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#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.

#### The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters

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U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

**“Statutory restrictions” require congressional action**

**Kershner 10** (Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

**The process by which the President fills an Executive Branch position is governed by the Appointments Clause:**

[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. n81

**This process is divided into three phases: (1) Congress creates an Executive Branch position by statute**; n82 (2) the President nominates an individual to fill the position; n83 and (3) the Senate confirms the nominee. n84 The Clause covers a specified list of positions and the generic "other Officers of the United States." n85 **The Clause controls who nominates, appoints, and confirms an individual for such a position**. n86 Finally, the Clause defines a separate process for inferior officers. n87 It should be noted, however, that the Appointments Clause limits but does not empower Congress to create positions. n88 That power comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause. n89

**The House of Representatives has no role in the process of nomination and appointment and is specifically not mentioned in the [\*626] Appointments Clause**. All of **the powers contained in the Appointments Clause are reserved to the President, the Senate, or both**. n90 The Appointments Clause makes a distinction between the power to nominate and the separate power to appoint. **The power of nomination is textually reserved to the President of the United States, n91 whereas the power of appointment is shared by the President and the Senate**. n92 **Statutory restrictions violate the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the very act of passing a statute requires the involvement of the House of Representatives.** n93

**Statutory restrictions on the appointments process are further problematic because the Appointments Clause's power to nominate is vested solely in the President**. n94 Those statutory restrictions that limit the President's power to nominate violate the plain text of the Clause. n95 **Where the Constitution provides a clear procedural process, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict principles of formalism,** construing the text so as to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the various branches of government. n96

The Senate's role in the appointments process is the final confirmation of a nominee. n97 The "advice and consent" of the Senate applies only to the appointment power. n98 The President and the Senate have interpreted advice as non-binding guidance, and have interpreted [\*627] consent as the act of confirmation. n99 Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the Senate only the narrow function of confirming nominees. n100

**Judicial restrictions” are imposed by the court**

**Singer 7** (Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (**noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs**"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (**discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs**); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, **Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era**, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (**discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force**).

#### B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.

#### C. Vote negative

#### 1. Limits—their interpretation kills limits because it creates a strategic incentive to disregard the resolution. If teams can get away with being non-topical, there’s no reason to defend the resolution. Limits are good:

**A limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash**

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, **Argumentation and** Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate:** the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered.** For example**, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take jobs** from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.** To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions,** frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate** during the summer of 2007. **Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. **Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad,** too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

#### 2. Switch-Side Debate—their interpretation allows teams to only debate one side of an issue. Switch-side debate is good:

#### A. Reflexive deliberation key to critical thinking

Catherine Fox, Iowa State University, “The Race to Truth: Disarticulating Critical Thinking from Whiteliness,” PEDAGOGY v. 2 n. 2, 2002, pp. 197-212.

We also tend to acknowledge critical thinking only as an analytic form of thought that "resists" the status quo. David Wallace and Helen Rothschild Ewald (2000: 21) point out that cultural critique is often the primary goal of feminist and critical pedagogies. "Privileging resistance can itself become an expression of a teacher's absolute authority," however, and is antithetical to our goal of transforming relations of power and authority. In feminist and critical pedagogies, resistance to the status quo becomes the answer that students are expected to arrive at after analyzing texts. For example, Shor (1992: 41) presents critical thinking as follows: Had I tried to be a "neutral" teacher who ignored the pro-business bias of news organizations, I would have cheated students of a chance for critical thinking about the real world they live in. For a teacher or syllabus to ignore business bias would have been just as political in orientation and less scientific; that would have meant avoiding the criticism of the way power actually operates in the media to create manipulative images of the world. . . . A syllabus without critical questions is not neutral or apolitical. In fact, it supports the status quo by not questioning it. . . . Students in the media class gained a critical perspective on their TV, radio, and daily papers. . . . When I posed [the antilabor tilt in these media] as a problem, they had a chance to see one structure in society for what it really is [emphasis mine]. I agree that no classroom is "neutral," and I do not deny the pro-business bias of the media, but I struggle with Shor's construing of critical thinking (which is fairly typical for the literature on alternative pedagogies). In the problem-posing approach to teaching, which relies on critical thinking as the primary tool for finding solutions, the instructor too often has already solved the problem. In my own composition classrooms, some students seem to equate critical thinking with figuring out what my opinion is and then reproduce it in their papers and class comments. I have told them that I do not expect them to agree with me; I simply want them to think critically. But in reflecting on the comments I put on their papers and the ways that I lead class discussions, I become uneasy, because my comments, which are intended to encourage critical thinking, often point to my unintentional use of it to guide my students to the "right" answer, the "right" perspective—which is always my answer, [End Page 200] my perspective. My experiences as a feminist educator and my review of the literature indicate that, too often, the "chance for critical thinking" means the chance finally to know the "truth." Rather than "an analytic and imaginative habit of mind," critical thinking comes to mean seeing from and believing in the feminist or critical instructor's perspective on the manipulative powers that serve the status quo. In this way critical thinking, however "revolutionary," is "still running in old cycles." 3 In sum, I perceive the following problems with the way that feminist and critical pedagogues posit critical thinking: 1. In general, we consider it an unquestionable good, and as such it operates as a god-term. 2. We equate it with analytic thinking that leads students to see issues in the "right" way. 3. Thus we tend to conflate critical thinking with feminist and critical ideologies. 4. Ultimately, doing so creates a race to truth whose telos is the same as that of the traditional pedagogies criticized for using transmission models of language, knowledge, and learning. Critical Thinking: Racing to Truth One way to disarticulate this conflation is through the metaphor of whiteliness. Ruth Frankenberg (1993, 1997) and Michelle Fine et al. (1997) explore the social construction of whiteliness and offer broad analyses of how it manifests itself (in such realms as history, sociological and cultural studies, subjectivity and the performance of identities, and social movements). Importantly, some scholars argue that studying whiteliness reifies its central position in discussions of race and racism. I believe, however, that naming and defining what has been considered "transparent" are also important steps toward disrupting systems of domination. 4 In "Identity: Skin Blood Heart," in which she explores her struggles against racism and anti-Semitism, Pratt (1984: 14-15) lists four characteristics of the white, southern female identity that she contends with in attempting to live in "connection" with others: "I was taught to be a judge, of moral responsibility and of punishment only in relation to my ethical system; was taught to be a martyr, to take all the responsibility for change, and the glory, to expect others to do nothing; was taught to be a peacemaker, to mediate, negotiate between opposing sides because I knew the right way; was taught to be a preacher, to point out wrongs and tell others what to do." She defines this white identity as a false identity that has taught her to lead her life through [End Page 201] "ought-to's" rather than through the need and desire for social change and connection to other people. 5 Frye (1992: 153) uses Pratt's four characteristics to launch her own discussion of whiteliness. She explains that the white, southern, Christian identity she was taught to espouse was based on the motto "Right is might": "'We' knew right from wrong and had the responsibility to see to it right was done; that there were others who did not know what is right and wrong and should be advised, instructed, helped and directed by us." Frye offers the following "lessons learned" about how to be whitely, all of which pertain primarily to Pratt's characteristic of judge: 6 I was taught that because one knows what is right, it is morally appropriate to have and exercise what I now would call race and class privilege. Whitely people have a staggering faith in their own rightness and goodness, and that of other whitely people. We are not crooks. Whitely people do have a sense of right and wrong, and are ethical. Their ethics is in a great part an ethics of forms, procedures and due process. Whitely people tend to believe that one preserves one's goodness by being principled, by acting according to rules instead of according to feeling. Authority seems to be central to whiteliness, as you might expect from a people who are raised to run things, or to aspire to that: belief in one's authority in matters practical, moral and intellectual exists in tension with the insecurity and hypocrisy that are essentially connected with the pretense of infallibility. (153-54) Turning next to white women's whiteliness, Frye argues that it is based on integrity, dignity, and respectability, which whitely women use as levers to raise themselves to the level of whitely men. She calls on white women to unlearn whiteliness, just as men are expected to unlearn masculinity, if the ultimate goal is to achieve more egalitarian relationships with others. The judgmentalism of whitely people and the presumed rightness that protects them from having to justify their ability to know right from wrong shed light on what is intuitively wrong with conflating critical thinking and a particular political agenda. 7 For example, Elizabeth Ellsworth (1992: 96) characterizes critical thinking as "judging the truth and merit of propositions . . . and the critical [and feminist] pedagogue is one who enforces the rules of reason in the classroom." When we teach students how to analyze texts as feminist and critical pedagogues, we often assume that we are being principled, ethical, and morally appropriate because we are following the "rules of reason" [End Page 202] as they have been established during the long history of Western intellectualism. 8 When analyzing and writing about the advertising industry's representation of women in my composition classroom, I often found myself approaching discussions and the evaluation of student papers with the assumption that I had the right analyses of the ads; my job was simply to pose leading questions to my students. If they arrived at my point of view, I rewarded them with oral or written comments that suggested that they had learned to think critically. If they did not arrive, I had such faith in my own rightness and righteousness that I could dismiss them as resisting my pedagogy and therefore as being unreachable. Rather than state my ideological position and goals as a feminist educator explicitly, I seductively named what I did "teaching my students to think critically." One's positioning as a feminist or critical pedagogue, then, rests on the assumption that one has already arrived at the position of being a critical thinker. It follows, since we have attained the right answer or political position, that we have the moral or ethical responsibility of getting our students to do the same. In assuming that critical thinking is a point of arrival and, perhaps more important, in using it to race students to the truths we have discovered, we manifest and reproduce whitely ways of being in the world. Thus critical thinking becomes a lever, similar to the integrity, dignity, and respectability whitely women use to raise themselves to the level of white men. In our classrooms, when we posit critical thinking as the moment of arriving at the right answer, we use it as a lever to raise students to our level. Transformation is supposedly undergone by the nonwhitely students; we instructors are exempt from it. Students who do not arrive at the right answer or resist the idea of the right answer do not get raised; in general, we do not reward their good critical thinking with high grades, favorable evaluations, and our interest in or involvement with them. The students whom we deem good critical thinkers can feel a "staggering faith in their own rightness and goodness and that of other whitely people" and can use their newly honed critical thinking skills to raise nonwhitely people to their level. When we replace dominant worldviews with "alternative" ones, moreover, we use critical thinking to reproduce dichotomous thinking between "us" and "them," between "right" and "wrong." There is nothing radical or transformative about supplanting a conservative, hegemonic truth with a leftist, marginalized truth—it is only more "running in old cycles." The parallels between theories of whiteliness and the uses of critical thinking in alternative pedagogies raise crucial questions for reflection: How much of the critical thinking that we laud in ourselves is embedded in our assumed righteousness, principled conduct, goodness, and standing as moral and ethical citizens and teachers who, because we possess these whitely qualities, have the authority to run things? Does the critical thinking we encourage our students to apply lead them to aspire to the same qualities? If so, it poses the danger of reproducing the very hegemony that radical pedagogues aim to disrupt. To the extent that we can name and understand how whiteliness manifests itself in critical thinking and in our ways of being in the world, however, we can begin to transform them into new ways of being. 9 Disarticulating Critical Thinking from Whiteliness Critical thinking, when disarticulated from a particular ideological standpoint, offers us a means of engaging in the self-reflexivity needed to question the truth of our positions. To begin to move away from whiteliness, we might construe critical thinking as a self-reflexive process that is pragmatically oriented, rather than as a right answer or a point of arrival. Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly (2001: 629), quoting C. S. Peirce, suggest that we link pragmatism with liberatory pedagogy to find fruitful methods of discovering transformative possibilities: "'Grant an idea to be true' . . . then ask 'what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life.'" Adopting the pragmatic insistence that "meaning resides in consequences" (614), we might begin by positing critical thinking as what examines the consequences of our choices and the locations from which we make them, not what suggests the relative correctness of choices and locations. Two concepts from Paulo Freire indicate an approach to critical thinking that supersedes the revolutionary cycles that race to the truth. 10 In Letters to Cristina Freire (1996: 115) explains that critical thinking begins with "epistemological curiosity" and leads to critical consciousness, which enables students to make broad connections between themselves and the social. For Freire, critical thinking involves the ability not only to know and analyze concepts but to imagine things beyond the present reality; students who possess this ability become knowers and doers, creators of the word and the world. In Teachers As Cultural Workers (Shor and Freire 1998: 40), Freire also explains the necessity of humility: "Humility does not flourish in people's insecurities but in the insecure security of the more aware, and thus this insecure security is one of the expressions of humility, as is uncertain certainty, unlike certainty, which is excessively sure of itself." Importantly, humility is not akin to meekness or docility, which has often been demanded of marginalized peoples and so is at odds with the goal of transformation. Hence we must understand the [End Page 204] locations from which we teach and speak; the degree to which we may invoke humility is contingent on the extent to which our positions already carry whitely notions of rightness and righteousness. Imagination and humility seem to go underground when we collapse critical thinking with feminist and critical ideologies. Ann Berthoff (1988: 38) aptly describes the imaginative, critical mind as "fresh and open," as a mind that "opens out" into the arena of the possible. The very idea of possibilities, rather than certainties, might keep our minds and our students' minds fresh and open. If we emphasized critical thinking as an imaginative habit of mind, we might move past moral ought-to's and stop urging our students to race to truths that we have already discovered. We might construe critical thinking, then, not as a way to home in on the truth through rational deliberation but as an inclination to look for multiple solutions and question their consequences. This inclination might lead us back to an attitude of humility, of "uncertain certainty," beyond the whitely notion that through critical thinking we can "judg[e] the truth and merit of propositions" infallibly. That is, if we could question the consequences of our actions, the ways that meaning resides in the consequences of a choice, we might see new ways of being that move past revolution, past replacing old truths with feminist or critical ideological truths, and into moments of transformation, moments in which we engage in constructing meaning and knowledge with our students, rather than transmit knowledge to them. The first-year composition course I teach at Iowa State University, a predominantly white, middle-class institution, encourages students to see writing as a powerful tool for both intellectual life and civic action. In it I use a local conflict or issue, for example, the "education crisis" that Iowa (like many states) is facing, as an occasion to engage in a reconceived kind of critical thinking. 11 Iowa loses teachers to neighboring states because its public schools lack the funding and other incentives to retain the new teachers that the local colleges train. To counteract this loss, a bill now under consideration proposes to secure quality teachers for Iowa's public schools through a new structure of promotion. I begin this project by having the class research the history of education in Iowa, identify what incentives draw its new teachers to other states, and investigate the solutions that citizens and legislators have recommended to stem the loss. The focus of this project then turns to a specific solution, such as the education bill. To learn about its consequences, my students may interview professors and students in the College of Education for their perspectives or local schoolteachers (both new and experienced) for the opinions of the citizens whom the bill would affect most directly. After [End Page 205] gaining these multilayered perspectives (and thus avoiding a single "truth" handed down from the teacher's position of authority), we formulate our own stances toward the bill. Finally, in keeping with the course's objectives, we choose some way to enter the conflict. I give the students various options for doing so, such as creating a Web page that helps educate citizens about the bill, assembling a brochure that takes a stand on it, or writing a letter to the editor or to a congressional representative. Toward the end of the project, we discuss the consequences of the options we have chosen; we also question the project itself and the choices I made in designing it. Certainly, the focus on working within institutionalized structures, such as the legal system, proceeds from trust in the authority and rules of preestablished systems of negotiation; hence the activities that I offer my students in this project move their thinking in a particular direction. I place my own choices on the table for discussion to model a pragmatic process of critical examination that asks: What difference do my choices make? What options do they preclude or open? Examining many perspectives, then, is vital to the critical thinking I want to promote, but so is questioning one's own stake in a particular position or solution, because it is where reflection and humility enter the process. One of the best ways I have found to encourage these habits is continually to ask students to think about their thinking, to consider why they think what they do about the conflict under investigation. To distance students from the component of whiteliness that judges only in relation to one ethical system, I often ask them: What do you stand to lose if you give up that belief or position or to gain if you hold on to it? The point is to engage them in a self-reflexivity that might forestall the collapsing of critical thinking with the whitely tendency to judge from a position of presumptive rightness and righteousness. Moreover, the teacher must become a coparticipant in the making of meaning so as to model critical thinking that resists the whitely feminist and critical assumption of having already arrived at the truth, at the position of "criticality." In a workshop at the Learning Community Institute at Iowa State, Jean MacGregor (2001) described an interdisciplinary project created through linked-learning community classes (in composition and environmental science) that struck me as a useful example of how critical thinking can be pragmatically reenvisioned in feminist and critical classrooms. The project centers on the local conflict over the Cushman Dam, which provides electricity for the city of Tacoma, Washington, but is threatening the local salmon population, whose migratory route it blocks. MacGregor's students research the various sides of the conflict and decide whether the dam should remain in place [End Page 206] or be torn down. In papers they then address the consequences: if they argue that the dam should be destroyed, they must suggest alternative sources of electricity; if they decide that the dam should be kept, they must find a way to save the dwindling salmon population. Asking students to reflect on the effects of their choices embraces the pragmatism that Ronald and Roskelly (2001) suggest might make transformation possible, because it moves us away from the dogmatism of feminist and critical discourse. It also positions us to question the truths that we forward. Confronting Closure and Embracing Uncertain Certainty Notwithstanding the examples above, it remains possible for critical thinking to be posited in whitely ways. For example, feminist and critical teachers have clear opinions about education; therefore it can be difficult for us not to posit the "right" answers when discussing conflicts that relate to education. It takes active commitment to move away from the assumption that we who have invested our lives in practicing and theorizing about learning already know the truth about the education crisis or the specific issues of an education bill. Where I know that I have strong vested interests, I make a concerted effort to model for my students the reflection, humility, and imagination that I have suggested we need to incorporate into critical thinking. Yet no matter how carefully I do so, I still struggle against an ideology of critical thinking that gives priority to social involvement and social responsibility. From one angle I perceive a set of moral ought-to's in how I have construed critical thinking in the above projects. For example, my definition of it assumes that humility is an admirable trait. For students who have been institutionally and socially constructed to be humble, or who are already unsure of their ability to make meaning and arrive at solutions, the emphasis on questioning can further undermine the ability to claim and voice an opinion in a conflict. These projects also presuppose that change is necessary and that good citizens are those who participate in the democratic process, assumptions that may run counter to students' understanding of democracy and even of the purposes of a college education. For example, MacGregor's project enforces the idea of disrupting the status quo, which not all students hold as a requirement of citizenship. Instructors will always bring to the classroom ideologies that drive our pedagogical choices. However, if we are committed to questioning the conflation of critical thinking with one ideological stance and to positing critical thinking as a pragmatic process of knowing, acting, being, and reflecting, we may begin to move from revolutionary cycles to spaces of transformation. [End Page 207] How do we deal with students who do not share our ideological assumptions? First, we can avoid summarily dismissing them as simply resistant to our agenda or our pedagogy. Second, we can find methods of using their dissonance to model critical thinking in ways that match our transformative goals. Redefining critical thinking as a recursive engagement in inquiry and then thinking about our thinking represent, for me, moves away from closure and toward the opening of the mind and imagination. We might model this process by opening a dialogue with our students about the structure of a class or the design of a project in order to explain our pedagogical choices to them. But simply explaining and justifying these choices would reify our authority and power to run things. Rather, we might invite students into a reflective consideration in which to show us some of the consequences of our choices in designing the course. The point of inviting students to do so is to show them that we are genuinely interested in these consequences and to enable students to collaborate in the development, or even the reconstruction, of the project or course. Indeed, I once stopped a project in midsemester when it was apparent that it was not working. In an evaluation I asked the students anonymously to describe the project's strengths and weaknesses and suggest how to reconfigure the remainder of the project and semester. I then presented their responses to the whole class as a starting point. Throughout this process I attempted to model explicitly the critical engagement central to my course curriculum. I realize that I am placing a tall order for feminist and critical educators to fill in one semester or one quarter. Nonetheless, I believe that it will allow us actually to engage in processes of critical thinking alongside our students. In Freire's (1996: 3) words, we need to be "rigorously coherent so as to not lose [ourselves] in the enormous distance between what [we] do and say." My point is not that we should rid our classrooms of truths or ideologies. In fact, we cannot do so, because our agenda is to teach something. However, we can ask for what purpose we posit critical thinking in our classrooms. If we do it in the service of our truth, we must recognize that there is nothing inherently liberatory about any ideological stance, no matter what the supposed emancipatory goal**s**. We also can unlearn whitely ways of being in the world; we can disarticulate a whitely construction of critical thinking from feminist and critical ideologies by being more reflective and humble about ourselves as critical thinkers. Not only do we need to represent critical thinking differently to our students, but we need to model it for them if we are to transform the processes of learning and teaching. This modeling requires, in part, more mutual engagement with students in making and reflecting on [End Page 208] meanings. Rather than race students to the truths that we have already figured out, rather than reproduce whitely ways of being, we might begin to construe critical thinking as a process that we engage in with our students. That is, we might see critical thinking as a different approach to learning and teaching: not a specific point of arrival, not a specific form of content, but a cycle in which together we make meaning, arrive at solutions, question the consequences, and return again to making meaning.

#### B. Tolerance—switching sides makes debaters more tolerant of arguments and ideas that are the opposite of their own—their one-sided approach promotes dogmatism

**Muir 93** (Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 288-289)

The role of **switch-side debate is especially important in the** oral **defense of arguments that foster tolerance** without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. **The forum is** therefore **unique in providing debaters with** attitudes of **tolerance** without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, **debaters are** indeed **exposed to a multivalued world**, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, **the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be** seen as **a means of gaining perspective** without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.'s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— **tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate**. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. **The willingness to recognize** the existence of **other views, and to grant alternative positions** a degree of **credibility, is** a value **fostered by switch-side debate**: Alternately **debating both sides** of the same question . . . **inculcates a deep-seated** attitude of **tolerance** toward differing points of view. **To** be forced to **debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side**. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .**Promoting** this kind of **tolerance is** perhaps **one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer**. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because **debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this** fact who **become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted**.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

#### C. Activism—only switching sides teaches students to anticipate counter-arguments and build coalitions effectively, which is necessary for sustained activism

**Harrigan 8** - Casey Harrigan, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications, Wake Forest U., 2008, “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.49-50

Third, there is an important question of means. Even the best activist intentions have little practical utility as long as they remain purely cordoned off in the realm of theoretical abstractions. Creating programs of action that seek to produce material changes in the quality of life for suffering people, not mere wishful thinking in the ivory towers of academia, should be the goal of any revolutionary project. Frequently, for strategies for change, the devil lies in the details. It is not possible to simply click one’s ruby red slippers together and wish for alternatives to come into being. Lacking a plausible mechanism to enact reforms, many have criticized critical theory as being a “fatally flawed enterprise” (Jones 1999). For activists, learning the skills to successfully negotiate hazardous political terrain is crucial. They must know when to and when not to compromise, negotiate, and strike political alliances in order to be successful. The pure number of failed movements in the past several decades demonstrates the severity of the risk assumed by groups who do not focus on refining their preferred means of change. Given the importance of strategies for change, SSD is even more crucial. Debaters trained by debating both sides are substantially more likely to be effective advocates than those experienced only in arguing on behalf of their own convictions. For several reasons, SSD instills a series of practices that are essential for a successful activist agenda. First, SSD creates more knowledgeable advocates for public policy issues. As part of the process of learning to argue both sides, debaters are forced to understand the intricacies of multiple sides of the argument considered. Debaters must not only know how to research and speak on behalf of their own personal convictions, but also for the opposite side in order to defend against attacks of that position. Thus, when placed in the position of being required to publicly defend an argument, students trained via SSD are more likely to be able to present and persuasively defend their positions. Second, learning the nuances of all sides of a position greatly strengthens the resulting convictions of debaters, their ability to anticipate opposing arguments, and the effectiveness of their attempts to locate the crux, nexus and loci of arguments. As is noted earlier, conviction is a result, not a prerequisite of debate. Switching sides and experimenting with possible arguments for and against controversial issues, in the end, makes students more likely to ground their beliefs in a reasoned form of critical thinking that is durable and unsusceptible to knee-jerk criticisms. As a result, even though it may appear to be inconsistent with advocacy, SSD “actually created stronger advocates”

that are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals (Dybvig and Iverson 2000). Proponents of abandoning SSD and returning to debating from conviction should take note. Undoubtedly, many of their ideas would be beneficial if enacted and deserve the support of activist energies. However, anti-SSD critics seem to have given little thought to the important question of how to translate good ideas into practice. By teaching students to privilege their own personal beliefs prior to a thorough engagement with all sides of an issue, debating from conviction produces activists that are more likely to be politically impotent. By positing that debaters should bring prior beliefs to the table in a rigid manner and assuming that compromising is tantamount to giving in to cooptation, the case of debating from conviction undercuts the tactics necessary for forging effective coalitional politics. Without such broad-based alliances, sustainable political changes will likely be impossible (Best & Kellner 2001).

#### 3. Topic Education—their interpretation diverts focus away from the topic. Topic education is good:

#### Effective radical problem-solving demands focusing on changing government policy

James Ferguson, Professor, Anthropology, Stanford University, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” ANTIPODE v. 41 n. S1, 2011, Wiley.

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims. My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor, in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming). My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest. As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2). As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do. Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

#### Learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence real policymakers

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention. More than 1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

**OFF**

**we affirm executive self restraint in the war on terror.**

**it competes or else they are not topical---authority is delegated power from a principal to an agent- the president can’t restrict their own authority**

**Hawkins et al, 5** (Darren, professor of law at Brigham Young, Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, <http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/papers/INTRO%20HLNT%20July%2031.pdf>

The relations between a principal and an agent are always governed by a con-tract,1 even if this agreement is implicit (never formally acknowledged) or informal (based on an unwritten agreement). **To be a principal, an actor must be able to both grant authority and rescind it**. The mere ability to terminate a contract does not make an actor a principal. Congress can impeach a president, and thereby remove him from office, but this power does not make Congress the principal of the president as we define it. Alternatively, **Congress can authorize the president to decide policy on its behalf in a specific issue area** – for example, to design environmental regulations – **and then later revoke that authority if it disapproves of the president’s policies. In this case, the Congress is indeed the principal of the president. To be principals, actors must both grant and have the power to revoke authority.**

**OFF**

**the aff creates a legacy chain which devastates prez power**

**Paul ‘8**

Christopher, Senior Social Scientist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School Pittsburgh Office Education Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. in sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, “US Presidential War Powers: Legacy Chains in Military Intervention Decisionmaking\* ,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Sep., 2008), pp. 665-679

Legacy Chains

Finegold & Skocpol (1995: 222) describe policy legacies: Past and present policies are connected in at least three different ways. First, **past policies give rise to analogies that affect how public officials think about contemporary policy issues.** Second, **past policies suggest lessons that help us to understand the processes by which contemporary policies are formulated and implemented and by which the conse quences** **of contemporary policies will be determined.** Third, **past policies** **impose limi tations** **that reduce the range of policy choices available as responses to contemporary problems.** All three of the ways in which they connect past policy to present policy can be viewed as changes in the institutional context in which policy is made. **These legacies are institutionalized in two different ways: first, through changes in formal rules or procedures,** **and** second, in the **'taken for granteds'**, 'schemas', **and accepted wisdom of policy makers** and ordinary citizens alike (Sewell, 1992: 1-29). While a policy or event can leave multiple legacies, it often leaves a single major legacy. For example, **the W**ar **P**owers **R**esolution for mally **changed** the **relationship between the president and the congress with regard to war-making and the deployment of troops**. **Subsequent military interventions were influenced by this change** and have, in turn, left their own legacy (legal scholars might call it **precedent**) as a link in that chain. Legacy chains can be modified, trans formed, or reinforced as they step through each 'link' in the chain. As another example, US involvement in Vietnam left a legacy in the sphere of press/military relations which affected the intervention in Grenada in 1983 (the press was completely excluded for the first 48 hours of the operation). The press legacy chain begun in Vietnam also affected the Panama invasion of 1989 (a press pool was activated, in country, but excluded from the action), but the legacy had been trans formed slightly by the Grenada invasion (the press pool system itself grew out of complaint regarding press exclusion in Grenada) (Paul & Kim, 2004). **Because of the different ways in which policy legacies are institutionalized, some legacies have unintended institutional conse quences.** The War Powers Resolution was intended to curtail presidential war-making powers and return some authority to the con gress. In practice, the joint resolution failed to force presidents to include congressional participation in their intervention decision making, but it had the unintended conse quence of forcing them to change the way they planned interventions to comply with the letter of the law (see the extended ex ample presented later in the article).1

**\*strong executive solves warming- increasing congressional strength trades off**

**Wold 2012**

[Chris Wold, Professor of Law & Director, International Environmental Law Project

(IELP), 2012, Lewis & Clark Law School, 2012, CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45·2012]

In 2007, then-Senator Barack **Obama wrote, “As the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases, America has the responsibility to lead.”1 As President, he has led.** At the domestic level, working primarily through the Environmental Protection Agency, President Obama has increased fuel economy standards,2 imposed new limits ongreenhouse gas emissions from “major emitting facilities,”3 and imposed limits on emissions relating to the development of oil and gas,4 among many other things.5 As he has said, **he must use his executive power because “We Can’t Wait” for Congress to act on climate change.6 Nonetheless, he must do more.** President **Obama has pledged to the international community that the United States will reduce its greenhouse gases by 17% of 2005 levels by 2020** and by 83% by 2050.7The President has also set a goal of ensuring that “[b]y 2035 we will generate 80 percent of our electricity from a diverse set of clean energy sources—including renewable energy sources like wind, solar, biomass, and hydropower; nuclear power; efficient natural gas; and clean coal.”8 None of his actions come close to meeting these goals. Moreover, **he must do more to help the international community reach its goal of keeping average global temperatures from increasing 2°C** above pre-industrial levels.9 Many **scientists argue that the 2°C goal can be met, and the worst impacts of climate change avoided,** if we keep carbon dioxide concentrations below 350 parts per million (ppm).10 As of July 2012, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide exceeded 394 ppm.11 **The United States is by far the largest historic contributor** to these high levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide, having contributed 28.52% of carbon dioxide from energy.12 As such**, the United States must do much more to ensure that the world’s largest historic emitter of greenhouse gases fulfills its moral and perhaps legal obligation to reduce greenhouse gases before we reach climate change tipping points**

 **beyond which climate change will be irreversible for millennia** to come.And indeed, President **Obama can do much more**. As described below**, the president can use his foreign affairs power to take a more positive role on the international stage**, **whether that stage is the climate change negotiations, the negotiations concerning other international treaties, or within the World Trade Organization. He can also do more with his executive power**, **not only by increasing existing standards but also by applying them to existing sources of greenhouse gases**, not just new sources. Further, President **Obama has so far failed to take advantage of strategies to mitigate emissions of short-term climate forcers** such as black carbon that could provide significant climate benefits. Lastly, **the approaches adopted so far have not pushed regulated entities or others to develop the transformative technologies that will be needed to deliver sufficient climate change benefits to avert the environmental and economic crisis that lies ahead** if we fail to take more aggressive action.

**Warming casues massive structural violence and risks extinction**

**Costello 11** (Anthony, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Mark Maslin, Department of Geography, University College London, Hugh Montgomery, Institute for Human Health and Performance, University College London, Anne M. Johnson, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Paul Ekins, Energy Institute, University College London [“Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action” May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942 1866-1882 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society)

Advocacy about the health consequences will ensure that climate change is a high priority. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change was set up in 1992 to ensure that nations worked together to minimize the adverse effects, but McMichael and Neira noted that, in preparation for the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, only four of 47 nations mentioned human health as a consideration [1]. With business as usual, **global warming** caused by rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions **will threaten mass populations through increased transmission of** some **infections, heat stress, food and water insecurity, increased deaths from more frequent and extreme climate events, threats to shelter and security, and through population migration** [2]. On the one hand it is necessary in the media to counter climate change sceptics and denialists, but on the other it is also important not to allow climate catastrophists, who tell us it is all too late, to deflect us from pragmatic and positive action. Catastrophic scenarios are possible in the longer term, and effective action will be formidably difficult, but evidence suggests that we do have the tools, the time and the resources to bring about the changes needed for climate stability. 2. Climate change evidence and denial Given the current body of evidence, it is surprising that global warming and its causal relationship with atmospheric GHG pollution is disputed any more than the relationship between acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, or lung cancer and cigarette smoking. The basic principles that determine the Earth’s temperature are, of course, relatively simple. Some of the short-wave solar radiation that strikes the Earth is reflected back into space and some is absorbed by the land and emitted as long-wave radiation (heat). Some of the long-wave radiation is trapped in the atmosphere by ‘greenhouse gases’, which include water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane. Without GHGs the Earth would be on average 33◦C colder. Over the last 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution, humans have been adding more carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. The result is that the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean and land are indeed warming—due to increased atmospheric ‘greenhouse gas’ concentrations [3]. Gleick et al. [4], from the US National Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter to Science stating ‘There is compelling, comprehensive, and consistent objective evidence that humans are changing the climate in ways that threaten our societies and the ecosystems on which we depend’. The most recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [5], amounting to nearly 3000 pages of detailed review and analysis of published research, also declares that the scientific uncertainties of global warming are essentially resolved. This report states that there is clear evidence for a 0.75◦C rise in global temperatures and 22 cm rise in sea level during the twentieth century. The IPCC synthesis also predicts that global temperatures could rise further by between 1.1◦C and 6.4◦C by 2100, and **sea level could rise by between 28 and 79 cm**, or more if the melting of Greenland and Antarctica accelerates. In addition, weather patterns will become less predictable and the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, heat waves and droughts, will increase. **There is also strong evidence for ocean acidification** driven by more carbon dioxide dissolving in the oceans [6]. Given the current failure of international negotiations to address carbon emission reductions, and that atmospheric warming lags behind rises in CO2 concentration, there is concern that global surface temperature will rise above the supposedly ‘safe limit’ of 2◦C within this century. Each doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration alone is expected to produce 1.9–4.5◦C of warming at equilibrium [7]. Of course, climate modelling is an extremely complex process, and uncertainty with projections relating to future emissions trajectories means that the time scale and magnitude of future climate change cannot be predicted with certainty [8]. These uncertainties are magnified when future climate predictions are used to estimate potential impacts. For example, the environmental impacts of **climate change** are also uncertain, but could underestimate such impacts because they **detrimentally interact with habitat loss, pollution and loss of biodiversity** due to other causes. There is also the additional problem that switching from biome to biome may not be directly reversible. For example, rainforest recycles a huge amount of water so it can survive a significant amount of aridification before it burns and is replaced by savannah. But the region then has to get much wetter before rainforest can return, as there is greatly reduced water cycling in savannah [9]. In the policy arena, further uncertainty surrounds the desire for international agreements on emission cuts, and the possible routes to such agreement and implementation. The feasible speed of technological innovation in carbon capture and provision of renewable/low-carbon energy resources is also uncertain. Denying the causes or the current weight of evidence for anthropogenic climate change is irrational, just as the existence of ‘uncertainties’ should not be used to deny the need for proportionate action, when such uncertainties could underestimate the risks and impact of climate change. There is no reason for inaction and there are many ways we can use our current knowledge of climate change to improve health provision for current and future generations. 3. Catastrophism At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10]. We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous– Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. **Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions** [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16]. Some people have even suggested that **human extinction may not be a remote risk** [17–19]. **Sherwood & Huber** [7] **point to continued heating effects that could make the world largely uninhabitable by humans and mammals** within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31◦C. They suggest that **if it rose to 35◦C,** which never happens now but would at a warming of 7◦C, **hyperthermia in humans and other mammals would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible**, therefore **making many environments uninhabitable**.

**OFF**

**restricting authority causes circumvention- creates a huge fight**

**Lobel 8**—Professor of Law @ University of Pittsburgh [Jules Lobel, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War,” **Ohio State Law Journal**, Vol. 69, 2008, pg. 391]

The critical difficulty with a contextual approach is its inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity, which tends to sharply shift the balance of power in favor of a strong President acting in disregard of congressional will. For example, the application of the Feldman and Issacharoff test asking whether the **congressional restriction** makes realistic sense in the modern world **would yield no coherent separation of powers answer if applied to the** current **Administration’s confrontation with Congress. It would undoubtedly** **embolden the President to ignore Congress’s strictures**. **The President’s advisors would argue that the** McCain Amendment’s ban on cruel and inhumane treatment, or FISA’s **requirement** of a warrant, **does not make realistic sense in the context of the contemporary realities of the war on terror** in which we face a shadowy, ruthless nonstate enemy that has no respect for laws or civilized conduct, a conclusion hotly disputed by those opposed to the President’s policies. Focusing the debate over whether Congress has the power to control the treatment of detainees on the President’s claim that the modern realities of warfare require a particular approach will merge the separation of powers inquiry of who has the power with the political determination of what the policy ought to be. **Such an approach is likely to encourage the President to ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments whenever he or she believes that a statute does not make realistic sense—that is, when it conflicts with a policy the President embraces**. 53¶ The contextual approach has a “zone of twilight” quality that Justice Jackson suggested in Youngstown. 54 Often **constitutional norms matter less than political realities**—**wartime reality often favors a strong President who will overwhelm both Congress and the courts**. While it is certainly correct— as Jackson noted—that neither the Court nor the Constitution will preserve separation of powers where Congress is too politically weak to assert its authority, **a** fluid **contextual approach is an invitation to Presidents to push** **beyond the constitutional boundaries of their powers and ignore legislative enactments that seek to restrict their wartime authority**.¶ Moreover, **another** substantial **problem** with a contextual approach in the war powers context **is that the judiciary is unlikely to resolve the dispute**. 55 The **persistent refusal of the judiciary to adjudicate the constitutionality of the W**ar **P**owers **R**esolution **strongly suggests that courts will often refuse to intervene to resolve disputes between the President and Congress over the constitutionality of a statute that a President claims impermissibly interferes with her conduct of an ongoing war**. 56 **This result leaves the political branches to engage in a**n **intractable dispute over the statute’s constitutionality that saps the nation’s energy, diverts focus** from the political issues in dispute, **and endangers the rule of law**.¶ Additionally, **in wartime it is often important for issues relating to the exercise of war powers to be resolved quickly**. Prompt action is not usually the forte of the judiciary. ¶ If, however, a constitutional consensus exists or could be consolidated that Congress has the authority to check the President’s conduct of warfare, that consensus might help embolden future Congresses to assert their power. Such a consensus might also help prevent the **crisis, chaos, and stalemate** that **may result when the two branches assert competing constitutional positions and**, as a practical matter, **judicial review is unavailable to resolve the dispute**.¶ Moreover, **the** adoption of a contextual, realist **approach will undermine rather than aid the cooperation and compromise between the political branches that is so essential to success in wartime**. In theory, an unclear, ambiguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch uncertain of its legal authority could further compromise and cooperation. However, **modern social science research suggests that** the opposite occurs. 57 **Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects or factors within the ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position. This self-serving bias hardens each side’s position and allows the dispute to drag on, as has happened with** the ongoing, unresolved **dispute over the constitutionality of the W**ar **P**owers **R**esolution. Pg. 407-409

**The impact is great power war**

**Haass 13** (Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, “What is the effect of U.S. domestic political gridlock on international relations?” http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/effect-us-domestic-political-gridlock-international-relations/p30725)

There is a well-known adage that politics stops at the water's edge, but this tends to be more hope than reality. **American history is filled with examples in which political disagreement at home has made it difficult for the United States to act, much less lead, abroad**. **Division within Congress or between the legislative and executive branches can make it impossible for individuals to be placed in senior positions.** **Such divisions can also make it impossible to conclude treaties, appropriate funds for foreign assistance, or pass specific reforms**, **such as the current proposed reform for immigration policy.** **A lack of consensus also can undermine investment in the foundations of American power**, **from resources for defense and diplomacy to education and infrastructure**. **Gridlock** at home **can** also **work against the ability of the U**nited **S**tates **to set an example that other societies will want to emulate.** And **it makes the U**nited **S**tates **less predictable, something that can unnerve allies and others who depend on this country**, **and embolden adversaries**. **All this tends to contribute to global disorder**—one reason I titled my new book Foreign Policy Begins at Home.

**OFF**

**Plan causes a drone shift which is modelled globally**

**RUSSIA TODAY**, “US Targeted Drone Killings Used as Alternative to Guantanamo Bay—Bush Lawyer,” 5—3—**13**, <http://rt.com/usa/obama-using-drones-avoid-gitmo-747/>

**A lawyer** who was **influential in the United States’ adoption of unmanned aircraft has spoken out against** the **Obama** administration **for** what he perceives as **using drones as an alternative to capturing suspects and sending them to Guantanamo** Bay prison camp. John **Bellinger**, the Bush administration attorney **who drafted the initial legal specifications regarding drone killings** after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, **said that Bush’s successor has abused the framework**, skirting international law for political points. **“This government has decided that instead of detaining members of Al-Qaeda** [at Guantanamo Bay prison camp in Cuba] **they are going to kill them**,” Bellinger told a conference at the Bipartisan Policy Center, as quoted by The Guardian. Earlier this week **Obama promised to reignite efforts to close Guantanamo** Bay, where prisoners have gone on a hunger strike to protest human rights violations and wrongful incarcerations. They were his first in-depth remarks on the subject since 2009, when Obama had just recently been elected to office after campaigning on a promise to close the facility. **But international law is equally suspect of drone strikes**. Almost 5,000 people are thought to have been killed by roughly 300 US attacks in four countries, according to The Guardian. Bellinger maintained that the government has justified strikes throughout Pakistan and Yemen by using the 'War on Terror' as an excuse. “We are about the only country in the world that thinks we are in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda,” he said. “We really need to get on top of this and explain to our allies why it is legal and why it is permissible under international law." “These **drone strikes are causing us great damage in the world, but on the other hand if you are the president and you do nothing to stop another 9/11 then you also have a problem,**” he added. Of the 166 detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 86 have been cleared for release by a commission made up of officials from the Department of Homeland Security, Joint Chiefs of Staff and other influential government divisions. **White House officials have justified the use of unmanned aircraft by saying the US is at war with Al-Qaeda** and that those targeted in drone attacks were planning attacks on America. I**n the future, experts say, future countries could use the same rationale to explain their own attacks**. “Countries under attack are the ones that get to decide whether or not they are at war,” said Philip Zelikow, a member of the White House Intelligence Advisory Board. While the conversation around drones is certainly a sign of things to come, Hina Shamsi of the American Civil Liberties Union encouraged Americans to think about the human rights issues posed by the new technology. It could be another long process, if the Guantanamo Bay handling is any indication. “The use of this technology is spreading and we have to think about what we would say if other countries used drones for targeted killing programs,” Shamsi said. “**Few things are more likely to undermine our legitimacy than the perception that we are not abiding by the rule of law or are indifferent to civilian casualties**.”

**\*drones strikes cause massive civilian deaths and psychic violence**

**Stanford Human Rights Clinic**, “Living under Drones: death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) and Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of 9—**12**, http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf

First, while civilian casualties are rarely acknowledged by the US government, there is significant evidence that US **drone strikes have injured and killed civilians**. In public statements, the US states that there have been “no” or “single digit” civilian casualties.”2 **It is difficult to obtain data on strike casualties because of US efforts to shield the drone program from democratic accountability**, compounded by the obstacles to independent investigation of strikes in North Waziristan. The best currently available public aggregate data on drone strikes are provided by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organization. TBIJ reports that **from June 2004 through midSeptember 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan**, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children.3 TBIJ reports that these **strikes also injured an additional 1,228-1,362 individuals**. **Where media accounts do report civilian casualties, rarely is any information provided about the victims or the communities they leave behind**. This report includes the harrowing narratives of many survivors, witnesses, and family members who provided evidence of civilian injuries and deaths in drone strikes to our research team. It also presents detailed accounts of three separate strikes, for which there is evidence of civilian deaths and injuries, including a March 2011 strike on a meeting of tribal elders that killed some 40 individuals. Second, **US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury**.

**Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning**. **Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities**. **Those living under drones have to face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims**. **Some community members shy away from gathering in groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution bodies, out of fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school.** Waziris told our researchers that the **strikes have undermined cultural and religious practices related to burial, and made family members afraid to attend funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in drone strikes now struggle to support themselves**.

**OFF**

**situating the political in the discursive/symbolic trades off with material change and makes class analysis impossible**

**Cloud** (Prof of Comm at Texas) **01**

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm]

 At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). **We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomen**a. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them**. In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure** at the level of the economy and the state. **It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformatio**n even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. **At the core of the issue is a debate** across the humanities and social sciences with regard to **whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment** in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, **there is a great deal of evidence against claims** that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, **both class polarization** (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) **and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism** (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) **still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts**. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in **the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor** in the U.S. (as well as **around the world) continued to grow,** **in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates**. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8**). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation** and progressive critical practice **in fact encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and** perhaps **revolutionary potential. I**

**nstead**, on their arguments, **we must** recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and **settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism.** Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn**: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases** they themselves **are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world**" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. **The point**, though, **is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other**. Marxist ideology critique, understands that **classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics** wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. **Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.** [cont’d] [cont;d] Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). **Within this understanding**, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: **Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said,** into the silences and the suppressed or missing, **in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details** and representations **of our lives**. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, **materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--**specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges**. (p. 7)

**Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural criticism that is the 1NC.**

**one must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—only the alt’s method produces change** grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humynize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Any **effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue **that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that **the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (**which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all **determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism** which

h is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. **All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois** left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable,** more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced** by the human mind and is thus free from the **actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.**

**case answers**

**Discourse Ans: 1NC**

**Discourse doesn’t shape policy making – doesn’t create change**

**Walt 13** ([Stephen M. Walt](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/author/Stephen%20M.%20Walt), is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “[Empty words](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/25/empty_words),” March 25, 2013, Foreign Policy, Realist In an Ideological Age) GANGEEZY

And therein lies the test of competing theories. There is a broad **school of thought** in international relations -- often labeled "social constructivism" -- which **maintains** that **discourse can be of** tremendous **importance in shaping** the **conduct of** **states**. In this view, how leaders talk and how intellectualswrite gradually shapes how we all think, and over time these discursive **activities can exert a tremendous influence on norms,** identities, and perceptions of what is right and what is possible. It is this view of the world that President Obama was channeling during his trip. By telling Israelis that he loved them and by telling both Israelis and Palestinians that the latter had just as much right to a state as the former, he was hoping to mold hearts and minds and convince them -- through logic and reason -- to end their century-old conflict. And make no mistake: He was saying that peace would require a powerful and increasingly wealthy Israel to make generous concessions, because the Palestinians have hardly anything more to give up. As Churchill put it, "in victory, magnanimity." Discourse does matter in some circumstances, of course, and perhaps Obama's words will prompt some deep soul-searching within the Israeli political establishment. But there is another broad family of IR theories -- the realist family -- and it maintains that what matters most in politics is power and how it is applied. In this view, national **leaders** often **say** lots of **things they don't** really **mean, or they say things they mean but** then **fail to follow through on because** doing **so would be politically costly.** From this perspective, **words sometimes** inspire and may **change a few minds on occasion, but they are rarely enough to overcome deep** and bitter **conflicts.** No matter how well-written or delivered, a speech cannot divert whole societies from a well-established course of action. **Policies in motion tend to remain in motion; to change** the **trajectory** of a deeply**-entrenched set of initiatives requires** the **application of political forces of equal momentum.** For realists like me, in short, halting a colonial enterprise that has been underway for over forty years will require a lot more than wise and well-intentioned words. Instead, it would require the exercise of power. Just as raw power eventually convinced most Palestinians that Israel's creation was not going to be reversed, Israelis must come to realize that denying Palestinians a state of their own is going to have real consequences. Although Obama warned that the occupation was preventing Israel from gaining full acceptance in the world, he also made it clear that Israelis could count on the United States to insulate them as much as possible from the negative effects of their own choices. Even at the purely rhetorical level, in short, Obama's eloquent words sent a decidedly mixed message. Because **power is more important than mere rhetoric,** it won't take long before Obama's visit is just another memory. The settlements will keep expanding, East Jerusalem will be cut off from the rest of the West Bank, the Palestinians will remain stateless, and Israel will continue on its self-chosen path to apartheid. And in the end, Obama will have proven to be no better a friend to Israel or the Palestinians than any of his predecessors. All of them claimed to oppose the occupation, but none of them ever did a damn thing to end it. And one of Obama's successors will eventually have to confront the cold fact that two states are no longer a realistic possibility. What will he or she say then?

**Their arguments are tautological—if true, all their ev is subject to cognitive bias**

**Rodwell 5** (Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of ‘neo-cons’ and Second Cold War, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

Next, **discourse analysis** as practiced **exists within an enormous logical cul-de-sac**. Born of the original premise that **each discours**e and explanation **has it’s own realities**, **what results is a theoretical approach in which a critique is** actually **impossible** **because** by post-structural logic **a critique can only operate within it’s own discursive structure and on it’s own terms**. If things only exist within specific languages and discourse you must share the basic premises of that discourse to be able to say anything about it. But **what** useful **criticisms can you make if you share fundamental assumptions**? Moreover remembering the much argued for normative purposes of **Jackson’s** case he **talks about the effects of naturalizing language and without blushing criticises the dangerous anti-terror rhetoric** of George W. **Bush**. **The** only **problem is Jackson** has **attempted to illustrate that what is moral or immoral depends on the values and structures of each discourse**. Therefore why should a reader believe Richard Jackson’s idea of right and wrong any more than George W. Bush’s? Fundamentally **if he wishes to maintain that each discourse is specific to each intellectual framework Jackson cannot criticise at all. By his own epistemological rules if he is inside those discourses he shares their assumptions, outside they make no sense** What actually occurs then is an aporia - a logical contraction where a works own stated epistemological premises rob it of the ability to contain any critical force. **Such arguments are caught between the desire to maintain that all discursive practices construct their own truths,** **in which case critiques are not possible as they are merely one of countless possible discursive truths with no actually reason to take then seriously, or an appeal to material reality, but again the entire premises of post structural linguistics rejects the idea of a material reality.**[vii] In **starting from a premise that it is not possible to neutrally describe the real world, the result is that without that real world, discourse analysis actually has nothing to say. The issue of the material real world, or ‘evidence’ is** actually **the issue at the heart of the weakness of post-structural discourse analysis**, **though it does hold the potential to at least rescue some of it’s usefulness.** The problem is simple, in that **the only way Jackson or any post-structuralist can operationalise their argument is with an appeal to material evidence**. But by the logic of discourse analysis there is no such thing as neutral ‘evidence’. **To square this circle many post-struturalist writers do seem to hint at complexity a**nd what post-structural culturalists might call ‘intertextuality’, arguing for ‘favouring a complexity of interactions’ **rather than ‘linear causality’**[viii]. The implication is that language is just one of an endless web of factors and surely this prompts one to pursue an understanding of these links. However, **to do so would dangerously undermine the entire post-structural project as again, if there are discoverable links between factors**, then **there are material facts that are identifiable regardless of language.** Consequently, **rather than seeking to understand the links between factors what seems to happen is hands are thrown up in despair as the search for complexity is dropped as quickly as it is picked up.** **The result is one-dimensional arguments that again can say little.** This is evident in Jackson’s approach as he details how words have histories and moreover are part of a dialectic process in which ‘they not only shape social structures but are also shaped by them’.[ix] However we do not then see any discussion of whether, therefore, **it is not discourse that is the powerful tool but the effect of the history and the social structure itself.** Throughout Jackson’s argument it is a top down process in which discourse disciplines society to follow the desire of the dominant, but **here is an instance of a dialectic process where society may actually be the originating force, allowing the discourse in turn to actually to be more powerful.** However we simply see no exploration of this potential dialectic process, merely the suggestion it exists.

**They tradeoff with politics**

**Taft-Kaufman, 95 -** Professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, Central Michigan University – 1995 (Jill, “Other ways: Postmodernism and performance praxis,”  [The Southern Communication Journal](http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?RQT=318&pmid=17630&TS=1184952735&clientId=17822&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD), Vol.60, Iss. 3;  pg. 222)

In its elevation of language to the primary analysis of social life and its relegation of the de-centered subject to a set of language positions, postmodernism ignores the way real people make their way in the world. While the notion of decentering does much to remedy the idea of an essential, unchanging self, it also presents problems. According to Clarke (1991): Having established the material quality of ideology, everything else we had hitherto thought of as material has disappeared. There is nothing outside of ideology (or discourse). Where Althusser was concerned with ideology as the imaginary relations of subjects to the real relations of their existence, the connective quality of this view of ideology has been dissolved because it lays claim to an outside, a real, an extra-discursive for which there exists no epistemological warrant without lapsing back into the bad old ways of empiricism or metaphysics. (pp. 25-26) Clarke explains how the same disconnection between the discursive and the extra-discursive has been performed in semiological analysis: Where it used to contain a relation between the signifier (the representation) and the signified (the referent), antiempiricism has taken the formal arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and signified and replaced it with the abolition of the signified (there can be no real objects out there, because there is no out there for real objects to be). (p. 26) To the postmodernist, then, real objects have vanished. So, too, have real people. Smith (1988) suggests that postmodernism has canonized doubt about the availability of the referent to the point that "the real often disappears from consideration" (p. 159). Real individuals become abstractions. Subject positions rather than subjects are the focus. The emphasis on subject positions or construction of the discursive self engenders an accompanying critical sense of irony which recognizes that "all conceptualizations are limited" (Fischer, 1986, p. 224). This postmodern position evokes what Connor (1989) calls "an absolute weightlessness in which anything is imaginatively possible because nothing really matters" (p. 227). Clarke (1991) dubs it a "playfulness that produces emotional and/or political disinvestment: a refusal to be engaged" (p. 103). The luxury of being able to muse about what constitutes the self is a posture in keeping with a critical venue that divorces language from material objects and bodily subjects.

**Util**

**Default to consequences—anything else is tautological and irrational**

Joshua **Greene**, Associate Professor, Harvard University, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” 20**10**, www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf

What turn-of-the-millennium **science is telling us** is that human **moral judgment is not** a pristine **rational** enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely** that **there is any** rationally **coherent** normative moral **theory that can accommodate** our **moral intuitions**. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood whatKant and like-minded deontologists are all about. **Deontology,** they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology **is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. **But this** insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it **defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively** **deontological**, t

hough they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and** **refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being** in the decision-making process. Likewise, **a consequentialist** attempts to **act according to reasons that rational creatures can share** by acting according to principles **that give equal weight to everyone's interests**, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask** a deontologically-minded person **why it's wrong to push someone** in front of speeding trolley in order **to save five** others, you will getcharacteristically deontological **answers.** Some **will be tautological:** "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

**Case: Fadel—1NC**

**Overall commitment to public reason and coalition building between Islamic thought and liberalism are the only methods to remove concepts of Muslims as an imminent threat**

**Fadel ’07** (Mohammad, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto, The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=977206>)

The need to replace the “conflict of civilizations” paradigm with a more analytically neutral framework in discussions regarding Islam and liberalism is especially pressing in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. The growing presence of Muslims in Canada, the United States and Western Europe has continued to generate various policies that target, directly or indirectly, Muslim populations, in no small part because Muslim populations are viewed as “dangerous.” Exploring how Muslims can participate in an overlapping consensus may help dissipate the suspicion that is currently focused on Muslim minorities living in constitutional democracies. Indeed, alarmists might even argue that “special” rules are needed to deal with this civilizational “threat.” At the same time, to the extent that liberalism can be viewed as sharing many fundamental values with Islam – despite their ultimate philosophical incompatibility – many stereotypes Muslims have about liberalism would also dissipate. The fate of Islam in Western democracies, however, has not been the only casualty of the “war on terrorism”: liberalism has found itself under increasing attack as irrelevant to a world in which, we are told, terrorists can threaten death and destruction on the scale of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Ironically, political realities created by the “war on terrorism” have created conditions – perhaps for the first time in the last two hundred years – in which both liberals and Muslims have a mutual interest in effecting a meaningful rapprochement.

**Islamic conceptions of law are consistent with the norms and basis of public reason**

**Fadel ’08** (Mohammad, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto, Public Reason as a Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law and International Human Rights, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1)

An exercise in reconciling Islamic law to public reason would be futile but for the fact that the bulk of substantive Islamic law is generally consistent with notions of public reason. For example, the legal doctrines set forth in the numerous treatises that pre-modern Muslim jurists wrote describing the rules governing the conduct of the state and the judiciary generally are consistent with notions such as: (i) the government is the agent of the governed and therefore exists to further the welfare of the ruled; (ii) individuals are rights-bearers whose rights cannot be infringed without due process of law; (iii) mature individuals have the legal capacity to direct their affairs autonomously without the interference of the state or others; (iv) parties to a judicial proceedings must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard, a right that includes the right to present evidence and impeach the other party’s evidence; (v) judges must be neutral and disinterested and are to rule based on evidence admitted pursuant to general rules of evidence rather than their personal knowledge of the case; (vi) government agents are subject to the law; and (vii) the government may not take private property except for a permitted purpose and with compensation to the owner. Similarly, Islamic private law, while perhaps obsolete, is generally non-discriminatory and therefore already consistent with public reason.This much is, or ought to be, non-controversial.

**Islamophobia Ans: 1NC**

**Your epistemology is wrong – the Islamophobia claims are too sweeping and the West isn’t inevitably tainted**

**Joppke 9**, professor of politics – American University of Paris, PhD Sociology – Berkeley

(Christian, “Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and Her Muslims,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Volume 35, Issue 3)

**The** Runnymede **report defines Islamophobia as certain ‘closed’ views of Islam**, which are **distinguished from ‘open views’ in terms of** eight **binary oppositions, such as ‘monolithic/diverse’, ‘separate/interacting’, or ‘inferior/different’** (the first adjective always marking a ‘closed’, the second an ‘open’ view). **This makes for an elastic definition of Islamophobia, with little that could not be packed into it.** Consider the eighth binary opposition, ‘Criticism of West rejected/considered’. **If ‘criticisms made by Islam of “The West**” (**are**) **rejected out of hand’, there is an instance of Islamophobia**, the non-biased attitude being that ‘criticisms of “the West” and other cultures are considered and debated’. Is it reasonable to assume that people enter debate by putting their point of view to disposition? **Under such demanding standards, only an advocate of Habermasian communicative rationality would go free of the charge of Islamophobia.** However, the real problem is to leave unquestioned the exit position, ‘criticism of the West’. **In being sweeping and undifferentiated, such a stance seems to be no less phobic than the incriminated opposite.** If the point of the Runnymede report is to ‘counter Islamophobic assumptions that Islam is a single monolithic system’, **it seems inconsistent to take for granted a** similarly **monolithic ‘criticism of “the West”’, which the ‘West’ is asked to ‘consider and debate’**. **There is a double standard here**, in that ‘**the West’ is asked to swallow what on the other side would qualify as phobia.**

## 2NC

### link

#### Legitimacy concerns lock in a culture of restrictions on Executive power

Paul ‘8

Christopher, Senior Social Scientist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School Pittsburgh Office Education Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. in sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, “US Presidential War Powers: Legacy Chains in Military Intervention Decisionmaking\* ,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Sep., 2008), pp. 665-679

The Institutional Context 'Institution' is used quite inclusively in this article. Following Nee & Ingram (1998: 19), 'An institution is a web of interrelated norms ? formal and informal ? governing social relationships' (emphasis in original).For military intervention decisions, these institutions include not only the formal organizations and departments of the gov ernment, but also the basic building blocks of the policy formation process: the laws gov erning who participates in the policy process and the procedures that must be followed. More subtle factors in policy formation are also institutionalized: the relationships between different policy participants (for ex ample, the congress and the White House, or the press and the military), taken for granted normative categories such as isolationism vs. interventionism, and the range of policies that are considered 'legitimate' by the elec torate and by other nations. The preferences, capabilities, and basic self-identities of indi viduals are conditioned by these institutional structures; if these individuals are part of the policymaking process, they can affect policy (Haney, 1997: 17). All actors are constrained by existing political institutions (Mann, 1993: 52). These institutions create and constitute the context (writ large) in which policy is made. The changes in the institutional contexts that constitute policy legacies tend to be of two different types. The first type of in stitutional legacy is a formal change in rules, structure, organization, or procedure. The second type is an informal institutional change, perhaps a change in the broad taken-for-granted logics that inform decision making. This could include changes in institu tionalized preferences, perceptions, informal rules, and 'sch?mas' (Sewell, 1992: 1-29). The most important difference between the two has to do with how the legacy comes about. Changes in taken-for-granted logics and schemas involve subtle shifts in perceptions based on demonstrated challenges to previously held assumptions or beliefs. These changes may or may not be undertaken consciously and reflexively, but they are certainly not something that is discussed and decided on; rather, they are a product of collective logic, sense, and unspoken consensus. For example, prior to President Truman's commitment of US forces to combat in Korea without congressional permission or a declaration of war, the division of powers laid down in the Constitution was assumed to be a sufficient protection of the various branches of the government s prerogatives with regarding to war-making. After Korea, such protections were less taken for granted and more contested, ultimately resulting in a formal institutional change: the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Such formal organizational institutional legacies, on the other hand, are the product of active decisionmaking and are codified in rule or law. As the product of a decision making process, these are 'intended' changes, and, if the language formalizing the change is not precisely aligned with its intentions, unintended institutional consequences can result. A case in point: the War Powers Re solution has not so much retilted the balance of power over war-making toward congress as placed artificial institutional constraints (time limits, reporting requirements) on how presidents plan and launch military interventions.

#### The aff turns the tide in war powers authority --- prevents continued expansion of executive power

FCNL 8, Friends Committee on National Legislation, the 501(c)(4) lobbying organization of the Religion Society of Friends (Quakers), October, “Reclaiming the Balance of Power: An Agenda for the 111th Congress,” Washington Newsletter No. 731, http://fcnl.org/assets/pubs/newsletter/2008/October.pdf

Pendulums swing by their nature, but sometimes they swing too far in one direction and need a push to return to balance. For several decades, the pendulum of power in the federal government has been swinging toward the president; in the past eight years, the president’s powers have reached unprecedented heights. The last two presidents have taken more power for themselves, but Congress has also ceded significant power to the executive branch. The 111th Congress has the opportunity to restore the balance. When members take their seats in January, reclaiming their constitutionally granted power to check the executive should be at the top of the agenda. Power Balanced by Design The framers of the Constitution had balance of power on their minds when they designed the U.S. government. They had recently rebelled against a monarchy with near total power over the people. Based on this experience, the framers limited specific government powers, such as compelling citizens to house soldiers in their homes, searching and seizing private property, and imposing taxes without a democratic process. The framers also structured the U.S. government to catch and prevent these kinds of abuses. They gave independent powers to the three branches of government — executive, legislative, and judicial — but they instituted mechanisms allowing the other branches to limit and balance these powers. In the first three words of the Constitution, “We the People,” the framers recognized a fourth branch of government to check the other three: the civil society. Unlike monarchs, U.S. presidents cannot act alone to commit their countries to war, empty their national treasuries, and impose new taxes on the citizenry to finance military adventures. Presidents can make treaties with other nations, and in time of war a president serves as commander in chief of the armed forces. Constitutionally, only Congress can formally declare war, “raise and support armies,” and increase taxes or otherwise fund a war. Maintaining these divisions is not easy. In the past 200 years, presidents have committed troops to military combat dozens of times without a formal declaration of war, and Congress has voted to cut off funding for war on only a few occasions. In the past eight years, Congress has failed to exercise adequate oversight of executive actions and uphold the Constitution in several areas. Most recently, President George W. Bush has defended the torture of prisoners held by the United States, denied prisoners the right to appeal their detention, and permitted spying on people in the United States without a warrant. Congress has turned a blind eye or acquiesced to the president’s requests to legalize his administration’s actions. The 111th Congress should reclaim its power on our behalf. In the mid-1970s, Congress passed laws to correct a pendulum of power that had swung too far toward the executive. The Congress that takes office in 2009 should do the same.

### warm reps

#### Our warmings representations are good and telling it like it is iskey to motivate action – coupling apocalyptic rhetoric with concrete solutions in a debate solves their offense

**Moser** **and Dilling 11** (Susanne E, Ph.D., Director and Principal Researcher of Susanne Moser Research & Consulting in CA, a Social Science Research Fellow at the Woods Institute for the Environment at Stanford University and a Research Associate at the University of California-Santa Cruz Institute for Marine Sciences and Lisa, Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, a Fellow of the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES) and a member of the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Colorado, “COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: CLOSING THE SCIENCE-ACTION GAP”, http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication\_files/2011.30.pdf)

Clearly these findings pose difficult dilemmas for communicators: Should we avoid telling whatscientists have established as facts and reasonable outlooks about the seriousness, pace, and long-term commitment of climate change? Should we instead only discuss energy- and money-saving actions and convey pictures of hope by focusing on the easy actions, the ‘doability’ of mitigation? Should we perpetuate the idea that there are fifty ‘simple ways to save the planet,’ just to spare lay publics rather appropriate anxiety? Existing research suggests otherwise. While neither alarmism nor Pollyannaism seem to yield desired results, wise integration of strategies may well result in greater engagement. First, communication that affirms rather than threatens the sense of self and basic worldviews held by the audience has been shown to create a greater openness to risk information (Kahan and Braman 2008). Second, risk information and fear-evoking images should be limited and always be combined with messages and information that provide specific, pragmatic help in realizing doable solutions. These solutions must be reasonably effective in reducing the problem, especially together with other solutions being implemented. Importantly, communicators must establish a sense of collective response, especially by people in like social and cultural groups. Moreover, solutions should be broadly consistent with individuals’ personal aspirations, desired social identity, and cultural biases (CRED 2009; Segnit and Ereaut 2007). Finally, given the ideological polarization around responses to climate change (discussed below), the legitimate experience of fear and being overwhelmed, and the deep and lasting societal changes required to address the problem, there is an important place for facilitated dialogue and structured deliberation of the issues as they emerge (Kahan and Braman 2006). Such deliberation has been shown to improve interpersonal knowledge and trust of people with very different values, provide critical social support and affirmation, increase openness to different opinions and risk information, and thus to enable decision making, rather than obstruct it (Nagda 2006).

**Confronting the apocalypse causes social transcendence—it’s the only way to rescue people**

**Wink**, 20**01** [Walter, nqa, “Apocalypse Now?” Christian Century, Oct 17, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1058/is\_28\_118/ai\_79514992 //]

If that were the whole story about apocalyptic, many of us would want nothing to do with it. That is not the whole story, however. There is a positive role for apocalyptic as well as its better-known negative. The positive power of apocalyptic lies in its capacity to force humanity to face threats of unimaginable proportions in order to galvanize efforts at self and social transcendence. Only such Herculean responses can actually rescue people from the threat and make possible the continuation of humanity on the other side. Paradoxically, the apocalyptic warning is intended to remove the apocalyptic threat by acts of apocalyptic transcendence.

### structural violence

#### Warming disproportionately affects developing countries

**Carrington 11** – Head of the environment at The Guardian (Damian, “Map reveals stark divide in who caused climate change and who's being hit”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2011/oct/26/climate-change-developing-country-impacts-risk?CMP=twt\_gu, October 26th, 2011, KTOP)

When the world's nations convene in Durban in November in the latest attempt to inch towards a global deal to tackle climate change, one fundamental principle will, as ever, underlie the negotiations. Is the contention that while rich, industrialized nations caused climate change through past carbon emissions, it is the developing world that is bearing the brunt. It follows from that, developing nations say, that the rich nations must therefore pay to enable the developing nations to both develop cleanly and adapt to the impacts of global warming. The point is starkly illustrated in a new map of climate vulnerability (ommitted): the rich global north has low vulnerability; the poor global south has high vulnerability. The map is produced by risk analysts Maplecroft by combining measures of the risk of climate change impacts, such as storms, floods, and droughts, with the social and financial ability of both communities and governments to cope. The top three most vulnerable nations reflect all these factors: Haiti, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe. But it is not until you go all the way down 103 on the list, out of 193 nations, that you encounter the first major developed nation: Greece. The first 102 nations are all developing ones. Italy is next, at 124, and like Greece ranks relatively highly due to the risk of drought. The UK is at 178 and the country on Earth least vulnerable to climate change, according to Maplecroft, is Iceland. "Large areas of north America and northern Europe are not so exposed to actual climate risk, and are very well placed to deal with it," explains Charlie Beldon, principal analyst at Maplecroft. The vulnerability index has been calculated down to a resolution of 25km2 and Beldon says at this scale the vulnerability of the developing world's fast growing cities becomes clear. "A lot of big cities have developed in exposed areas such as flood plains, such as in south east Asia, and in developing economies they so don't have the capacity to adapt." Of the world's 20 fastest growing cities, six are classified as 'extreme risk' by Maplecroft, including Calcutta in India, Manila in the Philippines, Jakarta in Indonesia and Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh. Addis Ababa in Ethiopia also features. A further 10 are rated as 'high risk' including Guangdong, Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Karachi and Lagos. "Cities such as Manila, Jakarta and Calcutta are vital centres of economic growth in key emerging markets, but heat waves, flooding, water shortages and increasingly severe and frequent storm events may well increase as climate changes takes hold," says Beldon.

### spillover

**finish 1NC**

 **beyond which climate change will be irreversible for millennia** to come.And indeed, President **Obama can do much more**. As described below**, the president can use his foreign affairs power to take a more positive role on the international stage**, **whether that stage is the climate change negotiations, the negotiations concerning other international treaties, or within the World Trade Organization. He can also do more with his executive power**, **not only by increasing existing standards but also by applying them to existing sources of greenhouse gases**, not just new sources. Further, President **Obama has so far failed to take advantage of strategies to mitigate emissions of short-term climate forcers** such as black carbon that could provide significant climate benefits. Lastly, **the approaches adopted so far have not pushed regulated entities or others to develop the transformative technologies that will be needed to deliver sufficient climate change benefits to avert the environmental and economic crisis that lies ahead** if we fail to take more aggressive action.

### threat con

#### extinction threats solve structural violence

Joanna Macy, Adjunct Professor, California Institute for Integral Studies, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: A READER, 2K, p. 243.

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self. It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body. This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

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### Case: Fadel—2NC

#### Morality within Islam requires a commitment to public rationality, reason and pluralism.

Fadel ’07 (Mohammad, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto, The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=977206>)

In substance, I have made the following argument: Islam, as a reasonable theory of the good, is characterized by a hierarchical set of normative discourses that begin with scholastic theology, proceed to moral theology and conclude with substantive law. The normative conclusions set forth in scholastic theology and in moral theology bind primarily the individual conscience, in contrast to the rules of substantive law, which were politically relevant independent of any theological belief in their correspondence to the divine will. It is the essentially political function of Islamic substantive law, combined with the system of normative pluralism legitimated by the epistemology of moral theology, that allowed for the introduction and acceptance of public reason arguments within Islamic law. In addition, the normative discourses of scholastic theology and moral theology required the active participation of rational judgment in order to discharge fundamental moral obligations. In theology, reason was the primary means (and according to some theologians, the only means) by which one could obtain knowledge of God and hence be saved. Similarly, one could not live an ethical life according to Muslim moral theologians without the mediation of reason in the form of qualified moral judgment, even after the advent of revelation. Because of the prominent role reason played in both theological and ethical discourses, this Article argued that a commitment to such discourses necessarily implies, as a political matter, a commitment to a society that provides space for free normative inquiry. Otherwise it would be impossible to discharge the duty of inquiry that is the basis for the greatest good, which is salvation. In addition, because moral theology recognized that it was obligatory to exercise qualified moral judgment in situations where revelation did not provide an express rule, and that it was impossible for qualified moral judgment to achieve certainty on the vast majority of questions, moral theology recognized a “normative pluralism” with respect to matters of ethical rules, either because it was impossible to know which proposed answer was the correct answer, or because all proposed answers were equally correct, in each case, to the extent that the judgment resulted from a valid procedure and diligence in considering the relevant evidence. This feature of Muslim ethical thought also acts to reinforce the political necessity to respect free inquiry, since in its absence individuals could not discharge their duty to exercise qualified moral judgment. Because moral reasoning could not provide definitive rules, Islamic law – those rules that had a political impact because they could be enforced by agents of the state – developed other techniques for rulemaking, namely, *taqlîd* and *siyâsa shar‘iyya*. Unlike the conclusions of moral reasoning, a rule of law could legitimately be enforced without a theological belief that the rule in question was from God. Instead, any rule could potentially become an “Islamic” so long as it did not contradict express commands of revelation. In fashioning a workable legal system, jurists were no doubt influenced by the conclusions of the moral theologians, but a clear distinction between ethical rules, known as rules of obligation, and rules of law in a strict sense, was maintained. It is within this latter body of rules that one finds jurists making arguments that sound in what Rawls calls public reason rather than in theology. Significantly, developments in moral theology legitimated the existence of legal arguments grounded in public reason rather than revelation. Accordingly, al-Ghazali argued that substantive law was in itself entirely instrumental and concerned solely with the just organization of temporal life. Similarly, moral theologians argued that the rules communicated by revelation (at least those not dealing with ritual), even if reason alone could not ascribe them to God prior to the advent of revelation, were rationally connected to human notions of well-being, and accordingly, utility became a legitimate basis for explaining and deriving legal rules. Finally, the fact that moral theologians, in considering the scope of Islamic law, generally refrained from recognizing any political obligation on non-Muslims to obey its terms *except* with respect to those rules that could be justified on a non-religious basis and thus did not require their subjective assent as to whether they are actually rules of God. Because of the centrality of individual inquiry in Islamic salvation theory and in discovering an individual’s ethical obligations, a committed Muslim has very powerful normative reasons within her own tradition for endorsing liberal constitutional essentials as they clearly provide sufficient political space for her to discover those truths necessary for her salvation. Moreover, as this Article has demonstrated, a committed Muslim will not find public reason arguments to be alien to her given the existence of public reason arguments within the Islamic tradition.

### Ext1: No Policy Change

#### Doesn’t produce any change

Rigakos and Law **9** (George, Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University, and Alexandra, Carleton University, “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance”, Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they: query why subversive ‘assertions of self ’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227) Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity. Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class. Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration: [T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes. In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a risk society.

**Focus on discourse sanitizes power structures and doesn’t change anything**

Doug **Stokes**, University of Bristol Politics Department, “Gluing the Hats On: Power, Agency, and Reagan’s Office of Public Diplomacy,” PAPER PRESENTED FOR THE BRITISH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION, 20**01**, http://web.archive.org/web/20060221025303/http://www.aqnt98.dsl.pipex.com/hats.htm.

In her discursive practices approach, Doty argues that more poststructurally inclined questions as to “how” foreign policy is made possible (that is, an examination of the prior conditions of possibility) provides a more nuanced account of foreign policy formation than questions which ask “why” (that is, why a particular decision or policy was pursued). She rightly argues that “why” questions pre-suppose a discursive matrix, a mode of being and a background of social practices. Furthermore, these “why” questions fail to account for “how these meanings, subjects, and interpretative dispositions are constructed”.66 However, in arguing for the superiority of analyses of possibility conditions, she misses a crucial point and simplifies the very nature of the “how” of foreign policy practice. **Whilst it is important to analyse the discursive conditions of possibility of policy formation, in failing to account for how various discourses were employed and through what institutional mechanisms, how some discourses gained ascendancy and not others, and how social actors intervene in hegemonic struggles to maintain various discourses**, Doty seriously compromises the critical potential of her analysis. By working with a notion of power free from any institutional basis and rejecting a notion of power that “social actors possess and use”,67 **she produces a narrative of foreign policy whereby the differential role of social actors is erased from foreign policy processes and decision making.** For Doty it seems, power resides in discourses themselves and their endless production of and play on meaning, not in the ability on the part of those who own and control the means of social reproduction to manipulate dominant social and political discourses and deploy them institutionally and strategically. **The ability to analyse the use of discourses by foreign policy elites for purposeful ends and their ability to deploy hegemonic discourses within foreign policy processes is lost through a delinking of those elites and discursive production (her “dispersed” notion of power).** Furthermore, Doty assumes that the “kind of power that works through social agents, a power that social actors posses and use” is somehow in opposition to a “power that is productive of meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships and a range of imaginable conduct”. But these forms of power are not mutually exclusive. **Social agents can be both subject to discourse and act in instrumental ways to effect discourse precisely through producing meanings and subject identities, and delineating the range of policy options.** Through her erasure of the link between foreign policy processes and purposeful social agents, **she ends up producing an account of hegemonic foreign policy narratives free from any narrator.**68 **This is particularly problematic because the power inherent within representational practices does not necessarily operate independently from the power to deploy those representations. The power to represent, in turn, does not operate independently from differential access to the principal conduits of discursive production, sedimentation and transmission** (for example, the news media).69 **Thus, Doty’s account fails to provide an adequate analysis of the socially constructed interests that constitute the discursive construction of reality.** As Stuart Hall argues “there are centers that operate directly on the formation and constitution of discourse. The media are in that business. Political parties are in that business. When you set the terms in which the debate proceeds, that is an exercise of symbolic power [which] circulates between constituted points of condensation.”**70 The overall critical thrust of poststructurally inclined IR theorists is blunted by both the refusal to examine or even acknowledge the limits and constraints on social discourses and the denial of any linkage** between identity representations and the interests that may infuse these representations.

### util

hough they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and** **refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being** in the decision-making process. Likewise, **a consequentialist** attempts to **act according to reasons that rational creatures can share** by acting according to principles **that give equal weight to everyone's interests**, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask** a deontologically-minded person **why it's wrong to push someone** in front of speeding trolley in order **to save five** others, you will getcharacteristically deontological **answers.** Some **will be tautological:** "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

### T

**Trying to understand the perspectives of others and critically weighing arguments is crucial to create an agonistic public sphere that can check totalitarian violence**

**Roberts-Miller 03** (Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that **the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into** solipsistic and **unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that **in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times**. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)What Arendt so beautifully describes is that **isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality**, unlike isolation, **depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences**. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it **is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical.** This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated **individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality**, who **abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with** disastrous **consequences,** both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, **one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide** of the Jews. **And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their** constant and apparently sincere **insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, **we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined**—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. **Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system**, however, **everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.** It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, **Arendt's solution is the** playful and competitive space of **agonism;** it is not the rational-critical public sphere. **The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new**" ("Truth" 263). According to SeylaBenhabib, **Arendt's public realm emphasizes the** assumption of **competition**, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. **This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim**" (78).**These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments,** of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "**What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process**" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, **it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy,** design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; **advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms** others will make of it. **The situation is agonistic** not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… **Eichmann** perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, **he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it,** especially not from the perspective of the victims, **and he was able to** exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that **he was just following orders**. **It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both**. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. **He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation**" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" **that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems** (Pitkin 87).Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. **Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaus**t—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) **Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.** Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). **I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way,theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors** (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, **"critical thinking,** while still a solitary business, **does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection"** (Lectures 43). Yet, **it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance;** participant

ts are interlocutors **and not just speakers**; they must listen. **Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters**. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; **it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.**Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. **Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks**: "Truth, though powerless and always defeated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. **Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace** it" ("Truth" 259).Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). **The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all**" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) **makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.** Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. **Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that **the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others** (Shape 5; emphasis added).Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, **communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.** Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). **Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead** individuals or communities **to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that **self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing** (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing**, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure tojudge"** ("Truth" 242).**Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions,** rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. **Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few?** Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). **Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral.** It is not an overstatement to say that **a central theme in Arendt's work is the** evil of conformity—**the fact that the modern bureaucratic state** makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. **It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement**" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving**. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism.** And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so **I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying**, on the one hand, **that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric** (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) **is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere.** On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. **Even with** these **flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.**

## 1NR

**Deliberation outweighs—solves multiple existential threats**

Christian O. **Lundberg**, Associate Professor, Communication, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina,” NAVIGATING OPPORTUNITY: POLICY DEBATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY ed. A.D.Louden, 20**10**, p. 311+.

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But **the democratic capacities built by debate are** not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for **critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and** better **public judgment.** If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a **high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate** provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds** precisely the **skills that allow** the citizenry to **research** and be informed **about** policy **decisions that impact them, to** sort through and **evaluate** the **evidence for** and relative merits of **arguments** for and against a policy **in an increasingly information-rich environment,** and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing **democratic deliberative capacities. The** unique **combination of critical thinking** skills, research and **info**rmation **processing** skills, oral communication skills, **and capacities for** listening and **thoughtful, open engagement** with hotly contested issues **argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich** and vital **democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and** serves as an **unmatched** practice f**or creating** thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and **self-critical students** who are **open to** the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. **Democracy faces** a myriad of **challenges, including**: domestic and international issues of **class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for rapid **climate change**; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. **More than any specific** policy or **proposal,** an informed and active **citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides** one of **the best hopes for** responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.