subtle engineering knowledge needed to overcome the technical challenges involved in turning black-market nuclear material into a workable nuclear weapon. Many scientific experts not cited here by Mueller would take issue with that argument. And having read one of the articles that Mueller does cite—“Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?,” by J. Carson Mark and others (1987)—I am of the opinion that it does not, in fact, support Mueller’s argument. Furthermore**, in dismissing the case for a terrorist nuclear threat, Mueller does not adequately address the possibility that a terrorist group seeking a bomb might have access to a scientist with nuclear-weapons experience from another state as an adviser or team member.** Still, by pointing out the importance of tacit and esoteric knowledge to the success of such an endeavor**, Mueller is making an important challenge to glib assumptions about the ease with which a terrorist group, even if it had access to uranium and plutonium, might be able to make a bomb.¶** **Mueller fails to discuss another possibility:** that **a rogue element within a state, not the state leadership itself, might sell an intact nuclear weapon to which it has access**. **This scenario is far from speculative**: After the fall of the Berlin wall, a Soviet soldier guarding nuclear weapons in East Germany offered to sell an atomic warhead to the antinuclear organization Greenpeace; Greenpeace wanted to buy the weapon and display it to show the dangers of nuclear proliferation. They were arranging payment and transportation when the warhead in question was abruptly removed from East Germany by the Soviets. It is, sadly, all too typical of Mueller’s style of argument that he makes his case with copious references to any literature that supplies evidence supporting his point of view, but he ignores inconvenient facts and arguments.¶ We see something similar **in Mueller’s discussion of arms-control treaties**. He **regards such treaties as bureaucratically unwieldy and argues that states often only agree to them when they involve no real sacrifice or merely codify what the state already intended to do**. **He bases this argument largely on a discussion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which forced nuclear testing underground but did nothing to curtail the nuclear arms race, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT I), which limited missiles but not the newly miniaturized warheads packed several to a missile, which were the real problem.¶** **Mueller has cherry-picked his treaties here. Why not discuss the Outer Space Treaty, which preempted a nuclear arms race in space?** And what about the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons from Europe, much to the chagrin of hardliners in both superpowers? Above all, **why not discuss the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (the existence of which, astonishingly, is never mentioned in Mueller’s book)?** The ABM Treaty was widely seen by arms-control advocates as having headed off an expensive and destabilizing race between offensive and defensive weapons during the Cold War.¶ The strengths and weaknesses **of Mueller’s argument collide most jarringly in his discussion of nuclear proliferation.** **He is entertaining when he catalogs decades of dire predictions from experts about a coming cascade of countries crossing the nuclear threshold—predictions that have failed to come true, although this has not deterred contemporary pundits from re-sounding the alarm.** And we need to think seriously about his argument that sanctions intended to deter nuclear proliferation killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in Iraq and North Korea while increasing the attractiveness of nuclear weapons to the paranoid leaders of those countries; the remedy may be worse than the disease.¶ But **surely Mueller goes too far, and his polemical casuistry becomes dangerous, when he argues that sanctions and treaties are largely unnecessary because most countries have freely eschewed proliferation, recognizing that nuclear weapons are “militarily useless, and a spectacular waste of money and scientific talent.”** Although he is surely right that nuclear weapons are overrated and often fail to bring the bargaining power and military strength their owners seek, some countries (whether because they are in a bad neighborhood or have a bad regime) have spared no expense to seek them. **And when a country acquires them, this puts pressure on rivals and neighbors to seek them too** (as Pakistan did in response to India, for example). **There can be a collective logic that forces individual countries to make choices they would rather not. The importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for which Mueller shows so little respect, is that it releases countries from the prisoner’s dilemma here: The treaty and its inspection provisions give confidence to countries who want to eschew nuclear weapons as long as they can be sure that their rivals do so too**. This is why Brazil and Argentina both joined the treaty regime in the 1990s, for instance.¶ In short, **Mueller has a gimlet eye for hype about nuclear weapons but is blind to their very real dangers. His book, which should sport a “don’t-worry-be-happy” smiley face rather than a scrawled atom on the cover, counsels us in its final sentence that we are not in danger and should “sleep well**.” **Mueller seems to assume that, because there has not yet been an accidental nuclear war, because terrorists have not yet exploded a nuclear weapon, and because no country has used nuclear weapons since the United States bombed Nagasaki, we are safe**. Presumably BP executives talked the same way about the safety of deep-water drilling before April 20, 2010; Soviet engineers talked the same way about the safety of their nuclear reactors before April 26, 1986; and NASA engineers talked the same way about the safety of shuttle launches at low temperatures before January 28, 1986. **In regard to nuclear weapons, we have** arguably **been lucky**. **There have been several incidents in which U.S. planes carrying nuclear weapons have crashed or burned.** In 1995 the Soviets mistook a Norwegian weather rocket for a U.S. nuclear attack, and Boris Yeltsin found himself staring into the nuclear briefcase as his aides told him he might only have a few minutes to launch Russian nuclear weapons. And we now know that in the early years of the Cold War, there were senior U.S. military officers who wanted to preemptively attack the Soviet Union.¶ Mueller mocks those who warn of events that are possible but have not happened. “There is a ‘genuine possibility,’” he says, “that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of Mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.”¶ **If only nuclear disaster were that unlikely.**

### Drones Up: US F/L

#### drones up

Jack Serle 12-3, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism Tuesday, Dec 3, 2013 07:41 AM CST http://www.salon.com/2013/12/03/rising\_number\_of\_drone\_killings\_raises\_questions\_about\_obamas\_rules\_for\_use\_partner/

Six months after President Obama laid out US rules for using armed drones, a Bureau analysis shows that covert drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan have killed more people than in the six months before the speech. Each drone strike kills more people on average in both countries. The number of strikes fell across the two countries in the six months after the speech compared with the six months before, yet the overall death toll increased. This analysis will raise questions about how much Obama’s new rulesconstrain the drone programme, as he claimed it would in his speech. On May 23 Obama explained how a new policy will govern the use of drones. He said using drones for targeted killing is legal, but added: ‘To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance.’ He said: ‘The same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power – or risk abusing it.’ The President’s remarks, and a background briefing to the media by unnamed administration officials, led some to report the US was ending the controversial practice of signature strikes – strikes which target groups of unidentified individuals based on their behaviour. However in the weeks after the speech, analyst Micah Zenko wrote: ‘There is no evidence that signature strikes will be reduced or ended based upon anything the Obama administration has recently stated.’ The speech and briefings fuelled reports that the US military – in the form of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) – would soon be given responsibility for carrying out drone strikes outside Afghanistan. But six months later the CIA is reportedly still carrying out strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. It was reported this week that the administration is trying to find a way to merge the CIA and Pentagon drone programmes. According to the Washington Post the ambition is to allow the CIA to keep running a fleet of drones but put JSOC in charge of the final, lethal step in a strike sequence, known as the finish. Obama’s speech addressed ‘criticism about drone strikes’, saying the US only carries out such attacks against individuals who pose ‘a continuing and imminent threat’ to US citizens, not ‘to punish individuals’. He added: ‘before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set’. Civilians have been killed in US strikes in the past, the President said. The day before the speech, Attorney General Eric Holder published a letter to Congress saying those killed included a 16-year-old US citizen, Abdulrahman al Awlaqi. In Yemen, civilians have reportedly been killed in drone strikes after the speech. Between six and seven civilians were reported killed, two of whom were said to be children. It also emerged this month that the US knew it had killed civilians in strikes after the speech. The LA Timesreported that the CIA briefed Congress about civilian casualties, including a child aged 6-13 who had been riding in a car with his older brother, an alleged militant, when the drones attacked. The CIA reportedly did not know he was in the car at the time. Other reports have identified the child as Abdulaziz, younger brother of Hassan al-Saleh Huraydan, an alleged AQAP commander. Every confirmed US drone strike in the past six months came in a 15-day period in late July and August, when eight attacks took place. The bombardment was more intense than any period in Yemen since mid-2012 when the US was providing air support to Yemeni forces as they fought an al Qaeda insurgency. The group established its own ‘Islamic emirate‘ in several towns and villages in southern Yemen, exploiting a security vacuum during popular unrest in 2011. Although other aerial attacks have been reported it is not clear whether they were carried out by drones or manned aircraft. The 2013 onslaught of strikes was a response to a perceived terror threat the US reportedly believed was coming from Yemen. Washington reacted to intelligence of an impending attack by closing over 20 embassies and consulates in Africa and the Middle East and launching a barrage of drone strikes.

#### Drones increasing and inevitable

Chow 10/3 (Eugene, Former Executive Editor, Homeland Security NewsWire, 10/3/13, “The Next Generation of Drone Warfare Is Here”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eugene-k-chow/the-next-generation-of-dr\_b\_4030384.html, zzx)

While the Air Force may insist that it has no plans to use these drones in combat, the calculus continues to shift towards just that. "There is every reason to believe that these so-called 'targets' could become a test bed for drone warfare, moving us closer and closer to automated killing," said Professor Noel Sharkey, a spokesman for the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. Transforming existing fighter jets into drones is becoming an increasingly economical option in light of dwindling military budgets and the fact that the troubled next generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is running hundreds of billions of dollars over budget and nearly a decade behind schedule. Furthermore, the MQ-9 Reaper drone, the current weapon of choice against insurgents, costs roughly $20 million each, and the Air Force spends more than $6 million to train a single fighter pilot and is struggling to retain them. In contrast, under an initial contract of $70 million, Boeing has already modified six F-16s, re-designated the QF-16, and is scheduled to begin low-rate production with an expected delivery date in 2015. While the QF-16 isn't the first unmanned fighter jet to soar through the skies -- since the mid-70s, the Air Force has used unmanned F-4s, or QF-4s for target practice -- the QF-16 is the first modern jet to fly without a pilot and is a stark reminder of the growing use of unmanned drones by the Pentagon. Earlier this year, the Navy's autonomous X-47B drone made history when it successfully landed by itself on the moving flight deck of an aircraft carrier at sea, one of the most challenging feats in modern aviation. Beyond just taking off and landing without a pilot, unmanned fighter jets are also capable of firing missiles. Since 2008, the military has used unmanned F-4 Phantoms to test fire experimental missiles, and rumors continue to swirl that the next generation long-range stealth bomber, capable of delivering nuclear weapons, could be unmanned. Skeptics have long dismissed drones as incapable of landing on carriers and some commanders continue to question their efficacy against an opponent with strong air defenses, but long-term trends continue to push for their use -- shrinking budgets, the zero-cost to American lives, and the powerful Congressional Drone Caucus. With these trends in place and the technological capabilities largely developed, it seems only a matter of time before these advanced fighter jet drones dominate the skies.

#### Drones increasing – shutdown didn’t stop

Mackey 10/1 (Robert, NYT, 10/1/13, “Drones Are Flying, Despite U.S. Shutdown”, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/drones-are-flying-despite-u-s-shutdown/, zzx)

As the United States government ground to a halt on Tuesday, there were plenty of sardonic comments from bloggers and journalists in parts of the world where the American military footprint is large. Writing on Twitter, the Pakistani columnist Cyril Almeida suggested that the top question for militants in the country’s North Waziristan Agency would be, “Are drones still operating?” While the Central Intelligence Agency’s campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal belt is covert — and there have been hints that some attacks there attributed to the Americans might have been carried out by Pakistan’s own military — there is no doubt that drones operated by the Air Force, at least, will continue to fly. As my colleagues Michael Schmidt, Thom Shanker and Andrew Siddons reported, while about 400,000 civilian employees of the Defense Department face unpaid leave, Pentagon contingency plans will keep more than 1.3 million active military personnel on duty, although they will probably not receive their paychecks until the shutdown ends. “Those of you in uniform will remain on your normal duty status,” President Obama confirmed in a prerecorded video message to members of the armed forces, released as the shutdown took effect. “The threats to our national security have not changed, and we need you to be ready for any contingency,” Mr. Obama explained. “Ongoing military operations — like our efforts in Afghanistan — will continue.”

### Lk: Drone Courts

#### Drone court will compromise counterterrorism

-will rule that US isn’t in “hostiliteis with AQ

-AQAP can’t be targeted b/c not in 9-11

-undermines quick response

**Groves 13** – Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation (Steven, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad>, CMR)

A Drone Court? Certain former Obama Administration officials, the editorial board of The New York Times, and at least one U.S. Senator have called for the establishment of a special oversight panel or court to review the Administration’s targeting determinations, particularly in instances in which a U.S. citizen is targeted.[49] Essentially, such a court would scrutinize the Administration’s targeting decisions, presumably including its decisions to place individuals on the “disposition matrix.” The court would apparently have the authority to overrule and nullify targeting decisions. The creation of such a court is ill advised and of doubtful constitutionality.¶The proponents of a drone court apparently do not appreciate the potential unintended consequences of establishing such an authority. The idea is wrongheaded and raises more questions than it answers. For instance, could the drone court decide as a matter of law that a targeted strike is not justified because the United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda? Could the drone court rule that members of a force associated with al-Qaeda (e.g., AQAP) may not be targeted because AQAP was not directly involved in the September 11 attacks and therefore the strike is not authorized under the AUMF? The proposed drone court cannot avoid these fundamental questions since the justification for the targeted strikes is dependent on the answers to these questions.¶Even if the proposed drone court attempts to eschew intervention into foundational questions such as the existence of an armed conflict, it still would not be in a position to rule on the “easy” questions involved in each and every drone strike. Does the target constitute an “imminent threat” to the United States? When civilian casualties may occur as a result of the strike, does the drone court have the authority to overrule the targeting decision as a violation of the principle of proportionality? Is the target an innocent civilian or a civilian “directly participating in hostilities”? Should U.S. forces attempt to capture the target before resorting to a drone strike? Is capture feasible? Any drone court, even if constituted with former military and intelligence officials, is ill suited to weigh all of the competing factors that go into a decision to target an al-Qaeda operative and make a timely decision, particularly when there is often only a short window of time to order a strike.¶ Regardless, creating a judicial or quasi-judicial review process will not ameliorate, much less resolve, objections to U.S. targeted killing practices. Critics will continue to demand more judicial process, including appeals from the proposed drone court, and additional transparency no matter what kind of forum is established to oversee targeting decisions.

***Any* derogation from AUMF increases risk of terrorism – sustaining current flexibility is key**

**Groves 13** – Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation (Steven, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad>, CMR)

What the U.S. Should Do¶ The U.S. drone program and its practices regarding targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and its associated forces are lawful. They are lawful because the United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict with those terrorist entities and because the United States has an inherent right to defend itself against imminent threats to its security. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that U.S. military and intelligence forces conduct targeted strikes in a manner consistent with international law. Military and intelligence officials go to great lengths to identify al-Qaeda operatives that pose an imminent threat and continually reassess the level of that threat. Decisions on each potential target are debated among U.S. officials before the target is placed in the “disposition matrix.” In conducting targeted strikes U.S. forces strive to minimize civilian casualties, although such casualties cannot always be prevented.¶ The United States will continue to face asymmetric threats from non-state actors operating from the territory of nations that are either unwilling or unable to suppress the threats. To confront these threats, the United States must retain its most effective operational capabilities, including targeted strikes by armed drones, even if U.S. forces degrade al-Qaeda and its associated forces to such an extent that the United States no longer considers itself to be in a non-international armed conflict. Moreover, the United States must continue to affirm its inherent right to self-defense to eliminate threats to its national security, regardless of the presence or absence of an armed conflict recognized by international law.¶ To that end, the United States should:¶ Continue to affirm existing use-of-force authorities. During the past three years, senior officials of the Obama Administration have publicly set out in significant detail U.S. policies and practices regarding drone strikes. The Administration should continue to do so, emphasizing that U.S. policies adhere to widely recognized international law. Critics of the United States will continue to claim that a lack of transparency surrounds U.S. policy and actions. Such critics will likely never be satisfied, not even with full disclosure of the relevant classified legal memoranda, and their criticism will not cease until the United States abandons its practice of targeting terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. However, consistent repetition of the U.S. legal position on targeted drone strikes may blunt such criticism.¶ Not derogate from the AUMF. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, NATO agreed that the vast majority of U.S. and other NATO forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, a time frame that President Obama confirmed during this year’s State of the Union address. Some critics of U.S. drone policy will inevitably argue that due to the drawdown the United States may no longer credibly claim that it remains in a state of armed conflict with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its associated forces, whether they are located in Afghanistan, the FATA, or elsewhere. Congress should pass no legislation that could be interpreted as a derogation from the AUMF or an erosion of the inherent right of the United States to defend itself against imminent threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations.¶ Not create a drone court. The concept of a drone court is fraught with danger and may be an unconstitutional interference with the executive branch’s authority to wage war. U.S. armed forces have been lawfully targeting enemy combatants in armed conflicts for more than 200 years without being second-guessed by Congress or a secret “national security court.” Targeting decisions, including those made in connection with drone strikes, are carefully deliberated by military officers and intelligence officials based on facts and evidence gathered from a variety of human, signals, and imagery intelligence sources. During an armed conflict, all al-Qaeda operatives are subject to targeting; therefore, a drone court scrutinizing targeting decisions would serve no legitimate purpose.¶ Rather than creating a special tribunal that is ill equipped to pass judgment on proportionality and military necessity, and that will never fully assuage the concerns of the critics of drone strikes, Congress should continue to leave decisions pertaining to the disposition of al-Qaeda terrorists—including U.S. citizens—with military and intelligence officials.¶ Conclusion¶ The debate within the international legal, academic, and human rights communities on the legality and propriety of drone strikes will likely continue unabated. To surrender to the demands of such critics would be equivalent to forgetting the lessons of September 11, when a small, non-state terrorist organization operating from a nation with which the United States was not at war planned and launched an attack that killed almost 3,000 Americans.¶ The United States should preserve its ability to use all of the tools in its arsenal to ensure that the plots hatched by terrorist organizations do not become successful attacks on the U.S. homeland. Armed drones have proved to be one of the most effective and discriminating tools available to U.S. forces, and their lawful use should continue until such time as non-state, transnational terrorist organizations no longer present an imminent threat to the United States.

**Public Backlash 1NC**

**Public loves drones**

**Sides 13** (John, George Washington University, “Most Americans approve of foreign drone strikes,” 3-10, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/10/most-americans-approve-of-foreign-drone-strikes/>)

In fact, **drone strikes attracted** roughly similar amounts of **support from across the partisan spectrum**: **68 percent of** **Republicans approved**, as did **58 percent** of **Democrats** and 51 percent of independents. **A pattern of relative bipartisanship** is not all that common **in public opinion** today, but **it is predictable in this case**. When leaders in the two parties don't really disagree on something, there is no reason for partisans in the public to disagree either. In John Zaller's magisterial account of how public opinion is formed and evolves, he refers to a pattern of bipartisanship like this one as a "mainstream effect." Like it or not, **drone warfare has become so common that "mainstream" does not sound inapt**.

Thus, **there is little reason to expect public opinion about the drone program to change** without concerted and prolonged dissent from political leaders. That does not seem to be forthcoming. Paul's dissent -- which didn't even emphasize foreign targets of American drones -- was met with harsh rebuttals from Lindsay Graham, John McCain and the Wall Street Journal editorial page. Democrats were not exactly rushing to stand with Paul either.