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#### liberal inclusion- their reliance on [gender/race/sexuality] as the site of political contestation is not an accidental instance of ignoring class. The demand arises out of the crisis of liberalism—such politics particularizes the oppressions of capitalism to the point that the universal system is naturalized. Attaining white, male bourgeoisse privilege becomes the bench-mark of success, re-entrenching the foundation of the system

Wendy Brown, Professor & genuis, “Wounded Attachments,” POLITICAL THEORY, August 1993, ASP.

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure.

If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### Identity politics- the aff is a divide-and-rule strategy used by global capital to prevent labor from organizing and perpetuates localism as a method of knowledge, destroying the political universalism of class, rendering the systems of oppression invisible

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[Rosemary, Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism, Routledge]

Basic to the structure of late capitalism is a new global division of labor. Of course, capitalism has relied on an international division of labor since its inception, and so strictly speaking it has always been global. The industrial take-off in early-nineteenth-century Europe was possible because of the accumulation of wealth accrued from colonies all over the globe, and the development of monopoly capitalism in Europe and the United States depended on finding sources of raw materials and expanding markets in far-flung colonial territories. What distinguishes late capitalism’s global division of labor is the way new technologies have accelerated the speed and dispersed the space of production to unprecedented levels. Although late capitalism has magnified the homogenization of social relations and cultural forms, it is also characterized by unprecedented fragmentation of the production process into subnational localities. Since the end of World War II, and to an intensified degree since the 1970s, production has become increasingly flexible as capital seeks out those spaces for production that offer the cheapest labor source and the least political interference. This has meant that production is no longer centered entirely in a single site, and it no longer takes place primarily on the assembly line. Instead, production relies on heightened mobility, and on time and space compression— making use of profit-enhancing strategies like small batch, just-intime production, and outsourcing, with the manufacture and assembly of component parts sometimes spread over continents or diffused into “private” homework. Late capitalism is also more intensely transnational in the sense that a network of industrial and service formations rather than a single nation serves as its center, and the transnational corporation is now the prime determiner of capital transmission. These changes in production have challenged and recast the post– World War II division of geopolitics into first, second, and third worlds. The “second world” of the Soviet bloc has virtually disappeared; parts of the “undeveloped third world” are full and competitive participants in transnational capital exchange and are saturated with first-world corporations and commodities, while parts of the “first world” harbor relations of production and ways of life that are indistinguishable from conditions in many third-world countries. Flexible production has made organized resistance by labor more difficult and the terms for those who do not participate efficiently in late capitalist production more arrogant and absolute: nonplayers are simply moved out of capital’s pathways (Dirlik 32). Culturally this interplay between global homogenization and subnational fragmentation has registered in new forms of consciousness and transnational identity— multiculturalism for one, and more gender-flexible sexual identities for another— that coexist with or are being articulated into the prevailing values and norms of Europe and the United States (Dirlik 28– 31). Late capitalism’s new economic, political, and cultural structures have also intensified the relationship between global and local situations. Global transnational corporations rely on localities of many sorts as sites for capital accumulation through production, marketing, and knowledgemaking. Global-localism has become both the paradigm of production and an explicit new strategy by which the corporation infiltrates various localities without forfeiting its global aims (Dirlik 34). From corporate headquarters, CEOs orchestrate the incorporation of particular localities into the demands of global capital at the same time that the corporation is domesticated into the local society. Thus it is in the interests of global capitalism to celebrate and enhance awareness of local communities, cultures, and forms of identification. But this cannot be done in a way that makes evident their exploitation, that is, in a way that makes visible the real material relationship between the global and the local (Dirlik 35). Against capitalism’s penetration of local communities, many “local” groups— indigenous people’s movements, ethnic and women’s organizations, lesbian, gay, and transgender rights movements— have presented themselves as potential sites for liberation struggles. Undoubtedly, these struggles have indeed accomplished changes that have enhanced the quality of life for countless people. But the celebration of “the local” as a self-defined space for the affirmation of cultural identity and the formation of political resistance often also play into late capitalism’s opportunistic use of local-izing— not just as an arrangement of production but also as a structure of knowing. The turn to “the local” has also been the characteristic talisman of a postmodern culture and politics that has repudiated the totalizing narratives of modernity. The claims of indigenous and ethnic groups, of women, and of lesbian and gay people have been an important part of postmodern challenges to the adequacy of cultural narratives— among them enlightened humanism and Eurocentric scholarship— that do not address the histories of subaltern peoples. However, insofar as their counter-narratives put forward an alternative that de-links the interests of particular social groups from the larger collective that they are part of, they tend to promote political projects that keep the structures of capitalism invisible.

#### patriarcy, racism and heterosexism are not ahistorical products of sexism or patriarchy, but historical productions of the emergence of a classed society founded on the logic of surplus accumulation. This shift from necessity to surplus solidified the pre-existing division of labor based on need and then sexed it to justify inequality

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[Dana, “Marxism and Oppression”, Talk for Regional Socialist Conference, April 19, 2003, p. online]

In order to challenge oppression, it is important to know where it comes from. Historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists tell us that in pre-class societies such as hunter-gatherer societies, racism and sexism were unheard of. Because homosexuality was not an identifiable category of such societies, discrimination on that basis did not occur either. In fact, it is clear that racism, sexism, and homophobia have arisen in particular kinds of societies, namely class societies. Women’s oppression originated in the first class societies, while racism came into prominence in the early periods of capitalism when colonialism and slavery drove the economic system. The prohibition against gays and lesbians is a relatively modern phenomenon. But what all forms of oppression have in common is that they did not always exist and are not endemic to human nature. They were created in the interest of ruling classes in society and continue to benefit the people at the top of society, while dividing and conquering the rest of us so as to weaken the common fight against the oppressors. The work of Marx’s collaborator Friederich Engels onThe Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State in some respects reflects the Victorian times in which in was written. Engels moralizes about women’s sexuality and doesn’t even include gay and lesbian liberation in his discussion of the oppressive family. However, anthropologists like the feminist Rayna Reiter have confirmed his most important and central argument that it was in the first settled agricultural societies that women became an oppressed class. In societies where for the first time people could accumulate a surplus of food and other resources, it was possible for some people to hoard wealth and control its distribution. The first governments or state structures formed to legitimate an emerging ruling class. As settled communities grew in size and became more complex social organizations, and, most importantly, as the surplus grew, the distribution of wealth became unequal—and a small number of men rose above the rest of the population in wealth and power. In the previous hunter-gatherer societies, there had been a sexual division of labor, but one without a hierarchy of value. There was no strict demarcation between the reproductive and productive spheres. All of that changed with the development of private property in more settled communities. The earlier division of labor in which men did the heavier work, hunting, and animal agriculture, became a system of differential control over resource distribution. The new system required more field workers and sought to maximize women’s reproductive potential. Production shifted away from the household over time and women became associated with the reproductive role, losing control over the production and distribution of the necessities of life. It was not a matter of male sexism, but of economic priorities of a developing class system. This is why Engels identifies women’s oppression as the first form of systematic class oppression in the world. Marxists since Engels have not dismissed the oppression of women as secondary to other kinds of oppression and exploitation. To the contrary, women’s oppression has a primary place in Marxist analysis and is a key issue that socialists organize around today. From this history we know that sexism did not always exist, and that men do not have an inherent interest in oppressing women as domestic servants or sexual slaves. Instead, women’s oppression always has served a class hierarchy in society. In our society divided by sexism, ideas about women’s nature as domestic caretakers or irrational sexual beings justify paying women lower wages compared to men, so that employers can pit workers against one another in competition for the same work. Most women have always had to work outside the home to support their families. Today, women around the world are exploited in sweatshops where their status as women allows bosses to pay them very little, driving down the wages of both men and women. At the same time, capitalist society relies on ideas about women to justify not providing very much in the way of social services that would help provide health care, family leave, unemployment insurance, access to primary and higher education, and so forth—all because these things are supposed to happen in the private family, where women are responsible. This lack of social support results in a lower quality of life for many men as well as women. Finally, contemporary ideologies that pit men against women encourage us to fight each other rather than organizing together.

#### The alternative has two parts

#### The first is about debate- our idea of the debate space is one which recognizes that the ballot isn’t imbued with power and doesn’t have a significant effect on the debate community writ large – the first step towards rejecting the commodity fetishism of the ballot is to refuse to give it power over us . We think debate should be a question of competing methods for changing politics. The alt is “base communism”- which works towards dedicating our labor to caring for community over abstract economies of value.

#### the second is disrupting “common sense”- Even in absence of a blueprint for an alternative – endorsing a politics of labor based on communal relations rather than surplus value is essential to avoid ecological devastation, extinction and fight those things. Decision calculus should not be to expect things to change overnight but be open to the possibility of revolution.

Graeber 13 (contributing editor of the Baffler, “A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse”¶ DAVID GRAEBER¶ [from The Baffler No. 22, 2013] http://www.thebaffler.com/past/practical\_utopians\_guide

What is a revolution? We used to think we knew. Revolutions were seizures of power by popular forces aiming to transform the very nature of the political, social, and economic system in the country in which the revolution took place, usually according to some visionary dream of a just society. Nowadays, we live in an age when, if rebel armies do come sweeping into a city, or mass uprisings overthrow a dictator, it’s unlikely to have any such implications; when profound social transformation does occur—as with, say, the rise of feminism—it’s likely to take an entirely different form. It’s not that revolutionary dreams aren’t out there. But contemporary revolutionaries rarely think they can bring them into being by some modern-day equivalent of storming the Bastille.¶ ¶ At moments like this, it generally pays to go back to the history one already knows and ask: Were revolutions ever really what we thought them to be? For me, the person who has asked this most effectively is the great world historian Immanuel Wallerstein. He argues that for the last quarter millennium or so, revolutions have consisted above all of planetwide transformations of political common sense.¶ Already by the time of the French Revolution, Wallerstein notes, there was a single world market, and increasingly a single world political system as well, dominated by the huge colonial empires. As a result, the storming of the Bastille in Paris could well end up having effects on Denmark, or even Egypt, just as profound as on France itself—in some cases, even more so. Hence he speaks of the “world revolution of 1789,” followed by the “world revolution of 1848,” which saw revolutions break out almost simultaneously in fifty countries, from Wallachia to Brazil. In no case did the revolutionaries succeed in taking power, but afterward, institutions inspired by the French Revolution—notably, universal systems of primary education—were put in place pretty much everywhere. Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a world revolution ultimately responsible for the New Deal and European welfare states as much as for Soviet communism. The last in the series was the world revolution of 1968—which, much like 1848, broke out almost everywhere, from China to Mexico, seized power nowhere, but nonetheless changed everything. This was a revolution against state bureaucracies, and for the inseparability of personal and political liberation, whose most lasting legacy will likely be the birth of modern feminism.¶ A quarter of the American population is now engaged in “guard labor”—defending property, supervising work, or otherwise keeping their fellow Americans in line.¶ Revolutions are thus planetary phenomena. But there is more. What they really do is transform basic assumptions about what politics is ultimately about. In the wake of a revolution, ideas that had been considered veritably lunatic fringe quickly become the accepted currency of debate. Before the French Revolution, the ideas that change is good, that government policy is the proper way to manage it, and that governments derive their authority from an entity called “the people” were considered the sorts of things one might hear from crackpots and demagogues, or at best a handful of freethinking intellectuals who spend their time debating in cafés. A generation later, even the stuffiest magistrates, priests, and headmasters had to at least pay lip service to these ideas. Before long, we had reached the situation we are in today: that it’s necessary to lay out the terms for anyone to even notice they are there. They’ve become common sense, the very grounds of political discussion.¶ Until 1968, most world revolutions really just introduced practical refinements: an expanded franchise, universal primary education, the welfare state. The world revolution of 1968, in contrast—whether it took the form it did in China, of a revolt by students and young cadres supporting Mao’s call for a Cultural Revolution; or in Berkeley and New York, where it marked an alliance of students, dropouts, and cultural rebels; or even in Paris, where it was an alliance of students and workers—was a rebellion against bureaucracy, conformity, or anything that fettered the human imagination, a project for the revolutionizing of not just political or economic life, but every aspect of human existence. As a result, in most cases, the rebels didn’t even try to take over the apparatus of state; they saw that apparatus as itself the problem.¶ It’s fashionable nowadays to view the social movements of the late sixties as an embarrassing failure. A case can be made for that view. It’s certainly true that in the political sphere, the immediate beneficiary of any widespread change in political common sense—a prioritizing of ideals of individual liberty, imagination, and desire; a hatred of bureaucracy; and suspicions about the role of government—was the political Right. Above all, the movements of the sixties allowed for the mass revival of free market doctrines that had largely been abandoned since the nineteenth century. It’s no coincidence that the same generation who, as teenagers, made the Cultural Revolution in China was the one who, as forty-year-olds, presided over the introduction of capitalism. Since the eighties, “freedom” has come to mean “the market,” and “the market” has come to be seen as identical with capitalism—even, ironically, in places like China, which had known sophisticated markets for thousands of years, but rarely anything that could be described as capitalism.¶ The ironies are endless. While the new free market ideology has framed itself above all as a rejection of bureaucracy, it has, in fact, been responsible for the first administrative system that has operated on a planetary scale, with its endless layering of public and private bureaucracies: the IMF, World Bank, WTO, trade organizations, financial institutions, transnational corporations, NGOs. This is precisely the system that has imposed free market orthodoxy, and opened the world to financial pillage, under the watchful aegis of American arms. It only made sense that the first attempt to recreate a global revolutionary movement, the Global Justice Movement that peaked between 1998 and 2003, was effectively a rebellion against the rule of that very planetary bureaucracy.¶ Future Stop¶ In retrospect, though, I think that later historians will conclude that the legacy of the sixties revolution was deeper than we now imagine, and that the triumph of capitalist markets and their various planetary administrators and enforcers—which seemed so epochal and permanent in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—was, in fact, far shallower.¶ I’ll take an obvious example. One often hears that antiwar protests in the late sixties and early seventies were ultimately failures, since they did not appreciably speed up the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. But afterward, those controlling U.S. foreign policy were so anxious about being met with similar popular unrest—and even more, with unrest within the military itself, which was genuinely falling apart by the early seventies—that they refused to commit U.S. forces to any major ground conflict for almost thirty years. It took 9/11, an attack that led to thousands of civilian deaths on U.S. soil, to fully overcome the notorious “Vietnam syndrome”—and even then, the war planners made an almost obsessive effort to ensure the wars were effectively protest-proof. Propaganda was incessant, the media was brought on board, experts provided exact calculations on body bag counts (how many U.S. casualties it would take to stir mass opposition), and the rules of engagement were carefully written to keep the count below that.¶ The problem was that since those rules of engagement ensured that thousands of women, children, and old people would end up “collateral damage” in order to minimize deaths and injuries to U.S. soldiers, this meant that in Iraq and Afghanistan, intense hatred for the occupying forces would pretty much guarantee that the United States couldn’t obtain its military objectives. And remarkably, the war planners seemed to be aware of this. It didn’t matter. They considered it far more important to prevent effective opposition at home than to actually win the war. It’s as if American forces in Iraq were ultimately defeated by the ghost of Abbie Hoffman.¶ Clearly, an antiwar movement in the sixties that is still tying the hands of U.S. military planners in 2012 can hardly be considered a failure. But it raises an intriguing question: What happens when the creation of that sense of failure, of the complete ineffectiveness of political action against the system, becomes the chief objective of those in power?¶ ¶ The thought first occurred to me when participating in the IMF actions in Washington, D.C., in 2002. Coming on the heels of 9/11, we were relatively few and ineffective, the number of police overwhelming. There was no sense that we could succeed in shutting down the meetings. Most of us left feeling vaguely depressed. It was only a few days later, when I talked to someone who had friends attending the meetings, that I learned we had in fact shut them down: the police had introduced such stringent security measures, canceling half the events, that most of the actual meetings had been carried out online. In other words, the government had decided it was more important for protesters to walk away feeling like failures than for the IMF meetings to take place. If you think about it, they afforded protesters extraordinary importance.¶ Is it possible that this preemptive attitude toward social movements, the designing of wars and trade summits in such a way that preventing effective opposition is considered more of a priority than the success of the war or summit itself, really reflects a more general principle? What if those currently running the system, most of whom witnessed the unrest of the sixties firsthand as impressionable youngsters, are—consciously or unconsciously (and I suspect it’s more conscious than not)—obsessed by the prospect of revolutionary social movements once again challenging prevailing common sense?¶ It would explain a lot. In most of the world, the last thirty years has come to be known as the age of neoliberalism—one dominated by a revival of the long-since-abandoned nineteenth-century creed that held that free markets and human freedom in general were ultimately the same thing. Neoliberalism has always been wracked by a central paradox. It declares that economic imperatives are to take priority over all others. Politics itself is just a matter of creating the conditions for growing the economy by allowing the magic of the marketplace to do its work. All other hopes and dreams—of equality, of security—are to be sacrificed for the primary goal of economic productivity. But global economic performance over the last thirty years has been decidedly mediocre. With one or two spectacular exceptions (notably China, which significantly ignored most neoliberal prescriptions), growth rates have been far below what they were in the days of the old-fashioned, state-directed, welfare-state-oriented capitalism of the fifties, sixties, and even seventies. By its own standards, then, the project was already a colossal failure even before the 2008 collapse.¶ If, on the other hand, we stop taking world leaders at their word and instead think of neoliberalism as a political project, it suddenly looks spectacularly effective. The politicians, CEOs, trade bureaucrats, and so forth who regularly meet at summits like Davos or the G20 may have done a miserable job in creating a world capitalist economy that meets the needs of a majority of the world’s inhabitants (let alone produces hope, happiness, security, or meaning), but they have succeeded magnificently in convincing the world that capitalism—and not just capitalism, but exactly the financialized, semifeudal capitalism we happen to have right now—is the only viable economic system. If you think about it, this is a remarkable accomplishment.¶ Debt cancellation would make the perfect revolutionary demand.¶ How did they pull it off? The preemptive attitude toward social movements is clearly a part of it; under no conditions can alternatives, or anyone proposing alternatives, be seen to experience success. This helps explain the almost unimaginable investment in “security systems” of one sort or another: the fact that the United States, which lacks any major rival, spends more on its military and intelligence than it did during the Cold War, along with the almost dazzling accumulation of private security agencies, intelligence agencies, militarized police, guards, and mercenaries. Then there are the propaganda organs, including a massive media industry that did not even exist before the sixties, celebrating police. Mostly these systems do not so much attack dissidents directly as contribute to a pervasive climate of fear, jingoistic conformity, life insecurity, and simple despair that makes any thought of changing the world seem an idle fantasy. Yet these security systems are also extremely expensive. Some economists estimate that a quarter of the American population is now engaged in “guard labor” of one sort or another—defending property, supervising work, or otherwise keeping their fellow Americans in line. Economically, most of this disciplinary apparatus is pure deadweight.¶ In fact, most of the economic innovations of the last thirty years make more sense politically than economically. Eliminating guaranteed life employment for precarious contracts doesn’t really create a more effective workforce, but it is extraordinarily effective in destroying unions and otherwise depoliticizing labor. The same can be said of endlessly increasing working hours. No one has much time for political activity if they’re working sixty-hour weeks.¶ It does often seem that, whenever there is a choice between one option that makes capitalism seem the only possible economic system, and another that would actually make capitalism a more viable economic system, neoliberalism means always choosing the former. The combined result is a relentless campaign against the human imagination. Or, to be more precise: imagination, desire, individual creativity, all those things that were to be liberated in the last great world revolution, were to be contained strictly in the domain of consumerism, or perhaps in the virtual realities of the Internet. In all other realms they were to be strictly banished. We are talking about the murdering of dreams, the imposition of an apparatus of hopelessness, designed to squelch any sense of an alternative future. Yet as a result of putting virtually all their efforts in one political basket, we are left in the bizarre situation of watching the capitalist system crumbling before our very eyes, at just the moment everyone had finally concluded no other system would be possible.¶ Work It Out, Slow It Down¶ Normally, when you challenge the conventional wisdom—that the current economic and political system is the only possible one—the first reaction you are likely to get is a demand for a detailed architectural blueprint of how an alternative system would work, down to the nature of its financial instruments, energy supplies, and policies of sewer maintenance. Next, you are likely to be asked for a detailed program of how this system will be brought into existence. Historically, this is ridiculous. When has social change ever happened according to someone’s blueprint? It’s not as if a small circle of visionaries in Renaissance Florence conceived of something they called “capitalism,” figured out the details of how the stock exchange and factories would someday work, and then put in place a program to bring their visions into reality. In fact, the idea is so absurd we might well ask ourselves how it ever occurred to us to imagine this is how change happens to begin.¶ This is not to say there’s anything wrong with utopian visions. Or even blueprints. They just need to be kept in their place. The theorist Michael Albert has worked out a detailed plan for how a modern economy could run without money on a democratic, participatory basis. I think this is an important achievement—not because I think that exact model could ever be instituted, in exactly the form in which he describes it, but because it makes it impossible to say that such a thing is inconceivable. Still, such models can be only thought experiments. We cannot really conceive of the problems that will arise when we start trying to build a free society. What now seem likely to be the thorniest problems might not be problems at all; others that never even occurred to us might prove devilishly difficult. There are innumerable X-factors.¶ The most obvious is technology. This is the reason it’s so absurd to imagine activists in Renaissance Italy coming up with a model for a stock exchange and factories—what happened was based on all sorts of technologies that they couldn’t have anticipated, but which in part only emerged because society began to move in the direction that it did. This might explain, for instance, why so many of the more compelling visions of an anarchist society have been produced by science fiction writers (Ursula K. Le Guin, Starhawk, Kim Stanley Robinson). In fiction, you are at least admitting the technological aspect is guesswork.¶ Myself, I am less interested in deciding what sort of economic system we should have in a free society than in creating the means by which people can make such decisions for themselves. What might a revolution in common sense actually look like? I don’t know, but I can think of any number of pieces of conventional wisdom that surely need challenging if we are to create any sort of viable free society. I’ve already explored one—the nature of money and debt—in some detail in a recent book. I even suggested a debt jubilee, a general cancellation, in part just to bring home that money is really just a human product, a set of promises, that by its nature can always be renegotiated.¶ ¶ Labor, similarly, should be renegotiated. Submitting oneself to labor discipline—supervision, control, even the self-control of the ambitious self-employed—does not make one a better person. In most really important ways, it probably makes one worse. To undergo it is a misfortune that at best is sometimes necessary. Yet it’s only when we reject the idea that such labor is virtuous in itself that we can start to ask what is virtuous about labor. To which the answer is obvious. Labor is virtuous if it helps others. A renegotiated definition of productivity should make it easier to reimagine the very nature of what work is, since, among other things, it will mean that technological development will be redirected less toward creating ever more consumer products and ever more disciplined labor, and more toward eliminating those forms of labor entirely.¶ What would remain is the kind of work only human beings will ever be able to do: those forms of caring and helping labor that are at the very center of the crisis that brought about Occupy Wall Street to begin with. What would happen if we stopped acting as if the primordial form of work is laboring at a production line, or wheat field, or iron foundry, or even in an office cubicle, and instead started from a mother, a teacher, or a caregiver? We might be forced to conclude that the real business of human life is not contributing toward something called “the economy” (a concept that didn’t even exist three hundred years ago), but the fact that we are all, and have always been, projects of mutual creation.¶ It’s as if American forces in Iraq were ultimately defeated by the ghost of Abbie Hoffman.¶ At the moment, probably the most pressing need is simply to slow down the engines of productivity. This might seem a strange thing to say—our knee-jerk reaction to every crisis is to assume the solution is for everyone to work even more, though of course, this kind of reaction is really precisely the problem—but if you consider the overall state of the world, the conclusion becomes obvious. We seem to be facing two insoluble problems. On the one hand, we have witnessed an endless series of global debt crises, which have grown only more and more severe since the seventies, to the point where the overall burden of debt—sovereign, municipal, corporate, personal—is obviously unsustainable. On the other, we have an ecological crisis, a galloping process of climate change that is threatening to throw the entire planet into drought, floods, chaos, starvation, and war. The two might seem unrelated. But ultimately they are the same. What is debt, after all, but the promise of future productivity? Saying that global debt levels keep rising is simply another way of saying that, as a collectivity, human beings are promising each other to produce an even greater volume of goods and services in the future than they are creating now. But even current levels are clearly unsustainable. They are precisely what’s destroying the planet, at an ever-increasing pace.¶ Even those running the system are reluctantly beginning to conclude that some kind of mass debt cancellation—some kind of jubilee—is inevitable. The real political struggle is going to be over the form that it takes. Well, isn’t the obvious thing to address both problems simultaneously? Why not a planetary debt cancellation, as broad as practically possible, followed by a mass reduction in working hours: a four-hour day, perhaps, or a guaranteed five-month vacation? This might not only save the planet but also (since it’s not like everyone would just be sitting around in their newfound hours of freedom) begin to change our basic conceptions of what value-creating labor might actually be.¶ Occupy was surely right not to make demands, but if I were to have to formulate one, that would be it. After all, this would be an attack on the dominant ideology at its very strongest points. The morality of debt and the morality of work are the most powerful ideological weapons in the hands of those running the current system. That’s why they cling to them even as they are effectively destroying everything else. It’s also why debt cancellation would make the perfect revolutionary demand.¶ All this might still seem very distant. At the moment, the planet might seem poised more for a series of unprecedented catastrophes than for the kind of broad moral and political transformation that would open the way to such a world. But if we are going to have any chance of heading off those catastrophes, we’re going to have to change our accustomed ways of thinking. And as the events of 2011 reveal, the age of revolutions is by no means over. The human imagination stubbornly refuses to die. And the moment any significant number of people simultaneously shake off the shackles that have been placed on that collective imagination, even our most deeply inculcated assumptions about what is and is not politically possible have been known to crumble overnight.

#### Historical materialism is key: you must understand the world before you can change it- grounding sites of political contestation outside of labor humanizes capital and forcloses upon the possibility of revolution.

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. W

hy? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### 2

#### Interpretation—all arguments read in previous debates must be publicly accessible on the wiki in either open source fashion, as complete citations, OR a complete description of the argument in the Round Report

#### A. Debaters should post their arguments—that some judge or competitor put up their description of your argument does not count—not only should you not get credit for that, they are often incomplete or entirely inaccurate—Round Reports require a description of your arguments, and answers to arguments in the debate

#### B. Source citations should be full—they can be APA, MLA, Chicago, whatever, as long as it includes enough information to find the parts of texts you used in the debate—this means your source should include an author name, a title, a publication, a date, a URL if applicable, a page number, and the first and last words of the text

#### Violation: The affirmative does not have adequate wiki disclosure

#### Reasons to Prefer

#### Argument Quality—our interp increases it substantially

#### a. Improvements happen rapidly through peer review—only in a system of disclosure do we know the arguments the other team is making in enough detail to actually test

Torvalds and Diamond ‘1 [Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); “Why Open Source Makes Sense”; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2 //nick]

It's the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the PC wasn't developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened for any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a project's development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the General Public License - the anticopyright - as the movement's powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to accept widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of Linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source expanding beyond the technical and business domains. At Harvard University Law School, professors Larry Lessig (who is now at Stanford) and Charles Nesson have brought the open source model to law. They started the Open Law Project, which relies on volunteer lawyers and law students posting opinions and research on the project's Web site to help develop arguments and briefs challenging the United States Copyright Extension Act. The theory is that the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project, and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and repostings. The site nicely sums up the trade off from the traditional approach: "What we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument." (Put in another context: With a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It's a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for diseases, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realise the tight-fisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system - is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, exploit it. But those improvements, changes and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and everyone. When a project is opened up, there is rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That's what we experienced with Linux. Imagine: Instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to the project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no, er, peer. The first time people hear about the open source approach, it sounds ludicrous. That's why it has taken years for the message of its virtues to sink in. Ideology isn't what has sold the open source model. It started gaining attention when it was obvious that open source was the best method of developing and improving the highest quality technology. And now it is winning in the marketplace, an accomplishment has brought open source its greatest acceptance. Companies were able to be created around numerous value-added services, or to use open source as a way of making a technology popular. When the money rolls in, people get convinced. One of the least understood pieces of the open source puzzle is how so many good programmers would deign to work for absolutely no money. A word about motivation is in order. In a society where survival is more or less assured, money is not the greatest of motivators. It's been well established that folks do their best work when they are driven by a passion. When they are having fun. This is as true for playwrights and sculptors and entrepreneurs as it is for software engineers. The open source model gives people the opportunity to live their passion. To have fun and to work with the world's best programmers, not the few who happen to be employed by their company. Open source developers strive to earn the esteem of their peers. That's got to be highly motivating.

#### b. No secrecy—there is no incentive to hide bad arguments, and weak arguments won’t be run

Raymond ‘99 [Eric S. (Hacker, GNU Contributor, Co-Developer of Fetchmail, Nethack, Emac’s VD and GUD modes); “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”; August 8; <http://www.cantonmaine.com/bazaar/cathedral-bazaar-4.html> //nick]

In The Mythical Man-Month, Fred Brooks observed that programmer time is not fungible; adding developers to a late software project makes it later. As we've seen previously, he argued that the complexity and communication costs of a project rise with the square of the number of developers, while work done only rises linearly. Brooks's Law has been widely regarded as a truism. But we've examined in this essay a number of ways in which the process of open-source development falsifies the assumptions behind it—and, empirically, if Brooks's Law were the whole picture Linux would be impossible. Gerald Weinberg's classic The Psychology of Computer Programming supplied what, in hindsight, we can see as a vital correction to Brooks. In his discussion of ``egoless programming'', Weinberg observed that in shops where developers are not territorial about their code, and encourage other people to look for bugs and potential improvements in it, improvement happens dramatically faster than elsewhere. (Recently, Kent Beck's `extreme programming' technique of deploying coders in pairs looking over one anothers' shoulders might be seen as an attempt to force this effect.) Weinberg's choice of terminology has perhaps prevented his analysis from gaining the acceptance it deserved—one has to smile at the thought of describing Internet hackers as ``egoless''. But I think his argument looks more compelling today than ever. The bazaar method, by harnessing the full power of the ``egoless programming'' effect, strongly mitigates the effect of Brooks's Law. The principle behind Brooks's Law is not repealed, but given a large developer population and cheap communications its effects can be swamped by competing nonlinearities that are not otherwise visible. This resembles the relationship between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics—the older system is still valid at low energies, but if you push mass and velocity high enough you get surprises like nuclear explosions or Linux.

#### c. Deeper level understanding—only open source encourages debaters, judges and coaches reflection on both the form AND the content of arguments

Raymond ‘99 [Eric S. (Hacker, GNU Contributor, Co-Developer of Fetchmail, Nethack, Emac’s VD and GUD modes); “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”; August 8; http://library.n0i.net/advocacy/cathedral/ar01s05.html //nick]

One key to understanding is to realize exactly why it is that the kind of bug report non–source-aware users normally turn in tends not to be very useful. Non–source-aware users tend to report only surface symptoms; they take their environment for granted, so they (a) omit critical background data, and (b) seldom include a reliable recipe for reproducing the bug. The underlying problem here is a mismatch between the tester's and the developer's mental models of the program; the tester, on the outside looking in, and the developer on the inside looking out. In closed-source development they're both stuck in these roles, and tend to talk past each other and find each other deeply frustrating. Open-source development breaks this bind, making it far easier for tester and developer to develop a shared representation grounded in the actual source code and to communicate effectively about it. Practically, there is a huge difference in leverage for the developer between the kind of bug report that just reports externally-visible symptoms and the kind that hooks directly to the developer's source-code–based mental representation of the program. Most bugs, most of the time, are easily nailed given even an incomplete but suggestive characterization of their error conditions at source-code level. When someone among your beta-testers can point out, "there's a boundary problem in line nnn", or even just "under conditions X, Y, and Z, this variable rolls over", a quick look at the offending code often suffices to pin down the exact mode of failure and generate a fix. Thus, source-code awareness by both parties greatly enhances both good communication and the synergy between what a beta-tester reports and what the core developer(s) know. In turn, this means that the core developers' time tends to be well conserved, even with many collaborators.

#### d. It leaves the debate community

von Hippel ‘5 [Eric (Head of the Innovation and Entrepreneurship Group in the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology); “Democratizing Information”; p. 88-89; http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/books.htm //nick]  
  
In the case of academic publications, we see evidence that free revealing does increase reuse—a matter of great importance to academics. A citation is an indicator that information contained in an article has been reused: the article has been read by the citing author and found useful enough to draw to readers' attention. Recent empirical studies are finding that articles to which readers have open access—articles available for free download from an author’s website, for example—are cited significantly more often than are equivalent articles that are available only from libraries or from publishers’ fee-based websites. Antelman (2004) finds an increase in citations ranging from 45 percent in philosophy to 91 percent in mathematics. She notes that "scholars in diverse disciplines are adopting open-access practices at a surprisingly high rate and are being rewarded for it, as reflected in [citations]."

#### e. This is empirically true

Mitchell ’00 [Gordon (Professor of Communications at the University of Pittsburgh); Strategic Deceptions: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy; p. xvi-xvii //nick]

Perhaps the most strange and idiosyncratic aspect of the contemporary intercollegiate debate community is that, by and large, it keeps to itself. Contrary to the populist tradition of debate as the quintessential genre of public discourse, contemporary intercollegiate debate is an insular and specialized academic activity. The research products generated by thousands of debaters nation-wide are generally put toward a singular end: winning tournament competitions. Sometimes this insularity appears absurd to those who stumble across a slice of the debate community for the first time. In the summer of 1990, Madison Laird (then captain of the Loyola University   
debate squad) was assigned the task of entertaining Earth Day organizer Bill Keepin during Keepin¹s visit to the Loyola campus in Los Angeles, California. After Keepin delivered a speech on nuclear power to the student body, Laird led him on a campus tour that ended up in the debate squad room, where yards and yards of argument briefs were stowed away in filing drawers. When Keepin asked to see the files containing research on nuclear power, Laird pulled open one file drawer stuffed to the gills with high-quality research. Keepin was stunned, asking incredulously "how long have you folks kept this stuff locked up?!" In a small way, this vignette   
illustrates the folly associated with the intercollegiate debate community's insular nature. Indeed, it would not be surprising to find countless other Bill Keepins out there who could make tremendous use of the research and knowledge generated out of intercollegiate policy debate competition. To reach them, debaters need only to realize that they can make vital contributions to public arguments swirling beyond the rarefied confines of debate tournament sites.

#### 2. Education—our interp increases both breadth and depth of education

#### Breadth – this is really just simple math – every innovation or argument would expand the research and education base. Depth -- Without the secrecy element of research, pre-tournament research is spent understanding arguments and how to interact with them, instead of just collecting evidence from the wiki

#### 3. Fairness—open source reduces entry barriers and solves resource disparities

#### Vote negative to endorse an open source model of debate

## 2NC

### cards

#### AND, THE AFFIRMATIVE’S CLAIM TO PERFORMATIVELY EFFECT CHANGE AGAINST CAPITALISM LOCATES AGENCY IN RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES LIKE THE PRECIOUS 1AC. THIS SHUTS DOWN MATERIALIST COALITIONAL ANTI-CAPITALIST MOVEMENTS.

GUNN AND CLOUD 2K10

[Joshua gunn and dana cloud, PhdCommunicatoins, University of Texas Austin, Agentic Orientation as magical Voluntarism, Communication Theory]

Notably, Campbell’s statement on the status of agency does not attempt to reverse the posthumanist turn, but rather, sets out to reconcile the theoretical perspectives of Judith Butler and Michelle Balif with close textual reading practices that, until the crisis of agency, were assumed to have singular, self-transparent authors. Similarly,

John Lucaites’ call to jettison agency as a concept and locate power, instead, in historically particular rhetorical performances ‘‘in relationship to a set of perceived or constituted tensions . . . between cultural, institutional, and technological norms and structures’’ is a theoretical compromise: Agency is best understood on a caseby-case basis, leading to a multiplicity of conceptions of agency(Lucaites, 2003, paras. 1–2). Carolyn R. Miller’s (2007) recharacterization of agency as an attribution that makes certain kinds of symbolic action possible also ﬁgures a subject’s actions between the constraints of an exterior and the motives of an interior. The most widely known, explicitly dialectical positions on agency in rhetorical studies, however, are those of James ArntAune, Dana Cloud, and other Marxist critics. For example, critical of certain posthumanist theories of agency (namely, those of Greene 1998; 2004; 2007), Cloud, Macek, &Aune (2006) argue that social groups, especially class-based groups, harbor a capacity for political action grounded in their material circumstances: Either workers and their allies claim the real agency of that they possess and take the chance of making a world in which they are free in body as well as mind; or they resign themselves to generation after generation of grinding exploitation, settling for the meaningful but insufﬁcient consolations of sporadic, creative, ungrounded, and symbolic resistance.(2006, p. 81) Cloud, Macek, &Aune (2006) argue not only that ordinary people must mobilizecollectively in order to pressure or overthrow employers and institutions, but also that it is the intersection of consciousness and experience that is generative of agency. In other words, as Cloud (2005) explains, working class agency is a product of both the experience of embodied labor and explicit political intervention and collective organizing. Agency in this view is not primarily characteristic of individuals; rather, the working class is a particular kind of collective agent that can manifest a real challenge to the capitalist system. In contrast, to believe that one can individually effect political change, or worse, to believe that one is powerless to effect political change, is to succumb to oppressive structures, economic and otherwise. Again, agency is located in the tensions between a larger structure and the (collective)

subject (also see Jameson, 1977).

#### post-fordism warehouses surplus populations- explains the drug war and and incarceration

Carter Wilson April, 2012 “The Dominant Class and the Construction of Racial Oppression: A Neo-Marxist/Gramscian Approach to Race in the United States Socialism and Democracy http://postcapitalistproject.org/node/92

Another severe impact of the Post-Fordist period, particularly on blacks, is the warehousing of surplus populations. Four trends reflect the severe racial repression associated with Post-Fordism. First, incarceration rates in the US have increased exponentially since 1980. In 1980 about 1.8 million people were in the system (jail, prison, probation or parole). About 400,000 were in jail or prison. By 2007, there were over 7.3 million in the system and over 2.3 million incarcerated.35 The United States incarcerates more people than ever before in its history and more people than any other nation in the world. Whereas the US only has 5% of the world population, it holds 25% of the world’s prisoners.36¶ Second, the increase in the prison population has been tied directly into surplus populations, the populations of the poor and unemployed. The overwhelming majority of those incarcerated are poor people and people of color:¶ ¶ Across all racial groups, prisoners are drawn from the poorest sectors of society. A large percentage (of prisoners) are unemployed at the time of their arrest or have only sporadic employment. Of those with jobs, many have incomes near or below the poverty level. Seventy-two percent of prison inmates and 60 percent of jail inmates have not completed high school; many are illiterate….¶ The statistical link between unemployment or underemployment and imprisonment is borne out in the demographic characteristics of prison populations. In 1990, 58.2 percent of all those jailed (about 561,700 people) were unemployed at the time of their arrest. Roughly 68 percent earned less than $15,000 a year. State prison populations reveal a similar link. In Florida, for example, of nearly 30,000 people imprisoned in 1986, barely half (52 percent) were employed full-time at the time of their arrest. Nearly half earned less than $500 a month.37¶ ¶ Third, not only does the US have the highest incarceration rate in the world, it incarcerates a higher percentage of its minority population than any other country. The US incarceration rate is 702 per 100,000. The nearest competitor is Russia with a rate of 628. US incarceration rates are much higher for male populations. The white male incarceration rate is 736 per 100,000. This high rate is indicative of a class repressive society. The black male incarceration rate is an alarming 4,789 per 100,000. This rate is indicative of an extreme racially repressive society.38 In 2006 there were about 836,800 black males in jail or prison out of a population of about 18,262,000 black males.39 That is, about 4.58% of the total black male population. The percentage is much higher when the age group of 20 to 29 is considered, close to 10%.40¶ Fourth, the repressive level of incarceration rates of blacks is a function of racial stereotypes and racial targeting of black populations. Conventional wisdom suggests that more black males are arrested for using and selling crack cocaine because this drug is more popular in the inner city and black dealers sell it openly in public places, thus making themselves targets. However, Michelle Anderson points out in her research that suburban whites buy their drugs – cocaine, ecstasy, crack – from a local white dealer who also sells in public. Police agencies target the black inner city drug dealers, but ignore the white suburban dealers.41 Moreover, research indicates that the overwhelming majority of drug users are white. Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project says, “Thus, SAMHSA data indicates that whites represent 77 percent of current drug users, African Americans constitute 15 percent and Hispanic 8 percent”; he adds that black crack cocaine use is 0.6% of the population compared to a white use of 0.2%.42 However, given their much greater proportion of the population, the white user rate translates into whites representing 54% of current crack cocaine users, blacks 34% and Hispanics 12%. Nevertheless, blacks constitute close to 90% of those arrested for crack cocaine use.43¶ A further indicator of a racially repressive society is the increase of draconian laws used in a racially discriminatory way to target African Americans. A good example of this is the mandatory sentences of five years for possession of five grams of crack cocaine, a law used to target African American users and dealers. Another example is the establishment of mandatory life sentences for three or more felonies. In the Ewing v California decision the US Supreme Court allowed a mandatory life sentence for the theft of three golf clubs.44 A further example is the imposition of life sentences for two felony drug offenses. In Georgia, over 98% of those sentenced to life for two or more drug offenses are black.45¶ The targeting of African Americans is not limited to adults. Recently, Human Rights Watch cited the United States for human rights violations for sentencing youth offenders to life imprisonment without any chance of parole and for racial biases in the sentencing. The report reads:¶ ¶ Our data reveal that blacks constitute 60 percent of the youth offenders serving life without parole nationwide and whites constitute 29 percent…. However, research studies have found that minority youths receive harsher treatment than similarly situated white youths at every stage of the criminal justice system from the point of arrest to sentencing.46¶ ¶ The incarceration rate is so high and sentences so severe that some critics refer to the United States as “the warehouse society,” warehousing a significant proportion of its poor and minorities. They refer to the explosive growth of the prison population as “correctional Keynesianism.” Regardless of these titles, large numbers of the poor and unemployed from industrial cities are warehoused in prisons, thus artificially reducing the unemployment and poverty rates.

#### the aff’s appeal to personal experience and portraying class as one of a laundry list of oppressions naturalizes inequality and precludes a universal starting point to challenge capitalism

Gimenez (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 01 [Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9).

I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered."

In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified).

From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different **from gender and race** and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out,** whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" **even** though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.

Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### praxis DA: This is why you can’t perm a method…They strip all of the conceptual theory that allows us to understand the world—worse than the aff or the alt alone. Perm will become like occupy wall street—it’s also a rejection of capitalism but doesn’t have a praxis because the movement is fractured, no one knows what they are fighting for—this is why it will never catch on.

Tumino (Prof. English @ Pitt) 01

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science**"** (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology**"** (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution o**f** the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

## 1NR

### K

#### Restabilization DA: perm is worse than the plan because it validates the ability of capitalism to fix itself – compromising radical politics

Istavan **Meszaros**, Professor Emeritus, University of Sussex, BEYOND CAPITAL: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TRANSITION, 19**95**.

THE difficulty is that the ‘moment’ of radical politics is strictly limited by the nature of the crises in question and the temporal determinations of their unfolding. The breach opened up at times of crisis cannot be left open forever and the measures adopted to fill it, from the earliest steps onwards, have their own logic and cumulative impact on subsequent interventions. Furthermore, both the existing socioeconomic structures and their corresponding framework of political institutions tend to act against radical initiatives by their very inertia as soon as the worst moment of the crisis is over and thus it becomes possible to contemplate again ‘the line of least resistance’. And no one can consider ‘radical restructuring’ the line of least resistance, since by its very nature it necessarily involves upheaval and the disconcerting prospect of the unknown. No immediate economic achievement can offer a way out of this dilemma so as to prolong the life-span of revolutionary politics, since such limited economic achievements made within the confines of the old premises — act in the opposite direction by relieving the most pressing crisis symptoms and, as a result, reinforcing the old reproductive mechanism shaken by the crisis. As history amply testifies, at the first sign of ‘recovery’, politics is pushed back Into its traditional role of helping to sustain and enforce the given socio-economic determinations. The claimed ‘recovery’ itself reached on the basis of the ‘well tried economic motivations’, acts as the self-evident ideological justification for reverting to the subservient, routine role of politics, in harmony with the dominant institutional framework. Thus, radical politics can only accelerate its own demise (and thereby shorten, instead of extending as it should, the favourable ‘moment’ of major political intervention) if it consents to define its own scope in terms of limited economic targets which are in fact necessarily dictated by the established socioeconomic structure in crisis.

#### Historical materialism is key: you must understand the world before you can change it- grounding sites of political contestation outside of labor humanizes capital and forcloses upon the possibility of revolution.

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why§ Marked 15:28 § ? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### Opensource

#### This is empirically true

Mitchell ’00 [Gordon (Professor of Communications at the University of Pittsburgh); Strategic Deceptions: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy; p. xvi-xvii //nick]

Perhaps the most strange and idiosyncratic aspect of the contemporary intercollegiate debate community is that, by and large, it keeps to itself. Contrary to the populist tradition of debate as the quintessential genre of public discourse, contemporary intercollegiate debate is an insular and specialized academic activity. The research products generated by thousands of debaters nation-wide are generally put toward a singular end: winning tournament competitions. Sometimes this insularity appears absurd to those who stumble across a slice of the debate community for the first time. In the summer of 1990, Madison Laird (then captain of the Loyola University   
debate squad) was assigned the task of entertaining Earth Day organizer Bill Keepin during Keepin¹s visit to the Loyola campus in Los Angeles, California. After Keepin delivered a speech on nuclear power to the student body, Laird led him on a campus tour that ended up in the debate squad room, where yards and yards of argument briefs were stowed away in filing drawers. When Keepin asked to see the files containing research on nuclear power, Laird pulled open one file drawer stuffed to the gills with high-quality research. Keepin was stunned, asking incredulously "how long have you folks kept this stuff locked up?!" In a small way, this vignette   
illustrates the folly associated with the intercollegiate debate community's insular nature. Indeed, it would not be surprising to find countless other Bill Keepins out there who could make tremendous use of the research and knowledge generated out of intercollegiate policy debate competition. To reach them, debaters need only to realize that they can make vital contributions to public arguments swirling beyond the rarefied confines of debate tournament sites.

#### Open source reduces entry barriers and solves resource disparities

Antonucci ‘5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //nick]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.