## 1NC

**OFF**

**the 1AC dehistoricizes class struggle- be skeptical of their analogies to explicit racial subordination of the past-**

Adolph **Reed 13**, Jr. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. “Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism”¶ New Labor Forum 2013 22: 49 http://nlf.sagepub.com/content/22/1/49¶ DOI: 10.1177/1095796012471637

**A second essentialist sleight-of-hand advances claims for the primacy of race/racism as an explanation of inequalities in the present by invoking analogies to regimes of explicitly racial subordination in the past. In these arguments, analogy stands in for evidence and explanation of the contemporary centrality of racism.** Michelle Alexander’s widely read and cited book, **The New Jim Crow, is only the most prominent expression of this tendency; even she has to acknowledge that the analogy fails because the historical circumstances are so radically different**.12¶ **Rigorous pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of capitalist class relations has been fully legitimized under the rubric of “diversity.”¶** **From the historical materialist standpoint, the view of racial inequality as a sui generis injustice and dichotomous formulations of the relation of race and class as systems of hierarchy in the United States are not only miscast but also fundamentally counterproductive. It is particularly important at this moment to recognize that the familiar taxonomy of racial difference is but one historically specific instance of a genus of ideologies of ascriptive hierarchy that stabilize capitalist social reproduction**. I have argued previously that **entirely new race-like taxonomies could come to displace the familiar ones. For instance, the “underclass” could become even more race-like as a distinctive, essentialized population,¶ by our current folk norms, multiracial in composition, albeit most likely including in perceptibly greater frequencies people who would be classified as black and Latino “racially,” though as small enough pluralities to preclude assimilating the group ideologically as a simple proxy for nonwhite inferiors.**13¶ **This possibility looms larger now. Struggles for racial and gender equality have largely divested race and gender of their common sense verisimilitude as bases for essential difference**. Moreover, **versions of racial and gender equality are now also incorporated into the normative and programmatic structure of “left” neoliberalism. Rigorous pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of given patterns of capitalist class relations—which is after all the ideal of racial liberalism—has been fully legitimized within the rubric of “diversity.” That ideal is realized through gaining rough parity in distribution of social goods and bads among designated population categories.** As Walter Benn Michaels has argued powerfully, **according to that ideal**, the **society would be just if 1 percent of the population controlled 90 percent of the resources, provided that blacks and other nonwhites, women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people were represented among the 1 percent in roughly similar proportion as their incidence in the general population**.14

**the alt is to endorse a Historical materialist methodology--that solves the aff and a broader base of oppression**

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01** [Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any **effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue **that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that **the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (**which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all **determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism** which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. **All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois** left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable,** more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced** by the human mind and is thus free from the **actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.**

**\*\* \*\*the aff’s focus on race is fundamentally antagonistic to working class politics- historical materialism key to give the aff praxis**

Adolph **Reed 13**, Jr. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. “Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism”¶ New Labor Forum 2013 22: 49 http://nlf.sagepub.com/content/22/1/49¶ DOI: 10.1177/1095796012471637

Yet, **for those who insist that racial reductionism is more than a pragmatic accommodation to the necessities of pursuing legal or administrative grievances, something more is at play. A historical materialist perspective can be helpful for identifying the glue that binds that commitment to a race-first political discourse and practice.¶ All politics in capitalist society is class, or at least a class-inflected, politics. That is also true of the political perspective that condenses in programs such as reparations, antiracism, and insistence on the sui generis character of racial injustice**. I submit that **those tendencies come together around a politics that is “entirely consistent with the neoliberal redefinition of equality and democracy along disparitarian lines.” That politics¶ reflects the social position of those positioned to benefit from the view that the market is, or can be, a just, effective, or even acceptable, system for rewarding talent and virtue and punishing their opposites and that, therefore, removal of “artificial” impediments to functioning like race and gender will make it even more efficient and just.**18¶ **This is the politics of actual or would-be race relations administrators, and it is completely embedded within American capitalism and its structures of elite brokerage. It is fundamentally antagonistic** **to working-class politics, notwithstanding left identitarians’ gestural claims to the contrary.**

### OFF

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend a thought experiment in which the United States Federal Government enacts a topical plan

#### USFG is the USFG

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

#### “War power” and “authority” mean specific things in this context:

Linn 2K

Alexander C. Linn, Lawyer, “International Security and the War Powers Resolution”, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 8(3), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=wmborj

"War Power" is defined as "[t]he constitutional authority of Congress to declare war and maintain armed forces (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14), and of the President to conduct war as commander-in-chief (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1578-79 (7th ed. 1999).

#### They’re not topical if the POTUS didn’t authorize the events of the 1AC:

West’s 8 – West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Edition 2, “President of the United States”, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/President+of+the+United+States

The head of the Executive Branch, one of the three branches of the federal government.

#### prefer our interp:

#### Stasis is a prerequisite to debate- limited topic key to decision-making, argument testing and critical thinking

Steinberg and Freeley 13, \* David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And \*\* Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, *Argumentation and Debate***,** *Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, 121-4

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### And, Critical thinking—switching sides forces debaters to assess all possible outcomes of a policy and sharpens their analysis of complex situations

**Harrigan 8** NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/207/1/harrigancd052008, p. 57-59)

Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1987, p. 10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are “issues of unsurpassed importance in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people…being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking” (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that “the next Pearl Harbor could be ‘compounded by hydrogen’” (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007).In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, “with such learning, we Americans could prepare…not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet” (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called “the highest educational goal of the activity” (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate’s critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches “conceptual flexibility,” where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p. 290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by the preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz)

#### Next, Policy relevance—learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence people whose hands are actually on the levers of power

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

#### Debate on war powers now is uniquely important because it has fallen out of public discourse- key to check executive overreach

Kurr 2013 – Ph.D. student in the Communication Arts & Sciences program at Pennsylvania State University and a coach for the Penn State Debate Society (9/5, UVA Miller Center & CEDA Public Debate Series, “Bridging Competitive Debate and Public Deliberation on Presidential War Powers”, http://public.cedadebate.org/node/14)

Taken together, the connection between tournament competition and a public collaboration reorients the pedagogical function of debate. Gordon Mitchell and his colleagues comment on this possibility, “The debate tournament site’s potential to work as a translational pipeline for scholarly research presents unique opportunities for colleges and universities seeking to bolster their institutional infrastructure for undergraduate research” (Mitchell et al, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, the debate series affords competitors the opportunity to become part of the discussion and inform policymakers about potential positions, as opposed to the traditional reactionary format of hosting public debates at the season’s end. Empirically, these events had the effect of “giv[ing] voice to previously buried arguments” that “subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 107). Given the timeliness of the topic, these debates provide a new voice into the ongoing deliberation over war powers and help make the fruits of competitive research have a public purpose.

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public.

Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents.

In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231).

Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### independently, they have forgone the opportunity to talk about nuclear weapons- this does an educational disservice and undermines nuclear deterrence

Jules Zacher 4-19-2013 (JD, Temple Law, “Presidential Authority and Nuclear Weapons: Taking Back our Rights” Sovereignty and Rule of Law Conference, Center for Ethics and Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School  <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1942-zacherpresidential-authority-and-nuclear-weapons>

The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study is a prime example of ¶ the non-involvement of the American public and Congress with the nuclear ¶ arsenal. The study was implemented to determine the numbers and targets for the ¶ United States’ nuclear weaponsvi. The President in 2010 articulated the goal of ¶ reducing the numbers and the role of US nuclear weaponsvii¶ Perhaps another example of how Congress and the American people have ¶ delegated war making to the President is in the doctrine of first use. The United ¶ States has never abandoned this doctrine which permits the President to launch ¶ nuclear weapons even before an actual nuclear attack has occurred. ¶ . He then requested the ¶ Pentagon and other Executive branch agencies to implement this goal. Although ¶ there have been some Congressional hearings on the Implementation Study, few ¶ American citizens are even aware of its ongoing status. Yet the results of the study ¶ have enormous implications for the average citizen including but not limited to ¶ budgetary implications in this time of tight budgets. Perhaps more important is the ¶ complete absence of public debate over the role of these weapons, whether nuclear ¶ weapons should be a part of American war making capability, and deterrence ¶ theory. ¶ viii. While the ¶ President certainly has the power to respond to an emergency situation, it is ¶ debatable whether he has the same power to initiate a war on his own.

**Public deliberation key to civilian control of nuclear weapons**

Walter B. **Slocombe**, attorney and former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Democratic Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” POLICY PAPER n. 12, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 4—**06**, p. 25-26.

The mechanisms for democratic, constitutional control of armed forces that are appropriate to a particular country will depend to a considerable degree on its broader political culture, traditional patterns of civil-military relations, its strategic and security situation, its overall structure, and its history – and on its degree of democratic development. For example, in a democracy with a strong executive with effective ability to secure a virtually automatic parliamentary majority, the parliament will not have a particularly powerful voice in nuclear matters. Workable and acceptable practices will almost certainly be different for large forces and for small forces, and for countries that regard themselves as under existential threat for which nuclear weapons provide a key element of deterrence compared to countries that have nuclear weapons for quite different reasons. Having said this, the following general observations and recommendations concerning democratic and civilian control of nuclear weapons can be made. • A nation’s nuclear weapons programs are very much properly subject to political control, if anything even more than for conventional military forces; • “Democratic” control is not synonymous with “civilian” or “political” control. A thoroughly non-democratic regime may exercise strong control over a state’s military institutions, including over nuclear weapons, without that control being in any sense “democratic”; • **The goal is democratic governance of all critical aspects of a nation’s possession of nuclear weapons**, not simply the ultimate authority over their actual use. Governance embraces not just “whose finger is on the button” but also who takes decisions on acquiring the weapons, on the shape and scale of the force, on the place of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy, on strategy and doctrine, and on advance planning for possible use; • As with other aspects of control of military forces, the main locus of democratic authority over nuclear weapons is the executive, which must have the acknowledged legitimacy, access to information, and staff support needed to make its formal authority meaningful. Since in a democracy, the executive is itself a part of the democratic system (whether directly elected or selected by an elected parliament to which it is accountable), executive control is itself an important element of democratic control; • The ultimate decision on use of nuclear weapons must be in the hands of the politically responsible leadership of the government. This entails full access by that leadership to the details of capabilities, plans and procedures, and meaningful on-going review of them by the civilian authorities; • In maintaining civilian, democratically responsible control over nuclear weapons (as well as minimising the potential for accidents or misappropriation), technical devices that, in effect, require an outside “key” controlled by the political authority play an important part. Almost equally important, however, are measures that build on military discipline and requirements for adherence to prescribed procedures and clear authentication by multiple individuals, rather than strictly mechanical devices; • It is by no means inconsistent with the principle of democratic control that there should be procedures, including for continuity of succession to authority and delegation of authority in extreme conditions – themselves set by the democratically selected executive or the elected parliament, or both – to protect against the possibility of hostile efforts to disrupt the mechanisms by which decisions would be made and communicated; • In a similar way to the military units that operate the weapons, the scientific-industrial community that builds and maintains them is a critical object of political control; it cannot be a world unto itself – but it can be a significant source of advice and oversight, and act as a counterweight to purely military (or political) perspectives. Neither the military nor the scientific constituencies should be allowed to exempt nuclear weapons programs and priorities from normal or executive and legislative controls over approval, funding, or oversight; • However, democracy not only means action by elected executive officials, but a system of accountability and shared power. Parliamentary institutions both can, and should, uphold democratic principles and have a meaningful role in decisions on programs and budgets, help ensure democratic control by prescribing by law procedures to be used within the executive, and do so without compromising legitimate security interests. Mechanisms can be created to permit parliamentary oversight without dangerously sacrificing necessary confidentiality; • While there are legitimate reasons for secrecy about many details of nuclear weapons and for reserving many operational plans and decisions to executive action, **public debate is a necessary condition of democratic control**. Consequently, a **democratic system of control over nuclear weapons – and the opportunity for informed and relevant debate – entails** acceptance by the executive of the responsibility to make public **sufficient information** concerning their existence, their basic characteristics and the ways in which they are intended to support the nation’s overall security strategy and requirements – **for meaningful public understanding and discussion**.

**Solves nuclear war**

Walter B. **Slocombe**, attorney and former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Democratic Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” POLICY PAPER n. 12, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 4—**06**, p. 4.

**Democratic civilian control of nuclear weapons remains of central importance** despite all the changes in the post-Cold War world and in the role of nuclear weapons. **The continued existence of nuclear weapons** in the military potential of major countries, together with the prospect of others acquiring them, **means that political systems will need to continue to grapple with the question of how to control these weapons –** both **to** serve national interests and to **avoid the horror of nuclear war.**

#### voting aff doesn’t achieve their broader goals – and tying their resistance strategy to the ballot is counterproductive

Ritter ‘13

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Many students who participate in comp etitive interscholastic debate in high school and college 20 frequently argue during debates that their speech acts, performances, or presentations criticizing a particular concept in a debate round could, just like 2PAC’s Changes , actually affect social inequities or issues inside and outside of the debate community. To preserve the activity, coaches and judges should discourage debaters from attempting to use — or deceiving others that they are using — competitive interscholastic debate to create social change. Those in the debate community who believe (or argue) that competitive interscholastic debate 21 can reach an audience beyond the debate room, and their opponents, coaches, and judges, should consider this question: “What can I learn from 2PAC’s success in communicating his message in Changes ?” Those who have wed themselves to the fiction that in - round speech acts in a competitive interscholastic debate setting can and does create actual social change (due t o either some strategic reasoning or simple denial ) will have a difficult time reaching the honest answer to that question: “ I am wrong.” The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with non - applicable rhetorical theory that f ails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more funda mental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which — as this article argues — is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical o f those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes. Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different from other types of persuasive activities. Each individual component of the term “competitive interscholastic debate” describes the essential structures of the activity from which very important precepts can be discerned. These precepts are fundamental to any application of any rhetorical theory reg arding speech acts wi thin a debate round because the precepts necessarily affect the scope of two crucial aspects of all communication: audience and purpose. The debate community’s m embers, many of whom are shorthand enthusiasts, simply refer to the activi ty as “debate.” But what that simple term omits, and what many frequently forget when uncritically accepting the “social change through debate” fiction, is any reference to the essential structures from which the community spawned: a competition of argumen tation during which students from one school compete against students from other schools for the votes of judges. Therefore, before any plausible argument can be made concerning the purposes or benefits of debate, the assumptions upon which those argumen ts are based must be identified and explained. The following discussion (perhaps painstakingly) analyzes the essential components of competitive interscholastic debate to identify the essential precepts that debunk the assumptions relied upon b y those endo rsing the fiction that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change. “Debate” “Debate,” in its simplest and most basic form, is the presentation of seemingly inconsistent positions to convince an audience. A position could be a factual or empirical position that describes current or historical fact (e.g. A = B). The presentation of a seemingly inconsistent position to convince an audience (e.g. A ≠ B) would constitute an empirical debate about what facts are (or were) true or false (or neit her) . A position could also be a normative position (i.e. a position about how the way things s hould have been or should be ( e.g. “A should not have been or should be A). The presentation of inconsistent normative positions to convince an audience (e.g. A should not or should be A) constitutes a normative debate. The intent - to - convince element is an indispensible part of any debate. Presenting apparently conflicting positions with the intent to convince requires an audience of some sort, as an audience is necessary for someone to be convinced. For instance, if a person writes an article on the propriety of the verdict in the Trayvon Martin trial to convince others that the verdict was wrong, but then no one reads it, there is no consideration of the positi on by the intended audience because no one (other than the author himself) could be persuaded. An audience can be as simple as a single person (e.g. having an internal debate with oneself to consider the validity of two seemingly inconsistent positions). A n audience could constitute only one person when someone presents two seemingl y inconsistent positions for that one - person audience to consider (e.g. an attorney advising his 22 client that he has two options and presents the pros and cons of both for his cl ient to make a decision). Two people could comprise an audience. For example, a debate could involve two people who present apparently inconsistent positions to try to convince each other of the rightness of their respective position s . A seeming or appare nt inconsistency between positions is also a necessary component of a debate. If two positions are clearly consistent, then there is no debate. Conversely, an actual inconsistency is not necessary for a debate. The following hypothetical demonstrates why a n actual inconsistency is not required for a debate: Two debaters go on a date appear to disagree over which movie, Django Unchained or Kill Bill, to see at Quinton Tarantino’s privately owned theater on Friday night at 10 p.m. This appears to be a conflic t because the two cannot watch both in different theaters together at the same time. Both of them want to see the most violent Tarantino movie with a revenge theme at that time. During the exchange their arguments for why Django Unchained or Kill Bill is m ore violent, one debater mentions I nglorious B astards and both agree that I nglorious B astards is the most violent Tarantino movie with a revenge theme. Fortunately, I nglorious B astards is also playing at the theater at the same time. Just because the two debaters di d not decide between Kill Bill and Django Unchained does not mean that they did not have a debate. During their debate, they realized that their apparently conflicting positi ons were not actually conflicting; they had the same position — wanting to see the most violent Tarantino revenge movie. And in this example, neither audience member was convinced of either initial position. Therefore, in any “debate” there will be some aud ience that must resolve an apparent conflict of positions. In all communications, there is some audience. Sometimes the audience has a specific goal, such as be ing entertained, informed, or persuaded. The discussion about what debate “ is ” demonstrates that identifying the audience is essential to understanding how the context of a speech act can advance or hinder the speaker’s goals. A Competitive Activity A second component of competitive interscholastic debate is that it necessarily involves a competition. Not all debates must occur within the context of a competition, as the Tarantino example above suggests. But most — if not all — debates in the debate commu nity occur either to win a debate round at a debate tournament or in preparation for winning a debate round at a debate tournament. The tournament structure is a sin qua non (a fundamental component) of the debate community . And in the very rare case that debaters host a public debate (and in the very fortunate case that an audience attends and does not leave during the first speech), the purpose is ordinarily not to convince the audience of a particular side, but to demonstrate what the school’s debate tea m does. At a typical tournament, there are a pre - determined number of preliminary rounds in which all entered schools’ debaters compete against debaters from other school s that have entered the tournament. The tournament usually determines beforehand the number of debaters that will advance to elimination rounds, and that number usually equal s four to thirty - two teams divided into brackets (semi - finals to double octafinals). If a team loses an elimination round, as the term suggests, then they are eliminat ed from the tournament. The prevailing team advances further into the tournament until the “ winner ” is left with no competitor. A hypothetically neutral critic will be assigned as a “judge.” The judge, or a panel of an odd number of judges, will vote for the debaters who they believe won the debate by doing “ the better debating. ” Many judges have written paradigms; and the vast majority of written paradigms expre ss a preference for how the debate should occur, but express little or no concern about what (in terms of content) is argued. In almost all debate rounds, the judge will make his decision based on how the debate occurs, not based on what persuaded the judg e. A primary (and probably the best) example of this point is a “dropped” argument. Many debate rounds are won, not on the basis of the persuasiveness of an argument, but because the opponents failed to directly respond to the argument. Judges will ordin arily permit the opponent to then “blow up the impact” of this drop in the following speech. Thus, the competitive nature of debate causes, to a great degree, the how to precede the what (unless the point is immaterial or non - essential). As a result, many judges divorce their human experiences and logical reasoning skills of objectively evaluating the persuasiveness of an argument from the decision of which team to vote for. And even when there is a “point - for - point and warrant - for - warrant” debate, many jud ges will vote based on who does the better job (technically speaking) extending and explaining the argument (even if the argument is atrociously absurd). T he target audience is solely the judge, and the sole issue the judge must decide is which side “did the better debating.” Mandatory switch - side debating confirms that the debaters themselves are not the audience for persuasion is mandatory switch - side debating. And b ecause fair opportunity is valued when there are winners and losers in competitions, mos t judges approach their paradigms with an attempt to be objective. Tournaments hire judges to objectively evaluate debates based on direct language from the ballot, the ballot the judge must sign his or her name to : who did the “better debating” or who “wo n the round ” ( which is a rephrasing of who did the better debating ) . Competitive debate is a very narrow slice of “debate . ” One could persuasively argue that competitive debate barely qualifies as “debate” because the target audience (the judge) is persu aded not by the truth of an argument, but who “does the better debating.” Hence , t he only point on which the judge of a competitive debate is seeking to be p ersuaded of is who to vote for. This conclusion narrows the previous section’s conclusions regard ing “debate” (generally) because the “competition” element narrows the audience in the debate to the judge, not the competitors. The debaters are not competing to be persuaded. They are competing to persuade. And the only issue on which the audience — the judge — is asked to resolve is which competitors did the better debating. The judges are not present to objectively evaluate the content of messages and arguments for their persuasive value outside of the narrow issue of who did the better debating. An Int erscholastic Activity The final essential component of competitive interscholastic debate is that students from different schools compete at debate tournaments. Many academics who have spent decades competing in and coaching debate have probably never e ncountered an intra scholastic debate competition, at least not in any of the formats in the debate community . The interscholastic element further narrows “ competitive debate” to a student activity that faces resource constraint (e.g. time, budget, rooms av ailable, etc.). Perhaps, noting that the competitive debates are interscholastic high lights the more important point about what competitive student debate is not: “academic debate” or “public debate.” The interscholastic element determines how the compet itive debates take place. Generally, several factors constrain interest in and participation on a school’s debate team. First, a school likely could not afford to send every enrolled student to travel to and register in debate tournament s . Even if some sch ools could afford this, not all could. But even the possibility of all schools’ students would be problematic in terms of one school making up more than half of the field. And even if all schools could afford to send all students to a debate competit ion, d ebate tournaments likely c ould not occur (perhaps, only during the summer) because debate tournaments would last several weeks. The tournament structure means that only a select few will be included in the first place to compete, and as tournaments progress , more and more debaters are excluded. Because only a limited number of teams can be sent to tournaments, coaches must decide who “makes the team” and which teams go to what tournaments. But these decisions (while they could be made for a good reas on, bad reason, or no reason at all) will likely be influenced by a student’s natural ability or potential to become skilled at how to do our community’s particular formats of competitive debate. And because teams generally can and do not compete against o ther teams from their schools, a competitive interscholastic debate will result in one school advancing over the other whose chances of advancing then diminish if not disappear. Finally, the interscholastic nature of competitive interscholastic debate is a point of differentiation from other types of competitive debates: the debaters are all students from different schools. They are either in college or high school. This distinguishes competitive interscholastic debate from other types of debate — particula rly academic debate. High schoolers are generally still developing physically and mentally, as well as start developing intellectually. Most college students continue their intellectual development as they obtain their associate’s or bachelor’s degrees. It is not until students begin studying for a master’s, law, or doctorate degree that they must study a particular field in depth, reading publications from academics in their respective fields. Many former competitive interscholastic debater s must , for th e first time, become familiar with the academics in the particular field for the sole p urpose of learning, not “cutting cards” for debate. It is at the end of a master’s studies or PhD program that students finally must contribute something novel within th eir particular field of study that contributes something to that field of study. This is the point at which students have made an academic contribution (assuming that what is written is selected for publication). Thus, competitive interscholastic debate is radically different from every other kind of debate. It is not “academic debate,” and it is not “public debate.” 23 Because schools’ resources limit debate participation, it is necessarily an exclusive activity to which no students have the right to parti cipate in. And without accounting for how the structures unique to competitive interscholastic debate — exclusion, competition, a limited audience, very narrow audience purpose, etc. — affect the application of a general communications or rhetorical theory in this specific context, the application should be reconsidered or viewed highly skeptically if not outright rejected. To illustrate many of the reasons why “social change through debate” is a fiction, consider the question posed in the i ntroduction: “How did 2PAC ’s Changes reach a substantial and diverse cross - section of a global audience?” Any reader who picked up on the humor of the “supposedly - late” descriptor above would immediately know that it is a trick question: 2PAC didn’t ma ke any impression by releasing Changes in 1999; 2PAC died in 1996 . 2PAC’s estate contracted with players in the music industry to produce Changes by splicing together several of 2PAC’s pre - death recordings, and released Changes in 1999. The song was advert ised and played on the radio and CD players internationally. The similarities and differences between 2PAC when recording Changes and a student arguing that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change are informative . Although 2PAC wrote and recorded parts of Changes , several other individuals in a very complex series of transactions and communications were responsible for the song’s global success es . When 2PA C recorded the various parts of Changes , he merely spoke and sang words into a mi crophone in an Interscope Records studio where the audience was solely concerned with operating equipment for quality assurance purposes. Similarly, a debater who is asserting that debate can cause social change, like 2PAC in Interscope Records’ recording studio, is speaking to an audience who typically cares little (if at all) about the debater’s intended message and cares about recording it “ on the flow . ” But unlike 2PAC’s audience (the recording studio that likely had solely a financial interest in re - co mmunicating 2PAC’s message), the judge generally does not re - communicate the debater’s mes sage for any persuasive purpose , and the judge usually has little or no interest or incentive to do so. 24 Changes ’s commercial context is part of what allowed the song to spread worldwide. Those initially re - communicating 2PAC’s message did so for financial reasons; the fact that 2PAC’s message was concerned with minimizing racial inequalities likely contributed only a limited extent to the song’s success. Pys’s Gangnam Style had similar success at reaching a global audience, and it made fun of Korean culture. What Changes , Gangnam Style (both messages disseminated in a commercial context), and debate (a competitive acti vity and, yet ironically, one increasingly marked by anti - capitalist sentiments ) have in common is that form is so much more important than substance. But the difference between the form of international hit songs a nd debate is that the form of musical p roduction s — with a catchy tune, visually stimulating music video, and sometimes a valuable message — makes the message appealing to a general audience. The form of modern competitive interscholastic debate — with, at its worse, rapid fire spreading of dense phi losophical verbiage or personal attacks tangentially related (at best) to the topic — is simply un appealing to a general audience. If anything, the form in which messages are communicated in com petitive interscholastic debate repels audience s outside of the community. To the extent that Changes was made more popular by its message, the crucial difference between the message of Changes and messages communicated in a debate round is that the in original production of Changes , and the re - communication of that original message, the message has never changed (save some remixes) or contradicted itself. The original version of Changes was the same as it was when it was released until (and after) the time that it made the Pope’s playlist. Conversely, debaters who co mmunicate messages in a debate round will, almost always, contradict their argument (again for persuasive reasons, not because they were convinced that they were wrong initially) in another round, read a different part of the card they were reading previou sly, reading different phrasings of the same argument by a different author, etc. Therefore, the message - repetition element is missing from competitive interscholastic debate. The multiple points of distinction between 2PAC’s Changes and messages made in d ebate rounds demonstrate why the dissemination of messages outside of a debate round for persuasive purposes is highly unlikely. The Kicker As the question, “How did 2PAC reach a substantial and diverse cross - section of that global audience?” was trick quest ion, so (to some extent) was this article’s initial question : “What can I learn from 2PAC’s success in communicating his message in Changes ?” While one lesson we can learn from the success 2PAC’s changes concerns the factors that make messages more li kely to be disseminated worldwide, there is pre tty much nothing else to learn in terms of persuasion in the context of competitive interscholastic debate. Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive inter scholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal su pport. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical s tudy of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted. Similarly , no one has studied whether 2PAC’s Changes had any effect on people’s attitudes toward racial equality. (Thus, it would be eq ually supported to say that 2PAC’s Changes increased racial violence.) No survey or statistical studies have been conducted, constrained by academic standards, and then published, that suggest that 2PAC’s Changes had any real effect on anyone (other than t he objectively measurable effect that purchasing the song had on the buyer’s wallet). Similarly, no one has studied whether any individual debate round , a team’s year - long “project,” or a debate team’s seemingly perpetual social campaign has created any social change regarding the position they support. While it is theoretically possible that someone has listened to 2PAC and thought to himself, “Hmm, perhaps I should not be so racist,” it is as equally possible that, according to the arguments of Judith Bu tler or Jacques Derrida (or insert any other philosophy academic or rhetorical theorist — from Aristotle to Slavoj Ž i ž ek — here), debate has created some sort of social change. The problem is that nothing supports that debate rounds can create social change other than the adage , “Anything is possible.” The reasoning that debate can create social change is circular at its best. The absurdity is that judges prefer specific, predictive, and empirical evidence over general theoretical possibilities in almost every single context except when it comes to attempts to use debate to create social change. Bald theoretical assertions with flowery language from philosophers are accepted over uncarded but logical analytical arguments. Any explanation for why coaches and students (at least pretend to) believe that debate can create social change would require an unacceptable degree of speculation. The bottom line is that the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate will (or more accurately, can) result in social change is merely speculation without any logical or empirical support. Merely labeling a proposition a fiction is insufficient to merit the proposition’s abandonment. This article uses the term “fiction” because the idea that debate rounds could likely create any social change is, in all meanings of the term, is a fiction . A fiction is a conclusion that is feigned, invented, or imagined. It is an imaginary thing or event, postulated for the purposes of argument or explanation . One can distinguish a fiction from a statement of fact (which can be determined true or false) or a scientific hypothesis (a falsifiable theory answering a posed question). A fiction, on the other hand, is something that is either false or has not been att empted to be proven true. A fiction is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Rather, it is a tool to achie ve some other purpose. Fictional stories frequently convey a moral to be extracted or lesson to be learned. 25 In law, a legal fiction is a lega l rule that is known to be factually false (such as the legal fiction that all people are presumed to know the law) that is endorsed for some greater public policy purpose (such as to avoid ignorance and dis courag e intentionally avoiding knowledge of the l aw ). After identifying whether a proposition is a fiction (or a truth or hypothesis), determining whether the fiction is worthwhile requires weighing the pros and cons of the fiction against the purposes of the context in which it is used. The Fiction The idea or proposition that competitive interscholastic debate can result in social change is properly characterized as a fiction because it is false and has not been proven true. The proposition that debate rounds can create social change is a fiction be cause it is false on a theoretical level. Those who attempt to apply theories about academic debate (i.e. arguments published in books and journals by PhDs who argue about concepts within their respective fields of study), social movements, rhetorical acts , and performances are not discussing competitive interscholastic debate. P hilosophers and rhetorical theorists have never written an article or book using competitive interscholastic debate as an example of their theory or position . Their theories draw up on historical (i.e. anecdotal) examples to demonstrate their theories. None of them have ever cited a debate round or “ debate movement” as an example of their theories. 26 Those who attempt to apply academic theories to competitive interscholastic debate (pr imarily communications academics, who also frequently happen to be participants in the debate community), decontextualize the broader theories to apply them to competitive interscholastic debate without adequately accounting for the competitive and intersc holastic structures of competitive interscholastic debate . Although some “competition” is part of any debate, this part is more accurately described as the presence of seemingly conflicting positions, which is discussed above and exemplified by the Taran tino hypothetical. In social movements or public debate, there are two (or more) apparently conflicting positions. Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different because there is not a possibility for compromise on the ultimate question of who di d the better debating ; most tournaments prohibit double wins, and no debaters would agree to a double loss. The competition is absolute ; one side must win and one side must lose. This is radically different from the ability of individuals to be persuaded b y the other side of a social movement. The switching of sides outside of the debate context comes from a person’s willingness to be persuaded by a particular position; it is not forced by tournament rules. Thus, the competitive structures of competitive in terscholastic debate render the applicability of philosophical or rhetorical theory inapplicable to the extent that it do es not account for particular competitive interscholastic debate context. The unique structures of debate rounds rob all arguments or positions therein (or in a series of rounds) of any persuasive value beyond the very narrow issue of “which side did the better debating.” The competitive element and tournament structure of competitive interscholastic debate taint all positions proffered in a debate round to create social change with a stench of “ I am actually lying about my goals; I am clearly just using this argument to win the ballot .” Even debates about how debates should proceed (i.e. theory arguments or arguments about the practices in debate, or “meta - debate” (debates about debate)) are not proffered for the truth of the proposition, but to win the debate. The audience — only the judge — is solely concerned with the ultimate question: “Which side did the better debating?” Competitive in terscholastic debate is certainly a venue in which students can become aware of societal issues and topics of concern. But the persuasive value of arguments presented in a debate round to convince debaters of the truth of either side on a topic is virtuall y nil. 2 Students will generally form opinions about issues they learn about in a debate round outside of their debate rounds. The issues debaters become aware of include issues external to debate (e.g. affirmative action, foreign policy) and issues inter nal to debate (e.g. theory, community issues). When debaters choose to bring those issues into a debate round, they necessarily use those issues as a competitive means to the ultimate end of convincing the judge that they did the better debating. This requ ires the opposing team to adopt a competitive counter - strategy to that position; it forecloses the option of the opposing team being fully persuaded by the other team’s position. Even an attempt to “compromise” via a permutation (as a competitive strategy rather than a persuasive position) will meet v igorous, usually - pre - scripted opposition. As a result, any in - round action (whether a speech act or the judge voting for one team or the other) will have no out - of - round effect consistent with or co ntemplated b y any cited authors or postulated by the high school or college student making the assertion. Even arguments about competitive interscholastic debate — primarily theory and issues about inequalities in the debate community — will necessarily lose all persuas ive value about those particular issues when they are raised in a debate round . Although more specific to competitive interscholastic debate and not general theories about academic debate, meta - debate loses its power to convince anyone in the round because the audience — only the judge — is solely concerned with the question of “which team did the better debating.” Theory and arguments about “social issues in debate” made in a debate inherently reek of disingenuousness. Most debaters and judges do not even cons ider adopting a position on the meta - debate until after the round in reflective discussion and thought about the issue, thought that n ever incorporates the truthfulness of an argument because “it was dropped” in a debate round. In the particular debate, the result is always based on who, in the judge’s opinion, did the better debating . I t is not based on who convinced the judge of some proposition irrelevant to deciding which team did the better debating. The preceding discussion demonstrates why argume nts about social change — even social change within the debate community — have persuasive value only outside of a debate round. The debate community has developed multiple forums in which members of the community engage in noncompetitive and, sometimes, acade mic debate on issues within the debate community. These include discussions before and after rounds with judges, teammates, and competitors; on forums or online message boards; or in academic publications. For the social issues external to the debate commu nity, there are almost an unlimited number of ways that students form opinions. And, after students form their opinions and join causes and organizations, there are about an equal number of non - competitive ways that students can use techniques and modes of persuasion discussed by academics and rhetorical theories. Debate rounds, at the very most, operate as venue solely for raising awareness about social issues and debate practices. It would be illogical to conclude that, because issues were debated in a particular debate and out - of - round discussion about that practice followed, the in - round debate created a social change. B ecause coaches and students strategically consider their arguments and practices prior to a deb ate round, the social issues or the “co ncern” about a debate tactic initially spawns outside of debate round s , not from within a singular debate round. And just because one even t occurred before another does not make the former the cause of the latter. To the extent that the in - round practice c auses a subsequent out - of - round discussion , debate is admittedly a form for raising awareness about practices and social issues for students. But the arguments presented in the debate round will lack persuasive value insofar as convincing the judge in the round of anything beyond the ultimate question of who did the better debating. But even if this article ’s arguments up to this point have no validity, and creating social change through debate rounds is more likely than just theoretically possible, this is insufficient to adopt the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate creates social change. It remains a fiction because no academics — not even those who have remained in the debate community for decades — have attempted to prove its validity with any form of study or survey. No studies or surveys have been conducted on any particular application of philosophical or rhetorical theory to the practices within competitive interscholastic debate. Thus, competitive interscholastic debates and meta - debat es therein claiming to create some sort of change either within the community or outside the community have no empirical support. They simply present the possibility, but fail to show any probability of success. Because any critically thinking person (in o r out of the debate community) should be hesitant to presume probability based on mere possibility, the probability of the general theory being applicable in the competitive interscholastic debate context should be presumed to be zero , as no probability ha s been proven. Although practices have certainly evolved, no empirical study has causally linked this evolution to in - round arguments to the exclusion of out - of - round, non - competitive discussions.

#### USFG’s not categorically racist. Examples prove that claim’s too sweeping:

Seligman ‘11

Brad Seligman – Lead Counsel, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc – The nationwide class action gender

discrimination case against Wal-Mart Stores and founder of the Impact Fund, which provides financial and technical

assistance and representation for complex public interest litigation – Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy – January–February 2011 – http://www.impactfund.org/downloads/Resources/UsingLawForChange-Seligman.pdf

Litigation as a tool for social change has a long and proud tradition in the United States. In the nineteenth century cases were brought to challenge discriminatory laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act and to advance labor rights and the rights of women and people of color. In the twentieth century the epic battle to dismantle Jim Crow laws and the “separate but equal” doctrine culminated in the famous Brown v. Board of Education decision. In the 1960s federal rules were developed to make class action litigation more feasible, and courts approved massive institutional-change cases against industries and governmental units.1 In the 1970s environmental litigation, aided by the passage of federal laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act, became common. Starting in the 1980s, however, social justice litigation has become more challenging to pursue due to more conservative judges, tougher class certification and substantive law decisions, more demanding attorney-fee and cost-recovery requirements, the decline in federal enforcement of civil rights and environmental laws, and cutbacks and restrictions on legal services funding.2 Still, such litigation remains a potent weapon for change. In recent years the environmental justice and disability rights movements have shown that the path remains open for innovative litigation. Today we nevertheless must be more strategic and thoughtful about how we use litigation. Here I describe a holistic model of social justice litigation that includes adroit use of the media, coalitions, and working partnerships with community and grassroots organizations and other forms of advocacy. I explore the range of procedural devices in the social justice litigator’s tool box. And I remind readers to take pride in and enjoy their work.

**They deny neg agency and shut down dialogue**

Ryan **Galloway**, Assistant Professor, Communication Studies, Samford University, “Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate as an Argumentative Dialogue,” CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE v. 28, 9—**07**, Ebsco.

**A second reason to reject the topic has to do with** its **exclusivity**. Many teams argue that because topicality and other fairness constraints prevent particular speech acts, debaters are denied a meaningful voice in the debate process. Advocates argue that because the negative excludes a particular affirmative performance that they have also precluded the affirmative team. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it views exclusion as a unitary act of definitional power. However, a dialogical perspective allows us to see power flowing both ways. A large range of affirmative cases necessitates fewer negative strategies that are relevant to the range of such cases. **If the aff**irmative **can present any case it desires, the benefits of the research, preparation, and in-depth thinking that go into the creation of negative strategies are** diminished, if not **eviscerated** entirely. **The** affirmative **case is obliged to invite a neg**ative **respons**e. In addition, even when the negative strategy is not entirely excluded, **any strategy that diminishes arg**umentative **depth and quality diminishes the quality of** in-round **dialogue. An aff**irmative speech act **that** flagrantly **violates** debate **fairness** norms **and claims that the benefits of the aff**irmative act **supersede** the need for such guidelines has the potential of excluding a meaningful negative response, and **undermines the pedagogical benefits of the in-round dialogue**. The “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) is stunted. While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the **aff**irmative **also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the neg**ative response. This unstated but understood rule is **that the neg**ative speech act **must** serve to **negate the affi**rmative act. Thus, **aff**irmative **teams** often **exclude** an entire range of **neg**ative **arguments,** including arguments **designed to challenge** the **hegemony, domination, and oppression** inherent **in** topical approaches to **the resolution**. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” **fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is** just that—a ground **to stand on,** a ground **to speak from**, a ground by which **to meaningfully contribute to** an ongoing **conversatio**n. Conversely, **in a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value,** and that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. **This respect encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues** without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite. The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counterwords,” enhancing the pedagogical process produced by debate. Additionally, debate benefits activism by exposing the participants to a wide range of points of view on topics of public importance. A debater starting their career in the fall of 2005 would have debated about China, landmark Supreme Court decisions, Middle East policy, and agricultural policy. It is unsurprising that many debaters contend that debate is one of the most educationally valuable experiences of their lives. Thus, the unique distinctions between debate and public speaking allow debaters the opportunity to learn about a wide range of issues from multiple perspectives. This allows debaters to formulate their own opinions about controversial subjects through an in-depth process of research and testing of ideas. Putting the cart before the horse by assuming that one knows that the resolution is oppressive and cannot be meaningfully affirmed denies debaters the ability to craft a nuanced answer to the question posed by the resolution.

**This destroys debate and entrenches racism**

Jacob D. **Subotnik**, Professor, law, Touro College, Cornell J. L. & Pub.Pol'y 681, 20**07**, LN.

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say** to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating."**These words** will clearly **invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they** will, by effectively **preclud**ing **objection, disconcert and disunite others**. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards,have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles.n76Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, **"I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective** on their condition. n77¶ [\*696] Last, as we have seen, **it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others**. n78 [\*697] It is because of **this conversation-stopping effect** of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs **succeeded in limiting academic debate**, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? **Discouraging white** legal **scholars from entering the** national **conversation about race**, n80 I suggest, has **generated** a kind of **cynicismin** white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected**.¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

## 2NC

#### Games are different--Representations of policy are different than the actual thing—their offense doesn’t link

Armstrong 2K

(Paul B., Dean and Professor of Literature at Brown University, New Literary History, 31: 211–223, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory”)

For Iser, ﬁctions are attempts by human beings to give form to themselves which reveal in the process that human beings have no deﬁnitive form. Without a shape to present itself as, human being would be nothing, but since we can only grasp ourselves as a form that is not what we are, there is no limit to the shapes human beings can try on. The plasticity of human beings gives rise to the multiplicity of ﬁctions and makes possible cultural differences. Accounting for ﬁctional multi- plicity may consequently help explain how different cultures are con- structed. The ways in which ﬁctional worlds interact might then also offer models for how cultural differences can be mediated. As an exploration of the implications of human plasticity, Iser’s anthropology constitutes a response to the contemporary political dilemma of negoti- ating differences between incommensurable worlds. Iser describes “the act of ﬁctionalizing” as “a crossing of boundaries” (FI 3). New meanings are generated, in his view, when limits are overstepped. He therefore rejects the notion of representation as 213 the politics of play copying because ﬁctions do not merely mirror reality but instead transform the materials they take from the pre-given world. The opposition of “ﬁction” and “reality” seems faulty to him because ﬁctions always contain elements of reality (“a piece of ﬁction devoid of any connection with known reality would be incomprehensible” [FI 1]) and because reality includes many ﬁctional elements (narratives, beliefs, and myths, for example, that are part of the texture of the real). He proposes “to replace this duality with a triad: the real, the ﬁctive, and . . . the imaginary. It is out of this triad that the text arises” (FI 1). The imaginary is the featureless, otherwise inaccessible capacity for making meaning to which ﬁctions give form. As what Iser calls “the generative matrix of the text” (FI 21), it is the ability to play with elements of the real and to transform them by selecting and combining them in ways they cannot determine or predict. The imaginary mediates between the ﬁctive and the real and animates their interaction, but it is knowable only through its effects. Not a faculty or an essence, it is the power of human plasticity to create forms, play with the given, and overstep limits. Iser calls representation “an act of transgression” (FI 3) because it entails the crossing of boundaries. This is true of each of the three dimensions of ﬁctionalizing he describes: selection, combination, and self-disclosure. For example, if a literary text is constructed by selecting “from a variety of social, historical, cultural, and literary systems that exist as referential ﬁelds outside the text,” then this process involves “a stepping beyond boundaries, in that the elements selected are lifted out of the systems in which they fulﬁll their speciﬁc function” (FI 4–5). Taking the given out of its original context changes it by depragmatizing it—suspending its instrumental activity and thereby making it observ- able. The context from which it is taken is altered as well because it is highlighted as the background against which the selected item emerges: “It is as if what is present in the text must be judged in the light of what is absent” (FI 5). Selecting materials to create a text is not a mechanical act but a transformative process, then, because it changes what it picks out by crossing over the boundaries that had previously deﬁned it.

Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate*

*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

## 1NR

**FW: SSD Good—Critical Thinking 2NC**

**Empirically proven—the best advocates learned to debate both sides first**

**Dybvig and Iverson 2K** (Kristin and Joel, Arizona State U., “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy”, http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html)

**Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy** and challenge peoples' assumptions. **Debaters must switch sides**, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. **While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides** of an argument **actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides** of an argument, **so that they could defend their positions** against attack, **they also learned** the **nuances** of each position. **Learning** and the intricate nature of various policy proposals **helps debaters** to **strengthen their own stance** on issues.

### Policy Solves Anti-Blackness

#### We need to use policy to dismantle racism

Jamelle Bouie, “Making and Dismantling Racism,” THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, 3—11—13,

<http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism>

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices**—**the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle thisprejudiceusing public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that has defined American history. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade without the emergence of an anti-black racism. It took particular choices made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

#### Their politics can’t access this

Martha Minow, Professor, Law, Harvard University, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1997, p. 56-57.

Identity politics tends to locate the problem in the identity group rather than the social relations that produce identity groupings.235 Personaltestimony about oppression risks replacing analysis of social structures that produce and maintain it.236 Personal testimony is crucial to articulating and maintaining memories, butincapable of providingeither analysis of the past or constructive programs for the future**.** Cornel West observes: "we confine discussions about race in America to the 'problems' black people pose for whites rather than consider what this way of viewing black people reveals about us as a nation."237 Serious discussion of race in America, he argues, "must begin not with the problems of black people but with the flaws in American society—flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural stereotypes."238 Identity politics is likely to reinforce white people's conception of blacks as "them" rather than bringing home people's mutual dependence and relationships. Identity politics tends to produce not only defensiveness among white men, but also makes it easier for white men to abandon and even blame people of color and women of all sorts for their circumstances. More basically, identity politics seems to breed more identity politics. Judith Butler put the limitations of identity politics bluntly: "You can articulate your identity all you want; you need the **damn** resources in order to respond to the concrete problems of bodies in pain."241 To get the resources, you need to work with others; to care about other bodies in pain, you need to move beyond your own circumstances. Racial patterns of inequality persist and expand.242 Yet, there remain twice as many whites as blacks below the poverty line.243 Something more than identity politics is neededto get a grip on these developments and to engage in resistance to them.244 A politics not of identities but of envisioned alternatives could bridge identity cleavages without demanding that people dissolve their differences in a pot of assimilation that does not absorb all. I do not want to understate the positive aspects of identity politics: valuable conceptions and occasions for being for oneself and forging solidarity with others based on a perception of a shared trait; important challenges to exclusionary practices; and effective questions about exclusionary practices that claim to be inclusive, such as colorblind policies that nonetheless produce virtually all-white beneficiaries. Identity politics also disturbs the repression of historic and continuing group-based injuries. Yet, ironically, identity politics responds to group-based exclusions by reiterating the very same group boundaries**.** The problem is not only that responses to oppression reiterate the oppressive strategy of treating identity as fixed.Thepotentially multiple,fluid qualities of any person's identityseem toevaporate in the assertion of a single trait.Considerable power must be marshalled to accomplish this disappearing act, given the complexity of anyone's identity. And this magical result does not, at the same time, produce purposes or causes that effectively mobilize people against oppression.

#### Their desire to ignore the consequences of their advocacy causes alt failure ---must evaluate consequences of proposals

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328#n281) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.