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**A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.**

**The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters**

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

**“Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan**

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

**“Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan**

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

**B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.**

**C. Vote negative**

**A limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster critical thinking, decision-making and clash**

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, **Argumentation and** Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate:** the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered.** For example**, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take jobs** from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.** To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions,** frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate** during the summer of 2007. **Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. **Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad,** too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

**Critical thinking skills are crucial to solve world problems—the training debate provides is uniquely key. It’s a pre-requisite to applying their aff in the real world**

**Lundberg 10** - Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But **the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech**—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making, and better public judgment**. **If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid** scientific and technological **change** outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, **and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy** such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems **place such a high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them**, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that **debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity**. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, **the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice** in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including**: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; **wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; **and increasing challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. **More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with** the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

**Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle oppression**

Robert **Gooding-Williams**, Professor, Political Science, LOOK, A NEGRO! PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RACE, CULTURE, AND POLITICS, 20**06**, p. 102-104.

I begin with the assumption that **fostering the capacity for democratic deliberation is a central aim of** public **education** in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[**deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view,** to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes **mutual understanding across cultural differences**, thereby **fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation**. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, **one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is critical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy** in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that **deliberative debate** of this sort **is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals**. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences **through cross-cultural dialogue** and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identityin the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual **understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that** cross-cultural **educational insights**, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may **alter** and further complicate those persons' **identities**, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to **deliberative democracy** in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural **education** that **is, specifically race-conscious**.

**Effective radical problem-solving demands focusing on changing government policy**

James **Ferguson**, Professor, Anthropology, Stanford University, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” ANTIPODE v. 41 n. S1, 20**11**, Wiley.

**If we are** seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, **to link** our **critical analyses to** the world of grounded **political struggle—**not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then **there is much to be said for focusing**, as I have here, **on mundane, real- world debates around policy** and politics, **even if doing so** inevitably **puts us on** the compromised and **reformist terrain** of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims. My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor, in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming). My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which **specific governmental** devices and **modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a** very particular (and **conservative) political agenda** (“neoliberalism”) **may be** in the process of being **peeled away** from that agenda**, and put to** very **different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge** I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge **of developing new** progressive **arts of government, ought to find this** turn of events **of** considerable **interest**. As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2). As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do. Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve**. If we can go beyond seeing** in “neoliberalism” **an evil essence** or an automatic unity, **and instead learn to see** a field of **specific governmental techniques,** we may be surprised to find that **some of them can be repurposed**, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that **the cabinet of governmental arts** available to us **is** a bit **less bare than first appeared,** and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

**K**

**liberal inclusion- their reliance on race as the site of political contestation is not an accidental instance of ignoring class. The demand arises out of the crisis of liberalism—such politics particularizes the oppressions of capitalism to the point that the universal system is naturalized. Attaining white, male bourgeoisse privilege becomes the bench-mark of success, re-entrenching the foundation of the system**

**Wendy Brown, Professor & genuis, “Wounded Attachments,” POLITICAL THEORY, August 1993, ASP.**

**Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's** companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. **On** **one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests**, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 **On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive** nation-state **identification:** deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. **These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes**, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "**disciplinary power" produces social identifies** (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) **that crosscut juridical identities based on** abstract **righ**t. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, **the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal**-the transparent fiction of state universality-**combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion** from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, **liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices**. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Th**us disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities**. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that **what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism** and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. **In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will** appear **not** as a **supplement** to **class politics**, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, **not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations** of power and persons-all of which they also are-**but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribe**s **a bour- geois ideal as its measure.**

**If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that** can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that **identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire.** From this perspective**, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through** **race**, **gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that** **when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism** (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) **are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight.** **Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.**

**they have no method- trying to shoehorn all types of oppression into the single label of anti-blackness stretches it’s conceptual limits to the breaking point- be skeptical of their analogies to “policing” or other historical forms of racial subordination- they take historically specific phenomena and rob them of context which dehistoricizes class and kills the alt**

Adolph **Reed 13**, Jr. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. “Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism”¶ New Labor Forum 2013 22: 49 http://nlf.sagepub.com/content/22/1/49¶ DOI: 10.1177/1095796012471637

The **whiteness discourse overlaps other arguments that presume racism to be a sui generis form of injustice. Despite seeming provocative, these arguments do not go beyond the premises of the racial liberalism from which they commonly purport to dissent. They differ only in rhetorical flourish, not content.**

**Formulations that invoke metaphors of disease or original sin reify racism by disconnecting it from the discrete historical circumstances and social structures in which it is embedded, and treating it as an autonomous force. Disconnection from political economy is also a crucial feature of postwar liberalism’s construction of racial inequality as prejudice or intolerance. Racism becomes an independent variable in a moralistic argument that is idealist intellectually and ultimately defeatist politically**.

**This tendency to see racism as sui generis also generates a resistance to precision in analysis. It is fueled by a tendency to inflate the language of racism to the edge of its reasonable conceptual limits, if not beyond. Ideological commitment to shoehorning into the rubric of racism all manner of inequalities that may appear statistically as racial disparities has yielded two related interpretive pathologies. One is a¶ constantly expanding panoply of neologisms—“institutional racism,” “systemic racism,” “structural racism,” “color-blind racism,” “post-racial racism,” etc.—intended to graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic and frequently psychologically inflected racism/anti-racism political ontology. Indeed, these efforts bring to mind** [Thomas S.] Kuhn’s **account of attempts to accommodate mounting anomalies to salvage an interpretive paradigm in danger of crumbling under a crisis of authority**.¶ **A second essentialist sleight-of-hand advances claims for the primacy of race/racism as an explanation of inequalities in the present by invoking analogies to regimes of explicit**ly **racial subordination in the past. In these arguments, analogy stands in for evidence and explanation of the contemporary centrality of racism.** Michelle Alexander’s widely read and cited book, **The New Jim Crow, is only the most prominent expression of this tendency; even she has to acknowledge that the analogy fails because the historical circumstances are so radically different**.12¶ **Rigorous pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of capitalist class relations has been fully legitimized under the rubric of “diversity.”**

**\*\*whack-a-mole--the aff is counterproductive- because capitalism requires an pool of surplus labor, all the aff changes is who is in the underclass- they can’t explain the new non-color coded lamarkian racism endemic to science- at best the aff is playing whack-a-mole with oppressed groups**

Adolph **Reed 13**, Jr. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. “Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism”¶ New Labor Forum 2013 22: 49 http://nlf.sagepub.com/content/22/1/49¶ DOI: 10.1177/1095796012471637

**From the historical materialist standpoint, the view of racial inequality as a sui generis injustice and dichotomous formulations of the relation of race and class as systems of hierarchy in the United States are not only miscast but also fundamentally counterproductive. It is particularly important at this moment to recognize that the familiar taxonomy of racial difference is but one historically specific instance of a genus of ideologies of ascriptive hierarchy that stabilize capitalist social reproduction**. I have argued previously that **entirely new race-like taxonomies could come to displace the familiar ones. For instance, the “underclass” could become even more race-like as a distinctive, essentialized population,¶ by our current folk norms, multiracial in composition, albeit most likely including in perceptibly greater frequencies people who would be classified as black and Latino “racially,” though as small enough pluralities to preclude assimilating the group ideologically as a simple proxy for nonwhite inferiors.**13¶ **This possibility looms larger now. Struggles for racial and gender equality have largely divested race and gender of their common sense verisimilitude as bases for essential difference**. Moreover, **versions of racial and gender equality are now also incorporated into the normative and programmatic structure of “left” neoliberalism. Rigorous pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of given patterns of capitalist class relations—which is after all the ideal of racial liberalism—has been fully legitimized within the rubric of “diversity.” That ideal is realized through gaining rough parity in distribution of social goods and bads among designated population categories.** As Walter Benn Michaels has argued powerfully, **according to that ideal**, the **society would be just if 1 percent of the population controlled 90 percent of the resources, provided that blacks and other nonwhites, women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people were represented among the 1 percent in roughly similar proportion as their incidence in the general population**.14¶ Given the triumph of racial liberalism, it is entirely possible that new discourses of ascriptive difference might take shape that fit the folk common sense of our time and its cultural norms and sensibilities. Indeed, the explosive resurgence in recent years of academically legitimated determinist discourses—all of which simply rehearse the standard idealist tropes and circular garbage in/garbage out faux scientific narratives—reinforce that concern.¶ **The undergirding premises of intellectual programs like evolutionary psychology, behavioral economics, genes and politics, and neurocriminology are strikingly like straight-line extrapolations from Victorian race science**—although for the most part, though not entirely, scholars operating in those areas are scrupulous, or at least fastidious, in not implicating the familiar racial taxonomies in their deterministic sophistries. Some scholars imagine that “epigenetics”—a view that focuses on the interplay of genes and environment in producing organisms and genotypes—avoids determinism by providing causal explanations that are not purely biological. **Recent research purporting to find epigenetic explanations for socioeconomic inequality already foreshadows a possible framework for determinist “underclass” narratives that avoid the taints associated with biological justifications of inequality and references to currently recognized racial categories**.15 Ironically, **some enthusiasts for this epigenetic patter expressly liken it to Lamarckian evolutionary theory, which stressed the heritability of characteristics acquired after birth,** as though this were insulation against determinism. As historian of anthropology George Stocking, Jr., and others have shown, Lamarckian race theory was no less determinist than its Darwinian alternative, which posited strictly biological determinism. As Stocking notes, **Lamarckians’ dependence on a “vague sociobiological indeterminism” made it all the more difficult to challenge their circular race theories**.16 In any event, **narrow approaches that reduce ascriptive ideology to reified notions of race/racism are not at all up to the challenge posed by this new determinist turn.**¶ Finally, **the adamant commitment to a race-first perspective** **on inequalities that show up as statistical disparities has a material foundation. The victories of the civil rights movement carried with them a more benign an**d **unavoidable political imperative. Legal remedies can be sought for injustices understood as discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or other familiar categories of invidious ascription; no such recourse exists for injustices generated through capitalism’s logic of production and reproduction without mediation through one of those ascriptive categories.** As I have argued elsewhere,¶ **this makes identifying “racism” a technical requirement for pursuing certain grievances, not the basis of an overall strategy for pursuit of racial justice**, or, as I believe is a clearer left formulation, racial equality as an essential component of a program of social justice.17

**Their black white binary kills collations and turns the aff**

**HUTCHINSON 2K4**

(Darren, Prof @ Wash College, August, 53 Am. U.L. Rev. 1187, American University Law Review, MosE)

A third area of critical race innovation involves multiracial politics. **Internal critics have argued that racial discourse in the United States fixates upon black/white racial issues, thereby marginalizing Latino, Native American, and Asian American experiences**. n95 Empirically, this observation is indisputable. Race theorists lack a full understanding of the breadth of racial injustice. The inclusion of the experiences of Latinos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans in racial discourse can improve CRT in several ways. First, **a multiracial discourse permits a full accounting of the problem of racial inequality and allows for the construction of adequate remedies for racial subordination.** n96 **Although all people of color suffer racism, often in similar ways, racial hierarchies impact communities of color in diverse ways**. A narrow focus on black/white subjugation severely limits the reach of antiracist remedies. **The black/white paradigm also prevents persons of color from engaging in coalition politics**. n97 **By treating racism as a problem that affects** blacks primarily (or exclusively), racial discourse in the United States divides persons of color who could align to create formidable political forces in the battle for racial justice. **Binary racial discourse also causes persons of color to compete for the attention of whites, as marginalized racial groups treat racial justice as a**  [\*1201]  **zero-sum game**. n98 **Instead of recognizing the pervasiveness and complexity of racial injuries, binary racial discourse leads to the tyranny of oppression ranking and to competing demands for centrality in a marginalized space of racial victimization.**

**Racism is a byproduct of the violent history of capital accumulation- understanding the historical basis is essential to effective anti-racist and anti-capitalist politics**

Tom **Keefer**, member of Facing Reality, in New Socialist Magazine, January **2003**. <http://www.newsocialist.org/magazine/39/article03.html> **ableism-edited**

The brutality and viciousness of capitalism is well known to the oppressed and exploited of this world. Billions of people throughout the world spend their lives incessantly toiling to enrich the already wealthy, while throughout history any serious attempts to build alternatives to capitalism have been met with bombings, invasions, and blockades by imperialist nation states. Although the modern day ideologues of the mass media and of institutions such as the World Bank and IMF never cease to inveigh against scattered acts of violence perpetrated against their system, they always neglect to mention that the capitalist system they lord over was called into existence and has only been able to maintain itself by the sustained application of systematic violence. It should come as no surprise that **this capitalist system**, which we can only hope is now reaching the era of its final demise, **was just as rapacious** and vicious **in its youth as it is now. The "rosy dawn" of capitalist production was inaugurated by the process of slavery and genocide in the western hemisphere**, and this "primitive accumulation of capital" resulted in the largest systematic murder of human beings ever seen. However, **the rulers of society have found that naked force is often most economically used in conjunction with ideologies of domination and control which provide a legitimizing explanation for the oppressive nature of society. Racism is such a construct** and it came into being as a social relation which condoned and secured the initial genocidal processes of capitalist accumulation--the founding stones of contemporary bourgeois society. While it is widely accepted that the embryonic capitalist class came to power in the great bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, what is comparatively less well known is the crucial role that chattel slavery and the plunder of the "New World" played in calling this class into being and providing the "primitive accumulation of capital" necessary to launch and sustain industrialization in Europe. The accidental "discovery" of the Western Hemisphere by the mass murderer Christopher Columbus in 1492 changed everything for the rival economic and political interests of the European states. The looting and pillaging of the "New World" destabilized the European social order, as Spain raised huge armies and built armadas with the unending streams of gold and silver coming from the "New World", the spending of which devalued the currency reserves of its rivals. The only way Portugal, England, Holland, and France could stay ahead in the regional power games of Europe was to embark on their own colonial ventures. **In addition to the extraction of precious minerals and the looting** and pillaging **of indigenous societies, European merchant-adventurers realized that substantial profits could also be made through the production of cash crops on the fertile lands surrounding the Caribbean sea. The only problem was that as the indigenous population either fled from enslavement or perished** from the diseases and deprivations of the Europeans, **there was no one left to raise the** sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and other **tropical cash crops that were so profitable. A system of waged labour would not work for the simple reason that with plentiful land and easy means of subsistence surrounding them, colonists would naturally prefer small scale homesteading instead of labouring for their masters**. As the planter Emanuel Downing of Massachusetts put it in 1645: "I do not see how we can thrive until we get a stock of slaves sufficient to do all our business, for our children's children will hardly see this great continent filled with people so that our servants will still desire freedom to plant for themselves, and not stay but for very great wages." **Capitalistic social relations have always been based on compulsion, and they require as a precondition that workers possess nothing but their capacity to labour**. The would-be developers of the wealth of the "New World" thus turned to forced labour in complete contradiction to all the theories of bourgeois economists because unfree labour was the only kind of labour applicable to the concrete situation in the Americas. **Although slavery is now**, and has almost always been **equated with unfree Black labour, it was not always**, or even **predominantly so. Capitalists looked first to their own societies in order to find the population to labour in servitude on the large-scale plantations necessary for tropical cash crop production**. Eric Williams, in his groundbreaking work Capitalism and Slavery, noted that in the early stages of **colonialism "white slavery was the historic base upon which Negro [sic] slavery was constructed." Between 1607 and 1783 over a quarter million "white" indentured servants arrived in the British colonies alone where they were set to work in the agricultural and industrial processes of the time. The shipping companies, ports, and trading routes established for the transport of the poor, "criminal", and lumpen elements of European society were to form the [core]**backbone **of the future slave trade of Africans. Slavery became an exclusively Black institution due to the dynamics of class struggle as repeated multi-ethnic rebellions of African slaves and indentured European servants led the slaveholders to seek strategies to divide and conquer. The fact that an African slave could be purchased for life with the same amount of money that it would cost to buy an indentured servant for 10 years, and that the African's skin color would function as an instrument of social control by making it easier to track down runaway slaves** in a land where all whites were free wage labourers and all Black people slaves, **provided further incentives for this system of racial classification**. In the **colonies where there was an insufficient free white population to provide a counterbalance to potential slave insurgencies, such as on the Caribbean islands, an elaborate hierarchy of racial privilege was built up, with the lighter skinned "mulattos" admitted to the ranks of free men where they often owned slaves themselves.** **The concept of a "white race" never really existed before the economic systems of early capitalism made it a necessary social construct to aid in the repression of enslaved Africans. Xenophobia and hostility towards those who were different than one's own immediate family, clan, or tribe were certainly evident, and discrimination based on religious status was also widespread but the development of modern "scientific" racism with its view that there are physically distinct "races" within humanity, with distinct attributes and characteristics is peculiar to the conquest of the Americas, the rise of slavery, and the imperialist domination of the entire world. Racism provided a convenient way to explain the subordinate position of Africans and other victims** of Euro-colonialism**, while at the same time providing an apparatus upon which to structure the granting of special privileges to sectors of the working class admitted as members of the "white race".** As David McNally has noted, one of the key component of modern racism was its utility in **resolving the contradiction as to how the modern European societies in which the bourgeoisie had come to power through promising "freedom" and "equality" were so reliant on slave labour and murderous, yet highly profitable colonial adventures.** **The development of** a concept like **racism allowed whole sections of the world's population to be "excommunicated" from humankind, and then be murdered or worked to death with a clear conscience for the profit of the capitalist class**. To get a sense of the scale of slavery and its economic importance, and thus an understanding of the material incentives for the creation of ideological constructs such as "race", a few statistics regarding the English slave trade from Eric Williams' book Capitalism and Slavery help to put things in context. The Royal African Company, a monopolistic crown corporation, transported an average of 5 000 slaves a year between 1680 and 1686. When the ability to engage in the free trade of slaves was recognized as a "fundamental and natural right" of the Englishman, one port city alone, Bristol, shipped 160 950 slaves from 1698-1707. In 1760, 146 slave ships with a capacity for 36 000 slaves sailed from British ports, while in 1771 that number had increased to 190 ships with a capacity for 47 000 slaves. Between 1700 and 1786 over 610 000 slaves were imported to Jamaica alone, and conservative estimates for the total import of slaves into all British colonies between 1680 and 1786 are put at over two million. All told, many historians place the total number of Africans displaced by the Atlantic slave trade as being between twelve and thirty million people--a massive historical event and forced migration of unprecedented proportions. These large numbers of slaves and the success of the slave trade as jump starter for capitalist industrialization came from what has been called the "triangular trade"--an intensely profitable economic relationship which built up European industry while systematically deforming and underdeveloping the other economic regions involved. The Europeans would produce manufactured goods that would then be traded to ruling elites in the various African kingdoms. They in turn would use the firearms and trading goods of the Europeans to enrich themselves by capturing members of rival tribes, or the less fortunate of their own society, to sell them as slaves to the European merchants who would fill their now empty ships with slaves destined to work in the colonial plantations. On the plantations, the slaves would toil to produce expensive cash crops that could not be grown in Europe. These raw materials were then refined and sold at fantastic profit in Europe. In 1697, the tiny island of Barbados with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania combined, while by 1798, the income accruing to the British from the West Indian plantations alone was four million pounds a year, as opposed to one million pounds from the whole rest of the world. Capitalist economists of the day recognized the super profitability of slavery by noting the ease of making 100% profit on the trade, and by noting that one African slave was as profitable as seven workers in the mainland. Even more importantly, the profits of the slave trade were plowed back into further economic growth. Capital from the slave trade financed James Watt and the invention and production of the steam engine, while the shipping, insurance, banking, mining, and textile industries were all thoroughly integrated into the slave trade. **What an analysis of the origins of modern capitalism shows is just how far the capitalist class will go** to make a profit**. The development of a pernicious racist ideology, spread to justify the uprooting and enslavement of millions of people to transport them across the world to fill a land whose indigenous population was massacred or worked to death, represents the beginnings of the system** that George W. Bush defends as "our way of life". **For revolutionaries today who seek to understand and transform capitalism and the racism encoded into its very being, it is essential to understand how and why these systems of domination and exploitation came into being before we can hope to successfully overthrow them.**

**Materialism explains reality…focus on the discursive/symbolic obfuscates that relation and makes oppression inevitable**

**Cloud** (Prof of Comm at Texas) **01**

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm]

 At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). **We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomen**a. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them**. In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure** at the level of the economy and the state. **It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformatio**n even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. **At the core of the issue is a debate** across the humanities and social sciences with regard to **whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment** in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, **there is a great deal of evidence against claims** that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, **both class polarization** (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) **and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism** (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) **still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts**. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in **the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor** in the U.S. (as well as **around the world) continued to grow,** **in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates**. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8**). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation** and progressive critical practice **in fact encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and** perhaps **revolutionary potential. Instead**, on their arguments, **we must** recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and **settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism.** Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn**: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases** they themselves **are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world**" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. **The point**, though, **is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other**. Marxist ideology critique, understands that **classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics** wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. **Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.** [cont’d] [cont;d] Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). **Within this understanding**, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: **Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said,** into the silences and the suppressed or missing, **in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details** and representations **of our lives**. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, **materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--**specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges**. (p. 7)

**The material determinism of capital is responsible for the instrumentalization of all life—makes all oppression inevitable and causes extinction**

**Dyer-Witherford** (professor of Library and Info. Sciences @ the Univ. of Western Ontarion) **‘99** [Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that **capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control.** Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. **This priority**—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—**assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas** of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, **all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet**. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

**Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.**

**one must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humynize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression**

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Any **effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue **that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that **the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (**which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all **determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism** which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. **All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois** left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable,** more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced** by the human mind and is thus free from the **actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.**

**the alt solves- relentless criticism informed by praxis can trigger rapid cascades rupturing the system**

Joel **Kovel**, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 20**02**, p. 224.

**Relentless criticism can delegitimate the system and release people into struggle. And as struggle develops, victories that are no more than in­cremental by their own terms** — stopping a meeting of the IMF, the hopes stirred forth by a campaign such as Ralph Nader’s in 2000 — **can have a symbolic effect far greater than their external result, and constitute points of rupture with capital. This rupture is not a set of facts added to our knowledge of the world, but a change in our relation to the world. Its effects are dynamic, not incremental, and like all genuine insights it changes the balance of forces and can propagate very swiftly Thus the release from inertia can trigger a rapid cascade of changes, so that it could be said that the forces pressing towards radical change need not be linear and incre­mental, but can be exponential in character.** In this way, **conscientious and radical criticism of the given, even in advance of having blueprints for an alternative, can be a material force, because it can seize the mind of the masses of people. There is no greater responsibility for intellectuals.**

## 2NC

#### 4th, praxis DA: This is why you can’t perm a method…They strip all of the conceptual theory that allows us to understand the world—worse than the aff or the alt alone. Perm will become like occupy wall street—it’s also a rejection of capitalism but doesn’t have a praxis because the movement is fractured, no one knows what they are fighting for—this is why it will never catch on.

Tumino (Prof. English @ Pitt) 01

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science**"** (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology**"** (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution o**f** the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

### Materialism First Link

a2 abjection/yancy on fw- why certain discourses/realities arise? root cause.

**Materialism explains reality…focus on the discursive/symbolic obfuscates that relation and makes oppression inevitable**

**Cloud** (Prof of Comm at Texas) **01**

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm]

 At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). **We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomen**a. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them**. In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure** at the level of the economy and the state. **It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformatio**n even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. **At the core of the issue is a debate** across the humanities and social sciences with regard to **whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment** in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, **there is a great deal of evidence against claims** that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, **both class polarization** (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) **and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism** (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) **still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts**. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in **the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor** in the U.S. (as well as **around the world) continued to grow,** **in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates**. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8**). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation** and progressive critical practice **in fact encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and** perhaps **revolutionary potential. Instead**, on their arguments, **we must** recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and **settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism.** Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn**: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases** they themselves **are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world**" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. **The point**, though, **is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other**. Marxist ideology critique, understands that **classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics** wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. **Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.** [cont’d] [cont;d] Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). **Within this understanding**, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: **Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said,** into the silences and the suppressed or missing, **in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details** and representations **of our lives**. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, **materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--**specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges**. (p. 7)

### impact

#### the shift to post-fordism explains race today

Carter Wilson April, 2012 “The Dominant Class and the Construction of Racial Oppression: A Neo-Marxist/Gramscian Approach to Race in the United States Socialism and Democracy http://postcapitalistproject.org/node/92

Within the neo-Marxist framework, the current period is no different from the previous eras. Racial oppression persists today. Although there are signs of dramatic progress in some areas, there is severe regression in others. Racism has not declined; it has simply changed form. Today, racial oppression overlaps with class oppression more than ever before. Whereas dominative-aversive racism, the old Jim Crow system, excluded all blacks of all social classes, meta-racism impacts low-income blacks most severely, particularly those living in concentrated poverty areas of inner cities. New racial stereotypes focus on the urban poor or urban underclass. New economic arrangements correspond with the new form of racial oppression.¶ The new economic arrangements can best be classified Gramscian terms as post-Fordism. These arrangements have produced enormous surplus labor and substantial inequalities. The new racial oppression is characterized by concentrated urban poverty, by the warehousing of black males in the criminal justice system, by high infant mortality rates, and by diminishing political power.¶ ¶ From Fordism to Post-Fordism to Meta-racism¶ Gramsci coined the term Fordism to define an era named after Henry Ford, who had envisioned his assembly-line workers earning enough money to purchase an automobile. Thus, Fordism was an era in which corporations accepted a well-paid work force, protected by strong unions; promoted Keynesian economic policy; and invested in local communities. Capital (production facilities) was fixed. That is, it was unfeasible to move factories because of their mammoth size (with often close to 20,000 workers), the enormous initial investment in them, and their dependence on established railroad lines.¶ Fordism ended during the middle 1970s, as a result of technological changes and of conscious decisions by corporate leaders. Technological changes led to the rise of mobile capital, the ability of corporations to easily close down a production facility in one area and relocate in another. These changes included the rise of the trucking industry, which freed production facilities from dependence on railroads; the telecommunications revolution, which allowed corporate headquarters to engage in instant audio and visual communications anywhere in the world; and the development of smaller, more automated production facilities, which made it easier to close down a facility in one region and relocate to another.¶ Corporate leaders made three conscious decisions that spelled the end of Fordism. They deliberately engaged in economic strategies to weaken labor and reduce wages. They decided to become more politically active in order seize the state and promote neoliberal public policies designed to trash protective regulations, shred the social safety net, and further weaken labor and reduce wages. And they decided to pour huge sums of resources into think tanks for the dissemination of neoliberalism and the construction and promotion of a new racist ideology. These decisions had their most devastating impact on inner-city blacks and contributed to the rise of meta-racism¶ From the mid-1970s, corporations slashed wages and eviscerated unions by closing down production facilities in high-wage, unionized, old industrial cities and moving to low-wage, anti-union areas in other parts of the country and the world; by outsourcing to non-union, low-wage firms; and by relying on part-time, temporary workers. This process had its most severe impact on declining industrial cities with large populations of African Americans. It contributed directly to a rise in surplus labor, an increase in people without jobs. It produced substantially high poverty rates in industrial cities. Older industrial cities suffered catastrophic losses of industrial jobs. Between 1972 and 1982, Detroit lost 69,300 industrial sector jobs, 24,900 jobs in retail and 17,000 jobs in wholesale.32¶ There was some job growth in the service sector, but this was in the areas of security guards, nurses’ aides, janitorial services, and other low-paying occupations. Professional jobs tended to be in areas such as social work and teaching. The rise of poverty was associated with the city’s hemorrhaging of decent-paying industrial jobs in the automobile industry.¶ These losses impacted the city’s poverty rate. Poverty in Detroit rose from 14.9% to 21.9% between 1970 and 1980.33 In 1980, a city poverty rate of over 20% was extreme. Today, most of the older industrial cities have poverty rates well above 20%. By 2008 Detroit’s poverty rate was 33.1%. Today, most of the older industrial cities suffer extremely high poverty rates: Flint, Michigan has a rate of 34.4%; Youngstown, Ohio, 32.6%; Buffalo, New York, 29.9%; Cleveland, Ohio, 28.9%; Cincinnati, Ohio, 25.7%; Newark, New Jersey, 24.7%.

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### Gender DA

#### The oppression of women and relegation of reproduction to the private sphere are not ahistorical products of sexism or patriarchy, but historical productions of the emergence of a classed society founded on the logic of surplus accumulation. This shift from necessity to surplus solidified the pre-existing division of labor based on need and then sexed it to justify inequality

**Cloud** (Prof. Comm at UT) **03**

[Dana, “Marxism and Oppression”, Talk for Regional Socialist Conference, April 19, 2003, p. online]

In order to challenge oppression, it is important to know where it comes from. Historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists tell us that in pre-class societies such as hunter-gatherer societies, racism and sexism were unheard of. Because homosexuality was not an identifiable category of such societies, discrimination on that basis did not occur either. In fact, it is clear that racism, sexism, and homophobia have arisen in particular kinds of societies, namely class societies. Women’s oppression originated in the first class societies, while racism came into prominence in the early periods of capitalism when colonialism and slavery drove the economic system. The prohibition against gays and lesbians is a relatively modern phenomenon. But what all forms of oppression have in common is that they did not always exist and are not endemic to human nature. They were created in the interest of ruling classes in society and continue to benefit the people at the top of society, while dividing and conquering the rest of us so as to weaken the common fight against the oppressors. The work of Marx’s collaborator Friederich Engels onThe Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State in some respects reflects the Victorian times in which in was written. Engels moralizes about women’s sexuality and doesn’t even include gay and lesbian liberation in his discussion of the oppressive family. However, anthropologists like the feminist Rayna Reiter have confirmed his most important and central argument that it was in the first settled agricultural societies that women became an oppressed class. In societies where for the first time people could accumulate a surplus of food and other resources, it was possible for some people to hoard wealth and control its distribution

. The first governments or state structures formed to legitimate an emerging ruling class. As settled communities grew in size and became more complex social organizations, and, most importantly, as the surplus grew, the distribution of wealth became unequal—and a small number of men rose above the rest of the population in wealth and power. In the previous hunter-gatherer societies, there had been a sexual division of labor, but one without a hierarchy of value. There was no strict demarcation between the reproductive and productive spheres. All of that changed with the development of private property in more settled communities. The earlier division of labor in which men did the heavier work, hunting, and animal agriculture, became a system of differential control over resource distribution. The new system required more field workers and sought to maximize women’s reproductive potential. Production shifted away from the household over time and women became associated with the reproductive role, losing control over the production and distribution of the necessities of life. It was not a matter of male sexism, but of economic priorities of a developing class system. This is why Engels identifies women’s oppression as the first form of systematic class oppression in the world. Marxists since Engels have not dismissed the oppression of women as secondary to other kinds of oppression and exploitation. To the contrary, women’s oppression has a primary place in Marxist analysis and is a key issue that socialists organize around today. From this history we know that sexism did not always exist, and that men do not have an inherent interest in oppressing women as domestic servants or sexual slaves. Instead, women’s oppression always has served a class hierarchy in society. In our society divided by sexism, ideas about women’s nature as domestic caretakers or irrational sexual beings justify paying women lower wages compared to men, so that employers can pit workers against one another in competition for the same work. Most women have always had to work outside the home to support their families. Today, women around the world are exploited in sweatshops where their status as women allows bosses to pay them very little, driving down the wages of both men and women. At the same time, capitalist society relies on ideas about women to justify not providing very much in the way of social services that would help provide health care, family leave, unemployment insurance, access to primary and higher education, and so forth—all because these things are supposed to happen in the private family, where women are responsible. This lack of social support results in a lower quality of life for many men as well as women. Finally, contemporary ideologies that pit men against women encourage us to fight each other rather than organizing together.

## 1NR

### FW: A2 “We Can’t Access Levers of Power”

#### 3. UK energy debates prove that outside discussion of policy influences the government

**Kuzemko 12** [Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

This observation brings us on to the way in which debates and narratives within political circles, particularly within parliament and amongst policymakers, started to shift. A plethora of new papers, debates and policy documents on energy emerged over this time, despite the round of energy reviews and the new White Paper that had been produced immediately prior to this period (see in particular Havard 2004; Ofgem 2004; DTI 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b and 2006c; JESS 2006). The energy sector became increasingly referenced in these proliferating policy and other government documents in terms of potential supply insecurity (FCO 2004; Straw in Plesch et al 2004). Echoing media, academic and think-tank narratives, direct links can be found between fears of supply insecurity and Russia (FAC 2008; see also House of Commons 2007; Ofgem 2009: 1). In particular, in 2007 the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) produced a report entitled ‘Global Security: Russia’ (FAC 2008). This is where we see how assumptions about resource nationalism and energy ‘politicisation’ as wrong affect perceptions (Straw in Plesch et al 2004; DTI 2007: 19). The FAC report focuses on certain political frameworks in non-OECD producer countries, particularly Russia, which may not allow new reserves to be developed properly making them ‘unstable’ suppliers (Havard 2004; FCO 2004). This in turn had negative implications for energy prices (Straw in Plesch et al 2004; DTI 2007: 19). What was also evident over this time, however, was the rising amount of reports produced by political institutions outside of those directly responsible for policymaking, the Energy Directorate of the DTI and the independent regulator, Ofgem. The Foreign Office, House of Commons committees and parliamentary offices, such as that of Science and Technology, all started to produce reports on energy focused on energy security (FCO 2004; POST 2004; Fox 2006; House of Lords 2006; House of Commons 2007; FAC 2007). Energy security was added, by the UK, to formal forums for international negotiation. In 2005, during the October EU Summit at Hampton Court, the issue of ‘energy security’ was added to the agenda (Offerdahl 2007). In a paper prepared for conference delegates energy is characterised as a sector which was by then becoming an issue of national security (Helm 2005b: 2). Increasing dependence on Russia for supplies of, particularly gas, is seen as a source of threat to the security of EU, and by extension UK, energy supply. Likewise, energy security was made top of the agenda in the G8 Summit of 2006 (G8 2006). In 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair used his annual Lord Mayor’s speech to highlight energy security concerns (DTI 2006c: 4). Growing political interest in energy, outside of those institutions formally responsible for energy policymaking, indicates the extent to which energy was becoming subject, once more, to political debate and deliberation. What is also interesting to note at this time is the degree to which the deliberation of energy becomes formalised through various new institutions. In July 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the Yukos affair, the new Energy Act had conferred on the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry a fixed duty to report annually on energy security matters to Parliament (DTI 2005a). Thus a specific political process was put in place to revisit energy security at least annually. Changes related to the need to deliberate more formally had also started to take place within the DTI and FCO in that new resources were allocated to energy analysis (Interview 5). The 2007 White Paper acknowledged that energy had not up until the mid 2000s existed as a discrete area of foreign policy. Again, as such, it had less dedicated capacity assigned to it. The paper announced that, for the first time, the UK would have ...an integrated international energy strategy which describes the action we are taking to help deliver secure energy supplies and tackle climate change. (DTI 2007: 8) Concurrent with the degree to which energy was re-entering elite political debates at both the national and international levels, which in itself indicates a degree of deliberative repoliticisation, there were a number of policy alterations made relating to changing interpretations of energy and international markets. It could be argued that energy security had, in 2003, been assumed to exist, especially given the degree to which energy governance was still understood to be heading in a promarket direction (Thomas 2006: 583; Jegen 2009: 1; Lesage et al 2010: 6; EC 2011: 14). For example the energy supply objective had been worded such that the UK should continue to “maintain the reliability of… supplies” (DTI 2003: 11). Energy security, although still an objective, had been an assumed outcome of marketisation which explains why competitive markets had been the principal objective of energy policy at that time (cf. Helm 2005). By contrast, however, by 2007 energy security is understood to be something that needs to be established, as one of the ‘immense’ challenges facing the UK as a nation, and furthermore, to require further political action to achieve (DTI 2006c: Introduction and 4). This refocus of objectives onto achieving energy security, over time, added to the political pressures being brought to bear on energy policymakers

given the degree to which supplies continued to be considered ‘insecure’ (Kuzemko 2012b: ). These changes in policy objectives, political institutions, and the addition of political capacity to deliberate energy are understood have taken place partly in response to political pressures to change emanating from outside energy policy circles, i.e. the DTI and Ofgem. Ofgem officials report a higher degree of ‘outside’ political interference in their practices (Interview 15), and it has been widely claimed that both the 2006 Energy Review and 2007 White Paper were researched and compiled specifically because the DTI and Ofgem understood the political need to respond to the crisis (CEPMLP 2006; House of Commons 2007a). As these processes of deliberation intensified it started also to become clear that the state had lost considerable capacity to understand the complexities of energy. Government was considered to be more responsible, given that the narrative was of national energy supply security, but lacking in information and knowledge both about what was happening and what to do about it. Ultimately this resulted in the formation of a new government institution, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), with specific mandates to deliver on energy and climate security.

**aff**

**Trendlines prove the status quo of political engagement works—this does not mean everything is perfect, but proves that there’s reason for optimism**

Zach **Beauchamp**, Think Progress, 12/11/**13**, 5 Reasons Why 2013 Was The Best Year In Human History, thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/11/3036671/2013-certainly-year-human-history/

**Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces**. **The statistical and experimental evidence is overwhelming** — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, **should put the “racism is dead” fantasy to bed**. **Yet the need to combat discrimination denial shouldn’t blind us to the good news**. Over the centuries, **humanity has made extraordinary progress in taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference** alone. Indeed, it is very likely that **we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization.** It’s not a huge prize given how bad the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating. **Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious**. Take four prominent groups in 1860: **African-Americans were in chains, European Jews were routinely massacred** in the ghettos and shtetls they were confined to, **women around the world were denied** the **opportunity** to work outside the home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, **and LGBT people were invisible**. **The improvements in each of these group’s statuses today**, both in the United States and internationally, **are incontestable**. On closer look, **we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue.** **Take racial discrimination**. In 2000, **Harvard sociologist** Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He **found a “national consensus” on the ideals of racial equality and integration. “A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view**,” Bobo writes, “**but now overtly positively endorses the goals of** racial integration and **equal treatment**. **There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call it into question. The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one.”** The norm against overt racism has gone global. In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse’s Audie Klotz says flatly that “the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South Africa’s persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation.” The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa’s whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them. **Racism obviously survived** both American and South African apartheid, albeit **in more subtle, insidious forms.** “The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place,” Bobo writes, “a state of laissez-faire racism” where racial discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. **But there’s reason to hope that’ll change as well:** **two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans** by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, **found that millenials were significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them**. Though I’m not aware of any similar research of on a global scale, it’s hard not to imagine they’d find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning. The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement’s enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was an important value. The U.N.’s Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history. Finally, we’ve made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world. The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew’s “acceptance of homosexuality” poll were towards greater tolerance, and young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers. best\_year\_graphics-04 Once again, these victories are partial and by no means inevitable. **Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren’t just “going away**” on their own. **They’re losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people’s minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality**. Positive trends don’t mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren’t excuses for sitting on our hands. That’s true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn’t lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn’t an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime. **But too often, the worst parts about the world are treated as inevitable, the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be fals**e. As best we can tell, **the reason humanity is getting better is because humans have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we’ve passed laws against workplace discrimination** and poisoning children’s minds with lead. So far, **these choices have more than paid off.** It’s up to us to make sure they continue to.

**Race K: A2 “Whiteness = Root Cause”**

**Their argument elevates anti-blackness to an all-pervasive force that explains all oppression – that re-inscribes its inevitability---specific analysis of racism is crucial**

Margaret L. **Andersen 3**, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28

Conceptually, **one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the** **reification of whiteness as a concept**, as an experience, and as an identity. **This** practice **not only leads to** **conceptual obfuscation** **but also** **impedes the possibility for empirical analysis**. In this literature, **"whiteness" comes to mean** just about **everything associated with racial domination.** As such, **whiteness becomes a** **slippery and elusive concept**. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "**If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they** **did** **mainly because they were white**, **then there's** **little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings**" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that **whiteness "emerges from this critique as an** **omnipresent and all-powerful historical force**. **Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism**, **for the impoverishment of humanity**. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: **Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America**" (1996b:153).¶ **Despite** noting that there is differentiation among whites and **warning against using whiteness as a** **monolithic category**, **most of the literature still proceeds to do** **so**, **revealing a reductionist tendency**. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, **most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history** (Gallagher 2000). Hence **while trying to "deconstruct” whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness**, **the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it (**Stowe 1996:77).¶ For example, Michael Eric **Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution** (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). **But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept**. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). **Empirical investigation requires being able to** **identify and measure a concept**— **or at the very least to have a clear definition—but** **since whiteness has come to mean just about everything**, **it ends up meaning hardly anything**.

### Metaphors Bad

Reject this metaphorical approach – it’s pragmatically dangerous and prone to miscommunication – vote neg on presumption

**Hart 06**

(Hart, Geoff, September 2006, “Editorial: Overextending metaphors”, Scientific Communication, Vol. 13 No. 1, http://www.stcsig.org/sc/newsletter/html/2006-3.htm)FS

One problem with metaphors is that they can be carried too far: because a metaphor is only a simulation of reality, it does not precisely or fully match that reality, and each mismatch can potentially lead to misunderstanding. Consider, for example, the trash can used to delete files in most graphical user interfaces. The Macintosh interface designers who chose this metaphor to describe how users discard files chose an obvious and effective metaphor because just about everyone understands how a trash can works. But unfortunately, a great many users took that metaphor places its designers never intended. When this interface choice was first made, many Macintosh owners used their computer at home or in a small graphics studio rather than in a large corporate workplace, and thus used their experience with trash cans to make the following assumption: "When I throw something in the trash, it's going to stay there forever, or at least until I can persuade someone to take out the trash." Unfortunately, the first implementation of the Macintosh trash can automatically emptied the trash when you shut down your computer. That was clearly a problem for anyone who expected the discarded files to still be there waiting for them the next day when they turned on their computer. So many people complained about losing precious files (never mind that these files should never have been in the trash in the first place) that Apple changed the interface. Version two of the trash can accounted for this problem by leaving deleted files in the trash until someone specifically told the computer to empty the trash. That's a great idea, except by then, the world had moved on and more Macintosh users were using their computer in the workplace, where a janitor could be relied on to empty the trash each night after the workers went home. Since that wasn’t the way the software actually worked, the inevitable consequence was that files accumulated in the trash until they took over the entire computer; in other cases, people deleted files that were potentially embarrassing, not realizing the files were still there to be discovered by anyone who went poking around in the trash. Clearly, another small interface failure; unlike a spouse or roommate, the Macintosh operating system doesn't remind you to empty your trash periodically. A future iteration of the interface will presumably strike the right balance between versions one and two by retaining information in the trash until you specifically delete it, but also by periodically providing a gentle reminder to empty the trash. This example illustrates an important rule for successful use of metaphors: you must strive to understand the consequences of the metaphor by asking yourself what users will think when they encounter it, and thus, how they can be expected to behave. Where some behaviors will prove damaging, we need to clearly communicate the problem and its solution in our documentation. Better still, we need to report the problem to the designers of a product so they can take appropriate measures to protect users from their own instincts. Another significant problem with metaphors is that they rely on certain assumptions, and those assumptions bias how we think about reality. One of the most famous (some might say infamous) relates to a favorite device of science fiction writers: time travel. Science fiction writer René Barjavel, in pondering the implications of time travel, wondered about what quickly became known as the grandfather paradox: What would happen if you traveled back in time to a date before your parents were born, and killed one of your grandparents? Clearly, this means that one of your parents would never have lived, and thus could not have conceived you; the result, a few years into the future, is that you would never exist to return and kill that grandparent. But because you did not kill the grandparent, your parent would be born, leading to your birth and your subsequent desire to travel back in time and become a murderer. Round and round we go until we give up in frustration and choose a convenient way to avoid the problem—declare that time travel is impossible. Whether or not time travel really is impossible, that would be an unfortunate choice, because paradoxes are crucially important in science: they reveal when we don't understand a process nearly as clearly as we thought we did. If we did understand fully, there would be no paradox. The grandfather paradox presupposes that we understand how the physics of time travel would really work, namely that there is an indestructible connection between the past and the future and that changing the past would inevitably change the future. Should we stop there, no one would ever examine time travel in more detail to see whether other possibilities exist, and that would rob us of a much richer understanding of our world. One consequence might be the elimination of the branch of mathematics that examines the "many worlds" hypothesis, in which a whole new universe is hypothesized to spring into existence as soon as we change the past. In the case of the grandfather paradox, this means that two universes (one in which you are born and one in which you are not) would move forward through time from that point onwards. In writing a story, I once proposed a different metaphor: that time is more like a VHS tape, and that if you go back and change something, this is no different from recording over an old program you've already watched. The future (the part of the tape after the new recording) isn't changed because you haven't overwritten it yet. Both metaphors may be entirely incorrect (as seems likely based on our modern understanding of physics), but their correctness is not the important issue here: what's important is how each metaphor biases the way we think and predetermines the kind of analysis we're prepared to consider. Thus, a second rule of successful use of metaphors is that we must take great pains to understand the constraints they place on our thoughts. If we're aware of those constraints, we can attempt to work around them; if not, we won't make that effort, and that may prevent us from making crucial new discoveries. A third problem arises if we oversimplify our description of reality and thus neglect key issues. Consider, for example, the issue of fighting forest fires. Because mature forests develop over time spans longer than the typical human life, it's natural for us to think of them as eternal. Because we now understand the value of "untouched" nature, the inevitable consequence is that we want to preserve old forests and protect them against fires. This belief is epitomized in the public consciousness by Smokey the Bear and the "only you can prevent forest fires" slogan. Although it's true that human-originated fires are a serious problem, and should often be fought, the often part is neglected. In particular, the limited worldview offered by Smokey the Bear ignores the fact that fires are a crucial part of natural ecosystems and that some forest ecosystems only develop after fires, and will eventually disappear from the landscape if natural fires are not allowed to burn. The more general point is captured by the cliché that "the only constant is change". Ecosystems, including forests, aren't truly stable; instead, they exhibit what is known as metastability, in which what seems stable from the outside is actually changing continuously. In a forest, old trees die, unlucky trees are felled by lightning or windstorms, and new trees sprout to take their place. Rather than perfect stability, a mature forest is in equilibrium: individual components change, but the overall ecosystem stays close to its current state. Yet these equilibrium states also change; if the environment changes, or if disturbances such as fire are prevented, natural processes will lead the ecosystem to change into something new, and a new equilibrium will develop. For example, in the absence of fire, boreal jack pine forests will be replaced by shade-tolerant decidous trees that grow in the limited light beneath the forest canopy. As the older trees die, they are replaced by younger decidous trees, which produce so much shade when mature that the pines can no longer survive. The problem with describing ecosystems as stable is that it conceals the important concept of dynamic equilibrium, and the consequence that any equilibrium will eventually shift to a new type of equilibrium. This means we can never preserve a specific ecosystem in its current state forever, and that we probably should not try. Instead, it is more important to preserve the conditions that allow a given site to evolve naturally from one equilibrium state to another ("succession"), while altering conditions elsewhere to permit the development of the desired ecosystem. Communicating more of the complexity provides the necessary bounds on the metaphor, permits a more complete understanding, and lets us choose wiser management strategies. A third rule for successful use of metaphors is thus that we must identify critical points of failure—places where the metaphor is insufficiently complete that it leads our audience astray—and must provide the missing complexity that will prevent this misunderstanding. We must recognize that the purpose of a metaphor is to facilitate understanding, but once that understanding exists, we must build on it to provide any missing details that explain the true complexity. As scientific communicators, we often resort to metaphors because of their power to facilitate understanding. But to use metaphors successfully, we must be conscious of the problems I've identified in this essay: we must identify mismatches with reality, implicit and explicit assumptions, and places where the metaphor is too simplistic. Understanding these three problems lets us help our audience to understand the mismatches between the metaphor and reality, remind them of the assumptions behind the metaphor so that they can challenge those assumptions and make conceptual breakthroughs, and recognize where we have oversimplified a complex reality. That oversimplification is only acceptable if it provides an initial understanding that we can subsequently build upon to create a deeper, richer understanding.