### 1

#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.

#### The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

**The phrase “introduction of USAF into hostilities” is a term of art--refers exclusively to human members-- excludes weapon systems**

Eric **Lorber**  UPenn Law School; Duke University - Department of Political Science March 1, **2013**, (Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 961, 2013, downloaded here <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017036>)

As is **evident from** a **textual analysis**,177 **an examination of the legislative history,**178 **and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act**,179 “**armed forces**” **refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547** does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it **states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government.”**180 **While this definition pertains to the broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR**. Though not dispositive, **the term “member” connotes a human individual who is part of an organization**.181 Thus, it appears that **the term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed forces**. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces.”182

**Restricting authority requires reducing the permission to act, not the ability to act.**

**Taylor**, 19**96**  (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 **Power refers to an agent's** ability or **capacity to produce a change** in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), **and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent** by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; **the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do**.

**Presidential authority only comes from congress or the constitution**

NAME: Laura A. **Cisneros 12**\* BIO: \* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. Copyright (c) 2012 West Virginia Law Review West Virginia Law Review Winter, 2012 West Virginia Law Review 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 577 LENGTH: 33396 words ARTICLE: YOUNGSTOWN SHEET TO BOUMEDIENE: A STORY OF JUDICIAL ETHOS AND THE (UN)FASTIDIOUS USE OF LANGUAGE. Lexis

At this point, it is helpful to take a step back and examine some text that occurs earlier in the Medellin opinion. **Roberts prefaced his recitation** of Jackson's tripartite framework **by reaffirming Justice Black's now-classic formula for discerning the legal sources of presidential power:** "**The President's authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, "must stem** [\*622] **either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution** itself.'" n200 Here, Roberts is structuring his opinion so as to maximize its rhetorical thrust and display its legal pedigree. Not only does he quote Justice Black's "first principle" of presidential authority from Youngstown, he also cites to Dames & Moore as additional legal support. With a simple string citation, Roberts places Dames & Moore, a decision battered by commentary critical of its expansive allowance of presidential power, n201 on equal footing with Youngstown, a decision viewed as one of the bulwarks against executive excesses. This is quite a balancing act, but one with a distinct purpose. By treating Dames & Moore as equal to and consistent with Youngstown, Roberts lays the groundwork for accepting Dames & Moore's use of the congressional acquiescence doctrine as a graft upon both Black's majority opinion and Jackson's concurrence in the earlier case.

#### B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.

#### C. Vote negative

#### 1. Limits—their interpretation kills limits because it creates a strategic incentive to disregard the resolution. If teams can get away with being non-topical, there’s no reason to defend the resolution. Limits are good:

#### A. Deliberation—having a limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Creativity—thinking “inside the box” forces teams to be creative about their positions and come up with innovative solutions. Absent constraints, debate becomes boring and stale—we link turn all of their offense.

**Intrator 10** (Intrator, David, President of The Creative Organization and musical composer, October 22, 2010, “Thinking Inside The Box: A Professional Creative Dispels A Popular Myth”, Training, http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box) FS

**One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”** As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, **nothing could be further from the truth. This** a **is** view **shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed** famously **by** the **modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.”** The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is **something weird and wacky.** The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s **about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint**, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of **photographers**. They **create by excluding the great mass what’s before them**, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem**.** You’re the one choosing the frame. And **you alone determine what’s an effective solution**. **This can be quite demanding,** both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. **But to be truly** creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. **You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.** You can always change the rules, but that also comes with an emotional price. Unlike many other kinds of problems, with creative problems there is no external authority to which you can appeal to determine whether you’re on the right track, whether one set of rules should have priority over another, or whether one box is better than another. There is no correct answer. Better said: There might be a number of correct answers. Or none at all. The responsibility of deciding the right path to take is entirely upon you. That’s a lot of responsibility, and it can be paralyzing. So it’s no wonder that the creative process often stalls after the brainstorming in many organizations. Whereas generating ideas is open-ended, and, in a sense, infinitely hopeful, having to pare those ideas down is restrictive, tedious, and, at times, scary. The good news, however, is that understanding the creative process as problem-solving is ultimately liberating. For one, all of those left-brainers with well-honed rational skills will find themselves far more creative than they ever thought. They’ll discover their talents for organization, abstraction, and clarity are very much what’s required to be a true creative thinker. **Viewing creativity as problem-solving also makes the whole process far less intimidating**, even though it might lose some of its glamour and mystery. Moreover, **since creative problems are open to rational analysis, they can be broken down into smaller components that are easier to address.** Best of all, **the very act of problem-solving, of organizing and trying making sense of things, helps generate new ideas.** Paradoxically, thinking within a box may be one of the most effective brainstorming techniques **there** is. That may be what Charles Eames meant when he added, “I welcome constraints.” Without some sort of structure to your creative thinking, you’re just flailing about. For a while you might feel like you’re making progress, generating a great mess of ideas that might hold some potential. But to turn those ideas into something truly innovative, your best bet is to build your box and play by the rules of your own creation.

#### 2. Topic Education—their interpretation diverts focus away from the topic. Topic education is good:

#### A. Policy relevance—learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence real policymakers—without tying advocacy to policy, debate becomes irrelevant

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

#### B. Their fixation on drones technology is a mere distraction – only debating the policy details of war power policies can create change

**Leuckin 12** (Paul, graduate of Notre Dame, “Drones: Why Americans Shouldn't Worry About Them”, 12/29, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/21556/drones-why-americans-shouldn-t-worry-about-them>, CMR)

Drones are merely a tool, and the popular focus on the tool distracts from the policy it implements. The most visible portion of the Obama administration's counterterrorism strategy is its targeted killing policy. This policy is the real issue, not drones, and the United States doesn’t need drones to carry it out. Manned aircraft and cruise missiles are just as capable of carrying out an airstrike. The incessant focus on drones may have started as a lazy shorthand for the targeted killing policy, but the problem is more than semantics. Focus on drones and, more generally, fetishizing technology, distracts us from the real debate at hand.¶ The targeted killing policy allegedly involves a loose definition determining which victims count as militants, a nominal commitment to detaining suspects when possible, and inevitable civilian casualties. Any security policy involves trade-offs, and a public discussion whether and why these trade-offs should be accepted is sorely needed. Substantive discussion should not be sidelined for overblown alarmism about drones.

#### C. Academic, institutions-based debate regarding war powers is critical to check excessive presidential authority---college students key

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

**2**

**OOO is incapable of understanding the social organization of commodities under productive forces – it is the enactment of labor that makes the commodity exist**

**Wolfe, 2012** Ross, University of Chicago, On Commodities and the False Liberation of the Object, June 19th, 2012, http://rosswolfe.wordpress.com/2011/06/19/on-commodities-and-the-false-liberation-of-the-object/

In other words, if I may draw some conceptual distinctions of my own, **Object-Oriented Ontology does emphatically deny that the existence of objects is dependent on their relation to human cognition, to their mental representation by a subject.  However, it would be preposterous to assert that objects exist independently of the objective forces of the social relations of production**.  An object that has been subsumed beneath the commodity-form could not appear in such a form were it not for these shadowy relations of production that take place “behind the backs” of these objects, to paraphrase Hegel.  **Even in precapitalist modes of production, when the preponderance of the commodity-form was not as yet total, the appearance of objects that were the products of human labor would clearly be the result of relations of production specific to that social formation**.  The mark of their artifice would be inscribed in their objectivity.  And so again, the existence of certain objects could not appear external to the productive relations that gave them their shape and constitution. **This point does not seem to be controversial, and I believe that most Object-Oriented Ontologists would gladly concede it.  However, I should like to make the further claim commodities do not exist independently of their relation to cognition, either.  In fact, it is only through their social recognition as commodities that they can function as such, as essentially fungible and equivalent to one another. This recognition alone provides the key to how commodities can function as fetishes, how they are able to reify the conditions of the present into the seemingly timeless conditions that obtain in all societies, past and present.  For it is only through their transfiguration into objects of ideology that qualitatively multiform objects, each unique in the aspect of their utility, can be reduced to quantitatively uniform equivalencies.  The overarching thought-forms of society, the ruling ideologies, allow (among other things) objects to be represented to the social subject as commodities available in their quantifiable immediacy**.  Of course, it is through the general social acceptance of this representation as empirically valid that allows capitalist society to sustain itself, not as some sort of illusory veil pulled ov

er the eyes of the masses, but as an historically specific reality.  In his dialectical unmasking of this ideological fetishization, Marx notes that [t]he categories of bourgeois economics consist precisely of forms of this [relative] kind.  They are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production, i.e., commodity production.  The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour on the basis of commodity production, vanishes therefore as soon as we come to other forms of production. **And it is precisely this “representationalist” aspect of commodity fetishism that so constantly eludes the grasp of Object-Oriented Ontology.  Vigorously denying the legitimacy of “correlationist” philosophies, which hold that the objects of experience arrive to the subject only in the form of “representation,” Object-Oriented Ontology is unable to make sense of how the phenomenon of reification or commodity fetishism takes place. Their realism is such that it simply tries to bypass the eidetic apprehension of reality.  This allows for their unfettered speculation into the constitution of the real, without having to bother with troublesome socio-epistemological questions of how subjects perceive and misperceive the world**.  In fact, it is unclear whether or not the contemplative subject of post-Cartesian philosophy vanishes entirely.  **This point is brought up** in a brilliant comment by the poster Utisz, who highlights not only the methodological quandaries involved **when Object-Oriented Ontology is forced to deal a counter-intuitive concept like commodity fetishism, but also the superficial way in which Marxist theory has been appropriated by members of the OOO movement**.  His comment, which seems otherwise to have been ignored, runs as follows: I think this would hold water if any of those who actually put forward OOO were that interested in Marx and showed any desire to acquaint themselves with debates within Marxism 1850-2011 or were by any stretch of the imagination political activists. They seem more interested in fighting ‘anthropocentrism’ and riffing on a strange combination of Leibniz, Whitehead and Arne Naess. I’d recommend reading a figure like Naess – this is the sort of thing we’re really dealing with here. Of course there’s an ‘orientation’ to things in Marx (critically not speculatively so, there’s the rub) as there was to objects in Hegel (critically and speculatively). But **no analysis of things in today’s world can with any responsibility ignore or downplay their relation to labour** or to the subject respectively. A better approach would be: **no object-orientation without equal subject-orientation (the subject, yes, scandalously different from rocks and flowers and bacteria), no speculation without critical self-reflection**, awareness of contradiction, paralogism, etc. Object-orientation is forever caught in a dualism flailing around trying to battle a supposed privelege of subject over object by merely plumping enthusiastically for the other. Abstrakte Negation. No Glasnost for me, I’m afraid.

**The material determinism of capital is responsible for the instrumentalization of all life—makes all oppression inevitable.**

**Dyer-Witherford** (professor of Library and Info. Sciences @ the Univ. of Western Ontarion) **‘99** [Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that **capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control.** Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. **This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet**. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

**Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.**

**one must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humynize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression**

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Any **effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that **to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All **modes** of Marxism **now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so**—and this is my main argument—**legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies**

**. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy**." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts** (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is** produced by the human mind and is thus **free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth**. In this paper I argue that **any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.**

**3**

**restricting presidential authority causes adversaries to doubt the credibility of our threats – causes nuclear escalation**

Matthew **Waxman** 8/25/**13**, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that **stronger¶ legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies**, **because¶ it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on¶ threats.** This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates¶ in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for¶ executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any** serious**¶ restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could¶ make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head¶ off explosive confrontations**.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet¶ Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, **the authority of the¶ President to set clear** and silent **limits** in advance **is** perhaps **the most important of**¶ **all the powers in our constitutional armory** **to prevent confrontations that could¶ carry nuclear implications. …¶** [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the¶ circumstance of modern life—**the power to make a credible threat to use force in¶ order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate**.179¶ In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed these¶ concerns, arguing that the law would undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrent and¶ coercive threats in the eyes of both adversaries and allies – they would know that¶ presidential authority to use force would expire after 60 days, so absent strong¶ congressional support they could assume U.S. withdrawal at that point.180 In short, those¶ who oppose tying the president’s hands with mandatory congressional authorization¶ requirements to use force sometimes argue that doing so incidentally and dangerously ties¶ his hands in threatening it. A critical assumption here is that **presidential flexibility**,¶ preserved in legal doctrine, **enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate**

**US drones sustain power projection --- key to hegemony**

**Reynolds** 6/26/**13** (Michael A, PhD, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, “Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23269995.2013.807603>, CMR)

Technology and the dilemma of counter-insurgency¶ **The U**nited **S**tates, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim¶ gun, **has successfully leveraged tech**nology **to extend its power** and reach into foreign¶ societies **in ways** that would have been **inconceivable to** the **empires of the high-imperial**¶ **age**. **American military personnel**, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, have **employ**ed **thousands of** unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or¶ **drones** more popularly, **to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals** literally **around the**¶ **globe**, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through¶ 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500¶ people (Zenko 2012).¶ Guerrillas, insurgents, and **terrorists have long protected themselves from** the **superior**¶ **firepower** of regular armies and police forces **by declining to wear uniforms** or other open¶ markers of identity **and** by **refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to** do¶ one of the two things: either to **curb** their use of **firepower** and thereby neutralize their¶ own advantage, **or** to **employ force indiscriminately** and thereby risk **alienating** their¶ population and public opinion around **the world** with excessive violence. This is the¶ classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.¶ To American strategic planners, surveillance and **attack drones** hold out the promise¶ that they **can**, if not **overcome this dilemma**, at least mitigate it. By employing **drones** to¶ find, monitor, and track specific individuals, the United States **can** aspire to **identify**¶whether or not those **individuals** are hostile **and** then **seamlessly** employ an **attack** drone¶ to destroy that individual. Thus, **the U**nited **S**tates government **now** routinely **uses drones**¶ **to mount extended** and even around-the-clock **observation of foreign locales to identify**¶ **and kill suspected terrorists**. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of¶ such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent¶ dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from¶ drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or¶ intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law¶ School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless, it seems¶ clearthat **drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma**. In countries where they fly¶ they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies¶ significantly more difficult.¶ Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals, **a**¶ **major appeal** of drones **is their cost**. **Drones pose no risk of death to** highly trained and¶ valuable **pilots and** they **are comparatively cheap**. The Predator, the best-known armed¶ drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By¶ comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, **drones will** likely **only grow cheaper** as design improves, economies of scale¶ drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation¶ drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars.¶ When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the¶ United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, **drones emerge as a potent tool for**¶ **monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers**. **The drone**¶ **is,** in essence, **a tool well-suited to imperial policing**, on sea as well as on land.¶ Thus, **the withdrawal of American military forces** from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere¶ in the greater Middle East due to war fatigue and financial constraints **will not necessarily**¶ **equate to an equivalent reduction in America’s coercive capabilities**. For better or for worse,¶ technology such as **drones**, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence **provide**¶ **the world’s policeman with a more potent**, if not **bigger, baton for the buck**. Further advances¶ in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be¶ translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. **Tech**nology **makes** many¶ **things possible. Empire** in an age of austerity **might well be one of them.**

**Hegemony reinvigorates democracy and solves conflcits that cause extinction**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett,** chief analyst, Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S. and Globalization, at Crossroads,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 3—7—**11**, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

Events in Libya are a further reminder for **Americans** that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the** world's sole full-service **superpower.** Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics** that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no** identifiable **human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down** that path of **perpetual war**. Instead**, America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of** **democracy**, the **persistent spread of** **human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivgered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war**. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

**Two-thousand years of history and robust statistical analysis prove**

William **Wohlforth 8** Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet **empirical studies of the relationship between** both systemic and dyadic **capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul** of well-established patterns or general historical findings, **then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then,** ceteris paribus, **unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone** than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes **in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."**39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. **An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over** the course of **two thousand years suggests** **that** **historical systems** **that come closest to** the definition of unipolarity used here **exhibit precisely the** **behavioral** **properties implied by the theory**. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the **East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was** an unusually stratified **unipolar** structure, **with** an economic and militarily dominant **China interacting with** a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian **states**.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. **Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned**, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms **Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social** identity **theory** and related literatures **suggest** the **conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations.** **Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory**, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

**Case: Drones Defense**

**Drones good – U.S. military action *inevitable* but drones are *superior to alternatives* and *minimize civilian casualties* – solves *humanitarian intervention***

**Singh & Wittes 12** (Ritika Singh – Research Assistant, Governance Studies, AND Benjamin Wittes – Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity”, Jan 11, The Cato Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/11-drones-wittes>, CMR)

Indeed, Cortright may argue that “terrorism is more a political and law enforcement challenge than a threat that can be addressed by military means,” but it is worth remembering that **the opposite of targeted killing is not usually law enforcement. It is often** less-targeted—that is, **more indiscriminate—killing**. The important flip side to Cortright’s anxiety that drones will lower our inhibition to go to war is that **drones can** also **limit the scope and scale of military action**. **The U**nited **S**tates **is not going to take a hands-off approach to states like Pakistan and Yemen**, **where law enforcement is not a feasible option**. **Drone warfare permits a highly calibrated military response to situations in which the alternative may involve** not lesser but far **greater** uses of **military violence**. This is a good trade. Conversely, **drones** also **allow militaries to contemplate** certain **humanitarian interventions where they might never contemplate risking actual forces**; **consider** whether the recent NATO **Libya**n intervention—**which** probably **saved a considerable number of lives**—would have been politically possible had U.S. forces been seriously at risk.¶ In other words, while the rise of drone warfare has changed the face of American counterterrorism efforts and promises far greater change in years to come, this does not present the simple and terrible moral equation that Cortright describes. **What began as a surveillance tool** that could, on occasion, deliver lethal force, **has evolved in a short space of time into a principal means of following enemy forces onto territory in which the U**nited **S**tates **is reluctant to put large numbers of boots on the ground—and striking at them there in a limited fashion that protects innocent civilians** **to an unprecedented level**.¶ **The logic of these weapons is so overpowering**, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, **that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that**, if taken at face value, **would lead to greater uses of force**, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.

**Civilian deaths overestimated and declining – prefer most recent evidence**

**Cohen 13** 5/23 (Michael, “Give President Obama a chance: there is a role for drones”, 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/23/obama-drone-speech-use-justified>, CMR)

I disagree. Increasingly it appears that arguments like Friedersdorf makes are no longer sustainable (and there's real question if they ever were). **Not only have drone strikes decreased, but so too have the number of civilians killed –** and **dramatically** so.¶ This conclusion comes not from Obama administration apologists but rather, Chris Woods, whose research has served as the empirical basis for the harshest attacks on the Obama Administration's drone policy.¶ Woods heads the covert war program for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), which maintains one of three major databases tabulating civilian casualties from US drone strikes. The others are the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation (full disclosure: I used to be a fellow there). While LWJ and NAJ estimate that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed somewhere between 140 and 300 civilians, TBIJ utilizes a far broader classification for civilians killed, resulting in estimates of somewhere between 411-884 civilians killed by drones in Pakistan. The wide range of numbers here speaks to the extraordinary challenge in tabulating civilian death rates.¶ **There is little local reporting done on the ground in northwest Pakistan, which is the epicenter of the US drone program**. **As a result data collection is reliant on Pakistani news reporting**, **which is** also **dependent on Pakistani intelligence, which has a vested interest in playing up the negative consequences of US drones.**¶ When I spoke with Woods last month, he said that **a** fairly **clear pattern** **has emerged over the past year – far fewer civilians are dying from drones.** "For those who are opposed to drone strikes," says Woods there is historical merit to the charge of significant civilian deaths, "but **from a contemporary standpoint the numbers just aren't there**."¶ While Woods makes clear that one has to be "cautious" on any estimates of casualties, **it's not just a numeric decline** that is being seen, but rather **it's a "proportionate decline**". In other words, **the percentage of civilians dying in drone strikes is also falling, which suggests** to Woods that **US drone operators are showing far greater care in trying to limit collateral damage.**¶Woods estimates are supported by the aforementioned databases. In Pakistan, New America Foundation claims **there have been no civilian deaths this year and only five last year**; Long War Journal reported four deaths in 2012 and 11 so far in 2013; and TBIJ reports a range of 7-42 in 2012 and 0-4 in 2013. In addition, **the drop** in casualty figures **is occurring not just in Pakistan but also in Yemen.**¶ **These numbers are broadly consistent with what has been an under-reported decline in drone use overall**. According to TBIJ, the number of drone strikes went from 128 in 2010 to 48 in 2012 and only 12 have occurred this year. These statistics are broadly consistent with LWJ and NAF's reporting. In Yemen, while drone attacks picked up in 2012, they have slowed dramatically this year. And in Somalia there has been no strike reported for more than a year.¶ Ironically, these numbers are in line with the public statements of CIA director Brennan, and even more so with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who claimed in February that the numbers she has received from the Obama administration suggest that **the typical number of victims per year from drone attacks is in "the single digits".**¶¶ Part of the reason for these low counts is that the Obama administration has sought to minimize the number of civilian casualties through what can best be described as "creative bookkeeping". The administration counts all military-age males as possible combatants unless they have information (posthumously provided) that proves them innocent. Few have taken the White House's side on this issue (and for good reason) though some outside researchers concur with the administration's estimates.¶ Christine **Fair, a professor at Georgetown** University **has long maintained** that **civilian deaths from drones** in **Pakistan are dramatically overstated**. She argues that **considering the alternatives** of sending in the Pakistani military or using manned aircraft to flush out jihadists, **drone strikes are** a **far more humane** method of war-fighting.¶ So how does one explain this rather important shift in the US drone war? ¶ The reasons appear to be three-fold. First, **as tech**nology **has improved so too have the capabilities of drone operators to be more precise.** Second, **there appears to be shift in targeting**, particularly away from so-called "signature strikes" that rely more on behavior than specific intelligence to justify kills. **Considering** the **criticism** of the program – from both inside and outside the US – **it's difficult to imagine this hasn't given impetus for Obama** administration officials **to take even greater caution in how drones are utilized**. Or to put it more directly, drone critics are having a constructive impact.¶ But there's a third reason: **as the war in Afghanistan has begun to wind down the use of drones against militants across the border from Pakistan has declined as well**.

**Case: OOO**

**OOO fails bad—Changing doesn’t mean we will treat these new subjects with respect**

**Hettinger**, Professor of Philosophy and coordinator of the minor in environmental studies, **02**

(Ned, Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 109-123)

**What cannot be found in Nature as Subject is a vision of a positive role for humanity in the natural world. My worry is that Katz's views about the value of nature and our obligations to it leave no room for such an account. I fear that Katz's conceptualization of how humans have wronged nature may entail that all human activity toward nature wrongs nature. This would undermine the possibility of envisioning an environmentally just future in which humans live in the natural world in a morally appropriate way. This is a serious problem, because environmental philosophy needs an ethic for the use of nature, as well as for its nonuse**. We need a vision of a constructive human relationship with nature, in addition to a characterization of our past failures of relationship. The question I pose is whether Katz's ideas allow for an account of how humans can be flourishing members who contribute to natural community.

**It’s impossible to ignore the inevitability of individual choice – which makes an understanding of vibrant materiality difficult. Even for the aff, it is humans that will choose whether to view nature as actants, which limits the connectivity of vibrant materialism**

**Armstrong 12** Rachel, interdisciplinary practitioner with a background in medicine. Her work uses all manners of media to engage audiences and bring them into contact with the latest advances in science and their real potential through the inventive applications of technology, *Next Nature*, 4-12, <http://www.nextnature.net/2012/04/the-ecological-human>

**Although ‘vibrant materiality’ may initially appear to have unlimited connectivity, it is actually constrained and edited by individual choices. People** may alter the composition of their bodies by changing the ‘actants’ that constitute their unique human ecology by, for example, choosing to eat different foodstuffs that make them smarter, or happier. They **may even nurture unique ecologies that confer an evolutionary advantage** such as incorporating telecommunications devices into their living spaces that increase behavioural effectiveness. **People may even decide just how far (through the agency of their associated ‘actants’) they can directly influence the ecology of the entire planet** by recycling material, using renewable energy or growing food.

**Sacrifices real world problems—object-oriented ontology doesn’t reveal how to recognize and represent the possibility of all objects**

**Berry 12** (David, Senior Lecturer, stunlaw: a critical review of politics, arts and technology, “The Uses of Object-Oriented Ontology,” May 5, 2012, http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html)

**In this ‘liberation’** therefore, **we are saved from the ‘crushing’ problem of repetitive accounts of marginal inequality and suffering**. This is **achieved by a new ‘humanism’ that rejects the human as having any special case, such that** the marginal **problems of women, LGBT, immigrants, asylum seekers, and the poor are replaced with the problem of a litany of objects such as “quarks, Elizabeth Bennet, single-malt scotch, Ford Mustang fastbacks, lychee fruit, love affairs, dereferenced pointers, Care Bears**, sirocco winds, the Tri-City Mall, tort law, the Airbus A330, the five-hundred drachma note” (Bogost 2012a: 133). He notes, “**If** we take seriously the idea that **all objects recede** interminably **into themselves, then human perception becomes just one among many ways** that **objects** might **relate**. **To put things at the centre of a new metaphysics** also **requires us to admit** that **they do not exist just for us**” (Bogost 2012a: 9). **Leaving aside the question as to why we would want to apply that idea in the first place when it stands as hypothesis rather than expressing any form of evidence or proof**, one might wonder **how** one is **to judge between the different forms of perception in order to (re)present the litanies, let alone recognize them. This is a constant and unexamined problem within** the domain of **object-oriented ontology and is hardly dealt with** by Harman’s notion of ‘metaphor’ or ‘alluding’ to things (Harman 2009b).

 **Case: Util**

**Every life is an end in and of itself – All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved**

**Cummisky 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 131)

Finally, **even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be** added and **summed in this way—this** point **still does not justify deontological constraints**. On the extreme interpretation, **why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two**; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, **even if dignity cannot be simply summed up**, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea **that I should save as many priceless objects as possible**? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, **each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can**. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.8

**Predictions are possible—it’s not all chaos and uncertainty**

**Levine 13** (Steve, Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation, 1/7/13, “The 14 rules for predicting future geopolitical events” Quartz) http://qz.com/40960/the-14-rules-for-predicting-future-geopolitical-events/

**Nations are eccentric. But they also have threads of repeated history through which we can discern what comes next. For five centuries**, since Ivan the Terrible, **for instance, Russia has been characterized by one-man rule, an exaggerated sense of identity, and an acceptance of often deadly cruelty toward individual citizens. Therefore, it is not surprising that those traits are the bricks and mortar of** Vladimir **Putin’s rule today. Many political scientists dismiss** the **detection of such trends as “deterministic.”** **Some insist that**, unlike in economics and statistics, **there is** as yet in fact **no useful algorithm for foreseeing events**—the only tool available to political forecasters is their own intuition. **But it is vapid to observe the world, its nations and peoples as an unfathomable mob. History is not a science—but neither is it pure chaos.** In an interview with Quartz last fall, statistician Nate Silver rejected the possibilityokhamf predicting geopolitics in the way that he forecasts US elections, and he has a point. Yet, to borrow his own phrase, **you can pick out the signal from the noise, and from that derive the likely direction if not the outcome of events.**

## 2NC

### Flex: Overview 2NC [:40]

#### Impact frame- wars are impossible with credible deterrence

Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN

There is a major disconnect here, though, between legal analysis and scholarship¶ of constitutional war powers – specifically, its predominant focus on actual military¶ engagements – and the way the United States wields its military might, especially since¶ the onset of the Cold War and extending into the 21st century. Often times the most¶ important policy tool derived from U.S. military power is not waging war – it is¶ threatening war or force. The power to threaten war is closely related to, but analytically¶ distinct from, the power to make it.¶ By “threats” in this Article I mean communicating the will and capability to use¶ military force, as a way to induce other actors to change behavior – whether to do¶ something or to not do something.12 During major periods of American history,¶ including the present one, U.S. strategy relied heavily on perceptions of U.S. military¶ might and willingness to use it; that is, it has relied on the manipulation of risk to deter¶ aggression or other actions by adversaries, to coerce or compel certain actions by other¶ states or international actors, to reassure allies, and to pursue other political designs under¶ the shadow of armed threats.13 The primary purpose to which U.S. military might has¶ been directed since World War II has generally been to prevent wars or avoid them; when¶ wars or large-scale force was actually used, it was because a prior policy or strategy had¶ failed, for instance, deterrent threats were insufficiently credible, crises involving U.S.¶ threats of force escalated in ways difficult to control, and so on – not because making war¶ was intended as the best approach to a danger or sometimes even that it was the expected¶ result. In this regard, most of the time that U.S. military power is “used” – and often¶ when it is most successful – it does not manifest as a war or major military engagement at¶ all.¶ Put another way, there is a basic paradox at work here, that if threats of force¶ work, force does not have to be used (at least not “used” in the sense that constitutional¶ lawyers’ think about it). Other things being equal, in theory the greater the credibility of¶ the threat, the less likely it will be necessary to make good on it. Because this argument¶ is about wars that *don’t* happen, though, it is difficult to develop empirical evidence to¶ support it. Accordingly, statesmen cannot be so sure of its validity and constitutional¶ lawyers’ tend to overlook it entirely.¶ There is a close parallel to this disconnect between legal discourse and security¶ strategy in international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits “*the threat* or use¶ of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”14¶ However, legal doctrine is not at all well developed with respect to threats beyond¶ prohibiting the most blatantly aggressive ones,15 nor is the regulation of threats of force¶ well theorized in legal scholarship.16 As with domestic law of American war powers, the¶ threat element has mostly disappeared from discussion, even though international¶ relations scholars recognize that threatened force is doing so much work.17¶ This Article is not a doctrinal argument. It is an argument about framing and¶ method, intended to fill an analytical gap and therefore to inform understanding of the¶ functional advantages and disadvantages of legal formulas for allocating war powers.18¶ Specifically, Part I of this Article contends that understanding evolution in¶ constitutional war powers and the merits or dangers of these developments requires¶ widening the data set and investigative lens to include threats of force and incorporating¶ the insights of the past several decades’ analysis by political scientists and scholars of¶ American grand strategy. Doing so reveals aspects of the war powers story obscured by¶ legal discourse and method focused predominantly on actual uses of force, and it alters¶ and refines the orthodox functional arguments usually relied on by both sides –¶ presidentialist (favoring vast unilateral executive authority to use force) and¶ congressionalist (favoring tight legislative checks on that authority) – of the war powers¶ debate. Most notably, and putting in game-theoretic terms, the debate between¶ presidentialist and congressionalist legal scholars about functional advantages takes place¶ only at the final stage of the decision tree; but the President’s ability to threaten force is¶ critically important at earlier stages in determining whether that final stage will even¶ occur at all.19

#### restricting inherent power collapses executive crisis response --- triggers terrorism, rogue state attacks, and wildfire prolif

John Yoo 8/30/13, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Like it or not, Constitution allows Obama to strike Syria without Congressional approval,” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allows-obama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval/>

The most important of the president’s powers are commander-in-chief and chief executive.¶ As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”¶ Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. . . It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”¶ The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action, sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances, that are best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. ¶ Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. ¶ Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because it had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow. ¶ Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.¶ Congress's track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one.¶ Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress's isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict.¶ President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president's foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism.¶ Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War, and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the Resolution in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it.¶ Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare War.” But these observers read the eighteenth-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare War” to mean “start war.” ¶ When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain – where the Framers got the idea of the declare-war power – fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.¶ Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war, because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process.¶ In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” ¶ This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive.¶ Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. ¶ Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans.¶ Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. ¶ Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. ¶ If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military.¶ Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse.¶ If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president's decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually.¶ It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action.¶ Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. ¶ Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.¶ The Framers expected Congress's power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war.¶ Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check.¶ We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security.¶ In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility.¶ It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security.¶ Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics.¶ As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

### K: War--Deescalates 2NC

**No warrant for violence and war arguments – drones make *all conflict* *less likely*.**

**Goure, 12**

[Daniel, vice president of the Lexington Institute, Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses!, CATO Unbound, January 13, 2012, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses>, CMR] gender edited

Has the accelerated use of drones opened a new chapter in the history of warfare, as David Cortright asserts? If so, what is the title of that chapter? It certainly is not “Drones Make War More Likely, Indiscriminate or Bloodier.” As recent landmark studies by Goldstein and Pinker clearly document, societal violence in general and armed conflict in particular are on the decline.[1] The fact that we live in the historical shadow of the air raids on Dresden and Tokyo but are focused on a few hundred strikes by unmanned aerial systems in Pakistan underscores this dramatic change in the way air power is employed today. Drones are not new. The V-1 was a drone, but lacked a man-in-the-loop and precision guidance capabilities. Modern drones emerged from the overall revolution in precision navigation and networked communications which began more than two decades ago. This revolution centered on improvements in technologies for position location, remote sensing, automated flight controls, computer-based target designation, high bandwidth communications, high capacity computing and smart fusing. These technologies were combined to provide a capability for long-range precision strikes, as demonstrated in the first Gulf War. Most often this capability required both a platform/launcher and a “smart” weapon such as a laser-guided bomb or Joint Direct Attack Munition that would be flown to a release point, then fly to a specific target based either on laser illumination or pre-programmed GPS coordinates. Cruise missiles, which have been widely proliferated, are essentially drones. Modern drones provide many of the best features of both cruise missiles and manned aircraft. Most significantly, they provide the tactical and operational flexibility of manned platforms with the reduced risk to personnel associated with cruise missiles. Unlike the former, they allow for man-in-the-loop control and vehicle recovery. Unlike the latter, they can operate at altitudes and in environments unsuited to manned systems and, in some cases, for extended periods of time. Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence. Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system. Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation. It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone. The availability of un[staffed]manned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. I might go even farther than Goldstein and argue that Cortright should advocate the greater use of drones, armed and otherwise, precisely due to his interest in reducing the frequency, intensity, and costs of conflicts. Just as dash cameras in police cars and cell phone cameras have led to a decrease in police brutality and the ability to bring those who violate procedures to account, the electro-optical sensors on drones can be used to increase oversight over military forces in the field. In fact, cameras can reduce what Cortright calls “the psychological distance that separates the launching of a strike from its bloody impact.” It can also help reduce the alleged isolation of the American people from the use of force in their name. Unfortunately in view of its title, the primary focus of Cortright’s article is not on drones and warfare. Rather, it centers on the subset of the role of drones in current counterterrorism operations. A number of the issues he raises are frankly much more relevant to the rather murky legal and operational circumstances surrounding the global campaign against al Qaeda. Cortright is closer to the mark when, as the title of his article suggests, he connects the nature of drones, notably the lack of a person in the cockpit, to the sense that both the George W. Bush and, most particularly, the Obama Administration saw such systems as supporting if not promoting a “license to kill.” Critics of the use of drones against unlawful combatants in Pakistan and elsewhere would be on firmer ground by connecting the disembodied features of “Nintendo warfare” to our seeming tolerance for the weakening of legal safeguards for criminal terrorists. In conclusion, I would suggest that there is nothing in the current employment of drones or in plans for future unmanned aerial systems that poses the kinds of dangers suggested by Mr. Cortright. They will not make war easier or cheaper. There is no evidence that armed drones have reduced the political inhibitions against the use of deadly force. The use of drones in no way threatens to weaken the moral presumption against the inappropriate or excessive use of force that is at the heart of the just war doctrine—the emphasis is mine, but the qualifiers have always belonged to just war theory. Mr. Cortright’s problem is not with drones but the policies of those who employ them. I almost hate to say it, but we should remember that drones don’t kill terrorists, governments do.

### K: War—Mystification 2NC

#### Aff has it backwards – Drones represent a moral paradigm shift that challenges the mystification and glorification of warfare

**Brennan-Marquez** 5/24 – Visiting Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School (Kiel, “A progressive defense of drones”, 2013, <http://www.salon.com/2013/05/24/a_progressive_defense_of_drones/>, CMR)

But there is another moral dimension to drone warfare, running in the opposite direction, which I fear has been lost in the haze of (rightful) outcry. For the same reason that drone warfare stands to make violence easier to deploy — none of our lives are on the line — it also makes violence harder to rationalize. The pain and death of drone strikes, unlike the pain and death of traditional missions, can draw no comfort from narratives of heroism. Destruction wrought by machines is neither noble nor grand. It’s asinine, and unfailingly repugnant. This means that drone strikes must be justified on their own terms, without recourse to war’s long-standing mystification. In a world where we apotheosize soldiers, and rope off their actions from everyday opprobrium, it’s important to consider whether the banal violence of machines might be preferable to the lionized violence of men.¶ A year ago, Tom Engelhardt published a memorable essay in the Nation on the vileness of drone warfare. Taking a healthily incredulous view of the Obama administration’s assurance that it would use its lurid toy for exclusively virtuous ends, Engelhardt concluded with a flourish of outrage: “What [our leaders] can’t see in the haze of exceptional self-congratulation is this: they are transforming the promise of America into a promise of death. And death, visited from the skies, isn’t precise. It isn’t glorious. It isn’t judicious. It certainly isn’t a shining vision. It’s hell.” Magnificently put: The only trouble is that these same critiques would apply just as forcefully, if not more so, to traditional warfare. War isn’t precise. It isn’t glorious. It isn’t judicious. It isn’t a shining vision. It’s hell.¶ The difference between traditional warfare and drone strikes is that the latter can be clearly identified as hellacious. Not just by poets and philosophers – but by everyone, everywhere, in the immediacy of its horror. When innocent people end up dead as the result of a drone strike, we easily recognize that outcome as morally lamentable. Undaunted by the symbolic distortion of the battlefield, we confront drones with the skepticism — and, as the case may be, the outrage — that accompanies moral clarity. The burden of proof inverts. Unli

ke traditional warfare, when the loss of life on the other side is presumptively acceptable, and it only becomes unacceptable if circumstances render it so, in the case of drone strikes, the loss of lives on the other side is presumptively unacceptable, and it only becomes acceptable if a persuasive rationale can be offered. Such rationales are not impossible to formulate, but it faces a steep upward grade. It’s an argument of last resort, defensive rather than triumphant.¶ Before exploring what practical light this observation can shed on drone strikes, it’s worth pausing to ask why moral judgment comes under strain during wartime. The answer is simple: we prize our own lives over enemy lives. This state of affairs is not necessarily justifiable on moral grounds. In fact, it seems plainly unjustified on moral grounds. But it’s also a social fact. A helpful analogy can be drawn to familial relations. Moral philosophers have encountered notorious difficulty in trying to rationalize the treatment of family members differently than the treatment of strangers. In both settings — family and war — the basic problem is the same. Justice makes no claim on love. Membership in a particular polity, no less than membership in a particular family, is a feature of the world to which we are attached – a condition inherited rather than chosen, which, despite its randomness, cannot be overcome by wordplay or will. Confronted with a question like, “Why should their soldiers die before ours?” an objective vantage point — the abstract stance of morality — is simply unavailable.¶ The dynamic of attachment at play in traditional warfare has persisted since time immemorial, and it is unlikely to relent soon. Nor am I trying to criticize it. Moral judgment is harsh, taut and withering; with good reason do we shield things we love from its gaze. At the same time, the difficulty involved in making sense of violence wrought by our troops also illuminates something important about the interpretation of wartime acts: The task of justifying an act of violence before the fact is distinct from the task of interpreting an act of violence after the fact. For example, in the face of a mission that made strategic sense but ended up yielding massive casualties, it would strike us as perfectly reasonable for an observer to say: “I was in favor of this mission, but now that I see the results, I am horrified.” The first thought — “I was in favor of this mission” — goes to whether, ex ante, the predicates of legitimate force existed. The second thought — “but now that I see the results, I am horrified” — goes to whether, ex post, the externalities can be rationalized.¶ And even more familiar is the inverse style of claim, in response to a mission that seemed heinous or imprudent but, for reasons outside of the observer’s control, was pursued: “Much as I opposed the mission to begin with, once our troops were on the ground, I believe they did what they had to do.” This commonplace formulation speaks to the way the battlefield consternates moral judgment. It’s one thing to advocate against the deployment of troops – but once the troops are deployed, a switch flips. Because soldiers make the ultimate sacrifice, their actions are not subject to typical moral analysis. What goes on “over there” stands beyond the comprehension — and beyond the everyday reproach — of civilians. This is not to say that soldiers act with moral impunity. Of course they do not. But the moral constraints of the battlefield are of an attenuated kind, very far off, and shrouded in mystique.¶In this respect, drones represent a welcome shift of paradigm: they stand to clarify the moral stakes of state-sponsored violence by eliminating the dynamic of attachment that has traditionally accompanied it. By itself, of course, this proposition does not entail that drone strikes are preferable to traditional troop deployments. What it does entail, however, is that the benefits of moral clarity should be weighed, in practice, against the drawbacks of less circumspect decision-making. As much as drones are liable to desensitize leaders, making violence easier to employ, the outrage they produce is also likely to have a chilling effect in the other direction. Which way will this calculus ultimately run? We exercise an important threshold of control over this question. Whether the anesthetic effect of machine-induced violence will outstrip the sense of outrage that violence-by-machines provoke, or vice versa, is not a static political fact to which we must be resigned – it’s a hard issue for us to deliberate with care. One thing, however, is certain. Moral clarity in the face of drone strikes, as compared to troop deployments, is only politically worthwhile — indeed, only possible — insofar as members of the public are kept informed about when drone strikes are happening, and what damage they cause. Transparency is a precondition of outrage – and of accountability.

### Accidents--1NC

#### FIRST, No risk of Accidents

Dr. Leonid **Ryabikhin et all** (Executive Secretary, Committee of Scientist for Global Security and Arms Control; Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute), General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov (Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom), and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov (Senior Research Scientist, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies) “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context” in Yverdon, Switzerland, 21-23 June 200**9**. http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf

Most of the experts define de-alerting as implementing some reversible physical changes in a weapon system that would significantly increase time between the decision to use the weapon and the actual moment of its launch. The proponents of this concept consider it as one of the ways to maintain strategic stability. They provide the following arguments in support of this concept. Radical changes have occurred in US-Russian relations. Russia and the United States are building strategic partnership relationship. In such situation the high alert readiness of strategic offensive forces targeted at each other does not correspond to the character of our relations. Strategic nuclear forces high alert readiness in combination with a concept of launch-on-warning strike increases the risk of “accidental” nuclear war (as a result of mistakes in the C3I system, inadequate situation analysis, mistaken decision-making, unauthorized action of personnel or even terrorists, provocation from the “third” states or non-state actors, etc.); False signals about missile attacks obtained from early warning system that may trigger an accidental launch. This assumption was very popular when the Russian early warning system was weakened as a result of collapse of the Soviet Union. Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

#### Second, No Hair Trigger—locks and discipline prevent accidents

Walter B. **Slocombe**, J.D. Harvard Law, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Senior advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, 21-23 June 20**09**, “De-Alerting: Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Side-Effects\*” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context” in Yverdon, Switzerland http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Slocombe.pdf

Whatever other problems the current nuclear posture of the US nuclear force may present, it cannot reasonably be said to be on a “hair trigger.” Since the 1960s the US has taken a series of measures to insure that US nuclear weapons cannot be detonated without the receipt of both external information and properly authenticated authorization to use that information. These devices – generically Permissive Action Links or “PALs” – are in effect combination locks that keep the weapons locked and incapable of detonation unless and until the weapons’ firing mechanisms have been unlocked following receipt of a series of numbers communicated to the operators from higher authority. Equally important in the context of a military organization, launch of nuclear weapons (including insertion of the combinations) is permitted only where properly authorized by an authenticated order. This combination of reliance on discipline and procedure and on receipt of an unlocking code not held by the military personnel in charge of the launch operation is designed to insure that the system is “fail safe,” i.e., that whatever mistakes occur, the result will not be a nuclear explosion.

### struct viol

**Heg (and democracy) decreases structural violence---any alt dooms humanity to deprivation**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett 11,** Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, “The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory,” World Politics Review, online: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-rest-spells-u-s-strategic-victory>

First the absurdity: A few of the most **over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did** indeed **promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today.** But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ **Meanwhile**, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. **With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be.** So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, **a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own**. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": **the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ **Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order**, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But **within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but **the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ **Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s** after the Soviet threat disappeared. **It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, **but we made the effort because**, in our heart of hearts, **we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do**. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of **the War on Terror** is that its operational requirements **actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones**. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But **the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But,** of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China,** whose growing strength upsets us so much, **then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come.** ¶ As always, **the choice is ours.**

### DPT

**democide kills millions- democracy key to solve**

Susan S. **Gibson**, Lt. Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Army, “The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair Elections in Nation Building: The Role of Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Law,” HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v. 21, Fall 19**98**, p. 12-13.

Soon after Bruce Russet published his seminal work on the democratic peace, 43 a new book by R.J. **Rummel laid out alarming evidence on "genocide and government mass murder," which Rummel calls "democide." 44 Rummel's results "clearly and decisively show that democracies commit less democide than other regimes. These results also well illustrate the principle underlying all his findings on war, collective violence, and democide: The less freedom people have, the greater the violence; the more freedom, the less the violence**." 45 As Rummel so aptly points out, "**Totalitarian communist governments slaughter their people by the tens of millions; in contrast, many democracies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers**." 46 After eight years of painstaking, gruesome research, Rummel sums up his conclusions quite succinctly: **Preliminary research seemed to suggest, that there was a positive solution to all this killing and a clear course of political action and policy to end it. And the [\*13] results verify this. The problem is Power. The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom**. 47

### Ext2A—Alts Worse

#### Other military technology has triggered the link for decades and will continue to do so after the plan – removal from the battlefield enhances accountability and mitigates decisions based on passion which drives violence – their stance forces soldiers to be put in danger which is comparatively unethical

McNeal 11 (Gregory S, Pepperdine University School of Law, “ARE TARGETED KILLINGS UNLAWFUL? A CASE STUDY IN EMPIRICAL CLAIMS WITHOUT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, 11/4/11)

Moreover, even Mayer conceded the point that drones are probably more accurate than conventional aircraft when she wrote “Predator drones, with their superior surveillance abilities, have a better track record for accuracy than fighter jets, according to intelligence oﬃcials.”48 Despite this fact, O’Connell further claims that “[t]he operators never see with their own eyes the persons they have killed.”49 If by this she means that the operators are not standing above the bodies of their targets, looking with the naked eye, her claim is correct. However, this is also true of nearly every air campaign since the Second World War, every naval campaign that used cannons or naval guns aided by a telescope, and every shot fired by a rifle using a scope. As the Economist notes, “There are still plenty of human beings in the operational loop—it takes a team of about 180 to run and service a Predator—and it is clear that the responsibility for the decision to fire a missile rests as much with the pilot in a distant command centre as with a pilot in any cockpit.”50 O’Connell continues, “[i]n the trailer in Nevada, the pilot knows she will not be attacked. She will go home to her family at the end of the day, coach a soccer game, make dinner, and help with homework.” But these same facts could be used as an argument in favor of targeted killings as such a person will be more apt to exercise care.¶ In fact, it seems more likely that a person who is not dodging anti-aircraft fire and is not exposed to danger will be calm, careful, and deliberative. As Randall Hansen noted in his book about the Allied bombing of Germany in the Second World War, bomb aimers struggled to do their jobs when faced with the mortal fear of anti-aircraft flak;51 the use of re

motely piloted aircraft removes that fear. Retired Lieutenant General David Deptula, who oversaw the U.S. Air Force’s drone¶ program from 2006 to 2010, questions O’Connell’s logic, asking, “Are these people arguing that . . . we should only fight if you are exposed to threats and putting your life at risk?”52 Deptula concludes, “That’s silly, and I think it’s ill-founded.”53 Edward Barrett, director of strategy and research at the U.S. Naval Academy’s Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership expands on this critique. Barrett points out, “A soldier in the situation is scared and possibly hasty in deciding what to do and acting—and possibly even angry, whereas an operator who’s not threatened can use tighter rules of engagement and is not going to be fearful and therefore is going have a much cooler head.”54 These factors are especially relevant given the measures taken to enhance accountability in target acquisition, as well as in actually engaging the target. Furthermore, as O’Connell herself notes, “a—1000 people see the video [from the drone]—from—pilots in their trailers in Nevada and New Mexico, to intelligence analysts at Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Florida, to persons in—Japan, to—POTUS (the President of the United States).”55 A pilot subject to that level of scrutiny certainly will be more careful and discriminating than a traditional pilot faced with imminent danger whose gun camera footage will only be reviewed after the fact.

### not videogames

**drones enhance the reality of warfare and increase attentiveness to human suffering**

**Brooks 12** – law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation (Rosa, “What's Not Wrong With Drones?”, Sept 5, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones?page=full>, CMR)

3. Drones Turn Killing into a Video Game.¶ Writing in the Guardian, Phillip Allston (the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) and Hina Shamsi of the ACLU decry "the PlayStation mentality" created by drone technologies. "Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life?"¶ But **are drones more "video game-like" than**, say, **having cameras in the noses of cruise missiles**? Those old enough to remember the first Gulf War will recall the shocking novelty of images taken by cameras inside U.S. Tomahawk missiles, the jolting, grainy images in the crosshairs before everything went ominously black.¶ Regardless, **there's little evidence that drone technologies "reduce" their operators' awareness of human suffering**. **If anything, drone operators may be far more keenly aware of the suffering they help inflict than any distant sniper or bomber pilot could be**.¶ Journalist Daniel **Klaidman reports the words of one CIA drone operator, a former Air Force pilot: "I used to fly my own air missions.... I dropped bombs, hit my target load, but had no idea who I hit. [With drones], I can look at their faces... see these guys playing with their kids and wives.... After the strike, I see the bodies being carried out of the house. I see the women weeping and in positions of mourning. That's not PlayStation; that's real**."¶ **Increasingly**, **there's evidence that drone pilots,** just like combat troops, **can suffer from p**ost-**t**raumatic **s**tress **d**isorder: watching a man play with his children, then seeing his mangled body takes a psychological toll. A recent Air Force study found that 29 percent of drone pilots suffered from "burnout," with 17 percent "clinically distressed."

**Envt D**

**The environment is invincible**

Easterbrook 95, Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environmentthat contains themis close to indestructible.The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts.Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still.Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.**

**Spanos Ans: Humanism DA—1NC**

**Humanism DA — it’s inescapable and giving up on it dooms the planet to extinction.**

Tony **Davies**, Professor of English, Birmingham University, Humanism, 19**97**, p. 130.

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. **The several humanisms** – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – **are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern**. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, **the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained.** Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. **All humanisms, until now, have been imperial.** They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. **Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.** The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. **At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, it would be unwise simply to abandon the ground occupied by the historical humanisms. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that** the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an **overweening rationality** and an unbridled technological will to power, **has enlarged the bounds of human empire to the point of endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. **But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?**

### OOO: Ext 3/OOO Don’t Solve

#### The Aff doesn’t change our interaction with nature—that’s Hettinger—that have no (and prevent a) positive vision for nature in their theory—they describe how humans have wronged nature but no account for how we can live ethically within nature

#### And even OOO authors admit that seeing the world as actants is no guarantee of change

Bennett 11 Jane, Professor Political Theory - Johns Hopkins University, *Eurozine*, 10-19, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-10-19-loenhart-en.html

I agree, of course, that **there is a darker side yet to vibrant materialism. Several forces could recoil upon us in a way that eliminates the conditions for human life. There are no cosmic guarantees to be provided by vital materialism.**

### OOO: Ext 4/No Connectivity

#### Individual choice is inevitable—that’s Armstrong—means connectivity is constrained by human interaction

#### Why do we underestimate the non-human? Because of philosophy that assumes humans are the measure of all things, because we think objects are passive and because of an ACTION BIAS BUILD INTO HUMAN PERCEPTION (Gendered language not advocated)

Bennett and Livingston 12 Jane Bennett, Chair of Political Science Department at Johns Hopkins University and Alexander Livingston SCAPEGOAT, Semi-ology of a Disaster or, Toward a Non-Moralizing Materialism, Issue 2

**Why do we then overlook the creative contributions of nonhumans and underestimate their calls? One source of the tendency is a philoso phical canon based on the presumption that man is the measure of all things; another is a default grammar that diligently assigns activity to subjects and passivity to objects; another is** what Henri Bergson identifi ed as **the action-bias built right into human perceptio**n**—sensory attention is continually directed pragmatically toward the potential utility of external bodies, rather than toward their non-instrumentalizable aspects or thing-powers**.7

### util

**This moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize**

Jeffrey **Issac** (professor of political science at Indiana University) 20**02** Dissent, Spring, ebsco

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws**: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends**. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscienceof their supporters; **(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; **and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant**. Just as the alignm

ent with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil**. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. **Moral absolutism** inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it **undermines political effectiveness**.

## 1NR

### FW: Overview

**Restrictions are prohibitions on action --- the aff is not**

Jean **Schiedler-Brown 12**,Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. **The ordinary definition of** the term "**restrictions**" also **does not include** the **reporting and monitoring or supervising** terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

**Black's Law** Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) **defines "restriction" as**;

**A limitation** often **imposed** in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. **To prohibit from action**; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

**In contrast**, the terms "**supervise" and "supervisor" are** defined as; **To have** general **oversight** over, to superintend **or** to **inspect**. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that **the** **definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision**"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. **Kincheloe** essentially **agreed to some supervision conditions**, **but** he **did not agree to restrict his license**.

**“On” means in contact with and links “restrictions” only to war powers authority**

**Graham 16** (Arthur Butler, “Brief for Appellants – Wilson v. Dorflinger& Sons”, Court of Appeals – State of New York, Reg. 108, Fol. 387, 1916, p. 11-12)

**The Standard Dictionary defines the word “on” as follows:** “In or into such a position with reference to something, as a vehicle, a table, or a stage, as to be **in contact with** and supported by it; in a position, state, or condition of adherence; as, he go on before the wagon had fully stopped.” In Webster’s International Dictionary, we find as follows: “on—The General signification of “on” is situation, motivation, motion, or condition with respect to contact or support beneath as (1) at or in contact with, the surface or upper part of a thing, and supported by it; placed or lying in contact with the surface; as, the book lies on the table, which stands on the floor of a house on an island.” It is submitted that an elevator is not operated on streets or on highways, as a car, truck or wagon is operated, and that **by the use of the word “on”** the **Legislature intended to include only those** appliances **therein enumerated**, namely, cars, trucks, and wagons. An elevator is not operated on anything, but is operated in or inside a shaft, and is controlled by guides, which deprive the operator of the power to change the course of the lift from right to left. Clearly the Legislature intended to include in Group 41, only those cars, trucks and wagons whose direction and guidance are controlled by the operator, in whatever direction he may deem advisable.

**“Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan**

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

**“Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan**

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

### Clash DA

#### It’s the only portable skill

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car.what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game?And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs.online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### absolute

#### 2. Even if words have no absolute meaning, it’s possible to assign them meaning—evaluate language situationally—terms have a particular meaning in the context of debate

**Knops**, Sociology – University of Birmingham, ‘**7**

(Andrew, “Debate: Agonism as Deliberation – On Mouffe's Theory of Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, March)

As Pitkin explains, Wittgenstein's version of language suggests that we learn terms through practice. The traditional account of language learning views it as the process of associating a term, for example a name, with a particular object or picture of that object in our heads. We can then apply that name when we encounter the object again. We associate a definition with that name, and it becomes a label for the object. While language can be learned and used in this way, Wittgenstein argues that this is a very limited account, which only explains a small section of what we use language to do. What about learning the words ‘trust’, ‘spinster’ or ‘envy’? He therefore develops a more comprehensive account of language learning which sees it as a particular practice. We learn to use a particular phrase in a particular context. Having heard its use in a context before, we hear it repeated in similar circumstances. We therefore learn to associate it with aspects of those circumstances, and to reproduce and use it in those circumstances for ourselves. So, for example, the (polite!) child learns that “Please may I have the marmalade?” results in the person who uttered it being passed the marmalade. They make the same sounds, and they are themselves passed the marmalade. They later learn that “Please may I have the jam?” leads to their being passed the jam. Finally, they understand that “Please may I have x?” will lead to their being given whatever they choose to substitute for x. This example is helpful because it shows how the meaning of a word can be refined through its use. It may be that a child initially only associates “Please may I have . . .” with marmalade. It is only when the same words are used to elicit the passing of another object – in our example, jam – that they associate it with that other object, and then eventually, after several iterations, with any object. This process may also involve them using the phrase, and projecting it into new contexts of their own. It may also, of course, involve them making mistakes, which are then corrected. Because words are developed through repeated use in this way, they rarely have settled meanings. By applying them to new contexts, we can use them to focus on different aspects of meaning. Pitkin suggests the example of ‘feed the monkey’ and ‘feed the meter’. Prior to such application, however, we may only have had a vague idea of the word's meaning, gathered through past usage. In most, if not all, cases this process is ongoing. So words are learned through a kind of ‘training’ or ‘practice’, and learning or understanding a word is an activity that involves using the word in the correct situation. It is not a case of applying a clear-cut rule to a definite situation. Because words develop through practices and their use in particular situations, and in many cases we continue to develop their meaning through such use, very rarely will a term have a single, fixed meaning. Rather, Wittgenstein argues, the different situations in which such a general term is used are like separate language games. Just like moves in a game, words that have meaning when used in one situation may be meaningless when used in another. For example, we cannot talk of ‘checking the King’ in football. While there are connections between games, they are linked like members of a family: some share the same colour eyes, others the same shape of nose, others the same colour hair, but no two members have all the same features. Wittgenstein also uses the analogy of an historic city to show how language builds up. While some areas may be uniform, many have been added to higgledy-piggledy, with no clear pattern over how streets are laid out, or which run into which. Wittgenstein therefore argues that it is impossible to assimilate the operation of all language to a single model, such as the ‘picture theory’ or label model of meaning. Different language games have different rules, and we can only discover these by investigating particular practices of use in specific cases. However, Wittgenstein concedes that there must be some kind of regularity to our use of words. Without some form of consistency, we could not know that our use of a word in a new context was supposed to indicate or evoke a similar context in which the word had been used in the past. That words do so, Wittgenstein argues, is due to their basis in activity– they are used by us in certain situations – and that such use is grounded ultimately in activities that are *shared* by groups of us, or all of us. Cavell sums this up well when he says: We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place, just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’. These forms of life are not so much constituted by, but constitute, language. They serve as its ‘ground’. Therefore, although the process of explaining a term, and of reasoning in language, may continue up to a point, it will always come to an end and have to confront simple agreement in activity, ways of going on, or forms of life. Mouffe sees this account as ruling out the possibility of rational consensus. Following Tully, she argues that the fact that arguments are grounded in agreement in forms of life, which constitute a form of practice marking the end point of explanation or reasons, means that all attempts at rational argument must contain an irrational, practical element. Neither is it possible to suggest, as she accuses Peter Winch of doing, that we can see forms of life as some underlying regularity, which argument or reasoning can then make explicit. Again with Tully, she contends that the ‘family resemblance’ or ‘historic city’ analogy for the development of language shows it to be far too varied and idiosyncratic for such an account. Yet I would like to argue that Wittgenstein's theory as characterised above does not rule out rational argument, and the possibility of consensus, at least in principle. Wittgenstein himself characterises the offering of reasons as a kind of ‘explanation’. This much is granted by Tully. Explanations are requested by someone unfamiliar with a practice, who would like to understand that practice. Wittgenstein sees this as a completely legitimate use of language and reason. This is not surprising, as this process of explanation is precisely the form of language learning that he sets out. A person uses a term based on their understanding of its use from their past experiences. This projection either meets with the predicted response, or a different one. If the latter, the person modifies their understanding of the term. It is only when we go further, and assume that there can be an explanation for every kind of confusion, every kind of doubt, that we get into trouble. But this is precisely not what a deliberative theory of reasoning holds. A deliberative theory of reasoning models communicative reason – reason used to develop mutual understanding between two or more human beings. To this extent, the truths that it establishes are relative, though intersubjective. They hold, or are useful for, the collectivity that has discursively constructed them. They do not claim to be objective in an absolute sense, although the concept can be extended, in theory, to cover all people and hence to arrive as closely as possible to the notion of an absolute. The process that Habermas calls ‘practical discourse’ and the process that Wittgenstein calls ‘explanation’ are basically one and the same. Both are synonyms for deliberation. Habermas sees the essentially rational nature of language as the capacity for a statement to be rejected, in the simplest case with a ‘no’. It is with this response that the request for reasons, latent in all rational statements, is activated. If we widen the sense of rejection meant by Habermas beyond the paradigm case of the utterance of a ‘no’ to the broader case of a failure to elicit an expected response, we can see the similarities between Habermas’ notion of deliberation and Wittgenstein's concept of explanation. Like Wittgenstein, Habermas sees ‘normal’ language use as taking place against a backdrop of conventionally shared meanings or understandings. It is only when this assumption breaks down, when the response differs from what was expected, that deliberation is required. Shared understandings and usage are established anew, through a dialogical sharing of reasons, or explanations, which repairs the assumption that we do use these words in similar ways.