## 1NC

### 1

#### US Armed Forces means active duty military personnel – prefer it – congressional definition

US Congress 80 ("U.S. Policy in the Far East," US Congress - House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 98)

(a) "United States armed forces" means the personnel on active duty belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of the United States of America when in the territory of Japan.

#### it requires deployments that lead to war

Ray Forrester ’89, Professor, Hastings College of the Law, University of California, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636

A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. . . . Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities and war. [\*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and the President.

#### B. Violation—plan only regulates the conduct of military operations, not their introduction into combat zones, and affects non-human parts of the military

#### vote neg

#### limits-they justify non-human, basing decisions, and numerous other policies that explode aff ground

#### ground-we lose core disads based on the introduction of new forces – kills all uniqueness

#### Plan: United States Federal Judiciary should substantially increase National Environmental Policy Act restrictions to the introduction of Armed Forces into hostilities.

#### extra topicality- they don’t limit the restriction to the president- they also restrict congresses ability to introduce armed forces into hostility

JULES **LOBEL 8** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power  over the Conduct of War” OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391 http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel\_.pdf

63 When Congress places such restrictions on the President’s authority to wage war, it limits the President’s discretion ¶ to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it confined the President’s authority to the use of U.S. armed ¶ forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi ¶ troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64 Yet that restriction seems to be the very kind of limitation on a President’s tactical battlefield command that the commonly accepted premise would not permit. But if Congress can thus limit the purpose of the war against an enemy, why could it not impose other similar restrictions— ¶ limiting for example the theater of war, or even the places the military can attack? If the 1991 Persian Gulf Resolution was constitutional—and nobody claimed it was not—Congress could have authorized war against Germany ¶ for the purpose of protecting Britain and liberating Western Europe, while not permitting combat operations into Germany or other theaters of action such as the Middle East or North Africa. Congress would never have done so, but the 1991 Persian Gulf authorization suggests that it could have. The 1991 Persian Gulf authorization is not an anomaly; Congress has limited the objects, purposes, and tactics Presidents could use in conducting war¶ throughout our history. Congress and the President therefore share concurrent authority over the conduct of warfare once it has been authorized by Congress, and the only Commander in Chief power that Congress is constitutionally precluded from ¶ removing is the President’s power to command the military. Congress can neither appoint itself military commander, nor establish a committee of Congress to be military commander. It cannot force the President to remove a¶ commanding general that Congress does not like. Nor can Congress prevent ¶ the President from dismissing an officer, nor dictate which officers will be¶ appointed to which commands. Nevertheless, even regarding military personnel decisions, Congress has adopted rules and procedures that have¶ limited, without taking away, the President’s powers to command.65

#### XT is a voter- proves the resolution is insufficent- reject the team or it’s a no risk option

#### jurisidictional qeustion- no mor a2

also links to limits- they justify affs that

you think it’s silly= but plan text wrong- can’t vote for them

R

T b4 condo

**2**

**Warming is inevitable unless we overthrown capitalism**

Robert **Newman**, “It’s Capitalism or a Habitable Planet-You Can’t Have Both,” THE GUARDIAN, 2-2-**06**, [www.commondreams.org/views06/0202-29.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0202-29.htm), accessed 5-2-08.

**There is no meaningful response to climate change without massive social change. A** cap on this and a quota on the other won't do it. Tinker at the edges as we may, **we cannot sustain earth's life-support systems within the present economic system**. **Capitalism is not sustainable by its very nature. It is predicated on infinitely expanding markets, faster consumption and bigger production in a finite planet.** And yet this ideological model remains the central organising principle of our lives, and as long as it continues to be so **it will automatically undo** (with its invisible hand) **every single green initiative anybody cares to come up with.** Much discussion of energy, with never a word about power, leads to the fallacy of a low-impact, green capitalism somehow put at the service of environmentalism. In reality, power concentrates around wealth. Private ownership of trade and industry means that the decisive political force in the world is private power. The corporation will outflank every puny law and regulation that seeks to constrain its profitability. **It** therefore **stands in the way of the functioning democracy needed to tackle climate change. Only by breaking up corporate power and bringing it under social control will we be able to overcome the global environmental crisis**.

**inherent contradictions prove capitalism is unsustainable and extinction is inevitable--Movements solve now, but the plan derails them**

**The alternative is to reject the aff**

**Magdoff and Foster, 2010**

(Fred and John Belamy, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “What Every Environmentalist Needs to Know about Capitalism”, Monthly Review, Volume 61, Issue 10) NG

The foregoing analysis, if correct, points to the fact that **the ecological crisis cannot be solved within the logic of the present system. The various suggestions for doing so have no hope of success**. **The system of world capitalism is clearly unsustainable in: (1) its quest for never ending accumulation of capital leading to production that must continually expand to provide profits; (2) its agriculture and food system that pollutes the environment and still does not allow universal access to a sufficient quantity and quality of food; (3) its rampant destruction of the environment; (4) its continually recreating and enhancing of the stratification of wealth within and between countries; and (5) its search for technological magic bullets as a way of avoiding the growing social and ecological problems arising from its own operations.¶** **The transition to an ecological**—which we believe must also be a socialist—**economy will be a steep ascent and will not occur overnight.** This is not a question of “storming the Winter Palace.” Rather**, it is a dynamic, multifaceted struggle for a new cultural compact and a new productive system**. The struggle is ultimately against the system of capital. **It must begin**, however, by **opposing the logic of capital, endeavoring in the here and now to create in the interstices of the system a new social metabolism rooted in egalitarianism**, community, **and a sustainable relation to the earth**. **The basis for the creation of sustainable human development must arise from within the system dominated by capital**, without being part of it, just as the bourgeoisie itself arose in the “pores” of feudal society.54 **Eventually, these initiatives can become powerful enough to constitute the basis of a revolutionary new movement and society.**¶ All over the world, **such struggles in the interstices of capitalist society are now taking place, and are too numerous and too complex to be dealt with fully here. Indigenous peoples** today, **given a new basis as a result of the ongoing revolutionary struggle in Bolivia, are reinforcing a new ethic of responsibility to the earth. La Vía Campesina, a global peasant-farmer organization, is promoting new forms of ecological agriculture, as is Brazil’s MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), as are Cuba and Venezuela.** Recently, Venezulean President Hugo **Chávez stressed the social and environmental reasons to work to get rid of the oil-rentier model in Venezuela, a major oil exporter**.55 The climate justice movement is demanding egalitarian and anti-capitalist solutions to the climate crisis. **Everywhere radical, essentially anti-capitalist, strategies are emerging, based on other ethics and forms of organization, rather than the profit motive**: **ecovillages**; the new urban environment promoted in Curitiba in Brazil and elsewhere; **experiments in permaculture, and community-supported agriculture**, **farming and industrial cooperatives in Venezuela, etc**. The World Social Forum has given voice to many of these aspirations. As leading U.S. environmentalist James Gustave Speth has stated: “The international social movement for change—which refers to itself as ‘**the irresistible rise of global anti-capitalism’—is stronger than many may imagine and will grow stronger.”**56¶ **The reason that the opposition to the logic of capitalism**—ultimately seeking to displace the system altogether—**will grow more imposing is that there is no alternative, if the earth as we know it, and humanity itself, are to survive.** Here, the aims of ecology and socialism will necessarily meet. It will become increasingly clear that the distribution of land as well as food, health care, housing, etc. should be based on fulfilling human needs and not market ¶ forces. This is, of course, easier said than done. But **it means making economic decisions through democratic processes occurring at local, regional, and multiregional levels**. We must face such issues as: (1) How can we supply everyone with basic human needs of food, water, shelter, clothing, health care, educational and cultural opportunities? (2) How much of the economic production should be consumed and how much invested? and (3) How should the investments be directed? **In the process, people must find the best ways to carry on these activities with positive interactions with nature—to improve the ecosystem. New forms of democracy will be needed, with emphasis on our responsibilities to each other**, to one’s own community as well as to communities around the world. Accomplishing this will, of course, require social planning at every level: local, regional, national, and international—which can only be successful to the extent that it is of and by, and not just ostensibly for, the people.57

**3**

**Plan collapses barriers to court interference—will then expand their power vis-à-vis the executive**

Jesse H. **Choper**, Professor, Public Law, UC-Berkeley, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 20**07**, pp. 1-21.

Because the prudential doctrine allows the Court to avoid deciding a case without an anchor in constitutional interpretation, it is this aspect of the political question doctrine that seems most troublesome. **It would be unwise**, however, **to reject the** entire **political question doctrine because of the failings of the prudential doctrine**. Indeed, the classical political question doctrine is critically important in the constitutional order, and its demise is cause for concern. In particular, the disappearance of the classical political question doctrine has a negative effect on two fronts. First, it has a direct negative impact in that it prevents the political branches from exercising constitutional judgment in those cases in which a classical political question is presented. Admittedly, this is a small category of cases that are not likely to arise very often. Electoral count disputes, judicial impeachments, and constitutional amendment ratification questions do not occur with much frequency. These questions are of fundamental importance, however, and judicial interference in these circumstances could have a negative effect on our government that transcends the scope of the particular case. Nothis provides a more poignant illustration than the Article II issue in the 2000 election cases. the doctrine strikes at the heart of separation of powers and the need for each branch to stay within its sphere to maintain the constitutional order. Second, the end of the classical political question doctrine has a much broader secondary effect. **The Supreme Court is effectively left alone to police the boundaries of its power**. This is, perhaps, the most difficult of all the Court's tasks, for **it requires the most extreme form of willpower**. It also dramatically displays the tension that exists beneath the surface of all the Court's decisions, That is, when the Court is protecting individual rights against congressional action, deciding whether authority resides with the states or with Congress, or resolving controversies between the executive and Congress, its own interest is not at the fore in the decision. Ostensibly, the Court is protecting one entity from another. **When the Court decides whether the political question doctrine applies,** however, **what is** merely **implicit** in those other decisions **becomes explicit: the Court's institutional interests and strengths vis-a-vis the other branches.** Thus, **when the Court conducts the threshold inquiry** **of whether a matter rests exclusively with another branch,** **it must inevitably weigh the advantages and disadvantages of judicial review versus pure political analysis**. This process therefore highlights for the Court its own strengths and weaknesses, as well as the upsides and downsides of giving the question to Congress of the executive. This is a healthy analysis for the Court to undertake, for it highlights the functional concerns behind the separation of powers and forces the Court to take a more modest view of its own powers and abilities. Therefore, **eliminating this jurisdictional question from the Court's tasks helps pave the way for a much broader vision of judicial supremacy** and a much more limited view of deference to the political branches. **The end of the** classical **political question doctrine** thus **threaten to disrupt** our constitutional order and **turn** the framers' vision of a constitutional **conversation among three coordinate branches into a monologue by the Supreme Court.**

**Court interference in national security guts effective executive responses to prolif, terror, and the rise of hostile powers---link threshold is low**

Robert **Blomquist**, Professor, law, Valparaiso University, “The Jurisprudence of American national Security Presiprudence,” VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW v. 44, 20**10**, LN.

Supreme Court **Justices**--along with legal advocates--**need to** conceptualize and **prioritize** **big theoretical matters of institutional design** **and** form and **function in** the American **national security** tripartite constitutional system. By way of an excellent introduction to these vital issues of legal theory, the Justices should pull down from the library shelf of the sumptuous Supreme Court Library in Washington, D.C. (or more likely have a clerk do this chore) the old chestnut, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by the late Harvard University law professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks. n7 Among the rich insights on institutional design coupled with form and function in the American legal system that are germane to the Court's interpretation of national security law-making and decision-making by the President are several pertinent points. First, "Hart and Sacks' intellectual starting point was the interconnectedness of human beings, and the usefulness of law in helping us coexist peacefully together." n8 By implication, therefore, **the Court should be** **mindful of the unique** [\*883] constitutional **role played by the POTUS in preserving peace** **and should prevent imprudent judicial actions that would undermine** American national **security**. Second, Hart and Sacks, continuing their broad insights of social theory, noted that legal communities establish "institutionalized[] procedures for the settlement of questions of group concern" n9 and regularize "different procedures and personnel of different qualifications . . . appropriate for deciding different kinds of questions" n10 because "every modern society differentiates among social questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other modes for others-e.g., courts for 'judicial' decisions and legislatures for 'legislative' decisions" n11 and, extending their conceptualization, an executive for "executive" decisions. n12 Third, Professors Hart and Sacks made seminal theoretical distinctions between rules, standards, principles, and policies. n13 While all four are part of "legal arrangements [\*884] in an organized society," n14 and all four of these arrangements are potentially relevant in **judicial review of presidential** national **security decisions**, principles and policies n15 **are of special concern because** **of** **the sprawling, inchoate, and rapidly changing nature of** national security **threats and the imperative of hyper-energy in the Executive branch in responding to these threats.** n16

The Justices should also consult Professor Robert S. Summers's masterful elaboration and amplification of the Hart and Sacks project on enhancing a flourishing legal system: the 2006 opus, Form and Function in a Legal System: A General Study. n17 The most important points that [\*885] Summers makes that are relevant to judicial review of American national security presiprudence are three key considerations. First, a "conception of the overall form of the whole of a functional [legal] unit is needed to serve the founding purpose of defining, specifying, and organizing the makeup of such a unit so that it can be brought into being and can fulfill its own distinctive role" n18 in synergy with other legal units to serve overarching sovereign purposes for a polity. The American constitutional system of national security law and policy should be appreciated for its genius in making the POTUS the national security sentinel with vast, but not unlimited, powers to protect the Nation from hostile, potentially catastrophic, threats. Second, "a conception of the overall form of the whole is needed for the purpose of organizing the internal unity of relations between various formal features of a functional [legal] unit and between each formal feature and the complementary components of the whole unit." n19 Thus, Supreme Court Justices should have a thick understanding of the form of national security decision-making conceived by the Founders to center in the POTUS; the ways the POTUS and Congress historically organized the processing of national security through institutions like the National Security Council and the House and Senate intelligence committees; and the ways the POTUS has structured national security process through such specific legal forms as Presidential Directives, National Security Decision Directives, National Security Presidential Decision Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, and National Security Policy Directives in classified, secret documents along with typically public Executive Orders. n20 Third, according to Summers, "a conception of the overall form of the whole functional [legal] unit is needed to organize further the mode of operation and the instrumental capacity of the [legal] unit." n21 So, **the Supreme Court should be aware that tinkering with national** **security decisions of the POTUS**--unless clearly necessary to counterbalance an indubitable violation of the text of the Constitution--**may lead to unforeseen negative second-order consequences in the ability of the POTUS** (with or without the help of Congress) **to** preserve, **protect**, and defend **the Nation**. n22

 [\*886] B. Geopolitical Strategic Considerations Bearing on Judicial Interpretation

Before the United States Supreme Court Justices form an opinion on the legality of national security decisions by the POTUS, they should immerse themselves in judicially-noticeable facts concerning what national security expert, Bruce Berkowitz, in the subtitle of his recent book, calls the "challengers, competitors, and threats to America's future." n23 Not that the Justices need to become experts in national security affairs, n24 but every Supreme Court Justice should be aware of the following five basic national security facts and conceptions before sitting in judgment on presiprudential national security determinations.

(1) "National **security** policy . . . **is harder today because the issues** that **are** involved are more **numerous and varied.** **The problem of the day can change at a moment's notice**." n25 While "[y]esterday, it might have been **proliferation**; today, **terrorism**; tomorrow, **hostile regional powers**" n26, the twenty-first century reality is that "[t]hreats are also more likely to be intertwined--proliferators use the same networks as narco-traffickers, narco-traffickers support terrorists, and terrorists align themselves with regional powers." n27

(2) "Yet, as worrisome as these immediate concerns may be, the long-term challenges are even harder to deal with, and the stakes are higher. Whereas the main Cold War threat--the Soviet Union--was brittle, most of the potential adversaries and challengers America now faces are resilient." n28

(3) "**The most important task for U.S. national security today is simply to retain the strategic advantage**. This term, from the world of military doctrine, refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events." n29 Importantly, "[w]hen you hold [\*887] the strategic advantage, situations unfold in your favor, and each round ends so that you are in an advantageous position for the next. When you do not hold the strategic advantage, they do not." n30

(4) While "keeping the strategic advantage may not have the idealistic ring of making the world safe for democracy and does not sound as decisively macho as maintaining American hegemony," n31 maintaining the American "strategic advantage is critical, because it is essential for just about everything else America hopes to achieve--promoting freedom, protecting the homeland, defending its values, preserving peace, and so on." n32

(5) **The U**nited **S**tates **requires national security "agility."** **n33 It not only needs "to refocus its resources** repeatedly; **it needs to do this faster than an adversary can focus its own resources**." n34

 [\*888] As further serious preparation for engaging in the jurisprudence of American national security presiprudence in hotly contested cases and controversies that may end up on their docket, our Supreme Court Justices should understand that, as Walter Russell Mead pointed out in an important essay a few years ago, n35 the average American can be understood as a Jacksonian pragmatist on national security issues. n36 "Americans are determined to keep the world at a distance, while not isolating ourselves from it completely. If we need to take action abroad, we want to do it on our terms." n37 Thus, recent social science survey data paints "a picture of a country whose practical people take a practical approach to knowledge about national security. Americans do not bother with the details most of the time because, for most Americans, the details do not matter most the time." n38 Indeed, since the American people "do know the outlines of the big picture and what we need to worry about [in national security affairs] so we know when we need to pay greater attention and what is at stake. This is the kind of knowledge suited to a Jacksonian." n39

Turning to how the Supreme Court should view and interpret American presidential measures to oversee national security law and policy, our Justices should consider a number of important points. First, **given** the robust text, tradition, intellectual history, and evolution of the institution of the POTUS as the American national security sentinel, n40 and **the unprecedented dangers to the U**nited **S**tates national security **after 9/11**, n41 **national security presiprudence should be accorded wide latitude** **by the Court** in the adjustment (and tradeoffs) of trading liberty and security. n42 Second, Justices should be aware that different presidents [\*889] institute changes in national security presiprudence given their unique perspective and knowledge of threats to the Nation. n43 Third, **Justices should be restrained in second**-**guessing the POTUS** and his subordinate national security experts **concerning** both **the existence and duration of national security emergencies and necessary measures to rectify them**. "**During emergencies, the institutional advantages of the executive are enhanced**", n44 moreover, **"[b]ecause of the importance of secrecy, speed, and flexibility, courts, which are slow, open, and rigid, have less to contribute to the formulation of national policy than they do during normal times**." n45 Fourth, Supreme Court Justices, of course, should not give the POTUS a blank check--even during times of claimed national emergency; but, how much deference to be accorded by the Court is "always a hard question" and should be a function of "the scale and type of the emergency." n46 Fifth, **the Court should be extraordinarily deferential** **to the POTUS** and his executive subordinates **regarding questions of executive determinations of the international laws of war and military tactics. As** cogently explained by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, n47 "**the U**nited **S**tates **should comply with the laws of war** in its battle **against Al Qaeda**"--and I would argue, other lawless terrorist groups like the Taliban--"**only** **to the extent these laws are beneficial to the U**nited **S**tates, taking into account the likely response of [\*890] other states and of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations," n48 **as determined by** the **POTUS** and his national security executive subordinates.

**4**

**Court rulings restricting presidential war powers spur massive court stripping – empirics**

Stephen **Reinhardt**, Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century: The Judicial Role in National Security,” BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW v. 86, 20**06**, LN.

Archibald Cox - who knew a thing or two about the necessity of government actors being independent - emphasized that an essential element of judicial independence is that "there shall be no tampering with the organization or jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions upon constitutional questions." n2 Applying Professor Cox's precept to current events, **we might question whether some recent actions and arguments advanced by the elected branches constitute threats to judicial independence**. **Congress,** for instance, **recently passed the Detainee Treatment Act**. n3 The **Graham-Levin Amendment, which is part of that legislation,** **prohibits any court from hearing or considering habeas petitions filed by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay**. n4 The Supreme Court has been asked to rule on whether the Act applies only prospectively, or whether it applies to pending habeas petitions as well. It is unclear at this time which interpretation will prevail. n5 But if the Act is ultimately construed as applying to pending appeals, **one must ask whether it constitutes "tampering with the ... jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions**," which Professor Cox identified as a key marker of a violation of judicial independence. **All of this**, of course, **is wholly aside from the question of whether Congress and the President may strip the courts of such jurisdiction prospectively**. And **it is**, of course, also **wholly apart from the Padilla case**, n6 **in which many** critics **believe that the administration has played fast and loose with the courts' jurisdiction** **in order to avoid a substantive decision** on a fundamental issue of great importance to all Americans. **Another possible threat to judicial independence involves the position taken** by the administration **regarding the scope of its war powers. In challenging cases brought by individuals charged** as enemy combatants or detained at Guantanamo, **the administration has argued that the President has "inherent powers"** as Commander in Chief under Article II **and that actions he takes pursuant to those powers are essentially not reviewable by courts** or subject to limitation by Congress. n7 **The administration's position in the initial round of Guantanamo cases was that no court anywhere had any jurisdiction to consider** [\*1311] **any claim, be it torture or pending execution**, by any individual held on that American base, which is located on territory under American jurisdiction, for an indefinite period. n8 **The executive branch has also relied on sweeping and often startling assertions of executive authority** in defending the administration's domestic surveillance program, asserting at times as well a congressional resolution for the authorization of the use of military force. To some extent, **such assertions carry with them a challenge to judicial independence**, **as they seem to rely on the proposition that a broad range of cases** - **those that in the administration's view relate to the President's exercise of power** **as Commander in Chief** (and that is a broad range of cases indeed) - **are, in effect, beyond the reach of judicial review**. The full implications of the President's arguments are open to debate, especially since the scope of the inherent power appears, in the view of some current and former administration lawyers, to be limitless. What is clear, however, is that **the administration's stance raises important questions about how the constitutionally imposed system of checks and balances should operate during periods of military conflict**, questions judges should not shirk from resolving.

**Stripping kills legitimacy which independently guts solvency.**

Tom **Clarke**, Department of Political Science, Emory University, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, 20**10**, p. 161-162.

In this vein, students of the separation of powers have recognized that **congressional hostility toward the Court may be an important component of the strategic interaction between the institutions**. Noting confrontations between the branches – such as those discussed in Chapter 2 – as well as more regular patterns of interinstituional tension, these scholars have focused on congressional hostility in its role as an institutional threat to exercise power (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist, Forthcoming; McNollgast 1995, Rosenberg 1992). That is, the focus on **congressional “saber rattling”** – through either committee hearings (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist, Forthcoming) or even Court-curbing (Rosenberg 1992) – **has been primarily concerned with the potential for Congress to use its constitutional powers to formally sanction the Court**. For example, Friedman and Harvey (2003, 17) note, “[t]here are numerous weapons a sitting Congress can apply against a Supreme Court deemed to be recalcitrant, **including jurisdiction stripping**, budget cutting, Court packing, and even the impeachment of Supreme Court Justices.” **One study** has even briefly **noted the** possible **connection between institutional confrontations and the Court’s *legitimacy***. **“If…[Congress** and the President] **succeed in overriding the Court’s interpretation, the Court will certainly pay a policy** price…**The Court also may bear a cost in terms of its *legitimacy*. Every override of the Court’s interpretation will chip away at its legitimacy** even if only marginally. **Given that the Justices’ ability to achieve their policy goals hinges on their** **legitimacy, because they lack** the **power to enforce their decisions, any erosion of the Court’s legitimacy is a concern**.” (Epstein, Knight Martin 2001, 598)

**<<if needed>>**

**Stripping sends a signal that undermines global democracy**

**Gerhardt 5** (Michael J. Gerhardt, William & Mary School of Law Professor, Lewis & Clark Review, "THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO COURT-STRIPPING," 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 347, lexis)

Beyond the constitutional defects with the Act, n40 **it may not be good policy**. **It may send the wrong signals to the American people and to people around the world**. **It expresses hostility to our** Article III **courts, in spite of their special function in upholding constitutional rights and enforcing and interpreting federal law**. **If a branch of our government demonstrates a lack of respect for federal courts**, **our citizens and citizens in other countries may have a hard time figuring out why they should do otherwise**. **Rejecting proposals to exclude all federal jurisdiction or inferior court jurisdiction for some constitutional claims extends an admirable tradition within Congress and reminds the world of our hard-won, justifiable confidence in the special role performed by** Article III **courts throughout our history in vindicating the rule of law.**

**Democracy’s on the brink --- consolidation solves global WMD conflict**

**Halperin 11** (Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional\_wisdom?page=0,11)

**As the** **U**nited **S**tates **struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance**. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in *The Democracy Advantage*, **democratic governments are** **more likely** **than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose** a **threat** to **peace and security**. **Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines** **and** **economic collapse**. **They are also** **less likely** to become **failed states** or suffer a **civil war**. **Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as** **terrorism** and **proliferation** of **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, **democracy** cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It **must come from** the people of **a nation working to get on the path** of democracy **and then adopting** the **policies necessary to remain on that path**. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, t**he outside world can make an enormous difference** **in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples**-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much **in America's interest** to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed.

### 5

#### Wartime causes circumvention--The intractable battle creates a national diversion that impairs military wartime decisions

Lobel 8—Professor of Law @ University of Pittsburgh [Jules Lobel, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War,” Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 69, 2008, pg. 391]

The critical difficulty with a contextual approach is its inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity, which tends to sharply shift the balance of power in favor of a strong President acting in disregard of congressional will. For example, the application of the Feldman and Issacharoff test asking whether the congressional restriction makes realistic sense in the modern world would yield no coherent separation of powers answer if applied to the current Administration’s confrontation with Congress. It would undoubtedly embolden the President to ignore Congress’s strictures. The President’s advisors would argue that the McCain Amendment’s ban on cruel and inhumane treatment, or FISA’s requirement of a warrant, does not make realistic sense in the context of the contemporary realities of the war on terror in which we face a shadowy, ruthless nonstate enemy that has no respect for laws or civilized conduct, a conclusion hotly disputed by those opposed to the President’s policies. Focusing the debate over whether Congress has the power to control the treatment of detainees on the President’s claim that the modern realities of warfare require a particular approach will merge the separation of powers inquiry of who has the power with the political determination of what the policy ought to be. Such an approach is likely to encourage the President to ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments whenever he or she believes that a statute does not make realistic sense—that is, when it conflicts with a policy the President embraces. 53

The contextual approach has a “zone of twilight” quality that Justice Jackson suggested in Youngstown. 54 Often constitutional norms matter less than political realities—wartime reality often favors a strong President who will overwhelm both Congress and the courts. While it is certainly correct— as Jackson noted—that neither the Court nor the Constitution will preserve separation of powers where Congress is too politically weak to assert its authority, a fluid contextual approach is an invitation to Presidents to push beyond the constitutional boundaries of their powers and ignore legislative enactments that seek to restrict their wartime authority.

Moreover, another substantial problem with a contextual approach in the war powers context is that the judiciary is unlikely to resolve the dispute. 55 The persistent refusal of the judiciary to adjudicate the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution strongly suggests that courts will often refuse to intervene to resolve disputes between the President and Congress over the constitutionality of a statute that a President claims impermissibly interferes with her conduct of an ongoing war. 56 This result leaves the political branches to engage in an intractable dispute over the statute’s constitutionality that saps the nation’s energy, diverts focus from the political issues in dispute, and endangers the rule of law.

Additionally, in wartime it is often important for issues relating to the exercise of war powers to be resolved quickly. Prompt action is not usually the forte of the judiciary.

If, however, a constitutional consensus exists or could be consolidated that Congress has the authority to check the President’s conduct of warfare, that consensus might help embolden future Congresses to assert their power. Such a consensus might also help prevent the crisis, chaos, and stalemate that may result when the two branches assert competing constitutional positions and, as a practical matter, judicial review is unavailable to resolve the dispute.

Moreover, the adoption of a contextual, realist approach will undermine rather than aid the cooperation and compromise between the political branches that is so essential to success in wartime. In theory, an unclear, ambiguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch uncertain of its legal authority could further compromise and cooperation. However, modern social science research suggests that the opposite occurs. 57 Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects or factors within the ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position. This self-serving bias hardens each side’s position and allows the dispute to drag on, as has happened with the ongoing, unresolved dispute over the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. Pg. 407-409

#### Congress cant check use of force

Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 6-8

The role that Congress plays in deciding whether a war is continued or concluded is of intrinsic interest to academics, policymakers, and casual observers of contemporary American politics alike. Yet the belief that Congress retains some capacity to shape the conduct of military affairs after a venture is launched is also a critically important and untested proposition underlying most theories asserting congressional influence over the initiation of military action. Why, according to this emerging literature, do presidents facing a strong opposition party in Congress use force less frequently than do their peers with strong partisan majorities in Congress? The most commonly offered answer is that presidents anticipate Congress's likely reaction to a prospective use of force and respond accordingly.14 Presidents who confront an opposition-led Congress anticipate that it is more willing and able to challenge the administration's conduct of military action than a Congress controlled by their partisan allies. Therefore, the frequency with which presidents use force abroad covaries with the strength of their party in Congress. However, this anticipatory logic requires that Congress has the ability to raise the costs of military action for the president, once that action has begun. If Congress lacks this capacity, presidents have little reason to adjust their willingness to initiate the use of force in anticipation of an adverse congressional response." As a result, determining whether and how Congress can influence the scope and duration of ongoing military operations is critically important even to evaluating prior research that asserts congressional influence over the initiation of military actions. Without it, such analyses rest on shaky ground. Unfortunately, because the dynamics change dramatically once American troops are deployed abroad, simply drawing lessons from existing studies of interbranch dynamics in military policymaking at the conflict initiation phase and applying them to the conflict conduct phase is unlikely to offer much insight." The decision-making environment at the conflict conduct phase differs from that at the conflict initiation phase along at least three key dimensions: the incentives and constraints governing congressional willingness to challenge presidential discretion; the relative institutional capacities of the executive and legislative branches to affect military policymaking; and finally, the ability of unfolding conflict events to change further the political and strategic environment in which the two branches vie for power. With regard to the political constraints that limit would-be adversaries in Congress, the president may be in an even stronger position after American troops are deployed in the field. Ordering troops abroad is akin to other unilateral presidential actions; by seizing his office's capacity for independent action, a president can dramatically change the status quo and fundamentally alter the political playing field on which Congress and other actors must act to challenge his policies.17 Once the troops are overseas, the political stakes for any congressional challenge to the president's policies are inexorably raised; any such effort is subject to potentially ruinous charges of failing to support the troops. Georgia Senator Richard Russell's conversion from opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam in the early 196os to stalwart support for staying the course after Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the American commitment there illustrates this change: "We are there now, and the time for debate has passed. Our flag is committed, and—more importantly—American boys are under fire."" Russell's sentiment was loudly echoed forty years later in the allegations by the Bush administration and its partisan allies in Congress that any legislative efforts to curtail the war in Iraq undermined the troops. As a result of these potentially intense political costs, there are reasons to question whether Congress can mount an effective challenge to the policies of the commander in chief. If it cannot, this would compel a reassessment of prior theories asserting congressional influence over the initiation of military actions through the logic of anticipated response. Certainly, more empirical analysis is needed to answer this question.

#### circumvention turns heg

Aloe, 82

Paul Hubschman Aloe, Kudman Trachten Aloe, L.L.P, Hofstra LR, Fall, 82,

The Vietnam War added a new twist to the political question doctrine. Many of the lawsuits challenging the war were dismissed on the theory that the political question doctrine precluded the courts from reaching the merits of the cases. n194 The courts, in reaching their decisions, refused to consider whether the President was acting within the scope of his powers. n195 The three judge district court opinion in Atlee v. Laird, n196 presented the most detailed analysis of this revised approach to the political question doctrine. The judges dismissed a challenge to the Vietnam War, refusing to consider whether Vietnam was, in fact, a war, n197 whether Congress had taken sufficient action to authorize a war, or whether the President was justified in maintaining American forces in Southeast Asia. The Atlee court relied on the factors set out in Baker v. Carr n198 and concluded that deciding the case "could lead to consequences in our foreign relations completely beyond the ken and authority of this Court to evaluate." n199 The court also concluded that it lacked "judicially manageable standards to apply to reach a factual determination whether we are at war." n200 The court noted that the "data necessary for such an evaluation regarding the nature of our military presence would be overwhelming." n201 For the first time, the political question doctrine prevented the courts from considering a separation of powers issue, n202 specifically, whether the President had the power to pursue the Vietnam War without congressional approval. Although the court held that the war making powers were committed to the political branches, it failed to decide whether the President had the power to wage war without congressional approval. [\*550] Many judges believed that this new approach was unsupported by prior case law n203 and was unsound as a matter of expediency. It was pointed out that even in the event that the war was declared unconstitutional, the President could still seek a declaration of war from Congress. n204 District Judge Sweigert noted that the court's refusal to decide whether the President was usurping war making power only added to the confusion and controversy surrounding the Vietnam War and prevented the political process from working. n205 [T]he political question doctrine . . . [presents] no obstacle to judicial determination of the rival legislative-executive claims . . . . The power to decide these claims plainly has not been lodged in either the legislative or executive branch; equally plainly, the jurisdiction to demark constitutional boundaries between the rival claimants has been given to the courts. The criteria for judgment whether a claim of "executive privilege" is maintainable can be found in parliamentary practice and, if need be, in the private litigation cases. And the framing of a remedy is attended by no special difficulties but rather falls into familiar patterns. Each of the parties seeks power allegedly conferred by the Constitution and each maintains that interference by the other with the claimed function will seriously impair it, the classic situation for judicial arbitrament. Arbitrament by the courts is the rational substitute for eyeball to eyeball confrontation. n219 The kind of conflicts that Justice Rehnquist's approach would encourage would be detrimental to the smooth functioning of the national government. This problem would be severe in the area of foreign affairs, where the questions are delicate and the need is pressing to present a coherent policy to foreign nations. Excessive infighting over which branch has what power in a given situation would undermine a coherent foreign policy and divert attention from the policy issues that needed to be faced. Such infighting might jeopardize the country's position as a world leader. The courts would do well not to use a political question doctrine rooted in concern for expediency to avoid separation of powers adjudication and, particularly, claims founded upon a statute limiting the President, such as the War Powers Resolution. n220 Rather, once it is determined that the plaintiffs have standing to sue under a statute, the courts should proceed to apply the statute, unless it is found to be unconstitutional. The courts may inquire into congressional power to pass the particular statute n221 or whether the statute unconstitutionally requires the courts to hear cases the fall outside of their article III power. A political question, however, requires deference to [\*555] a political branch of government. Once there is a statute, it is evidence that a political branch has made a political determination. The role of the court should then be to consider whether that political branch acted within the scope of its authority. If the statute is constitutional, then the political question doctrine should compel the courts to defer to the legislative expression and apply its commands. As Professor Firmage wrote: When the executive and legislative branches are in open disagreement over the employment of the war powers, most of the criteria of political question noted in Baker v. Carr point toward independent judicial review. The question of the constitutional delegation is simply which of the political branches should prevail. The national government is not speaking with one voice and may be able to do so only after judicial determination of constitutional competence. The embarrassment of "multifarious pronouncements" has occurred, not by judicial intrusion, but as a result of disputes between the political branches. n222 The courts' disregard of acts of Congress, without considering the separation of powers question, effectively constitutes the judicial branch placing itself above the will of Congress, thus usurping congressional power.

**6**

**The Executive branch of the United States federal government should determine that the National Environmental Policy Act restricts the introduction of Armed Forces into hostilities, and implement these restrictions by requiring that the executive agencies:**

* **comply with the National Environmental Policy Act restrictions to the introduction of Armed Forces into hostilities;**
* **not invoke “national security” exemptions when challenged on its compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act restrictions to the introduction of Armed Forces into hostilities;**

**and the Executive branch should implement these through self-binding mechanisms including, but not limited to independent commissions to review and ensure compliance with the order and transparency measures that gives journalists access to White House decisionmaking. The Executive branch should publically announce these policies.**

CP sends the most powerful signal

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 12/3/12, Obama's Moment, [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/obamas\_moment](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/obamas_moment) gender edited

In foreign affairs, the central challenge now facing President Barack Obama is how to regain some of the ground lost in recent years in shaping U.S. national security policy. Historically and politically, in America's system of separation of powers, it is the president who has the greatest leeway for decisive action in foreign affairs. He is viewed by the country as responsible for Americans' safety in an increasingly turbulent world. He is seen as the ultimate definer of the goals that the United States should pursue through its diplomacy, economic leverage, and, if need be, military compulsion. And the world at large sees him/[her] -- for better or for worse -- as the authentic voice of America.

To be sure, he is not a dictator. Congress has a voice. So does the public. And so do vested interests and foreign-policy lobbies. The congressional role in declaring war is especially important not when the United States is the victim of an attack, but when the United States is planning to wage war abroad. Because America is a democracy, public support for presidential foreign-policy decisions is essential. But no one in the government or outside it can match the president's authoritative voice when [s]he speaks and then decisively acts for America.

This is true even in the face of determined opposition. Even when some lobbies succeed in gaining congressional support for their particular foreign clients in defiance of the president, for instance, many congressional signatories still quietly convey to the White House their readiness to support the president if he stands firm for "the national interest." And a president who is willing to do so publicly, while skillfully cultivating friends and allies on Capitol Hill, can then establish such intimidating credibility that it is politically unwise to confront him. This is exactly what Obama needs to do now.

## Warming

### Heg Ans: Enviro Leadership—1NC

#### Environment not key to heg

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Drawing on rational choice theory, Downs and Jones show that a far more compelling theoretical case can be made that states have multiple reputations—each particular to a specific agreement or issue area. For this reason, they find that "the reputational, consequences of defection are usually more bounded" than institutionalist scholarship currently presumes." 67 If America has, for example, one reputation associated with the UN and another regarding the WTO, then lack of compliance with the former organization will in no way directly undercut its ability to gain cooperation in the latter. As Downs and Jones note, viewing states as having multiple reputations "helps to explain why, despite the prevalence of the unitary reputation assumption, examples of a state's defection from an agreement in one area (for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other area (for example, trade and security) are virtually nonexistent in the literature." 68 This conclusion is consistent with the two most detailed studies of reputation in IR, which decisively undercut the notion that states have a general reputation that will strongly influence how other states relate across different issue areas. 69

**International cooperation fails – numerous alt causes**

**Young et al 13**

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The Doha round of trade negotiations is **deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it**. Climate negotiators have met **for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed** in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.

**Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas**. The reasons for this are **not the result of any single underlying causal structure**, but rather of **several underlying dynamics that work together.** Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that **have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them.** It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.

A golden era of governed globalization

In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics.

While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day.

Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials, public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies.

Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew.

This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997).

Beyond the special privileges of the great powers

Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point **where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation.** That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors **grinding that system into gridlock.**

Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. **Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled.** In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, **multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare.** Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be **increasingly difficult and deficient** at **precisely** the time **when it is needed most**.

It is possible to identify **four reasons for this blockage**, four pathways to gridlock: **rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation**. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend **that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms**. Each of these are explained briefly below.

**Growing multipolarity**. The absolute number of states **has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years,** meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that **many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree** in order for global cooperation to occur.

**Institutional inertia**. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And **yet, the architects of the postwar order did not**, in most cases, **design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power**.

**Harder problems**. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. **Problems are both now more extensive**, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, **and intensive**, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. **Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives** needed to achieve a low carbon economy, **have made a global deal, thus far, impossible** (

Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).

**Fragmentation**. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in **a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency**. The **exponential rise in** both multilateral and transnational **organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance.** Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. **Fragmented institutions**, in turn, **disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs.**

In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The **challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced** by the 1945 victors **in the postwar settlement**. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

**Realist theory disproves the advantage**

JM **Greico**- professor of political science at Duke University, **1993** “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

**Realism** has **dominated international relations theory** at least since World War II.' For realists, international **anarchy fosters competition** and conflict among states **and inhibits** their **willingness to cooperate** **even when** **they share common interests**. Realist theory also argues that **international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation**. Realism, then, presents **a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and** of **the** **capabilities of** international **institutions**.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ **International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure**. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal **institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and** therefore **it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism.** As a result, the new theory's **optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶** Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that **states are positional, not atomistic**, in character, and **therefore** realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, **states in cooperative arrangements** also **worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do**. For realists, **a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation**, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that **there are** at least **two major barriers to international cooperation**: **state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains.** Neoliberal **institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former** **and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶** Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that **states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors**. According to realists, states worry that **today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy** in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, **states must give serious attention to the gains of partners.** Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that **realism**, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, **offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger**. If that is true, then **realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.**

### Warming Good 1NC (1:40)

#### CO2 solves food crisis, kills millions—tech can’t keep up

Dr. Craig D. **Idso**, ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE YEAR 2050: WILL WE PRODUCE ENOUGH TO ADEQUATELY FEED THE WORLD, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, 6—15—**11**, p. 30-31.

As indicated in the material above, a very real and devastating food crisis is looming on the horizon, and continuing advancements in agricultural technology and expertise will most likely not be able to bridge the gap between global food supply and global food demand just a few short years from now. However, the positive impact of Earth’s rising atmospheric CO2 concentration on crop yields will considerably lessen the severity of the coming food shortage. In some regions and countries it will mean the difference between being food secure or food insecure; and it will aid in lifting untold hundreds of millions out of a state of hunger and malnutrition, preventing starvation and premature death. For those regions of the globe where neither enhancements in the techno-intel effect nor the rise in CO2 are projected to foster food security, an Apollo moon-mission-like commitment is needed by governments and researchers to further increase crop yields per unit of land area planted, nutrients applied, and water used. And about the only truly viable option for doing so (without taking enormous amounts of land and water from nature and driving untold numbers of plant and animal species to extinction) is to have researchers and governments invest the time, effort and capital needed to identify and to prepare for production the plant genotypes that are most capable of maximizing CO2 benefits for important food crops. Rice, for example, is the third most important global food crop, accounting for 9.4% of global food production. Based upon data presented in the CO2 Science Plant Growth Database, the average growth response of rice to a 300-ppm increase in the air’s CO2 concentration is 35.7%. However, data obtained from De Costa et al. (2007), who studied the growth responses of 16 different rice genotypes, revealed CO2-induced productivity increases ranging from -7% to +263%. Therefore, if countries learned to identify which genotypes provided the largest yield increases per unit of CO2 rise, and then grew those genotypes, it is quite possible that the world could collectively produce enough food to supply the needs of all of its inhabitants. But since rising CO2 concentrations are considered by many people to be the primary cause of global warming, we are faced with a dilemma of major proportions. If proposed regulations restricting anthropogenic CO2 emissions (which are designed to remedy the potential global warming problem) are enacted, they will greatly exacerbate future food problems by reducing the CO2-induced yield enhancements that are needed to supplement increases provided by advances in agricultural technology and expertise. And as a result of such CO2 emissions regulations, hundreds of millions of the world’s population will be subjected to hunger and malnutrition. Even more troubling is the fact that thousands would die daily as a result of health problems they likely would have survived had they received adequate food and nutrition. About the only option for avoiding the food crisis, and its negative ramifications for humanity and nature alike, is to allow the atmospheric CO2 concentration to continue to rise as predicted (no CO2 emission restrictions), and then to learn to maximize those benefits through the growing of CO2-loving cultivars.

#### food crisis outweighs warming—massive wars, turns biosphere

Dr. Craig D. **Idso**, ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE YEAR 2050: WILL WE PRODUCE ENOUGH TO ADEQUATELY FEED THE WORLD, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, 6—15—**11**, p. 31-32.

In light of the host of real-world research findings discussed in the body of this report, it should be evident to all that the looming food shortage facing humanity mere years to decades from now is far more significant than the theoretical and largely unproven catastrophic climate- and weather-related projections of the world’s climate alarmists. And it should also be clear that the factor that figures most prominently in both scenarios is the air’s CO2 content. The theorists proclaim that we must drastically reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions by whatever means possible, including drastic government interventions in free-market enterprise systems. The realists suggest that letting economic progress take its natural unimpeded course is the only way to enable the air’s CO2 content to reach a level that will provide the aerial fertilization effect of atmospheric CO2 enrichment that will be needed to provide the extra food production that will be required to forestall massive human starvation and all the social unrest and warfare that will unavoidably accompany it, as well as humanity’s decimation of what little yet remains of pristine nature, which will include the driving to extinction of untold numbers of both plant and animal species. Climate alarmists totally misuse the precautionary principle when they ignore the reality of the approaching lack-of-food-induced crisis that would decimate the entire biosphere, and when they claim instead that the catastrophic projections of their climate models are so horrendous that anthropogenic CO2 emissions must be reduced at all costs. Such actions should not even be contemplated without first acknowledging the fact that none of the catastrophic consequences of rising global temperatures have yet been conclusively documented, as well as the much greater likelihood of the horrendous global food crisis that would follow such actions. The two potential futures must be weighed in the balance, and very carefully, before any such actions are taken.

**Co2 solves ice age--extinction**

David **Deming**, Associate Professor, Arts and Sciences, University of Oklahoma, “The Coming Ice Age,” AMERICAN THINKER, 5—13—**09**, [www.americanthinker.com/2009/05/the\_coming\_ice\_age.html](http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/05/the_coming_ice_age.html), accessed 5-27-11.

In northern Europe, the Little Ice Age kicked off with the Great Famine of 1315. Crops failed due to cold temperatures and incessant rain. Desperate and starving, parents ate their children, and people dug up corpses from graves for food. In jails, inmates instantly set upon new prisoners and ate them alive. The Great Famine was followed by the Black Death, the greatest disaster ever to hit the human race. One-third of the human race died; terror and anarchy prevailed. **Human civilization** as we know it **is only possible in a warm interglacial climate.** Short of a catastrophic asteroid impact, the greatest threat to the human race is the onset of another ice age. The oscillation between ice ages and interglacial periods is the dominant feature of Earth's climate for the last million years. But the computer models that predict significant global warming from carbon dioxide cannot reproduce these temperature changes. This failure to reproduce the most significant aspect of terrestrial climate reveals an incomplete understanding of the climate system, if not a nearly complete ignorance. Global warming predictions by meteorologists are based on speculative, untested, and poorly constrained computer models. But our knowledge of ice ages is based on a wide variety of reliable data, including cores from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. In this case, it would be perspicacious to listen to the geologists, not the meteorologists. **By reducing our** production of **carbon dioxide, we risk hastening the advent of the next ice age.** Even more foolhardy and dangerous is the Obama administration's announcement that they may try to cool the planet through geoengineering. **Such a move** in the middle of a cooling trend **could provoke the irreversible onset of an ice age.** *It is not hyperbole to state that* **such a climatic change** would mean the **end** of human **civilization** *as we know it***. Earth's climate is controlled by the Sun**. In comparison, every other factor is trivial. The coldest part of the Little Ice Age during the latter half of the seventeenth century was marked by the nearly complete absence of sunspots. And the Sun now appears to be entering a new period of quiescence. August of 2008 was the first month since the year 1913 that no sunspots were observed. As I write, **the sun remains quiet. We are in a cooling trend.** The areal extent of global sea ice is above the twenty-year mean. We have heard much of the dangers of global warming due to carbon dioxide. But **the potential danger of any potent**ial **anthropogenic warming is trivial compared to the risk of entering a new ice age**. Public policy decisions should be based on a realistic appraisal that takes both climate scenarios into consideration.

#### negative feedbacks check

**NIPCC**, Nongovernment International Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED, Craig Idso, S. Fred Singer, Warren Anderson, J.Scott Armstrong, Dennis Avery, Franco Battaglia, Robert Carter, Piers Corbyn, Richard Courtney, Joseph d’Aleo, Don Easterbrook, Fred Goldberg, Vicent Gray, Williams Gray, Kesten Green, Kenneth Haapala, David Hagen, Richard Alan Keen, adhav Khandekar, William Kininmonth, Hans Labohm, Anthony Lupo, Howard Maccabee, M.Michael MOgil, Christopher Monckton, Lubos Motl, Stephen Murgatroyd, Nicola Scafetta, Harrison Schmitt, Tom Segalstad, George Taylor, Dick Thoenes, Anton Uriarte Gerd Weber, 20**09**, p. 3.

Chapter 2. Feedback Factors and Radiative Forcing • Scientific research suggests the model-derived temperature sensitivity of the earth accepted by the IPCC is too large. Corrected feedbacks in the climate system could reduce climate sensitivity to values that are an order of magnitude smaller. • Scientists may have discovered a connection between cloud creation and sea surface temperature in the tropics that creates a “thermostat-like control” that automatically vents excess heat into space. If confirmed, this could totally compensate for the warming influence of all anthropogenic CO2

emissions experienced to date, as well as all those that are anticipated to occur in the future. • The IPCC dramatically underestimates the total cooling effect of aerosols. Studies have found their radiative effect is comparable to or larger than the temperature forcing caused by all the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations recorded since pre-industrial times. • Higher temperatures are known to increase emissions of dimethyl sulfide (DMS) from the world’s oceans, which increases the albedo of marine stratus clouds, which has a cooling effect. • Iodocompounds—created by marine algae— function as cloud condensation nuclei, which help create new clouds that reflect more incoming solar radiation back to space and thereby cool the planet. • As the air’s CO2 content—and possibly its temperature—continues to rise, plants emit greater amounts of carbonyl sulfide gas, which eventually makes it way into the stratosphere, where it is transformed into solar-radiationreflecting sulfate aerosol particles, which have a cooling effect. • As CO2 enrichment enhances biological growth, atmospheric levels of biosols rise, many of which function as cloud condensation nuclei. Increased cloudiness diffuses light, which stimulates plant growth and transfers more fixed carbon into plant and soil storage reservoirs. • Since agriculture accounts for almost half of nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions in some countries, there is concern that enhanced plant growth due to CO2 enrichment might increase the amount and warming effect of this greenhouse gas. But field research shows that N2O emissions fall as CO2 concentrations and temperatures rise, indicating this is actually another negative climate feedback. • Methane (CH4) is a potent greenhouse gas. An enhanced CO2 environment has been shown to have “neither positive nor negative consequences” on atmospheric methane concentrations. Higher temperatures have been shown to result in reduced methane release from peatbeds. Methane emissions from cattle have been reduced considerably by altering diet, immunization, and genetic selection.

#### Ecosystems resilient to higher CO2

**NIPCC 11** (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

#### adaptation solves

Indur **Goklany**, PhD., “Misled on Climate change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming,” POLICY STUDY n. 399, Reason Foundation, 12—**11**, 12.

The second major reason why future adaptive capacity has been underestimated (and the impacts of global warming systematically overestimated) is that few impact studies consider secular technological change.25 Most assume that no new technologies will come on line, although some do assume greater adoption of existing technologies with higher GDP per capita and, much less frequently, a modest generic improvement in productivity. Such an assumption may have been appropriate during the Medieval Warm Period, when the pace of technological change was slow, but nowadays technological change is fast (as indicated in Figures 1 through 5) and, arguably, accelerating. It is unlikely that we will see a halt to technological change unless so-called precautionary policies are instituted that count the costs of technology but ignore its benefits, as some governments have already done for genetically modified crops and various pesticides.

#### their authors are hacks

Dr. William **Happer**, “The Truth About Greenhouse Gases,” George C. Marshall Institute, 5—23—**11**, [www.marshall.org/article.php?id=953](http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=953), accesse 6-28-11.

The management of most scientific societies has enthusiastically signed on to the global warming bandwagon. This is not surprising, since **governments, as well as many states and foundations, generously fund those who** reinforce their desired outcomes **under the** cover **of saving the planet. Certain private industries are** also **involved: those positioned to profit from enacted controls as well as** financial institutions **heavily invested in “green technologies” whose rationale disappears the moment global warming is widely understood to be a non-problem. There are known connections and movements of people involved in** governmentpolicy**,** scientific societies**, and** private industry**, all with the** common thread **of influencing the outcome of a set of programs and** investments **underpinned by the supposed threat of global warming.**

**Econ--Econ Leadership**

**US economic leadership is impossible- lack of international clout and multiple global disagreements**

* Sovereign Debt Crisis
* Farm Subsidies
* IPR Protection
* FDI Definition
* Future Regulatory Strategies

**Bremmer & Roubini ’11,**

(Ian, President of Eurasia Political Risk Consulting Group, Nouriel, Prof. of Economics @ NYU, A G-Zero World, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67339/ian-bremmer-and-nouriel-roubini/a-g-zero-world>)

International commerce is a different game; trade can benefit all players. But **the divergence of economic interests in the wake of the financial crisis has undermined global economic cooperation**, throwing a wrench into the gears of globalization. In the past, **the global economy has relied on a hegemon** -- the United Kingdom in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the United States in the twentieth century -- **to create the security framework necessary for free markets**, free trade, and capital mobility. **But the combination of Washington’s declining international clout**, on the one hand, **and sharp policy disagreements**, on the other -- both between developed and developing states and between the United States and Europe -- **has created a vacuum of international leadership** just at the moment when it is most needed. For the past 20 years, whatever their differences on security issues, **governments** of the world’s major developed and developing states **have had common economic goals.** The growth of China and India provided Western consumers with access to the world’s fastest-growing markets and helped U.S. and European policymakers manage inflation through the import of inexpensively produced goods and services. **The U**nited **S**tates, **Europe, and Japan have helped developing economies create jobs by buying huge volumes of their exports and** by **maintaining relative stability** in international politics. But **for the next 20 years, negotiations on economic and trade issues are likely to be driven by competition** just as much as recent debates over nuclear nonproliferation and climate change have. **The Doha** Round **is** as **dead** as the dodo, **and the W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization **cannot manage the surge of protectionist pressures that has emerged with the global slowdown.** **Conflicts over trade liberalization have** recently **pitted the U**nited **S**tates, the **E**uropean **U**nion, **Brazil, China, India, and other emerging economies against one another** as each government looks to protect its own workers and industries, often at the expense of outsiders. **Officials** in many European countries **have complained that Ireland’s corporate tax rate is too low** and last year pushed the Irish government to accept a bailout it needed but did not want. **German voters are grousing about the need to bail out poorer European countries**, and the citizens of southern European nations are attacking their governments’ unwillingness to continue spending beyond their means. Before last November’s G-20 summit in Seoul, **Brazilian and Indian officials joined their U.S. and European counterparts to complain that China manipulates the value of its currency.** Yet **when the Americans raised the issue** during the forum itself, **Brazil’s finance minister complained that** the **U.S.** policy of **“quantitative easing” amounted to** much **the same unfair practice**, and Germany’s foreign minister described U.S. policy as “clueless.” **Other intractable disagreements include debates over subsidies for farmers** in the United States and Europe, the **protection of i**ntellectual **p**roperty **r**ights, **and the imposition of antidumping measures and countervailing duties.** **Concerns over** the behavior of sovereign wealth funds have restricted the ability of some of them to take controlling positions in Western companies, particularly in the United States. **And China’s rush to lock down reliable long-term access to natural resources** -- which has led Beijing to aggressively buy commodities in Africa, Latin America, and other emerging markets -- **is further stoking conflict with Washington.** **Asset and financial protectionism are on the rise**, too. A Chinese state-owned oil company attempted to purchase the U.S. energy firm Unocal in 2005, and a year later, the state-owned Dubai Ports World tried to purchase a company that would allow it to operate several U.S. ports: both ignited a political furor in Washington. This was simply the precursor to similar acts of investment protectionism in Europe and Asia. In fact, **there are few established international guidelines for f**oreign **d**irect **i**nvestment -- defining what qualifies as “critical infrastructure,” for example -- **and this is precisely the sort of politically charged problem that will not be addressed successfully anytime soon** on the international stage. **The most important source of** international **conflict may** well **come** from debates **over how** best **to ensure that** an international **economic meltdown never happens again**. Future global monetary and financial stability will require much greater international coordination on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Eventually, they may even require a global super-regulator, given that capital is mobile while regulatory policies remain national. But **disagreements on these issues run deep**. The governments of many **developing countries fear that the creation of tighter international rules for financial firms would bind them more tightly to the** financial **systems of the** very **Western economies** that they blame for creating the recent crisis. And there are significant disagreements even among advanced economies on how to reform the system of regulation and supervision of financial institutions. **Global trade imbalances remain wide and are getting even wider, increasing the risk of currency wars** -- not only between the United States and China but also among other emerging economies. There is nothing new about these sorts of disagreements. But the still fragile state of the global economy makes the need to resolve them much more urgent, and the vacuum of international leadership will make their resolution profoundly difficult to achieve.

**their internal link is too small to matter**

resilience

**Engardio 8** (Pete, Senior Writer – Business Week, “Is U.S. Innovation Headed Offshore?”, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 5-8, http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/may2008/id2008057\_518979.htm)

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Apparently not, according to a new **study published by** the **National Academies**, the Washington organization that advises the U.S. government on science and technology policy. The 371-page report titled Innovation in Global Industries argues that, in **sectors from software and semiconductors to biotech and logistics, America's lead in creating new products and services has remained remarkably resilient over the past decade—even as more research and development by U.S. companies is done offshore.**  "**This is a good sign**," says Georgetown University Associate Strategy Professor Jeffrey T. Macher, who co-edited the study with David C. Mowery of the University of California at Berkeley. "It **means most of the value added is going to U.S. firms, and they are able to reinvest those profits in innovation**." The report, a collection of papers by leading academics assessing the impact of globalization on inventive activity in 10 industries, won't reassure all skeptics that the globalization of production and R&D is good for the U.S. One drawback is that most of the conclusions are based on old data: In some cases the most recent numbers are from 2002. Exporting the Benefits? And while the authors of the report make compelling cases that U.S. companies are doing just fine, thank you, none of the writers addresses today's burning question: Is American tech supremacy thanks to heavy investments in R&D also benefiting U.S. workers? Or are U.S. inventions mainly creating jobs overseas? A few years ago, most people took it for granted that what was good for companies was good for the greater economy. But the flat growth in living standards for most Americans during the last boom has raised doubts over the benefits of globalization. "Innovation shouldn't be an end in itself for U.S. policy," says trade theorist Ralph E. Gomory, a research professor at New York University's Stern School of Business. "I think we have to address whether a country can run on innovation. If you just do R&D to enhance economic activity in other countries, you are getting very little out of it." Gomory, a former top IBM (IBM) executive, retired in 2007 as president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which funded the National Academies study. Still, given all the debate over offshoring, the report's central findings are interesting. The authors marshal a wealth of evidence to show that, **thanks to innovation, globalization hasn't eroded U.S. leadership even in some industries where there has been a substantial offshore shift in engineering and design.** **Despite an explosion of outsourcing to India and Ireland**, for example, **America's software industry still trumps the rest of the world in exports of packaged software and services, patent activity, and venture capital investment.** The **U.S**. also **accounts for 90% of chip-design patents**—the same level as 1991—**although Asian companies now do most of manufacturing**. And **when it comes to biotech**nology, **the U.S. is way ahead**, luring more venture capital than all other countries combined. America First The U**.S. even remains a heavyweight in personal computers**, the study says, though China and Taiwan manufacture most of the hardware. That's because the real innovation and profits still belong to companies like Microsoft (MSFT) and Intel (INTC), makers of the operating system and central processors, while U.S. brands command 40% of the global market and still define breakthrough design. There are cases where the U.S. can lose a commanding lead when domestic manufacturing disappears—namely in flat-panel displays and lighting. Macher also concedes "there are problems on the horizon" regarding America's future competitiveness. Other nations are starting to mimic many of the strategies that give the U.S. an innovation edge, for example. And as Asians grow richer "they are becoming more sophisticated and demanding than Americans as users of many tech products." But **for now, "all evidence is that our position in many of these industries will continue,"** says Macher. Why is the U.S. so entrenched? One reason, he says, is simply that **U.S. corporations are proving very adept at managing global R&D networks while keeping core innovation at home.** While innovative activity in chips and software is growing fast elsewhere, it has not yet been enough to close the gap with the U.S. The fact that the **U.S. remains by far the world's most lucrative market for pharmaceuticals and business software** helps explain its continued strength in those industries. What's more, industry clusters involving companies, universities, and venture capital are so well-established—such as San Diego and Cambridge, Mass., in biotech—that it will take many years for other nations to replicate them.

## Bioterror

### Env’t Ans: Biodiversity—1NC

#### Can’t solve bio-d—alt causes

Bruce Tonn, School of Planning, Universtiy of Tennessee, “Futures Sustainability,” FUTURES, 11—07, LN.

Threats to biodiversity are numerous and well known. Studies suggest that the number of species on earth is decreasing faster than the 'natural' rate [19]. It can be strongly argued that the biodiversity of the earth is decreasing mostly as the result of human behavior. The relentlessexpansion ofhuman settlements hasresulted in widespread destruction of habitats. The loss of tropical rainforests, estuaries and wetlands to development have been particularly ruinous. Of course, over the course of historyhumans have also hunted numerous species into extinction [20] and are threatening to over-harvest many aquatic species to extinction. Industrial waste also has the capability to kill species outright and to prevent their reproduction. The transport ofinvasive species around the worldis another near-term threat to the earth's biodiversity. Human-induced climate change is threatening many species in the near-term, such as the polar bear. Rapid global climate change and nuclear war could result in catastrophic species extinction similar to massive extinctions in the earth's geologic past. There are also numerous natural threats to biodiversity. Naturally occurring viruses and otherpathogens could become more virulent and uncontrollable and could threaten numerous flora and fauna alike. However, long-term threats to biodiversity mostly stem from extreme climate change. Volcanic eruptions, collisions with asteroids, plate tectonics, changes in ocean currents, and even minute changes in the energy output of the sun could cause rapid global cooling. Cooling could not only spread ice over most of the earth's surface again, killing the majority of species outright, but could also lower sea floors enough to foster massive oxidation, thereby reducing oxygen levels enough in the atmosphere to asphyxiate all oxygen breathing species [17].

#### No bio-d impact

Donald Dodds, M.S. and President, North Pacific Research, “The Myth of Biodiversity,” 5—30—07, northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc

Biodiversity is a corner stone of the environmental movement. But there is no proof that biodiversity is important to the environment. Something without basis in scientific fact is called a Myth. Lets examine biodiversity through out the history of the earth. The earth has been a around for about 4 billion years. Life did not develop until about 500 million years later. Thus for the first 500 million years bio diversity was zero. The planet somehow survived this lack of biodiversity. For the next 3 billion years, the only life on the planet was microbial and not diverse. Thus, the first unexplainable fact is that the earth existed for 3.5 billion years, 87.5% of its existence, without biodiversity. Somewhere around 500 million years ago life began to diversify and multiple celled species appeared. Because these species were partially composed of sold material they left better geologic records, and the number of species and genera could be cataloged and counted. The number of genera on the planet is a indication of the biodiversity of the planet. Figure 1 is a plot of the number of genera on the planet over the last 550 million years. The little black line outside of the left edge of the graph is 10 million years. Notice the left end of this graph. Biodiversity has never been higher than it is today.

### Env’t Ans: General—1NC

#### Impact on environment is small—their ev

Cohan 3 (John Alan – J.D., Loyola Law School, “MODES OF WARFARE AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR”, 2003, 15 Fla. J. Int'l L. 481, lexis)

A further problem is that predictions of the extent of damage to an environment are somewhat tentative. The reverberations from environmental harm are quixotic compared to the reverberations from harm done to conventional targets such as a military air field or radar apparatus. The building can be rebuilt, and the impact on the surrounding infrastructure is somewhat straightforward. But in contrast, environmental damage, whether based on collateral damage or direct attacks on the environment itself, is something that has much more complex reverberations. Moreover, environmental damage is often difficult to contain or control, regardless of the intent of the actor. The environmental harm caused by Iraq's actions during Desert Storm continues to have adverse effects in terms of poisoning of the soil and waters, and will continue to have adverse effects on the local region, if not the world's oceans, for many years to come. On the other hand, "many predictions of what Gulf War damage would do to the environment proved exaggerated." n228 Thus, operations in future wars may well need to undergo scrutiny over a period of time before the degree of environmental risk can be established. Often enough, environmental damage may prove irreversible. Destruction or contamination of an area by chemical or biological agents may require the relocation of people and the migration (or extinction) of local species. An example of this, mentioned above, is the Scottish island of Gruinard which to this day remains contaminated with the causative agent of anthrax. Today military leaders and policymakers often display a growing concern for the environment by considering the foreseeability of environmental damage when they calculate proportionality. This is in contrast to wars of, say, fifty years ago, where concern over war's devastating effects on the environment was somewhat remote by comparison. The future will certainly bring us greater abilities to effectively manipulate the potentially dangerous forces that are pent-up in [\*538] the environment. On humanitarian principles, our efforts to develop environmental modification techniques needs to be dedicated to the benefit of humankind and nature. They must be carried out in good faith, facilitated by international understanding and cooperation and in the spirit of good neighborliness. The global environment is being subjected to ever more serious strains by a growing world population that seeks at least the basic necessities of life as well as some of its amenities. In order to help ensure that the increasingly limited resources of our environment are not further reduced by hostile military activities, it is urged that environmental issues in general and those raised by environmental warfare in particular be widely publicized, through schools, the press and by other means, in order to help develop and strengthen cultural norms in opposition to military activities that cause direct or indirect environmental harm.

### Enviro Adv Ans: Bioweapons

#### Not statistically probable

Klotz and Sylvester, 9 (Lynn C. Klotz – senior science fellow with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Edward J. Sylvester – professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University, “Breeding Bio Insecurity: How U.S. Biodefense Is Exporting Fear, Globalizing Risk, and Making Us All Less Secure”, Ebrary, p. 151—154)

To us, biosecurity means safeguarding from infectious disease in all its manifestations. That requires committing the largest portion of our finite resources to shielding against the threats most likely to kill us. Protection against bioweaponry is just one element in such a shield, but in the wake of the Amerithrax attacks and the government’s hasty and overblown response, this highly unlikely threat to American life has become the squeaky wheel, garnering billions in appropriations, cornering the market on public fear, and capturing the news spotlight.

We must ask ourselves what biological threats pose the greatest danger to our families. Biowarfare is well down the list of probables, but just as we weighed the likelihood and consequences of various biological attack threats against one another in chapter 4, we can now put some force behind our claims for the low risk of a major anthrax attack, the kind that could truly disrupt public life and would require a major public health response, in comparison with looming health threats such as a pandemic flu and the steady, year-in, year-out toll of annual diseases like drug-resistant staph infections and garden-variety influenza.

Now the government assesses the relative likelihood and consequences of bioweapons, pandemic flu, and annual infectious disease threats in three different “boxes” so the yearly threats never get compared to bioweapons. That means the most powerful or emotionally charged concern wins in the ensuing funding battles. Efforts against bioweaponry and pandemic flu are funded from special vaults provided under BioShield 2004, the Bush administration’s $6.1 billion pandemic flu plan, 1 and other dedicated sources. That leaves the killers and disablers of the largest number of Americans still wanting for additional research funding. Only a combined risk assessment makes sense to determine a health hazard’s true impact.

As earlier, we’re using the term “risk” as an indicator of the seriousness of a threat to us, arrived at by multiplying the consequences of the threat by the probability of occurrence. Since our crude assessment considers only fatalities— in order to make the point that our priorities are skewed— some of our conclusions are only a first word on the subject, not the last. Let’s take annual flu as the standard against which other threats are measured. Flu kills around thirty-six thousand people every year, so deaths in the tens of thousands occur each year with certainty— that is, with a probability of one. Another group of particularly deadly disease agents, the feared hospital-borne multiple drug– resistant (MDR) bacteria, kill tens of thousands every year, again a certainty. A recent report places deaths from just one of these bacteria, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, at over eighteen thousand per year, an annual death toll greater than that of AIDS. 2

 Let’s add into the mix the possibility of a pandemic flu, now a big worry, which is distinct from the annual flu. But how can we rationally assess the threat of a bioweapons attack that has never happened against that of a global flu outbreak that recurs, if infrequently, and annual infectious diseases? The fact is that it must be done for simple reasons. We mount bulwarks against all manner of biological threats— from AIDS, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases to biowarfare— and we do so from a fund of limited resources that we must spend efficiently.

Without a data-based ballpark calculation of the threat and size of a new pandemic flu, even experts can make wildly varying predictions. Here is the assessment of Robert Webster, not only an eminent virologist but director of the WHO Collaborating Center on the Ecology of Influenza Viruses in Lower Animals and Birds: “The world is teetering on the edge of a pandemic that could kill a large fraction of the human population,” 3 he wrote recently in a coauthored article. Recalling the 1997 virus that spread through Hong Kong poultry markets, Webster said, “the only thing that saved us was the quick thinking of scientists who convinced health authorities to slaughter more than a million domesticated fowl in the city’s markets. The avian virus turned out to be a new strain— one that the human population had never seen before. These deadly new strains arise a few times every century, and the next one may arrive any day now.” Webster believes the 1918-like scenario will replay. “But this time it will be worse.” 4

Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, agrees. He foresees a toll of some 270 million pandemic flu deaths worldwide, a number he arrived at simply by extrapolating the 1918 death toll of 40 million to the world’s current population. 5

Scary stuff, but now listen to Paul Offit of Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. He says of avian flu, “the virus is clearly not so highly contagious among mammals, and I just don’t think it’s going to become so.” 6 Moreover, Offit does not expect the next pandemic until sometime around 2025.

The WHO itself takes a conservative position, estimating that a new pandemic would take the lives of from 2 million to 7.4 million people, believing that the 1918 pandemic was unusual and unlikely to be repeated. 7

We will try to make rational risk assessments about pandemic flu and anthrax as best we can in a field of such uncertain numbers. 8 Since anthrax is on everyone’s minds, we’ll tackle it first. As discussed earlier, a bioweapons assault resulting in thirty thousand fatalities is a reasonable guess for a large attack, so we will use it. What is the probability of an attack of this magnitude in any given year? Is it .001? Or .01? Or a radical 0.1— meaning that there is a one in ten chance of an attack in the coming year? We must make some choice, because everyone’s risk assessments are based on guesses of such probabilities. 9 But what does each one mean in everyday terms?

Our intuitive method involves simply thinking about the number of years that must go by to have a 50– 50 chance of such an attack, given its probability in any one year. Table 8.1 offers some examples.

To set the probability of such an anthrax attack at 0.1 would mean there is a 50– 50 chance that in 6.6 years we will have suffered at least one such attack resulting in 30,000 fatalities. Given what we showed would be required to mount such an offensive, that probability would be unrealistic. Only the most fearful among us would believe this to represent the seriousness of the anthrax threat today. How about the lowest probability, 0.001? We could then expect 692 years to pass before there was a 50– 50 chance of at least one attack, and clearly one would have to be blissfully optimistic to pretend we are that safe. Any realistic guess must lie in between, so let’s look at 0.01 probability, meaning that 69.9 years will pass before there is a 50– 50 chance that an attack has occurred. This, too, seems optimistic, although it seems more realistic, given the 30,000 fatalities that would mark an extremely successful bioweapons attack.

## 2NC

### T: IAFH—Overview 2NC

#### Restrictions on authority prohibit- the aff is a condition

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

####  Hostilities excludes irregular or infrequent violence in a particular area—foundational definition

Morrison, ’11 – Law School Prof @ Columbia University Law School. “Hostilities,” 1 JOURNAL OF LAW (1 PUB.L.MISC.), p. 236-7, http://journaloflaw.us/1%20Pub.%20L.%20Misc./1-2/JoL1-2,%20PLM1-2,%20Morrison.pdf

What does “hostilities” mean? The WPR itself does not define the ¶ term, and no court decision or subsequent legislation has done so.¶ But there are some materials bearing on the question. We reproduce a small selection of them here, mindful that this is by no means ¶ a complete catalog.¶ At the time of the WPR’s passage, some in Congress evidently ¶ read hostilities quite expansively. The House Report accompanying ¶ the WPR, for example, stated that “[t]he word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in ¶ scope.” At the same time, colloquies in hearings suggested that some ¶ of the sponsors of the WPR could not agree, even after the fact, ¶ about when hostilities began in Vietnam.¶ Two years after the WPR was passed, Congress invited State ¶ Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh and Defense Department ¶ General Counsel Martin Hoffmann to provide their best understanding of hostilities. In their letter, Leigh and Hoffmann said that ¶ the Executive Branch understood the term “to mean a situation in ¶ which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces,” but that it did ¶ not include “irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particular area.” In his testimony this past summer, Koh claimed ¶ that in the 36 years since the Leigh-Hoffmann letter, “the Executive ¶ Branch has repeatedly articulated and applied th[e] foundational understandings” articulated in it.¶ As with so many separation of powers issues, the practice over ¶ time of the Executive and Legislative Branches may indeed provide ¶ the best evidence of what hostilities has come to mean. The Libya ¶ episode is now part of that history. Precisely what meaning it assigns¶ to hostilities – and what life it leaves in the WPR – is sure to be debated the next time around.

### Ext 1--CO2 Ag--Overview 2NC (:35/1:10

#### food insecurity is a conflict multiplier – most probable scenario for nuclear war

Future Directions International ’12 (“International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme”, May 25, <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Workshop_Report_-_Intl_Conflict_Triggers_-_May_25.pdf>, )

There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

#### turns biodiversity—land conversion

**Carter et al. 11**—lead authors are Robert Carter, Ph.D., Adjunct Research Fellow at James Cook University – AND – Craig Idso, Ph.D., Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change – AND – Fred Singer, Ph.D., President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project; contributing authors are Susan Crockford, Joseph D’Aleo, Indur Goklany, Sherwood Idso, Madhav Khandekar, Anthony Lupo, Willie Soon, and Mitch Taylor (© 2011, Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report, The Heartland Institute, <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/2011NIPCCinterimreport.pdf>)

Several years ago, Waggoner (1995) rhetorically asked: How much land can ten billion people spare for nature? That was the title of an essay he wrote to illuminate the dynamic tension between the need for land to support the agricultural enterprises that sustain mankind and the need for land to support the natural ecosystems that sustain all other creatures. As noted by Huang et al. (2002), human populations ―have encroached on almost all of the world‘s frontiers, leaving little new land that is cultivatable.‖ And in consequence of humanity‘s ongoing usurpation of this most basic of natural resources, Raven (2002) has noted ―species-area relationships, taken worldwide in relation to habitat destruction, lead to projections of the loss of fully two-thirds of all species on earth by the end of this century.‖ In addition, Wallace (2000) has calculated we will need to divert essentially all usable non-saline water on the face of the Earth to the agricultural enterprises that will be required to meet the food and fiber needs of humanity‘s growing numbers well before that. So what parts of the world are likely to be hit hardest by the great land-grabbing and water-consuming machine of humanity? Tilman et al. (2001) report developed countries are expected to withdraw large areas of land from farming between now and the middle of the century (2050), leaving developing countries to shoulder essentially all of the growing burden of feeding our expanding population. In addition, they calculate the loss of these countries‘ natural ecosystems to crops and pasture represent about half of all potentially suitable remaining land, which ―could lead to the loss of about a third of remaining tropical and temperate forests, savannas, and grasslands,‖ along with the many unique species they support. If one were to pick the most significant problem currently facing the biosphere, this would probably be it: a single species of life, Homo sapiens, is on course to annihilate two-thirds of the ten million or so other species with which we share the planet within the next several decades, simply by taking their land and water. Global warming, by comparison, pales in significance, as its impact is nowhere near as severe and in fact may be neutral or even positive. In addition, its chief cause is highly debated, and actions to thwart it are much more difficult, if not impossible, to define and implement. Furthermore, what many people believe to be the main cause of global warming—anthropogenic CO2 emissions—may actually be a powerful force for preserving land and water for nature. In an analysis of the problem of human land-use expansion, Tilman et al. (2002) introduced a few more facts before suggesting some solutions. They noted, for example, that by 2050 the human population of the globe is projected to be 50 percent larger than it was in 2000, and that global grain demand could double because of expected increases in per-capita real income and dietary shifts toward a higher proportion of meat. Hence, they stated the obvious when they concluded, ―raising yields on existing farmland is essential for ‗saving land for nature‘.‖ So how is it to be done? Tilman et al. (2002) suggested a strategy built around three essential tasks: (1) increasing crop yield per unit land area, (2) increasing crop yield per unit of nutrients applied, and (3) increasing crop yield per unit of water used. Regarding the first of these requirements, Tilman et al. note that in many parts of the world the historical rate of increase in crop yields is declining, as the genetic ceiling for maximal yield potential is being approached. This observation, in their words, ―highlights the need for efforts to steadily increase the yield potential ceiling.‖ With respect to the second requirement, they indicate, ―without the use of synthetic fertilizers, world food production could not have increased at the rate it did [in the past] and more natural ecosystems would have been converted to agriculture.‖ Hence, they state the solution ―will require significant increases in nutrient use efficiency, that is, in cereal production per unit of added nitrogen, phosphorus,‖ and so forth. Finally, as to the third requirement, Tilman et al. remind us ―water is regionally scarce,‖ and ―many countries in a band from China through India and Pakistan, and the Middle East to North Africa either currently or will soon fail to have adequate water to maintain per capita food production from irrigated land.‖ Increasing crop water use efficiency, therefore, is also a must. Although the impending biological crisis and several important elements of its potential solution are thus well defined, Tilman et al. (2001) noted ―even the best available technologies, fully deployed, cannot prevent many of the forecasted problems. This was also the conclusion of Idso and Idso (2000), who stated that although ―expected advances in agricultural technology and expertise will significantly increase the food production potential of many countries and regions,‖ these advances ―will not increase production fast enough to meet the demands of the even faster-growing human population of the planet. Fortunately, we have a powerful ally in the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content that can provide what we can‘t. Since atmospheric CO2 is the basic ―food‖ of essentially all plants, the more of it there is in the air, the bigger and better they grow. For a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 concentration, for example, the productivity of Earth‘s herbaceous plants rises by 30 to 50 percent (Kimball, 1983; Idso and Idso, 1994), and the productivity of its woody plants rises by 50 to 80 percent or more (Saxe et al. 1998; Idso and Kimball, 2001). Hence, as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, the land use efficiency of the planet will rise right along with it. In addition, atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically increases plant nutrient use efficiency and plant water use efficiency. Thus, with respect to all three of the major needs identified by Tilman et al. (2002), increases in the air‘s CO2 content pay huge dividends, helping to increase agricultural output without the taking of new land and water from nature.

[if necessary]

#### nuke war causes extinction, turns environment

#### Starr 12 [Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,” <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/>]

In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke. This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block most sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth . The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict 40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death. A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be a mass extinction event that would wipe out many animals living at the top of the food chains - including human beings.

### Ext 1--CO2 Ag--Link 2NC (:45/1:00

#### link outweighs the turn—Co2 solves everything—including earthworms and ozone

raises productivity by one-third—even greater in regions under stressful and resource limited conditions—solves:

drought

soil salinity

high and low temperature stress

low light intensity

oxidative stress

herbivore stress

enhanced nitrogen use efficiency

longer residence time of carbon

more earthworms

reduces impact of ozone pollution

**NIPCC**, Nongovernment International Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED, Craig Idso, S. Fred Singer, Warren Anderson, J.Scott Armstrong, Dennis Avery, Franco Battaglia, Robert Carter, Piers Corbyn, Richard Courtney, Joseph d’Aleo, Don Easterbrook, Fred Goldberg, Vicent Gray, Williams Gray, Kesten Green, Kenneth Haapala, David Hagen, Richard Alan Keen, adhav Khandekar, William Kininmonth, Hans Labohm, Anthony Lupo, Howard Maccabee, M.Michael MOgil, Christopher Monckton, Lubos Motl, Stephen Murgatroyd, Nicola Scafetta, Harrison Schmitt, Tom Segalstad, George Taylor, Dick Thoenes, Anton Uriarte Gerd Weber, 20**09**, p. 6-7.

Chapter 7. Biological Effects of Carbon Dioxide Enhancement • A 300-ppm increase in the air’s CO2 content typically raises the productivity of most herbaceous plants by about one-third; and this positive response occurs in plants that utilize all three of the major biochemical pathways (C3, C4, CAM) of photosynthesis. For woody plants, the response is even greater. The productivity benefits of CO2 enrichment are also experienced by aquatic plants, including freshwater algae and macrophytes, and marine microalgae and macroalgae. • The amount of carbon plants gain per unit of water lost—or water-use efficiency—typically rises as the CO2 content of the air rises, greatly increasing their ability to withstand drought. In addition, the CO2-induced percentage increase in plant biomass production is often greater under water-stressed conditions than it is when plants are well watered. • Atmospheric CO2 enrichment helps ameliorate the detrimental effects of several environmental stresses on plant growth and development, including high soil salinity, high air temperature, low light intensity and low levels of soil fertility. Elevated levels of CO2 have additionally been demonstrated to reduce the severity of low temperature stress, oxidative stress, and the stress of herbivory. In fact, the percentage growth enhancement produced by an increase in the air’s CO2 concentration is often even greater under stressful and resource-limited conditions than it is when growing conditions are ideal. • As the air’s CO2 content continues to rise, plants will likely exhibit enhanced rates of photosynthesis and biomass production that will not be diminished by any global warming that might occur concurrently. In fact, if the ambient air temperature rises, the growth-promoting effects of atmospheric CO2 enrichment will likely also rise, becoming more and more robust. • The ongoing rise in the air’s CO2 content likely will not favor the growth of weedy species over that of crops and native plants. • The growth of plants is generally not only enhanced by CO2-induced increases in net photosynthesis during the light period of the day, it is also enhanced by CO2-induced decreases in respiration during the dark period. • The ongoing rise in the air’s CO2 content, as well as any degree of warming that might possibly accompany it, will not materially alter the rate of decomposition of the world’s soil organic matter and will probably enhance biological carbon sequestration. Continued increases in the air’s CO2 concentration and temperature will not result in massive losses of carbon from earth’s peatlands. To the contrary, these environmental changes—if they persist—would likely work together to enhance carbon capture. • Other biological effects of CO2 enhancement include enhanced plant nitrogen-use efficiency, longer residence time of carbon in the soil, and increased populations of earthworms and soil nematodes. • The aerial fertilization effect of the ongoing rise in the air’s CO2 concentration (which greatly enhances vegetative productivity) and its antitranspiration effect (which enhances plant wateruse efficiency and enables plants to grow in areas that were once too dry for them) are stimulating plant growth across the globe in places that previously were too dry or otherwise unfavorable for plant growth, leading to a significant greening of the Earth. • Elevated CO2 reduces, and nearly always overrides, the negative effects of ozone pollution on plant photosynthesis, growth and yield. It also reduces atmospheric concentrations of isoprene, a highly reactive non-methane hydrocarbon that is emitted in copious quantities by vegetation and is responsible for the production of vast amounts of tropospheric ozone.

#### earthworms solve extinction

Balfour ’99 [Eve, Farmer & Ag Expert, “Harnessing the Earthworm,” http://journeytoforever.org/farm\_library/oliver/balfour\_intro.html]

When, in connection with my work for the Soil Association, I have lectured on world soil erosion and the imperative need to restore, maintain and if possible increase the vitality of what soil is left, people often say, 'I realize the situation is appalling, but what can I do?' I feel this book at last contains a practical answer to that question. 'Feed earthworms.' This answer may sound flippant. I don't think you will think so when you have read this book. The technique is easy, and involves much less work than ordinary compost-making, and in all seriousness I suggest that if everyone turned his attention to increasing the earthworm population (and there is no one who cannot do this, for it can be done even in a flower-pot or window-box) it might be the key to the survival of the human race, because through utilizing all organic wastes to feed earthworms and then deliberately putting them to work in the manner here described, it might be possible not only vastly to increase the fertility and productivity of the land already under cultivation, but also to arrest the further advance of deserts and dustbowls. This would give humanity a breathing space in which to learn how to bring other creative forces into play, so that water and life and the capacity to sustain vegetation may ultimately be restored to all the man-made deserts of the earth.

#### ozone collapse causes extinction

David Crockett **Williams 96**, Jr., author of Tetron Natural Unified Field Theory, Chemist, Personal and Financial Agent. February 7, 1996 THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRITUAL REVOLUTION http://www.angelfire.com/on/GEAR2000/video96.html

Today all life on earth is threatened by many problems associated with the materialistic and shortsighted human activities out of harmony with nature that have led to an oxygen crisis from massive deforestation and fossil fuel combustion which has created global warming responsible for increased weather extremes, flooding, droughts, disease vectors, etc., and an ozone layer depletion that threatens all life on earth by the imminent destruction of the ocean's phytoplankton which produce over half of earth's oxygen and form the beginning of the oceanic food chain. Nuclear testing has caused lasting increases in seismic and volcanic activity, explainable by free energy science, which threatens cataclysmic earth changes. The danger of nuclear conflagration still exists. All these conditions have been predicted independently by many different religious prophecies since many hundreds of years ago. How can this be understood and resolved?

### CO2 Ag Link: Production 2NC

#### CO2 will boost food production by fifty percent over the next 40 years

Dr. Craig D. **Idso**, ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE YEAR 2050: WILL WE PRODUCE ENOUGH TO ADEQUATELY FEED THE WORLD, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, 6—15—**11**, p. 15-17.

The results of the world food supply calculations are contained in Table 3. Column one lists the forty-five crops that provided 95% of the total food production of all the planet’s agricultural enterprises over the period 1995-2009, the individual percentage contributions of which (listed in column 2) are assumed will remain constant to the year 2050. The third column lists the linear regression-based modeled production values of these crops in 2009. The fourth column lists the production values of the crops projected for the year 2050 on the basis of techno-intel-induced enhancements of the agricultural enterprise, as calculated in the previous section of this paper; while the fifth column lists the techno-intel production values plus enhancements due to the increase in the air’s CO2 content expected to occur between 2009 and 2050. Summing the food production contributions reported in columns three, four and five, it can be seen that for the world as a whole, total food production is estimated to increase by 34.5% between 2009 and 2050 due to the techno-intel effect alone, but that it will increase by 51.5% due to the combined consequences of the techno-intel effect and the CO2 aerial fertilization effect. Both of these percentage increases, however, fall far short of the estimated 70 to 100 percent increase in agricultural production needed to feed the planet’s growing population by the year 2050, as per the calculations of Bruinsma (2009), Parry and Hawkesford (2010) and Zhu et al. (2010).

### CO2 Ag Link: Photosynthesis 2NC

#### CO2 boosts plant photosynthesis

Craig D. **Idso** PhD and Sherwood B. Idso, PhD, CARBON DIOXIDE AND EARTH’S FUTURE: PURSUING THE PRUDENT PATH, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, 2—2—**11**, p. 87.

With respect to rising temperatures and their effect on photosynthesis, Kirschbaum states that “all plants appear to be capable of a degree of adaptation to growth conditions,” noting that “photosynthesis in some species can function adequately up to 50°C.” In fact, he says that “photosynthesis can acclimate considerably to actual growth conditions,” noting that “optimum temperatures for photosynthesis acclimate by about 0.5°C per 1.0°C change in effective growth temperature (Berry and Bjorkman, 1980; Battaglia et al., 1996).” This response, wherein plants adjust the workings of their photosynthetic apparatus to perform better at higher temperatures as temperatures rise, would appear to be especially beneficial in a warming world.

### CO2 Ag Link: A2 "CO2 Levels Adequate Now"

#### Plants were CO2 starved during glacial periods

Sherwood **Idso**, Keith Idso and Craig Idso, “Plants of Today (And Even More So of Tomorrow): Free at Last!” CO2 SCIENCE MAGAZINE v. 15 n. 23, 6—6—**12**, <http://co2science.org/articles/V15/N23/EDIT.php>, accessed 7-12-12.

In an illuminating Commentary article in a recent issue of New Phytologist, Tissue and Lewis (2012) write that "atmospheric CO2 over the past 800,000 years has varied generally as a function of glacial periods, with minima (c. 170-200 ppm) during glacial periods and maxima (c. 280-300 ppm) during inter-glacial periods," citing Luthi et al. (2008). More specifically, they indicate that "during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM, 18,000-20,000 years ago), atmospheric CO2 ranged from 180-200 ppm, which is approximately half the current CO2 (392 ppm), and among the lowest CO2 observed during the evolution of vascular land plants over the past 350 million years [italics and bold added]." Therefore, as the Beatles once musically lamented about temperature - "it's been a long cold lonely winter" - one could surely state the analogous about the atmosphere's long-term CO2 concentration; for as Tissue and Lewis continue ... "Glacial plants were severely carbon limited over a very long time period, until atmospheric CO2 began rising during the glacial-interglacial transition." In fact, they indicate that "controlled environment studies with modern plants grown in glacial CO2" have shown "significant carbon limitations on plant physiology even when other resources were generally not limiting [italics added]," citing Dippery et al. (1995) and Tissue et al. (1995). So in spite of anything one could have done to enhance their productivity (other than supply them with more CO2), glacial-age plants simply could not produce the bounty that today's plants do. In fact, they were fortunate to merely survive.

### a2 “SLR

#### Antarctic ice isn’t melting

**NIPCC**, Nongovernment International Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED, Craig Idso, S. Fred Singer, Warren Anderson, J.Scott Armstrong, Dennis Avery, Franco Battaglia, Robert Carter, Piers Corbyn, Richard Courtney, Joseph d’Aleo, Don Easterbrook, Fred Goldberg, Vicent Gray, Williams Gray, Kesten Green, Kenneth Haapala, David Hagen, Richard Alan Keen, adhav Khandekar, William Kininmonth, Hans Labohm, Anthony Lupo, Howard Maccabee, M.Michael MOgil, Christopher Monckton, Lubos Motl, Stephen Murgatroyd, Nicola Scafetta, Harrison Schmitt, Tom Segalstad, George Taylor, Dick Thoenes, Anton Uriarte Gerd Weber, 20**09**, p. 152-154.

Utilizing Special Sensor Microwave Imager (SSM/I) data obtained from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) for the period December 1987-December 1996, Watkins and Simmonds (2000) analyzed temporal trends in different measures of the sea ice that surrounds Antarctica, noting that “it has been suggested that the Antarctic sea ice may show high sensitivity to any anthropogenic increase in temperature,” and that most climate models predict that “any rise in surface temperature would result in a decrease in sea ice coverage.”

Contrary to what one would expect on the basis

of these predictions, the two scientists observed statistically significant increases in both sea ice area and sea ice extent over the period studied; and when they combined their results with results for the preceding period of 1978-1987, both parameters continued to show increases over the sum of the two periods (1978-1996). In addition, they determined that the 1990s also experienced increases in the length of the sea ice season.

Watkins and Simmonds’ findings, i.e., that Southern Ocean sea ice has increased in area, extent, and season length since at least 1978, are supported by other studies. Hanna (2001) published an updated analysis of Antarctic sea ice cover based on SSM/I data for the period October 1987-September 1999, finding the serial sea ice data depict “an ongoing slight but significant hemispheric increase of 3.7(±0.3)% in extent and 6.6(±1.5)% in area.” Parkinson (2002) utilized satellite passivemicrowave data to calculate and map the length of the sea-ice season throughout the Southern Ocean for each year of the period 1979-1999, finding that although there are opposing regional trends, a “much larger area of the Southern Ocean experienced an overall lengthening of the sea-ice season … than experienced a shortening.” Updating the analysis two years later for the period November 1978

through December 2002, Parkinson (2004) reported a linear increase in 12-month running means of Southern Ocean sea ice extent of 12,380 ± 1,730 km2 per year. Zwally et al. (2002) also utilized passivemicrowave satellite data to study Antarctic sea ice trends. Over the 20-year period 1979-1998, they report that the sea ice extent of the entire Southern Ocean increased by 11,181 ± 4,190 square km per year, or by 0.98 ± 0.37 percent per decade, while sea ice area increased by nearly the same amount: 10,860 ± 3,720 square km per year, or by 1.26 ± 0.43 percent per decade. They observed that the variability of monthly sea ice extent declined from 4.0 percent over the first 10 years of the record, to 2.7 percent over the last 10 years.

Yuan and Martinson (2000) analyzed Special SSM/I data together with data derived from brightness temperatures measured by the Nimbus-7 Scanning Multichannel Microwave Radiometer. Among other things, they determined that the mean trend in the latitudinal location of the Antarctic sea ice edge over the prior 18 years was an equatorward expansion of 0.011 degree of latitude per year. Vyas et al. (2003) analyzed data from the multichannel scanning microwave radiometer carried aboard India’s OCEANSAT-1 satellite for the period June 1999-May 2001, which they combined with data for the period 1978-1987 that were derived from space-based passive microwave radiometers carried aboard earlier Nimbus-5, Nimbus-7, and DMSP satellites to study secular trends in sea ice extent about Antarctica over the period 1978-2001. Their work revealed that the mean rate of change of sea ice extent for the entire Antarctic region over this period was an increase of 0.043 M km² per year. In fact, they concluded that “the increasing trend in the sea ice extent over the Antarctic region may be slowly accelerating in time, particularly over the last decade,” noting that the “continually increasing sea ice extent over the Antarctic Southern Polar Ocean, along with the observed decreasing trends in Antarctic ice surface temperature (Comiso, 2000) over the last two decades, is paradoxical in the global warming scenario resulting from increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.”

In a somewhat similar study, Cavalieri et al. (2003) extended prior satellite-derived Antarctic sea ice records several years by bridging the gap between Nimbus 7 and earlier Nimbus 5 satellite datasets with National Ice Center digital sea ice data, finding that sea ice extent about the continent increased at a mean rate of 0.10 ± 0.05 x 106 km² per decade between 1977 and 2002. Likewise, Liu et al. (2004) used sea ice concentration data retrieved from the scanning multichannel microwave radiometer on the Nimbus 7 satellite and the spatial sensor microwave/imager on several defense meteorological satellites to develop a quality-controlled history of Antarctic sea ice variability covering the period 1979-2002, which includes different states of the Antarctic Oscillation and several ENSO events, after which they evaluated total sea ice extent and area trends by means of linear least-squares regression. They found that “overall, the total Antarctic sea ice extent (the cumulative area of grid boxes covering at least 15% ice concentrations) has shown an increasing trend (~4,801 km²/yr).” In addition, they determined that “the total Antarctic sea ice area (the cumulative area of the ocean actually covered by at least 15% ice concentrations) has increased significantly by ~13,295 km²/yr, exceeding the 95% confidence level,” noting that “the upward trends in the total ice extent and area are robust for different cutoffs of 15, 20, and 30% ice concentrations (used to define the ice extent and area).”

Elderfield and Rickaby (2000) concluded that the sea ice cover of the Southern Ocean during glacial periods may have been as much as double the coverage of modern winter ice, suggesting that “by restricting communication between the ocean and atmosphere, sea ice expansion also provides a mechanism for reduced CO2 release by the Southern Ocean and lower glacial atmospheric CO2.” Three papers on Antarctic sea ice were published in 2008. Laine (2008) determined 1981-2000 trends of Antarctic sea-ice concentration and extent, based on the Scanning Multichannel Microwave Radiometer (SSMR) and SSM/I for the spring-summer period of November/December/ January. These analyses were carried out for the continent as a whole, as well as five longitudinal sectors emanating from the south pole: 20°E-90°E, 90°E-160°E, 160°E-130°W, 130°W-60°W, and 60°W-20°E. Results indicated that “the sea ice concentration shows slight increasing trends in most sectors, where the sea ice extent trends seem to be near zero.” Laine also reports that “the Antarctic region as a whole and all the sectors separately show slightly positive spring-summer albedo trends.”

Comiso and Nishio (2008) set out to provide updated and improved estimates of trends in Arctic and Antarctic sea ice cover for the period extending from November 1978 to December 2006, based on data obtained from the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer (AMSR-E), the SSM/I, and the SMMR, where the data from the last two instruments were adjusted to be consistent with the AMSR-E data. Their findings indicate that sea ice extent and area in the Antarctic grew by +0.9 ± 0.2 and +1.7 ± 0.3 percent per decade, respectively.

A study that “extends the analyses of the sea ice time series reported by Zwally et al. (2002) from 20 years (1979-1998) to 28 years (1979-2006)” by Cavalieri and Parkinson (2008) derived new linear trends of Antarctic sea ice extent and area based on satellite-borne passive microwave radiometer data. Results indicate “the total Antarctic sea ice extent trend increased slightly, from 0.96 ± 0.61 percent per decade to 1.0 ± 0.4 percent per decade, from the 20- to 28-year period,” noting the latter trend is significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

Corresponding numbers for the Antarctic sea ice area trend were 1.2 ± 0.7 percent per decade and 1.2 ± 0.5 percent per decade. Both sets of results indicate a “tightening up” of the two relationships: Over the last eight years of the study period, both the extent and area of Antarctic sea ice have continued to increase, with the former parameter increasing at a more rapid rate than it did over the 1979-1998 period.

### Defense: Volcanoes – Frontline

#### Probability is low, humans have empirically survived.

#### Robert Roy Britt 05 March 8, Live Science, “Super Volcano Will Challenge Civilization, Geologists Warn” http://www.livescience.com/environment/050308\_super\_volcano.html

The odds of a globally destructive volcano explosion in any given century are extremely low, and no scientist can say when the next one will occur. But the chances are five to 10 times greater than a globally destructive asteroid impact, according to the new British report. The next super eruption, whenever it occurs, might not be the first one humans have dealt with. About 74,000 years ago, in what is now Sumatra, a volcano called Toba blew with a force estimated at 10,000 times that of Mount St. Helens. Ash darkened the sky all around the planet. Temperatures plummeted by up to 21 degrees at higher latitudes, according to research by Michael Rampino, a biologist and geologist at New York University. Rampino has estimated three-quarters of the plant species in the Northern Hemisphere perished. Stanley Ambrose, an anthropologist at the University of Illinois, suggested in 1998 that Rampino's work might explain a curious bottleneck in human evolution: The blueprints of life for all humans -- DNA -- are remarkably similar given that our species branched off from the rest of the primate family tree a few million years ago. Ambrose has said early humans were perhaps pushed to the edge of extinction after the Toba eruption -- around the same time folks got serious about art and tool making. Perhaps only a few thousand survived. Humans today would all be descended from these few,

### Ext 2--Ice Age 2NC

#### NEXT, Ice Age

#### Emissions solve ice age

**PERISCOPE POST**, “Human Carbon Emissions Have Averted Ice Age, Say Scientists, But Global Warming Dangers Remain,” 1—9—**12**, npg.

Scientists have published research suggesting human carbon emissions will prevent the next ice age. The news is likely to infuriate environmentalists while enthusing groups who oppose limiting carbon emissions. The advent of the next ice age is already behind schedule, reported The Telegraph: "Typically there is a period of about 11,000 years between ice ages, and with the last one ending 11,600 years ago the arrival of the next already appears overdue." Researchers suggested that this delay is due to the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. So if global warming is keeping us from freezing over, does that mean it's actually a good thing? Nothing new. Andrew C. Revkin reported for The New York Times Dot Earth blog that there is already a large body of scientific literature on the subject of whether greenhouse gases are preventing a big freeze. Revkin spoke to several researchers in the field on the matter, most of whom concluded that what's new about the latest study is the way in which those involved have calculated the "interglacials", which are the warmer periods between ice ages.

### Ext 2--Ice Age (A2 "NAC Shutdowm")

#### IPCC says it won’t happen

Walter **Gibbs**, “Scientists Back Off Theory of a Colder Europe in a Warming Period,” NEW YORK TIMES, 5—16—**07**, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/health/16iht-sncold.1.5737461.html

OSLO, Norway — Mainstream climatologists who have feared that global warming could have the paradoxical effect of cooling northwestern Europe or even plunging it into a small ice age have stopped worrying about that particular disaster, although it retains a vivid hold on the public imagination. The idea, which held climate theorists in its icy grip for years, was that the North Atlantic Current, an extension of the Gulf Stream that cuts northeast across the Atlantic Ocean to bathe the high latitudes of Europe with warmish equatorial water, could shut down in a greenhouse world. Without that warm-water current, Americans on the Eastern Seaboard would most likely feel a chill, but the suffering would be greater in Europe, where major cities lie far to the north. Britain, northern France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway could in theory take on Arctic aspects that only a Greenlander could love, even as the rest of the world sweltered. All that has now been removed from the forecast. Not only is northern Europe warming, but every major climate model produced by scientists worldwide in recent years has also shown that the warming will almost certainly continue. "The concern had previously been that we were close to a threshold where the Atlantic circulation system would stop," said Susan Solomon, a senior scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. "We now believe we are much farther from that threshold, thanks to improved modeling and ocean measurements. The Gulf Stream and the North Atlantic Current are more stable than previously thought." After consulting 23 climate models, the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change said in February it was "very unlikely" that the crucial flow of warm water to Europe would stall in this century. The panel did say that the gradual melting of the Greenland ice sheet along with increased precipitation in the far north were likely to weaken the North Atlantic Current by 25 percent through 2100. But the panel added that any cooling effect in Europe would be overwhelmed by a general warming of the atmosphere, a warming that the panel said was under way as a result of rising concentrations of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases. "The bottom line is that the atmosphere is warming up so much that a slowdown of the North Atlantic Current will never be able to cool Europe," said Helge Drange, a professor at the Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center in Bergen, Norway.

#### not enough ice in the entire northen hemisphere

Dr. Curt **Stager**, Biology and Geology, DEEP FUTURE, 20**11**, p. 17-19.

But wait. Isn't global warming supposed to trigger the next ice age? Isn't that what we saw happen in the apocalyptic enviro-thriller movie The Day After Tomorrow, in which the greenhouse effect suddenly shuts down climatically important ocean currents in the North Atlantic and triggers a superglaciation? The movie isn't totally wrong, in that the warm Gulf Stream really does help to keep northwestern Europe from becoming cooler than it already is. It's part of a huge global conveyor belt system of intercon­nected currents that draws solar-heated tropical water into the cold sur­face of the North Atlantic, where it cools off and then sinks for a deep return journey southward. Some scientists worry that future climatic changes could disrupt that conveyor and trigger a sudden regional cool­ing; hence the movie scene in which a fierce wind seizes Manhattan with remorseless fangs of frost. But as gripping as that storyline is, serious questions remain about the real role of the conveyor in past and future climate change. The engine driving the conveyor goes by several dry technical names, most recently the meridional overturning circulation, or MOC. It is also sometimes called THC, an abbreviation that is in no way connected to marijuana smoking (and tetrahydrocannabinol) but rather, re­flects the upgrading of a simpler concept, that of thermohaline circulation, whose basic premise is that changes in temperature and saltiness drive major circulation currents of the oceans. Warm water on the surfaces of the tropical oceans loses moisture to evaporation, which makes it saltier than average seawater. When the Gulf Stream ﬂows from the hot latitudes between West Africa and the Caribbean into the cooler North Atlantic. it doesn't easily mix with those northern waters because its tropical heat content makes it less dense (warming makes both water and air expand). But the Gulf Stream gradu- ally releases much of that heat into the cooler air over the North Atlantic. and when it ﬁnally does chill down its extra load of salt leaves it denser than usual. That extra density makes some of the Gulf Stream water sink be- neath the surface and continue its riverlike meanderings at greater depths. By the time it resurfaces, the deep ﬂow has wormed its way around the southern tip of Africa and entered the Indian and Paciﬁc oceans. Back on the surface again, the current recurves back across those oceans, rounds the tip of South Africa, and returns to the North Atlantic, picking up new loads of equatorial warmth along the way. Additional branches also oper- ate in the Southern Ocean and Arabian Sea, adding extra loops to the tortuous path of the global conveyor. There’s a lot more to the picture than that, however, and when illustrations of this common version of the THC concept appear in professional slide presentations, they can become what one speaker at a recent meeting of the British Royal Society called “oceanographer detectors," because they make specialists in the audience "go visibly pale at the vast oversimpliﬁcation." The THC model is not so much wrong as incomplete. Most sci- entists have now switched the focus of ocean-climate discussions to the more comprehensive MOC formulation because temperature and salin- ity aren't the only drivers of ocean currents after all; winds and tides are at least as inﬂuential. THC-style flow does occur, but midlatitude westerly winds and tropical easterly trades do much of the actual push- ing. So why does marine MOC aﬂ’ect climate? As heat rises into the air from the Gulf Stream, it warms the westerly winds that blow toward Europe. Without those ocean-tempered winds, London might be as cold as . . . well, look at a map to see what lies at the same latitude on the op- posite side of the Atlantic, and you'll ﬁnd snowy Labrador. With this basic introduction to the topic, you're already well enough equipped to take a pot shot at The Day After Tomorrow. The pre- vailing winds over Manhattan blow offshore toward the Atlantic, not from it, so why should a Gulf Stream shutdown freeze the city? The ﬁlm also unrealistically subjects Europe to severe winter conditions year- round. Even if it really did become a climatic equivalent of Labrador, northern Europe would still warm up quite a bit in summer, just as Lab- rador does. In reality, a MOC slowdown alone couldn’t turn Europe into a climatic twin of Labrador because it lies downwind of a temperature- modulating ocean rather than the interior of a continent. And because prevailing winds spin the North Atlantic surface current system clock- wise regardless of what the salinity or temperature of the water is, some version of the Gulf Stream will exist as long as these winds continue to blow over it. Although some computer models do simulate moderate conveyor slowdowns in a warmer future, a truly severe disruption would require extremely large ﬂoods of freshwater to pour into the sea, presumably from the melting of land-based ice. lf, say, a major ice sheet were to slide oﬂ’ into the North Atlantic where some critical sinking zone is operating, then perhaps it might cap the ocean off with dilute, buoyant meltwater. ln i999, oceanographer Wallace Broecker published a striking theo- retical description of just such a total MOC collapse under perfect-storm conditions. Tundra replaces Scandinavian forests. Ireland becomes the cli- matic equivalent of Spitsbergen, an island in the Norwegian Arctic. When climate modelers working at Britain's Hadley Center several years ago told 1 their computers to "kill the MOC," the virtual air outside their lab cooled by 8°F (5°C) within ten years, at least on the digital screen. But Broecker maintains that such a scenario is unlikely today, be- cause those theoretical events only played out in a world that had already been cooled by a prolonged ice age. Nowadays, however, we don't have nearly enough readily meltable ice left in the Northern Hemisphere to do the job. To reset that stage we'd have to cover Canada, northern and cen- tral Europe, and Scandinavia with thick ice caps, and that would require colder, rather than warmer, conditions in the future.

#### earth spin and tides solve

Marlo **Lewis**, senior fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Scare Mongering as Journalism: A Commentary on Time’s “Special Report” on Global Warming,” 4—28—**06**, <http://cei.org/pdf/5288.pdf>

Comment: Speculation that global warming could shut down the Gulf Stream, a wind driven system that transports equatorial warmth to Northern Europe, has no scientific merit. The Gulf Stream is energized primarily by the Earth’s spin and secondarily by the lunar tides, not salinity levels in the oceans. This means, as MIT atmospheric physicist Karl Wunsch put it, that the Gulf Stream is safe as long as the Earth turns and the wind blows.

### feedbacks

#### DMS is unaccounted for by their models, checks any warming

**NIPCC**, Nongovernment International Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED, Craig Idso, S. Fred Singer, Warren Anderson, J.Scott Armstrong, Dennis Avery, Franco Battaglia, Robert Carter, Piers Corbyn, Richard Courtney, Joseph d’Aleo, Don Easterbrook, Fred Goldberg, Vicent Gray, Williams Gray, Kesten Green, Kenneth Haapala, David Hagen, Richard Alan Keen, adhav Khandekar, William Kininmonth, Hans Labohm, Anthony Lupo, Howard Maccabee, M.Michael MOgil, Christopher Monckton, Lubos Motl, Stephen Murgatroyd, Nicola Scafetta, Harrison Schmitt, Tom Segalstad, George Taylor, Dick Thoenes, Anton Uriarte Gerd Weber, 20**09**, p. 45-47.

More than two decades ago, Charlson et al. (1987) discussed the plausibility of a multi-stage negative feedback process, whereby warming-induced increases in the emission of dimethyl sulfide (DMS) from the world’s oceans tend to counteract any initial impetus for warming. The basic tenet of their hypothesis was that the global radiation balance is significantly influenced by the albedo of marine stratus clouds (the greater the cloud albedo, the less the input of solar radiation to the earth’s surface). The albedo of these clouds, in turn, is known to be a function of cloud droplet concentration (the more and smaller the cloud droplets, the greater the cloud albedo and the reflection of solar radiation), which is dependent upon the availability of cloud condensation nuclei on which the droplets form (the more cloud condensation nuclei, the more and smaller the cloud droplets). And in completing the negative feedback loop, Charlson et al. noted that the cloud condensation nuclei concentration often depends upon the flux of biologically produced DMS from the world’s oceans (the higher the sea surface temperature, the greater the sea-to-air flux of DMS). Since the publication of Charlson et al.’s initial hypothesis, much empirical evidence has been gathered in support of its several tenets. One review, for example, states that “major links in the feedback chain proposed by Charlson et al. (1987) have a sound physical basis,” and that there is “compelling observational evidence to suggest that DMS and its atmospheric products participate significantly in processes of climate regulation and reactive atmospheric chemistry in the remote marine boundary layer of the Southern Hemisphere” (Ayers and Gillett, 2000). But just how strong is the negative feedback phenomenon proposed by Charlson et al.? Is it powerful enough to counter the threat of greenhouse gas-induced global warming? According to the findings of Sciare et al. (2000), it may well be able to do just that. In examining 10 years of DMS data from Amsterdam Island in the southern Indian Ocean, these researchers found that a sea surface temperature increase of only 1°C was sufficient to increase the atmospheric DMS concentration by as much as 50 percent. This finding suggests that the degree of warming typically predicted to accompany a doubling of the air’s CO2 content would increase the atmosphere’s DMS concentration by a factor of three or more, providing what they call a “very important” negative feedback that could potentially offset the original impetus for warming. Other research has shown that this same chain of events can be set in motion by means of phenomena not discussed in Charlson et al.’s original hypothesis. Simo and Pedros-Alio (1999), for example, discovered that the depth of the surface mixing-layer has a substantial influence on DMS yield in the short term, via a number of photo-induced (and thereby mixing-depth mediated) influences on several complex physiological phenomena, as do longer-term seasonal variations in vertical mixing, via their influence on seasonal planktonic succession scenarios and food-web structure. More directly supportive of Charlson et al.’s hypothesis was the study of Kouvarakis and Mihalopoulos (2002), who measured seasonal variations of gaseous DMS and its oxidation products—non-sea-salt sulfate (nss-SO4 2-) and methanesulfonic acid (MSA)—at a remote coastal location in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea from May 1997 through October 1999, as well as the diurnal variation of DMS during two intensive measurement campaigns conducted in September 1997. In the seasonal investigation, DMS concentrations tracked sea surface temperature (SST) almost perfectly, going from a low of 0.87 nmol m-3 in the winter to a high of 3.74 nmol m-3 in the summer. Such was also the case in the diurnal studies: DMS concentrations were lowest when it was coldest (just before sunrise), rose rapidly as it warmed thereafter to about 1100, after which they dipped slightly and then experienced a further rise to the time of maximum temperature at 2000, whereupon a decline in both temperature and DMS concentration set in that continued until just before sunrise. Consequently, because concentrations of DMS and its oxidation products (MSA and nss- SO4 2-) rise dramatically in response to both diurnal and seasonal increases in SST, there is every reason to believe that the same negative feedback phenomenon would operate in the case of the longterm warming that could arise from increasing greenhouse gas concentrations, and that it could substantially mute the climatic impacts of those gases. Also of note in this regard, Baboukas et al. (2002) report the results of nine years of measurements of methanesulfonate (MS-), an exclusive oxidation product of DMS, in rainwater at Amsterdam Island. Their data, too, revealed “a well distinguished seasonal variation with higher values in summer, in line with the seasonal variation of its gaseous precursor (DMS),” which, in their words, “further confirms the findings of Sciare et al. (2000).” In addition, the MS- anomalies in the rainwater were found to be closely related to SST anomalies; and Baboukas et al. say this observation provides even more support for “the existence of a positive oceanatmosphere feedback on the biogenic sulfur cycle above the Austral Ocean, one of the most important DMS sources of the world.” In a newer study of this phenomenon, Toole and Siegel (2004) note that it has been shown to operate as described above in the 15 percent of the world’s oceans “consisting primarily of high latitude, continental shelf, and equatorial upwelling regions,” where DMS may be accurately predicted as a function of the ratio of the amount of surface chlorophyll derived from satellite observations to the depth of the climatological mixed layer, which they refer to as the “bloom-forced regime.” For the other 85 percent of the world’s marine waters, they demonstrate that modeled surface DMS concentrations are independent of chlorophyll and are a function of the mixed layer depth alone, which they call the “stress-forced regime.” So how does the warming-induced DMS negative feedback cycle operate in these waters? For oligotrophic regimes, Toole and Siegel find that “DMS biological production rates are negatively or insignificantly correlated with phytoplankton and bacterial indices for abundance and productivity while more than 82 percent of the variability is explained by UVR(325) [ultraviolet radiation at 325 nm].” This relationship, in their words, is “consistent with recent laboratory results (e.g., Sunda et al., 2002),” who demonstrated that intracellular DMS concentration and its biological precursors (particulate and dissolved dimethylsulfoniopropionate) “dramatically increase under conditions of acute oxidative stress such as exposure to high levels of UVR,” which “are a function of mixed layer depth.” These results—which Toole and Siegel confirmed via an analysis of the Dacey et al. (1998) 1992-1994 organic sulfur time-series that was sampled in concert with the U.S. JGOFS Bermuda Atlantic Time-Series Study (Steinberg et al., 2001)—suggest, in their words, “the potential of a global change-DMS-climate feedback.” Specifically, they say that “UVR doses will increase as a result of observed decreases in stratospheric ozone and the shoaling of ocean mixed layers as a result of global warming (e.g., Boyd and Doney, 2002),” and that “in response, open-ocean phytoplankton communities should increase their DMS production and ventilation to the atmosphere, increasing cloud condensing nuclei, and potentially playing out a coupled global change-DMS-climate feedback.” This second DMS-induced negative-feedback cycle, which operates over 85 percent of the world’s marine waters and complements the first DMSinduced negative-feedback cycle, which operates over the other 15 percent, is another manifestation of the capacity of earth’s biosphere to regulate its affairs in such a way as to maintain climatic conditions over the vast majority of the planet’s surface within bounds conducive to the continued existence of life, in all its variety and richness. In addition, it has been suggested that a DMS-induced negative climate feedback phenomenon also operates over the terrestrial surface of the globe, where the volatilization of reduced sulfur gases from soils may be just as important as marine DMS emissions in enhancing cloud albedo (Idso, 1990). On the basis of experiments that showed soil DMS emissions to be positively correlated with soil organic matter content, for example, and noting that additions of organic matter to a soil tend to increase the amount of sulfur gases emitted therefrom, Idso (1990) hypothesized that because atmospheric CO2 is an effective aerial fertilizer, augmenting its atmospheric concentration and thereby increasing vegetative inputs of organic matter to earth’s soils should also produce an impetus for cooling, even in the absence of surface warming. Nevertheless, and in spite of the overwhelming empirical evidence for both land- and ocean-based DMS-driven negative feedbacks to global warming, the effects of these processes have not been fully incorporated into today’s state-of-the-art climate models. Hence, the warming they predict in response to future anthropogenic CO2 emissions must be considerably larger than what could actually occur in the real world. It is very possible these biologically driven phenomena could entirely compensate for the warming influence of all greenhouse gas emissions experienced to date, as well as all those anticipated to occur in the future.

#### ocean convection creates Co2 thermostat--

**NIPCC**, Nongovernment International Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED, Craig Idso, S. Fred Singer, Warren Anderson, J.Scott Armstrong, Dennis Avery, Franco Battaglia, Robert Carter, Piers Corbyn, Richard Courtney, Joseph d’Aleo, Don Easterbrook, Fred Goldberg, Vicent Gray, Williams Gray, Kesten Green, Kenneth Haapala, David Hagen, Richard Alan Keen, adhav Khandekar, William Kininmonth, Hans Labohm, Anthony Lupo, Howard Maccabee, M.Michael MOgil, Christopher Monckton, Lubos Motl, Stephen Murgatroyd, Nicola Scafetta, Harrison Schmitt, Tom Segalstad, George Taylor, Dick Thoenes, Anton Uriarte Gerd Weber, 20**09**, p. 27-28.

Based on data obtained from the Tropical Ocean Global Atmosphere—Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Response Experiment, Sud et al. (1999) demonstrated that deep convection in the tropics acts as a thermostat to keep sea surface temperature (SST) oscillating between approximately 28° and 30°C. Their analysis suggests that as SSTs reach 28°-29°C, the cloud-base airmass is charged with the moist static energy needed for clouds to reach the upper troposphere, at which point the cloud cover reduces the amount of solar radiation received at the surface of the sea, while cool and dry downdrafts promote ocean surface cooling by increasing sensible and latent heat fluxes there. This “thermostat-like c

ontrol,” as Sud et al. describe it, tends “to ventilate the tropical ocean efficiently and help contain the SST between 28°-30°C.” The phenomenon would also be expected to prevent SSTs from rising any higher in response to enhanced CO2-induced radiative forcing. Lindzen et al. (2001) used upper-level cloudiness data obtained from the Japanese Geostationary Meteorological Satellite and SST data obtained from the National Centers for Environmental Prediction to derive a strong inverse relationship between upperlevel cloud area and the mean SST of cloudy regions of the eastern part of the western Pacific (30°S-30°N; 130°E-170°W), such that the area of cirrus cloud coverage normalized by a measure of the area of cumulus coverage decreases about 22 percent per degree C increase in the SST of the cloudy region. In describing this phenomenon, Lindzen et al. say “the cloudy-moist region appears to act as an infrared adaptive iris that opens up and closes down the regions free of upper-level clouds, which more effectively permit infrared cooling, in such a manner as to resist changes in tropical surface temperature.” The findings of Lindzen et al. were subsequently criticized by Hartmann and Michelsen (2002) and Fu et al. (2002), and then Fu et al. were rebutted by Chou et al. (2002), an exchange that is summarized in Section 1.2 of this report. The debate over the infrared adaptive iris still rages in the scientific community, but Lindzen and his colleagues are not the only scientists who believe the cooling effect of clouds has been underestimated. Croke et al. (1999) used land-based observations of cloud cover for three regions of the United States (coastal southwest, coastal northeast, and southern plains) to demonstrate that, over the period 1900- 1987, cloud cover had a high correlation with global air temperature, with mean cloud cover rising from an initial value of 35 percent to a final value of 47 percent as the mean global air temperature rose by 0.5°C. Herman et al. (2001) used Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer 380-nm reflectivity data to determine changes in radiation reflected back to space over the period 1979 to 1992, finding that “when the 11.3-year solar-cycle and ENSO effects are removed from the time series, the zonally averaged annual linear-fit trends show that there have been increases in reflectivity (cloudiness) poleward of 40°N and 30°S, with some smaller but significant changes occurring in the equatorial and lower middle latitudes.” The overall long-term effect was an increase in radiation reflected back to space of 2.8 Wm-2 per decade, which represents a large cloud-induced cooling influence. Rosenfeld (2000) used satellite data obtained from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission to look for terrestrial analogues of the cloud trails that form in the wakes of ships at sea as a consequence of their emissions of particulates that redistribute cloud-water into larger numbers of smaller droplets that do not rain out of the atmosphere as readily as they would in the absence of this phenomenon. Visualizations produced from the mission data clearly revealed the existence of enhanced cloud trails downwind of urban and industrial complexes in Turkey, Canada, and Australia, to which Rosenfeld gave the name pollution tracks in view of their similarity to ship tracks. Rosenfeld also demonstrated that the clouds comprising these pollution tracks were composed of droplets of reduced size that did indeed suppress precipitation by inhibiting further coalescence and ice precipitation formation. As Toon (2000) noted in a commentary on this study, these smaller droplets will not “rain out” as quickly and will therefore last longer and cover more of the earth, both of which effects tend to cool the globe. In summation, as the earth warms, the atmosphere has a tendency to become more cloudy, which exerts a natural brake upon the rising temperature. Many of man’s aerosol-producing activities tend to do the same thing. Hence, there appear to be a number of cloud-mediated processes that help the planet “keep its cool.”

### Ext 6--Sources--2NC (1:30

#### peer review has been coopted

Bob **Carter**, palaeoclimatolgist, James Cook University, “Money Corrupts the Peer Review Process,” NATIONAL POST, 6—15—**12**, p. FP13.

Scientific knowledge, then, is always in a state of flux. Much though bureaucrats and politicians may dislike the thought, there is simply no such thing as "settled science," peer-reviewed or otherwise. During the latter part of the 20th century, Western governments started channelling large amounts of research money into favoured scientific fields, prime among them global-warming research. This money has a corrupting influence, not least on the peer-review process. Many scientific journals, including prestigious internationally acclaimed ones, have now become captured by insider groups of leading researchers in particular fields. Researchers who act as editors of journals then select referees from within a closed circle of scientists who work in the same field and share similar views. The Climategate email leak in 2009 revealed for all to see that this cancerous process is at an advanced stage of development in climate science. A worldwide network of leading climate researchers were revealed to be actively influencing editors and referees to approve for publication only research that supported the IPCC's alarmist view of global warming, and to prevent the publication of alternative or opposing views.

#### their authors are bought off

**Jasper** 7/13/**12** – senior editor of the New American, one of the US’s top investigative reporters, attended of several international conferences hosted by the UN (William F, “Climate Science” in Shambles: Real Scientists Battle UN Agenda, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/tech/environment/item/11998-%E2%80%9Cclimate-science%E2%80%9D-in-shambles-real-scientists-battle-un-agenda>, )

Until recently, the AGW alarmists definitely had the upper hand. For one thing, they have been organized. For another, they have been outspending the climate realists by a huge order of magnitude. In 2007, Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), the ranking member of the Environment & Public Works Committee, showed that proponents of man-made global warming enjoyed a monumental funding advantage over the skeptics. The alarmists had received a whopping $50 billion — mostly from the federal government — compared to “a paltry $19 million and some change” for the realists. A 2009 study entitled “Climate Money,” by Joanne Nova for the Science & Public Policy Institute, found that the U.S. government had sunk $79 billion into climate-change-related activities (science research, alternative energy technology, foreign aid, etc.) between 1989 and 2009. That total does not include additional massive funding from state governments, foundations, and corporations. Similar levels of funding have been poured into “climate policy” by European Union institutions and the national governments of European nations and Japan. This super-extravagant lavishing of state funding on a new scientific field has created an instant global climate industry that is government-fed and completely political. However, these sums, impressive as they are, represent only the very tip of the mountain of “climate cash” that has the political classes panting and salivating. They smell not only tens of billions of dollars for research and technology, but also hundreds of billions for “climate debt” foreign aid, and trillions to be made in CO2 cap-and-trade schemes.

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#### no consensus on warming—international surveys prove

Bast & Taylor ’11 (Joseph, President and CEO, The Heartland Institute, James M Taylor, Senior Fellow Env. Policy @ Heartland Institute, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis”, Aug 2, <http://heartland.org/experts>, [retrieved June 14, 2012], )

Isn’t There a Consensus? Science doesn’t advance by “consensus.” A single scientist or study can disprove a theory that is embraced by the vast majority of scientists. The search for a consensus is actually part of what philosophers call “post-normal science,” which isn’t really science at all. Still, many people ask: What do scientists believe? Most surveys cited by those who claim there is a consensus ask questions that are too vague to settle the matter. It is important to distinguish between the statement that global warming is a crisis and the similar-sounding but very different statements that the climate is changing and that there is a human impact on climate. Climate is always changing, and every scientist knows this. Our emissions and alterations of the landscape are surely having impacts on climate, though they are often local or regional (like heat islands) and small relative to natural variation. It is easy to find evidence that scientists disagree about climate change. Climate Change Reconsidered cites thousands of articles appearing in peer-reviewed journals that challenge the basic underlying assumptions of AGW (Idso and Singer, 2009). More than 30,000 scientists have signed a petition saying there is no threat that man-made global warming will pose a threat to humanity or nature (Petition Project). Alarmists often cite an essay by Naomi Oreskes claiming to show that virtually all articles about global warming in peer-reviewed journals support the so-called consensus. But a no-less-rigorous study by Benny Peiser that attempted to replicate her results searched the abstracts of 1,117 scientific journal articles on “global climate change” and found only 13 (1 percent) explicitly endorse the “consensus view” while 34 reject or cast doubt on the view that human activity has been the main driver of warming over the past 50 years. A more recent search by Klaus-Martin Schulte of 928 scientific papers published from 2004 to February 2007 found fewer than half explicitly or implicitly endorse the so-called consensus and only 7 percent do so explicitly (Schulte, 2008). A survey that is frequently cited as showing consensus actually proves just the opposite. German scientists Dennis Bray and Hans von Storch have surveyed climate scientists three times, in 1996, 2003, and 2007 (Bray and von Storch, 2010). Their latest survey found most of these scientists say they believe global warming is man-made and is a serious problem, but most of these same scientists do not believe climate science is sufficiently advanced to predict future climate conditions. For two-thirds of the science questions asked, scientific opinion is deeply divided, and in half of those cases, most scientists disagree with positions that are at the foundation of the alarmist case (Bast, 2011). On August 2, 2011, von Storch posted the following comment on a blog: “From our own observations of discussions among climate scientists we also find hardly consensus [sic] on many other issues, ranging from changing hurricane statistics to the speed of melting Greenland and Antarctica, spreading of diseases and causing mass migration and wars” (von Storch, 2011). These are not minor issues. Extreme weather events, melting ice, and the spread of disease are all major talking points for Al Gore and other alarmists in the climate debate. If there is no consensus on these matters, then “skeptics” are right to ask why we should believe global warming is a crisis.

#### Idso is qualified and peer reviewed

**Hackney 9** - Law Clerk to United States District Judge Sim Lake for the Southern District of Texas. J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 2009; A.B. and A.M., Harvard University, 1997 (Ryan, “ Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change Defendants in the Hot Seat,” Lewis & Clark Law School’s Environmental Law Online, 2009, http://www.elawreview.org/elaw/401/flipping\_daubert\_putting\_clima.html, )

 Sherwood Idso would make a good test case of such an expert. Idso, who has served as a research physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and as an adjunct professor in Geology and Botany at Arizona State University, is the president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, an organization that promotes the view that heightened CO2 levels are a good thing because of their beneficial effects on plant growth.[143] Idso has energy industry connections: The Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change has been reported to have received funding from ExxonMobil,[144] and in 1991 Idso produced a video extolling the agricultural benefits of heightened CO2 for the Western Fuels Association, a coal industry association.[145] While Idso’s connections to energy interests have led some to question his work as biased,[146] his research on the effects of CO2 on plant growth has been published several times in peer-reviewed journals. His research on the effects of heightened CO2 in boosting growth in eldarica pine trees (Pinus eldarica), for example, was published in the Journal of Experimental Botany, an Oxford University Press publication.[147] He published peer-reviewed papers in 2001 and 2004 on the long-term effects of CO2 on growth of sour orange trees.[148] Since Idso is a published scientist who has publicly promoted the benefits of CO2 and has shown a willingness to accept money from energy companies, it is not unthinkable that climate change defendants could turn to him for expert testimony about his research. But would he be allowed to testify? It is likely that Idso would pass a Daubert reliability challenge. First, there is little question that Idso would qualify as an expert in some aspects of climate change: He is a published scientist who has worked specifically with the biological effects of heightened CO2.[149] Idso’s acceptance of energy company money is irrelevant to this question, as no part of Rule 702 or Daubert suggests that corporate funding diminishes an expert’s qualifications or the reliability of his or her work.[150] While some might argue that this is a blind spot in Daubert,[151] it would probably be unreasonable to institute a rule that prohibits scientists from testifying on behalf of their employees or sponsors. The Committee Notes to the Rule 702 amendments do allow judges to consider whether an expert is “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.”[152] This analysis would likely weigh in favor of admitting Idso’s testimony, since he began researching the effects of CO2 on plants years prior to any climate change litigation. And even if Idso is a paid shill of the energy industry in some aspects of his career, he has also published several papers in independent, peer-reviewed journals. To the extent that Idso’s testimony is based on the results of his peer-reviewed studies and other similar publications, it would be difficult to challenge his testimony on the Daubert five-factor reliability test. Testability can be established because the publications describe the tests that Idso conducted to advance his theories.[153] The fact that the papers were accepted for publication in respected journals suggests that the methodologies of the tests involved—including error rate and control standards—were sufficiently rigorous that other scientists would accept them as reliable for publication. While all of Idso’s conclusions may not be widespread in the scientific community, it is generally accepted among ecologists that heightened CO2 can promote plant growth.[154] If Idso’s testimony sticks to the information contained in his peer-reviewed publications, a Daubert challenge to his reliability would probably fail.

## 1NR

### International Cooperation

**No international cooperation impact – numerous at causes - UN is parayzed, severa underying causes - rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. – that’s Young. Gut check - ruling on NEPA restrictions not going to be sufficient to invigorate all multilateral institutions**

**finishing**

§ Marked 15:43 § of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. **Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled.** In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, **multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare.** Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be **increasingly difficult and deficient** at **precisely** the time **when it is needed most**.

It is possible to identify **four reasons for this blockage**, four pathways to gridlock: **rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation**. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend **that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms**. Each of these are explained briefly below.

**Growing multipolarity**. The absolute number of states **has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years,** meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown

. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that **many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree** in order for global cooperation to occur.

**Institutional inertia**. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And **yet, the architects of the postwar order did not**, in most cases, **design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power**.

**Harder problems**. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. **Problems are both now more extensive**, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, **and intensive**, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. **Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives** needed to achieve a low carbon economy, **have made a global deal, thus far, impossible** (

Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).

**Fragmentation**. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in **a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency**. The **exponential rise in** both multilateral and transnational **organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance.** Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. **Fragmented institutions**, in turn, **disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs.**

In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The **challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced** by the 1945 victors **in the postwar settlement**. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

**Realist theory disproves the advantage**

JM **Greico**- professor of political science at Duke University, **1993** “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

**Realism** has **dominated international relations theory** at least since World War II.' For realists, international **anarchy fosters competition** and conflict among states **and inhibits** their **willingness to cooperate** **even when** **they share common interests**. Realist theory also argues that **international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation**. Realism, then, presents **a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and** of **the** **capabilities of** international **institutions**.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ **International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure**. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal **institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and** therefore **it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism.** As a result, the new theory's **optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶** Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that **states are positional, not atomistic**, in character, and **therefore** realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, **states in cooperative arrangements** also **worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do**. For realists, **a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation**, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that **there are** at least **two major barriers to international cooperation**: **state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains.** Neoliberal **institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former** **and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶** Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that **states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors**. According to realists, states worry that **today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy** in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, **states must give serious attention to the gains of partners.** Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that **realism**, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, **offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger**. If that is true, then **realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.**

**Multilat fails**

**Holmes 10**-VP, foreign policy and defense studies, Heritage. Frmr Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Member of the CFR. Frmr adjunct prof of history, Georgetown. PhD in history, Georgetown (Kim, Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations, 21 Sept. 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations)

**The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial.** Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, **where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body** made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. **A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the U.N.** The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently leading to institutional paralysis when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: **“The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good**.”[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1) Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. **Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region,** country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3) If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. It requires the political will and diplomatic skill of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in *Foreign Affairs*.[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism **The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations,** from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[[5]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5) for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[[6]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn6)The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[[7]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn7) **all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions.**

**Econ--Econ Leadership**

**US economic leadership is impossible- lack of international clout and multiple global disagreements**

* Sovereign Debt Crisis
* Farm Subsidies
* IPR Protection
* FDI Definition
* Future Regulatory Strategies

**that’s Bremmer & Roubini ’11, - prefer, prof of economics**

**Finishing**

**§ Marked 15:45 § countervailing duties.** **Concerns over** the behavior of sovereign wealth funds have restricted the ability of some of them to take controlling positions in Western companies, particularly in the United States. **And China’s rush to lock down reliable long-term access to natural resources** -- which has led Beijing to aggressively buy commodities in Africa, Latin America, and other emerging markets -- **is further stoking conflict with Washington.** **Asset and financial protectionism are on the rise**, too. A Chinese state-owned oil company attempted to purchase the U.S. energy firm Unocal in 2005, and a year later, the state-owned Dubai Ports World tried to purchase a company that would allow it to operate several U.S. ports: both ignited a political furor in Washington. This was simply the precursor to similar acts of investment protectionism in Europe and Asia. In fact, **there are few established international guidelines for f**oreign **d**irect **i**nvestment -- defining what qualifies as “critical infrastructure,” for example -- **and this is precisely the sort of politically charged problem that will not be addressed successfully anytime soon** on the international stage. **The most important source of** international **conflict may** well **come** from debates **over how** best **to ensure that** an international **economic meltdown never happens again**. Future global monetary and financial stability will require much greater international coordination on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Eventually, they may even require a global super-regulator, given that capital is mobile while regulatory policies remain national. But **disagreements on these issues run deep**. The governments of many **developing countries fear that the creation of tighter international rules for financial firms would bind them more tightly to the** financial **systems of the** very **Western economies** that they blame for creating the recent crisis. And there are significant disagreements even among advanced economies on how to reform the system of regulation and supervision of financial institutions. **Global trade imbalances remain wide and are getting even wider, increasing the risk of currency wars** -- not only between the United States and China but also among other emerging economies. There is nothing new about these sorts of disagreements. But the still fragile state of the global economy makes the need to resolve them much more urgent, and the vacuum of international leadership will make their resolution profoundly difficult to achieve.

**their internal link is too small to matter**

resilience

**Engardio 8** (Pete, Senior Writer – Business Week, “Is U.S. Innovation Headed Offshore?”, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 5-8, http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/may2008/id2008057\_518979.htm)

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Apparently not, according to a new **study published by** the **National Academies**, the Washington organization that advises the U.S. government on science and technology policy. The 371-page report titled Innovation in Global Industries argues that, in **sectors from software and semiconductors to biotech and logistics, America's lead in creating new products and services has remained remarkably resilient over the past decade—even as more research and development by U.S. companies is done offshore.**  "**This is a good sign**," says Georgetown University Associate Strategy Professor Jeffrey T. Macher, who co-edited the study with David C. Mowery of the University of California at Berkeley. "It **means most of the value added is going to U.S. firms, and they are able to reinvest those profits in innovation**." The report, a collection of papers by leading academics assessing the impact of globalization on inventive activity in 10 industries, won't reassure all skeptics that the globalization of production and R&D is good for the U.S. One drawback is that most of the conclusions are based on old data: In some cases the most recent numbers are from 2002. Exporting the Benefits? And while the authors of the report make compelling cases that U.S. companies are doing just fine, thank you, none of the writers addresses today's burning question: Is American tech supremacy thanks to heavy investments in R&D also benefiting U.S. workers? Or are U.S. inventions mainly creating jobs overseas? A few years ago, most people took it for granted that what was good for companies was good for the greater economy. But the flat growth in living standards for most Americans during the last boom has raised doubts over the benefits of globalization. "Innovation shouldn't be an end in itself for U.S. policy," says trade theorist Ralph E. Gomory, a research professor at New York University's Stern School of Business. "I think we have to address whether a country can run on innovation. If you just do R&D to enhance economic activity in other countries, you are getting very little out of it." Gomory, a former top IBM (IBM) executive, retired in 2007 as president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which funded the National Academies study. Still, given all the debate over offshoring, the report's central findings are interesting. The authors marshal a wealth of evidence to show that, **thanks to innovation, globalization hasn't eroded U.S. leadership even in some industries where there has been a substantial offshore shift in engineering and design.** **Despite an explosion of outsourcing to India and Ireland**, for example, **America's software industry still trumps the rest of the world in exports of packaged software and services, patent activity, and venture capital investment.** The **U.S**. also **accounts for 90% of chip-design patents**—the same level as 1991—**although Asian companies now do most of manufacturing**. And **when it comes to biotech**nology, **the U.S. is way ahead**, luring more venture capital than all other countries combined. America First The U**.S. even remains a heavyweight in personal computers**, the study says, though China and Taiwan manufacture most of the hardware. That's because the real innovation and profits still belong to companies like Microsoft (MSFT) and Intel (INTC), makers of the operating system and central processors, while U.S. brands command 40% of the global market and still define breakthrough design. There are cases where the U.S. can lose a commanding lead when domestic manufacturing disappears—namely in flat-panel displays and lighting. Macher also concedes "there are problems on the horizon" regarding America's future competitiveness. Other nations are starting to mimic many of the strategies that give the U.S. an innovation edge, for example. And as Asians grow richer "they are becoming more sophisticated and demanding than Americans as users of many tech products." But **for now, "all evidence is that our position in many of these industries will continue,"** says Macher. Why is the U.S. so entrenched? One reason, he says, is simply that **U.S. corporations are proving very adept at managing global R&D networks while keeping core innovation at home.** While innovative activity in chips and software is growing fast elsewhere, it has not yet been enough to close the gap with the U.S. The fact that the **U.S. remains by far the world's most lucrative market for pharmaceuticals and business software** helps explain its continued strength in those industries. What's more, industry clusters involving companies, universities, and venture capital are so well-established—such as San Diego and Cambridge, Mass., in biotech—that it will take many years for other nations to replicate them.

### Env’t Ans: Biodiversity—1NC

#### They can’t solve biod – expansion of settlements in the rainforest, wetlands, overharvesting, and industrial waste are all massive alt causes that are unrelated to the military – that’s Tonn

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§ Marked 15:45 § outright and to prevent their reproduction. The transport ofinvasive species around the worldis another near-term threat to the earth's biodiversity. Human-induced climate change is threatening many species in the near-term, such as the polar bear. Rapid global climate change and nuclear war could result in catastrophic species extinction similar to massive extinctions in the earth's geologic past. There are also numerous natural threats to biodiversity. Naturally occurring viruses and otherpathogens could become more virulent and uncontrollable and could threaten numerous flora and fauna alike. However, long-term threats to biodiversity mostly stem from extreme climate change. Volcanic eruptions, collisions with asteroids, plate tectonics, changes in ocean currents, and even minute changes in the energy output of the sun could cause rapid global cooling. Cooling could not only spread ice over most of the earth's surface again, killing the majority of species outright, but could also lower sea floors enough to foster massive oxidation, thereby reducing oxygen levels enough in the atmosphere to asphyxiate all oxygen breathing species [17].

#### No bio-d impact

Donald Dodds, M.S. and President, North Pacific Research, “The Myth of Biodiversity,” 5—30—07, northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc

Biodiversity is a corner stone of the environmental movement. But there is no proof that biodiversity is important to the environment. Something without basis in scientific fact is called a Myth. Lets examine biodiversity through out the history of the earth. The earth has been a around for about 4 billion years. Life did not develop until about 500 million years later. Thus for the first 500 million years bio diversity was zero. The planet somehow survived this lack of biodiversity. For the next 3 billion years, the only life on the planet was microbial and not diverse. Thus, the first unexplainable fact is that the earth existed for 3.5 billion years, 87.5% of its existence, without biodiversity. Somewhere around 500 million years ago life began to diversify and multiple celled species appeared. Because these species were partially composed of sold material they left better geologic records, and the number of species and genera could be cataloged and counted. The number of genera on the planet is a indication of the biodiversity of the planet. Figure 1 is a plot of the number of genera on the planet over the last 550 million years. The little black line outside of the left edge of the graph is 10 million years. Notice the left end of this graph. Biodiversity has never been higher than it is today.

### Env’t Ans: General—1NC

#### Impact on environment is small—their ev

Cohan 3 (John Alan – J.D., Loyola Law School, “MODES OF WARFARE AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR”, 2003, 15 Fla. J. Int'l L. 481, lexis)

A further problem is that predictions of the extent of damage to an environment are somewhat tentative. The reverberations from environmental harm are quixotic compared to the reverberations from harm done to conventional targets such as a military air field or radar apparatus. The building can be rebuilt, and the impact on the surrounding infrastructure is somewhat straightforward. But in contrast, environmental damage, whether based on collateral damage or direct attacks on the environment itself, is something that has much more complex reverberations. Moreover, environmental damage is often difficult to contain or control, regardless of the intent of the actor. The environmental harm caused by Iraq's actions during Desert Storm continues to have adverse effects in terms of poisoning of the soil and waters, and will continue to have adverse effects on the local region, if not the world's oceans, for many years to come. On the other hand, "many predictions of what Gulf War damage would do to the environment proved exaggerated." n228 Thus, operations in future wars may well need to undergo scrutiny over a period of time before the degree of environmental risk can be established. Often enough, environmental damage may prove irreversible. Destruction or contamination of an area by chemical or biological agents may require the relocation of people and the migration (or extinction) of local species. An example of this, mentioned above, is the Scottish island of Gruinard which to this day remains contaminated with the causative agent of anthrax. Today military leaders and policymakers often display a growing concern for the environment by considering the foreseeability of environmental damage when they calculate proportionality. This is in contrast to wars of, say, fifty years ago, where concern over war's devastating effects on the environment was somewhat remote by comparison. The future will certainly bring us greater abilities to effectively manipulate the potentially dangerous forces that are pent-up in [\*538] the environment. On humanitarian principles, our efforts to develop environmental modification techniques needs to be dedicated to the benefit of humankind and nature. They must be carried out in good faith, facilitated by international understanding and cooperation and in the spirit of good neighborliness. The global environment is being subjected to ever more serious strains by a growing world population that seeks at least the basic necessities of life as well as some of its amenities. In order to help ensure that the increasingly limited resources of our environment are not further reduced by hostile military activities, it is urged that environmental issues in general and those raised by environmental warfare in particular be widely publicized, through schools, the press and by other means, in order to help develop and strengthen cultural norms in opposition to military activities that cause direct or indirect environmental harm.

### Enviro Adv Ans: Bioweapons

**No pandemic or extinction – history proves**

Easterbrook, 3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.