### OFF

#### Should means immediate

Justice Summer, Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in *in praesenti* resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the *entire* record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16)  ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to *every words and every part of the text*, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an *in praesenti* resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is *impliedly followed* by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or **immediately effective**, **as opposed to something that will** or would **become effective in the future** [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### the aff happens in 9 months

#### vote neg

#### -ground- spike out of our disads to immediate implementation

#### -limits- infinite possible future aff dates makes prep impossible

**OFF**

**Obama’s successfully holding off pressure for wider sanctions by taking a calculated approach – failure causes Russian retaliation**

**AP, 3—22**—14 “Are Tougher Sanctions Against Russia To Come?”, http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-stories/223017/are-tougher-sanctions-against-russia-to-come.html

**Putin has mocked the punitive steps** President Barack **Obama has taken so far** in their post-Cold War game of chess — or chicken.¶ **Putin made jokes of Obama’s decision** this week **to freeze the assets of businessmen** with close ties to him as well as Bank Rossiya, which provides them support. **Putin quickly retaliated by slapping travel restrictions on nine U.S. officials** and lawmakers, including Sen. John McCain, who quipped: “I guess this means my spring break in Siberia is off.”¶ **More serious repercussions loom if the standoff heats up**.¶ **For now, Putin says there is no need for further Russian retaliation**, yet his Foreign Ministry said Moscow would “respond harshly.”¶ **Putin claims to have no plans for further incursions into Ukraine or elsewhere in the neighborhood**. But he’s not planning to reverse Russia’s annexation of Crimea either.¶ **The U.S.** and Europe are **left to weigh the possibility of levying tougher measures on Russia’s energy and banking sectors.** **That could backfire if Moscow, in turn, seized American or other foreign assets or cut exports of natural gas to Europe, which is heavily dependent on Russia for energy**.¶ “**If Russia doesn’t do anything other than what they’ve done so far with Crimea, I think the Obama administration will probably stand pat with the sanctions that it has already imposed,” said** Richard **Fontaine, president of the** Washington-based Center for a **New American Security**. “I think they are waiting to see if this is the end of the Russian adventurism, or if there is more to come, and then they will react with more sanctions accordingly.”¶ **By taking a step-by-step approach, the U.S. is giving Russia a chance to take the “diplomatic off-ramp” and resolve the crisis,** Fontaine said. “The problem with that is that Putin has shown absolutely no appetite to take any off-ramp,” he said. “If the off-ramp means reversing what he’s done in Crimea, I don’t think these sanctions are going to achieve that.”¶ Just the threat of harsher sanctions has dampened the outlook for the fragile Russian economy. Russian stocks were under pressure Friday as a second credit rating agency put the country on notice of a possible downgrade. Visa and MasterCard stopped serving two Russian banks, including Bank Rossiya.¶ The Russian stock market has lost more than 10 percent this month.¶ Also Friday, Russia said it might scrap plans to tap international markets for money this year.¶ The European Union hit 12 more people with sanctions Friday over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, bringing its list of those facing visa bans and asset freezes to more than 30. They include one of Russia’s deputy prime ministers, two Putin advisers and the speakers of both houses of Russia’s parliament.¶ But it is still short of the top-tier list of Putin associates punished by the United States, and evidence that Europe is not as eager to punish its energy supplier and trade partner.¶ U.S. Sen. Dick **Durbin**, who went to Ukraine with McCain last week, **urged Obama to rally the support of U.S. allies on sanctions.** “To do it alone is very limited. To do it with our allies can have some impact on Putin,” he said.¶ McCain also said cracking down on Russian lawmakers and Putin’s inner circle won’t get Putin’s attention. He said the U.S. should provide financial aid to Ukraine, immediately send defensive weapons to the country, resume work on a missile defense system in Poland and develop a long-term plan to get energy to Europe and Ukraine.¶ “The higher price that Putin thinks he has to pay for further aggression, the more likely that he doesn’t act,” said McCain.¶ **Fifty former U.S. government officials and foreign policy experts wrote Obama** on **Friday urging him** **to** strengthen Ukraine’s democratic transition and **impose “real costs” on Putin.**¶ **They said Obama should** go after Putin, and **expand the sanctions to isolate Russian financial institutions** and businesses that are complicit in Russia’s incursion into Crimea or support Syrian President Bashar Assad.

**Plan is a political disaster for Obama**

John **Bresnahan**, “Senators Discuss Revising 9/11 Resolution,” POLITICO, 5—7—**13**, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=5D34D2EA-4EBE-461D-B44B-86AA6C3378A7

**Both the House and Senate would have to adopt the new resolution**, giving the White House virtual veto authority through its Democratic allies on Capitol Hill. Some Democrats, for their part, worry that **vocal Obama critics** like Paul and Ted Cruz (R-Texas) — or dozens of House Republicans — **would use such a debate to attack the president**’s policy **on all military and national security issues**, not just terror-related topics. “Can you imagine what Paul or Cruz would do with this?” said one top Democratic aide. “**It could be a disaster**. And it would be worse in the House.” Such unfettered political slams of Obama would not be accepted by Democratic leaders, and spurred predictions that **nothing substantive would come out** of the calls for a new resolution in the long run.

**Political capital is critical for Obama to hold off hawks and promote conflict de-escalation**

**Richmanm, 3—6**—14. Sheldon – VP of the Future of Freedom Foundation and editor of Future of Freedom, FFF's monthly publication. “American Hawks Risk Escalating the Ukrainian Crisis”, <http://reason.com/archives/2014/03/06/american-hawks-escalate-ukrainian-crisis>.

**With Russia and the United States confronting each other over Ukraine, the world is at a dangerous juncture.** **While the chances of war** between the two behemoths **seem small**—these are, after all, nuclear powers that have avoided war for over 60 years—**nothing can be taken for granted**. **No one wanted the Great War** that began in central Europe a century ago this year either, **but things can get out of control.** Governments are run by human beings who, perhaps more than others, are tainted by arrogance, vainglory, and the fear of humiliation.¶ **What’s most worrisome is not what** Russian President Vladimir **Putin is doing in Crimea** and threatening to do in eastern Ukraine. Not that Putin’s actions are good or justified—they are neither. **What’s most worrisome are the actions of the U.S. government, which could aggravate the conflict**.¶ **U.S. regimes from** George **H.W. Bush onward have done their utmost to demean Russia** and its rulers. In violation of Bush’s promise to Mikhail Gorbachev, NATO expanded its membership to include states formerly part of the defunct Soviet Union’s empire and publicly talked about admitting both Ukraine and another former Soviet republic, Georgia. The United States has also cut deals with former Soviet republics in central Asia, further putting Russian rulers on edge.¶ But despite these aggressive U.S. actions, Putin should not have escalated the Ukrainian conflict by sending troops to Crimea or obtaining his parliament’s authorization to invade the rest of Ukraine.¶ No government is to be trusted, and among the most fearful components of government is the military. Thus Putin’s moves toward mobilization are to be condemned by all who love peace and oppose war. **Any war would** kill innocents and **run a high risk of careening out of control**. For that reason, Putin’s responses to events in Ukraine merit the contempt of all decent people.¶ But **Putin alone cannot heighten the risk of a big war. That would also require certain moves by the Obama administration.** President Barack **Obama talks about imposing sanctions, which is bad enough. The question is whether he has the backbone to withstand the pressure to “get tougher” with Russia**.¶ **This pressure comes from the** usual **hawks,** like the dependably opportunistic Republican senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), as well as The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post. Obama, we’re told, is naïve, playing marbles while Putin plays chess. Do they not see the hypocrisy of supporting America’s preventive wars while condemning Russia for violating another country’s sovereignty?¶ **The theme** of the Obama-goading is that **Putin wouldn’t have dreamed of intervening in Ukraine had America not “retreated from the world.**”¶ The problem with this claim is that it is utterly without foundation. There has been no U.S. retreat from the world. After pointing out that Secretary of State John Kerry has both asserted and rejected the retreat claim, foreign policy writer John Glaser commented, “I can’t think of one single place in the world where the United States is withdrawing.”¶ Not only is the U.S. government exerting influence, however ineptly, in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, it’s been heavily involved in the very location under examination, Russia’s backyard. (I agree that Russia should not attempt to control its backyard, but how many Americans believe the U.S. government should stop trying to manage its backyard?) As Glaser writes,¶ Our State Department has helped usher in a change of government in Ukraine, as Washington continues to compete with Moscow for influence in a post-Soviet state that is of no vital interest to the U.S. Across Europe, in countries like Germany, Italy, Greece, Belgium, et al., Washington maintains military bases and continues to push for the expansion of NATO.¶ Yes, indeed. Talk about bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO is heard once again. NATO, which should have disbanded along with the Soviet Union, operates on the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all. Imagine if Georgia had been a member when it fought with Russia over South Ossetia in 2008. Imagine if Ukraine were a member now.¶ **It’s unlikely any good would come from more U.S. intervention. Obama should pull back and resist the confrontationists.**

**Broad sanctions cause retaliation and the greatest global economic collapse of the 21st century**

**Mercier, 3—16**—14. Gilbert – Global Research Analyst) “Ukraine’s Crisis: Economic Sanctions Could Drive a Fragile World Economy into a Financial Quagmire”, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraines-crisis-economic-sanctions-could-drive-a-fragile-world-economy-into-a-financial-quagmire/5373597?print=1>

**The referendum in Crimea** on March 16, 2014 will probably attach the peninsula to the Russian federation. While **it is unlikely that NATO will intervene and seek a direct military confrontation** with Russia, **the United States** and the European Union **are** already **cooking some broad and unwise** **economic sanctions with which to punish Russia**. ¶ **Russia**, for its part, **has at its disposal some mighty economic weapons with which to retaliate**, as needed.¶ **The economic pain from this tit for tat of sanctions will be**, in particular, **inflicted to the EU. Because of the interconnections between all** economies and **financial markets**, mutual **economic sanctions could drive a still fragile world economy to a financial crash**.¶ The West, acting as if it solely and arrogantly represents the international community, has formulated a hazardous policy to isolate Russia. This ill-advised strategy is extremely shortsighted on all levels. Unlike Iran, Russia is fully integrated into the global economy.¶ A test for BRICS¶ The Ukraine crisis is a major test of BRICS‘ geopolitical validity as an economic group, political force and potential military alliance. China, Russia’s biggest partner in BRICS, has been strangely muted about Ukraine and the Crimea referendum, urging for “restraint on all sides” and pushing for a political solution.¶ During the emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on March 15, 2014, on a resolution to declare Crimea’s referendum illegal, China did not side with Russia by using its veto power but instead abstained from voting. China’s abstention does not fare well for the future of BRICS, as it plays into the strategy of the US and its EU partner to isolate Russia. China, by its abstention from the UN vote, and India, Brazil and South Africa, by their subdued responses, have already played into the hands of the US and its European allies. Will China and other BRICS members step in forcefully to stop the madness of multilateral economic sanctions?¶ Dumping US Treasury Bonds¶ Russia, to prevent the announced freeze of its assets in the US, has already acted on the looming sanctions by liquidating more than $100 billion of its holdings in US Treasury Bonds. The bonds, which represent about 80 percent of Russia’s holding in US T-Bonds, were transferred out of the US Central Bank. The withdrawal was revealed by the US central bank when it announced that its holdings in T-Bonds dropped by $105 billion for the week ending March 12, 2014, from $2.96 trillion to $2.85 trillion. This abrupt sale is three times higher than any weekly sale was at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis.¶ Of all countries, China has the means to diffuse the potential economic crisis by also threatening to dump US T-Bonds. China owns an estimated $1.3 trillion in US Treasury Bonds and is the number one investor amongst foreign governments. Other BRICS members such Brazil and India own respectively $250 billion and $64 billion in T-Bonds. Consequently, the threat by BRICS members of a coordinated fire sale would represent more than $1.6 trillion in T-Bonds. This would be a powerful enough “financial weapon of mass destruction,” to quote Warren Buffet, to crash Wall Street, the US dollar, and by a ripple effect, the European financial markets.¶ Economic sanctions’ global boomerang effect¶ **China has** rightly **warned that drastic economic sanctions against Russia, and Russia’s subsequent retaliation could make the global economy “spiral into chaos**.” Sanctions on Russian exports would greatly expose the EU. Europe imports 30 percents of its gas from the Russian state-owned company Gazprom. Russia is also Europe’s biggest customer. The EU is, by far, Russia’s leading trade partner and accounts for about 50 percent of all Russian exports and imports. In 2014, EU-Russia overall trade stands at around 360 billion Euros per year. Russia’s total export to the EU, which is principally raw materials such as gas and oil, stands at around 230 billion Euros, while Russia’s imports from the EU amount to around 130 billion Euros of mainly manufactured products as well as foodstuff. The EU is also the largest investor in the Russian economy and accounts for 75 percent of all foreign investments in Russia.¶ In case of Western economic sanctions, **Russian lawmakers have announced** that **they would** pass a bill to **freeze the assets of European and American companies that operate in Russia**. On the other side, more than 100 Russian businessmen and politicians are allegedly targeted by the EU for a freeze of their European assets. Besides Alexey Miller, head of the state-owned Gazprom, the CEO of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, is also apparently on the sanction hit list. Rosneft is the largest listed oil company in the world and, as such, has partners worldwide, including in the West. For example, the US-based company Exxon-Mobil has a $500 million oil-exploration project with Rosneft in Siberia, and Exxon-Mobil is already in partnership with the Russian giant oil company to exploit Black Sea oil reserves.¶ Global zero sum game or is it fracking stupid?¶ The US’ booming fracking business and its lobbyists in Washington view Ukraine’s crisis as an opportunity for expansion into new markets. They argue that the US can provide Europe with all its gas needs and, by doing so, make obsolete Russia’s main economic weapon of shutting off EU’s main gas supply. Needless to say, this would harm the Russian economy by cutting off one of its key sources of revenue, which amounts to $230 billion a year of export to the EU.¶ On paper and in theory, the plan to supply the EU with natural gas from fracking sounds manageable. Fortunately, for the sake of the environment, this idea to provide Europe with gas proudly made in the USA is a pie in the sky. Fracking has been singled out as perhaps the most damaging way to extract energy, due to its pollution of water, release of the extremely strong greenhouse gas methane, and potential to cause earthquakes. Realistically, it would take at least three years to sort out the issues of transport, storage and distribution of the US-derived natural gas for Europe. Europeans have a choice: either stick to Gazprom’s cheap and reliable gas or rely on Uncle Sam’s pipe dream for their energy needs. **Military escalation is unlikely once Crimea decides to join the Russian federation: NATO doesn’t have the stomach for it**. **On the other hand, economic sanctions and the Russian retaliations are a recipe for disaster. This game of sanctions is a global zero sum game that could make the 2008 crash look for all of us like a walk in the park**.

**Collapse causes global nuclear warfare**

**Merlini 11** (Cesare, nonresident senior fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, “A Post-Secular World?” Survival, 53(2), 2011, ebsco, ldg)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. **One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps** even **involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis** **might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system**, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, **and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of** **outside interference** would self-interest and rejection of outside interference **would** likely **be amplified, emptying**, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of **multilateralism**, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, **tensions** such as those related to immigration might **become unbearable.** **Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbat**ed. One way or another, the **secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes**, competing or **converging** **with** secular absolutes such as **unbridled nationalism.**

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#### The Executive branch of the United States should refuse to use public law 107-40's authorization to use force effective December 31, 2014 and make necessary adjustments to its targeted killing and detention policy to ensure compliance with relevant domestic and international law, including principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality, publicly articulate its legal rationale for its policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection. The Executive should not use the special forces for counterterror missions.

#### The CP’s the best middle ground---preserves the vital counter-terror role of targeted killings while resolving all their downsides

Daniel Byman 13, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4

Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.

Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.

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#### Text: The United States federal government should amend public law 107-40’s authorization to use force restriction to require narrow targeting criteria consistent with international self-defense law and institutional checks that include transparency, auditing, and periodic assessment requirements. The United States federal government should only use special forces as a last resort in counterterror missions.

#### repaling aumf causes terror and kills flex- revision is better

Cully Stimson, Manager of the National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow --- Heritage, 1-21-2014, Framing the Debate of AUMF Reform, p. blog.heritage.org/2014/01/21/framing-debate-aumf-reform/

I warned that “repealing the AUMF prematurely would be unwise,” and that it would “signal, legally, that the war against al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue in fact to wage war against the United States.” And I suggested that the “current AUMF should remain in place unless and until the narrow class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national security.”¶ Recognizing that it is “not too early to begin thinking about what comes after the AUMF,” I suggested a framework for how the United States government should approach future threats:¶ Whether we need to enact additional authorities for the use of military force must be “based on our national security needs.”¶ The substance of the 2001 AUMF authorization should be used as a template so that the new authorization, however narrow, allows the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those entities that pose a substantial threat to the United States.¶ The new authorization, if indeed one is deemed necessary, must be “narrowly tailored, flexible legislation” that is prepared in “an open and transparent manner” in order to best serve the interests of the American people.¶ Congress should consider building on the existing AUMF, rather than replace it prematurely. The President has the option of not using the broad grant of authority in the existing AUMF. Any radical, premature modification to the core AUMF grant of authority would cast “uncertainty on the legal basis for so many aspects of our campaign against al Qaeda.”¶ If or when the President turns his attention to reform of the AUMF, the Administration would be wise to follow that template.

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#### Wartime causes circumvention--The intractable battle creates a national diversion that impairs military wartime decisions

Lobel 8—Professor of Law @ University of Pittsburgh [Jules Lobel, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War,” Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 69, 2008, pg. 391]

The critical difficulty with a contextual approach is its inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity, which tends to sharply shift the balance of power in favor of a strong President acting in disregard of congressional will. For example, the application of the Feldman and Issacharoff test asking whether the congressional restriction makes realistic sense in the modern world would yield no coherent separation of powers answer if applied to the current Administration’s confrontation with Congress. It would undoubtedly embolden the President to ignore Congress’s strictures. The President’s advisors would argue that the McCain Amendment’s ban on cruel and inhumane treatment, or FISA’s requirement of a warrant, does not make realistic sense in the context of the contemporary realities of the war on terror in which we face a shadowy, ruthless nonstate enemy that has no respect for laws or civilized conduct, a conclusion hotly disputed by those opposed to the President’s policies. Focusing the debate over whether Congress has the power to control the treatment of detainees on the President’s claim that the modern realities of warfare require a particular approach will merge the separation of powers inquiry of who has the power with the political determination of what the policy ought to be. Such an approach is likely to encourage the President to ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments whenever he or she believes that a statute does not make realistic sense—that is, when it conflicts with a policy the President embraces. 53¶ The contextual approach has a “zone of twilight” quality that Justice Jackson suggested in Youngstown. 54 Often constitutional norms matter less than political realities—wartime reality often favors a strong President who will overwhelm both Congress and the courts. While it is certainly correct— as Jackson noted—that neither the Court nor the Constitution will preserve separation of powers where Congress is too politically weak to assert its authority, a fluid contextual approach is an invitation to Presidents to push beyond the constitutional boundaries of their powers and ignore legislative enactments that seek to restrict their wartime authority.¶ Moreover, another substantial problem with a contextual approach in the war powers context is that the judiciary is unlikely to resolve the dispute. 55 The persistent refusal of the judiciary to adjudicate the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution strongly suggests that courts will often refuse to intervene to resolve disputes between the President and Congress over the constitutionality of a statute that a President claims impermissibly interferes with her conduct of an ongoing war. 56 This result leaves the political branches to engage in an intractable dispute over the statute’s constitutionality that saps the nation’s energy, diverts focus from the political issues in dispute, and endangers the rule of law.¶ Additionally, in wartime it is often important for issues relating to the exercise of war powers to be resolved quickly. Prompt action is not usually the forte of the judiciary. ¶ If, however, a constitutional consensus exists or could be consolidated that Congress has the authority to check the President’s conduct of warfare, that consensus might help embolden future Congresses to assert their power. Such a consensus might also help prevent the crisis, chaos, and stalemate that may result when the two branches assert competing constitutional positions and, as a practical matter, judicial review is unavailable to resolve the dispute.¶ Moreover, the adoption of a contextual, realist approach will undermine rather than aid the cooperation and compromise between the political branches that is so essential to success in wartime. In theory, an unclear, ambiguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch uncertain of its legal authority could further compromise and cooperation. However, modern social science research suggests that the opposite occurs. 57 Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects or factors within the ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position. This self-serving bias hardens each side’s position and allows the dispute to drag on, as has happened with the ongoing, unresolved dispute over the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. Pg. 407-409

#### aumf gets circumvented thru covert action statute

Lawfare, “Legality of U.S. Government’s Targeted Killing Program under Domestic Law,” 2012,

www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/legality-of-targeted-killing-program-under-u-s-domestic-law/

Nevertheless, Bradley and Goldsmith explain, even if Congress did not authorize the U.S. government’s targeted killing program with the AUMF, the President could in theory act against terrorists presenting an imminent threat under the Covert Action Statute (CAS), 50 U.S.C. §413b. The CAS is potentially an important authorizing authority, as its scope extends beyond that of the AUMF, namely in that it is not limited to those terrorist groups linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In other ways, though, the CAS may be narrower than the AUMF. For instance, Robert Chesney sets forth the argument that the CAS merely authorizes that which is otherwise lawful under Article II, and thus does not expand the scope of the President’s authority.

#### turns heg and overstretch

Haass 13 (Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, “What is the effect of U.S. domestic political gridlock on international relations?” http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/effect-us-domestic-political-gridlock-international-relations/p30725)

There is a well-known adage that politics stops at the water's edge, but this tends to be more hope than reality. American history is filled with examples in which political disagreement at home has made it difficult for the United States to act, much less lead, abroad. Division within Congress or between the legislative and executive branches can make it impossible for individuals to be placed in senior positions. Such divisions can also make it impossible to conclude treaties, appropriate funds for foreign assistance, or pass specific reforms, such as the current proposed reform for immigration policy. A lack of consensus also can undermine investment in the foundations of American power, from resources for defense and diplomacy to education and infrastructure. Gridlock at home can also work against the ability of the United States to set an example that other societies will want to emulate. And it makes the United States less predictable, something that can unnerve allies and others who depend on this country, and embolden adversaries. All this tends to contribute to global disorder—one reason I titled my new book Foreign Policy Begins at Home.

## \*\*Terror Adv

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#### The US is winning the war on terror because of drones

**Byman** July/August **’13** (Daniel L, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice”, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>, CMR)

Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused. Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

#### [ insert link], OR

#### aff flips that--*Perception* of drones flexibility disrupts recruitment, crushes operational effectiveness, and distracts from large-scale attacks

Young 13

[Alex, Associate Staff at Harvard Int’l Review, M.D., Harvard University; M.S.H.S., University California Los Angeles, “A Defense of Drones”, Feb 25, <http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones>, CMR]

Critics also claim that eliminating only the senior leaders of terrorist organizations does not make significant progress in eradicating the group as a whole. This argument falls short on two fronts. First, killing the leaders of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and similar networks does hinder their operations: decapitating terrorist groups interrupts their planning, recruitment, and execution of attacks – not necessarily because each leader is irreplaceably vital to the success of the group (although some are), but because the threat of death from the skies shifts the strategic calculations of living leaders, changing the actions of the group. The Los Angeles Times of March 22nd, 2009, quoting an anonymous counterterrorism official, reported that Al Qaeda leaders are wondering who's next to be killed in a drone strike and have started hunting down people inside al Qaeda who they think are responsible for collaborating with the US on drone strike planning. The threat of drone strikes sows divisive suspicion inside enemy groups and distracts them from accomplishing their objectives.¶ Moreover, drone strikes have disrupted al Qaeda’s system for training new recruits. The Times of London reports that in 2009, Al Qaeda leaders decided to abandon their traditional training camps because bringing new members to a central location offered too easy a target for drone strikes. Foreign Policy emphasized this trend on November 2nd, 2012, arguing that, “destroying communication centers, training camps and vehicles undermines the operational effectiveness of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and quotes from operatives of the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network reveal that drones have forced them into a ‘jungle existence’ where they fear for the lives on a daily basis.” The threat of death from the skies has forced extremist organizations to become more scattered.¶ More importantly, though, drone strikes do not only kill top leaders; they target their militant followers as well. The New America Foundation, a think tank that maintains a database of statistics on drone strikes, reports that between 2004 and 2012, drones killed between 1,489 and 2,605 enemy combatants in Pakistan. Given that Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the various other organizations operating in the region combined do not possibly have more than 1,500 senior leaders, it follows that many, if not most, of those killed were low-level or mid-level members – in many cases, individuals who would have carried out attacks. The Los Angeles Times explains that, “the Predator campaign has depleted [Al Qaeda’s] operational tier. Many of the dead are longtime loyalists who had worked alongside Bin Laden […] They are being replaced by less experienced recruits.” Drones decimate terrorist organizations at all levels; the idea that these strikes only kill senior officials is a myth.

#### repaling aumf causes terror

Cully Stimson, Manager of the National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow --- Heritage, 1-21-2014, Framing the Debate of AUMF Reform, p. blog.heritage.org/2014/01/21/framing-debate-aumf-reform/

I warned that “repealing the AUMF prematurely would be unwise,” and that it would “signal, legally, that the war against al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue in fact to wage war against the United States.” And I suggested that the “current AUMF should remain in place unless and until the narrow class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national security.”¶ Recognizing that it is “not too early to begin thinking about what comes after the AUMF,” I suggested a framework for how the United States government should approach future threats:¶ Whether we need to enact additional authorities for the use of military force must be “based on our national security needs.”¶ The substance of the 2001 AUMF authorization should be used as a template so that the new authorization, however narrow, allows the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those entities that pose a substantial threat to the United States.¶ The new authorization, if indeed one is deemed necessary, must be “narrowly tailored, flexible legislation” that is prepared in “an open and transparent manner” in order to best serve the interests of the American people.¶ Congress should consider building on the existing AUMF, rather than replace it prematurely. The President has the option of not using the broad grant of authority in the existing AUMF. Any radical, premature modification to the core AUMF grant of authority would cast “uncertainty on the legal basis for so many aspects of our campaign against al Qaeda.”¶ If or when the President turns his attention to reform of the AUMF, the Administration would be wise to follow that template.

### BB: 1NC (:30

#### no blowback – alt causes inevitable, alternatives worse

**Etizoni 13** 4/30 – director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies and a professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University (Amitai, “Drones: Say it with figures”, 2013, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/>, CMR)

Attacking drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the United States has found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media.¶ Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims.¶ One argument that is repeated again and again is that killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen, thereby breeding many more terrorists than are killed. For example, Akbar Ahmed, a distinguished professor at American University, told the BBC on April 9 that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result."¶ The key word is "perhaps"; Ahmed cites no data to support his contention.¶ Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians.¶ At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans.¶ No such self-serving statements can be taken as evidence in themselves.¶ And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, Mazzetti presents no evidence.¶ One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish.¶ In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks.¶ These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.¶ These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back.¶ As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs:¶ "A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... It is now clear that even major changes, such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have had surprisingly little effect on Arab attitudes towards the United States. Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is once again flowing freely."¶ The Pew Global Attitudes Project says anti-American sentiments were high and on the rise in countries where drone strikes weren't employed. In Jordan, for example, U.S. unfavorability rose from 78 percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2012 while Egypt saw a rise from 78 percent to 79 percent over the same period.¶ Notably, the percentage of respondents reporting an "unfavorable" view of the United States in these countries is as high, or higher, than in drone-targeted Pakistan.¶ In Pakistan, a country that has been subjected to a barrage of strikes over the last five years, the United States' unfavorability held steady at 68 percent from 2007-10 (dropping briefly to 63 percent in 2008), but then began to increase, rising to 73 percent in 2011 and 80 percent in 2012 -- a two-year period in which the number of drone strikes was actually dropping significantly.¶ It is also worth noting that these critics attribute resentment to drones rather than military strikes.¶ Do they really think that resentment would be lower if the United States were using cruise missiles? Or bombers? Or Special Forces?

#### \*\*Public opposition exaggerated – and alternatives are even worse

CARD IS IN YEMEN 2NC

AND PUBLIC BACKLASH 1NC

**Byman** July/August **’13** (Daniel L, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice”, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>, CMR)

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

### BB: Allies 1NC (1:00

#### squo drone policy solves allied coop

Peter Juul 13, Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, 2/6/13, “Moving Beyond 9/11: The United States Needs a Broader-Based and Sustainable Counterterrorism Policy,” http://susris.com/2013/02/07/drone-basing-revelation-underscores-strong-defense-and-security-bonds/

Terrorism will be with us in some form or another for the foreseeable future. And it’s just as likely that given changing dynamics and realities that the drone strikes that have apparently proven effective against Al Qaeda central will have limited utility going forward. The confluence of circumstances that allows drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan—groups that have directly targeted the United States from active conflict zones over which nominal governments have little authority and allow drone strikes—are unlikely to recur in the future. While the possibility that these circumstances may occur again cannot be definitively ruled out, they suggest it would be appropriate to adopt a high threshold when considering the use of drone strikes as a counterterrorism tool.

By contrast with Al Qaeda central and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the extremists threatening Mali have not directly targeted the United States, and longstanding U.S. ally France has taken responsibility in working with the Malian government to turn them back. What’s more, the United States is working to train the troops of various African nations to step into the situation as well. No matter how brutal they may otherwise be, not every terrorist group will directly target the U.S. homeland, and those that do may not have the opportunity to hide in legally distinct areas such as Pakistan’s tribal areas where foreign government security forces do not operate. Other governments may or may not prove as cooperative in allowing drone strikes as those of Pakistan and Yemen, preferring other approaches or types of U.S. assistance.

In other words, drones will probably outlive their usefulness as a counterterrorism tool when Al Qaeda central is judged to be on a permanent path to defeat. This is not to say that drones will not have utility in certain conflicts involving terrorist groups, but rather that the current framework for their use is based on the unique circumstances of the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. Other places drones have been used—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, for example—fall more clearly under policy and legal frameworks of conventional war. Policymakers should not assume that this framework is easily transferable to the problems posed by other violent Islamist extremist groups and non-Islamist terrorist organizations in other parts of the world.

Looking forward, a broader-based and more sustainable counterterrorism policy that can both adapt to post-Al Qaeda terrorist threats—including other violent Islamist extremists—wherever they arise and is not based on the exigencies of the fight against Al Qaeda central will be needed. Interestingly, the Obama administration appears to have taken some steps forward on this front. The recent development of a counterterrorism “playbook” reportedly setting clear rules for lethal CIA strikes—exempting Pakistan for one to two years—shows how far the administration is going to rationalize its counterterrorism policies. And the work the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism has done to promote counterterrorism cooperation and capacity building across U.S. allies and partners—such as the launch of the Global Counterterrorism Forum in 2011, as well as various regional cooperation initiatives— provides a foundation for the future.

### Defense: WMD Terror 1NC

#### No WMD terrorism – lack of desire and capability – empirically the threat is overblown

Mueller 11. John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, “The Truth About al Qaeda”, 8/2/2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show>, CMR

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead, many preferred to engage in massive extrapolation: If 19 men could hijack four airplanes simultaneously, the thinking went, then surely al Qaeda would soon make an atomic bomb. As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. That probability will remain unchanged unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so. Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience, however, cannot be very encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or even by much surveillance), Aum Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then moved to biological weapons, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears expressed in the United States of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue the weapons. The group did finally manage to release some sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal shutdown, as well as to 16 years (and counting) of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the future. No elephants there, either.

## Heg

#### aff kills crisis response and heg

John Yoo 8/30/13, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Like it or not, Constitution allows Obama to strike Syria without Congressional approval,” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allows-obama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval/> ableist edited

The most important of the president’s powers are commander-in-chief and chief executive.¶ As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”¶ Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. . . It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”¶ The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action, sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances, that are best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. ¶ Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. ¶ Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because it had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze [freeze] American policy while foreign threats grow. ¶ Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.¶ Congress's track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one.¶ Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress's isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict.¶ President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president's foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism.¶ Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War, and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the Resolution in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it.¶ Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare War.” But these observers read the eighteenth-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare War” to mean “start war.” ¶ When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain – where the Framers got the idea of the declare-war power – fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.¶ Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war, because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process.¶ In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” ¶ This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive.¶ Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. ¶ Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans.¶ Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. ¶ Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. ¶ If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military.¶ Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse.¶ If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president's decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually.¶ It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action.¶ Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. ¶ Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.¶ The Framers expected Congress's power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war.¶ Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check.¶ We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security.¶ In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility.¶ It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security.¶ Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics.¶ As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### No entanglement

Hurrell ‘6 (Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford (Andrew, Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers? (p 1-19), International Affairs, January 24, 2006)

The contrast with the United States is instructive. Much is made of the unique position of the United States and the degree to which, unlike all other modern great powers, it faced no geopolitical challenge from within its region and was able to prevent, or more accurately contain, the influence of extraregional powers. This is certainly true (even if the rise of the US to regional hegemony is often dated too early and its extent exaggerated). But the other important regional aspect of US power is the ability to **avoid** excessively deep **entanglement or involvement** and, for the most part, to **escape from ensnaring** and diverting **lower-level conflicts** within its ‘backyard’. It has been able to take the region for granted and, for long periods, to avoid having a regional policy at all (as has arguably been the case since 2001). It is this fact that, perhaps counterintuitively, provides Brazil with some capacity to develop a relatively autonomous regional role. Second, attempts to develop a global role can easily stir the animosity, or at least raise the concerns, of regional Panama and the Gulf. A **passive world-view encouraged** American **leaders to ignore** troubling **developments** which eventually metastasized into full blown threats to American security. Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the United States did not consider its interests threatened by their behavior, only to discover that they had been misled. In each case, a broader and more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have made the later large and potentially costly interventions unnecessary

#### no escalation

Weiner 2007

Michael Anthony, J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt School of Law, 2007, “A Paper Tiger with Bite: A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Weiner.pdf

IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXONERATED WPR AND THE WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING The WPR is an effective piece of war powers legislation. As Part III made clear, no presidential unilateral use of force since 1973 has developed into a conflict that in any way resembles the WPR's impetus, Vietnam. Rather, the great majority of these conflicts have been characterized by their brevity, safety, and downright success. Yes, there have been tragic outcomes in Lebanon and Somalia; but what happened in response to those tragedies? In Lebanon, President Reagan actually submitted to being Congress's "messengerboy," 203 asking for its permission, per the WPR, to continue the operation. And in Somalia, at the first sight of a looming disaster, it was President Clinton who cut short the operation. Thus, from 1973 on, it is easy to argue that sitting Executives have made responsible use of their power to act unilaterally in the foreign affairs realm. The WPR has even contributed to a congressional resurgence in the foreign affairs arena. In many of these conflicts, we have seen Congress conducting numerous votes on whether and how it should respond to a unilaterally warring Executive. In some of the conflicts, Congress has come close to invoking the WPR against rather impetuous Executives. 20 4 In Lebanon, Congress actually succeeded in the task.20 5 It is this Note's contention, though, that even when Congress failed to legally invoke the WPR, these votes had normative effects on the Executives in power. Such votes demonstrate that Congress desires to be, and will try to be, a player in foreign affairs decisions. So, perhaps the enactment of the WPR, the rise of Congress (at least in the normative sense) and the successful string of unilateral presidential uses of force are just a series of coincidences. This Note, however, with common sense as its companion, contends that they are not. Rather, it is self-evident that the WPR has played a significant role in improving the implementation of presidential unilateral uses of force.

#### Data disproves heg impacts

**Fettweis, 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### allies won’t abandon us

Stephen M. Walt 11 the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, December 5, 2011, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?,” online: <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem>

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies.

The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to th

e possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.)

There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I'venever really understood why U.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

**Latent power checks**  
**Wohlforth 07** (William) Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale and Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, “Unipolar Stability,” Harvard International Review, Spring (<http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1611>)

**The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power.** **One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them**. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, **one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged**. Yale historian Paul **Kennedy coined the term** “imperial **overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments**. **This** situation **should be contrasted with** what might be termed “**self-inflicted overstretch**”—a situation **in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power.** This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But **the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its** foreign policy **commitments**. **Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by** slashing personal and corporate **tax rates**. **Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and** claims to be fighting **a global “war” on terrorism, the** United States **is not acting like a country under intense international pressure**. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. **The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only** about **4 percent of** its **GDP** **on the military, as compared to** 7 to **14 percent during the peak** years **of the Cold War**. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. **Even more radically, it could reinstitute** military **conscription**, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. **On the economic front, it could raise taxes** in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, **to put its fiscal house back in order**. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but **there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly** for decades. **Most** of those who study US politics **would argue that the** likelihood and potential **success of such** power-generating **policies depends on public support**, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. **And** as unnerving as terrorism is, **there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the** United States **for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize.** It is often noted that **the rise of a peer competitor to the** United States **might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers**.

#### SOF strong now- and it’s key to warfighting

By Alan M. Milner 3-12 “Budget Cuts for 2015 Pose Problems for U.S. Military” <http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/budget-cuts-for-2015-pose-problems-for-u-s-military/>

If implemented, these cuts would reduce the standing Army to its pre-World War II levels and, if modernization plans are not followed, the Navy and Air Force might find also themselves fighting future engagements with outmoded weapons and aging leadership because the military follows a last hired first fired discipline when required to cut spending. (No one is suggesting that the Navy or Air Force return to pre-WWII staffing levels…yet.)¶ While these cuts are being imposed, special operations forces will receive a six percent increase in their funding, indicating the Pentagon’s belief that future engagements are more likely to be short-term, small unit actions in which there will be no intent to keep boots on the ground after the job is done.

#### Plan kills SOF

same card w/ more hilighint is in JR link 1nc for ex post

Larry Maher 10**,** Quartermaster General, Veterans of Foreign Wars, et al, 9/30/10, BRIEF OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS AND DISMISSAL, Nasser al-Aulaqi, Plaintiff, vs. Barack H. Obama, et al., Defendants, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/VFW_Brief_PACER.pdf>

Finally, the VFW’s membership includes many current and former members of the U.S. armed forces’ elite special operations forces—Army Rangers and Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force parajumpers and combat controllers, and Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance personnel, among others. These elite warriors conduct highly dangerous missions today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries around the world. By definition, special operations “are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, at I-1 (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\_pubs/jp3\_05.pdf.

Special operations are differentiated from conventional operations in many ways, but foremost among these are their “degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.” Id. “Surprise is often the most important principle in the conduct of successful [special operations] and the survivability of employed [special operations forces],” and the very nature of special operations requires “high levels of security . . . to protect the clandestine/covert nature of missions.” Id. at I-6. More than mission accomplishment is at stake—“[g]iven their operating size, [special operations teams] are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their presence than larger conventional units,” and therefore the protection of sources and methods is essential for the survival of special operations forces. Id. To preserve this element of surprise, special operations forces must broadly conceal their tactics, techniques and procedures, including information about unit locations and movements, targeting decisions, and operational plans for future missions. Disclosure of this information would allow this nation’s adversaries to defend themselves more effectively, potentially inflicting more casualties upon U.S. special operations forces. Such disclosure would also provide information about how the U.S. military gathers information about its adversaries, enabling terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to alter its communications and activities in order to evade future detection and action by the U.S. Government. Such harm would not be limited to just this instance or terrorist group group; these disclosures would also provide future terrorist adversaries and military adversaries with insight into U.S. special operations capabilities which would enable them to counter such capabilities in future conflicts. Cf. Public Declaration of Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Govt. Exhibit 4, September 23, 2010, at ¶¶ 6-7.

**No korea war**

Paul **Stares**, CFR Center for Preventive Action Director and Conflict Prevention Senior Fellow, 8/12/20**10**, “Handling Tensions on the Korean Peninsula," http://www.cfr.org/publication/22788/handling\_tensions\_on\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html, access 12/7/2010

Other than **firing** some coastal **artillery and detaining a South Korean fishing boat** that recently strayed into North Korea waters, **Pyongyang has responded** primarily **with belligerent rhetoric and apocalypticwarnings. The recent ROK-U.S. naval exercises**, for example, **elicited threats of a "retaliatory sacred war." But** by historical standards, **such bombast is unexceptional. The recent North Korean provocations also pale in comparison to earlier attacks and skirmishes**, most notably during the late 1960s when, among other things, the Blue House--South Korea's presidential residence--was attacked, or in the 1980s when the South Korean cabinet was bombed during a visit to Burma.

**These far-worse periods of inter-Korean tensions never ignited another war, and the incentives to prevent this from happening are even greater today. South Korea fears losing its hard-won prosperity, while a much weaker North knows that it would never survive another major conflict.**

**Interdependence checks war with China**

**Perry & Scowcroft, 9** – \*Professor at Stanford University, \*\*Resident Trustee of the Forum for International Policy (William & Brent, 2009, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations)

**Economic interdependence provides an incentive to avoid military**conflict**and nuclear confrontation. Although the United States has expressed concern about the growing trade deficit with China, the economies of the two** countries **have become increasingly** intertwined and **interdependent**. **U.S. consumers have bought massive quantities of cheap Chinese goods, and Beijing has lent huge amounts of money to the U**nited**S**tates. **Similarly, Taiwan and the mainland are increasingly bound in a reciprocal economic relationship**. **These** economic relation- ships should **reduce the probability of a confrontation between China and Taiwan, and keep the United States and China from approach- ing the nuclear brink**, were such a confrontation to occur. **On other nuclear issues, China and the United States have generally supported each other, as they did in the six-party talks to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.** Here**, the supportive Beijing-Washington relationship points toward potentially promising dialogues on larger strategic issues.**

## 2NC

### L: Law Enforcement 2NC

#### flex

#### There is a linear increase in risk every time the Aff prevents action

Metz 2013 [Steven Metz is a defense analyst and the author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy." His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Wednesday 27 Feb 2013 World Politics Review “Strategic Horizons: The Strategy Behind U.S. Drone Strikes” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12747/strategic-horizons-the-strategy-behind-u-s-drone-strikes]

The current strategy of containing al-Qaida-style extremism may repeat this pattern. Its strategic logic is the same, even if its methods differ. Yet, as during the Cold War, remaining steadfast until the strategy works will not be easy. Many parts of it are difficult, even repellent. Drone strikes are an example. But there is no other sustainable method of offensive actions that can effectively hinder the ability of the terrorists to organize and execute attacks. Even though this conflict does not look like the sort of traditional wars that Americans are used to, it cannot be handled like a law enforcement issue. And those who support a strictly defensive version of containment may be right that al-Qaida's flame will eventually burn out on its own. But without an offensive element to U.S. strategy, this day will be postponed, increasing the chances that a terrorist will get through America's defenses. And extending the conflict also brings even greater suffering to the people al-Qaida and its ilk hide behind.¶ Nearly all Americans would embrace a strategy that counters and defeats al-Qaida-style extremists without using drone strikes. So far, though, critics of the drones have not provided a viable alternative or made the case that the strategic costs of drones outweigh the benefits. At this point, drones remain the only effective offensive tool in a strategy that requires them.

#### Law enforcement and intelligence alone are inadequate – incapacitation key

**Chesney et al. 13** (Robert Chesney is a¶ professor at the University¶ of Texas School of Law, a¶ nonresident senior fellow¶ of the Brookings Institution,¶ and a distinguished scholar¶ at the Robert S. Strauss¶ Center for International¶ Security and Law, Jack Goldsmith is the Henry¶ L. Shattuck Professor of¶ Law at Harvard Law School¶ and a member of the Hoover¶ Institution’s Jean Perkins¶ Task Force on National¶ Security and Law, Matthew C. Waxman¶ is a professor of law at¶ Columbia Law School,¶ an adjunct senior fellow¶ at the Council on Foreign¶ Relations, and a member¶ of the Hoover Institution’s¶ Jean Perkins Task Force¶ on National Security and¶ Law, Benjamin Wittes is a senior¶ fellow in governance¶ studies at the Brookings¶ Institution, a member of¶ the Hoover Institution’s¶ Jean Perkins Task Force¶ on National Security and¶ Law, and the editor in chief¶ of the Lawfare Blog, “A Statutory Framework¶ for Next-Generation¶ Terrorist Threats”, Feb 25, [www.hoover.org/taskforces/national-security](http://www.hoover.org/taskforces/national-security), CMR)

To be very clear, we do not claim that all terrorism-related threats can or¶ should be dealt with militarily. Law enforcement and intelligence tools can¶ have tremendous effect, and we strongly endorse the view that the¶ president’s authority to use them should not be unduly constrained out of a¶ misguided sense that most or all terrorism scenarios require a military¶ solution. But law enforcement and intelligence tools are not a panacea. In some¶ circumstances—such as the late 1990s in Afghanistan and today in certain¶ areas of Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel region—these options simply¶ do not provide sufficient capacity to capture individuals or to otherwise¶ disrupt their activities. And in some circumstances, these tools are equally¶ inadequate to the task of long-term incapacitation. Meanwhile, local¶ governments are sometimes either incapable of addressing or unwilling to¶ address terrorism threats; in some cases, for various reasons, we would not¶ want to entrust them with these responsibilities. Whether this is the case¶ with respect to any given extra-AUMF threat at any given point in time is¶ exceedingly difficult to say, particularly for those (including us) who are¶ outside government and lack access to the relevant intelligence. We proceed¶ on the assumption, however, that some such circumstances do exist or¶ will arise.

**BB: Ext1A—AC (Top) 2NC**

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other critics argue that drones strikes engender ¶ much resentment among the local population and¶ serve as a major recruitment tool for the terrorists, ¶ possibly radicalizing more individuals than they ¶ neutralize. This argument has been made especially in reference to Pakistan, where there were ¶ anti-American demonstrations following drones ¶ strikes, as well as in Yemen.44 However, such ¶ arguments do not take into account the fact that ¶ anti-American sentiment in these areas ran high ¶ before drone strikes took place and remained so ¶ during periods in which strikes were signiﬁcantly ¶ scaled back. Moreover, other developments—such ¶ as the release of an anti-Muslim movie trailer by an ¶ Egyptian Copt from California or the publication of ¶ incendiary cartoons by a Danish newspaper—led ¶ to much larger demonstrations. Hence stopping ¶ drone strikes—if they are otherwise justiﬁed, and ¶ especially given that they are a very effective and ¶ low-cost way to neutralize terrorist violence on ¶ the ground45—merely for public relations purposes ¶ seems imprudent.

**BB: Ext1C—AC (Global) 2NC**

**Alt causes to lack of trust in the US**

**Tomei 2012** (September 17, Lizzy, “Anti-US protests and Arab public opinion: Q&A” <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/120917/anti-us-protests-and-public-sentiment-qa>)

**Surveys have shown** than **Muslims abroad believe that Americans do not respect Muslims or Islamic traditions.** Several polls have found this pattern, including Gallup polls across the Muslim world. The video played right into this way of thinking. **The protests may also reflect dissatisfaction with US/western foreign policies**. Various **survey research has shown that anti-American sentiment is usually based primarily on anger at US foreign policy** rather than a clash of cultures or values, **including**: Muslims’ **longstanding perceptions of a pro-Israel bias in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, the US handling of the war in Afghanistan**, and actions the US has taken to combat terrorism, including drone strikes. A recent Pew survey found that about nine in ten in Egypt and Jordan, eight in ten in Turkey and seven in ten in Tunisia oppose the use of drone strikes (as do majorities in several non-Muslim countries).

### Allies: Ext1--SQ Solves 2NC

#### Allies will inevitably come around on US drone doctrine questions---they know they’re the future of war and won’t want to be left out

Ulrike Esther Franke 13, Ph.D. Candidate, International Relations, University of Oxford, April 2013, “Just the new hot thing? The diffusion of UAV technology worldwide and its popularity among democratic states,” <http://files.isanet.org/ConferenceArchive/4269932e782d47248d5269ad381ca6c7.pdf>

As shown in the first part of this paper, democracies seem to be particularly interested in drone technology. Niklas Schoerning argues that especially western democracies are fuelling a global UAV arms race.56 I argue that in addition to the aforementioned arguments, there are three main reasons why democracies and especially western democracies are particularly interested in the unmanned technology.

Prestige (among partners): Not only autocracies have an interest in depicting their armed forces as modern and powerful. Democracies use UAVs to show off as well – however, their aim is rather to portray themselves as capable and reliable coalition partners for other western democracies and especially with an eye on the United States. French General Patrick Charaix points out: “If [France] wants to remain powerful within a coalition, we need to bring an unmanned capability to the table. Indeed, those countries that count have this military means which contributes on the one hand to the success of a mission and on the other hand increases the power and influence of the country.57 German defence minister Thomas de Maizière voiced a similar opinion in a recent speech on UAVs in the Bundestag: “We cannot say ‘we’ll keep the stagecoach’ while all others are developing the railway”.58 UAVs, according to this interpretation, are the irresistible future – those who are not part of it will lose out. An important aspect of this desire not to lose out is interoperability.59 Western states rarely go to war alone anymore. Today’s western wars are fought by coalitions, namely within NATO. This has important consequences for the equipment that is needed: the members of the coalition need to use the same kind of material in order to be effective and powerful.60 As NATO is dominated by the US and since the US is the most capable user of UAVs, this has important repercussions on the other NATO members. For Frans Osinga, NATO is “an obvious and important avenue of infusion of US military […] technology”.61

#### US anti-terror intel is fine on its own – outstrips everybody else

Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, 8-29-2013, “Top secret ‘black budget’ reveals US spy agencies’ spending,” LA Daily News, http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20130829/top-secret-black-budget-reveals-us-spy-agencies-spending

“The United States has made a considerable investment in the Intelligence Community since the terror attacks of 9/11, a time which includes wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, and asymmetric threats in such areas as cyber-warfare,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in response to inquiries from The Post. “Our budgets are classified as they could provide insight for foreign intelligence services to discern our top national priorities, capabilities and sources and methods that allow us to obtain information to counter threats,” he said. Among the notable revelations in the budget summary: Spending by the CIA has surged past that of every other spy agency, with $14.7 billion in requested funding for 2013. The figure vastly exceeds outside estimates and is nearly 50 percent above that of the National Security Agency, which conducts eavesdropping operations and has long been considered the behemoth of the community. The CIA and NSA have launched aggressive new efforts to hack into foreign computer networks to steal information or sabotage enemy systems, embracing what the budget refers to as “offensive cyber operations.” The NSA planned to investigate at least 4,000 possible insider threats in 2013, cases in which the agency suspected sensitive information may have been compromised by one of its own. The budget documents show that the U.S. intelligence community has sought to strengthen its ability to detect what it calls “anomalous behavior” by personnel with access to highly classified material. U.S. intelligence officials take an active interest in foes as well as friends. Pakistan is described in detail as an “intractable target,” and counterintelligence operations “are strategically focused against [the] priority targets of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Israel.” In words, deeds and dollars, intelligence agencies remain fixed on terrorism as the gravest threat to national security, which is listed first among five “mission objectives.” Counterterrorism programs employ one in four members of the intelligence workforce and account for one-third of all spending. The governments of Iran, China and Russia are difficult to penetrate, but North Korea’s may be the most opaque. There are five “critical” gaps in U.S. intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, and analysts know virtually nothing about the intentions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Formally known as the Congressional Budget Justification for the National Intelligence Program, the “Top Secret” blueprint represents spending levels proposed to the House and Senate intelligence committees in February 2012. Congress may have made changes before the fiscal year began on Oct 1. Clapper is expected to release the actual total spending figure after the fiscal year ends on Sept. 30. The document describes a constellation of spy agencies that track millions of individual surveillance targets and carry out operations that include hundreds of lethal strikes. They are organized around five priorities: combating terrorism, stopping the spread of nuclear and other unconventional weapons, warning U.S. leaders about critical events overseas, defending against foreign espionage and conducting cyber operations. In an introduction to the summary, Clapper said the threats now facing the United States “virtually defy rank-ordering.” He warned of “hard choices” as the intelligence community — sometimes referred to as the “IC” — seeks to rein in spending after a decade of often double-digit budget increases. This year’s budget proposal envisions that spending will remain roughly level through 2017 and amounts to a case against substantial cuts. “Never before has the IC been called upon to master such complexity and so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment,” Clapper wrote. The summary provides a detailed look at how the U.S. intelligence community has been reconfigured by the massive infusion of resources that followed the Sept. 11 attacks. The United States has spent more than $500 billion on intelligence during that period, an outlay that U.S. officials say has succeeded in its main objective: preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack in the United States. The result is an espionage empire with resources and reach beyond those of any adversary, sustained even now by spending that rivals or exceeds the levels reached at the height of the Cold War.

### Defense: WMD Terror 2NC

#### --And he’s most qualified

Harper 12 (Jim, director of information policy studies @ Cato, “Mueller Right; Terror Experts Wrong”, 1-11, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/mueller-right-terror-experts-wrong/>, CMR)

John Mueller was right and everyone else was wrong. (Well, not everyone else…)

That’s Cato senior fellow John Mueller. He noted on the National Interest blog last week that 79 per cent of top terrorism experts queried in 2006 thought it was likely or certain that there would be another major terrorist attack in the United States by the end of 2011. They got it wrong.

When the survey came out, it touted these experts as the “very people who have run America’s national-security apparatus over the past half century.” Mueller lampoons them thus:

The Very People’s 79 percent error rate is especially impressive because, although there had been quite a bit of terrorist activity in Iraq and elsewhere during the four-and-a-half years between 9/11 and when the survey was conducted, none of these attacks even remotely approached the destruction of the one on September 11. Nor, for that matter, had any terrorist attack during the four-and-a-half millennia previous to that date. In addition, although terrorist plots have been rolled up within the United States, none of the plotters threatened to wreak destruction on anything like the scale of 9/11, except perhaps in a few moments of movieland-fantasy musings.

Mueller was one of few suggesting in 2006—and well before—that 9/11 might be more of an aberration than a harbinger. Mueller’s studied correctness so far is not proof of what the future holds, of course. If you want to, it is certainly possible to cling to the threat of terrorism and the metastasis of policies that purport to address your fears. Part of terrorism’s design is its operation on fear to produce cognitive errors like probability neglect, for example. But thanks to Mueller, terrorism is holding fewer and fewer people in thrall. It is a serious, but manageable security threat. Those still transfixed by terrorism may add another fear to their long list: They may be mocked by the man who knows the subject matter better.

#### No retaliation

* Delay in identification – bad forensics – too many countries – lack of data – turf battles

#### Erwin and Manguson ‘9

(Sandra and Stew, National Defense “7 Deadly myths about weapons of terror” 6-1, 94:667 lexis)

4 Myth: If the U.S. Were the Victim of a Nuclear Attack, It Would Immediately Retaliate \* Under the nightmare scenario of a nuclear bomb exploding in a U.S. city, the implied assumption is that the nation's leaders would immediately be able to fire back. That would be the case under the Cold War rules of nuclear retaliation, but the situation is far more complicated when nuclear attacks are perpetrated by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. Unless the weapon is delivered by a missile, immediate retaliation is not realistic, experts said. It could take weeks or months to figure out where the nuclear materials came from or how the explosive device was built. No state or terrorist group would choose to launch a nuclear weapon by missile because we would know the origin, said Evan Montgomery, of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The more likely means to execute a nuclear attack would be to smuggle the materials and build the bomb on U.S. soil, or steal a bomb and somehow manage to bring it into the United States. Either way, U.S. nuclear experts may not be able to quickly determine the origin of the weapon once it's detonated. Forensics can take weeks or months, said Charles Blair, director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies and co-author of a recently published book titled, "Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction." "None of the systems we have now are very quick," he said. "Government officials and the public would have to be willing to wait a while before we retaliate." Nuclear forensics usually is based on fallout and debris. Within hours, U.S. authorities could determine that it was a nuclear explosion. It would take up to a couple of days to determine if there was uranium, plutonium or a mix of the two in the weapon. It's known that eight nations have plutonium bombs, and six others have enough plutonium to build a bomb. If there were a nuclear explosion of a plutonium based weapon, it could be traced to one of 14 countries. With uranium-based weapons, it's more complicated. There are 40 countries that have enough uranium to build at least one bomb. That would take longer to track, said Blair. "You can take debris samples and compare them against known tests. You can within several weeks trace the design to known designs." Nuclear forensics would be far easier if there were a single global database that listed all known methods of creating uranium or plutonium, and catalogued the weapon designs, Blair said. But such a database is unlikely to ever materialize. States prefer to not reveal information about the fissile materials they use or their methods for constructing a weapon. The world's largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, both go to great lengths to protect their top secret data on the isotopic composition of their weapons grade plutonium. Even for the United States it's been a challenge to keep track of its own plutonium. Ola Dahlman, a nuclear physicist and advisor to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said there is one cubic meter of plutonium that the United States cannot account for. "Nobody is really concerned," he told National Defense. "But it shows how hard it is to keep track of things." Because plutonium is not a naturally occurring substance, it can only be made in reactors. Identifying the origin in this case would be somewhat easier because reactors have identifiable signatures. With uranium weapons the situation gets more complex because experts would have to figure out how it was enriched. "It doesn't leave many maces," said Blair. Considering how many nuclear weapons still exist on the planet, it may be shocking to many that nuclear forensics is a vanishing science in the United States, The nation currently has only 40 to 45 scientists who are nuclear forensics experts working at national laboratories, said Blair. "Most are pretty old and will be dying soon." Only seven universities in the United States offer graduate degrees in radiochemistry, which is one of the primary drivers of nuclear forensics, says Blair. Of those seven programs, four are staffed by just one faculty member. "The U.S. doesn't really have the brainpower right now to really attack this," said Blair. It's also worth noting that no single U.S. government agency is entirely responsible for nuclear attribution. The Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office comes the closest. It operates a nuclear forensic center that coordinates the work of seven agencies. But the lines of responsibility are blurred, Blair said. If an attack occurred, the FBI would probably step in right away to investigate but the national labs would want to preserve the evidence untouched so they could collect debris, Blair said. There would be turf battles within the government, which would complicate the forensics work.

### Drone Backlash 1NC (:35

READ ALLIES 1NC/EU RELS 1NC

#### Gov won’t shut down drones

Benjamin Wittes, editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of several books and a member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law, 2/27/13, In Defense of the Administration on Targeted Killing of Americans, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/in-defense-of-the-administration-on-targeted-killing-of-americans/

This view has currency among European allies, among advocacy groups, and in the legal academy. Unfortunately for its proponents, it has no currency among the three branches of government of the United States. The courts and the executive branch have both taken the opposite view, and the Congress passed a broad authorization for the use of force and despite many opportunities, has never revisited that document to impose limitations by geography or to preclude force on the basis of co-belligerency—much less to clarify that the AUMF does not, any longer, authorize the use of military force at all. Congress has been repeatedly briefed on U.S. targeting decisions, including those involving U.S. persons.[5] It was therefore surely empowered to either use the power of the purse to prohibit such action or to modify the AUMF in a way that undermined the President’s legal reasoning. Not only has it taken neither of these steps, but Congress has also funded the relevant programs. Moreover, as I noted above, Congress’s recent reaffirmation of the AUMF in the 2012 NDAA with respect to detention, once again contains no geographical limitation. There is, in other words, a consensus among the branches of government on the point that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict that involves co-belligerent forces and follows the enemy to the new territorial ground it stakes out. It is a consensus that rejects the particular view of the law advanced by numerous critics. And it is a consensus on which the executive branch is entitled to rely in formulating its legal views.

#### \*\*Public loves drones

Sides 13 (John, George Washington University, “Most Americans approve of foreign drone strikes,” 3-10, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/10/most-americans-approve-of-foreign-drone-strikes/>)

In fact, drone strikes attracted roughly similar amounts of support from across the partisan spectrum: 68 percent of Republicans approved, as did 58 percent of Democrats and 51 percent of independents. A pattern of relative bipartisanship is not all that common in public opinion today, but it is predictable in this case. When leaders in the two parties don't really disagree on something, there is no reason for partisans in the public to disagree either. In John Zaller's magisterial account of how public opinion is formed and evolves, he refers to a pattern of bipartisanship like this one as a "mainstream effect." Like it or not, drone warfare has become so common that "mainstream" does not sound inapt.

Thus, there is little reason to expect public opinion about the drone program to change without concerted and prolonged dissent from political leaders. That does not seem to be forthcoming. Paul's dissent -- which didn't even emphasize foreign targets of American drones -- was met with harsh rebuttals from Lindsay Graham, John McCain and the Wall Street Journal editorial page. Democrats were not exactly rushing to stand with Paul either.

## heg 2

### Ext1--No Entanglement 2NC

#### We wont start wars just because we can

Brooks 12, Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51

temptation. For many advocates of retrenchment, the mere possession of peerless, globe-girdling military capabilities leads inexorably to a dangerous expansion of U.S. definitions of national interest that then drag the country into expensive wars. 64 For example, sustaining ramified, long-standing alliances such as NATO leads to mission creep: the search for new roles to keep the alliance alive. Hence, critics allege that NATO’s need to “go out of area or out of business” led to reckless expansion that alienated Russia and then to a heedless broadening of interests to encompass interventions such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya. In addition, peerless military power creates the temptation to seek total, non-Clausewitzian solutions to security problems, as allegedly occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. 65 Only a country in possession of such awesome military power and facing no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial solutions such as containment and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building in such unlikely places. In addition, critics contend, the United States’ outsized military creates a sense of obligation to use it if it might do good, even in cases where no U.S. interests are engaged. As Madeleine Albright famously asked Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about, if we can’t use it?” Undoubtedly, possessing global military intervention capacity expands opportunities to use force. If it were truly to “come home,” the United States would be tying itself to the mast like Ulysses, rendering itself incapable of succumbing to temptation. Any defense of deep engagement must acknowledge that it increases the opportunity and thus the logical probability of U.S. use of force compared to a grand strategy of true strategic disengagement. Of course, if the alternative to deep engagement is an over-the-horizon intervention stance, then the temptation risk would persist after retrenchment. The main problem with the interest expansion argument, however, is that it essentially boils down to one case: Iraq. Sixty-seven percent of all the casualties and 64 percent of all the budget costs of all the wars the United States has fought since 1990 were caused by that war. Twenty-seven percent of the causalities and 26 percent of the costs were related to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. All the other interventions—the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, the subsequent airstrike campaigns in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya, and so on—account for 3 percent of the casualties and 10 percent of the costs. 66 **Iraq is the outlier** not only in terms of its human and material cost, but also in terms of the degree to which the overall burden was shouldered by the United States alone. As Beckley has shown, in the other interventions allies either spent more than the United States, suffered greater relative casualties, or both. In the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, for example, the United States ranked fourth in overall casualties (measured relative to population size) and fourth in total expenditures (relative to GDP). In Bosnia, European Union (EU) budget outlays and personnel deployments ultimately swamped those of the United States as the Europeans took over postconflict peacebuilding operations. In Kosovo, the United States suffered one combat fatality, the sole loss in the whole operation, and it ranked sixth in relative monetary contribution. In Afghanistan, the United States is the number one financial contributor (it achieved that status only after the 2010 surge), but its relative combat losses rank fifth. 67 In short, the interest expansion argument would look much different without Iraq in the picture. There would be no evidence for the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, and the overall pattern of intervention would look “unrestrained” only in terms of frequency, not cost, with the debate hinging on whether the surge in Afghanistan was recklessly unrestrained. 68 How emblematic of the deep engagement strategy is the U.S. experience in Iraq? The strategy’s supporters insist that Iraq was a Bush/neoconservative aberration; certainly, there are many supporters of deep engagement who strongly opposed the war, most notably Barack Obama. Against this view, opponents claim that it or something close to it was inevitable given the grand strategy. Regardless, the more important question is whether continuing the current grand strategy condemns the United States to more such wars. **The Cold War experience suggests a negative answer**. After the United States suffered a major disaster in Indochina (to be sure, dwarfing Iraq in its human toll), it responded by waging the rest of the Cold War using proxies and highly limited interventions. Nothing changed in the basic structure of the international system, and U.S. military power recovered by the 1980s, yet the United States never again undertook a large expeditionary operation until after the Cold War had ended. All indications are that Iraq has generated a similar effect for the post–Cold War era. If there is an Obama doctrine, Dominic Tierney argues, it can be reduced to “No More Iraqs.” 69 Moreover, the president’s thinking is reflected in the Defense Department’s current strategic guidance, which asserts that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” 70 Those developments in Washington are also part of a **wider rejection of the Iraq experience** across the American body politic, which political scientist John Mueller dubbed the “Iraq Syndrome.” 71 Retrenchment advocates would need to present much more argumentation and evidence to support their pessimism on this subject.

**No interventions**

Mandelbaum 2011 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)

I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

#### Political constraints check the impact

Eric Posner, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, and Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, March 2011, The Executive Unbound, p. 176-7

So far we have attempted to show that the administrative state relaxes legal constraints on the executive, but generates political constraints in the form of public opinion. In this chapter we fit this picture together with the fear of unbridled executive power that is such a prominent strand in liberal legalism. We suggest that liberal legalists overlook the importance of de facto constraints arising from politics, and thus equate a legally unconstrained executive with one that is unconstrained tout court. The horror of dictatorship that results from this fallacy and that animates liberal legalism is what we call "tyrannophobia." Tyranny looms large in the American political imagination. For the framers of the Constitution, Caesar, Cromwell, James II, and George III were antimodels; for the current generation, Hitler takes pride of place, followed by Stalin, Mao, and a horde of tyrants both historical and literary. Students read 1984 and Animal Farm and relax by watching Chancellor Palpatine seize imperial power in Star Wars. Unsurprisingly, comparisons between sitting presidents and the tyrants of history and fiction are a trope of political discourse. Liberals and libertarians routinely compared George W. Bush to Hitler, George III, and Caesar. Today, Barack Obama receives the same treatment, albeit in less respectable media of opinion. All major presidents are called a "dictator" or said to have "dictatorial powers" from time to time.' Yet the United States has never had a Caesar or a Cromwell, or even come close to having one, and rational actors should update their risk estimates in the light of experience, reducing them if the risk repeatedly fails to materialize. By now, 235 years after independence, these risk estimates should be close to zero. Why then does the fear of dictatorship—tyrannophobia—persist so strongly in American political culture? Is the fear justified, or irrational? Does tyrannophobia itself affect the risk of dictatorship? If so, does it reduce the risk or increase it?

### Ext2--No Escalation 2NC

#### Assign minimal risk – paranoia and misperception

Posner and Vermeule 2009

Eric and Adrian, Professors of Law @ Chicago and Harvard, Tyrannophobia, September 15, 2009

Tyrannophobia is a central element of American political culture, and has been since the founding. We have offered several claims and hypotheses to illuminate its origins and importance. We suggest that tyrannophobia arises from the interaction between history and the quirks of political psychology, or from the differential costs of information about legal and political checks on the executive; that dictatorship, at least in any strong sense, is not a real possibility in the United States today, due to demographic factors; and th444

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at tyrannophobia therefore has little social utility in modern circumstances. Whatever its possible utility in the past, a question on which we are agnostic, tyrannophobia today is just another misperception of risk, akin to a fear of genetically modified foods. Indeed, in light of the current evidence on the determinants of democratic stability, tyranny should be at the very bottom of the scale of public concern. The modern entrepreneurs of tyrannophobia – from George Orwell to George Lucas – ought not be lionized as defenders of the liberal state, but instead shunned, as purveyors of political misinformation.

#### Can’t happen here and their risk calculus is bad

Posner and Vermeule 2009

Eric and Adrian, Professors of Law @ Chicago and Harvard, Tyrannophobia, September 15, 2009

Against this historical and comparative background, we turn to the relationship between tyrannophobia and dictatorship in the United States. If tyrannophobia were a crucial safeguard against dictatorship, it would have benefits (although, as we discussed in Part I, the benefits would not be as large as some assume). However, we believe that tyrannophobia is either not a safeguard against dictatorship, or is at best an unnecessary and costly one, akin to placing one’s house underground to guard against the trivial risk of a meteor strike. In the administrative state that flowered in the 20th century, demographic factors provide an independent and sufficient buffer against dictatorship. The United States of 2009 is too wealthy, with a population that is too highly educated, to slide into authoritarianism. **Very likely, it really can’t happen here**;66 current tyrannophobia can only be of the irrational variety, and if it constrains institutions or policies that are otherwise desirable, tyrannophobia produces social costs for little in the way of offsetting benefits. A. Causes of Tyrannophobia As we saw in Part II, tyrannophobic rhetoric, possibly rationa

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l, played an important role in the American founding. The puzzle is that, even if it was justified in that period as a prophylactic against dictatorship (and it may well not have been), why has it persisted across two hundred years of political stability? 1. Bounded Rationality Psychologists have offered a number of hypotheses for why people have incorrect beliefs about the risk of an event. These hypotheses center around bounded rationality, particularly cognitive biases and reliance on mental shortcuts called heuristics.67 People exaggerate risks of events that inspire them with dread (cancer deaths rather than ordinary illnesses); over which they have no control (nuclear accidents rather than car accidents); and that have unusual salience. The first tendency is related to loss aversion, the attribution of greater weight to losses than to identical gains against an arbitrary reference point. People are also imperfect Bayesians: they update probability estimates in light of new information as they should, but they do not do this very well or very quickly. Instead they give too much weight to their initial estimates and discount new information that conflicts with it. Past probability estimates are stickier, over time, than would be the case with unbounded rationality.

### allies

#### allies resil- incnetives to cooperate- walt

e possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.)

There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I'venever really understood why U.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

### Latent Power 2NC

#### Latent power checks

Singh 2008 – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest)

Finally, **latent power** -- the degree to which resources can be mobilized by a government -- **should not be overlooked in assessing American predominance.** Despite Bush's declaration of a global war on terror, **it has been the US military rather than America that has been at war since 9/11. Americans** at large have **neither** been **requested nor required to make serious material sacrifices to secure the homeland** or assist the offensive struggle against radical Islam abroad. **After two wars during which taxes were cut rather than raised, the overall tax burden remains low, the armed forces** -- while strained -- **remain exclusively volunteer** and the many American fatalities and casualties in Iraq do not compare in either absolute or relative terms to those of Vietnam or Korea previously, let alone to WWII. The costs that America's imperial role has imposed on ordinary Americans have been consequential but not nearly so burdensome as to prompt a domestic revolt against the Pax Americana . At least as important, **America possesses ample reserves with which to defend its global role and primacy,** if required.

#### Latent power solves overstretch

Brooks and Wohlforth 8 Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government (Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg 211)

Analysts who argue that the United States now suffers, or soon will suffer, from imperial overstretch invariably fail to distinguishbetween latent power(the level of resources that could be mobilized from society) and actual power (the level of resources a government actually chooses to mobilize)." In his original formulation of imperial overstretch, Kennedy had in mind a situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot cope with its existing foreign policy commitments. To date, there is virtually no research on whether the United States faces this prospect. Part of the problem is that because the Bush administration made no attempt to ask the public for greater sacrifice, there is no observable evidence of whether it would be possible to extract more resources for advancing Ll.S. foreign policy interests. The Cold War experience indicates that the U.S. public is capable ofsupporting, over long periods, significantly higher spending on foreign policy than current levels. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the U.S. public would be willing to support a dramatic increase in foreign policy spending now if policymakers called for it. The larger issue is that though IR scholars use the term, they have not theorized or researched imperial overstretch as a constraint independent of counterbalancing. In the historical cases highlighted by Kennedy and others, leading states suffered from imperial overstretch in significant part because they faced counterbalancing that demanded more resources than they were able to extract domestically. As chapters 2 and 3 showed, the United States does not face a counterbalancingconstraint. This raises a key question of whether there are limits to the U'S. polity's capacity to generate power in the absence of the threat posed by a geopolitical peer rival. Lacking a focused research effort, scholars can now only answer with speculation.

### SOF Strong

#### funding and staffing growing now- sustains warfighting

Posted 3/6/2014 by Staff Sgt. Erica Horner 3-6¶ Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs “Senior leaders discuss special operations in FY 15 budget request”¶ http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123402601

3/6/2014 - Hurlburt Field, Fla. -- Air Force and Department of Defense leadership provided insight into the Fiscal Year 2015 proposed budget, including growth in special operations, during a briefing to the press March 4.¶ The FY 15 budget proposal focused on balancing capability, capacity and readiness for future challenges and opportunities.¶ "As you can see this is no easy task, and we were forced to make very difficult choices in this budget," said Maj. Gen. Jim Martin, the Air Force director of budget, who presented the service's budget request. "Throughout every step of the process we worked very hard to make every dollar count, so that we can protect the minimum capabilities for today's war fighting efforts while also investing capabilities needed to defeat potential high end threats in the future."¶ While many items were on the chopping block to include personnel, aircraft and special programs, special operations may see an increase in [staffing]manning and funding.¶ "They're going from about 60,000 troops today to 69,700, so they're definitely growing over the next few years," said Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). "And between '14 and '15, the budget goes from $6.6 billion to $7.7 billion so there's considerable growth in (special operations forces)."¶ Air Force Special Operations Command receives funding from both the Air Force and United States Special Operations Command. In general terms, base operating support and service common equipment are funded by the Air Force, while SOF dedicated operations, including flying hours, SOF unique equipment, modifications to service common equipment and new SOF mission military construction are funded through USSOCOM.¶ "In a dynamic environment where minutes matter, a growing force will enable timely response to combatant commanders," said Lt. Gen. Eric Fiel, AFSOC commander. "We will continue to preserve our core capabilities while seeking innovative solutions to balance and modernize our force."¶ The Air Force's FY 15 budget request also details recapitalization efforts to seek additional funding for F-35s, MC-130Js, HC-130Js and MQ-9s.¶ "As part of the C-130 multi-year procurement program, we buy 13 C-130 variants," said Martin. "Seven C-130Js in support of global mobility, four HC-130s in support of personnel recovery and two MC-130s in support of special operations."¶ Additionally, the proposal realigns and reprioritizes capability and capacity across the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance portfolio. In accordance with the FY 14 National Defense Authorization Act, the Air Force will transfer the MC-12W manned medium-altitude ISR capability to the U.S. Army and Air Force Special Operations Command.¶ The proposed budget calls for an Air Force budget $34 billion above sequestration levels.

### China-US War--Ext 1--Interdependence

#### Interdependence checks—china and the US are more intertwined than any other countries in the world—ensures conflicts won’t go nuclear—that’s Perry

#### Strong statistical support—interdependence outweighs power transition

**Hillebrand 10** (Professor of Diplomacy @ University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency, Evan E. Hillebrand, “Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?”, Global Economy Journal, Volume 10, Issue 2)

A long line of writers from Cruce (1623) to Kant (1797) to Angell (1907) to Gartzke (2003) have theorized that economic interdependence can lower the likelihood of war. Cruce thought that free trade enriched a society in general and so made people more peaceable; Kant thought that trade shifted political power away from the more warlike aristocracy, and Angell thought that economic interdependence shifted cost/benefit calculations in a peace-promoting direction. Gartzke contends that trade relations enhance transparency among nations and thus help avoid bargaining miscalculations. There has also been a tremendous amount of empirical research that mostly supports the idea of an inverse relationship between trade and war. Jack Levy said that, “While there are extensive debates over the proper research designs for investigating this question, and while some empirical studies find that trade is associated with international conflict, most studies conclude that trade is associated with peace, both at the dyadic and systemic levels” (Levy, 2003, p. 127). There is another important line of theoretical and empirical work called Power Transition Theory that focuses on the relative power of states and warns that when rising powers approach the power level of their regional or global leader the chances of war increase (Tammen, Lemke, et al, 2000). Jacek Kugler (2006) warns that the rising power of China relative to the United States greatly increases the chances of great power war some time in the next few decades. The IFs model combines the theoretical and empirical work of the peacethrough- trade tradition with the work of the power transition scholars in an attempt to forecast the probability of interstate war. Hughes (2004) explains how he, after consulting with scholars in both camps, particularly Edward Mansfield and Douglas Lemke, estimated the starting probabilities for each dyad based on the historical record, and then forecast future probabilities for dyadic militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars based on the calibrated relationships he derived from the empirical literature. The probability of a MID, much less a war, between any random dyad in any given year is very low, if not zero. Paraguay and Tanzania, for example, have never fought and are very unlikely to do so. But there have been thousands of MIDs in the past and hundreds of wars and many of the 16,653 dyads have nonzero probabilities. In 2005 the mean probability of a country being involved in at least one war was estimated to be 0.8%, with 104 countries having a probability of at least 1 war approaching zero. A dozen countries12, however, have initial probabilities over 3%. The globalization scenario projects that the probability for war will gradually decrease through 2035 for every country—but not every dyad--that had a significant (greater than 0.5% chance of war) in 2005 (Table 6). The decline in prospects for war stems from the scenario’s projections of rising levels of democracy, rising incomes, and rising trade interdependence—all of these factors figure in the algorithm that calculates the probabilities. Not all dyadic war probabilities decrease, however, because of the power transition mechanism that is also included in the IFs model. The probability for war between China and the US, for example rises as China’s power13 rises gradually toward the US level but in these calculations the probability of a China/US war never gets very high.14 Deglobalization raises the risks of war substantially. In a world with much lower average incomes, less democracy, and less trade interdependence, the average probability of a country having at least one war in 2035 rises from 0.6% in the globalization scenario to 3.7% in the deglobalization scenario. Among the top-20 war-prone countries, the average probability rises from 3.9% in the globalization scenario to 7.1% in the deglobalization scenario. The model estimates that in the deglobalization scenario there will be about 10 wars in 2035, vs. only 2 in the globalization scenario15. Over the whole period, 2005-2035, the model predicts four great power wars in the deglobalization scenario vs. 2 in the globalization scenario. Deglobalization in the form of reduced trade interdependence, reduced capital flows, and reduced migration has few positive effects, based on this analysis with the International Futures Model. Economic growth is cut in all but a handful of countries, and is cut more in the non-OECD countries than in the OECD countries. Deglobalization has a mixed impact on equality. In many non-OECD countries, the cut in imports from the rest of the world increases the share of manufacturing and in 61 countries raises the share of income going to the poor. But since average productivity goes down in almost all countries, this gain in equality comes at the expense of reduced incomes and increased poverty in almost all countries. The only winners are a small number of countries that were small and poor and not well integrated in the global economy to begin with—and the gains from deglobalization even for them are very small. Politically, deglobalization makes for less stable domestic politics and a greater likelihood of war. The likelihood of state failure through internal war, projected to diminish through 2035 with increasing globalization, rises in the deglobalization scenario particularly among the non-OECD democracies. Similarly, deglobalization makes for more fractious relations among states and the probability for interstate war rises.

#### Chinese leaders are pragmatic

**Goldstein 11—**professor emeritus of IR, American U. PhD in pol sci from MIT. Former visiting professor emeritus at Yale (Sept 2011, Joshua, Think Again: War, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war)

What about China, the most ballyhooed rising military threat of the current era? Beijing is indeed modernizing its armed forces, racking up double-digit rates of growth in military spending, now about $100 billion a year. That is second only to the United States, but it is a distant second: The Pentagon spends nearly $700 billion. Not only is China a very long way from beingable to go toe-to-toe with the UnitedStates; it's not clear why it would want to. A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor) would impede China's global trading posture and endanger its prosperity. Since Chairman Mao's death, China has been hands down the most peaceful great power of its time. For all the recent concern about a newly assertive Chinese navy indisputed international waters, China's military hasn't fired a single shot in battle in 25 years. "A More Democratic World Will Be a More Peaceful One." Not necessarily. The well-worn observation that real democracies almost never fight each other is historically correct, but it's also true that democracies have always been perfectly willing to fight non-democracies. In fact, democracy can heighten conflict by amplifying ethnic and nationalist forces, pushing leaders to appease belligerent sentiment in order to stay in power. Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant both believed that selfish autocrats caused wars, whereas the common people, who bear the costs, would be loath to fight. But try telling that to the leaders of authoritarian China, who are strugglingto hold in check, not inflame, a popular undercurrent of nationalism against Japanese and American historical enemies. Public opinion in tentatively democratic Egypt is far more hostile toward Israel than the authoritarian government of Hosni Mubarak ever was (though being hostile and actually going to war are quite different things).

## 1NR

### Overview: 2NC

#### We turn and outweigh

#### a.) Speed – Quicker timeframe – Global recession OVERNIGHT

Foster 3-25 (Peter, “Obama has backed himself into a corner over Ukraine,” <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/peterfoster/100264830/obama-has-backed-himself-into-a-corner-over-ukraine/>)

Once again, Mr **Obama is drawing red lines, promising** yesterday that "**if Russia escalates**" – ie invades eastern Ukraine – then **the US** and the EU **will impose "a greater cost".** We tend to dismiss sanctions as the soft option – obviously softer than a military confrontation which Nato and common sense has already ruled out – but **we should be under no illusions as to what a full-on sanctioning of the Russia economy might mean**. **Russia** **is** not Iran or Libya. It's **a two trillion dollar economy that supplies a third of Europe's energy and exports 7 million barrels of oil per day**. To put that in perspective, the "spare" global oil capacity is 2 million barrels per day. So while there is talk of "Iran-style" sanctions, Russia's energy footprint already precludes **walling off the Russian economy** from the rest of the world, since to do so **would** plunge us into a global recession over night. So, is Obama just bluffing again? Well, after his threats on Syria proved empty and led to accusations of weakness and incompetence that still sting in the White House, that seems unlikely. If Putin calls Mr Obama's bluff there will be little choice but to impose sanctions on sectors such as financial services, defence and Mr Putin's state-owned behemoths. Likely targets, say the experts, include the state arms exporter RosoboronExport, the aviation giant United Aircraft Corporation or the VSMPO, the world's largest titanium manufacturer. But that will not be without significant consequences. For example, VSMPO provides about a third of the titanium used in Boeing aircraft according to one industry estimate and RosobornExport currently cooperates with French, Italian and Spanish manufacturers. **One estimate** from the Financial Times **has sanctions costing** some **300,000 German manufacturing jobs in the inevitably tit-for-tat exchanges,** **while Bloomberg tallies up deals between Russian companies and the West,** including Britain, **worth $180bn over the last two years.** Similarly with banks. Hitting Bank Rossiya with $10bn in assets is but a pinprick – albeit an annoying one for the oligarchs – but begin to size up Russia's bigger institutions like Sberbank and VTB and you are into the soft tissue of global financial architecture, even as you raise the costs of doing business in Russia by tighten the lending spigots. According to figures from Russia's Central Bank, **Russian oligarchs and big business have borrowed heavily from the West**, perhaps as much as $160bn in new borrowings over the last two years. **If Russia now defaults on those loans**, as it might, inflicting haircuts on banks and big investors, **that pain will flow downwards in ways difficult to predict**. European banks have nearly $185 billion in exposure to Russia. France is the leading lender, with $50 billion, and Britain with $20 billion, according to figures from the Bank for International Settlements published by Reuters. What will mutual funds with exposure to sanctioned Russian sectors tell their clients? Will holdings, estimated at $75 billion in the US alone, be frozen and marked down on portfolios as zero-value, or will everyone be given 30 days to "get out" – sparking a disinvestment campaign? These are not insignificant details that officials are now scrambling to work out. **Russia is** also **certain to retaliate**, according to Cliff Kupchan head of the Russia desk at the Eurasia Group global risk consultancy who has met Mr Putin on no fewer than nine occasions. "It will be big," he tells me, when asked to quantify the potential blowback from Russian sectoral sanctions. "**The Russians will quickly retaliate and pivot away from Europe to Asia for their transportation, heavy equipment and high tech**, which is a significant part of Russia-EU trade." At the same time, large companies with operations in Russia would see business seriously disrupted if Moscow took retaliatory measures. Everyone has a different stake. Britain has to protect its financial services, the French have vulnerable defence contracts and Germans exports in tradable goods like vehicles and chemical products will suffer. **None of the above even take into account the long-term consequences of using the US Treasury, steward of the world's reserve currency and guardian of global financial stability, as** an engine of economic war – as the White House seems to be proposing at the moment.

#### b.) Size – Tit for tat sanction war will collapse the global economy and cause world war 3

Sara Carter 3/18/2014 (Senior Washington Correspondent for TheBlaze.) “How Sanctions Against Russia Could Signal the Beginning of ‘World War III’”, <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/03/18/how-sanctions-against-russia-could-signal-the-beginning-of-world-war-iii/>

Kevin Freeman, a global financial analyst with expertise in financial warfare and terrorism, warned that Russia, along with allies like China, could cripple the U.S. financial system.¶ It’s not a theory but a “very real reality” that should not be ignored, he said.¶ “The real risk is if we go after them with economic weapons, they come back after us and this creates World War III,” said Freeman, who has consulted for the Pentagon, CIA and FBI. ”This is a very tough game of chicken that we’re playing, and Putin is serious.”¶ On Wednesday, The Blaze TV’s For The Record investigative news magazine show will examine the global impact of the Ukraine crisis in “Resistance” (8 p.m. ET). For The Record will take viewers into Ukraine and reveal firsthand accounts of the deadly violence that has gripped the country, and explain how the international tug of war over Crimea could change the world.¶ The threat of economic warfare is nothing new. Freeman, who was hired by the Pentagon as a contractor to investigate the 2008 stock market crash, believes the economic crisis was the result of a purposeful attack on the U.S. financial market by a state actor or by financial terrorists. Last September, For The Record revealed how hostile nations such as China and Russia may have been the instigators of the 2008 crash and how a system with substantial growing debt is vulnerable to such attacks.¶ Following Sunday’s vote in Crimea to leave Ukraine and rejoin Russia, the Obama administration announced a number of sanctions against Russia as both U.S. and European Union officials said they would not recognize the referendum’s results — an overwhelming and questionable 97 percent win.¶ The crisis began in November, when then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych reversed course and failed to sign an economic agreement with the EU and instead chose to accept a $15 billion loan from Russia, sparking an uprising by protesters who wanted closer alignment with the rest of Europe, not Russia. After Yanukovych was ousted, Russian forces marched into Ukraine’s Crimea region, home to mostly ethnic Russians and territory that was once part of Russia.¶ “Russia is playing a very good game of Chess and there’s every reason to believe that Russia has thought this out in advance,” said Vitaly Chernetsky, a Ukraine expert at the University of Kansas. It’s up to the rest of the world to decide what will be needed to stop Putin’s momentum, he said.¶ Putin on Tuesday vowed not to bow to the international community, saying,”in our hearts we know Crimea has always been an inalienable part of Russia.”¶ U.S. analysts told TheBlaze that the sanctions announced Monday against seven of Russia’s wealthiest oligarchs and politicians may not be enough to stop Putin. Some Russian leaders have even joked that these are insignificant measures from a weak U.S. administration.¶ “There is no doubt that Russia has been thinking long and hard about how to disrupt U.S. power and the value of the dollar in the global market,” a U.S. defense official said. “We’re mindful but I don’t think we’re mindful enough. One thing is certain the greatest threat to our stability is not a conventional war but the destabilization of our economy by an enemy.”¶ For the past five years, Putin has promised that he would take America’s role as the leading global financial mammoth away, vowing to create alternatives to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 2011, he criticized the U.S. debt load, saying the “U.S. is living way beyond their means and shifting a part of their weight of their problems to the world economy.”¶ “To some extent [the U.S. is] living like parasites off the global economy and their monopoly of the dollar,” Putin said.¶ Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported a significant drop in foreign central banks’ Treasury bond holdings at the Federal Reserve. Analysts said they believed the drop was a result of Russia shifting Treasury bond holdings out of the Fed and into offshore accounts so it would be able to buy or sell its portfolio if the U.S. and its European allies imposed economic sanctions over Ukraine.¶ Earlier this month, Kremlin economic aide Sergei Glazyev made Russia’s intentions for economic warfare very clear, saying, “an attempt to announce sanctions would end in a crash for the financial system of the United States, which would cause the end of domination of the United States in the global financial system.”

### T/Heg

#### Economic strength is key to hegemony

**Gelb 9**—president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Former correspondent to senior official in State and Defense Departments. Former Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University. Former director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the DOD, won the highest award (distinguished service). serving as director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and winning the Distinguished Honor Award, the highest award of the US State Department. Served as an Assistant Secretary of State. B.A. from Tufts University M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard (Leslie, Is Obama Really a Hawk?, 13 December 2009, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-13/the-war-we-have-to-win/?cid=hp:exc>, AMiles)

But going to war does not a foreign policy make. If Americans are searching for a new Obama foreign policy, they need to look back to the closing words of Obama’s two week-old West Point speech. Those paragraphs zeroed in on the overriding imperative of restoring America’s economic strength—the very **heart of America’s military and diplomatic power**, and economic competitiveness. **Without** that **economic power, there will be no military** and economic power, no military victories, not much of anything. **This truth, one of the few truths in the foreign-policy business, is** **the** **only basis for a realistic and effective national-security policy**. Most foreign-policy experts and media performers don’t know much about economics and find it boring. They couldn’t have been less interested in focusing on rebuilding economic strength. Nor were they terribly interested in exploring Mr. Obama’s assertion that Afghanistan was just one of many places from which terrorists could strike or just one of many ongoing international crises. They only wanted to know how many troops he was sending, and for how long. All this helps to explain why the commentariat also paid scant attention to the second part of the Oslo “war” address, which focused on what nations must do with their diplomatic power—carved from economic and military—to avoid war.

### T/Terror

#### Economic decline leads to terrorism.

**Thomas ‘8** [John Thomas, Professor of Economics, January 18 2008, Becker-Posner Blog, Accessed April 8 2008, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2008/01/terrorism\_and\_e.html]

However **lack of economic growth** also **helps terrorism**. To manage in the modern world, every country requires an intellectual class, and **without sufficient economic growth this intellectual class is often idle or their partially educated children are idle and likely somewhat unemployed, and thus ripe for radicalism**. Also**, lack of economic growth tends to support the idea that the nation has fallen behind as a great power**. **People always like to feel like their part of a great power and economic growth makes people feel like if they are not part of a great power they are becoming part of one. Much of the discontent in the Muslim world is from the idea that the Muslim world has fallen behind the West and thus it must become a great power by any means necessarily.**

### T/Trade

#### Leads to a wave of protectionism

**Friedberg ‘8** [Mr. Friedberg is a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Mr. Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, 10-21, http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html]

Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow.

### Thumper Ans: Top

#### Distinguish between controversies and spending capital – he’s spending capital on Ukraine

Patrick and Schachter, 3—25—14—Stewart M. Patrick and Claire Schachter, “Getting Past Crimea at the Nuclear Security Summit,” Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/03/getting-past-crimea-nuclear-security-summit/81208/

Remove the Crimean elephant from the room: The United States and Russia should release a bilateral statement declaring that despite differences over Crimea and Ukraine, both remain committed to the NSS process and facilitating the fulfillment of the objectives of the Washington Workplan, their individual pledges, and those of all participants. The world needs Russia to play ball on securing civilian-use nuclear material as well as on non-proliferation generally, given the number of facilities and quantity of material still in its possession. It may be too late to prevent unhelpful issue linkage, but confronting the problem squarely could make it more difficult for any stakeholder to hold the process hostage going forward. Untether U.S. leadership: President Obama has allocated political capital to this issue. But the United States cannot lead by example with one hand tied behind its back. The president should declare his determination to work with lawmakers of both parties to push legislation through the Senate that will ensure U.S. compliance with the CPPNM and its 2005 amendment.

### U—A2 “IMF”

#### Dems backed off IMF reform to avoid a fight---didn’t cost PC and there was never a vote

Michael Tomasky 3-26, Daily Beast special correspondent, editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, 3/26/14, “The GOP Just Screwed Ukraine Out of Billions to Hurt Obama,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/26/the-gop-just-screwed-ukraine-out-of-billions-to-hurt-obama.html

But those points don’t matter on the right, of course. Over there, it all spells a diminution of American power, the hated global governance, like Pat Buchanan’s old warnings about sending our boys out to global hotspots donning light-blue (i.e. United Nations) helmets. John McCain and Bob Corker, to their credit, supported the aid with the IMF reform tacked on. But most Republicans didn’t, and even though the full package easily passed a procedural vote, Democrats were getting the strong sense that an aid deal with the IMF stuff included wasn’t going to make it.

And so, it emerged this week that the Obama administration and Senate Democrats apparently backed off their demand for the Ukraine aid bill on Capitol Hill to include the reforms. On Monday, John Kerry visited Congress and threw in the towel. Better to have whatever we can get now than fight over this and delay matters. Or worse, lose altogether, because there was no chance that the House would ever have passed the IMF-laden version.

### Thumper Ans: Minimum Wage

#### Minimum wage doesn’t capital – no vote, just a stump tool

Reuters, 3—26—14—“White House urges higher minimum wage for tipped workers,” The Raw Story, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/03/26/white-house-urges-higher-minimum-wage-for-tipped-workers/

The White House said on Wednesday raising the minimum wage for workers who receive tips would disproportionately benefit low-income women and help close the gender pay gap in which men earn higher pay than women. The federal minimum wage for workers who receive tips is $2.13 an hour – well below the minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. Even though employers are required to make up any shortfall between the tipped minimum and the standard minimum if gratuities fall short, one in 10 workers earn less than the minimum wage, the White House said. “This provision is difficult to enforce,” the White House Council of Economic Advisers said in a report. The president has asked Congress for an 18 percent, $41 million increase in funding for Department of Labor Wage and Hour division investigators to hold employers to the law. The federal tipped minimum wage has remained at its level for more than 20 years, the White House said. The president supports raising the full minimum wage to $10.10 an hour and the tipped minimum to $4.90 by 2016 and eventually to 70 percent of the full minimum wage. Such a rise would predominantly benefit women, the White House said. Of the 3.3 million workers in tipped occupations, about 2 million are restaurant servers, 70 percent of whom are women. President Barack Obama’s efforts to raise the minimum wage are unlikely to be taken up in the Republican-led House of Representatives, where Speaker John Boehner has argued that raising the minimum would hurt, not help, low-skilled workers because it could force employers to cut jobs. Obama has highlighted efforts to improve economic opportunities for women in recent speeches, such as last week when he told an audience at a community college in Florida that he wants to take steps to raise pay for women, who make up a big share of the minimum-wage workforce. “People naturally think about whether women are breaking through glass ceilings and making great strides and achieving the same kind of significant goals as men,” CEA member Betsey Stevenson told reporters. “But equally, it’s important to figure out how women are doing at the bottom.” The president is also hoping to rally women to support Democratic candidates as his party tries to prevent Republicans from taking over control of the Senate in elections this fall.

### U—A2 “Aid Package”

#### More ev – Obama still key

Zengerle, 3—27—14—Patricia, “U.S. Senate, House pass bills for Ukraine aid, sanctions,” Reuters, http://news.yahoo.com/u-senate-house-pass-bills-ukraine-aid-sanctions-164455348--business.html

The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives easily passed bills on Thursday to provide aid to Ukraine, back a $1 billion loan guarantee for the Kiev government and impose sanctions on Russians and Ukrainians over Russia's annexation of Crimea. The Senate passed its legislation by voice vote and the House voted for its legislation by 399-19, two days after Senate Democrats agreed to remove from the legislation reforms to the International Monetary Fund opposed by many Republicans. The two chambers will have to agree on how to handle differences between the two pieces of legislation before a final bill can be sent to President Barack Obama, who is expected to sign it into law. Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said leaders of the House and Senate had reached an agreement to send the bill to Obama by the end of the week. Under that deal, the Senate would pass legislation authorizing western news broadcasts into Ukraine and neighboring areas, and the House would consider and pass the Senate bill. "I expect it (the House vote) before they leave this week," he told a news conference shortly after the Senate vote. In addition to the loan guarantee, the Senate bill provides $150 million in aid to Ukraine and neighboring countries, and formalizes sanctions on Russians and Ukrainians who the United States says are responsible for corruption, human rights abuses or undermining stability in Ukraine. Obama announced sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle last week, but congressional approval makes them mandatory. The Senate bill also would impose sanctions on a broader category of individuals than Obama's order. Lawmakers said they considered the bill only a first step. They said Congress should consider more legislation in the weeks ahead to impose more sanctions to punish Moscow, provide military aid for Ukraine and boost U.S. energy exports to lessen Europe's reliance on Russian natural gas. "I believe we are in a dangerous moment in history with global consequences and the world is watching," Menendez said.

The aid package creates flexibility for broad sanctions

Joachim and Weisman, 3—27—14— DAVID S. JOACHIM and JONATHAN WEISMAN, “Congress Approves $1 Billion in Aid for Ukraine,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/world/europe/senate-approves-1-billion-in-aid-for-ukraine.html

The House and Senate voted overwhelmingly on Thursday to approve a billion-dollar aid package for Ukraine, two days after Senate Democrats relented to Republican demands that they drop a provision backed by the White House that would have authorized an overhaul of the International Monetary Fund. The bills, which were nearly identical, passed by 399 to 19 in the House and by 98 to 2 in the Senate. President Obama has said he will sign the legislation, which includes new sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians who provided support to Russia to annex the Crimea region of Ukraine. “This bill is a first step toward supporting the Ukrainians and our Central and Eastern European partners, and imposing truly significant costs on Moscow,” the House majority leader, Eric Cantor, said in a floor speech as his chamber considered its bill. Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said after the vote that a path had been cleared to get the bill to the president before the end of the week. To match the two bills, the Senate will pass a House bill to authorize the broadcast of Western news programs into Ukraine and the region, and the House will then take up the Senate bill and pass it. In addition to providing aid money to Ukraine, the bills would formalize sanctions authorized recently by Mr. Obama and expand the list of individuals and entities targeted for sanctions. Unlike the president’s executive order last week, the Senate’s sanctions are mandatory and do not grant Mr. Obama latitude to choose which penalties to apply. The bill also makes mandatory the application of sanctions on any Russian official found to have engaged in corruption in Ukraine, a broader category than any applied by the administration. The Senate measure would give the administration more flexibility to apply economic sanctions to any Russian official engaged in corrupt activity and anyone who assists such activities.

It didn’t pass

Kaper, 3—28—14—Stacy, “Blame the Doc Fix! Congress Fails to Send Obama Ukraine Bill This Week,” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/blame-the-doc-fix-congress-fails-to-send-obama-ukraine-bill-this-week-20140328>.

After much back and forth this week about how the House and Senate would finally send substantially similar legislation to aid Ukraine to the White House, the legislation is rolling over to next week, congressional aides said Friday. The House and Senate have each passed essentially the same set of measures designed to provide loan guarantees to Ukraine while imposing sanctions against Russia meant to punish President Vladimir Putin. But they are not in the same package, which is necessary to send a bill to the president's desk. Late Thursday the Senate approved by unanimous consent funding for Voice of America and similar European broadcasts into eastern Ukraine and Crimea geared toward ethnic Russian communities, which was included in the House legislation. House lawmakers had been expected to approve the Senate Ukraine package Friday on voice vote, while the chamber is adjourned in a pro forma session. But after heartburn over a quick voice vote on the so-called doc-fix legislation Thursday, the chamber decided to instead put the remaining Ukraine legislation on its suspension calendar, for quick debate and approval on Tuesday. The latest delay is only for a few days, but comes at the end of a long month of uncertainty as lawmakers' overwhelming disapproval of Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea struggled to translate into a straightforward legislative path—despite widespread bipartisan agreement on the fundamental necessity of a U.S. response. A House aide said the urgency lessened after Ukraine received aid from the International Monetary Fund this week, allowing Congress more breathing room to come up with a legislative deal.

### A2 UQ Overwhelms

UQ doesn’t overwhelm—broad sanctions still possible and being pushed by the right

The Courier, 3—30—14—“Russia Could Still Face Sanctions,” <http://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/politics/russia-could-still-face-sanctions-1.293928>.

Russia still faces the threat of economic sanctions which will "seriously hurt" it if Moscow orders a further intervention in Ukraine, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond warned amid hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough in the crisis. US secretary of state John Kerry and Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov were set to hold hastily convened talks in Paris, building on discussions between their countries' leaders about ways to resolve the dispute. Mr Hammond said he hoped a diplomatic solution could be found but it was important to maintain pressure on Moscow following its use of "very crude" tactics against its neighbour. The Defence Secretary said there were concerns about Russian troops on the border with Ukraine, following the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. He said UK forces were stepping up their involvement in military exercises in eastern Europe to provide reassurance for Nato members in the region that they would be defended in the event of any Russian attempts to violate their territory. Mr Hammond told the BBC's Andrew Marr Show: "Everybody is concerned. We are concerned that there might be a further incursion in the territory of a sovereign nation. "Whether there is or there isn't, we all need to be concerned about the use of this very crude and blunt instrument to try to influence other countries and their behaviour. "We thought we had seen the end of that kind of thing in Europe." He added: "Certainly one of the things we are looking at is a greater participation in exercises in the Baltic States, the eastern European Nato member countries as a way of reassuring them about our commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the mutual guarantee." Article 5 of the Nato treaty means that an attack on one nation in the alliance is viewed as an act of aggression against them all. Mr Hammond said: "We have already announced that we will be providing Typhoon aircraft, based probably in Estonia, to support the Polish-led Baltic air policing mission during the summer. "We are looking at opportunities to increase participation in planned Nato exercises as another way of reassuring our Nato allies. "Nobody should be in any doubt to our resolve to live up to our commitments under the Nato treaty." The talks between Mr Kerry and Mr Lavrov follow a telephone conversation between US president Barack Obama and Russian premier Vladimir Putin. Mr Obama urged Mr Putin to withdraw his troops from the border with Ukraine. The Russian leader, who initiated the call, asserted that Ukraine's government is allowing extremists to intimidate civilians with impunity - something Ukraine insists has not happened. Asked if there was the possibility of a breakthrough, Mr Hammond said: "I hope so because we have to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis over the Crimea while continuing to make very clear to the Russians that if they were to go any further into the Ukraine there would be a raft of new measures against them which would seriously hurt the Russian economy." Shadow foreign secretary Douglas Alexander told the Andrew Marr Show: "I think these talks are vital between the US and Russia but it's equally vital we see talks between Russia and the Ukraine. "That is the basis on which we can see a lowering of the temperature and a de-escalation of what remain some very serious risks on the eastern Ukrainian border."

### Link

**Huge fight—gets sucked into Gitmo debates**

Air **Shaprio**, “Why Obama Wants to Change the Key Law in the Terrorism Fight,” NPR, 5—29—**13**, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/05/29/187059276/why-obama-wants-to-change-the-key-law-in-the-terrorism-fight

**"This law has served us well** for over a decade," he says. "Much hangs from it, **including** the **detention** capability **and** the **ability to use the** U.S. **military** against clear and present dangers to the United States." That detention piece of the puzzle is key: The **Guantanamo** prison o**perates under the AUMF,** so repealing this law is also part of the White House's effort to close the prison. **Many in Congress want to keep the prison open. That's one reason this issue will not** **be easily resolved,** says Thomas Kean, who co-chaired the 9/11 Commission. "I think **it'll be a long debate**, and it should be," Kean says. **"[These are] very, very contentious issues**, but the one thing you have to have, I think, in the United States, particularly for something lasting as long as this, is a framework of laws. We're a nation of laws. You can't just do ad hoc as we have in the past." It's pretty unusual for a president to ask Congress to take away some of his power. But Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies says if you look at it a different way, this situation doesn't seem so strange. "It's not unusual for presidents to end wars, right?" she says. "And if what we were talking about was ending military operations, that would not look like a president giving up power. It would look like a president ending wars." In fact, the White House wants **to change this law** authorizing the war on terrorism **at the same time the Afghan war ends** in 2014. That **means** it has a year and a half **to wrestle with Congress over the details.**

**GOP will hijack debate, use plan to attack Obama**

Andrew **Rosenthal**, “Revisiting Post-9/11 Law,” NEW YORK TIMES, 5—7—**13**, http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/revisiting-the-a-u-m-f/

**Reviewing the force resolution** is not optional. And yet, the risk is obvious: this sort of discussion **can go badly awry** in a Congress that has preyed on Americans’ fear of terrorism to needlessly attack civil liberties and the rule of law. Congress could broaden, rather than rein in military power. Just for instance, the most recent National Defense Authorization Act — which Mr. Obama signed last year — seemed to expand the military’s authority on American soil. And as Politico pointed out, Mr. **Obama’s implacable Republican enemies** in Congress **could hijack the debate** over the resolution **as a pretext to launch yet another attack on the president**.

### M—Gas Cutoff—War

#### Russia cutoff Europe gas in retaliation

John Cohen 3/24/14 (former U.S. State Department official, works for a satellite technology company in the Washington area) “Putin Has Many Ways to Strike Back at Sanctions”, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-has-many-ways-to-strike-back-at-sanctions/496684.html>

In the wake of President Vladimir Putin's decision to annex Crimea, there is much talk in the West that Russia must pay a serious price. But the discussion of how to "punish" Russia largely overlooks the fact that Moscow would retaliate with penalties of its own if the West imposed sanctions on Russia.¶ Above all, Russia can use the gas weapon against Ukraine, which would cripple the Ukrainian economy and as well as cause widespread disruption across Europe.¶ In 2009, when Moscow shut down all gas deliveries to Ukraine, the disruption resulted in substantial shortages and rises in gas prices throughout Europe. Europe still imports 30 percent of its gas from Russia, and several Eastern European countries are close to 100 percent reliant on Russia.¶ A number of European countries are suffering severe economic problems, and as a whole European economies have performed significantly worse than that of the U.S. Therefore, a cutoff of Russian gas might well throw Europe back into a full recession.¶ In the Middle East, Russia could also significantly disrupt the P5+1 negotiations with Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. Putin could decide to move forward with the supply of advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, or take concrete steps to assist Tehran's desire to build a second nuclear power plant.¶ Putin also possesses a "swing vote" in the Syrian crisis, and if he decides to double down on his support for Syrian President Bashar Assad, any chance for a cease-fire in Syria could be wrecked.¶ Afghanistan is another theater where Putin could strike a blow against Western — primarily U.S. — interests. The northern route that U.S forces use to ship equipment in and out of Afghanistan runs through Russia. Putin could shut this down at any time, thereby greatly complicating the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan.¶ Finally, Putin could ratchet up tensions in other states with substantial ethnic Russian populations, such as Estonia and Latvia. Last week, Moscow sent shudders through Estonia by complaining that its policy requiring its Russian population to speak Estonian was comparable to Ukraine's policy of limiting the use of Russian.¶ While Russia may no longer have the superpower status of the former Soviet Union, when it comes to sanctions Putin has plenty of cards of his own to play.

### M—Gas Cutoff—Europe

#### Russia cutoff Europe gas in retaliation

John Cohen 3/24/14 (former U.S. State Department official, works for a satellite technology company in the Washington area) “Putin Has Many Ways to Strike Back at Sanctions”, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-has-many-ways-to-strike-back-at-sanctions/496684.html>

In the wake of President Vladimir Putin's decision to annex Crimea, there is much talk in the West that Russia must pay a serious price. But the discussion of how to "punish" Russia largely overlooks the fact that Moscow would retaliate with penalties of its own if the West imposed sanctions on Russia.¶ Above all, Russia can use the gas weapon against Ukraine, which would cripple the Ukrainian economy and as well as cause widespread disruption across Europe.¶ In 2009, when Moscow shut down all gas deliveries to Ukraine, the disruption resulted in substantial shortages and rises in gas prices throughout Europe. Europe still imports 30 percent of its gas from Russia, and several Eastern European countries are close to 100 percent reliant on Russia.¶ A number of European countries are suffering severe economic problems, and as a whole European economies have performed significantly worse than that of the U.S. Therefore, a cutoff of Russian gas might well throw Europe back into a full recession.¶ In the Middle East, Russia could also significantly disrupt the P5+1 negotiations with Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. Putin could decide to move forward with the supply of advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, or take concrete steps to assist Tehran's desire to build a second nuclear power plant.¶ Putin also possesses a "swing vote" in the Syrian crisis, and if he decides to double down on his support for Syrian President Bashar Assad, any chance for a cease-fire in Syria could be wrecked.¶ Afghanistan is another theater where Putin could strike a blow against Western — primarily U.S. — interests. The northern route that U.S forces use to ship equipment in and out of Afghanistan runs through Russia. Putin could shut this down at any time, thereby greatly complicating the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan.¶ Finally, Putin could ratchet up tensions in other states with substantial ethnic Russian populations, such as Estonia and Latvia. Last week, Moscow sent shudders through Estonia by complaining that its policy requiring its Russian population to speak Estonian was comparable to Ukraine's policy of limiting the use of Russian.¶ While Russia may no longer have the superpower status of the former Soviet Union, when it comes to sanctions Putin has plenty of cards of his own to play.

#### Collapses European and global economies

Unger 3-18 (David, “Why Europe can't hit Russia with its biggest club: energy sanctions,” <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/0318/Why-Europe-can-t-hit-Russia-with-its-biggest-club-energy-sanctions-video>)

The German-Russian business partnership also influences how Berlin responds to the Ukraine crisis. A shutoff of Russian gas to Germany would be a devastating blow to Europe's largest economy, and ripple across global markets. **The risk** **of upsetting a major supplier of resources and financial wealth**, critics say, **makes** German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other **European leaders** more **hesitant to impose significant sanctions** on Russia.

**PC High: S/L**

**Obama has PC – he’s been conserving it by avoiding national security fights – he has enough to spend in the months ahead – that’s Feaver**

**Obama has PC**

**Mann 2/6** (Michael, Climate Scientist, 2/6/14, “"Climate Hubs" a Good Step, but Obama's Policies Still Leading to Climate Disaster”, http://truth-out.org/news/item/21703-climate-hubs-a-good-step-but-obamas-policies-still-leading-to-climate-disaster, zzx)

MANN: Well, you know, I'm sure that **the president faces pressure from all sides. And I don't envy the position that he's in**. And, of course, there is quite a bit of pressure by special interest groups like the Koch brothers, who stand to make billions of dollars if the Keystone XL Pipeline is built. Of course there's pressure from industry groups, front groups, right-wing foundations advocating for the fossil fuel industry. And **the president understands that. He's got a certain amount of political capital, and he has to calculate how much of that he's willing to expend** on this particular issue.